§ III. On the Vices Opposed to Charity toward Neighbor

The chief ones are hatred, envy, quarrel, scandal, and cooperation in the sins of others. We shall speak only of the two latter, since concerning the others treatment has already been made above, or is to be made in the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing to someone an occasion of spiritual ruin. - I said 1st, a saying or deed, under which name omission also is understood. - I said 2nd, less right, that is, what is either evil in itself or has the appearance of evil. I said 3rd, furnishing an occasion, because the proper cause of sin is the will of the one acting. - I said 4th, of spiritual ruin, which can be grave or light; for by this name sin is understood, whether mortal or venial. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 43, art. 1; and de Verit., q. 15, art. 1.

Scandal is divided: 1st, into direct and indirect, according as the evil action of another is intended in itself, or only in a cause by which one's neighbor is incited to sin; 2nd, into active and passive, according as the saying or deed itself which furnishes an incitement or occasion of sin is considered, or rather the incitement itself already taken up.

But two things are to be noted here:

1st. Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is formally intended. But if the spiritual ruin of another is not intended, but only one's own utility or pleasure, it is called simply direct.

2nd. Any scandal whatsoever can be active or given, without being passive or accepted; because an action apt of itself for scandal can be posited, without one's neighbor taking from it an occasion of spiritual ruin. And vice versa there can be accepted scandal, without its being given; but in that case scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of another, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal or admits it without foundation. If it is taken up from weakness or ignorance, it is called scandal of the little ones; but if it arises from the mere malice of the subject, it is called pharisaical. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43.

I Say 1st. Scandal, even indirect, is a grave sin from its genus, because from its genus it is opposed by commission to charity, since it is directly opposed to fraternal correction: for this draws one's neighbor away from sin, but that on the contrary draws him to sinning. Wherefore besides the proper malice of the action, which is called scandalous, there is had the specific malice of scandal, by which charity is injured. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 43, art. 3.

I Say 2nd. Scandal of the little ones or of the weak is to be avoided whenever it can be done without grave inconvenience, by omission both of an indifferent work and also of a good work not prescribed. The reason is that by charity we are bound to impede the ruin of our neighbor who needs our help, when we easily can, for example, by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc.; but the little ones need help, since because of ignorance or weakness they are placed in a certain spiritual necessity. Therefore. - But St. Thomas well observes that scandal of the little ones after admonition for the most part becomes pharisaical. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. cited, art. 7.

I Say 3rd. Pharisaical or malicious scandal, at least ordinarily, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work or by omission even of an indifferent work not having the appearance of evil. The reason is that those suffering scandal from their malice alone are not in a necessity from which they cannot easily free themselves without the help of another, and otherwise a place would be given to the wicked for impeding good works whenever they wished.

Question 1. In scandal is there had not only a sin against charity, but also against the virtue to violating which one's neighbor is induced?

Response. Affirmatively, as to direct scandal; for any virtue specially forbids not only that it be violated, but also that someone directly induce another to violate it. But as to indirect scandal there is much dispute, but the negative opinion which Lugo defends with others seems probable. The reason is both that virtues do not oblige us to impede the opposite vices in others, but only not to induce our neighbor positively and directly to violate them; and that otherwise he who by his example moves another to steal would be bound to restitution, which the Doctors most commonly deny. In this opinion it is enough that the penitent express generally the sin of scandal, without being bound to add the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is it necessary to express circumstances which perhaps add a species to the sins of others, for example, whether those who are induced to lust by foul speech are married or bound by vow, etc. Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 159. - Baller., note (b), p. 207.

Question 2. Are precepts sometimes to be omitted on account of scandal of the little ones?

Response. Negatively, as to negative precepts of natural law, because these oblige always and for always, and works contrary to them are intrinsically evil. But affirmative precepts, because these do not oblige for always, it is sometimes licit and indeed necessary to omit, for example, the precept of correcting sinners, if graver ruin is to be feared from it; or rather it must be said that then the law itself ceases. As to positive human precepts, there is controversy. The more probable opinion affirms, excluding grave inconvenience, because the precept of avoiding scandal to one's neighbor, as being natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone, if she goes to the prescribed Mass, is bound to omit it once or twice, if there is hope that afterward the scandal will cease; but not several times, on account of the grave inconvenience which would result from it. But because the negative opinion is also probable, a burden concerning which there is no certainty must not be imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51. - Baller., note (a) and (b), p. 206.

Question 3. Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

Response. Negatively, ordinarily speaking, because charity toward neighbor does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he will blaspheme; for that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur rather often, and thus easily becomes grave; nay, it could rather often be an incitement to blaspheming. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

Question 4. Must one sinning with an accomplice declare in confession the circumstance of solicitation?

Response. Negatively, more probably, provided either from the nature of the sin, or from the mode in which the sin is accused, the confessor sufficiently understands that some accomplice was present. The reason is that by the simple communion of crime it is effected that there was mutual scandal, and indeed active on each side, between the one soliciting and the one consenting, and therefore, once that has been declared, the sin of scandal also is declared. But that one of the accomplices placed the cause of scandal before the other is a merely aggravating circumstance, which does not change the species of sin. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46.

Question 5. Is it licit to persuade someone determined upon a greater evil to a lesser evil?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably with St. Alphonsus. Yet some limit this if the lesser evil is contained in some way in the greater, as beating in homicide, etc.; which limitation, however, does not seem necessary to the Holy Doctor. Certain other theologians, as, for example, Cardinal de Lugo, posit another limitation, namely provided that to one willing to inflict greater harm on one person, you do not persuade lesser harm to be inflicted on another. But others deny that this limitation also is required. - But the reason of the solution is that this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that a greater sin not be committed; from which it happens that he from whom a robber steals what is less is not reasonably unwilling concerning him who gave the counsel. - Cf. Vasquez, Opuscul. de scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14. - Baller., note (b), p. 208.

Thence you conclude that if someone persuades another to inflict a lesser harm so that a greater evil may be avoided, he is not bound to restitution: not by reason of a thing received, because he has received nothing; not by reason of unjust damaging, because by his counsel he rather usefully managed the matter of another. Nor is the one giving counsel bound to restitution who has brought help to another, for example, to a robber, because he manages the master's matter usefully. And this conclusion is of very grave moment, namely lest an obligation of restitution be imposed where there truly is none. Sanchez, de Matr., l. 7, disp. 11, nn. 17, 18; De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, disp. 19, n. 44.

Question 6. Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning so that the guilty person may be corrected?

Response. Affirmatively, because to permit is not to induce, and often there is a sufficient reason for permitting sin. Hence parents and masters are of themselves to be excused from sin who allow sons or servants to sin, in order that they may find an opportune place of correcting them. Indeed it is licit also, at least probably, to place an occasion of sin, provided the act is indifferent, and a just cause is present for placing it. Hence a master ought to be excused from sin who, deliberately, leaves the key attached to the chest in which money is stored, in order to test the doubtful fidelity of a servant; but in no way can a father be excused who keeps a prostitute at home, in order that he may take an experiment of his son's chastity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 58.

Note. - From the doctrine handed down thus far, all cases concerning scandal could already be solved, but because of special difficulties it will be useful to say something in particular concerning luxury, bad books, dances, and spectacles.

Concerning Luxury. To do, represent, or display those things which notably provoke to lust is indeed most grave scandal; because no subtler poison can be offered to the soul. Hence those are guilty of most grave scandal: 1st, who represent shameful things in plays or other assemblies; 2nd, who compose or sing shameful songs or poems; 3rd, who make or expose obscene statues or images; 4th, who seduce pupils entrusted to them by bad examples, etc. But especially attention must be given to the following.

Question 1. Does a woman sin gravely by displaying nudities on the breast and arms?

Response. Affirmatively, if the nudity is immoderate or very notable, notwithstanding any contrary custom whatsoever. But if it is not so immoderate, custom will easily excuse from grave sin, because it notably diminishes the force of concupiscence, since things customary excite the imagination less. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 55.

Question 2. What is to be said concerning women's adornment and cosmetics?

Response. The doctrine of St. Thomas concerning this matter is reduced to the following heads: 1st, women sin mortally if they adorn themselves with the intention of provoking to lust; 2nd, but venially, if they do this merely from vanity, levity, or boasting; 3rd, to wear superfluous adornment is only a venial fault from its genus; 4th, there is no sin of itself if the custom of the country and condition of state is observed; 5th, women licitly add something of adornment, so that they may please husbands either whom they have or whom they ought to receive; 6th, cosmetics will be mortal if they are applied for lasciviousness; venial, if merely to feign beauty; but none, if to hide some defect. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 169, art. 1 and 2; and Comm. in Isai., chap. 4. - Baller., note (a), p. 210.

Question 3. Is it licit to rent a house to prostitutes?

Response. Affirmatively, probably, especially if there are not other renters present, or if it is easy for the prostitutes to obtain another house. Yet except the case if the prostitutes gravely harm honest neighbors, or by the location of the dwelling furnish a greater occasion for sinning. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 70.

Question 4. What is to be said concerning the exposure of images along public ways, as is accustomed to be done among us by merchants?

Response. Often exposure of this kind is gravely scandalous, for those images sometimes, both because they are painted with more vivid colors and because they display immoderate nudities, gravely move the imagination and entice to sin. Nor should you say that scandal is not intended, because those images are exposed only either for showing the art, or for attracting buyers; for the response is that an end, even if good, can never be obtained by illicit means.

Concerning Bad Books. Among every kind of scandals, none is more execrable than that which is produced from impious and obscene books. This is the most dreadful plague of all, because it infects not one region or age only, but is diffused to all places and times. Therefore the reading, printing, and spreading of books altogether opposed to faith and morals is never to be permitted, even independently of the positive prohibition concerning which there will be discussion in the tract on censures. Wherefore altogether wisely the Fathers of the Third Council of Baltimore, after they had bitterly complained about the abuse of the excellent art of typography, warn pastors of souls, confessors, and preachers with most grave words concerning the obligation of keeping the faithful away from the reading of bad books. - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 224 and following.

Question 1. Can books which are partly good, partly bad, be committed to type?

Response. Negatively, generally speaking, unless they have been accurately purged; otherwise, however, if the danger to be feared from them is not so grave, and this seems to be compensated by a great utility to be taken from them. But printers should diligently ask learned and experienced men, especially ecclesiastical superiors, what is to be done in doubtful matters.

Question 2. Can bad books sometimes be sold?

Response. They can in no way be sold indiscriminately, namely to any buyer, as is clear. Yet sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men, who can read books of this kind usefully, for example, to refute them, etc. Except books altogether obscene, which are to be rooted out completely. The same, with proportion observed, is to be said concerning donation or rental of the same books.

Question 3. Can books of this kind be returned to the owner who has rented them?

Response. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience suggests otherwise. This flows of itself from the principles handed down above. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this kind from the owner. Slight sadness, or even fear of dissolving friendship, certainly would not be judged a reason, at least for the most part, for returning bad books to a friend.

Concerning Dances. Dances of themselves are not illicit, if they are done in an honorable manner, that is, with every immodest touch, gesture, or act removed; for dances of themselves are acts of gladness, and are prohibited by no law. But by reason of nudities, the manner of dancing, words, gestures, and songs, dances can become gravely illicit. But as to the fact, among dances gravely illicit certain more recent dances which among us are called round dances are reckoned by some. - Yet since, the case of a special prohibition always excluded, the malice of these dances consists only in danger, which is essentially relative, and therefore diverse for diverse persons, it will belong to the confessor to judge concerning particular cases. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de sexto praec. Decal., n. 429.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Those who are so weak that they undergo grave danger of sinning in dances even honorable ones must abstain from them under mortal sin; unless perhaps sometimes a certain necessity presses, and then, at least probably, proximate danger of consent is absent.

2nd. To be present at honorable dances, even without necessity, excluding however danger and notable scandal, and to dance decently in them, not only is not mortal, but can easily also be free of every sin. For there are found sometimes men, and not rarely women, to whom no danger or only very remote danger threatens. Although these persons are to be dissuaded from dances, nevertheless a promise of avoiding dances would be demanded from them altogether imprudently.

3rd. To legitimate the practice of those confessors who indiscriminately deny absolution to all those who lead dances commonly called among us round dances, it is not valid to say that those dances were condemned by the Fathers of Baltimore. For when the Baltimore Fathers name the aforesaid dances in the Pastoral Letters, they do not impose a precept, but only furnish an admonition. But when they speak more severely in Decree 472, they not only make no mention of those dances in particular, but neither do they impose a precept on all the faithful, and they require only that pastors of souls "attack immodest dances and condemn them altogether." - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 472, and the Pastoral Letters, n. x.

4th. Nor did the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore properly condemn any dances whatsoever, or even the aforesaid dances, when in n. 290 they imposed the following precept: "We command also that priests take care that the abuse by which banquets are prepared with dances (balls) for promoting pious works be altogether removed."

5th. Generally speaking, it is not expedient publicly in preaching to reprehend certain dances by name, because the preacher would accomplish nothing, indeed perhaps he would entice some persons to them. It is rather expedient to act indirectly against dances, and directly against the sins which are accustomed to be committed in them.

6th. Generally speaking, dances with masks (masked balls) are illicit and altogether to be condemned, because experience establishes that they incline very much to lust, from the fact that they suppress modesty, which is the guardian of decency.

7th. Certain very recent dances have seemed gravely indecent to many; hence because of the dangers connected with them, especially young persons of either sex are generally to be kept away from them altogether. Wherever there is a special prohibition, there indeed they are in no way to be permitted. It is wholly clear that the holding of them must never be favored. But when the confessor encounters particular cases, let him judge concerning them according to the circumstances of the singular case.

Sacred Consistorial Congregation. Decree concerning certain dances in the United States of North America and in the Canadian region. - In the last century, in the Federated States of North America, there had begun a custom of calling together Catholic families to dances which were accustomed to be prolonged for many hours of the night with banquets and other recreations. The reason and cause of this thing was given, namely that Catholics might mutually know one another and be united more intimately by bonds of love and charity, and at the same time that subsidies necessary for this or that pious work might be procured. But those who were accustomed to announce these gatherings and preside over them were for the most part presidents of some pious work, and not rarely rectors of churches themselves or pastors. But the Ordinaries of the places, although they did not doubt concerning the right end of those who promoted these dances, nevertheless, perceiving the harms and dangers of the introduced practice, judged that it belonged to their office to proscribe them; and therefore in can. 290 of the Plenary Council of Baltimore they established these things: "We command also that priests take care that the abuse by which banquets are prepared with dances (balls) for promoting pious works be altogether removed." But, as often happens in human affairs, those things which had most justly and wisely been commanded from the beginning gradually began to come into oblivion, and the use of dances again to prevail, indeed also to be diffused into the neighboring region of the Canadian dominion. Knowing these things, the Most Eminent Fathers of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, having heard several Ordinaries of the places, and with the matter subjected to examination with much study, judged that one must altogether stand by the sanctions established by the Third Council of Baltimore: and, with the approval of Our Most Holy Lord Benedict XV, Pope, they decreed that all priests, whether secular or regular, and other clerics, are altogether prohibited from promoting and fostering the mentioned dances, even if for the relief and subsidy of pious works, or for any other pious end; and moreover that all clerics are forbidden from being present at these dances, if perhaps they are promoted by laymen. But the Supreme Pontiff commanded that this decree be made public law and be observed religiously by all, anything whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding. Given at Rome, from the buildings of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, on the day of March 31, 1916.

To a certain Ordinary asking: Whether the dances of which the decree of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation of March 31, 1916 treats, and which the same Sacred Congregation proscribed, are sometimes licit, or are not comprehended in the reprobation, if they are held during daytime hours, or only in the first hours of the night, and are not too greatly prolonged, or even if they are held without banquets or by that method which commonly is accustomed to be called picnic? The Sacred Congregation responded: "They are comprehended in the reprobation: and therefore all clerics are prohibited from promoting them, even in the mentioned circumstances, and if they are promoted by others, they are prohibited from being present at them." Sacred Consistorial Congregation, Dec. 10, 1917.

Concerning Spectacles. Concerning spectacles nearly the same thing is to be held as concerning dances, namely that they are not illicit of themselves, but can become evil because of circumstances. The reason is that they are opposed to no law, neither natural nor positive. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 168, art. 3.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He does not sin mortally who, scandal being set aside, is present at a play not gravely shameful, unless perhaps he knows by experience that he is vehemently moved by games of this kind toward lust with proximate danger of consent, so that the spectacle is for him a proximate occasion of sinning. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de sexto praec. Decal., n. 427.

2nd. If in plays things notably shameful were represented, or in a shameful manner, it would indeed be mortal to watch them on account of delight arising from the shameful things themselves; but venial on account of curiosity only or vain enjoyment, excluding however danger of consent in shameful delight, which will easily be present in adolescents, or in others of little timorous conscience, and unless scandal is present; and it would plainly be present if clerics or religious were present at shameful plays. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid. and Hom. Ap., tract. 9, n. 10.

3rd. Deservedly, because of the scandal of others, both those who by money or applause cooperate in notably shameful plays are condemned of mortal sin, and those also who are bound to impede them and, when they conveniently can, do not impede them; but a fortiori those who represent them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. But insofar as it can be opposed to charity, it is a certain participation in the evil action of another. Cooperation is distinguished in many ways; for it is: 1st, immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator acts with the sinner in the very act of sin, or posits other actions having some connection with the sin of another; 2nd, proximate or remote, according as the action of the cooperator is connected more closely or more remotely with the evil action of another; 3rd, positive or negative, according as the cooperator either posits some action influencing the sin of another, for example, by helping him, or omits a due act, for example, if he does not obstruct, when he ought to obstruct; 4th, formal or material: the former concurs with the evil will of another, and participates in his evil action insofar as it is evil; the latter concurs only with the action, insofar as it is something physical and indifferent, abstracting from the end and malice of the principal agent.

Cooperation is made chiefly in nine ways, namely by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising, furnishing recourse, participating in the action or profit, by being silent, by not obstructing, by not manifesting. Hence the verses:

Command, counsel, consent, praise, recourse, One participating, mute, not obstructing, not manifesting.

Formal cooperation is never licit; but material cooperation can become licit if there is present a just cause proportioned to the gravity of the sin of another and to the proximity of the concurrence to the execution of the sin. The reason of the first is taken from the very definition of formal cooperation. But the reason of the second is that, when you cooperate only materially, you do not contract the malice of the action itself, for this is supposed to be good or indifferent; nor do you sin by virtue of any evil intention whatsoever, because this must be wholly absent; nor finally do you become guilty by virtue of the sin of another, because if he wishes to abuse your cooperation for executing sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it, and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, when a just and proportionate cause intervenes, you are excused from every sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 63.

From the application of this principle all solutions concerning cooperation must be gathered. But this application, if it is considered speculatively, appears easy; but practically speaking, nothing in all moral theology is more difficult. For often it can scarcely be determined whether cooperation is formal or material, which indeed would always have to be determined in the first place. Then, once it is posited that it is known that cooperation in some case is only material, it does not follow from that that it is in fact licit, but only that it can be licit if the aforesaid required conditions have place. Now the verification of those conditions cannot be known from some physical mark of discernment or scale, but from rules of prudence and discretion, the application of which has always been difficult. Wherefore we add here several particular solutions, so that they may be an example for obtaining other similar ones.

As Regards Servants. - Question 1.

Is it licit for a servant to bring wine to the table, by which the master and guests will become drunk, or to prepare and serve meats on days of abstinence?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably as to each; for on the one hand cooperation of this kind seems certainly material, and on the other a servant could scarcely refuse those and other services of this kind without at the same time being bound to refuse any service whatever, at least among us, which certainly imports a grave inconvenience. Add that often it is difficult to foresee excess in drink or to know certainly that no reason or dispensation is had for eating meats. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 68 and 69. - Kenrick, n. 137.

Question 2. Is it ever licit for a servant to put his shoulders under, or to carry a ladder for, a master climbing up to fornicate, to open a door by force, and similar things?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably, because these actions are indifferent of themselves, at least in relation to fornication, and the whole malice is held on the part of the master requiring them. But the sole reason of service, or fear of any notable detriment whatsoever, does not suffice for excusing, but fear of death, mutilation, or similar most grave harm is required. The reason is taken not only from the condemnation of the proposition to be cited immediately, but also from the proximity of the influence which cooperation has upon the sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 66 and 68. - Kenrick, n. 141.

Question 3. Can a maidservant open the door of the house to a prostitute?

Response. The Doctors more commonly affirm, and very many excuse her by the sole reason of service, but not when another who would open is lacking. - But other theologians contend that it is never licit to open the door to a prostitute, and they rely on the following proposition, which is the 51st condemned by Innocent XI: "The servant who, with shoulders placed under, knowingly helps his master to climb through windows to violate a virgin, and many times subserves him by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable detriment, for instance lest he be badly treated by the master, lest he be looked upon with fierce eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." - But these words, opening a door, manifestly ought to be understood of opening by force the house of another, as is clear from the context. Cf. Viva on this proposition. - St. Alphonsus, n. 66. - Kenrick, n. 140.

Question 4. Can a servant by reason of service saddle a horse for a man about to go forth to sin, or accompany him?

Response. Affirmatively, probably, if the servant only saddles the horse, because in this he does not seem to cooperate more with the sin of the master than if he should hand shoes or a hat to him when he is going to leave the house. But according to St. Alphonsus it would not be permitted to him to accompany his master to the place where the sin is to be perpetrated, unless he must incur some grave harm. But there are not lacking grave theologians who indeed require some other grave harm in the case in which the master would not go to sin without the servant, because then the cooperation would be more necessary and therefore more proximate; but if another servant would not be lacking, or the master would go equally without the servant, then they teach that the sole reason of service suffices for accompanying him. Yet all make exception for the case in which the master would be rendered more emboldened for sinning by the servant accompanying him, because then the cooperation would be formal, which is never licit.

Applying this solution to another similar case, we can say that it is licit for a coachman to carry someone to a brothel by the sole reason of service or of the fare accepted, since, if he refused, another coachman would not be lacking. Yet he seems to cooperate formally who would lead someone ignorant of where the brothel is to that place, or would furnish his work for carrying him there more secretly and safely. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 64. - Kenrick, n. 137. - Baller., note (b), p. 218. Revue des sciences ecclés., vol. 9, p. 161.

Question 5. Is it licit for a servant to write or transmit letters inciting to shameful things, or to carry gifts to a prostitute?

Response. It indeed seems never to be licit to write or transmit letters of this kind, when what they contain is known, because to utter shameful things or suggest them to another is intrinsically evil. - But if in those letters it is said only that the prostitute should wait at such a place, should come to the house at such an hour, or something else of this kind, then the malice is held only on the part of the agent, and therefore the cooperation would be only material, which, a proportionate cause being posited, can be excused. The same must be said concerning the transmission of gifts, which is not evil except from the intention and end of the master. Thus it seems that what is taught in diverse ways by different authors concerning a servant carrying love letters or gifts must be explained. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 219, and note (a), p. 220. - Revue des sciences ecclés., loc. cit., pp. 158 and following.

As Regards Workmen. - Question 1.

Is it licit for workmen to build temples of heretics?

Response. Negatively, if this is demanded by heretics in hatred of religion; but otherwise in another hypothesis, when a just cause presses, excluding however scandal, which among us scarcely has place.

Question 2. Is it licit to make statues of false gods?

Response. Affirmatively, if these are not to be employed for false worship, but for the ornament of streets, buildings, etc.; but otherwise, if they are to be handed over to a pagan. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 69.

Question 3. Is it sometimes licit to cooperate in publishing bad books?

Response. It is licit for a grave cause to cooperate mediately or remotely, for example, to prepare ink or paper or arrange printed books. But to cooperate immediately in the printing of such books, for example, to arrange the type, to direct the printing, etc., generally speaking, does not seem licit. I said generally speaking, because in a case of most grave detriment, for a brief time, Laymann indicates that some such thing can be furnished materially, de Caritate, chap. 13, n. 5.

Question 4. What is to be said concerning the cooperation of clerks among bankers?

Response. Kenrick has this: "Clerks among bankers are not bound to judge concerning their manner of acting whether it is just; nor are they considered to concur effectively in fraud, if perhaps there is any, since they furnish a bare ministry according to defined rules. Otherwise one must speak if they themselves persuaded others to sell promissory notes at an unjust price, or if they compose accounts falsely for fraud." - Cf. Kenrick, n. 154.

Question 5. Is it licit for a Catholic to make masonic signs?

Response. Negatively, unless there is a truly grave cause.

As Regards Merchants. - Question 1.

Is it licit for merchants to sell dice, swords, cosmetics, women's adornments, etc., when future abuse is foreseen?

Response. Affirmatively, because a sale of this kind is not evil of itself, since those things are indifferent, and can be turned to a good use. Therefore the only reason for doubting is taken from the foreseen sin of the buyer, which charity obliges you to impede. But charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, and this could easily be present, especially among us, if merchants, suspecting or even certainly foreseeing future abuse, refused to sell to someone in particular wares exposed to all and indifferent of themselves. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 71. - Baller., note (a), p. 223.

Question 2. Is it licit to sell poison?

Response. Affirmatively, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it badly; the reason is that today poisonous potions or herbs are employed for many effects, either good or indifferent, and therefore it can easily be presumed that poison is not bought for perpetrating evil. But the answer is otherwise if it is a question of the sale of those instruments (male protectors) which today are frequently employed for sinning more freely.

As Regards Innkeepers. - Question 1.

Is it licit for innkeepers to give liquors to those who are foreseen as about to make themselves drunk?

Response. It is not licit without a grave reason, as is clear. But it is licit on account of fear of some grave harm, for example, acts of violence, quarrels, etc. ...; because charity does not oblige us to turn another away from sin with grave inconvenience. Likewise for preventing blasphemies, which are graver evils. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 69.

Question 2. How must one act with innkeepers who admit dances in their buildings, so that they may attract more guests?

Response. Generally they are to be turned away from this insofar as can be done, because dances, especially those which are held in an inn, for the most part are done less honorably and furnish an occasion to many sins. Nevertheless absolution is not always to be denied to them, but the circumstances and the ordinary manner in which those dances are held must be considered.

Question 3. Is it licit for masters of inns to propose any public journals whatsoever to be read by guests?

Response. They cannot admit those which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to religion and good morals, even if guests cease to flow to them on that account. Yet they can admit all those which treat of merely political matters. Nor do they seem bound to reject some journal because it sometimes contains something less right against the faith, provided it is not generally opposed to religion.

As Regards Nuns and Other Catholics Serving the Sick. - Question 4. Is it licit for them to call a heretical minister to one dying?

Response. To call spontaneously a heretical minister, so that he may furnish the dying person with the consolations of religion, is illicit on account of forbidden communication in divine things. For the same reason it is illicit for nuns having care of the sick in a hospital to comply with the custom of a dying heretic asking the help of a minister of his sect, as the Holy Office responded in a particular case on March 14, 1848. The decree is as follows:

"D. Evens ... humbly sets forth that in the city of Neutz ... there exists a hospital, of which he himself is Rector and Chaplain, and in which Nuns have the care of the sick. ... But since in this hospital followers of a non-Catholic religion are from time to time received, and the same repeatedly ask for a heretical minister from whom they may receive the aids and consolations of religion, it is asked whether it is licit for the aforesaid nuns to call a minister of false religion? It is asked moreover whether the same solution is to be given where a sick heretic stays in the private house of a certain Catholic; namely whether then the Catholic can licitly call a heretical minister?

"Response. According to the things set forth, it is not licit; and according to the mind." The mind is, "that they conduct themselves passively." In the Declaration to the Vicar Apostolic of Egypt of February 5, 1872 the sense of the words they conduct themselves passively is explained: "The mind of the Most Eminent Fathers is that the Prelate Orator be notified that to Nuns or other Catholic persons assigned to the direction or service of the Hospital, it is not licit to furnish their work directly to non-Catholic sick persons for calling their own minister, and it will be well if, when the occasion has been given, they declare this; but the Most Eminent Fathers add that for calling the minister the ministry of some person belonging to the respective sect of those asking can be employed. And thus the doctrine remains intact with relation to forbidden communication in divine things." This Leo XIII approved on Dec. 26, 1898. Cf. Analecta Ecclesiastica, year 7, pp. 98, 99, where you will find the Declaration rendered into Latin. But if no non-Catholic is present, it is illicit for Catholics to call the minister, so that he may perform his heretical rites. But to say to the minister: this sick person wishes that you visit him, seems licit on account of a most grave reason, for example, on account of hatred against the Church and other harms otherwise going to arise. Cf. Genicot, vol. 1, n. 201. Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, n. 652.

It Must Be Noted. "In hospital ... X ... whose ownership belongs to the Sisters of the Congregation of S. N., the Superior is anxious: 1. Whether she ought to inquire into the doctors by questioning them themselves or by another means, whether they rightly observe the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition of May 4, 1898, with its declaration of March 5, 1902. The reason for the doubt is that practicing doctors are chosen by the Sisters. 2. Or whether it suffices that they choose conscientious doctors, to whom they leave both the manner of proceeding and the responsibility, without themselves inquiring." The Sacred Penitentiary responded to the proposed doubts: To 1 ... Negatively. To 2 ... Affirmatively, nor is the Superior bound to obstruct the work of such doctors, unless in the case in which their intention of prevaricating will evidently betray itself. Sacred Penitentiary, July 7, 1911. - Nouvelle Rev. Théol., v. 44, p. 35.