The Causes of Sin

322. Notions. 1. Temptation is the attempt to draw the will over to sin. Temptation arises from this, that an object, some good, prohibited by law is proposed to the will: for this attempts to move the will to consent.

a. Temptation is called grave if the will is vehemently incited by an object prohibited under grave obligation to embrace it; and it is called light if the will is incited to embrace it by an object prohibited under light obligation, or by an object prohibited under grave obligation but only lightly.

b. Temptation is called internal if, once an evil object has been proposed, the appetite is inclined to embrace it; it is called external if only the evil object is proposed, without the appetite being excited to embrace it.

2. The frequency of temptations varies according to diverse internal and external circumstances of persons; nevertheless no one is altogether immune from them, because no one can escape the causes of temptations unless he goes out of this world. Christ the Lord must be excepted, in whom internal temptation was impossible, and the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom the grace of God preserved immune from internal temptation. The ascetics show at length that temptation in itself is not evil, but a good of great moment for the spiritual life.¹

¹ Hense, Die Versuchungen^3 (Freiburg: Herder, 1902). Scaramelli-Winkler, Geistlicher Fuhrer (Regensburg: Verlagsanstalt, 1901). Monsabre-Drammer, Die Versuchung (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1892).

323. The causes of temptations are numbered as three, of which the first, concupiscence, is internal, and the other two, the world and the devil, are external.

1. Concupiscence. a. By the name concupiscence here is understood the sensitive appetite insofar as it is borne also toward sensible goods which are contrary to the moral order.

a. Having arisen from original sin, it remains even in the justified and consists in a positive inclination toward evil. It is not sin; nevertheless it is the most abundant source of sins, because it allures the will to sin. Therefore it is called the fomes of sin by the Council of Trent.¹

b. Acts of concupiscence allure the will to sin in two ways: indirectly, through influence on the intellect, whose judgment concerning the malice of a good so pleasant to the senses is disturbed; directly, through influence on the will, which on account of the connection of the powers is drawn to willing the same thing toward which the sensitive appetite is borne.

c. The force and vehemence of temptation, and therefore the gravity of the danger of sinning, depends on the nature of the thing toward which concupiscence is borne, on the greater or lesser clarity and vivacity with which it is represented, on the greater or lesser intensity of the act of concupiscence, and finally on the weakness of the will, which can be greatly increased in the concrete by natural character and the habit of sinning.

b. Concupiscence is the primary and principal source of temptations: Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence.² The goods prohibited by law toward which concupiscence is borne are of a threefold genus, and according as it is borne toward these goods, there is distinguished in it a threefold respect, which Sacred Scripture indicates: All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh and concupiscence of the eyes and pride of life.³

2. The world. a. Insofar as the world designates the complex of corporeal things, it tempts in this, that it represents sensible goods to the appetite by means of the senses and allures it to embrace them, even if they are prohibited by law.

b. Insofar as the world signifies men alien from God, who profess perverse principles and, indulging their passions, live in sins, it tempts: a. by its principles contrary to the doctrine of Christ, which are disseminated among men both by voice and by writings; b. by its perverse works, by which, as also by conversations, it is a scandal, and excites others to follow evil examples.

3. The devil. a. That the devil incites men to sin is a most certain fact from Sacred Scripture: for he tempted to sin not only the first parents,⁴ but also Job,⁵ Ananias and Sapphira,⁶ the apostles,⁷ and especially Judas,⁸ indeed even the divine Savior;⁹ whence the apostles solicitously admonish us to beware of the temptations of the demon.¹⁰

b. Since the devil cannot act directly and immediately on the human will and draw it to sin, he tempts in this: a. he excites representations in the senses, whether external or internal, alluring toward prohibited goods; b. he imbues the mind with illusions, that death is still remote, passions impose necessity, sins are easily remitted, virtue is too arduous, man cannot be without the pleasures of life, etc.; c. he disturbs the soul with scruples, thoughts of hatred, lust, despair, human respect, etc.

c. Although, as Scripture witnesses, every sin took its beginning from the devil,¹¹ all sins of men proceed from him in some way, he is named the prince of this world,¹² and sins are called his works,¹³ nevertheless the intervention of the devil is necessary neither for every sin nor for all temptations; for concupiscence and the free will of man also suffice for effecting these. In fact, however, the devil is rather often the author of temptations, especially of those which are more troublesome and arise without another cause that is known, e.g. during prayer. The power of tempting in the devil is not absolute, but subordinated to divine providence. Therefore he cannot tempt except when God, by permitting, wills, and as much as he wills.

Note. Although in the Sacred Scriptures God is said to tempt men,¹⁴ nevertheless he himself must not be numbered among the causes of temptations, because he incites no one to sin nor can he incite.¹⁵ The temptations of which God is author are temptations of proving, not of seduction:¹⁶ for he does not himself send these temptations, but only permits them, nor does he permit them beyond strength, and with the temptation he will also make the outcome.¹⁷

¹ Sess. 5, can. 5.

² Jas. 1, 14.

³ 1 John 2, 16.

⁴ Gen. 3, 1-6; 2 Cor. 11, 3.

⁵ Job 1, 12.

⁶ Acts 5, 3.

⁷ Luke 22, 31.

⁸ John 13, 2.

⁹ Matt. 4, 3 ff.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 7, 5; Eph. 5, 11 ff.; 1 Pet. 5, 8 ff.

¹¹ 1 John 3, 8.

¹² John 12, 31.

¹³ 1 John 3, 8.

¹⁴ Gen. 22, 1.

¹⁵ Jas. 1, 13.

¹⁶ 2 Cor. 12, 7 ff.; Gen. 22, 1 ff.; Job 1, 12; Tob. 2, 12.

¹⁷ 1 Cor. 10, 13.

324. On the resistance to be opposed to temptations.¹

a. It is clear that neither the world nor the devil can tempt man unless they excite motions of concupiscence through the senses; wherefore the only source of temptations properly is concupiscence. Now it is asked how the will ought to have itself concerning motions of concupiscence after the mind has fully adverted to them.

b. If consent is prescinded from, the will can have itself toward these motions in a threefold way: a. it is said to have itself negatively or passively or indifferently if it does not consent, but neither applies any means to repress them; b. it is said to resist positively, but indirectly, if it applies means to suppress them, but does not elicit a contrary act; c. it is said to resist directly if it elicits contrary acts. Now it is asked whether there is an obligation of positively resisting depraved motions, whether therefore sin is committed not only through consent to the depraved motion but also through omission of positive resistance.

1. It is not licit to have oneself merely passively toward these motions unless there is a just cause; rather, positive resistance must be opposed to them. a. For motions of this kind cast one into danger of consenting to them, which danger is increased the more the longer they are deliberately admitted; hence the greater the danger of consenting to depraved motions, the graver is the obligation of repressing them. b. If a reasonable cause for omitting resistance is present, the help of grace, by which consent may be prevented, can deservedly be hoped for, provided the firm purpose of the will not to consent to sin is retained.

a. A just cause for having oneself merely passively is present: a. where the motions arise from an honorable and useful action; b. where it is deservedly feared that from positive resistance they may become more vehement, and on the contrary experience establishes that they are more easily removed by being despised; c. where long positive resistance would be too troublesome. Therefore in temptations which last for a long time, it certainly suffices to resist them from time to time. In these cases, therefore, motions of concupiscence are rather to be despised than positively attacked. Nevertheless, especially in the first case, it is preferable to oppose to them an act of displeasure or a purpose not to sin.

b. One must assent to the authors who contend that the obligation of repressing these motions does not arise already from the fact that they are disordered, but from the danger of consent: for the obligation of the will of ruling the powers subject to it indeed requires that it guard against consent to evil, but it does not require that it prevent or repress indeliberate motions arisen from nature.²

2. To omit resistance and to have oneself merely passively where the motions of concupiscence are great and vehement is a grave sin; to omit it where the motions of concupiscence are light does not exceed venial sin, even if they turn about an object prohibited under grave obligation. For vehement motions induce a great or proximate danger of consenting, but light motions induce only a light danger; but we are held to remove proximate danger of consent under grave obligation, and light danger only under light obligation.

a. Hence pious penitents, who in temptations are rarely accustomed to consent, are not easily to be accused of grave sin if they have had themselves merely negatively; on the contrary, those who often fall in temptations can more easily be guilty of mortal sin, although in a particular case it is most difficult to bear a certain judgment concerning this matter.

b. It must be noted that if first-first motions, and evil ones, exist in the will, these after full advertence to them begin to become deliberately evil; wherefore they must always be driven away by positive resistance or dissent. For he who has himself merely negatively toward motions of this kind gravely evil sins gravely.

3. Of itself there is no obligation of directly resisting depraved motions, but of itself it suffices to resist them positively, because this of itself suffices for obtaining the end. Accidentally, however, there can be an obligation of resisting directly if positive resistance does not sufficiently exclude the danger of consent.

a. There are temptations, e.g. against faith, against chastity, which are conquered more easily and effectively by indirect resistance, especially by the mind being seriously occupied with other things.

b. The modes of resisting positively according to St. Alphonsus are the following: a. to elicit an act of dissent or displeasure, which, even if it does not repress the motion, especially one joined with carnal pleasure, nevertheless guards against consent of the will; b. to think about the passion of the Lord or about the last things; c. by praying, to have recourse to God, the Blessed Virgin, or the saints; d. to elicit an act of love of God and of the purpose of dying rather than sinning; e. to turn the mind to other things.

Note. Concerning the occasion of sin, see De sacramentis, n. 412 ff.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 595 ff.

² Castropalaus, Opus morale, tr. 2, disp. 2, p. 10, § 5. Tamburini, Explic. decal., l. 10, c. 2. Lacroix, Theologia moralis, l. 5, n. 111 ff.

Preliminary. In order that the doctrine concerning imputability may be rightly proposed, certain things are to be noted concerning the efficient cause.

An efficient cause is called that which by its own power influences an effect. It is distinguished:

1. Into a physical and a moral cause, according as it influences an effect physically or morally, that is, by moving another free cause to act. Thus, for example, a thief is the physical cause of theft; but the one who impelled the thief to steal is the moral cause of the theft.

2. Into a cause per se and a cause per accidens. The former is that which by its nature, or by reason of its proper form, produces an effect or influences an effect, whether physically or morally. Thus, for example, immoderate drinking is the per se and physical cause of drunkenness; evil counsel is the per se and moral cause of a proximate sin. The latter is that which, by reason of a form or circumstance which happens to it, produces an effect or influences an effect. Thus, for example, immoderate drinking can be the per accidens and physical cause of pollution.

Note. An occasional cause, which properly is not a cause, is called that upon the positing of which another cause produces an effect. Thus, for example, one who gives a sum of money to someone can be for him the occasional cause of drunkenness.

3. Into a proximate and a remote cause, according as it concurs proximately or remotely in producing the effect. Thus one who arranges the type is the proximate cause, and one who prepares the paper is the remote cause, of printing a book.

4. Into a cause influencing gravely, moderately, and lightly, according as it exercises a grave, moderate, or light influence on the effect. Thus, for example, very immodest touches influence venereal commotion gravely, moderately immodest touches moderately, and lightly immodest touches lightly.

III. Imputability of effects. The discussion concerns evil effects; moreover, acts, although undeliberated, that are going to follow from a cause, for example in drunkenness, are also referred to effects. Therefore we ask:

1. What is required in order that an evil effect be imputed? It is required:

a) That the agent advert, at least confusedly, that the effect will certainly or probably follow. For nothing is willed unless it is at least in some way known.

b) That the agent be able not to posit the cause, or to remove it once posited, or to posit a cause which may impede the effect. Otherwise liberty is lacking, which is the foundation of imputation.

c) That the agent ought not to posit the cause, or ought to remove it once posited, or ought to posit a cause which may impede the effect; and precisely for this reason, lest the evil effect follow (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 20, a. 5; q. 73, a. 8, ad 1; St. Alphonsus, V, nn. X and XI). Therefore the effect is not imputed: 1. if the action, as being sinful, must indeed be omitted, yet not on account of the evil effect. If someone, for example, gets drunk on Thursday, foreseeing that he will not be present at Mass on the following Sunday, he does indeed sin by making himself drunk, but the neglect of Mass is not imputed to him, because he is not bound on Thursday to abstain from drunkenness in order to avoid the neglect of Mass; indeed, positive precepts do not carry with them the obligation of removing remote impediments. 2. The effect is not imputed if the action can be placed notwithstanding the evil effect. This has place especially, though with the things that must be posited being posited, in the case in which the action, besides an evil effect, also has a good effect. I have said "with the things that must be posited being posited"; since the assigned case is very practical, these things must be explained more fully. Therefore let there be this:

Proposition. It is permitted to place an action from which a double effect is going to follow, one good, the other evil, if the following conditions are present:

a) The action is good in itself, that is, abstraction being made from the evil effect, or at least indifferent, according to these words of St. Paul: "Let us not do evil that good may come."¹ It is said, "abstraction being made from the evil effect"; understand this of an evil effect distinct from a formally evil effect, because an action which has a formally evil effect, that is, which produces an evil effect by the very fact that it is placed, is evil in itself. In a word: here and in what follows we speak of effects which are not formal.

b) The evil effect is not intended; and moreover there is absent any grave danger of approving it, for example a pollution that will follow from the action, or of consenting to it.

c) The good effect does not follow by means of the evil effect. Otherwise evil would be done so that good might come. Nevertheless, it is not required that the good effect follow as immediately, nor that it follow as probably, as the evil effect. This required condition is present when, for example, medicine taken by a pregnant and sick mother produces the expulsion of the fetus and the health of the mother, yet does not produce the latter effect by means of the former. It must be said otherwise if a pregnant girl or wife were to procure reputation or health for herself by means of abortion (St. Alphonsus, III, 394).

d) There is present a proportionate cause for permitting the evil effect; for since this effect is evil, it must of itself be guarded against, so that of itself it cannot be permitted, much less contributed to in any way, unless a proportionate cause excuses. Besides, concerning the proportionate cause, observe:

a) The cause for permitting the evil effect of the action is situated in the good effect of the same action. Nevertheless, the effects are not only to be considered as if in particular, but the advantage and disadvantage of the whole of human society must be weighed.²

b) A graver cause is required: a) the greater, of itself, the obligation is of impeding the effect,³ or the weaker, of itself, the right is of placing the action;⁴ b) the greater the causal connection is between the action and the evil effect, so that a greater cause is required if the action influences it per se than if it influences it per accidens, and a greater cause if it influences it gravely than if lightly;⁵ c) the more closely the evil effect is joined with the action;⁶ d) the more necessary the action is for the evil effect;⁷ e) the more certainly the effect is going to follow; f) the worse the evil effect is.

Therefore, when there is question of an action whose effect is twofold, good and evil, it is certainly permitted to place it when the explained conditions have place. But it is another question whether each of the said conditions is always required. Moreover, this seems to be denied concerning the second and third conditions when the evil effect consists either: 1. in the privation of a good which is ordered to the good effect that will follow from the action; or 2. in the privation of a good which an unjust aggressor has lost the right of retaining. Hence it is permitted, for example, to amputate a member in order to save the whole; likewise, with the things to be observed having been observed, to wound or kill an unjust aggressor, although in the examples adduced the good effect is obtained by means of the evil effect, and the evil effect is intended as a means.⁸

2. To how much fault is the evil effect imputed? The solution depends on so many circumstances that it cannot be answered completely here. It will suffice to have noted these things, while more matters are referred to the diverse treatises.

a) A lightly evil effect is imputed to light fault.

b) A gravely evil effect is imputed to grave fault if the cause, both by its own nature and gravely, influences it, as pollution from gravely immodest touches. It is imputed of itself to light fault if the cause influences either lightly, as pollution from a less immodest touch, or remotely, per accidens, or occasionally, even gravely, as pollution from drunkenness, provided nevertheless that the danger of consenting is absent. I have said "of itself," because it can happen that the effect is imputed to grave fault even if the cause posited influences it only remotely, per accidens, or occasionally. This has place if the effect must be guarded against by reason of a stricter virtue, especially justice or religion, or by reason of the common good. Hence, for example, blasphemies and homicide committed in drunkenness, and foreseen, are imputed to grave fault, although drunkenness does not influence the aforesaid effects per se.

3. When is the evil effect imputed? The whole malice is contracted at the time when the cause is posited or not removed, or at least when the will of positing or not removing it is present. The reason is that every fault resides in the free will. But the malice is contracted whether or not the effect follows, because the event does not influence the depraved will, which has already preceded (St. Alphonsus, V, 10).

Question. Whether the evil effect itself, if it can no longer be impeded, for example homicide committed in perfect drunkenness, is infected with the malice of the will, or whether it is a merely material sin.

Response I. The evil effect of which we are speaking is a merely material sin if the depraved will was sincerely retracted before the event of the effect; for when it has been retracted, there is not that from which true morality could accede to the effect.

Response II. It is disputed if the will has not been sincerely retracted; but with St. Alphonsus (IV, 149; V, 10), it seems it must be said that the said effect is not a merely material sin. For what has been chosen by the will, or at least culpably permitted, and is committed while the will persists, cannot be called a merely material sin, but seems infected with the malice of the will. Finally, observe that this effect can consist both in a deed or in a positive act, and in an omission, for example of hearing Mass (St. Alphonsus, l.c.). Thus also Cajetan,⁹ the Salmanticenses,¹⁰ and Billuart.¹¹

St. Thomas has these words: "It must be said that in drunkenness two things are attended to, as was said: namely, the consequent defect and the preceding act. From the part of the consequent defect, in which the use of reason is bound, drunkenness has the effect of excusing from sin, insofar as it causes the involuntary through ignorance. But from the part of the preceding act, a distinction seems to have to be made; because if from that preceding act drunkenness has followed without sin, then the following sin is totally excused from fault, as perhaps happened to Lot. But if the preceding act was culpable, then someone is not totally excused from the following sin, which namely is rendered voluntary from the will of the preceding act, insofar as someone giving himself to an unlawful thing falls into the following sin. Yet the following sin is diminished, just as the nature of the voluntary is diminished" (II-II, q. 150, a. 4).

¹ Rom. 3:8.

² Frins, De actibus humanis ontologice et psychologice consideratis, n. 197.

³ For example, a graver cause is required for a public official than for a private person to cooperate in theft.

⁴ For example, a graver cause is required for a stranger than for a parishioner to seek the sacraments from an unworthy pastor.

⁵ For example, a graver cause is required so that, notwithstanding a pollution that will follow, a very immodest touch may be admitted, than so that a less immodest touch may become lawful.

⁶ For example, if there is question of printing an evil book, a greater cause is required if there is discussion of arranging the type than if there is discussion of preparing the paper.

⁷ For example, a graver cause is required for it to be permitted to give drink to a drunkard if other innkeepers who would give drink are lacking, than if they are present.

⁸ Concerning these things, which are denied by many, something will be said later.

⁹ In II-II, q. 150, a. 4.

¹⁰ De princ. mor., tr. 20, c. 10, n. 26.

¹¹ De pecc., diss. 1, a. 4, § 3.

A cause exempting is said to be one which withdraws someone from the domain of the law, as if someone goes out from the territory of the law, or renounces the community for which the law was made. Now it is licit to place, or not to remove, a cause exempting from the law, and this even directly, that is, with the intention that the obligation be escaped. For a law generally does not command that someone remain a subject, but only that, as long as he is a subject, he fulfill the law (St. Alphonsus, I, 152, 157).¹ I said generally,² because civil law forbids soldiers, and indeed deservedly by right, to desert the standards.

¹ c. 49, 53, X, V, 39.

² As we shall note in its own place, the ecclesiastical discipline has now been changed which formerly, in some matters, forbade one to betake himself into another region so that the obligation of the law might be escaped.

A cause excusing is one which brings it about that one who is subject to the law is not held to observe it. It differs from a cause exempting, which brings it about that someone ceases to be subject to the law (St. Alphonsus, I, 152).

The excusing causes are ignorance and inability. Ignorance brings it about that one who transgresses the law does not sin formally, but not that material sin is absent. Inability averts not only formal sin, but also material sin. Ignorance was discussed where there was speech about impediments of liberty (nn. 30-32), so that only inability must be treated.

Excusing causes are distinguished into causes proximately and causes remotely impeding the observation of the law, according as the time for fulfilling the law is at hand or still remote. Furthermore:

I. It is licit to place or not to remove causes remotely impeding. The reason is that the legislator is not considered to bind subjects to such a burden that each one would have to avoid already, while the time of obligation is still remote, all things which will stand in the way of observing the law. Indeed the aforesaid inconvenience will easily be so great that a human legislator of himself cannot even bind to such a burden. Hence he is excused who, for example, on Thursday, even without a special reason, undertakes a journey, even if he foresees that on Sunday he cannot assist at Mass (St. Alphonsus, III, 301). Indeed, considering today's customs of traveling, he does not seem to sin who, with a just cause, even if not grave, begins a journey on Friday or even Saturday.

II. It is not licit to place causes proximately impeding, unless a proportionate cause for acting thus is present. The reason is that the legislator is considered to bind to that burden lest laws be able to be eluded more easily than is right. As regards a proportionate cause, it can generally be said that a graver one is required according as the matter of the law and the end of the legislator are graver, according as the time for fulfilling the law is more urgent, and according as the obligation recurs less frequently. Of itself, a graver cause is also required if there is question of divine law than if of human law. Therefore he sins who without just cause undertakes a journey on Saturday, foreseeing that on the following day he cannot hear Mass (St. Alphonsus, III, 301).

Nevertheless, one who illicitly placed an impeding cause is excused here and now, although by acting in this way he sinned (St. Alphonsus, III, 1045).

Finally, if there is present a sufficient cause for placing the impeding cause, it does not appear why it would be illicit to place it directly, as they say, that is, also with this intention, that you be excused from the law; nevertheless most authors are opposed to this opinion.

The discussion is of the efficient causes of sins. Now the efficient causes of sin can be distinguished as: 1. immediate; 2. mediate.

The immediate cause of sin is the perverse will of man. "It is certain that sin is committed by the will, as all teach with St. Augustine and St. Thomas" (St. Alphonsus, V, 5). The reason is that the whole essence of sin is founded on the free voluntary. But the immediate cause of the free voluntary is the will. "If you say that not all sins are elicited by the will, but many are commanded by it, such as heresy, intemperance, etc.; I respond that these and similar things indeed are not elicited by the will as to their material element, yet they are as to their formal element, namely as to the character of the voluntary and aversion from God."¹

The mediate causes, i.e., the causes which induce the will to sin, are some external and some internal; and to know these causes is of the highest importance, so that the priest may be able to speak to the penitent more aptly and efficaciously concerning the state of conscience and manner of life, and may select more suitable remedies and make them acceptable to the penitent. Hence we shall speak of each.

¹ Billuart, De peccatis, diss. 4, art. 1.

The external causes are the world and the devil.

I. The world; by which are signified: 1. sensual pleasures, riches, and honors, which move the will from without and entice it to sin; 2. worldly men, who by examples, exhortations, speech, gesture, writings, rewards, threats, and violence try to lead others to sin.

II. The devil, who, retaining the original acuteness of his mind, knows innumerable arts of exercising influence upon men.

1. That the devil continually attacks men we are taught from Sacred Scripture itself: "Brethren, be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil goes about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour; resist him, strong in faith."¹ "Put on the armor of God, that you may be able to stand against the snares of the devil. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the heavens. Therefore take up the armor of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and in all things to stand perfect."²

2. Concerning the manner in which the devil induces to sin, these things should be noted:

a) He cannot be the direct cause of sin for man. "For he cannot be the cause of sin except either by acting interiorly upon the will and moving it to sin, or by proposing an object and persuading its appetibility. But he cannot do the first; for it belongs to God alone to move the will interiorly by acting upon it. The second does not suffice, because the will is moved by no object of necessity, except by the ultimate end alone."³

b) The devil can be for men an indirect cause of sinning, namely by proposing to the senses, whether external or internal, something appetible, and by exciting passions in the sensitive appetite (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80, a. 2). The "devil also has the power by his own virtue, unless he is restrained by God,... to induce someone of necessity to do some act which by its genus is sin" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80, a. 3); likewise so to disturb the interior faculties that the use of reason is wholly impeded. In these cases, because of defect of liberty, the act is not imputed (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, c. 7, § 8; Correspondentia specialis, II, n. 377).

Corollary. They reason badly who wish to acknowledge the devil's influence only when it is placed beyond every doubt, although from the doctrine of the Gospel it ought to be judged frequent. Therefore priests are advised to use a private adjuration from time to time, for which the license of the bishop is not required. St. Alphonsus (Praxis Confessarii, n. 113) advises this formula to be recited over those whom the devil vexes: As a minister of God I command you, or you, unclean spirits, to depart from this creature of God. The priest can also use such or a similar private exorcism if he should notice that the penitent does not grieve for sins, or should fear that he is not manifesting some sin. Moreover, against the demon one must act with great confidence and humility. Here should be noted the "Exorcism against Satan and the Apostate Angels," published by order of Pius XI, Supreme Pontiff, which those priests may use who have obtained the faculty for this from their bishop.⁴

Note. God is not the cause of sin formally taken, or according to its formal being; nevertheless he is the cause, and indeed the first cause, of the material being or physical entity of the sinful act.

¹ 1 Pet. 5:8.

² Eph. 6:11 ff.

³ Billuart, De peccatis, diss. 5, art. 9.

⁴ Rituale Romanum, title XI, chapter 3.

I. Culpable ignorance; which can be a cause of sin to the extent that man, if he had expelled the ignorance, would have abstained from the depraved act. To this cause also belongs defect of consideration, which is a certain actual culpable ignorance, concerning which the prophet Jeremiah says: "With desolation the whole land is made desolate, because there is no one who reflects in the heart."¹

¹ Jer. 12:11.

II. Concupiscence - by which here is understood every passion or motion of the sensitive appetite - is the cause of sin according to these words of St. James: "Each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and enticed. Then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin."¹ Sins which are perpetrated from concupiscence are called sins of weakness (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 3). Such commonly are self-pollutions, morose delectations, drunkenness, hatred of neighbor, blasphemies, which nevertheless by others are also uttered from malice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 463).

¹ James 1:14.

III. Slothfulness, i.e., lack of zeal and affection toward those things which concern the salvation of the soul. From slothfulness commonly arise neglects of Mass, of the abstinence to be observed, etc.

IV. Malice, i.e., the depravity of the will by which someone sins even if vehement passion does not incite him to sin. Among sins from malice are counted hatred of God, hindering the good which priests and other good men promote; likewise, commonly, sins against the Holy Spirit, and those which are said to cry to heaven.

Finally, note that one actual sin is sometimes the cause of other sins: first, indirectly, when God, in order to punish sin, permits that someone fall into sin, whether light or grave. Of this both the doctrine of the Saints and especially St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans is witness: "On account of this," i.e., on account of the sin of neglecting the glorification of God, "God handed them," that is, the ancient philosophers, "over to passions of shame."¹ In another way, directly, sin is the cause of sin, namely by force both of an increased inclination toward sins of the same species and of the connection which exists among depraved acts of diverse species. Thus - the examples are legion - thus Cain first sinned by envy against his brother, then by hatred, then by homicide, and finally despaired of the mercy of God... Thus also Judas first sinned by avarice, then handed over Jesus Christ, and finally brought death upon himself (St. Alphonsus, Sermoni compendiati, Twenty-Second Sunday after Pentecost). To this, moreover, those sins especially are to be referred which are called capital, because from them as from heads other sins naturally arise. Of these there will be a specific discussion later.

¹ Rom. 1:26.

The Causes of Sin.—The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e., those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which are without).

The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect; (b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.

Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults. Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized; breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law; imprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b) Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against conscience.

Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.

Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.

Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary, more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.

The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil spirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of the soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that is, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or by their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice of virtue.

Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none of the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of the will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction between temptation and sin. The rebellion of the passions, the suggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are temptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but rather virtue and merit.

In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful to remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this without just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being overcome by sin.

Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which commands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to the sin suggested. This resistance may be:

(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what contains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a temptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance, while the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;

(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is also exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an uncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a book to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;

(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a temptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by thoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in order to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he reads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;

(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not retracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a temptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of rejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is actual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it appears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his resistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.

General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a grave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave, the danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable; otherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the resistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example: If a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had decided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he put off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its appealing features.

The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the character and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the person tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the temptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who knows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he uses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance also. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation increases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better that the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations against faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away from the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a long time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by worrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is true as regards temptations against purity.

Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in certain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a) Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples: Associating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil associations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.

Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it will result from a certain set of circumstances. Example: Attention to business sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may degenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection between industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and insincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger, but only accidentally from its possibility.

It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of sin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss without cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs according to circumstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become proximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to which he exposes himself—and this even though the sin does not actually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is to love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is venially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not imply affection for grave sin.

It is lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sin, if this can be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities would follow (e.g., that urgent duties should not be performed, if one feared they contained the danger of sin). The requirements of prudence referred to are: (a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.

It is lawful to expose oneself to the possibility of sin, for, since almost every action may be perverted, one who wished to avoid the possibility of sin would have to leave this world and become confirmed in grace.

The Occasions of Sin are external circumstances—persons, places or things—which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others to defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where irreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.

The occasions of sin are of various kinds. (a) They are proximate or remote, according as it is morally certain, or only likely that they will lead to sin. (b) Occasions are necessary or free, according as one is able or not able to abandon them without difficulty. For example, one who chooses dishonest persons as his associates is in a free occasion of sin; one who is imprisoned with criminals is in a necessary occasion of sin. An occasion of sin is also necessary when the impossibility of leaving it is not physical, but moral. Examples: A wife who is bound to a provoking husband; a person who cannot give up an employment that offers many temptations, without suffering great temporal or spiritual injury, or without incurring a worse condition. (c) Occasions are present or absent, according as one has the occasion with him or must go to seek it. Examples; Intoxicants kept in his home are a present occasion of sin for a drunkard; atheistic lectures are an absent occasion of sin for one who has to go out to hear them.

It is not lawful to remain in a free occasion of sin,, whether it be present or absent; for to do so is to expose oneself rashly to the danger of sin (see 258 sqq.).

It is not lawful for one who is in a necessary occasion of sin to neglect means that are adapted to preserve him from the moral contagion by which he is surrounded; for to neglect spiritual safeguards and protections in such a case is to refuse to resist temptation (see 252 sqq.). The means that should be used depend on circumstances, but prayer and firm resolves to avoid sin should be employed in every case.

The gravity of the sin committed by one who freely remains in an occasion of sin, or who does not use the requisite spiritual helps in a necessary occasion, depends on various factors: (a) if the sin to which he is tempted is light, he does not sin gravely; (b) if the sin to which he is tempted is serious, and the occasion is proximate, he sins gravely; (c) if the occasion is remote, he sins venially.

Temptations to Impurity.—Before treating the various kinds of impurity, we shall speak briefly of temptations that occasion this sin and of the duties of the person tempted.

(a) External temptation comes from the devil or the world, and the duty of struggling against it has been treated elsewhere (see 252, 1455 sqq., 1495 sqq.). Thus, he who finds that certain persons, places or things are for him a temptation to impurity must be guided by the principles given for occasions of sin (263 sqq.); he who finds that another wishes to seduce him into impurity must refuse all internal consent (see 254 sqq.), and must also resist violence when there is hope of success, or when this is necessary to avoid giving scandal or yielding consent (see on self-defense, 1841).

(b) Internal temptation comes from the flesh. It consists in inchoative disturbances or excitements of the organs or fluids that serve generation (e.g., erections, clitoral movements). Sometimes it is produced involuntarily, without any intention or consent of the will, by physiological states (e.g., conditions of the blood, nerves, etc., due solely to the weather, to disease, to aphrodisiac properties of ailment, to clothing, or position) or by psychical states (e.g., spontaneous images or appetites of the soul mentioned in 129), and in these cases the temptation is manifestly free from all sin. St. Pius V condemned the teaching of Baius that those who suffer motions of concupiscence against their will are transgressors of the command: “Thou shalt not covet” (see Denziger, Enchiridion, nn. 1050, 1051, 1075). Sometimes the temptation is directly voluntary, as when the passion is deliberately awakened for the purpose of sin, and then there is grave guilt (see 2496 b). Sometimes the temptation is indirectly voluntary, as when with the foresight of the passion but without desire of it an action is performed that arouses it. In this last case, if there is a just reason for the excitatory action (e.g., a physician sees and hears things that are calculated to be a temptation, but his reason is the exercise of his profession), no sin is committed; but if there is no just reason for the action (e.g., a person reads an erotic book, and curiosity is his only motive), sin is committed, and its gravity depends on the amount of danger to which one exposes oneself (see 2496 c).

Resistance to Internal Temptations.—The fight against internal temptations is of various kinds.

(a) By reason of its subject, the conflict is chiefly in the will, to which it belongs to give or withhold consent; secondarily, in the other powers of the soul and the body, which under command from the will perform acts designed to overcome temptation.

(b) By reason of its manner, the conflict is either removal of the temptation (i.e., cessation from an act which produces the temptation) or resistance, passive or active. Passive resistance is the suspension of activity relative to the temptation till it ends of itself, as when internally the will neither consents nor dissents, or externally nothing is done for or against the temptation. Active resistance is positive opposition offered to temptation. It is made in two ways: first, by way of flight, as when internally the mind turns away to other thoughts (e.g., absorbing studies, meditation on the passion of Christ), or the will devotes itself to other subjects of resolve (e.g., acts of love of God or of purity), or externally the body is removed or freed from conditions that excite temptation; secondly, by way of attack, as when internally the mind turns against the temptation (e.g., thinking of its dangers, calling on God to drive it away), or the will rejects the temptation (e.g., by despising it, by expressing dislike, disapproval and unwillingness, by firmly resolving not to yield, by deciding on measures against the passion), or when externally the body is subjected to pain or mortification.

(c) By reason of its circumstances, resistance to temptation is either prolonged, as when the act by which the will resists is of considerable duration or is renewed at frequent intervals, or is brief, as when the act of rejection is momentary and is not repeated.

What Opposition to Temptation Is Sufficient?—Opposition to temptations of the flesh must be sufficient to remove the temptation, when the temptation is due to the continuance of one’s own sinful or unjustified act; for one is obliged to cease from sin or the unreasonable. This happens (a) when the temptation is directly voluntary—for example, one who wished to experience temptation and therefore reads a very seductive book must give over this reading; or (b) when the temptation is not directly voluntary and is without sufficient reason—for example, one who experiences carnal temptation due to a book which he reads from idle curiosity must desist from the book. But one is not bound to omit or interrupt necessary or useful acts, such as rest and sleep, prayer and charity; consent should be denied the evil, but the good should be continued.

Insufficient, Harmful and Unnecessary Opposition.—In other cases opposition to temptations of the flesh must be such as is sufficient to keep one from consent, that is, to protect one against the proximate danger of sin.

(a) Hence, that resistance is insufficient which does not strengthen the will. It seems that passive will-resistance is of this kind, since it is most difficult for the will to remain inactive in the presence of carnal stimulation or motions of the sensible appetites without being moved by the evil suggestion. In external resistance, however, passive opposition suffices when it alone is feasible, as when temptation grows out of necessary work, or rest that cannot be discontinued or interrupted by active resistance, provided the will registers internally its displeasure or disapproval; but external passivity is not permissible when the will needs the help of external resistance, as in the case of vehement and prolonged temptations.

(b) That resistance is harmful which strengthens the temptation. Hence, resistance by direct attack or by formal rejection is oftentimes to be omitted in favor of resistance by flight or by contempt; for it is a common teaching of the Fathers and Doctors confirmed by experience that dwelling on reasons and means of repelling passion often adds to its strength, and that resolving mightily and expressly to crush a weak and passing temptation often serves only to give it a longer life. It is better to brush a mosquito away than to risk one’s neck by chasing it up and down stairs.

(c) That resistance is unnecessary which demands a physical or moral impossibility. Thus, a prolonged act of resistance or one repeated at intervals of a few minutes, or a resistance that includes extreme corporal austerities, is not required in ordinary cases at least. When a temptation is unusually vehement or is due to one’s own fault, there should be proportionately greater resistance to offset the greater danger; but when a temptation is only moderately dangerous, it suffices to reject it firmly but briefly and to repeat this when there arises a new crisis or danger and the renewal of resistance is useful.

Weapons against Carnal Temptations.—The most powerful weapons against carnal temptations are spiritual ones, and of these the most necessary is grace, which should be asked in prayer (Wis., viii. 21), especially through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary (see Pius XII, Sacra Virginitas, March 25, 1954). But corporal means, chiefly of a preventive kind, should not be neglected.

(a) Physical measures are the observance of what are now often spoken of as sex hygiene for normal and sex therapeutics for abnormal cases. Special health rules whose observance conduces to good morals are especially the cultivation of habits of bodily cleanliness, of hard mental and physical work, of vigorous exercise and the avoidance of unhealthful habits (such as constipation, drug or spirit stimulation), unsuitable clothing or sleeping conditions. Surgical or medical treatment for structural abnormalities or for mental or bodily diseases that react unfavorably on sex life requires the service of a conscientious and competent physician.

(b) Religious measures are various forms of corporal mortification, such as custody of the eyes and other senses, deprivation in food (fasting and abstinence) and sleep (vigils, night watches), afflictive penances through the use of hairshirts, painful girdles, scourges or disciplines. But austerities must be suited to the health, age, condition, duties and other circumstances of the person who practises them, and should not be used without the consent of one’s confessor or spiritual director.

Impure Desires.—Impure desire is a deliberate intention to commit impurity in the future.

(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which consent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same thing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that he would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only that he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as a mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances that would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were lawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both he and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these velleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of danger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will consents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to fornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take away the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were it not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to practise fornication).

(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure desire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual, mental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or what is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but without carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future married relationship).

"It follows that, when a grave temptation has arisen, and after the sensitive appetite, concupiscible, venereal, or irascible, is vehemently excited by phantasy or from elsewhere, then, I say, acts of a threefold kind can be given in the will. 1. Those which precede the use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant or time in which the intellect does not yet propose to the will motives deterring it, but only motives enticing it toward that object into which the appetite is borne. And these acts of the will are called first-first motions. 2. Those which follow upon some use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant in which the intellect proposes the deterring motives only obscurely, but the enticing motives toward illicit love or toward hatred so vividly that the will is moved only weakly and imperfectly by the deterring motives.

And these acts of the will are called second-first motions. 3. Finally, those which follow upon the perfect use of reason, and are elicited by the will in that instant in which the intellect has proposed to the will, sufficiently clearly and intensely, deterring motives or the unsuitability and moral malice, by which the will could freely be deterred if it seriously wished. And these acts of the will are called deliberate acts. "Acts of the first kind are not free, and consequently they are not formally sinful. But acts of the second kind are imperfectly free, and only venially sinful. But acts of the third kind are perfectly free, and consequently, if there is gravity of matter, they are mortally sinful." Struggl, Theol. Mor., tr. 1, q. 1, a. 1, v. 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3.

What is the direct and indirect voluntary; voluntary in itself and in the cause; positive and negative? - The voluntary, by reason of the act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one thing direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting, namely which ought and can prohibit. For "not always is that which follows upon a defect of action reduced, as into a cause, into the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or the governance of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, since the will, by willing and acting, can impede this which is not to will and not to act, and sometimes ought to, this which is not to will and not to act is imputed to it as existing from it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; 2. 2. q. 69. a. 7; 3. p. q. 47. a. 1. Namely, it must be what one ought and can prohibit, so that one is in fault. And thus no one would say that every good which you do not do is voluntary to you, even indirectly, and consequently imputable, although absolutely you can do it, but are not bound to do it; and much less every evil which you are not bound in any way to impede.

If nevertheless someone knowingly posits an act incompatible with another act, which is omitted, for performing which there is no obligation, since that omission is free, it is indirectly voluntary, although not imputable to fault; for example, if you wish to study without wishing not to go to visit a church, when there is no obligation; and, on the contrary, it is imputable to merit, as if you wish to pray and therefore omit recreation, without saying, I wish to omit it. Cf. Commentary de Act. hum., Fourth, n. 9. Cf. here the following paragraph and n. 35.

The voluntary, by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing voluntary in itself, another voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; the second, when someone wills the cause from which some effect is going to follow, even if he foresees this effect; for then he does not will it in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. Foresees, that is, merely foresees; for if besides this he wills it, that effect will already be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not merely in the cause. From this it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect, with respect to the will, will have the notion of an end, and the cause the notion of a means. For that which someone wills on account of itself has the notion of an end; what someone wills on account of another has the notion of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, then that effect is outside the intention, and in no way can it be voluntary, not even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to impede it if it is evil, the effect is imputed to it; consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3; q. 71. a. 5.

And thus evil works committed against one's neighbor in drunkenness are voluntary in the cause for him who was voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. If someone writing a bad book foresees many spiritual evils from it, although he does not intend them, they are imputed to him, and they are voluntary to him not in themselves, but in the cause. But if the effect is good, and someone who posits the cause foresees it, he is already judged implicitly to will it, and he does not lack his merit, since the good is the object of the will, not evil. If you give your goods to a monastery, foreseeing the spiritual goods thence to come, you certainly do not lack merit. Therefore there is a distinction between good and evil; for good, at least in some way, we ought to intend; evil, on the contrary, cannot be intended, but ought to be avoided. Suarez, d. 1, s. 4.

Several theologians altogether distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says, "The voluntary in itself is sufficiently clear; for then something is said to be voluntary in itself when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately concerned with it, either by a proper act, if it is voluntary direct, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirectly voluntary." D. 1, s. 4. Likewise S. Th. q. 77. a. 7: "Two things seem to have to be considered. First, that something can be voluntary either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it, or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause and not into the effect; as is clear in him who voluntarily becomes drunk. For from this, what he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly, it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed is that into which the will is borne; but indirect is that which the will could have prohibited, but does not prohibit."

But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause the direct and indirect voluntary, and express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. Gury, Ballerini, n. 5. Now, with a comparison established between both divisions, the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary includes under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause. For the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be "that which proceeds from the will as from an agent," q. 6. a. 3 ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing.

But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be "that which is from the will as from a non-agent," l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the acting and willing will. Therefore the indirectly voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Nevertheless it can be reduced to both; for the indirectly voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since externally not acting is as it were the external object completing that not willing, just as the former is in some way voluntary in itself, so also is the latter, since one complete non-act is as it were constituted from both the lack of an interior and exterior act; for example, not willing to hear Mass, and not hearing Mass in fact, just as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass.

Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so from the omission of an act another act can follow, which, although it is not properly the effect of that omission, just as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect. And thus it can be called voluntary in the cause; for example, the death of those sailing, indirectly voluntary, is, in the sense stated, voluntary in the cause for the pilot of the ship who desists from steering.

What is required so that an evil effect which follows, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will as fault? - The following conditions are required: 1. That he who posits or omits the cause advert, at least confusedly, that such an effect will follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless in some way it is known beforehand.

2. That the agent be able to impede such a cause; because there is no obligation to impossibilities.

3. That the agent be bound, by reason of that effect, to remove or omit that cause; because the effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in reality does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. L. 1. 5. n. 15; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; q. 21. a. 2; C. I. 1151 f.; C. G. 1182 f.; C. H. 1092 ff.

When is someone bound to remove the cause, by reason of an evil effect that will follow? - 1. He is bound when it of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect. For then the cause is evil in itself. It is said, of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect, because one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause if the evil effect followed merely accidentally; for then the cause would not therefore be evil in itself. Nor would he be bound if the cause of itself, directly and primarily, produces a good effect, and only through this as a medium an evil effect follows; for a cause according to moral estimation is judged from its effect of itself, directly, and primarily, and accordingly it is then simply honorable in itself. Therefore then one would not will the evil, but would will the good, and would only permit the evil. Likewise one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause because it equally, directly and primarily, as if in a parallel manner, influences a good and an evil effect. For then the cause in itself, according to moral estimation, is indifferent, and honorable, insofar as it is subject to the honorable intention of the agent; for the evil effect is not intended, but permitted. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 5; q. 73. a. 8; 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

2. Someone is likewise bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless someone is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept that presses to be fulfilled; for example, if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. "For he who is bound to the law must necessarily be bound to procure the ordinary means, and the means proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing, for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things." Ithur., case 32, n. 4. Hence "the reason can be given, that by reason of the precept that cause and the effects following from it, although physically they are connected only accidentally, and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless morally are judged to have the notion of one unsuitable object, or one to be avoided by the will, and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 9.

3. Finally, someone is bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness on the part of the agent. For then an honorable end of the one operating is lacking; for evil is to be avoided, and it can be permitted when there is a rational and just cause. Besides, to will such a cause then often shows an evil affection directly toward that evil effect that will follow; or at least there is often a proximate danger of such evil affection. But a greater or lesser reason is required for positing the cause according as it is a cause of itself, or from its own nature influencing such an effect, or an accidental cause, namely one which does not influence such an effect from its intrinsic nature, but from some extrinsic condition of things. Likewise the greater reason is required for acting in such a case, the more proximately the cause touches the evil effect, the more probable the evil effect is, the less right one has to the action considered in itself, and the graver the effect itself is, if one is bound by office to impede the evil. For if a proportionately grave reason is not had, natural honesty itself obliges us to omit that cause. L. 1. 1. n. 152; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

Is the effect which follows, gravely evil, voluntary only indirectly or in the cause, always imputable as grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if he illicitly posits the cause without any sufficient reason? - R. 1. Affirmatively, if that cause of itself, or from its intrinsic nature, gravely influences the effect. The reason is that if the cause of itself gravely influences the effect, the grave malice from the effect redounds into the cause. Therefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect itself by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, one who wills the cause, of itself gravely influencing an effect gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in reality directly wills the grave malice of that effect, and does not merely permit it; since the cause and effect are inseparably connected with one another, so far as concerns the very nature of the thing, and no other honorable reason is present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed.

R. 2. Negatively, if that cause of itself influences that effect only lightly. The reason is that, since the cause of itself has only a light influence upon that gravely evil effect, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and accordingly, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with one another. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. Accordingly he does not contract the grave malice proper to the effect. But since the malice of the effect redounds into the cause by reason of the influence which the latter has upon the effect, where the influence is light there is only light malice; and consequently, with the direct intention of the gravely evil effect always excluded, someone willing a cause that influences such an effect only lightly, although he will not sin gravely, nevertheless will sin lightly. And this is the proper reason why, although there is no smallness of matter in venereal matters, nevertheless there is such in those acts of mere sensuality, as are looks, from a cause of mere curiosity, at less honorable things, with the intention of the venereal thing itself again excluded, as the very common opinion of theologians holds.

R. 3. Again negatively, if the cause in no way of itself influences that evil effect, but the effect follows merely accidentally, or from extrinsic circumstances. The reason is that since the effect follows only accidentally, there is no connection, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause of itself, but merely accidentally, someone willing the cause, with every intention of the evil effect excluded, contracts none of its malice, neither grave nor light, although perhaps otherwise he also sins gravely. And thus, if someone foresees pollution from some excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly, or perhaps even gravely, by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of lust. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing only accidentally into some evil effect, by reason only of that evil effect itself. For in actions only this one thing must be attended to: whether they are the cause of this effect, or not. For if they do not have the force of a cause, it is ridiculous that they must be avoided on account of an effect of this kind. And in no way is someone bound to abstain from positing such a cause, if a reasonable motive is present for positing a cause of this kind.

Cf. 40. 1, 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, 5; Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 14 ff.; L. 1. 3. n. 484; Salm., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5; 3. p. q. 30. a. 7; d'Annibale, 4th ed., p. 1, n. 157, note 15.

When is an effect willed in the cause imputed? - It is imputed, speaking of itself, first when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. "The reason is that the free volition, or non-impeding, of an evil effect is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and accordingly formal sin is committed when there is such a perverse volition or nolition.... Thus therefore, he who, for example, has offered poison to another ... does not sin when the death of the other follows ... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect." Struggl, q. 1, a. 3, n. 32. Speaking of itself; for if someone can impede an effect of this kind right up to its execution, and does not impede it, or is pleased in its futurition or existence, he continues in his mind the sin whose cause he previously posited freely and culpably. Consequently someone must then confess the effect as if it were the external act and object, the complement of the sin. But it would be otherwise if, after the cause had been posited, before the effect follows, he retracts the will, or confesses the sin committed. L. 1. 5. n. 10; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 3.

Note: Since the cause, as such, participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a different malice, it suffices in confession to accuse only the malice of the effect; or if the cause has in itself another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if because of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if because of theft you likewise omitted Mass, you can then accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. L. 1. 5. n. 9; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 15, n. 479.

You will resolve: 1. "If the cause of pollution is one gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was at least confusedly foreseen. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust, namely touches or sights of the shameful parts of another's or one's own body with base and deliberate delight; the sight of human intercourse; and morose thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes are certainly mortal. Thus S. Th. a. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, de Matr., l. 9, c. 45, n. 23, and all agree." L. 1. 3. n. 482. A special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in delight excited from a base object. Gravely influencing; therefore, if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow, since then it follows outside the intention and accidentally. Of themselves are grave faults: "the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause of itself mortal in the genus of lust.... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil." L. 1. 3. n. 484. In the genus of lust, whence "it is inferred that the pollution which happens outside the intention from causes illicit even mortally in another genus than lust is not mortal, as from drunkenness, or from eating too immoderately or on a forbidden day." L. 1. 3. n. 484, 477; Salm., Theol. Schol., tr. 13, d. 10, n. 274; Theol. Mor., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41.

2. "If someone, about to do some necessary or lawful and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends, then, provided the danger of consent to the delight is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action; because the effect following accidentally and outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his right. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is lawful to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace according to the custom of the country, if otherwise one would have to be regarded as uncivil." L. 1. 3. n. 481. "It is lawful for someone who suffers a great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows." L. 1. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either of themselves influence only lightly, or although they of themselves gravely influence, nevertheless, since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and delight, but from an honorable, necessary, useful, suitable cause, they no longer have the same force and influence upon the effect, which is gravely increased by that evil propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished by the will turned elsewhere and resisting as far as it can. Hence the evil effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to natural constitution, or to weakness of nature, than to the aforesaid acts as cause. Besides, with the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the evil effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, by behaving permissively toward the evil. Therefore that evil effect, in the case, truly follows accidentally and outside the intention. L. 1. 3. n. 483; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

3. "It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not prolonged conversation with a girl, or from a slight glance, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as has been said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them." L. 1. 3. n. 484. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing. L. 1. 5. n. 29. A just cause is "any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness." L. 1. 3. n. 484; l. 5. n. 29.

4. A fortiori grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and accidentally, since they are outside the genus of lust. Therefore, although pollution or an evil commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is lawful to ride horseback, not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for recreation; to recline in some position in order to rest more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drink; to lead honorable dances, etc. L. 1. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent; for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the effect going to follow, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, "because, as they say, the pollution arises rather from the weakness of nature than from that cause, which concurs to pollution only accidentally and remotely. But Sanchez, Lessius, and others more probably affirm it..., because without a rational cause to permit pollution always seems something unbecoming and disordered." L. 1. 3. n. 484; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 45; Sporer, de Matr., n. 644 ff.; Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, d. 14, n. 97-103.

"Does he sin gravely who behaves negatively, and does not positively resist a movement of the sensitive appetite concerning an object prohibited under mortal sin? - There are three opinions. The first affirms that one sins gravely, even when the danger of consent ceases... The second opinion says that such a one does not sin even venially, with danger of consent removed...

The third and true opinion holds that, when the danger of consent ceases, it is venial not to resist illicit movements positively, but not mortal. And this seems expressly confirmed by St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 74, a. 4, where he says: mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, but only in reason. Therefore the reason is, both because consent to sinning gravely does not arise from the sensible appetite, but from the will, and when it does not positively consent, mortal sin is not committed; and therefore venial sin is committed insofar as man ought to beware lest the appetite draw the will after itself; but this obligation, when the danger of consent is not proximate, is only light. And also because, if under grave obligation we were held positively to repel all disordered movements, we would be held to the impossible; for it is impossible positively to coerce all these movements taken collectively." L. 6, 29; Diana, vol. 8, tr. 6, de aliq. cas. circa mat. lux., r. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 8, ad 3; q. 79, a. 1; La-Croix, l. 5, n. 111.

"Note: There is no obligation to resist carnal movements positively, if there is a just cause of not resisting, namely if someone has experienced that by resisting the movements are more excited and increased; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary or useful action;... if it is not an easy business to repel them. It is enough, therefore, then to behave negatively, with the firm purpose of never consenting; for the actual care of not consenting itself then suffices to free a man from fault, at least mortal fault, although not from venial fault, if the resistance is tepid." L. 9. Therefore when temptation lasts long, and it would be too troublesome continually to repel its movements positively, it is no sin to permit them by behaving negatively. And to do thus is counseled to those who are of timorous conscience. L. 9.

How is resistance made positively? - Positive resistance can be furnished in two ways: 1. Directly, by repelling those movements; and indeed there is no obligation to employ this direct resistance, which, as regards carnal movements, often excites them more; much less is there an obligation to material resistance, which itself also often, as regards those carnal movements, is harmful. 2. Indirectly, by diverting the mind to other things. As regards movements against chastity and against faith and charity, this indirect resistance is more to be counseled than any direct resistance or attack; and if the movements are slight, it is better to despise them. L. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 3, ad 2.

439. That God is not the author of sin, whatever the Manicheans and not a few Protestants said to the contrary, we have already proved in the Treatise on the One God, n. 94-99; which from another side is established from Trent:¹ "If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as He works good ones, not only permissively, but also properly and of Himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is His proper work no less than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema." Therefore the efficient cause of sin is the free will of man itself, which, from infirmity or malice, and often from both at the same time, deviates from the right path of virtue, and prefers its own advantage to the will of God. But the will is drawn to sin by various motives or causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. The prior and principal intrinsic cause is our corrupted nature, or concupiscence, which, with Trent as witness, is from sin and inclines to sin; but the extrinsic causes are the world and the devil; concerning these three we must speak separately. Afterward concerning temptation, which is nothing other than an incitement to sin arising from this threefold cause.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, can. 6, apud Denzing., n. 698.

440. St. James explains that this is a cause of sin thus:² "But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; then when concupiscence has conceived, it brings forth sin; but sin, when it is consummated, begets death." Therefore concupiscence is not sin in itself, but the principal internal cause of sin, or incitement to sinning; if the will freely consents to it, then a sinful act arises. - But St. John teaches that concupiscence is threefold:³ "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." (a) Now concupiscence of the flesh is a certain inordinate propensity toward carnal pleasures, especially toward intemperance and lust. (b) Concupiscence of the eyes, according to St. Augustine and St. Thomas,¹ designates inordinate curiosity for knowing, through the eyes of the body or of the mind, all things which please, even dangerous things; or an inordinate propensity toward riches, resources, magnificent houses, and other things of this kind, by whose sight men are delighted, and whose possession they covet. (c) The pride of life is the inordinate desire of honors, dignities, and similar things which render life conspicuous and procure vainglory. Therefore the principal internal propensities which incline to sin are: intemperance and lust, curiosity and covetousness, and also ambition. - But the root of all these is inordinate love of self: "That someone inordinately desires some temporal good proceeds from this, that he inordinately loves himself";² for he does not desire riches, pleasures, and honors except in order to enjoy them and to please himself. - Moreover all passions, concerning which above, n. 99-107, can allure us to sin: concerning the principal ones it will be treated where we discuss the capital vices.

² Jas. 1:14-15.

³ 1 John 2:16. Cf. Bossuet, Traite de la Concupiscence. - A certain concupiscence is natural to man; this, besides, received an increase from original sin, as was proved in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 171, 198.

¹ St. Augustine, Confess., l. X, c. 35, P.L. XXXII, 802; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 5.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4.

441. There are especially two external causes soliciting to sin: the world and the devil.

(A) The world, concerning which the question is, is not the complex of men who live in the world, but that depraved spirit which flourishes among many men; this is often exhibited in Scripture, especially apud St. John, as an occasion of sin. Thus Christ anathematizes the world because of the scandals which it offers,³ nor does He pray for the world,⁴ but for the disciples, not indeed that God take them out of the world, but that He preserve them from the evil which is in the world;⁵ He predicts that the disciples will suffer persecution from the world, but inspires confidence in them, because He Himself has conquered the world.⁶ The reason for fleeing the world is because the world "is wholly set in the evil one,⁷... since all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life."¹ Or, in other words, the world in these places is held as the tinder of threefold concupiscence.

³ Matt. 18:7.

⁴ John 17:9.

⁵ John 17:5.

⁶ John 16:33.

⁷ 1 John 5:19.

¹ 1 John 2:16.

In truth it often induces us to sinning: (a) by deceiving the incautious with fallacies which are directly opposed to the doctrine of Christ; for while the Master calls blessed the poor in spirit, the meek and humble, the peacemakers, and those who mourn and suffer persecution for justice, - the world on the contrary pronounces these unhappy and foolish, and places the highest good in riches, pleasures, and honors; (b) by allurements it draws us, by placing before the eyes all those things which please the senses or favor ambition, so that it may deter us from the right path, and by promising any delights to those who wish to serve it; (c) by depraved examples it draws those weak in soul, and terrifies the timid with threats, lest they fulfill their office.²

² Cf. Marion, De la solidarite morale, Paris, 1883, p. 163-231.

Yet it must be noted that those who are strong in soul, and trust in God, not with difficulty despise the vanities of the world and reject its solicitations: "Have confidence, I have overcome the world... And this is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith."³

³ John 16:33; 1 John 5:4.

442. (B) The devil likewise not rarely incites man to sin: he tempted our first parents,⁴ did not hesitate to attack Christ Himself,⁵ and incited Judas the traitor to hand over the Lord;⁶ but in a general way, the Apostles warn us to beware of diabolical temptation: "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour... For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the heavenly places."⁷

⁴ Gen. 3:1-16.

⁵ Matt. 4:3-10.

⁶ John 13:2, 27.

⁷ 1 Pet. 5:8-9; Eph. 6:12.

This, according to common doctrine, he accomplishes in these various modes: (a) by acting upon the external and internal senses, namely by proposing to the eyes, imagination, and memory sensible objects or phantasms, from which passions are moved; (b) also by stirring up passions, namely by cooperating with natural causes which are able to excite the sensible appetite. Yet commonly it is said that he cannot act directly on the intellect and will, which, as being spiritual faculties, are subject to no other external agent except God: "Whence the whole interior operation of the devil seems to be concerned with phantasy and the sensitive appetite; by moving each of these, he can induce to sin."¹ - But here it can be observed that many temptations are attributed to the devil which in truth arise from concupiscence itself.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80, a. 2. - Yet some think that the demon can also act directly on the intellect.

The cause of personal sin (causa deficiens),¹ as we have seen, is free-will. "If any one saith," defines the Tridentine Council, "that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema."² —"Man's will alone/' says St. Thomas, "is directly the cause of his sin."³ And St. Augustine:

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, XII, c. 7: "Let no one seek an efficient cause of an evil will; for it is not efficient but deficient, because that is not an effecting but a defecting. For to fall away from that which supremely is toward that which is less is to begin to have an evil will." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 355).

² Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 6: "If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as well as good, not merely permissively but also properly and of Himself, so that the treason of Judas is no less His own work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema."

³ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1: "A man’s will alone is directly the cause of his sin." —Cfr. De Malo, qu. 3, art. 3: "An act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination of the will toward what is willed, just as natural appetite is nothing other than an inclination of nature toward something. The inclination of nature is both from the natural form and from Him who gave the form; hence the upward motion of fire is said to be from its lightness and from the generator that produced such a form. Thus the motion of the will proceeds directly from the will and from God, who is the cause of the will, who alone works in the will and can incline it to whatever He wills. But God is not the cause of sin. It remains, therefore, that nothing other than the will is the direct cause of human sin."

"It is written into every heart by the hand of God that sin is impossible without the cooperation of the will." ⁴ The will can excite concupiscence and proceed from desire to act, thus producing sin, as it were, out of itself. The will may also be seduced by outside influences (causae occasionales). Of these there are chiefly two, viz.: temptation and occasion.

⁴ De Duab. Anim. c. Manich., c. n, n. 15: "Every mind reads within itself, divinely inscribed, that sin cannot exist without the will." (Migne, P. L., XLII, 105.)

I. TEMPTATIONS. —Temptation, broadly speaking, is a testing or trial of the will. Defined more narrowly, it is a direct incitement to evil which stirs up concupiscence and thereby causes a struggle between the good and the evil forces of nature.

A temptation may be either internal or external, and it may proceed from God (tentatio probationis), or from the devil, or from the world, or from concupiscence.⁵ i. Christ exhorts all men to pray, "Lead us not into temptation." ⁶ St. Paul says that God suffers all to be tempted.⁷ Hence there are temptations that come from God. Not, of course, as if God seduced His creatures to sin. "Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God, for God is not a tempter of evils, and he tempteth no man." ⁸ "When He 'tempts' a man/' says Dr. Pohle, "He simply 'tries his faith/ as in the case of Adam and Abraham; which is quite compatible with His infinite holiness." ⁹ God tries man's faith, not merely in a passive manner, by allowing him to be tempted, but sometimes actively, by sending him trials and worries which may become a source of temptation and thereby a means of probing his character. But St. Paul tells us that God never allows man to be tempted beyond his strength.¹⁰ And St. James assures us: "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life which God hath promised to them that love him.”¹¹ Hence Au- gustine's exhortation: "It is not good for us to be without temptations, nor should we ask God that we be not tempted, but rather that we be not led into temptation." ¹² 2. THE DEVIL. —Sin originated with the Devil. He “sinneth from the beginning.”¹³ He is "the prince," ¹⁴ " the god of this world,"¹⁵ a murderer and a liar,¹⁶ "the tempter" par excellence,¹⁷ who seduced our first parents,¹⁸ and tempted Job,¹⁹ Ananias and Saphira,²⁰ Judas,²¹ nay our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.²² The Apostles repeatedly warn the faithful against this sinister foe, who is the more dangerous because, according to St. Paul, he transforms himself into an angel of light.²³ In view of the plain scriptural teaching on the subject no Christian needs to be assured that belief in the evil one is not a "remnant of medieval superstition," or that the Devil is not merely a "symbol of evil." ²⁴ On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that Satan is a creature dependent upon God and limited in power. He is a dangerous tempter, but he can compel no man to do wrong. His power amounts to nothing unless he can get man to consent to his evil suggestions. "It is our will, not his power that delivers us into his hands/' says St. Bernard.²⁵ "However great the power and pertinacity of Satan," says the Roman Catechism, "he cannot, in his deadly hatred of our race, tempt or torment us as much or as long as he pleases; but all his power is governed by the control and permission of God." ²⁶ There is an apt comparison of the devil to a chained dog in a sermon attributed to St. Augustine. ²⁷

⁵ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 13: "The struggle that remains is with the flesh, with the world, and with the devil." — Cfr. St. Augustine, Serm., 344 (a/. 31), n. 1: "This contest is set before us: this struggle with the flesh, this struggle with the devil, this struggle with the world." (P. L., XXXIX, 1512).

⁶ Matth. VI, 13.

⁷ 1 Cor. X, 13. —Cfr. Gen. XXII, 1; Deut. XIII, 3; Tob. XII, 13.

⁸ Jas. I, 13: "God is not a tempter of evils, and He Himself tempts no one."

⁹ Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, p. 345.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. X, 13.

¹¹ Jas. I, 12. —St. Ambrose, De Abraham, 1. i, c. 8, n. 66: "God tempts in one way, the devil in another. The devil tempts in order to overthrow; God tempts in order to crown. Indeed, He tempts those whom He has approved for Himself. Hence David also says: Prove me, O God, and try me. And He first approved holy Abraham and then tempted him, lest, if He tempted him before approving him, He should burden him. For God did not will the son to be sacrificed by his father, nor did He will this duty to be fulfilled, for He offered a ram to be sacrificed in place of the son; but He tested the father’s affection, whether he would prefer God’s precepts to his son and would not bend the force of devotion through consideration of paternal affection." (Migne;, P. L., XIV, 445). —IDEM, ibid., n. 76: "I inquired into your affection; I did not exact the deed. I tested your mind, whether for My sake you would not spare even your dearest son. I do not take away what I Myself gave, nor do I begrudge the heir whom I bestowed upon one who had none." (P. L., XIV, 448).—Epist., 51, n. 11: “You are a man, and temptation comes to you; overcome it.” (P. L., XVI, 1162). Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., 1. 4. n. 41: "He who wishes to give a crown proposes trials. And if ever you are tempted, know that a crown is being prepared. Take away the martyrs’ struggles, and you have taken away their crowns; take away their torments, and you have taken away their beatitudes." (P. L., XV, 1625).

¹² Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 1: "It is not expedient for us to be without temptations, nor should we ask God that we not be tempted, but that we not be led into temptation." (P. L., XXXVI, 761).

¹³ 1 John III, 8.

¹⁴ John XIV, 30.

¹⁵ 2 Cor. XI, 3; John XII, 31.

¹⁶ Gen. III, 1-6.

¹⁷ Matth. IV, 3.

¹⁸ John VIII, 44.

¹⁹ Job I, 12.

²⁰ Acts III, 5.

²¹ Luke XXII, 31; John XIII, 2.

²² 2 Cor. XI, 3.

²³ 1 Cor. VII, 5. Cfr. 2 Cor. XI, 14; Eph. VI, 11-17; 1 Pet. V, 8-9.

²⁴ Cfr. M. Hagen, S.J., Der Teufel $m Lichte der Glaubensquellen, Freiburg 1899.—Th. H. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulut, and ed., pp. 67 sqq.; J. G. Raupert, Hell and its Problems, pp. 82 iqq.

²⁵ De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio, 6, n. 18: "Our will, not the devil’s power, delivers us into bondage to him." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, ion).— Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 1: "The devil is indeed bound so that he may not do as much as he can or as much as he wishes; nevertheless he is permitted to tempt only so much as is expedient for those making progress." (P. L., XXXVI, 761). —IDEM, ibid., 103, s. 3, n. 22: "No one can be tempted by the devil unless God permits it, either for condemning the wicked or for proving the devout." (P. L., XXXVII, 1375).— St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 3: "The devil by his own power, unless restrained by God, can compel a man to perform an act which in its kind is a sin; but he cannot impose the necessity of sinning. This is evident because man resists an inducement to sin only through reason, the use of which the devil can totally impede by moving the imagination and sensitive appetite, as is evident in those who are possessed. But when reason is thus bound, whatever a man does is not imputed to him as sin. If reason is not totally bound, however, insofar as it is free it can resist sin. Hence it is manifest that the devil can in no way impose the necessity of sinning."

²⁶ Catech. Rom., P. 4, c. 15, qu. 8: "Even with such power and persistence, and with mortal hatred of our race, Satan can tempt or vex us neither as much nor as long as he wishes; rather, all his power is governed by God’s will and permission." —Cfr. J. Wirtz, Die Lehre von der Apolytro* sis, Treves 1906, pp. 31 sqq.

²⁷ Cfr. Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm., 37 (al. 197 de tempore), n. 6: "He is bound like a dog fastened with chains and can bite no one except him who joins himself to him in deadly security. Now see, brethren, how foolish is the man whom a dog placed on a chain bites. Do not join yourself to him through the wills and desires of the world, and he will not presume to approach you. He can bark and harass; he cannot bite anyone except one who wills it. For he harms not by compelling but by persuading, and he does not extort our consent but asks for it."—The last sentence is taken from the Epistula Pelagii ad Demetriadem, c. 25 (ibid., XXXIII, 1117).—Cfr. Brev. Rom., Dom. IV post Pent., Lect. II Noct.

As regards the manner in which the devil proceeds, note that he is himself a creature, and therefore cannot read the souls of men, but judges their state by the natural manifestations of their thoughts and purposes.²⁸ Nor can he exercise a direct influence upon the human will. His methods are necessarily indirect and circuitous, though for that reason no less effective. He works upon the imagination, blindfolds reason, stirs up the passions, etc. "The devil," says St. Thomas, is a cause of sin, not directly or sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite."²⁹ He is "the enemy" who came and "sowed cockle among the wheat while men were asleep."³⁰ While it must be admitted that the devil, "the prince of this world," has a share in every sin, it would be wrong to assume that all temptations come from him. Sacred Scripture points to concupiscence as the principal source of sin. "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence."³¹ The fact that sin is often inspired by the devil, does not, of course, render it less culpable. Not to speak of concupiscence, which exercises a powerful influence over every human heart, man himself is but too often the tempter and seducer of his fellowmen.³²

²⁸ Cfr. St. Jerome, In Ps., 6, 20: "The devil does not know inwardly in the soul what a man thinks unless he understands it through outward movements."

²⁹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1: “The devil is not the cause of sin directly or sufficiently, but only by way of persuading or proposing something desirable. Since the human will is moved necessarily by no object, but by itself, the devil is not in himself the cause of sin, but only by way of persuading or proposing a desirable object. Although the devil, according to the condition of his nature, could persuade something by illuminating a person’s intellect, as a good angel does, he nevertheless does not do this, because the more the intellect is illuminated, the more it can guard itself against the deception which the devil intends. Hence it follows that the devil’s inward persuasion and any revelation by him do not occur through illumination of the intellect, but only through a certain impression upon the interior or exterior sensitive powers. By way of disposing, however, he can be a cause of sin insofar as by moving the spirits and humors he makes some persons more disposed to anger, concupiscence, or something of this kind. For it is manifest that when the body is disposed in a certain way, man is more prone to concupiscence, anger, and passions of this kind; and when these arise, man is disposed toward consent. Thus it is evident that the devil inwardly incites to sin by persuading and disposing, but not by completing the sin.”

³⁰ Matth. XIII, 25. —On the temptation of Job St. Ambrose remarks: "The woman, the enticement of the first deceit, is employed; friends are employed to overcome the one who resists by wicked counsels." (Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., IV, n. 39; Migne, P. L., XV, 1624).

³¹ Jas, I, 14 sa; cfr, Rom. VII, 20; Gal. V, 17.

³² Cfr. the Catechism of the Council of Trent, P. IV, c. 15, qu. 10.

3. THE WORLD. —"This present wicked world,"³³ which is full of sin and impiety,³⁴ and hates God and His servants,³⁵ is another prolific source of sin. The term world, as used in the Scriptures, denotes either the physical universe or the human race. In the former sense, i. e., as the aggregate of material things, "the world" deceives and lures man away from His Creator. Taken in the latter sense, i. e., as humanity, especially in the state of original sin and estranged from the true Church, "the world" is full of direct and indirect temptations —seduction, denial of truth, scandal, heresies and perverted ideals, a corrupt civilization, a mendacious press, debased arts, etc. This sad state of affairs accounts for St. John's warning: "Love not the world, nor the things which are in the world; if any man love the world, the charity of the Father is not in him." ³⁶ 4. CONCUPISCENCE. —Concupiscence is the inordinate leaning of human nature towards evil. It results from the fall of our first parents ³⁷ and is the most prolific source of temptations. St. James says: "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. Then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin. But sin, when it is completed, begetteth death." ³⁸ Concupiscence manifests itself through the eyes and the flesh, and also in the form of pride. Though not a sin in itself, it is "of sin and inclines to sin." ³⁹ It is "an incentive" to sin, and becomes sinful only when freely consented to.⁴⁰

³³ Gal. I, 4.

³⁴ John VII, 7; XIV, 17.

³⁵ John XV, 18 sq.; XVI, 20, 33; XVII, 9, 14, 25. —Cfr. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., pp. 72 sqq.; Tillmann, Die Wiederkunft Christi, Freiburg 1909, pp. 25 sqq.

³⁶ 1 John II, 15; cfr. Matth. XVIII, 7; Rom. XII, 2; Col. III, 2. —St. Augustine, Serm., 80 (a/. 23 de Divers.), n. 8: "The world is evil; behold, it is evil and yet is loved as though it were good. But what is the evil world? Heaven and earth and the waters and the things in them—fish, birds, and trees—are not evil. All these things are good, but evil men make the world evil." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 498).

³⁷ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 203, 217.

³⁸ Jas. I, 14-15; cfr. Jas. IV, 1; Gen. II, 6; IV, 7. —Supra, Vol. I, pp. 116 sqq.

³⁹ Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5. —Cfr. 1 John II, 16; Rom. XIII, 23. —Prop. Damnat. Baii, n. 50 sq., 74-76 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1050 sq., 1073 sqq.). —Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 438 sqq.

⁴⁰ Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5.

Concupiscence is in all human beings (with the exception of the Blessed Virgin Mary,⁴¹41), but manifests itself differently,⁴² according to temperament, age, sex, disposition, heredity, education, training, association, manner of life, and other factors. Every man has his own temptations according to his peculiar constitution of body and soul. But each also has his own means of fighting temptation. Hence, while no man is free from concupiscence and temptation, no one is tempted beyond his strength. Every man is able, with the aid of grace, to overcome temptations. Nay, more, he can and should convert them into means of spiritual progress. "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him." ⁴³ Temptation, therefore, is designed to test and steel the character.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Pius IX, Bull "Ineffab. Deus" (Dec. 13, 1854).—St. Augustine, De Nat. et Grat., c. 36, n. 42: "Excepting the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honor of the Lord, I wish no question whatever to be raised when sins are being discussed." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 267). Cfr. Pohle- Preuss, Mariology, pp. 72 sqq.

⁴² Cfr. St. Ambrose, Expos, in Evang. sec. Luc., IV, n. 39: "The very diversity of temptations corresponds to the diversity of those who contend." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1624).—Cfr. Pius IX, Bull "Ineffabilis Deus."

⁴³ Jas. I, 12; cfr. Gen. IV, 7; Cor. X, 13; Heb. II, 18; 1 Pet. V, 9.

⁴⁴ Cfr. H'ense, Die Versuchungen, 3rd ed., pp. 114 sqq.

Christ allowed the devil to tempt Him in order to show by His example how temptation should be withstood. Moreover, He expressly designated the most effective means of combatting it, viz.: watchfulness and prayer,⁴⁵ the practice of the theological virtues, conscientious fidelity to duty, faithful perseverance in one's vocation, mortification, in short, imitating Him in all things. "If any man will come after me," He says, "let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me." ⁴⁶ In many temptations, especially those against chastity, salvation lies in flight.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Matth. XXVI, 41.—Cfr. St. Ambrose, De Cain et Abel, 1. i, c. 5, n. 16: "The Lord Jesus has certainly taught you how to resist temptations of this kind." (Migne, P. L., XIV, 325)-—IDEM, Expos. Evang. sec. Lucam, IV, n. 17: "We are taught that there are especially three weapons of the devil with which he is accustomed to arm himself to wound the mind of man: one of gluttony, another of vainglory, a third of ambition. He began from the point where he had already conquered. And therefore in Christ I begin to conquer from the point where I was conquered in Adam, provided that Christ is for me the image of the Father and an example of virtue. Let us therefore learn to beware of gluttony and to beware of lust, because it is a weapon of the devil. You have learned the devil’s weapon; take up the shield of faith and the breastplate of abstinence." (P. L., XV, 1617).

⁴⁶ Matth. XVI, 24; cfr. Luke XIV, 27; 1 Cor. IX, 27.

⁴⁷ Cfr. Gen. XXXIX, 12; 1 Cor. VI, 18; Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm. 293 (a/. 250 de Temp.), n. 1: "Against the assault of lust take hold of flight, if you wish to obtain victory." (P. L., XXXIX, 2301).— Cfr. Homer's Odyssey, XII, 120.

"Brethren," admonishes St. Paul, "be strong in the Lord and in the might of his power. Put ye on the full armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of this world of darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in regions above. Therefore take ye up the full armor of God, that ye may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect. Stand, therefore, with your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of justice, and your feet shod with the preparation [to carry] the gospel of peace: taking up withal the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to extinguish all the fiery darts of the evil one. And take unto you the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit (which is the word of God). With all prayer and supplication pray at all times in the spirit ; and in the same watching with all instance and supplication..." ⁴⁸ " When you are tempted," says the Venerable Don Bosco, "shake off the thought of evil and do not wait until temptation has gained possession of your heart, but ward it off by work or prayer."

⁴⁸ Eph. VI, 10-18.—Cfr. St. Au- in gustine, Enarr. in Ps., 136, n. 22: XXXVII, "If you wish to be armed against temptations in the world, let desire for the eternal Jerusalem grow and be strengthened in your hearts." (P. L., 1774).

II. OCCASIONS OF SIN. —An occasion is an external circumstance which leads one to commit sin. An occasion, therefore, is not a temptation; but it may become a temptation by causing evil thoughts to arise in the mind and thus inciting concupiscence. However, not every occasion necessarily entails temptation, and many temptations arise without any external incitement whatever. It is important for the confessor to keep this fact in mind, because habitual and occasional sinners must be treated differently.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Cfr. Pighi, De ludicio Sacrapp. 39 sqq., 59 sqq.; E. Be- De Recidivis et Occasionariis, 3rd ed., Faventiae 1882; Aertnys, C.SS.R., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 7th ed., pp. 192 sqq.; Reuter-Lehmkuhl, S.J., Neo-Confessarius, pp. 274 sqq.

Occasions, like temptations, are an indispensable test of virtue. "Who hath been tried... and made perfect," says Holy Scripture, "he shall have glory everlasting: he that could have transgressed and could do evil things, and hath not done them." ⁵⁰ i. All men are in duty bound to avoid, or, if they cannot avoid, to overcome or resist the occasions of sin.⁵¹ To determine this duty more definitely, the Scholastics have evolved the following distinctions:

⁵⁰ Ecclus. XXXI, 10; cfr. 1 Cor. V, 10.

⁵¹ Ecclus. III, 27; XXXI, 10; Matth. V, 29-30; Mark IX, 41-46.

a) PROXIMATE AND REMOTE OCCASIONS. —An occasion is proximate (occasio proximo) if it leads a person to commit sin oftener than not. It is remote (occasio remota) if it leads to the commission of sin only once in a while.

A proximate occasion of sin may be either absolute or relative. It is absolute or proximate in itself (occasio absolute sive per se proximo) if it constitutes a danger for every man and in all circumstances. It is relative (occasio per accidens sive relative proximo) if the danger it involves differs according to individual character or disposition. Relatively proximate occasions are, e. g., strong drink, the theatre, a certain class of books, plays, etc.

b) VOLUNTARY AND NECESSARY OCCASIONS. — An occasion is voluntary (occasio voluntaria) if sought or wilfully persisted in after one has gotten into it involuntarily. A necessary occasion (occasio necessaria) is one that can be avoided only by the use of extraordinary diligence or not at all. In the latter case it is called physically necessary (occasio physice necessaria). Such temptations may grow out of the mutual intercourse of parents and children, married persons, soldiers, prisoners, etc. If it is more difficult to avoid an occasion than to keep from sinning by the use of proper precautions, an occasion is called morally necessary (occasio moraliter necessaria). Occasions of this kind cannot, as a rule, be avoided without great inconvenience or injury. They invariably involve a grave conflict of duties.⁵² On the one side there is the duty of avoiding the proximate occasion of sin; on the other are such unavoidable professional obligations as, e. g., hearing confession, practicing medicine, etc.

⁵² See Vol. I, pp. 211 sqq.

Hence the further distinction between occasio quae est in esse and occasio quae non est in esse. Occasions of the former class entail immediate danger of sin, whereas those of the latter leave an opportunity of escaping the danger. As an example of the former kind we may mention a woman being an inmate of a brothel.⁵³

⁵³ Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 50, n. 3: “Mulier longe, libido prope. Alibi erat quod [David] videret, in illo unde caderet." (P. L., XXXVI, 587)-

2. PRACTICAL HINTS. —As a general rule it is forbidden to seek an occasion of sin, even though it be only remote, for "He that loveth danger shall perish in it." ⁵⁴ On the other hand no man is bound to avoid all remote occasions, for this is impossible.⁵⁵ But every man is strictly bound: a) To avoid all proximate and voluntary occasions of (grievous) sin, and also those morally necessary occasions that entail immediate danger (occasiones in esse).⁵⁶°° It is a mortal sin to expose oneself voluntarily and without necessity to the danger of committing a mortal sin or to remain inactive towards such danger in a case of necessity, even though the sin be not committed, for to remain voluntarily in the proximate occasion of sin is deliberately to choose evil. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is licit to absolve a man who remains in the proximate occasion of mortal sin, though able to get away from it.⁵⁷ b) If a man finds himself in a morally neces- sary proximate occasion of sin, which does not involve immediate danger (quae non est in esse), he is in duty bound to convert the same into a remote occasion by fervent prayer, devout reception of the Sacraments, frequent renewal of the firm purpose of not consenting to sin, and especially by avoiding the company of those with whom he has sinned before or of whom he has reason to apprehend that they will tempt him. Should these means prove ineffective, all other considerations must be set aside and the occasion strictly shunned, even at the risk of life. c) A physically necessary occasion which cannot be gotten away from, must be neutralized by the use of extreme caution and other available means. If a man is a proximate occasion of sin to himself, he should mortify his body and try to the best of his power to control his passions. "I chastise my body/' says St. Paul, "and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway."⁵⁸ A warning example to all is Peter' s denial of Christ.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Ecclus. III, 27.

⁵⁵ Cfr. 1 Cor. V, 9-10; John XVII, 15.

⁵⁶ Cfr. Prov. VI, 27-28; XVIII, 6-10; Matth, V, 29-30; Mark IX, 41-46.

⁵⁷ Prop. Dainnat. sub Innocentio XI, n. 61: "One who remains in a proximate occasion of sin which he can but does not wish to abandon may sometimes be absolved, even though he directly and deliberately seeks it or thrusts himself into it." No. 62: "A proximate occasion of sin need not be fled when some useful or honorable reason for not fleeing it occurs." No. 63: "It is lawful directly to seek a proximate occasion of sin for our own or our neighbor’s spiritual or temporal good." (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1078-1080).

⁵⁸ 1 Cor. IX, 27.

⁵⁹ Matth. XXVI, 69 sqq.

READINGS. —F. Hense, Die Versuchungen und ihre Gegenmittel, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1902. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. II, pp. 220 sq. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 114, art. 1-5. —Th. H. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., pp. 67 sqq. —M. Hagen, S J., Der Teufel im Lichte der Glaubensquellen, Freiburg 1899.—W. H. Kent, art. "Devil" in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 766 sq.—J. J. Ming, S.J., art. "Concupiscence," ibid., Vol. IV, p. 208. —J. F. Delany, art. "Temptation," ibid., Vol. XIV, p. 504. —IDEM, art. "Occasions of Sin," ibid., Vol. XI, pp. 196 sq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Past., Vol. II, pp. 248 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 322 sqq., 360 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 358 sqq., 364 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S. J., Comp. Theol. Mor., 22nd ed., pp. 751 sq. —A. Konings, CSS.R., Theol. Mor., 2nd ed., New York, 1876, Vol. II, pp. 161 sqq. —St. Francis de Sales, Introduction a la Vie Devote, Part II, Ch. 18, Part IV, Ch. 3-6.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 403 sqq.—F. Ter Haar, CSS.R., De Occasionariis et Recidivis, Turin 1927.

This chapter is divided into two articles: 1. on the causes of sins in general; 2. on temptations to sin.

382. Preliminary note. Since sin, that "mystery of iniquity," is the greatest among all evils, it is of great interest to know its causes; for if its causes are clearly known, it will also be easier to avoid sin itself. For this reason St. Thomas treats at greatest length, that is, through ten questions in 45 articles, of the causes of sins.¹ But we, studying brevity, cannot treat specially except of the efficient cause and of the exciting causes. For four causes are customarily distinguished: material, formal, efficient, final.

The material cause² of sin is that in which sin resides, namely first of all the will, and then also the sensitive appetite and the intellective faculty, but not the external members. For where there is virtue, there sin can be. But in those powers, as being in some way free, virtue can be, but not in the external members, since these are necessarily moved. Thus, for example, the virtue of temperance is in the concupiscible appetite, but fortitude is in the irascible appetite.

The formal cause of sin is its essential constitutive element, namely aversion from God, the ultimate end, if there is question of mortal sin, and disordered conversion to created good.

The principal efficient cause of sin is its author, namely the perverse will, as will soon be proved more broadly. Nevertheless several other secondary efficient causes exist, as will be said below.

The final cause of sin is its intended end. There are indeed diverse particular ends of diverse sins, but the common end of all sins is earthly happiness disorderedly sought.

Leaving aside the material, formal, and final causes, we now treat only of the efficient cause of sin, which indeed is twofold: one interior, namely the faculties of man: intellect, will, imagination, sensitive appetite;³ the other exterior, namely the devil, the world, external goods.⁴

¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 75-84.

² It is often also called the subject of sin. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74.

³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 75, a. 2.

⁴ Ib. a. 3.

383. Principle. The adequate efficient cause of sin is neither God nor the devil, but only the perverse will. So all Catholic authors. It is proved by parts:

a) God is not the cause of sin, as Simon Magus, several Gnostics, the Manichaeans, the Albigensians, Calvin, Zwingli, Beza, and others wished, teaching that God from eternity positively defined and willed all sins which happen in the world.^4a But this is manifestly false and impious. For in Scripture it is said: "Thou art not a God willing iniquity";⁵ and: "Let no one, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God; for God is not a tempter of evils, and he himself tempts no one."⁶ Hence the Council of Trent deservedly defined:⁷ "If anyone says that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works just as he works good works, not only permissively, but also properly and by himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is his own work no less than the calling of Paul, A. S." - This dogmatic truth can easily be proved also from natural reason. For God made every creature for himself and draws all men to himself. Moreover mortal sin is essentially aversion from God, as was said above. Therefore if God willed or caused sin, he would will contraries, namely to convert men to himself and to turn them away from himself.

For greater clarity, however, two things must be distinguished in sin, namely the act itself materially considered and the malice or deformity of the act.

The act materially taken is some being and good, and therefore is caused by God, since there cannot be any being which is not caused by God. Hence, for example, the physical act of adultery is caused by God.

But the malice or deformity of the act, in which precisely the essence of sin consists, is in no way caused by God. For it is privation and defect. To declare this matter more, St. Thomas often uses the example of a lame leg. For just as the soul moves the lame leg and causes the motion, but not the lameness itself, so God moves man to the act and causes the action, but does not cause the defect and disorder of the act. Likewise, as lameness comes from a sick leg, so the disorder or sinfulness of the act comes from the perverse will of man.⁸ Hence God in no way wills or causes the evil of fault which is found in any sinful act, although he causes the physical act of sin. But God permits all sins, because unless God permits, nothing would happen. In this sense St. Augustine said:⁹ "That which happens even against his [God's] will does not happen apart from his will, because it would not happen if he did not permit it; and certainly he does not permit unwillingly, but willingly."

^4a Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 5, a. 9.

⁵ Ps. 5, 5.

⁶ Iac. 1, 13.

⁷ Sess. 6, can. 6 de iustif. (Denz. n. 816).

⁸ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 79, a. 2.

⁹ Enchir. c. 100 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 279).

384. b) The devil is not the direct and sufficient cause of sin. The reason is that the devil cannot cause sin in us except either by directly moving the will to sinning, or by proposing some evil object and efficaciously persuading that this object is to be sought. But he can do neither. Therefore...

alpha) The devil certainly cannot sufficiently move the human will, for the human will is essentially free, and therefore its essence would be destroyed if some extrinsic agent could force it to some act. Wherefore St. Thomas in many places forcefully teaches that an evil angel cannot directly and sufficiently move the human will.¹⁰ Indeed man can and must resist the devil, and therefore St. Peter admonishes: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about seeking whom he may devour; resist him, strong in faith";¹¹ and St. James similarly says: "Be subject therefore to God; but resist the devil, and he will flee from you."¹²

beta) Next, the devil cannot efficaciously move the will by proposing an object, because the will is moved necessarily by no object except by the ultimate end alone. Indeed the devil can stain the human imagination with unlawful images of every kind; indeed he can totally disturb the use of reason, and also cause most vehement disordered motions in the sensitive appetite; but since the human will always remains free mistress of its acts, hence the devil cannot sufficiently and certainly cause formal sin. St. Thomas¹³ briefly states this truth in this way: "The devil by his own power, unless he is restrained by God, can induce someone by necessity to doing some act which of its own genus is a sin, but he cannot induce the necessity of sinning."

There have been those who taught that all sins of men are at least from the suggestion of the devil. But St. Thomas¹⁴ expressly denies this, teaching: "Occasionally indeed and indirectly the devil is the cause of all our sins, insofar as he induced the first man to sin, from whose sin human nature has been so vitiated that we all are inclined to sin.... But directly he is not the cause of all human sins, such that he persuades individual sins. Origen proves this from the fact that, even if the devil did not exist, men would have appetite for foods and sexual things and the like; and this could be disordered unless it were ordered by reason, which is subject to free will." - These things must be kept before the eyes; for they serve to foster our humility. For we must not say, as the first parents did in paradise: The devil seduced us to sin; but it is necessary humbly to confess: I have sinned exceedingly through my fault, through my most grievous fault. Therefore only the perverse will, led by disordered love of self, is the adequate cause of sin. Indeed besides the devil, also perverse men, worldly allurements, and one's own disordered passions can instigate to sin, but it belongs to the will alone to consent to sin, and without that consent no sin can ever be present.

¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 9, a. 6; q. 80, a. 1 et 3; De malo q. 3, a. 4.

¹¹ 1 Petr. 5, 8.

¹² Iac. 4, 7.

¹³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 80, a. 3.

¹⁴ L. c. a. 4.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 1 and 2; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.

461. In what way sin has a cause. - Sin 1) on the part of the act (the material element), has, like any act and any being, an efficient cause per se, namely, the power of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; 2) on the part of disorder (the formal element), it has a cause in the mode in which negation can have a cause:

a) an efficient cause per accidens: for upon the placing of one effect there follows the absence of another; and thus a cause intending the placing is, per accidens, the cause of the consequent negation, as fire by causing heat consequently causes the privation of coldness. Thus the will intending a created good opposed to law at the same time produces the privation of conformity with law annexed to this good, which nevertheless it does not intend, but which it causes consequently, per accidens, and outside its intention. Whence the cause of sin per se on the part of the act is also per accidens the cause of disorder;

b) it has a deficient cause: for in sin there is not mere negation but privation; but that which ought to be in some effect would never be absent except on account of the defect of some cause. Therefore the will causes sin insofar as it defects from the direction of the rule of reason and the law of God, that is, insofar as it does not attend to it or does not use it. Nor is this defect or lack of the rule already sin (although it is a physical imperfection), but rather that the will proceeds with this lack to choosing and acting.

462. Sin has four interior causes on the part of the act: two proximate and immediate, reason and will, which are required in every sin; two remote and mediate, sensitive cognition and the appetite following, when sin is concerned with sensible good. In this case the imagination begins (at least ordinarily) and proposes a delectable good to the sensitive appetite, and immediately by that very fact the appetite is moved into it, preceding reason and enticing it to approve it and judge it good. Then reason adverts to the various advantages and disadvantages of this delectable good, even that it is or perhaps is against the law of God. Nevertheless reason, defecting from the rule, can approve it: then the will, by consenting to it, completes and perfects (through delight, through desire, or through the work) the notion of sin (James I, 14-15).

463. Division of the question. - Therefore sin is from reason directing badly, from appetite inclining under the guidance of imagination, and from will perfecting. Hence we shall speak:

1. of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason;

2. of infirmity or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;

3. of malice (or contempt), which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Thus according to that saying of Isidore, De Summo Bono, book 2: "In three modes sin is carried on, that is, by ignorance, infirmity, and industry." Namely, sins are called sins of ignorance, infirmity, or malice, according as their principal cause or principle of sinning is ignorance, passion, or malice.

1. This distinction, however, is not essential and specific, but merely accidental of gravity, because it is not from the object. Therefore the same sin, for example, of homicide, can be from ignorance, passion, or malice.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 3; De Malo q. 3, a. 3.

478. The exterior cause of sin is that which moves its interior cause, whether the will or reason or the sensitive appetite. No one can move the will immediately except God, who is not the cause of sin but permits it; man and the devil can move reason, by persuading to sin; exterior objects, for example, apprehended in themselves or in the imagination, move the sensitive appetite. Yet nothing so moves the will that it necessarily sins.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79; De Malo q. 3, a. 1 and 2.

479. Sin, according to the formal element, insofar as it is privation, aversion, and defect, is not from God, who is not the cause except of being, nor can he move to aversion from himself: for he is the ultimate end, which inclines all things to himself. This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 6, and from the Second Council of Orange, and the Council of Valence, and the Fourth Lateran Council.

But according to the material element or conversion: a) insofar as it is being, it is from God as from the first being through essence, and insofar as it is act, it is from God as from the first moving cause and the one applying all other causes to acting; b) but insofar as defect is joined to the material element (or insofar as it is the foundation of privation), it is not from God but from the deficient cause, namely free choice: for the act of sin can be considered inadequately insofar as it retains something of the order of reason to good, and under this respect it is not evil but good and is from God; also adequately, insofar as it does not have enough of the order of reason but deviates from it, and thus it is evil and is not from God but from the will defecting from order. Just as whatever there is of motion in limping is from the motive power of the soul, but that the defect of limping is joined to the motion is not from the motive power but from the indisposition of the shin-bone: so whatever there is of perfection and act in sin is from God; but that that act is with defect is from free choice defecting from the order of reason: for God would move to a perfect act if free choice were not defectively disposed.¹

¹ Even in the opinion of the Thomists, man begins sin in some genus of cause, namely the material and dispositive, insofar as he objectively moves God to furnish an influx by reason of the disposition of nature corrupted by original or actual sin: God moves each thing according to its condition. Cf. Billuart, De voluntate Dei, diss. 8, a. 5; De peccatis, diss. 8, a. 9.

480. God is not the cause of sin, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 6: a) not a cause directly and per se, as is clear from what precedes; nor b) a cause per accidens or indirectly, although he could impede sin, by bestowing motion or efficacious grace toward good, and sometimes does not impede it, by not granting that grace, or even by subtracting it from those who place an obstacle: for he is not bound to give such grace and to impede sin, which otherwise he permits according to wisdom and justice (cf. Ps. V, 5; Ecclus. XV, 21; Rom. IX, 14; James I, 13; Deut. XXXIII; Wis. XIV, 9 together with XI, 25).

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 7; De Malo q. 13, a. 4, ad 19.

487. Man is a cause of sin: a) by transmitting original sin, concerning which Dogmatic Theology treats;

b) by suggesting and persuading actual sin to others, which is done by scandal, namely, both by the perverse and false principles of the world (that is, of evil men), and by its depraved works and examples by which it draws the weak, and by threats by which it terrifies the timid, and by the attractions of exterior goods which excite concupiscence (Matt. XVIII, 7; II Tim. III, 1-10; Rom. XII, 2; I John V, 19; II, 16). Scandal formally and principally is against charity, and therefore its malice is spoken of specifically in the treatise on charity;

c) by cooperating with others, which can happen in 9 modes (6 positive and 3 negative): by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising and reproaching, patronizing, participating, by not admonishing, by not opposing, by not manifesting. These are commonly called, metonymically, others' sins (I Tim. V, 22), because, namely, they are committed by others, yet are imputed to us, because in some way we are their cause insofar as we have cooperated toward them as authors, helpers, or those not impeding them. Hence they are others' and our own at the same time, because although committed by others, by reason of cooperation they become our own.

488. Cooperation toward the sin of another is every concurrence furnished to the evil action of another.¹

¹ Waffelaert wrote excellently on cooperation in a special little work: Etude sur la Cooperation et l'espece morale du scandale.

A. By reason of the mode in which it is done: I. one cooperation is properly so called and directly voluntary, which is done by a positive act (the first 6 modes); II. another is improperly so called and indirectly voluntary, which is done by omission of an action impeding sin by one who can impede and is bound to this (the 3 negative modes): the latter is called negative, the former positive.

Positive cooperation is twofold: 1. broadly so called, which is done by a moral influence upon the will of another who executes the evil action (so that his will may be moved or in some way determined to sin): it is identified with direct scandal, which is not a mere occasion but a true moral cause of the sin of another, and is done by command, counsel and seduction, petition and consent, praise, moral patronage;

2. strictly so called, which is done by a real influence upon the evil effect itself, by helping another to produce it, or by partially causing with another principally acting the evil act or effect, which is done by participation or real patronage: it is called a) immediate when the cooperator executes with the principal agent the very act of sin, for example, by helping a thief in taking away another's thing, as if two steal one thing by carrying it together; b) mediate when the cooperator supplies something (matter, faculty, means) which serves the principal agent for executing the evil work, or for executing it more easily, for example, by handing over a ladder for stealing or by opening a window for a thief. This can be more or less proximate or remote, according as the means supplied, from its nature or from the circumstances, more or less influences and has a greater or lesser connection with the sin of the principal agent; for example, to hold a ladder for one ascending, or to furnish an idol to an unbeliever, is called proximate cooperation; to hand over a ladder, or to sell matter from which an idol is to be made, remote cooperation.

B. By reason of intention, it is divided into formal cooperation, when the cooperator consents to the evil will of the principal agent and intends his sin (as happens in direct scandal); and material cooperation, when he does not intend the sin but does something foreseeing that the principal agent will abuse it to perpetrate sin. Therefore the same action, according to a diverse intention, can be formal or material cooperation: thus an innkeeper, if he serves drink to someone for the end that he become drunk, is formal cooperation; but only material if for the sake of profit he furnishes drink to one who is foreseen to be about to make himself drunk.²

² Thus material and formal cooperation is better defined after St. Alphonsus. But in order that the doctrine of authors may be rightly understood, the reader must attend to the fact that they sometimes explain the terms otherwise.

489. Principles. Cooperation toward evil generally is illicit, because it is to place a cause of an evil effect; and this cannot be licit unless the action in itself is not evil, but at least indifferent, the intention is right, and there is produced equally immediately at the same time both a good effect and an evil one which is compensated (n. 173). Hence:

a) Formal cooperation is always illicit, because it does not proceed from a right intention but intends the sin of the principal agent, and therefore is always a sin of the same species as that sin, as consent in it and approval of it.

b) Immediate cooperation, even merely material, is illicit, because it is not an indifferent action but an evil one; indeed it is always a sin of the same species as the sin of the principal agent, because it is to execute with him and to do the prohibited work itself; - unless sometimes the question is of goods of fortune, in the taking away of which the owner can consent.

c) Mediate merely material cooperation, although not always and necessarily, nevertheless per se and ordinarily is illicit, because it is an act of evil appearance which is not licit except on account of an extrinsic reason rendering it honorable: for if the effect or end is evil and prohibited, even the means for obtaining it per se and ordinarily (unless there is an excusing reason) will be prohibited; for if the means are voluntarily employed, the effect also will be voluntary in its cause; if the means are culpably employed, the effect will be culpable in its cause. This is a sin against the virtue which is injured by the sin of the principal agent (although not of the same lowest species), and at the same time against charity when, by omitting cooperation, we could impede the sin of our neighbor.

d) Mediate merely material cooperation per accidens is licit, if a proportionately grave reason is present.³

³ Hence St. Thomas: "For avoiding some inconvenience, a man can licitly use the matter of another, or not subtract the matter from him, but furnish it." Q. D. De Malo 13, a. 4, ad 19.

Thus according to the rule handed down above concerning an action from which a twofold effect arises: it is licit to place a cause good or indifferent in itself, which has a twofold equally immediate effect: one good, which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason for acting (n. 173). Of these four conditions, the two intermediate ones in this cooperation are always verified from the nature of the thing; hence it must be said that this cooperation is licit, if the action is not evil in itself (which is not always easy to determine), and if a proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present.

490. A proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present, if the good end or effect, that is, the utility and necessity of acting, compensates the evil effect, or rather the influence into the evil effect: thus, for example, if another means is lacking, it is licit to cooperate mediately toward the sin of another on account of avoiding his greater sin (as toward drunkenness lest he blaspheme), and toward harm to neighbor on account of avoiding either a greater harm to him or an equal harm to oneself; of two evils the lesser evil is to be preferred.

Hence a graver cause is required the graver the cooperation is, that is:

a) the graver the sin is toward which someone cooperates, both in itself and with respect to the harm which it brings to the honor of God, the common good, or a third party; for example, a graver cause is required for cooperating with a sin of injustice than with another, because the cooperation is done not only to the spiritual harm of the sinner but also to the temporal harm of a third party; likewise for cooperating with homicide than with theft;

b) the more proximate the cooperation is, that is, the more it influences the sin of another or is more closely connected with it; for example, a graver cause is required for arranging the type in printing a bad book than for preparing the papers, for extending the sword of killing than for the material from which it is made;

c) the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin; for example, a greater cause is required for selling weapons, wine, bad books, etc., if there is one shop than if there are many who sell those things; for furnishing meats in a paternal house than in a tavern.

491. Therefore the following special practical rules can be established:

1. Proximate cooperation toward an action which is gravely harmful to the public good, whether of religion or of the state, is excused from mortal sin on account of no harm whatever, because it is a perversion of order: to prefer a private good to the public and common good.

2. If the evil action does not gravely harm the public good, proximate cooperation toward it (especially if it is necessary for the execution of the sin) will not be excused except on account of a grave cause or inconvenience; indeed, if the cooperation is gravely harmful to an innocent third party, a very grave inconvenience is required, namely, fear of at least equal harm.

C. As regards temptations. Those who tend to progress of virtue are attacked by special temptations, for more efficaciously overcoming which they need the prudent counsel of the confessor.

1. At the beginning: rather often, excited from a certain natural fervor or by spiritual consolations, they easily presume upon their strength and wish to undertake excessive or greater things; but afterward, delights having been withdrawn, they no less easily lose their former ardor and fall into dejection of soul, judging that they cannot attain virtue. Therefore a) let him fortify them from the beginning that the business of perfection is not completed in one day but by slow degree;

b) let him not trust much in fervent beginnings;

c) especially let him instruct them that true and solid progress consists not in delights but in spiritual struggle, and in a firm will of doing whatever pleases God and avoiding whatever displeases Him, and that God, who looks upon the heart, rewards efforts more than apparent progress. Accordingly let them commit themselves with a great soul to the good pleasure of God.

2. After some progress: those who have served God for some time, wearied after some time by the spiritual struggle, often look back, wishing to stand still where they are, and by love of comfort are solicited to tepidity. From this it happens that they decline a little, curtail the exercises of prayers and mortifications, or omit them, or accomplish them negligently, receive the sacraments without fitting preparation, flee difficult things, esteem perfection less, grow in love of the world and pleasures, etc. This is with difficulty adverted to at the beginning of the time, but easily with progress. From this it happens that they begin to hold light defects as small, and admit them deliberately, and sometimes, when temptation presses, slide into mortal sin.

This evil must be carefully treated. Hence:

a) let them be seriously admonished concerning the danger which they incur: he who does not progress in the way of God, by that very fact, because concupiscences and temptations arise, regresses; hence also slow tepidity is often more dangerous than mortal sin itself, Apoc. III, 15-16;

b) let them be excited to greater fervor, both because those who have been heaped with more abundant graces are held to greater perfection, and because the loss of time and grace is treated severely by God, and because God, the best and greatest, deserves to be worshiped with all the strength we can;

c) let them be ordered to resume and perform well all neglected exercises of devotion, especially mental prayer and examination of conscience, or even to increase them for some time, or also to make a sacred retreat.

d) But if kind exhortation does not profit, let them be treated with severity and terrified by the terror of divine judgment.

3. Finally in the more advanced state of virtue: from time to time they are caught in the snare of pride, vain glory, and a certain rash presumption. From this it happens that, forgetful of the necessity of divine help, they are pleased with themselves in their own strength, rashly throw themselves into certain occasions of sin, and hold negligence in small matters as harmless, and are deceived by vain illusions; thus anger is judged zeal, pertinacity is held for constancy, prodigality for liberality, self-love for divine love, sensual love for charity. Hence they can also fall into grave sin, although more rarely.

For these things it will profit a) generally to use instant prayer, discussion of self, consideration of one's need and fragility, and frequent remembrance of sins;

b) specifically, as regards the practice of virtues, counsel and simple and humble obedience to the confessor, and particular examination; and for avoiding illusions, let them do nothing extraordinary without the confessor having been consulted.

I. What temptation is. - The incitement of temptation is the common lot of men in the present life, from which not even the most perfect are altogether freed. Temptation is an incitement to sin, or toward a created good proposed to the will, by which it is allured or inclined to violate virtue or a precept. It can be light, grave, most grave, according as the force of moving is small, vehement, or most vehement for inciting the will. That force depends on the nature of the thing, on the vividness of the representation, and on the intensity of the appetite.

Temptation arises either from an intrinsic principle, namely from the corruption of nature, especially of the flesh, Jas. I, 14-15; or from an extrinsic principle: either by way of an object alluring externally, and thus it is from the world, by whose temporal goods, that is, riches, honors and glory, or power, and pleasures and false principles man is allured to sinning; or by way of an agent which internally moves the imagination to representing evil and excites the appetite to a perverse motion of passion, so that reason and will may thus be drawn to evil, and in this way it is from the devil, although he can also appear externally, which nevertheless very rarely happens. Concerning these, cf. the treatise on Sins.

Temptations can be from ourselves, that is, from our evil concupiscence, and from the devil at the same time, and these temptations are more common. But if they exceed the customary passions of our powers, they are attributed to the devil alone and are preternatural; these occur more rarely.

Now it rather often happens that penitents are cast down in soul because of temptations which they frequently and vehemently suffer; these now must be taught the necessity of perpetual combat, the end and utility of temptations, and the manner of resisting them.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 114, a. 2; II Sent. d. 21, q. 1, a. 1; in ep. ad Hebr. VI, 15, l. 3; Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 244; Aertnijs, Th. P., nn. 168-175; Marc, Th. M., I, n. 378; Tanquerey, de Pecc., nn. 443-448; Lehmkuhl, Th. M., II, nn. 629-632; Noldin, Th. M., I, nn. 327-329; Prummer, Th. M., I, nn. 385-389; Hense, Die Versuchungen. Likewise the theological inquiry La Tentation, by Fr. Masson in the periodical La Vie spirituelle, Nov. and Dec. 1923; Jan., Feb., July, Sept. 1924; Feb., March, April 1926.

II. Necessity of temptation. - The Scriptures teach the necessity of temptation, Job VII, 1; Eccli. II, 1; Tob. XII, 13. But the reason of this necessity is that God proposes immortal life both a) as a crown toward which we strive; but no crown is given without an opposing difficulty to be overcome; hence the Apostle, II Tim. II, 5: "No one will be crowned unless he has fought lawfully"; and b) as the reward of service for proving our fidelity: Deut. XIII, 3: "The Lord your God tempts you, that it may be made manifest whether you love Him or not with all your heart and with all your soul."

Therefore God tempts us or permits us to be tempted for proving fidelity, but not like the devil, for deceiving us and leading us into sin, according to Jas. I, 13.

III. Ends of temptation. - Therefore the ends or utilities on account of which God permits temptations are the good of His faithful and just ones, namely our good, and indeed manifold. For temptations:

1. give man knowledge of himself, show his fragility and need of divine help, and thus admonish him concerning humility, beat down his pride, and teach him both how much he ought to distrust himself and how much he ought to trust God;

2. teach him the envy of the devil, and to exercise continual vigilance and mortify the passions;

3. render him more fervent in the service of God, and free him from torpor and softness;

4. induce him into love of the heavenly fatherland, where there are no snares, nor struggles, but peace and full possession of life always going to endure;

5. join the soul to the faithful God, who does not permit one to be tempted above that which we can bear, but accommodates helps to temptations and with temptation makes the outcome of help, I Cor. X, 13, and thus raises one to confidence and hope of victory, and confers tranquility of soul; for grave temptations are rather a sign that we are in the friendship of God;

6. furnish testimony, increase, and consolidation of virtue, because by repeated strong and heroic acts the habit is increased and brought to perfection;

7. have an opportunity for satisfying for sins and for being purified from their remnants: for where a man indulged evil affections and delights, there they subject him to pains and afflictions;

8. enrich us with many and splendid crowns if we conquer, according to Jas. I, 12; Wis. III, 5; Apoc. III, 21; thus by increasing merit, they also increase future glory: for as often as we conquer, so often we shall be crowned;

9. instruct man, not only for himself, but also for others, Eccli. XXXIV, 9; and St. Gregory, Mor., l. 23, c. 27;

10. finally they manifest more splendidly the divine attributes: power, mercy, wisdom which draws good from evil, justice which repays according to works.

IV. General means against temptations of whatever kind are humility, prayer, and fortitude. Humility removes the impediments of assisting grace: for God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble, Jas. IV, 6. Prayer obtains the helps of grace, Mt. VI, 13; Luke XI, 4. Fortitude uses them, removes pusillanimities, Phil. IV, 13; I Pet. V, 9, and presumptions, and takes care that someone not rashly expose himself to dangers.

From these the following general rules can be deduced for practice, to be suggested by the confessor to the penitent:

1. If temptation attacks you, repel it immediately from the beginning, lest, if it is negligently permitted to grow strong, it increase with such power that victory becomes very difficult. Therefore follow the prescription of the Lord: Pray that you enter not into temptation, and immediately flee to the mercy of God, confidently entrusting your infirmity to Him; or turn the soul to an honorable external occupation, or elicit an act of virtue, e.g., of charity or contrition, or of the opposed virtue.

2. Relying on divine help, be of great soul in temptations, mindful that you can do all things in God: "Resist the devil and he will flee from you," Jas. IV, 7; Phil. IV, 13. For if the devil adverts you to be fainthearted, he will assail more, promising himself already the victory which great confidence in God would supply to the one tempted.

3. Beware altercation with the enemy: for altercation will increase the temptation, disturb the soul, and the enemy will wrap it in darkness.

4. Constantly exercise the virtue opposed to the temptation, by meditating on its beauty and the contrary baseness of the vice, and by increasing horror of the vice and esteem of the virtue.

5. Open especially troublesome temptations to the confessor or spiritual director: Satan hates nothing more than that his machinations not remain hidden; then God is accustomed to reward this act of humility by breaking temptations.

V. Diverse manner of fighting against temptations. - Since the genera of temptations are diverse, of which some cast in bitterness, others sweetly allure, the manner of fighting is also diverse. Against temptations of the former genus it profits to struggle not only defensively but also offensively, by seeking occasions of subduing them, e.g., anger, impatience, lust for vengeance, sloth, vain glory. But sweet temptations are conquered more safely by flight, that is, by calling the mind away, than by direct attack, e.g., against faith or chastity, so that they must be excluded from memory and their occasions removed. St. Thomas teaches this, II-II, q. 35, a. 1, ad 4: "Sin is always to be fled; but the attack of sin is sometimes to be overcome by fleeing, sometimes by resisting. By fleeing indeed, when continued thought increases the incentive of sin, as in lust, whence it is said, I Cor. VI, 18: flee fornication; but by resisting, when persevering thought removes the incentive of sin which comes from some light apprehension. And this happens in sloth: because the more we think concerning spiritual goods, the more pleasing they are rendered to us, from which sloth ceases."

Hence certain special rules can be established:

1. In temptations against chastity there is need of special caution lest you be disturbed or fear inordinately, and lest you apply the soul to baseness even for considering it, because thus you will increase the temptation; but immediately flee to God, to the wounds of Christ, to the last things, e.g., death and the punishments of hell, and apply the mind seriously and with all your powers to other honorable things, or even to external works and labors. But care must be taken that with a released soul you look upon Jesus, or upon one good idea, not the temptation; otherwise you increase it. It also helps to have recourse to the Blessed Virgin, the Guardian Angel, St. Joseph, St. Thomas, St. Aloysius, etc. After the temptation, it is by no means expedient anxiously to ruminate whether you consented to it, since the temptation could easily return.

Again. No sin, even venial, exists which is not voluntary. But the primo primi motions, which anticipate every advertence of reason, and those which we suffer unwillingly, are in no way voluntary. Therefore.

Again. No one is bound to the impossible. But it is impossible for man to prevent the motions of concupiscence from arising, whether from the unlooked-for apprehension of an object present or absent, or from the natural disposition of the body, or from the devil procuring them : since all these causes are not within the power of man.

As to the things objected especially from Sts. Augustine and Thomas, it must be answered that they take sin or fault improperly, either for that which is from sin and inclines to sin, or for any disorder of nature, even though not imputable; or else that they speak of the motions of concupiscence that are secundo primi, which do not proceed from perfect deliberation. Moreover, that the holy Doctors think Catholicly with us is evident from their testimonies cited in the first conclusion. Likewise, as regards Augustine, from lib. V cont. Julian., c. 3; ib. IV cont. eumd., c. 15; lib. I de Civit., c. 26, and lib. II de Peccatorum meritis et remis., c. 4. As to St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 154, a. 5, o, and q. 7 de Malo, a. 6, ad 6.

Note 1°. Sin, as a concrete accident, imports two things, material and formal. The material is the act or entity; the formal is the malice or deformity. When we ask whether God be the cause of sin, the question is not of the material, but of the formal; as when I ask who made this statue, I ask not who made the wood, but who made the form or figure.

Note 2°. A twofold cause of sin can be distinguished: one per se and directly, as when someone impels to sin, concurs positively in it or flows into it; another per accidens and indirectly, as removing a prohibition, as when one does not hinder a sin which he can and ought to hinder. These things noted, I say 1°: God neither is nor can be the per se and direct cause of sin²; that is, God does not impel, move, instigate to sin, does not command it, does not do it, neither per se, nor through Satan or the impious as his instruments, as Calvin, Zwinglius and other here- ² Ibid.

^{1 2 1} Here q. 79, a. 1, o. ² Ibid.

It is proved 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XXXII, 4, it is said: The works of God are perfect, and all his ways judgments: God faithful and without any iniquity, just and right. Rom., IX, 14: Is there injustice with God? Far be it! Psal., V, 5: Not thou willing iniquity art God. Eccli., XV, 12: Say not: He hath caused me to err, that is, deceived me and led me into sin. And afterwards, 21: He commanded no man to do wickedly. Jacob., I, 13: Let no man when he is tempted say that he is tempted of God; for God is not the tempter of evils. I Joann., III, 8: He who committeth sin is of the devil. Sap., XI, 25: Thou hatest none of the things which thou hast made. And yet Sap., XIV, 9: To God the ungodly and his ungodliness are hateful. And elsewhere often.

It is proved from the Fathers, who unanimously teach the conclusion. Whence Trid., sess. VI, can. 6: « If anyone shall say that it is not within the power of man to make his ways evil, but that evil works, as well as good ones, God works, not permissively only, but properly and per se, so that his own work is no less the treason of Judas than the calling of Paul; let him be anathema. »

It is proved by reason. Every sin is by recession from order which has God as its end¹. But it is impossible that God be cause, to himself or to others, of departing from the order which is unto himself. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. God is the last end of all things, and consequently inclines and converts all things to himself as last end, according to that of Prov., XVI, 4: The Lord made all things for himself. Therefore. ¹ Ibid.

It is confirmed. A just will, as St. Anselm says, lib. de Lib. arbit., c. 8, is that which wills what God wills it to will. Therefore, if God will it to sin, by sinning it wills what God wills it to will, and at once God wills it not to will, and on account of which he punishes it; which is manifestly contradictory.

2° No just reason can be assigned why God should will and make men to sin. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. The heretics assign no other reason, nor can they assign any, but this, namely

^{1 1} Ibid.

that God have those whom he may pity and whom he may punish, and thus mercy and justice shine forth. But from this, that God wills and makes men to sin, pities some, punishes others, mercy and justice by no means shine forth therefrom, but rather injustice and cruelty appear. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. Although in punishing an unjust man justice appears, nevertheless to make an unjust man, that he be punished, is not justice, but supreme injustice; for this is not to intend punishment on account of guilt, but guilt on account of punishment, which is wholly disordered and unjust. Nor is it mercy, but rather cruelty, to make a man impious, that he be freed from impiety; as it would be cruel to wound a man that he be healed. Therefore.

I say 2°: Neither per accidens and indirectly is God the cause of sin; because then alone is anyone said to be the per accidens and indirect cause of sin, namely as removing a prohibition, when he can and ought to hinder sin and hinders it not; as a pilot is not said to be the cause of the sinking of a ship from this, that he does not steer the ship, unless he withdraw his steering, able and bound to steer. But God, according to the laws of his wisdom and universal providence, is not bound to hinder the sins which he permits. Therefore.

You will ask 1°, about q. 80 of St. Thomas, whether and how the devil is the cause of men's sins.

I answer. 1° It is certain that the devil is in some way the cause of men's sins². It is manifest because he led Eve into sin, tempted Job, and daily tempts men: whence that of I Petr., V, 8: Your adversary the devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour. ² Here q. 80, a. 1, o.

2° The devil cannot be the direct and sufficient cause of sin³; because he cannot be the cause of sin, except either by acting interiorly upon the will and moving it to sin, or by proposing the object and persuading its appetibility. But the first he cannot do; for to move the will interiorly by acting upon it belongs to God alone. ³ Ibid.

^{1 2 3 1} Ibid. ² Here q. 80, a. 1, o. ³ Ibid.