Article III: On Man Cooperating

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 7; De Malo q. 13, a. 4, ad 19.

487. Man is a cause of sin: a) by transmitting original sin, concerning which Dogmatic Theology treats;

b) by suggesting and persuading actual sin to others, which is done by scandal, namely, both by the perverse and false principles of the world (that is, of evil men), and by its depraved works and examples by which it draws the weak, and by threats by which it terrifies the timid, and by the attractions of exterior goods which excite concupiscence (Matt. XVIII, 7; II Tim. III, 1-10; Rom. XII, 2; I John V, 19; II, 16). Scandal formally and principally is against charity, and therefore its malice is spoken of specifically in the treatise on charity;

c) by cooperating with others, which can happen in 9 modes (6 positive and 3 negative): by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising and reproaching, patronizing, participating, by not admonishing, by not opposing, by not manifesting. These are commonly called, metonymically, others' sins (I Tim. V, 22), because, namely, they are committed by others, yet are imputed to us, because in some way we are their cause insofar as we have cooperated toward them as authors, helpers, or those not impeding them. Hence they are others' and our own at the same time, because although committed by others, by reason of cooperation they become our own.

488. Cooperation toward the sin of another is every concurrence furnished to the evil action of another.¹

¹ Waffelaert wrote excellently on cooperation in a special little work: Etude sur la Cooperation et l'espece morale du scandale.

A. By reason of the mode in which it is done: I. one cooperation is properly so called and directly voluntary, which is done by a positive act (the first 6 modes); II. another is improperly so called and indirectly voluntary, which is done by omission of an action impeding sin by one who can impede and is bound to this (the 3 negative modes): the latter is called negative, the former positive.

Positive cooperation is twofold: 1. broadly so called, which is done by a moral influence upon the will of another who executes the evil action (so that his will may be moved or in some way determined to sin): it is identified with direct scandal, which is not a mere occasion but a true moral cause of the sin of another, and is done by command, counsel and seduction, petition and consent, praise, moral patronage;

2. strictly so called, which is done by a real influence upon the evil effect itself, by helping another to produce it, or by partially causing with another principally acting the evil act or effect, which is done by participation or real patronage: it is called a) immediate when the cooperator executes with the principal agent the very act of sin, for example, by helping a thief in taking away another's thing, as if two steal one thing by carrying it together; b) mediate when the cooperator supplies something (matter, faculty, means) which serves the principal agent for executing the evil work, or for executing it more easily, for example, by handing over a ladder for stealing or by opening a window for a thief. This can be more or less proximate or remote, according as the means supplied, from its nature or from the circumstances, more or less influences and has a greater or lesser connection with the sin of the principal agent; for example, to hold a ladder for one ascending, or to furnish an idol to an unbeliever, is called proximate cooperation; to hand over a ladder, or to sell matter from which an idol is to be made, remote cooperation.

B. By reason of intention, it is divided into formal cooperation, when the cooperator consents to the evil will of the principal agent and intends his sin (as happens in direct scandal); and material cooperation, when he does not intend the sin but does something foreseeing that the principal agent will abuse it to perpetrate sin. Therefore the same action, according to a diverse intention, can be formal or material cooperation: thus an innkeeper, if he serves drink to someone for the end that he become drunk, is formal cooperation; but only material if for the sake of profit he furnishes drink to one who is foreseen to be about to make himself drunk.²

² Thus material and formal cooperation is better defined after St. Alphonsus. But in order that the doctrine of authors may be rightly understood, the reader must attend to the fact that they sometimes explain the terms otherwise.

489. Principles. Cooperation toward evil generally is illicit, because it is to place a cause of an evil effect; and this cannot be licit unless the action in itself is not evil, but at least indifferent, the intention is right, and there is produced equally immediately at the same time both a good effect and an evil one which is compensated (n. 173). Hence:

a) Formal cooperation is always illicit, because it does not proceed from a right intention but intends the sin of the principal agent, and therefore is always a sin of the same species as that sin, as consent in it and approval of it.

b) Immediate cooperation, even merely material, is illicit, because it is not an indifferent action but an evil one; indeed it is always a sin of the same species as the sin of the principal agent, because it is to execute with him and to do the prohibited work itself; - unless sometimes the question is of goods of fortune, in the taking away of which the owner can consent.

c) Mediate merely material cooperation, although not always and necessarily, nevertheless per se and ordinarily is illicit, because it is an act of evil appearance which is not licit except on account of an extrinsic reason rendering it honorable: for if the effect or end is evil and prohibited, even the means for obtaining it per se and ordinarily (unless there is an excusing reason) will be prohibited; for if the means are voluntarily employed, the effect also will be voluntary in its cause; if the means are culpably employed, the effect will be culpable in its cause. This is a sin against the virtue which is injured by the sin of the principal agent (although not of the same lowest species), and at the same time against charity when, by omitting cooperation, we could impede the sin of our neighbor.

d) Mediate merely material cooperation per accidens is licit, if a proportionately grave reason is present.³

³ Hence St. Thomas: "For avoiding some inconvenience, a man can licitly use the matter of another, or not subtract the matter from him, but furnish it." Q. D. De Malo 13, a. 4, ad 19.

Thus according to the rule handed down above concerning an action from which a twofold effect arises: it is licit to place a cause good or indifferent in itself, which has a twofold equally immediate effect: one good, which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided that there is a proportionately grave reason for acting (n. 173). Of these four conditions, the two intermediate ones in this cooperation are always verified from the nature of the thing; hence it must be said that this cooperation is licit, if the action is not evil in itself (which is not always easy to determine), and if a proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present.

490. A proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause for cooperating is present, if the good end or effect, that is, the utility and necessity of acting, compensates the evil effect, or rather the influence into the evil effect: thus, for example, if another means is lacking, it is licit to cooperate mediately toward the sin of another on account of avoiding his greater sin (as toward drunkenness lest he blaspheme), and toward harm to neighbor on account of avoiding either a greater harm to him or an equal harm to oneself; of two evils the lesser evil is to be preferred.

Hence a graver cause is required the graver the cooperation is, that is:

a) the graver the sin is toward which someone cooperates, both in itself and with respect to the harm which it brings to the honor of God, the common good, or a third party; for example, a graver cause is required for cooperating with a sin of injustice than with another, because the cooperation is done not only to the spiritual harm of the sinner but also to the temporal harm of a third party; likewise for cooperating with homicide than with theft;

b) the more proximate the cooperation is, that is, the more it influences the sin of another or is more closely connected with it; for example, a graver cause is required for arranging the type in printing a bad book than for preparing the papers, for extending the sword of killing than for the material from which it is made;

c) the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin; for example, a greater cause is required for selling weapons, wine, bad books, etc., if there is one shop than if there are many who sell those things; for furnishing meats in a paternal house than in a tavern.

491. Therefore the following special practical rules can be established:

1. Proximate cooperation toward an action which is gravely harmful to the public good, whether of religion or of the state, is excused from mortal sin on account of no harm whatever, because it is a perversion of order: to prefer a private good to the public and common good.

2. If the evil action does not gravely harm the public good, proximate cooperation toward it (especially if it is necessary for the execution of the sin) will not be excused except on account of a grave cause or inconvenience; indeed, if the cooperation is gravely harmful to an innocent third party, a very grave inconvenience is required, namely, fear of at least equal harm.

3. Remote cooperation, if the other is already equipped for sinning, is excused on account of a light cause; unless, by denying consent, the sin could be impeded: for then fear of notable detriment is required.

492. Applications to cases. - In order that the doctrine explained above, and in a moral matter of daily application, may be better understood, it is useful to illustrate it by certain examples from approved authors concerning the cooperation of merchants and servants, which regards many matters, and therefore belongs more fittingly to general theology than other applications which pertain to the special virtues.

A. Concerning the cooperation of merchants: 1. To sell indifferent things, not of themselves destined to evil (painted cards, wine, weapons, knives, meats on Friday, feminine adornment), is licit by reason of profit alone, even if it is foreseen in general that many will abuse them: for the cooperation is sufficiently remote and abuse cannot be altogether impeded.

2. But if this or that one is foreseen in particular as going to abuse them:

a) the sale is not licit except on account of a grave cause proportioned to the sin, because the cooperation is proximate; hence it will not be licit to sell adornment to a girl who is going to abuse it for lust (or drink to one going to become drunk), even if it would equally be bought from others; unless for avoiding notable harm or inconvenience, or on account of a moderately grave cause (the departure of a wealthy customer, diminution of buyers, a grave quarrel, real blasphemy).

b) When by not selling it is foreseen that the sin will be impeded, a far graver cause is required; wherefore it is not licit, except perhaps on account of a most grave cause, to sell a bad book to an innocent person who otherwise would not be corrupted.

c) Finally, if the other is going to abuse the thing to the harm of a third party, fear of equivalent harm is required; for example, it is not licit to sell weapons to one going to kill unless to avoid one's own death or an equivalent evil, and scarcely ever will it be licit to sell things to those who, after making a truly harmful adulteration, are going to resell them to others, because this is gravely harmful to the public good.

3. Things not indifferent, but destined to an evil use either of themselves or by institution, and scarcely having another use, such as poison, truly obscene images, an abortive means, it is not licit to sell unless it is clear that danger of abuse is absent, or unless a most grave cause proportionately excuses.

4. Things which of themselves from their own nature have no other use than evil, and which man cannot use without sin, it is never licit to sell, such as a manifestly base theatrical garment, or instruments destined to impede generation, a drug destined only for abortion, insignia of the Masonic sect; unless it were certain that someone was seeking them for another end and would not abuse them.

B. Concerning the cooperation of servants: 1. To present garments, prepare a horse or carriage for a master going off to sin, open the door to a concubine, bring a torch, prepare a bed, bring a bad book or newspaper, prepare meats on a forbidden day, set out wine for a master going to make himself drunk, etc., is licit by reason of service alone, because these are indifferent services and cooperation toward sin is remote.

2. To accompany the master or carry him by carriage to the place of sin, for example, to a concubine, is not licit by reason of service or profit alone, but there must be added fear of some notable detriment (such as being treated badly, being expelled from the house, a grave quarrel), because the cooperation is more proximate.

But if by the company of the servant the master is rendered more bold for sinning, when otherwise he would not sin, according to St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 64, he can never accompany him; according to others, however, he can on account of the greatest harm, as cases similar to this are: to keep watch while the master sins with a mistress and to warn him if someone intervenes - secretly to gather information concerning the place in which such a girl is accustomed to dwell - to paint an image of a person basely loved - to offer one's shoulder to one ascending to a woman not unwilling.

3. To carry gifts or love letters to a concubine, according to St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 67, is illicit because, since they directly excite to sinning, it is intrinsically evil: for it is cooperation toward the sin of the master and direct scandal toward the concubine. Many authors, however, judge that this is an indifferent work which nevertheless will not be licit except for avoiding grave harm, because the cooperation is sufficiently proximate; but it would be intrinsically evil both to write and carry very base love letters, or to approve them before such a person.

4. To place one's shoulder under, to hold a ladder, to open a window by force so that the master can ascend to deflower a virgin will not be licit except on account of fear of death or equivalent evil, because the cooperation is altogether proximate and maximally injurious to an innocent third party (cf. Innocent XI, prop. 51 condemned).

C. Specifically as to the cooperation of a servant toward usuries: 1. He who helps a usurer only in counting monies, writing accounts, or carrying a pledge, can be excused by reason of service alone.

2. Not so the servant who in the name of the master exacts usuries, because exaction is more proximate cooperation toward the sin of the usurer, even if he exacts amicably.

3. But if he exacted by force or threats, he would not only sin but also be bound, in default of the master, to restitution.