Article First. On Temptation to Sin.

322. Notions. 1. Temptation is the attempt to draw the will over to sin. Temptation arises from this, that an object, some good, prohibited by law is proposed to the will: for this attempts to move the will to consent.

a. Temptation is called grave if the will is vehemently incited by an object prohibited under grave obligation to embrace it; and it is called light if the will is incited to embrace it by an object prohibited under light obligation, or by an object prohibited under grave obligation but only lightly.

b. Temptation is called internal if, once an evil object has been proposed, the appetite is inclined to embrace it; it is called external if only the evil object is proposed, without the appetite being excited to embrace it.

2. The frequency of temptations varies according to diverse internal and external circumstances of persons; nevertheless no one is altogether immune from them, because no one can escape the causes of temptations unless he goes out of this world. Christ the Lord must be excepted, in whom internal temptation was impossible, and the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom the grace of God preserved immune from internal temptation. The ascetics show at length that temptation in itself is not evil, but a good of great moment for the spiritual life.¹

¹ Hense, Die Versuchungen^3 (Freiburg: Herder, 1902). Scaramelli-Winkler, Geistlicher Fuhrer (Regensburg: Verlagsanstalt, 1901). Monsabre-Drammer, Die Versuchung (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1892).

323. The causes of temptations are numbered as three, of which the first, concupiscence, is internal, and the other two, the world and the devil, are external.

1. Concupiscence. a. By the name concupiscence here is understood the sensitive appetite insofar as it is borne also toward sensible goods which are contrary to the moral order.

a. Having arisen from original sin, it remains even in the justified and consists in a positive inclination toward evil. It is not sin; nevertheless it is the most abundant source of sins, because it allures the will to sin. Therefore it is called the fomes of sin by the Council of Trent.¹

b. Acts of concupiscence allure the will to sin in two ways: indirectly, through influence on the intellect, whose judgment concerning the malice of a good so pleasant to the senses is disturbed; directly, through influence on the will, which on account of the connection of the powers is drawn to willing the same thing toward which the sensitive appetite is borne.

c. The force and vehemence of temptation, and therefore the gravity of the danger of sinning, depends on the nature of the thing toward which concupiscence is borne, on the greater or lesser clarity and vivacity with which it is represented, on the greater or lesser intensity of the act of concupiscence, and finally on the weakness of the will, which can be greatly increased in the concrete by natural character and the habit of sinning.

b. Concupiscence is the primary and principal source of temptations: Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence.² The goods prohibited by law toward which concupiscence is borne are of a threefold genus, and according as it is borne toward these goods, there is distinguished in it a threefold respect, which Sacred Scripture indicates: All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh and concupiscence of the eyes and pride of life.³

2. The world. a. Insofar as the world designates the complex of corporeal things, it tempts in this, that it represents sensible goods to the appetite by means of the senses and allures it to embrace them, even if they are prohibited by law.

b. Insofar as the world signifies men alien from God, who profess perverse principles and, indulging their passions, live in sins, it tempts: a. by its principles contrary to the doctrine of Christ, which are disseminated among men both by voice and by writings; b. by its perverse works, by which, as also by conversations, it is a scandal, and excites others to follow evil examples.

3. The devil. a. That the devil incites men to sin is a most certain fact from Sacred Scripture: for he tempted to sin not only the first parents,⁴ but also Job,⁵ Ananias and Sapphira,⁶ the apostles,⁷ and especially Judas,⁸ indeed even the divine Savior;⁹ whence the apostles solicitously admonish us to beware of the temptations of the demon.¹⁰

b. Since the devil cannot act directly and immediately on the human will and draw it to sin, he tempts in this: a. he excites representations in the senses, whether external or internal, alluring toward prohibited goods; b. he imbues the mind with illusions, that death is still remote, passions impose necessity, sins are easily remitted, virtue is too arduous, man cannot be without the pleasures of life, etc.; c. he disturbs the soul with scruples, thoughts of hatred, lust, despair, human respect, etc.

c. Although, as Scripture witnesses, every sin took its beginning from the devil,¹¹ all sins of men proceed from him in some way, he is named the prince of this world,¹² and sins are called his works,¹³ nevertheless the intervention of the devil is necessary neither for every sin nor for all temptations; for concupiscence and the free will of man also suffice for effecting these. In fact, however, the devil is rather often the author of temptations, especially of those which are more troublesome and arise without another cause that is known, e.g. during prayer. The power of tempting in the devil is not absolute, but subordinated to divine providence. Therefore he cannot tempt except when God, by permitting, wills, and as much as he wills.

Note. Although in the Sacred Scriptures God is said to tempt men,¹⁴ nevertheless he himself must not be numbered among the causes of temptations, because he incites no one to sin nor can he incite.¹⁵ The temptations of which God is author are temptations of proving, not of seduction:¹⁶ for he does not himself send these temptations, but only permits them, nor does he permit them beyond strength, and with the temptation he will also make the outcome.¹⁷

¹ Sess. 5, can. 5.

² Jas. 1, 14.

³ 1 John 2, 16.

⁴ Gen. 3, 1-6; 2 Cor. 11, 3.

⁵ Job 1, 12.

⁶ Acts 5, 3.

⁷ Luke 22, 31.

⁸ John 13, 2.

⁹ Matt. 4, 3 ff.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 7, 5; Eph. 5, 11 ff.; 1 Pet. 5, 8 ff.

¹¹ 1 John 3, 8.

¹² John 12, 31.

¹³ 1 John 3, 8.

¹⁴ Gen. 22, 1.

¹⁵ Jas. 1, 13.

¹⁶ 2 Cor. 12, 7 ff.; Gen. 22, 1 ff.; Job 1, 12; Tob. 2, 12.

¹⁷ 1 Cor. 10, 13.

324. On the resistance to be opposed to temptations.¹

a. It is clear that neither the world nor the devil can tempt man unless they excite motions of concupiscence through the senses; wherefore the only source of temptations properly is concupiscence. Now it is asked how the will ought to have itself concerning motions of concupiscence after the mind has fully adverted to them.

b. If consent is prescinded from, the will can have itself toward these motions in a threefold way: a. it is said to have itself negatively or passively or indifferently if it does not consent, but neither applies any means to repress them; b. it is said to resist positively, but indirectly, if it applies means to suppress them, but does not elicit a contrary act; c. it is said to resist directly if it elicits contrary acts. Now it is asked whether there is an obligation of positively resisting depraved motions, whether therefore sin is committed not only through consent to the depraved motion but also through omission of positive resistance.

1. It is not licit to have oneself merely passively toward these motions unless there is a just cause; rather, positive resistance must be opposed to them. a. For motions of this kind cast one into danger of consenting to them, which danger is increased the more the longer they are deliberately admitted; hence the greater the danger of consenting to depraved motions, the graver is the obligation of repressing them. b. If a reasonable cause for omitting resistance is present, the help of grace, by which consent may be prevented, can deservedly be hoped for, provided the firm purpose of the will not to consent to sin is retained.

a. A just cause for having oneself merely passively is present: a. where the motions arise from an honorable and useful action; b. where it is deservedly feared that from positive resistance they may become more vehement, and on the contrary experience establishes that they are more easily removed by being despised; c. where long positive resistance would be too troublesome. Therefore in temptations which last for a long time, it certainly suffices to resist them from time to time. In these cases, therefore, motions of concupiscence are rather to be despised than positively attacked. Nevertheless, especially in the first case, it is preferable to oppose to them an act of displeasure or a purpose not to sin.

b. One must assent to the authors who contend that the obligation of repressing these motions does not arise already from the fact that they are disordered, but from the danger of consent: for the obligation of the will of ruling the powers subject to it indeed requires that it guard against consent to evil, but it does not require that it prevent or repress indeliberate motions arisen from nature.²

2. To omit resistance and to have oneself merely passively where the motions of concupiscence are great and vehement is a grave sin; to omit it where the motions of concupiscence are light does not exceed venial sin, even if they turn about an object prohibited under grave obligation. For vehement motions induce a great or proximate danger of consenting, but light motions induce only a light danger; but we are held to remove proximate danger of consent under grave obligation, and light danger only under light obligation.

a. Hence pious penitents, who in temptations are rarely accustomed to consent, are not easily to be accused of grave sin if they have had themselves merely negatively; on the contrary, those who often fall in temptations can more easily be guilty of mortal sin, although in a particular case it is most difficult to bear a certain judgment concerning this matter.

b. It must be noted that if first-first motions, and evil ones, exist in the will, these after full advertence to them begin to become deliberately evil; wherefore they must always be driven away by positive resistance or dissent. For he who has himself merely negatively toward motions of this kind gravely evil sins gravely.

3. Of itself there is no obligation of directly resisting depraved motions, but of itself it suffices to resist them positively, because this of itself suffices for obtaining the end. Accidentally, however, there can be an obligation of resisting directly if positive resistance does not sufficiently exclude the danger of consent.

a. There are temptations, e.g. against faith, against chastity, which are conquered more easily and effectively by indirect resistance, especially by the mind being seriously occupied with other things.

b. The modes of resisting positively according to St. Alphonsus are the following: a. to elicit an act of dissent or displeasure, which, even if it does not repress the motion, especially one joined with carnal pleasure, nevertheless guards against consent of the will; b. to think about the passion of the Lord or about the last things; c. by praying, to have recourse to God, the Blessed Virgin, or the saints; d. to elicit an act of love of God and of the purpose of dying rather than sinning; e. to turn the mind to other things.

Note. Concerning the occasion of sin, see De sacramentis, n. 412 ff.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 595 ff.

² Castropalaus, Opus morale, tr. 2, disp. 2, p. 10, § 5. Tamburini, Explic. decal., l. 10, c. 2. Lacroix, Theologia moralis, l. 5, n. 111 ff.