Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether God is a cause of sin?
Note 1°. Sin, as a concrete accident, imports two things, material and formal. The material is the act or entity; the formal is the malice or deformity. When we ask whether God be the cause of sin, the question is not of the material, but of the formal; as when I ask who made this statue, I ask not who made the wood, but who made the form or figure.
Nota 1°. Peccatum utpote concretum accidentale duo importat, materiale et formale. Materiale est actus seu entitas, formale est malitia seu difformitas. Dum quaerimus, utrum Deus sit causa peccati, non est quaestio de materiali, sed de formali; sicut dum quaero, quis fecerit statuam hanc, non quaero quis fecerit lignum, sed quis fecerit formam seu figuram.
Note 2°. A twofold cause of sin can be distinguished: one per se and directly, as when someone impels to sin, concurs positively in it or flows into it; another per accidens and indirectly, as removing a prohibition, as when one does not hinder a sin which he can and ought to hinder. These things noted, I say 1°: God neither is nor can be the per se and direct cause of sin2; that is, God does not impel, move, instigate to sin, does not command it, does not do it, neither per se, nor through Satan or the impious as his instruments, as Calvin, Zwinglius and other here- 2 Ibid.
Nota 2°. Duplex distingui potest causa peccati: una per se et directe, ut cum quis impellit, concurrit positive seu influit in peccatum; altera per accidens et indirecte, tamquam removens prohibens, ut cum quis non impedit peccatum quod potest et debet impedire. His notatis, Dico 1°: Deus nec est nec esse potest per se et directe causa peccati2; id est, Deus non impellit, movet, instigat ad peccatum, non jubet illud, non facit illud, neque per se, neque per Satanam aut impios, tamquam per sua instrumenta, ut docuerunt Calvinus, Zwinglius et alii haere- 2 Ibid.
It is proved 1° from the Scriptures. Deut., XXXII, 4, it is said: The works of God are perfect, and all his ways judgments: God faithful and without any iniquity, just and right. Rom., IX, 14: Is there injustice with God? Far be it! Psal., V, 5: Not thou willing iniquity art God. Eccli., XV, 12: Say not: He hath caused me to err, that is, deceived me and led me into sin. And afterwards, 21: He commanded no man to do wickedly. Jacob., I, 13: Let no man when he is tempted say that he is tempted of God; for God is not the tempter of evils. I Joann., III, 8: He who committeth sin is of the devil. Sap., XI, 25: Thou hatest none of the things which thou hast made. And yet Sap., XIV, 9: To God the ungodly and his ungodliness are hateful. And elsewhere often.
Probatur 1° ex Scripturis. Deut., XXXII, 4, dicitur: Dei perfecta sunt opera, et omnes viae ejus judicia: Deus fidelis et absque ulla iniquitate, justus et rectus. Rom., IX, 14: Numquid iniquitas apud Deum? Absit! Psal., V, 5 : Non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es. Eccli., XV, 12 : Non dicas : Ille me implanavit, id est, decepit et in peccatum induxit. Et postea, 21 : Nemini mandavit impie agere. Jacob., I, 13: Nemo cum tentatur dicat, quoniam a Deo tentatur; Deus enim intentator malorum est. I Joann., III, 8: Qui facit peccatum, ex diabolo est. Sap., XI, 25 : Nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Et tamen Sap., XIV, 9: Odio sunt Deo impius et impietas ejus. Et alibi saepe.
It is proved from the Fathers, who unanimously teach the conclusion. Whence Trid., sess. VI, can. 6: « If anyone shall say that it is not within the power of man to make his ways evil, but that evil works, as well as good ones, God works, not permissively only, but properly and per se, so that his own work is no less the treason of Judas than the calling of Paul; let him be anathema. »
Probatur ex Patribus, qui unanimiter conclusionem docent. Unde Trid., sess. VI, can. 6 : « Si quis dixerit non esse in potestate hominis vias suas malas facere, sed mala opera, ita ut bona, Deum operari, non permissive solum, sed etiam proprie et per se, adeo ut sit proprium opus ejus non minus proditio Judae, quam vocatio Pauli; anathema sit. »
It is proved by reason. Every sin is by recession from order which has God as its end1. But it is impossible that God be cause, to himself or to others, of departing from the order which is unto himself. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. God is the last end of all things, and consequently inclines and converts all things to himself as last end, according to that of Prov., XVI, 4: The Lord made all things for himself. Therefore. 1 Ibid.
Probatur ratione. Omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine qui est in Deum sicut in finem1. Atqui impossibile est quod Deus sit sibi vel aliis causa discedendi ab ordine, qui est in ipsum. Ergo. — Prob. min. Deus est ultimus finis omnium, et omnia consequenter inclinat et convertit ad seipsum ut finem ultimum, juxta illud Prov., XVI, 4 : Universa propter semetipsum fecit Dominus. Ergo. 1 Ibid.
It is confirmed. A just will, as St. Anselm says, lib. de Lib. arbit., c. 8, is that which wills what God wills it to will. Therefore, if God will it to sin, by sinning it wills what God wills it to will, and at once God wills it not to will, and on account of which he punishes it; which is manifestly contradictory.
Confirmatur. Justa voluntas, ut dicit S. Anselm., lib. de Lib. arbit., c. 8, est quae vult id quod Deus vult illam velle. Ergo, si Deus vult illam peccare, peccando vult quod Deus vult illam velle, et simul Deus non vult illam velle, et propter quod illam punit; quod est manifeste contradictorium.
2° No just reason can be assigned why God should will and make men to sin. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. The heretics assign no other reason, nor can they assign any, but this, namely
2° Nulla potest assignari justa ratio cur Deus velit et faciat homines peccare. Ergo. — Prob. ant. Non aliam assignant haeretici, neque assignare possunt, quam hanc, scilicet
that God have those whom he may pity and whom he may punish, and thus mercy and justice shine forth. But from this, that God wills and makes men to sin, pities some, punishes others, mercy and justice by no means shine forth therefrom, but rather injustice and cruelty appear. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. Although in punishing an unjust man justice appears, nevertheless to make an unjust man, that he be punished, is not justice, but supreme injustice; for this is not to intend punishment on account of guilt, but guilt on account of punishment, which is wholly disordered and unjust. Nor is it mercy, but rather cruelty, to make a man impious, that he be freed from impiety; as it would be cruel to wound a man that he be healed. Therefore.
ut Deus habeat quorum misereatur et quos puniat, sicque eluceant misericordia et justitia. Atqui, ex hoc quod Deus velit et faciat homines peccare, et aliquorum misereatur, alios puniat, nullatenus inde elucent misericordia et justitia, quin potius apparet injustitia et crudelitas. Ergo. — Prob. min. Quamvis in puniendo injustum appareat justitia, attamen efficere injustum, ut puniatur, non est justitia, sed summa injustitia; hoc enim non est intendere poenam propter culpam, sed culpam propter poenam, quod est omnino inordinatum et injustum. Neque est misericordia, sed potius crudelitas, efficere hominem impium, ut ab impietate liberetur; sicut crudele esset hominem vulnerare, ut sanetur. Ergo.
I say 2°: Neither per accidens and indirectly is God the cause of sin; because then alone is anyone said to be the per accidens and indirect cause of sin, namely as removing a prohibition, when he can and ought to hinder sin and hinders it not; as a pilot is not said to be the cause of the sinking of a ship from this, that he does not steer the ship, unless he withdraw his steering, able and bound to steer. But God, according to the laws of his wisdom and universal providence, is not bound to hinder the sins which he permits. Therefore.
Dico 2°: Neque per accidens et indirecte Deus est causa peccati; quia tunc tantum quis dicitur causa per accidens et indirecte peccati, nimirum ut removens prohibens, quando potest et debet impedire peccatum et non impedit; sicut gubernator non dicitur causa submersionis navis ex hoc quod non gubernat navim, nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem, potens et debens gubernare. Atqui Deus, secundum leges suae sapientiae et providentiae universalis, non tenetur impedire peccata quae permittit. Ergo.
You will ask 1°, about q. 80 of St. Thomas, whether and how the devil is the cause of men's sins.
Petes 1°, circa q. 80 S. Thomae, an et quomodo diabolus sit causa peccatorum hominum.
I answer. 1° It is certain that the devil is in some way the cause of men's sins2. It is manifest because he led Eve into sin, tempted Job, and daily tempts men: whence that of I Petr., V, 8: Your adversary the devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour. 2 Here q. 80, a. 1, o.
Resp. 1° Certum est diabolum aliquo modo esse causam peccatorum hominum2. Patet quia induxit Evam in peccatum, tentavit Job, et quotidie tentat homines: unde illud I Petr., V, 8: Adversarius vester diabolus, tamquam leo rugiens, circuit quaerens quem devoret. 2 Hic q. 80, a. 1, o.
2° The devil cannot be the direct and sufficient cause of sin3; because he cannot be the cause of sin, except either by acting interiorly upon the will and moving it to sin, or by proposing the object and persuading its appetibility. But the first he cannot do; for to move the will interiorly by acting upon it belongs to God alone. 3 Ibid.
2° Diabolus non potest esse causa peccati directe et sufficienter3; quia non potest esse causa peccati, nisi vel agendo interius in voluntate et eam movendo ad peccatum, vel proponendo objectum et persuadendo ejus appetibilitatem. Atqui primum non potest; est enim solius Dei movere voluntatem interius in eam agendo. 3 Ibid.