Article I: On God Permitting

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79; De Malo q. 3, a. 1 and 2.

479. Sin, according to the formal element, insofar as it is privation, aversion, and defect, is not from God, who is not the cause except of being, nor can he move to aversion from himself: for he is the ultimate end, which inclines all things to himself. This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 6, and from the Second Council of Orange, and the Council of Valence, and the Fourth Lateran Council.

But according to the material element or conversion: a) insofar as it is being, it is from God as from the first being through essence, and insofar as it is act, it is from God as from the first moving cause and the one applying all other causes to acting; b) but insofar as defect is joined to the material element (or insofar as it is the foundation of privation), it is not from God but from the deficient cause, namely free choice: for the act of sin can be considered inadequately insofar as it retains something of the order of reason to good, and under this respect it is not evil but good and is from God; also adequately, insofar as it does not have enough of the order of reason but deviates from it, and thus it is evil and is not from God but from the will defecting from order. Just as whatever there is of motion in limping is from the motive power of the soul, but that the defect of limping is joined to the motion is not from the motive power but from the indisposition of the shin-bone: so whatever there is of perfection and act in sin is from God; but that that act is with defect is from free choice defecting from the order of reason: for God would move to a perfect act if free choice were not defectively disposed.¹

¹ Even in the opinion of the Thomists, man begins sin in some genus of cause, namely the material and dispositive, insofar as he objectively moves God to furnish an influx by reason of the disposition of nature corrupted by original or actual sin: God moves each thing according to its condition. Cf. Billuart, De voluntate Dei, diss. 8, a. 5; De peccatis, diss. 8, a. 9.

480. God is not the cause of sin, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 6: a) not a cause directly and per se, as is clear from what precedes; nor b) a cause per accidens or indirectly, although he could impede sin, by bestowing motion or efficacious grace toward good, and sometimes does not impede it, by not granting that grace, or even by subtracting it from those who place an obstacle: for he is not bound to give such grace and to impede sin, which otherwise he permits according to wisdom and justice (cf. Ps. V, 5; Ecclus. XV, 21; Rom. IX, 14; James I, 13; Deut. XXXIII; Wis. XIV, 9 together with XI, 25).