Chapter — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
On the Causes of Sins
Again. No sin, even venial, exists which is not voluntary. But the primo primi motions, which anticipate every advertence of reason, and those which we suffer unwillingly, are in no way voluntary. Therefore.
Item. Nullum est peccatum, etiam veniale, quod non sit voluntarium. Atqui motus primo primi, omnem rationis advertentiam praevenientes, et ii quos inviti patimur, nullo modo sunt voluntarii. Ergo.
Again. No one is bound to the impossible. But it is impossible for man to prevent the motions of concupiscence from arising, whether from the unlooked-for apprehension of an object present or absent, or from the natural disposition of the body, or from the devil procuring them : since all these causes are not within the power of man.
Item. Nemo ad impossibile tenetur. Atqui impossibile est homini impedire ne exsurgant motus concupiscentiae, sive ex inopinata objecti praesentis vel absentis apprehensione, sive ex naturali corporis dispositione, sive ex daemone eos procurante : cum hae omnes causae non sint in potestate hominis.
As to the things objected especially from Sts. Augustine and Thomas, it must be answered that they take sin or fault improperly, either for that which is from sin and inclines to sin, or for any disorder of nature, even though not imputable; or else that they speak of the motions of concupiscence that are secundo primi, which do not proceed from perfect deliberation. Moreover, that the holy Doctors think Catholicly with us is evident from their testimonies cited in the first conclusion. Likewise, as regards Augustine, from lib. V cont. Julian., c. 3; ib. IV cont. eumd., c. 15; lib. I de Civit., c. 26, and lib. II de Peccatorum meritis et remis., c. 4. As to St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 154, a. 5, o, and q. 7 de Malo, a. 6, ad 6.
Quantum ad ea quae objiciuntur praesertim ex SS. Aug. et Thoma, respondendum est, eos sumere peccatum seu culpam improprie, sive pro eo quod est ex peccato et ad peccatum inclinat, sive pro quacumque inordinatione naturae, etsi non imputabili; vel loqui de motibus concupiscentiae secundo primis, qui non procedunt ex perfecta deliberatione. Caeterum SS. Doctores sentire catholice nobiseum constat ex eorum testimoniis citatis in prima conclusione. Item, quoad Aug., ex lib. V cont. Julian., c. 3; ib. IV cont. eumd., c. 15; lib. I de Civit., c. 26, et lib. II de Peccatorum meritis et remis., c. 4. Quantum ad S. Thomam, 2° 2ae, q. 154, a. 5, o, et q. 7 de Malo, a. 6, ad 6.
Within this chapter
- Whether, and what, ignorance is a cause of sin, and is itself a sin?
- Whether there can be invincible ignorance of positive divine law?
- Whether there can be invincible ignorance of the law of nature?
- Whether invincible ignorance of the law of nature excuses from sin?
- On inadvertence to sin
- Whether ignorance excuses from the penalties established by positive laws?
- Whether God is a cause of sin?