Censures in General

I have thought that the treatise on ecclesiastical penalties, which pertain to the proper object of canon law, should be added to moral theology, because in some schools the professor of moral theology also treats ecclesiastical penalties.

1. a. The power which Christ conferred upon His Church, that through it the faithful might be directed to the supernatural end of eternal life, is twofold: the power of order, which is an aptitude acquired by sacramental ordination for performing certain sacred actions, but especially the offering of the eucharistic sacrifice and the administration of the sacraments and sacramentals; and the power of jurisdiction, which is the power of ruling the faithful in order to eternal salvation.

The power of jurisdiction is again twofold: the power of teaching, or the power of ruling the faithful with respect to the intellect through precepts of faith; and the power of government, which is the power of ruling the faithful with respect to the will through precepts of morals.

b. That Christ instituted His Church as a true, visible, and perfect society, to which He conferred every power which is necessary for directing the faithful to the end of eternal salvation, is shown both by dogmatic theologians in fundamental theology and by canonists in public law. But in particular the same authors show that the power of jurisdiction with which Christ willed the Church to be furnished is not only the power of making laws, but also of exercising coercive force and of restraining transgressors of both divine and ecclesiastical laws by penalties. Now, therefore, after laws have been treated, the sanction of laws, or ecclesiastical penalties, must also be treated.

c. Namely, law needs a sanction, by which a reward is decreed for those observing it, but a penalty for those violating it. The sanction of the Christian law is twofold: one of the future life, another of the present life. The sanction of this life consists chiefly in ecclesiastical penalties, by which the Church strives to deter the faithful at least from violation of the graver laws and to compel them to fulfill their duties.

¹ Thesaurus-Giraldi, De poenis ecclesiasticis. J. Hollweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1899). Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. morale^3 (Prati: Giachetti, 1901) VII, De poenis ecclesiasticis. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis^10 (Freiburg: Herder, 1902) II, 860-1030.

WE here understand by a censure a spiritual and remedial penalty by which a baptized and contumacious delinquent is deprived by ecclesiastical authority of the use of certain spiritual advantages. It differs from other penalties, such as degradation, which are also spiritual and inflicted by the Church, in that a censure has in view the correction and amendment of the delinquent, while other penalties have chiefly in view the common good to be procured by the punishment and repression of crime. The Church has jurisdiction only over those who are baptized, and she punishes by censures only those of her children who have done wrong with their eyes open, with knowledge of the wrongfulness of their action and of the spiritual censure by which the Church punishes it.

A censure does not and cannot deprive a man of all the spiritual advantages which he may possess. There are some spiritual gifts in man’s possession which depend only on his personal relations with God, such as sanctifying grace, and the supernatural virtues and gifts which accompany it. These may adorn the soul of one who is not baptized, and they are not possessed by all members of the Church. There are, however, other spiritual privileges which a Christian enjoys through membership with the Church of God. Among these theologians distinguish those that are internal, external, and mixed. Internal comprise the special providence and helps which God grants to the members of his Church because they belong to his Spouse who is continually interceding for them. External are the society and special charity which binds the members of the Church to each other. Mixed are the participation in the same sacraments and sacrifice, the common suffrages, satisfactions, indulgences, children of the Church in communion with her enjoy. According to the common opinion, excommunication deprives the delinquent of all these privileges, it puts him outside the communion of the faithful, and consequently leaves him without the benefits of union.. The other two censures, suspension and interdict, deprive him at least of some of those benefits, as of their nature they are limited in their effect. There are, however, some theologians who with Suarez deny that a censure deprives a man of the merely internal advantages which membership with the Church confers.

With reference to the effects produced by them, censures are of three kinds: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. With reference to the manner in which they are inflicted, they are said to be a jure, or ab homine. The former are imposed by a stable and permanent law, the latter by way of particular precept or sentence. Sometimes a censure is incurred by the very fact of committing a crime, without any declaratory sentence of a judge; it is then said to be latae sententiae. Sometimes it needs the intervention of a judge, and is said to be ferendae sententiae.

Certain conditions must be fulfilled in order that a censure may be incurred:

(a) As it is a serious penalty, and a serious penalty can only be inflicted for a grave fault, a censure can only be incurred by one who has committed a mortal sin.

(b) ‘The Church does not judge of what is merely internal, and so the fault which is punished by censure must be grave externally as well as internally. A slight blow given to a cleric, which does not constitute a serious injury, does not involve excommunication incurred by those who violate the privilege of the canon, even though the act were accompanied with mortal hatred.

(c) Penalties must be interpreted strictly, and therefore the crime which is punished by censures must be completed, not merely attempted.

(d) Inasmuch as a censure is remedial and inflicted on the delinquent for his correction and amendment, it cannot be incurred for a crime which is altogether past, and which has left no traces behind it. Sometimes suspension or interdict may be inflicted in punishment of such crimes, but then they are inflicted for a definite period, or for ever, and become pure penalties, not censures, (e) ‘There must be contumacy in order that a censure may be incurred, or, in other words, the delinquent must be conscious at the time that he is committing a crime which is punished by the Church by censure. It follows from this: that a censure cannot be inflicted ab homine by a particular sentence without previous admonition, and this should ordinarily be in writing so as to be capable of proof. In censures inflicted a jure or ab homine by a general precept which is of the nature of a law, no special admonition is required, as the law itself is a sufficient admonition. Nor is an admonition necessary when suspension or interdict are inflicted by way of mere penalty (Can. 2242).

It is of faith that the Church has the power of inflicting censures. It is contained in the general power of binding and loosing granted to the Church by her divine Founder. This power is exercised by all ecclesiastical prelates who have jurisdiction in the external forum, unless their authority has been restricted. The Pope and a general council have jurisdiction over the whole Church, and they can bind all the faithful by their laws and censures. A bishop can inflict censures on his subjects, as can regular prelates on theirs.

A parish priest has no jurisdiction in the external forum, and cannot as such impose censures, nor can laymen, nor women.

A bishop cannot lawfully exercise contentious jurisdiction outside his diocese, and consequently he cannot inflict censures outside his diocese when the case requires a judicial process. If the case does not require any judicial process, he may impose a censure on a guilty subject even when he is outside his diocese.

A bishop within his diocese may punish with censure a subject who is now outside the diocese on account of a crime which was committed within the diocese, and even on account of a crime which has been committed outside if it had reference to the diocese. And so a parish priest who is absent from the diocese and refuses to come to synod, or who is taking too long a holiday, may be punished by censure. The more probable opinion holds that a subject who violates a precept imposed under censure while he is outside the diocese incurs the censure, though St Alphonsus admits that the opposite is probable. The jurisdiction of superiors over regulars is personal, and these certainly incur censures imposed on them wherever they may be at the time when it is imposed. Regulars belonging to mendicant orders and members of the Society of Jesus have a special privilege granted by the Holy See, by which they cannot be put under censure by any bishop, even when they do wrong in matters in which their general exemption is of no avail, and in which they are subject to the bishop. In three cases, however, these religious may be punished by episcopal censure, notwithstanding their special privilege. Gregory XV permitted this in case they preach in churches not their own without the bishop’s licence, or in their own without asking for his blessing, or against his command; Innocent X added to this the case of disobedience with reference to hearing confessions; and Urban VIII added the case of hanging sacred pictures painted in an unusual or scandalous manner.

In order to incur a censure, the delinquent must be subject to the authority which imposes it. Strangers, therefore, do not incur the particular censures which bind in the place where they are staying for a short time. If strangers, however, violate some provision of the common law which for such violation imposes a censure ferendae sententiae, the bishop of the place may inflict this on them, Even when they offend in other matters, the local ordinary may punish them by other penalties, and if they prove contumacious, they may be put under censure by him.

A censure latae sententiae is multiplied: (1) If different crimes of which each is punished by censure are committed by the same or distinct actions.

(2) If the same crime punished by censure is often repeated so that there are several distinct crimes.

(3) If a crime punished by different censures by distinct superiors is committed once or several times (Can. 2244).

Grave fear and ignorance prevent contumacy, and therefore hinder one who commits a crime under their influence from incurring any censure by which such crime is punished. Grave fear, however, does not excuse from censures inflicted for crimes which produce contempt for the faith, or for ecclesiastical authority, or public harm to souls (Can. 2229, sec. 3, iii). If, however, the ignorance be crass or supine, it will not excuse from grave sin or contumacy, and so the censure will be incurred. But if the censure is inflicted on those who knowingly, rashly, with rash daring, or presumption, commit a crime, full knowledge is required in order to incur the censure, but merely affected ignorance will not prevent its being incurred (Can. 2229).

WHEN a censure has been incurred, it does not cease as a rule merely by lapse of time or on the correction and amendment of the delinquent. The delinquent must obtain absolution of the censure from one who is competent to give it. In some cases, however, a censure is imposed as long as certain conditions last, and then on the termination of those conditions the censure lapses without absolution.

Any confessor in the tribunal of Penance may absolve from censures inflicted by law and not reserved to the Holy See or to the bishop. Censures, too, which are imposed ab homine but by a general precept or ordinance are in the same category, and may be absolved by any confessor unless they are reserved (Can. 2253, i).

Absolution for a reserved censure must be sought from him to whom it is reserved, or from his delegate. Similarly, absolution from a censure inflicted ab homine by a particular precept must be obtained from him who inflicted it, or from his superior, or successor in office, or from some one delegated by one of these to grant absolution (Can. 2253, ii).

If a confessor in ignorance of the reservation absolves a penitent from a censure and from sin, the absolution of the censure is valid provided that it is not a censure ab homine or a censure most specially reserved to the Holy See (Can. 2247, sec. 3).

If there is question of a censure which does not prevent the reception of the sacraments if he who is under censure is rightly disposed and has ceased to be contumacious, he can be absolved from his sins, while the censure remains unabsolved.

But if there is question of a censure which prevents the reception of the sacraments he who is under censure cannot be absolved from his sins unless he has previously been absolved from the censure.

The absolution of a censure in the sacramental forum is contained in the usual form of absolution for sins prescribed in the Ritual; in the non-sacramental forum it may be given in any way, but for the absolution of excommunication it is ordinarily advisable to use the form given in the Ritual (Can. 2250).

If absolution for a censure is given in the external forum it avails also for the internal forum; if it is given in the internal forum he who is absolved if there is no scandal can act as absolved also in the external forum; but unless the grant of absolution is proved or at least can be lawfully presumed in the external forum, the censure can be urged by the superiors of the external forum and the guilty party should obey them until absolution is obtained in the same forum (Can. 2251).

When treating of the sacrament of Penance in the chapter on reserved cases we saw that any priest has unrestricted faculties to absolve any penitent in danger of death, and that a simple confessor has very large powers in more urgent cases by Canon 2254.

OF all the penalties which the Church can inflict, excommunication is the most severe, and it virtually contains the others. It deprives the delinquent of all the advantages which he possessed as a member of the Church, and puts him outside the communion of the faithful. According to the ancient discipline of the Church, no excommunicated person could hold any intercourse with the faithful, nor could the faithful hold intercourse with him, but at the close of the Middle Ages, when heresy became more common, it grew to be impossible to maintain the ancient rigour, and Martin V introduced an important mitigation in the law. By the decree Ad evitanda, he distinguished between those under censure who were still to be avoided and those who were to be tolerated. All who were excommunicated by name, and at the same time specially denounced by name, together with all who notoriously violated the privilege of the canon by striking clerics, were still to be avoided; all others were to be tolerated. By this concession Catholics might without scruple, as far as concerned the censure, henceforth have intercourse with persons under censure who were tolerated. The concession was not, indeed, made directly in favour of those under censure, but these could not fail to benefit indirectly by the relaxation in the law that had been granted to the faithful. The tolerated as well as those to be avoided were still theoretically subject to the former disabilities, but custom made a distinction between them in several important respects.

The Code retains the distinction between excommunicates who are to be avoided and those who are tolerated; no one is to be avoided as excommunicated unless he has been excommunicated by name by the Holy See, publicly denounced as such, and in the sentence it is expressly said that he is to be avoided (Can. 2258).

By the ancient discipline one of the faithful who held unlawful intercourse with one who was under excommunication himself incurred the minor excommunication, but this penalty has ceased to exist since the promulgation of the constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae Sedis, where no mention is made of it.

THE special censures which are now in force in the Western Church are contained in Book V, Part III, of the Code—On the Penalties of Particular Crimes. Of the excommunications some are reserved to the Holy See in a very special manner, others in a special manner, and others simply reserved; others are reserved to bishops, and others are not reserved but may be absolved on proper conditions by any confessor. Special faculties are required in order to absolve from cases reserved to the Holy See, except in certain circumstances described in the chapter on reserved cases. Faculties for cases simply reserved will not avail for cases specially reserved, and faculties for cases specially reserved will not avail for cases very specially reserved. ensures very specially reserved to the Holy See have other characteristics besides requiring very special faculties for their absolution. Canon 2247, sec. 3, provides that where a confessor in ignorance of the reservation absolves a penitent from a censure and from a sin, the absolution is valid except in the case of a censure ab homine, or of a censure very specially reserved to the Holy See. Canon 2237, sec. 2, grants power to bishops to remit penalties latae sententiae of the common law in occult cases, but censures very specially and those specially reserved are excepted. Canon 2252 provides that when a penitent has been absolved when in danger of death by a simple confessor from a censure ab homine or one very specially reserved to the Holy See, if he recovers he is bound to present himself to the person who censured him or to the Sacred Penitentiary, and submit to their requirements. This is not necessary in the case of one who has been absolved in danger of death from other censures.

We shall speak first of censures in general, then of censures in species.

We shall treat first of the notion, multiplication, and division of censure; then of reservation; finally, of remission of censure.

The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to the virtue of faith, are as follows:

(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as contained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in the teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit and handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in exceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.

(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed in scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the Church. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those given in the Creeds, ex cathedra definitions of the Popes, decisions of Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the universal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical letters [see Humani Generis, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are the condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.

(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its object all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not revealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise of the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that is, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic facts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of the saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special recognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of private revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that is, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical, near to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account of their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious, suspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of their tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc. Examples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book Augustinus, the suitability of the terms “consubstantial” and “transubstantiation,” the agreement of the Vulgate with the original scriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the Filioque.

(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of the Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and authoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations given by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of Modern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or definitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are contrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to be rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets are drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses, and the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are in this class.

(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal matters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her position and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It would be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief which the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.

As regards censures and irregularities. - Bishops can, by themselves or by another specially deputed, absolve subjects from hidden papal cases, except those which are reserved in a special way to the Supreme Pontiff. From the Declaration of S. O., 17 June 1866 and 4 Apr. 1871, there is also excepted the case of a person of whatever sex falsely denouncing a priest concerning the crime of solicitation in confession. They can likewise absolve those who strike a cleric lightly; and, if these are living collegially, although the striking was grave, but not if it was enormous. From the same censure they can also absolve those who are impeded from going to Rome. Cf. vol. 2, n. 1182. Various cases, however, are reserved to them by the law itself. C. Apost. Sedis; Decr. S. C. C. concerning the trafficking of Masses, etc. Cf. vol. 2, de Censuris.

They can besides dispense in all irregularities, and absolve from all suspensions incurred on account of hidden delict, except voluntary homicide, and other matters brought to the contentious forum. Trent, s. 24, c. Liceat. Probably they can dispense also in doubtful irregularities from defect. Moreover they can dispense in non-hidden irregularities from defect of birth for minor orders and simple benefices. As regards inabilities enjoined by Pontiffs as penalty, whether they can dispense is disputed, and the matter is very doubtful. Concerning homicide, "the common opinion is that the Bishop can dispense when danger of soul is imminent; or another most grave cause, and it would be difficult to have recourse to the Pontiff, etc." L. 51, 29, 35, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53; l. 3, n. 397; l. 6, n. 593, 705; l. 7, n. 353, 392, 394; E. M.

As regards ecclesiastical censures. The privileges of absolving from papal cases having been revoked by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, regulars can still absolve from cases reserved to Bishops by the same Constitution, and from the censure of the canon, as before the aforesaid Constitution. - All regulars of either sex, in the time of a general interdict, can privately perform divine offices in their monasteries and receive the sacraments; and they can also celebrate publicly on several feasts: Easter, Pentecost, etc. L. 95 ff.; l. 4, n. 61.

Who can enter religion? - From the preceding Law, still in force, but to which several other things have been added: all those and only those can enter religion who 1. are their own masters; 2. are not bound to others by some graver obligation; and 3. are not criminals. Those who are not their own masters, but depend on others, cannot validly enter and profess without their consent. But the others validly enter and profess, although illicitly. L. 65; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5, 6; E. M.; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 1, d. 21; l. 4, d. 47.

261 bis. You will resolve: From the first head, the following cannot enter religion: those before puberty, because they are subject to parents or guardians as regards the disposition of life; spouses after consummated marriage, unless the other party is guilty of a delict on account of which he or she can licitly be dismissed. Religious profession entered into by a spouse, the other spouse being unwilling, is resolved into a simple vow of chastity from presumption of law, C. 3, 12 de Conv. coniug.

A Bishop already consecrated and even only confirmed cannot enter religion without the license of the Supreme Pontiff, because of the spiritual marriage by which the Bishop is bound to his church. C. Licet de Regular.; C. Inter de Transl. Episcop. - From the second head the following cannot enter: those liable to intricate and litigious accounts, those burdened with debt; those who have seduced a virgin with marriage promised; those who would leave brothers in extreme necessity, parents or unemancipated children in grave necessity. - From the third head those cannot enter whom from public acts it is established have been accused or investigated for crime. C. Cum de omnibus and C. Ad Romanum of Sixtus V; C. In suprema of Clement VIII. - Illegitimates from the same law are admitted validly and licitly. Sixtus V, C. Cum de omnibus, November 26, 1587; Gregory XIV, C. Circumscripta, March 15, 1591; Clement VIII, C. In suprema, April 2, 1862. From Clement VIII, C. Cum ad singularem, March 19, 1603: "If someone exceeding the twenty-fifth year has asked for the regular habit and is without learning, let him be counted only among the number of Conversi." - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 1; L. 65, 71, 76, 969, 971; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 185, a. 4; q. 189, a. 5, 7; E. M.

What is censure? It is a medicinal spiritual penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods. Penalty: i.e., chiefly of the external forum. Therefore only those can impose censure who have jurisdiction in the external forum. Spiritual: because it consists in a certain removal of spiritual goods; it is from spiritual or ecclesiastical power; for a spiritual good; and obliging in conscience. Medicinal: for it is properly imposed for this end, as a medicine for preventing sins not yet admitted and curing those admitted, namely so that one may not sin, and if he has sinned may return to better fruit. C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. exc., in VI.

Hence, in order that a censure truly be imposed by way of censure, and not generally by way of penalty, it is necessary that it not be imposed in perpetuity, nor at the discretion of the one imposing it, but it must be imposed simply, so that as soon as the guilty person has amended himself he can be absolved; for when the disease ceases, the medicine ceases. Baptized man: for one who has not been baptized is not subject to the power of the Church. But he must be capable of reason and a subject: for one who is incapable of fault is not liable to penalty; and the power of jurisdiction, of which censure is an act, is exercised only upon subjects.

He must also be some determinate person, and not a moral person, which can indeed be deprived of the rights by which it enjoys, but cannot be struck with penalties and censures so that it may repent, since it has only a moral existence. Yet the individual persons of a moral body can be punished with censures. Cf. Schmalzgrueber, n. 44-46. But Cardinals and Bishops are not liable to censures issued by the law itself unless they are expressly included, except for excommunication; likewise those not yet pubescent, except in the case of violation of the enclosure of nuns. C. Apostolicae Sedis. But by a special privilege legitimately introduced in the course of time, kings and queens cannot be bound by censure except by the Pope. By ecclesiastical power: for a penalty cannot be imposed except by one having power, and spiritual penalty pertains to spiritual power.

Of the use of certain spiritual goods: therefore censures do not take away the goods themselves, nor power or rights to them, but only the use of them from the guilty person, until he has returned to better fruit. C. Ex litteris 11, de Const. But it deprives him of the use of those goods which are in the power of the Church, such as public prayers, administration of the sacraments, offering of sacrifice, ecclesiastical burial, etc. Therefore it does not deprive him of merely internal goods, e.g., the sacramental character, the power of order, nor of proper and private goods, e.g., faith, hope, charity, etc. And if sometimes it deprives him of human intercourse, this is done only secondarily. E.M.

What is the division of censures? According to the various goods of whose use censure deprives one, it is threefold, namely excommunication, suspension, and interdict. Excommunication and interdict touch all; suspension touches only clerics. Excommunication has the force only of censure, or medicinal penalty. Therefore it cannot be imposed upon a moral person. C. Romana 5, de Sent. exc., in VI; Suarez, disp. 18, sec. 2, n. 3. But suspension and interdict can be imposed also by way of mere penalty, or in vindication of fault, and by way of mere privation, which holds even without fault, and therefore both the guilty and the innocent. Hence suspension and interdict can be imposed for a merely past delict which has no successive continuance, without any preceding threat or warning, without any expressed cause, in perpetuity, or for a determinate time, or at the good pleasure of the one who imposed it. Likewise they can be imposed upon moral persons, e.g., a chapter, a city, etc., and with respect to the innocent they have the nature of mere privation. Violation of a censure imposed by way of censure brings irregularity if a cleric violates it by exercising an order; not likewise one imposed by way of penalty, unless something else has been specially provided by law.

Some censures are issued by law; others by man. The former are imposed by way of law, the latter by way of mandate or sentence. An example of the former kind is the censures contained in the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, and the censures contained in episcopal statutes. An example of the latter is if a Bishop, without judicial process, issues a mandate, or if a judge, after judicial process has been instituted, issues a sentence against an abductor, that he restore the abducted person to liberty within three days, otherwise he incurs excommunication. Suarez, disp. 3, sec. 1, n. 2. A censure issued by law still perseveres after the death of the author; not likewise one issued by man. Yet one who incurs the latter is held by it everywhere until he is absolved from it. Episcopal censures issued in synod are held as censures by way of law and, when the Bishop has died, they endure; but those issued outside synod are held as censures by way of simple statute, and when the Bishop has died, they cease. L. 6.

Likewise some censures are latae sententiae; others are ferendae sententiae. They are latae sententiae if they are established as to be incurred by the very fact by which someone acts against the law. They are ferendae sententiae if they are to be inflicted by the sentence of a judge. Therefore censures are ferendae sententiae if the words of the law require the ministry of a judge, or the action of another, for incurring the censure, e.g., if it is said: it is prescribed under penalty of excommunication; he will be excommunicated, etc. But they are latae sententiae if the words of the law do not include a condemnatory sentence, or at least a declaratory sentence of the crime, e.g., one doing such things is by that very fact, by the law itself, excommunicated.

What is required on the part of sin for incurring censures? It is required that it be mortal, for censure is a very grave penalty which consequently presupposes mortal fault. Hence they must be imposed soberly and with great circumspection. Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 3, de Ref.; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 10, chap. 2. Therefore, unless there is question of some light censure, or at least one for a brief time, which is imposed because of light fault, censures of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, as they are ordinarily imposed, can in no way be imposed for light faults. L. 30; Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 39, n. 59; Suarez, disp. 4, sec. 6, n. 12; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 16, n. 61; Lessius, book 2, chap. 12, n. 54; Sanchez, in Decal., book 7, chap. 21, nn. 28, 29.

The sin must be external; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain, not in the internal forum. Not only must the sin be exterior, but also grave in the nature of the external act. Therefore one who is excused from grave fault either as regards the internal act or at least as regards the external act is also excused from censure. It must be a sin consummated by deed, because penal laws are of strict interpretation. Namely, the sin must be complete in its own genus according to the proper meaning of the words which are contained in the precept or law. Schmalzgrueber, l.c., n. 64. It is required that the sin not be merely past, because censure is a medicinal penalty, which therefore cannot be imposed on those who have already returned to better fruit. Merely past; for if a past delict, such as theft, detraction, etc., has a successive continuance, censure can be imposed because of it, once it has first been denounced to the guilty person, unless he obeys the mandate to restore what was taken away, to repair reputation, etc., within a definite time. Merely past: namely, if the censure is truly imposed by way of censure, or medicinal penalty, and not by way of mere vindictive penalty. Therefore a superior who wishes to punish some sin with censure must first threaten this censure. L. 54. Finally contumacy is required. For by censures contumacy against the law of the Church is punished, and indeed against the Church threatening censure to the contumacious. C. Pia 1, de Except., in VI; C. Statuimus 3, de Sent. exc., in VI. Contumacy is from despising; hence it is contempt of censure. Therefore for incurring censure it is necessary that the censure first have already been imposed, either by way of general law, or by particular precept at least denounced as to be incurred unless the precept is obeyed. Hence if someone withdraws from contumacy before he actually incurs the censure to be incurred once the effect has followed, he by no means incurs it afterwards when the effect follows. Withdraws from contumacy, namely by confession, or sorrow, or retraction of the will, and in the way in which he can he tries to impede the effect, although the revocation cannot become known to him to whom perhaps he gave the command or counsel. L. 31, 39, 40; book 7, nn. 368, 373; book 6, n. 600.

Is warning required beforehand for incurring censure? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that censure is imposed because of actual contumacy and disobedience. But one who has not been warned by the one imposing the censure is not rebellious and disobedient to him. Therefore. Hence among the doctors it is commonly received that a censure with no warning at all first given is regularly null. Now as regards a censure issued by law by way of law, or issued by man by way of mandate, the law itself and the mandate itself warn. Yet if the delict is occult, for declaring a censure incurred, citation of the guilty person is certainly needed; otherwise the sentence will be null and void. But if the censure is not contained in a law or mandate, then it is necessary to threaten it, or it is necessary to warn the guilty person, and indeed a threefold warning is needed, although this does not pertain to validity; or one for three, with the space of at least two days observed between them, or between this and the sentence the space of at least six days. But warning must be made to the guilty person before witnesses, and it is customarily and must be done in writing, but it is valid by living voice. Although a censure imposed without writing is valid, nevertheless, because this is grave, if it has been imposed orally, it is presumed to be penalty rather than censure.

If the censure has already been threatened by law, if indeed there is question of a censure ferendae sententiae, whether a new warning is needed is disputed: some affirm it, and it is more equitable, because censures of this kind are for the most part unknown; others deny it, and it is more probable, because the law itself warns sufficiently. C. Reprehensibilis 26, de Appellationib., etc.; C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. excomm., in VI; L. 22, 51, 65, 317; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 3.

Who can impose censures? By ordinary law, every and only ecclesiastical superior having ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the external or contentious forum can impose censure, whether ordinary or delegated, namely the Pope and a General Council with respect to all the faithful; Cardinals in the churches of their titles; Primates and Archbishops, both in their own dioceses and in the dioceses of suffragans during the time of visitation, and also when there is question of a case brought to their tribunal, because then they have jurisdiction over the suffragans; Bishops in their dioceses, provided they have been elected and confirmed, although not consecrated; Legates of the Apostolic See in the provinces of their legation; Vicars General of Bishops, for they constitute one tribunal with the Bishops themselves; the Chapter, when the see is vacant and before the election of the Capitular Vicar, who afterwards enjoys such power exclusively; abbots, generals, provincials, rectors, conventual priors, guardians, etc., of religious orders with respect to religious subject to themselves; and all those to whom that power is specially committed by delegation from the aforesaid persons.

Therefore by common law both lay persons and all women, even abbesses, are excluded from this power, both ordinary and delegated. Likewise parish priests, since they do not have ordinary jurisdiction in the external forum, but only administration for the right ordering of the parish, do not have this faculty. As regards delegated power, this ceases with the death of the one delegating, when there is question of a case of justice, unless the case has already been begun by the delegate at least through citation. But one delegated to impose censures cannot subdelegate another, unless he has had express permission from the one delegating, or unless he is delegated at least for any causes whatsoever, or by the Roman Pontiff. CC. Perniciosa 1, Cum ab Ecclesiarum 3, Pastoralis 11, sec. Praeterea, Conquerente 16, Grave gerimus 19, de Off. iud. ord.; C. Cum Episcopus 7, e.t., in VI; C. Transmissam 15, de Elect.; C. Si pro debilitate, de Off. Deleg.; CC. Cum in Ecclesiis 10, His quae 11, de Maior. et obed.; C. Ea quae final, de Statu Monach.; C. Quaerenti 20, de Verbor. signific.; C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. exc., in VI; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 22, aa. 1, 2; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 3, 12-21, 40; Engel, nn. 12-15; Pichler, Ius Canonicum, book 5, title 39, nn. 4, 5; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 6, disp. 6; E.M.

What is required so that an ecclesiastical superior can impose censures? It is required: 1. That he be possessed of reason; indeed that he have the intention of binding him against whom he imposes the censure. The reason is that to impose censure is an act of jurisdiction, which has its whole force from the interior will. 2. That he have jurisdiction free as regards its use. Hence an excommunicated, suspended, heretical, or schismatic Bishop cannot impose censures; the same is to be said of his vicar. Yet an occult heretic or excommunicated person validly imposes censures, although illicitly, because for the public good, unless he is to be avoided, the Church preserves jurisdiction for him. Indeed there are not lacking those, and it seems today the common opinion, who hold that even one publicly excommunicated validly imposes censures if he has not been denounced by name, or if he is not a public striker of a cleric from the Extravagant of Martin V, Ad evitanda, where it is sanctioned that a tolerated excommunicated person is not to be avoided in those things which pertain to public office, nor even by those who know this. L. 12; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 22, a. 3. 3. That the one imposing censure act freely, not under compulsion. But whether a censure imposed from grave fear is valid, some deny, others more truly affirm: because an act done from grave fear is of itself valid unless it is invalidated by special positive law. But a censure imposed from fear is not invalidated by positive law. Therefore. Schmalzgrueber, n. 23; L. 12; E.M.

Can a Bishop impose censures if he is outside the diocese? R. Negatively. For no one can exercise contentious jurisdiction in another's territory. Yet the following cases are excepted: 1. If the censure is imposed not by way of sentence, but by way of precept or statute, for preventing future crimes. 2. If the censure is imposed by way of sentence which nevertheless does not need cognizance of the case and judicial commotion, either because the contumacy is manifest, or because the case has already been known in his own territory. If it needs judicial commotion, it is necessary that permission be given by the Ordinary of the place and that the parties consent; for no one unwilling can be drawn outside his own territory. 3. If the Bishop has been unjustly expelled from his own territory, for then permission sought from the Ordinary of the place suffices, although not obtained. C. Novit 7, de Off. leg.; Clementine, single chapter, de For. comp.

Can a Bishop existing in his own diocese impose censure on a subject existing outside the diocese? A Bishop, existing in his own diocese, can bind by censures through sentence a subject existing in another diocese, both for a crime committed in his own diocese and also if the subject commits a delict outside the diocese, but there is question of a matter which is in it, as if clerics who do not come to the synod are excommunicated. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that citation cannot be made outside the territory; for then it suffices that the guilty person be cited in his own house or in a public place. Likewise if a Bishop by special precept prohibited some delict to someone under censure, the absent person incurs this censure. For the precept is personal. Therefore, since a subject outside the territory is bound by the precept, he is also bound by the censure. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 23, who calls the denying opinion probable when someone commits a delict outside the territory of the one administering law, and adds: But it is certain from C. Ut animarum 2, de Const., in VI, that if the Bishop has previously given no precept to the subject under penalty of censure, he cannot punish him with censure if he commits a delict in another diocese. And the same must be said if he commits a delict in an exempt place, because in that place he remains as if he were in a place outside the diocese, from C. Cum Episcopus 7, de Off. ord., in VI; C. Volentes 1, de Priv., ibid.; Clementine Archiepiscopo 2, e.t.

Through sentence or special precept: for if the prohibition has been made by territorial statute, a censure imposed on delinquents does not affect one existing outside the territory of the one establishing the censure, as is expressly decided in C. Ut animarum 2, de Const., in VI. But regular prelates can bind their subjects with censures in whatever place they exist, because their jurisdiction is more personal than territorial. L. 20; Engel, n. 31; La Croix, book 7, n. 28; Pichler, Ius Canonicum, book 7, title 39, n. 6.

Can a Bishop bind by censure another's subject committing a delict in his diocese? Pilgrims probably, according to Lugo and others, do not incur censures issued by the special law of some place; for they are exempt from the very obligation of observing the laws of that place. But if there is question of censures issued by man through sentence, they can indeed be bound by censures by the Bishop of the place after they have committed a delict in that place by violating common law, and not only the law of his diocese, and after the Bishop has cited them, yet only if that common law prescribes or prohibits something under excommunication and other penalties to be inflicted by an ecclesiastical judge; for then by reason of the delict the pilgrim obtains the forum of the Bishop of that place in which he committed the delict. But if the Bishop himself by his own authority threatens excommunication against one violating the common law, e.g., stealing, not restoring, etc., the excommunication is null. For the immediate delict because of which excommunication is imposed is the contumacy and disobedience of a subject disobeying the Bishop who prohibits theft or prescribes restitution under censure. But the Bishop can neither command a pilgrim who is not a subject, nor consequently impose a special sentence on him as one not subject. Yet others, with Engel and La Croix, contradict this opinion, because just as laws can be imposed by which pilgrims are bound, e.g., concerning not carrying arms, so censure can be added to those laws, and such a pilgrim by reason of the delict becomes subject to such a Bishop. Hence at least he can, as an inhabitant and stranger, be restrained by censures by the office of the judge, C. final, de For. comp. La Croix, book 7, n. 32; Engel, nn. 35, 112; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 47-48; L. 19, 26, 27; book 6, n. 591; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 6, disp. 22; Laymann, chap. 4, nn. 5, 6.

Can Bishops impose censures on regulars? R. Affirmatively, if they are not exempt; for then they are subject to episcopal laws and censures in plainly the same way as other clerics. Moreover, if they have the Bishop as their proper prelate, they can be bound by censures by him just as other regulars by their proper superiors. Sanchez, in Decal., book 6, chap. 1, n. 11; Schmalzgrueber, book 3, title 35, nn. 61, 62.

Affirmatively, if they are exempt and commit a delict concerning those things in which, by force of canons and Constitutions, they are subject to the jurisdiction of Bishops. And in such a case Bishops proceed not by ordinary but by delegated power. S.C.C., February 17, 1632; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 9, chap. 16, n. 5; book 7, chap. 41, n. 5; Barbosa, De Off. et Potest. Episc., part 3, alleg. 105, n. 14 ff. Negatively, if the discussion concerns those regulars who in this matter enjoy special exemption. For a twofold exemption of regulars, or immunity from the censures of Bishops, must be distinguished. The first proceeds from this, that regulars in certain things are exempt from the jurisdiction of Ordinaries, and therefore as regards these things they cannot be punished either by censures or by other penalties. Yet since in other things they are subject to Bishops, when they commit delicts in these matters they can be punished by them, even by censures. But the other proceeds from this, that certain regulars enjoy a special privilege, namely Mendicants and Religious of the Society of Jesus, so that they cannot be punished by Bishops with censures, although they can be punished with other penalties if they commit delicts in those very things in which they are subject to the Ordinaries of places. The case from the constitution Inscrutabili of Gregory XV is excepted, namely "if in churches of others, which are not of their orders, without the license of the Bishop; and in their own churches or those of their orders, without having sought his blessing, or while he contradicts, they presume to preach." Innocent X, Brief Cum sicut accepimus, May 14, 1653, declaring another case in the cited constitution Inscrutabili of Gregory XV, added a case, namely that of hearing confessions. A third case must also be added concerning the form and habit of sacred images from the constitution Sacramenta of Urban VIII, March 15, 1642.

Does ignorance excuse from incurring censure? Invincible ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, i.e., of the censure attached, excuses from incurring it. For contumacy is lacking. Here forgetfulness and inadvertence operate the same as ignorance. Ignorance that is vincible and lightly culpable, or even gravely culpable if it is not crass or supine, also excuses from incurring censure; otherwise if it is crass and supine, from C. final, de Const., in VI, where it is said, "we do not wish the ignorant to be bound, when nevertheless their ignorance has not been crass or supine." But whether there is truly given gravely culpable ignorance which nevertheless is not crass or supine is disputed. Commonly they deny it; yet many affirm it, because for crass ignorance a certain highest negligence is required, and negligence can be gravely culpable although it is not the highest.

A fortiori affected ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, does not excuse from incurring censure. Vincible ignorance that is gravely culpable, whether it is crass or supine, or, probably, even affected, excuses from incurring censure if in the Decree there is a clause: whoever does this knowingly, deliberately, rashly; whoever has presumed to do this, etc. For one who acts with ignorance of whatever kind surely does not act knowingly. And indeed, from the Holy Office, January 12, 1870, by these words, by rash daring, or from presumption, etc., it is signified that someone committed a delict not while compelled or ignorant, but prudently and knowingly; and moreover it ought not to be wondered that one devoid of every excuse is subject to censure. L. 43-45, 48.

Does grave fear excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, unless nevertheless observance of the law is necessary for preserving the public good, or violation of it yields to contempt of faith, or of law, or of ecclesiastical power. The reason for the response is that one who commits a delict from fear sins rather from weakness of nature than from contumacy. The reason for the exception is that in the aforesaid cases the obligation even of human law does not cease.

Does an appeal legitimately interposed excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, namely if it was interposed before the sentence, or after it indeed had been issued, but while the day from which, or the condition under which, it was issued, is pending. Likewise it ceases if, while the day or condition is pending, one ceases to be superior and the other ceases to be subject. But if the censure has already been issued absolutely, appeal does not suspend it, whence canonists say that the appeal is devolutive, not suspensive. Yet recourse to the Holy See is always given against its injustice. L. 63-65; Suarez, disp. 3, sec. 4, n. 10 ff.; sec. 5, n. 2; sec. 15, n. 18 ff.; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 2, disp. 6.

Is one to be judged to have incurred censure who doubts whether he has incurred it? In a doubt of fact and in a doubt about the existence of the law, one is excused from incurring censure; not likewise in a doubt about the justice of the law, namely whether the censure is just. The first reason is that in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. But one who doubts whether by his act he has incurred censure possesses the right of using spiritual goods. Therefore he is not to be deprived of his right. Therefore. The second reason is that favors are to be enlarged and odious things restricted. Therefore a law inducing a doubtful penalty is to be taken in the more benign part; for penalty is odious. Therefore. The third reason is that in a doubt of justice, presumption favors the superior. When someone doubts whether he has been absolved from a censure which he incurred, in the external forum judgment must be made in favor of the censure, or bond, from C. Sicut 39, de Sent. exc., and therefore absolution must be sought. Likewise in the internal forum absolution must be sought, lest perhaps one become deprived of the goods of the Church. Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, n. 18; Sanchez, in Decal., book 1, chap. 10, nn. 55, 56; St. Thomas, Quodlibet 4, a. 14; L. 32, 39, 67, 68.

Is one bound by censure who knows it to be manifestly unjust? One is not bound by censure who knows it to be certainly unjust, whether because of a false presumption of fact, or because legal forms were omitted, or because the limits of jurisdiction were exceeded. Therefore he is not bound to observe it publicly, except by reason of scandal, if this is present. L. 68; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 4; Laymann, chap. 6, nn. 2-4; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 89-94; Engel, nn. 103-113; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 37, n. 188.

Can someone be bound by several censures at the same time? Because of one and the same delict only one censure is incurred out of several perhaps imposed by one and the same legislator, namely that by which the others are eminently comprehended. Thus, e.g., those usurping goods pertaining to ecclesiastical persons by reason of their churches are bound only by the excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and not also by the Tridentine excommunication. Because of one and the same delict someone can indeed incur several censures imposed by different legislators, by the Bishop of the benefice and by the Bishop of domicile, by the Roman Pontiff and by the Ordinary of the place; e.g., if clerics violating the enclosure of nuns are punished by suspension in an episcopal Statute, they would also be liable to the excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff through the constitution Apostolicae Sedis. Because of the same delict repeated, and because of diverse delicts, someone can incur several censures, namely the same one several times, and several diverse ones, of the same or of a different nature. And here it must be noted that if the censure is reserved to the Pontiff, through this reservation the faculty of reserving the same censure to themselves then seems to have been taken away from inferior Prelates.

What is to be said generally about absolution from censures? "Absolution signifies an act of justice in which some case, or judgment, is terminated in favor of the guilty person.... But dispensation is an act of grace or mercy... by which something is relaxed from the common law in favor of someone." Thesaurus, De Poenis, part 1, chap. 20. For releasing a censure, absolution imparted by a legitimate judge or superior is necessary; and if the guilty person has ceased from his contumacy, justice itself requires that he be absolved from the censure.

And a censure cannot be released in another way, although satisfaction has already been made, if it was owed, and amendment has followed, except for censures imposed for a definite time: for when that has ended, they cease; and those which were imposed at the good pleasure of the one imposing them also cease when he has died, or when his right has been dissolved. This is established from C. Qua fronte 25, de Appell.; C. Ex litteris 11, de Const.; C. Cum desideres 15, de Sent. exc.; C. Relatum 37, ibid.; proposition 44 condemned by Alexander VII; L. 122. Absolution of this kind can be given by an ecclesiastical superior, or by his delegate, even if he is not a priest. And although the penalties of censure are especially of the external forum, absolution from them can nevertheless be given in the internal forum of conscience, as long as they have not been brought to the external forum; this is established by common doctrine and practice.

Absolution from censures, as removing an impediment, must be given first under grave obligation before absolution from sins; yet if it is given afterwards, it is valid; and if the penitent receiving this has not sinned gravely, the absolution from sins also is valid. But since it is not established that the penitent is bound by censure, it is prefaced only as a precaution. And from these things it is clear that absolution from censures is entirely distinct from absolution from sins, and one can stand without the other. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 2, ad 2; Laymann, chap. 7, n. 1; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 107, 111; E.M. 952.

Who can absolve from the various censures? From a censure, whether issued by man by way of precept or by particular sentence, or reserved by law, only these can absolve: 1. the one who imposed the censure; 2. his superior; 3. his successor; 4. another delegated by one of these. The reason is that it belongs to the one to absolve to whom it belongs to bind. L. 63; Laymann, chap. 7; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 85-93, 97; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 1. A censure issued by man by way of precept or by particular sentence: for censures issued by man, but by way of statute or general sentence, according to the more probable opinion are equated with those issued by law which are not reserved. L. 73; Schmalzgrueber, 94; Engel, n. 124. From censures which are such less properly, namely those imposed until a certain day, in perpetuity, or at the good pleasure of the superior, only he or another having special faculty can absolve: since, although they are not expressly reserved, they are nevertheless implicitly reserved from their very nature. Cf. Suarez, disp. 29, sec. 1, n. 16.

Any confessor can absolve from censures issued by law and by no means reserved to the Pope or Bishop, both for the internal forum and for the external forum, C. Nuper 29, de Sent. exc.; formula of absolution in the Roman Ritual; Struggl, 29; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 1; L. 69-71, 126, 322, 339; book 1, n. 191; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 95, 96. "Yet in order that someone can use the absolution publicly, it is necessary that it be publicly established.... But in order that it be judged publicly established, it is enough that it be publicly established that he was confessed... to one having power... provided that the satisfaction which was necessary has also been publicly exhibited." Suarez, disp. 7, sec. 5, n. 29.

For this is required, although the censure has not been juridically denounced, for preventing scandal, and so that it be established that he has withdrawn from his contumacy and has returned to obedience to the Church. Cf. Leo XIII, Monita pro Iubilaeo for the year 1900, Singulares, Kalends of November, 1899, sec. 8 ff.

From Trent, sess. 24, C. Liceat 6, and from the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, paragraph Firmam, Bishops can, in the forum of conscience, absolve from occult cases and censures reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, except those which are reserved in a special manner. The Capitular Vicar also enjoys this power, S.C.C., December 3, 1632. Bishops can also delegate this Tridentine faculty generally to some priest, provided that they expressly specify it; for special deputation is required from Trent. And they can absolve even pilgrims, since they become subjects by submitting themselves in the forum of conscience. But by this faculty Bishops cannot absolve from occult cases reserved by other Bishops. S.C.C., January 24, 1711; November 20, 1712; Benedict XIV, constitution Pias Christi, August 21, 1752.

But those cases are reputed occult which have not been proved in judgment and can still be concealed in the neighborhood in some way, as if it is known only to a few discreet persons, e.g., five or six, or if the fact appears doubtful. Probably a crime public in one place can be absolved by a Bishop in another place where it is occult, provided there is no fear that it will easily be made public where it is occult. Likewise an occult crime can be absolved by a Bishop, whether it is materially occult, because the committed delict is publicly unknown, or formally occult, namely because although the crime is known, nevertheless it is unknown that a censure is attached to it. L. 76, 78; book 1, appendix II, de Privil., n. 29 ff.; book 6, nn. 294, 593, 594.

That regular prelates by force of their privileges, as regards their subjects, 1. cannot absolve from censures imposed by the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, whether reserved in a special manner or simply to the Roman Pontiff; but 2. can absolve from censures reserved to Bishops, even if occult; and 3. as regards the faculty of the same prelates for absolving their subjects from censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff which are not contained in the aforesaid Constitution and which pertain to internal government, nothing has been innovated by the same Constitution; 4. regulars impeded from going to Rome cannot be absolved by their regular superiors from censures contained in that Constitution and reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, but must have recourse to the Holy See for the necessary faculties, was declared in the Holy Office, March 22, 1881. Synod of the Diocese of Ostia and Velletri, Rome, 1892, p. 122.

Those confessors who have the Pagella of the Sacred Penitentiary can also absolve from several censures, even reserved ones. Cf. the aforesaid Pagella.

Finally, as to who can absolve from papal cases and censures in the article of death and in the case of impediment from going to Rome, and how, cf. 773, 797, 799, 800.

What special circumstances of absolution from censures are to be noted? Various circumstances of absolution from censures to be noted are declared in the following propositions. An absent and unwilling person can be absolved from censures. For absolution from censures is not sacramental, but a mere relaxation of a bond imposed by the Church, which can also be pronounced upon the absent and unwilling. But this is not licit without grave cause. L. 117, 130; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 2. One who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, the others being left, because there is no necessary connection among them. C. Cum pro causa 27, de Sent. exc.; L. 118, 131; St. Thomas, q. 24, a. 3. Absolution extorted by force or grave fear unjustly inflicted is not valid, from C. single chapter, de His quae vi, etc., in VI; L. 119. The same is to be said if it is given by error concerning the motive cause. C. Offic. 42, de Sent. exc.; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 99, 100, 102; Thesaurus, De Poenis, part 1, chaps. 22-24.

Absolution cannot be given unless first, where there was need, the one to be absolved has repaired scandal, satisfied the injured party, or, if he cannot, has furnished suitable security, or unless he has sworn or promised that he will make satisfaction as soon as he can; and, if the crime is among the more atrocious, or there is question of striking clerics, that he will never relapse into it. But oath and pledge-security pertain to the external forum. As regards the internal forum, a simple and sincere promise suffices concerning making satisfaction, standing by the mandates of the Church, etc. C. Porro 7, de Sent. exc.; C. Per tuas 40, 10, 11, ibid.; C. Qua fronte 25, de Appell.; C. Odoardus 3, de Solut.; C. Ex parte 23, de Verb. sign.; Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1857. But when the Pontiff gives faculty of absolving "the party having been satisfied," whether this clause is always added as a condition sine qua non, some probably affirm, others probably deny. L. 121, 129; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 100, 101; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm.; the warnings cited at n. 1101.

Absolution can be given both absolutely and conditionally. Likewise absolution can be given with reincidentia, i.e., so that the absolved person, unless he performs something, for instance unless he has restored after such a time, falls back into the same censure by that very fact. Reincidentia is either by law or by man. It is by man only when it is added by the express will of the superior; but by law when it is contained in clear law. For we are in odious matters. Moreover the censure into which the absolved person is going to fall back is a new censure in number, although of the same species. Therefore reincidentia cannot be added to absolution except by one who has power of imposing censure, and it is not incurred without new fault and contumacy. L. 86, 87, 123-125; Laymann, chap. 7, n. 8; Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, nn. 213-214.

For validly absolving from censures, no determinate formula is prescribed in law. Therefore the will of the superior manifested by a sensible sign suffices, so that it becomes known to the other. Schmalzgrueber, n. 98. And although it can be given by the fact itself, speaking per se, nevertheless from the law it does not seem to be presumed that it was given thus. Cf. Clementine Si summus 4, de Sent. exc.; C. Si aliquando 41, e.t.; C. In praesentia 46, ibid.; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 77, 389; St. Raymond de Penyafort, Summa, book 3, de Sententiis Praecepti, etc., sec. 36. For licitly absolving in the sacramental forum, the formula must be used which is contained in the formula itself of sacramental absolution, and the same is used in the internal forum of conscience outside the sacrament. But in the external forum the formula prescribed in the Roman Ritual and Pontifical, and in C. A nobis 28, de Sent. exc., must be used. For solemn and public absolution, as described in the Ritual, the mandate of the Bishop is needed, who is accustomed to prescribe this only when there was scandal of the whole community; and the other solemnities of law must be observed.

And thus, if there is question of an enormous crime, before absolution the delinquent must swear, unless perhaps he is not yet pubescent, that he will not relapse further into such a crime. C. Ex tenore 10; C. De cetero 11, de Sent. exc.; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm. One who has power of absolving in the forum of conscience from a censure can do this also outside Confession, except in a jubilee, in which it must be given in the sacramental forum. Benedict XIV, constitution Inter praeteritos, sec. 63.

Absolution given in the external forum also benefits in the internal forum; given in the internal forum it benefits the tolerated even in the external forum, but it does not prevent action from being taken against them according to the norm of law; not likewise those to be avoided, when this is licit, as in a Jubilee and in the article of death. Benedict XIV, constitution Inter praeteritos, sec. 61. L. 70, 116, 126-129; book 6, n. 536; Laymann, part 2, chap. 6; Pichler, book 5, title 39, n. 13; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm.

What is excommunication, and how many kinds are there? Excommunication is a censure through which someone is deprived of communion with the Church. "It is a penalty, the gravest which the Church can inflict, and in itself it contains by force the other censures of suspension and interdict, as those which deprive one not so fully, but only partially, of the goods of the Church, or of their use." Pichler, book 4, title 39, n. 23. An excommunicated person who, after legitimate warnings, has not repented, and has grown filthy in excommunication for a year, or has persevered obstinately, incurs suspicion of heresy, because he seems to despise the authority of the Church. Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 3, de Ref. It is twofold: one is minor, the other major. This major excommunication is evident in two ways. For one is that by which someone is an excommunicated tolerated person, whom the faithful are not bound to avoid; the other is that by which someone is an excommunicated person not tolerated, whom they are bound to avoid.

What is to be said about an excommunicated tolerated person? As regards an excommunicated tolerated person, by canon law it is forbidden to anyone, even one secretly excommunicated, to communicate with others both in divine and in human things. But the faithful can communicate with him both in human and in divine things, even without necessity, although they are not bound to. Hence spiritual things, such as sacraments, can licitly be given to an excommunicated person; likewise sacraments can licitly be sought from an excommunicated person, even without necessity, precisely by force of excommunication; for if he is in mortal sin, a just cause is required. Therefore indirectly it has also been granted to an excommunicated person that he may be able to communicate without sin with those by whom he is asked. The same is to be said of one suspended and one interdicted, as regards those matters in which it is forbidden to communicate with them. Constitution of Martin V in the Council of Constance, Ad evitanda; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 121-125; L. 135, 138-140, 160.

What is to be said about an excommunicated person to be avoided? Only two excommunicated persons to be avoided are reckoned. The first is anyone excommunicated by name who at the same time has been specially and publicly denounced. By name, i.e., with the name expressed by words or indubitable signs, so that he cannot be confused with another. Hence we are not bound to avoid heretics, e.g., even if it is publicly known that they are excommunicated by law. Specially denounced, i.e., not denounced generally, but also denounced by name. Hence if it is said: We excommunicate Peter the arsonist and his accomplices, only Peter is to be avoided, but not the others, although they are publicly known; for the sentence as regards them is only general, and not special against a certain person. Publicly denounced, i.e., the denunciation must be made in a public place, according to the usage of the region. But here it must be noted that although it suffices that one excommunicated by law be denounced only as such, so that he is now to be avoided, nevertheless it does not suffice if the guilty person is declared by sentence only to have committed the crime to which excommunication is attached; rather, the excommunication itself must be denounced by the judge. The second is a notorious striker of a cleric. Notorious, i.e., according to St. Alphonsus, not only by notoriety of law, but also by notoriety of fact, at least commonly or ordinarily speaking. By notoriety of law: namely, that it is known either by sentence of the judge, or by confession of the guilty person in judgment, or by sufficient judicial deposition. By notoriety of fact: namely, that it is really known to many, so that the fact can no longer be hidden by any evasion. Otherwise the fact could always be excused by some favorable consideration. Hence probably the striker of a cleric, notorious in one place, is not to be avoided in another where he is not notorious. And the same is to be said of the former case, i.e., of one excommunicated by name and already publicly denounced in some place, who is entirely unknown in another place. And "unless at least it is publicly established by the fact itself that the striker advertently willed (knew and contemned) to incur the censure, he is probably never to be avoided" before the very sentence of the judge specially denouncing him. L. 144. This is established from the constitution of the Council of Constance, Ad evitanda; Holy Office, January 9, 1884.

L. 134, 146; Diana, tome 5, tract 1, de Excommunic., resolution 50, nn. 4, 5; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 2, disp. 5; Laymann, chap. 4; Ferraris, Bibliotheca, v. Excomm., art. 9, nn. 5, 7; E.M.

What is to be said about minor excommunication? Minor excommunication deprives one per se only of the passive use, or reception, of the sacraments, and consequently of passive election to benefices and dignities of the Church. C. Si quem 59, de Sent. exc.; C. A nobis 2, de Except.; C. Si celebrat 10, de Cler. exc. min. It was incurred for only one cause, namely if someone communicated with an excommunicated person to be avoided, and it could be absolved by any confessor. C. Nuper 29, de Sent. exc. Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 23, aa. 1, 2; L. 147, 156; Suarez, disp. 24; Laymann, chap. 3, n. 6; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 198-211. Minor excommunication today has been removed by the constitution Apostolicae Sedis.

Thus the Holy Office, December 5, 1883, Leo XIII approving and fully confirming. Yet this does not prevent "a Bishop (even at present) from being able, in penalty of some crime, to forbid someone by name the passive use of the sacraments, or at least of Communion." L. 148. But because of communication with an excommunicated person, in certain peculiar cases major excommunication, suspension, and interdict are now incurred. Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, art. 16 and 17 of Excommunications reserved simply to the Roman Pontiff, art. 1 of Excommunications reserved to no one, art. 6 of Suspensions, and art. 2 of Interdicts. Holy Office, January 9, 1884. Synod of the Diocese of Albano, year 1880, appendix n. 10, sec. XI, n. 3; Pichler, nn. 34, 35; E.M.

What is to be said about major excommunication? Major excommunication has the following effects. It deprives one of receiving and of the passive use of the sacraments. C. A nobis 28, de Sent. exc.; C. Cum illorum 32, ibid.; C. Sacris 38, ibid.; C. Si quem 59, ibid.; C. final, de Cler. excomm. ministr. Hence "no excommunicated person, whether tolerated or not, can licitly receive them (but he validly receives them, except penance, unless he approaches in good faith) under mortal sin, unless invincible ignorance, fear of death, infamy, loss of goods, etc., excuses, because censure does not oblige with so great rigor." L. 158. Schmalzgrueber, nn. 146-153; Pichler, n. 29; Coninck, dub. 5.

It deprives, at least the non-tolerated, of the common suffrages and prayers of the Church, namely those which are made in the name of the Church by her ministers; likewise it deprives one of the fruit of indulgences. Common suffrages and prayers of the Church: therefore it does not deprive one of private suffrages and prayers, namely those which are made in one's own name. "Hence not only any private person, but even a priest can pray as a private person for the excommunicated, even in public prayers and the sacred rite; indeed, he can offer the action of sacrificing insofar as it depends on the private merit of the one operating, or remember him in particular in the Memento. This is certain with St. Thomas." L. 162. At least the non-tolerated, because, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, probably sacrifices, etc., can be offered for an excommunicated tolerated person even in the name of the Church. "The reason is that favorable laws are to be understood with every amplitude; therefore, while it was granted to the faithful to communicate with tolerated persons, it was also granted to offer public prayers for them; for to communicate also imports this, etc." L. 164. CC. cited; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 126, 134-139; Pichler, nn. 29, 33; Coninck, dub. 6; Engel, n. 38; Laymann, chap. 1, n. 4; Salmanticenses, tract 10, chap. 3, n. 56; Suarez, disp. 9, secs. 4, 5; St. Thomas, III, q. 82, a. 7, ad 3; Suppl., q. 21, a. 1, ad 2; a. 3. Cf. 610.

It deprives one of the active use, or administration, of the sacraments. C. Latores 4, de Cler. excomm. ministr.; C. final, ibid. Administration: for a non-tolerated person this is altogether illicit, except in the case of extreme necessity or grave inconvenience; nevertheless he validly confers the sacraments, except penance, which requires jurisdiction, and of this he lacks, unless there is common error of fact, or there is question of the article of death. But for an excommunicated tolerated person, it is sometimes licit, namely if he does not thrust himself in, but the faithful demand and ask; and thus he can celebrate if he is a pastor whose subjects are bound to hear Mass and there is no other who celebrates, for they are tolerated for the favor of the faithful, not in their own favor. Hence he also validly administers penance, since he is not deprived of jurisdiction; for this is expedient for the usefulness of the faithful. L. 165-170; St. Thomas, III, q. 64, a. 9; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 144-146; Laymann, chap. 2, n. 5; Ithur., case 42.

It deprives one of the use of divine offices, so that an excommunicated person, whether to be avoided or tolerated, not only lacks their fruit, but also under mortal sin cannot celebrate them or assist at them in a notable part, so that morally he is judged to communicate with others, unless ignorance or necessity of avoiding scandal excuses. Although the same law applies to those to be avoided and to those tolerated, nevertheless as regards the latter, since today there is scarcely a confessor who keeps an excommunicated person away from the divine offices and there is no excommunicated person who thinks that he must abstain from the divine offices, the rigor of the law in this matter seems to some to have been tempered. Similarly others sin who participate with an excommunicated person to be avoided by assisting at divine things with him, e.g., at the same Mass; and although this sin from its genus is mortal, nevertheless from smallness of matter it is venial, as if only a small part of the Mass, e.g., only up to the Gospel, is heard with him.

Moreover, by divine offices are understood the sacrifice of the Mass, public prayer, procession, chanting of the hours, blessing of oil, water, candles, palms, ashes, and the other things annexed to the clerical order by the institution of Christ or of the Church, which are done publicly and solemnly with proper ornaments, excepting a sermon. L. n. 177. Hence an excommunicated person, whether tolerated or to be avoided, can also, during the time when divine things are not celebrated, enter the church to pray privately, and separately from others in a distinct chapel, and even in the same chapel where others pray, pray privately, because by praying privately he by no means communicates with others. Indeed, although from C. Excommunicatos 17, q. 3, c. 11, it is forbidden for an excommunicated person to communicate with others even in private prayer, nevertheless, scandal and contempt set aside, it does not seem to be grave matter to use him as a companion for privately reciting the office, just as for saying the Rosary. One obliged to the canonical hours is not free from reciting them. But in reciting them he must not say Dominus vobiscum, but Domine, exaudi orationem meam, because that formula imports a certain salutation to the people; whence otherwise he would sin venially. L. 173-178; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 131-133, 178; Pichler, l.c.

Now if an excommunicated person assists at divine offices and is to be avoided, and when warned does not wish to withdraw from the Church, clerics are bound to expel him if they can; or, if they cannot, or if a graver inconvenience is feared, to cease from the office; otherwise they sin gravely. If the sacrifice of the Mass is being celebrated, the celebrant, if the Canon has not yet been begun, must break off the Mass; if he has begun, he can, with the others departing, continue the sacred rite or break it off, because of the probability of each opinion; if he has consecrated, he must, with only the minister remaining, proceed up to and including Communion, and complete the remaining things in the sacristy or another decent place. But the excommunicated person must be expelled by the work of lay persons if they are present; but if they are lacking, clerics also must expel him. As regards those assisting, some more probably say that they also sin gravely unless some necessity or smallness of matter excuses; others not improbably say that this communication of those standing by does not exceed venial fault, because such communication seems too remote and accidental, unless they themselves are also the cause that the excommunicated person is present. But the common doctrine is that if those standing by hear another Mass different from that which the excommunicated person hears, neither they nor the celebrant are bound to withdraw, because then there is no formal communication. C. Veniens 16; C. Significavit 18; C. Nuper 29; C. Responso 43, de Sent. exc.; Clementine Gravis 2, e.t.; Laymann, chap. 2, n. 6; Engel, nn. 57, 59; Pichler, n. 33.

It deprives one of the conferral of a benefice, or ecclesiastical dignity having jurisdiction; and this conferral made to an excommunicated person, such as presentation, election, institution, confirmation, is null, and this even if the excommunication is unknown; for although ignorance can excuse from fault, it nevertheless does not supply the defect of a condition required for the validity of the act. For a benefice is given because of the office. But an excommunicated person, whether to be avoided or tolerated, is incapable of exercising office; for he cannot communicate in office. C. Postulatis 7; C. final, de Cler. exc. Hence he cannot make the fruits his own. But he is not deprived of another benefice already obtained, nor before the sentence of a judge is he bound to restore the fruits, if by himself or by another he fulfilled its burdens. For penalties requiring action on the part of the delinquent always need the sentence of a judge, at least declaratory. L. 179-183; book 1, nn. 148-149; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 147-162; Engel, nn. 60, 61. It also deprives one of Apostolic Rescripts. An excommunicated person is incapable by the law itself of obtaining these rescripts both of grace and of justice, which consequently will be null. C. Dilectus 26, de Rescriptis; C. Ipso iure 1, e.t., in VI. Except unless they were granted knowingly, motu proprio, or after absolution from censures was prefaced, as is customary; which will also have to be understood concerning the conferral of a benefice, if in the concession there is a clause of absolution from censures. Pichler, n. 29; Coninck, dub. 9, 10; L. 180, 182; Laymann, chap. 2, nn. 7-12. Likewise the minor Rescripts of the Holy See are valid, although obtained by excommunicated persons, for the forum of conscience only. Sacred Penitentiary, September 9, 1898, A.S.S., vol. 35, p. 754; E.M.

Several, not improbably, deny that a tolerated person is incapable of obtaining benefices. Cf. Commentary, n. 103, 5.

From the constitution Vacante Sede Apostolica, for the effect of electing the Supreme Pontiff no Cardinal can be impeded from active or passive election by force of any excommunication, suspension, interdict, or other ecclesiastical penalty, which meanwhile all remain suspended. Sec. 29.

With those things observed which are prescribed by the constitution Sapienti consilio, "graces and dispensations granted by the Holy See, even to those entangled in censure, are ratified and legitimate, unless there is question of those who are excommunicated by name, or likewise by name struck by the Holy See with the penalty of suspension from divine things." Order to be observed in the Roman Curia, September 29, 1908, part 2, chap. 3.

It deprives one of forensic communication, or every act pertaining to judgment, both in the ecclesiastical forum and, per se, also in the civil forum. C. Decernimus 8, de Sent. exc., in VI. Per se: for today it has no place in the civil forum. Hence an excommunicated person cannot be judge, advocate, procurator, plaintiff, notary, witness, tutor, curator, executor of a will, etc. But one must distinguish between an excommunicated person tolerated and one to be avoided. An excommunicated tolerated person is deprived by the very fact of no forensic communication, whence he acts validly if he uses it, and also licitly if he is required. But he can be juridically repelled by exception, both by adversaries and by the judge. But an excommunicated person to be avoided acts illicitly; yet he can except, appeal, and defend himself. Besides, the sentence of a judge to be avoided is not only illicit but invalid, since he lacks jurisdiction. C. Ad probandum 24, de Sent. et re iud.; C. Cum inter 5, de Except.; C. Pia consideratione 1, ibid. Moreover he cannot licitly enter contracts or make a will, although he does so validly, even when he institutes an excommunicated person as heir.

It deprives one of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. C. Ad probandum 24, de Sent. et re iud.; C. Romana 1, de Suppl. negl. praelat., in VI; C. Romana 1, de Offic. vicar., in VI; C. Si is cui 10, de Off. deleg., in VI. But the reason is that the exercise of jurisdiction is the principal communication with the faithful. Hence an excommunicated person to be avoided would absolve, elect to benefices, etc., both illicitly and invalidly. But an excommunicated tolerated person, even a notorious one, also a heretic from a sect and a schismatic, validly exercises jurisdiction, but acts illicitly, unless either from a grave cause, or when asked, he exercises acts of jurisdiction; in which cases he is excused from mortal sin even while administering the sacraments. Illicitly; but his acts can be annulled through exception, by sentence of a judge. L. 185; Ithur., case 42; Laymann, chap. 2, n. 13; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 163-166; Pichler, l.c.; Coninck, dub. 10; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 37, n. 6 ff.

The crime of simony in the election of the Supreme Pontiff is subject to a most special excommunication; nevertheless the aforesaid simoniacal election is not invalid. Pius X.

Constitution Vacante Sede, December 25, 1904, secs. 51-79.

It deprives one of ecclesiastical burial, namely that which is done in a sacred place destined for the burial of the faithful. Hence an excommunicated person to be avoided and one tolerated cannot be buried in a sacred place, and if they have been buried in a sacred place, they must be extracted from it. But this difference intervenes between one to be avoided and one tolerated: 1. if each, when dying, has given signs of repentance, the tolerated person can be buried in a sacred place, although it is fitting that he first be absolved from excommunication. Indeed a tolerated person, if he is occult, can certainly be buried in a sacred place; if known, he can still probably be buried in a sacred place, because if it is licit to communicate with them while living, it is also licit to communicate with them when dead, and because in practice, especially at present, several scandals are thus avoided. 2. If an excommunicated person to be avoided has been buried in a sacred place, that place is judged polluted by such contact and must be expiated; but if an excommunicated tolerated person has been buried in a sacred place, the sacred place is not judged polluted, and therefore does not need expiation. C. Sacris 12, de Sepult.; Pichler, n. 29; Coninck, dub. 8; L. 186, 187.

It deprives one of civil society, which involves five things: mouth, prayer, greeting, communion, table. Therefore excommunicated persons cannot live together with other faithful, cohabit, converse, transact business, etc. This deprivation of civil association is to be understood only for those to be avoided; for tolerated persons, by today's custom, no longer sin by communicating with the faithful in civil matters, even if they have not been asked by them. Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1867. In civil matters: for in divine matters they can communicate only when asked. Pichler, l.c.

"To no apostolic Missionary of whatever grade, condition, preeminence, religion, or state is it to be lawful in the future to commit to type any work of his own or of another, under any pretext whatsoever, by himself or through another or others, without the express license in writing of the S. C. itself, in the accustomed form, under penalty of privation of office, of active and passive voice, suppression of the same work, excommunication latae sententiae to be incurred by the very fact and reserved to Our Most Holy Lord alone, commanding the above-mentioned and each of them that, in the case in which they obtain the said license, they are bound to print the same at the beginning of the work itself, under the same penalties, notwithstanding whatsoever privileges, faculties, licenses, even orally, otherwise given or conceded, all and singular of which by the present Decree are to be judged revoked in every way." S. C. de P. F. 6 Dec. 1655.

"Therefore since, as we have received, although at another time the Congregation of Our Venerable Brothers the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church for just causes had forbidden anyone without its license to publish by type books and writings in which Missions were treated in any way, nevertheless many, either ignorant of what the same Congregation had decreed, or rashly transgressing its decree, publish writings and books often containing false and inept things, not without offense of pious and learned men: We, moved by these and other grave causes, by the counsel of the mentioned Cardinals, by apostolic authority and the tenor of the present letters, again prohibit that anyone of whatever state, grade, and condition, even a regular of any Order, Congregation, Institute, and Society, even of Jesus, although he were one of whom specific and individual mention would have to be made, without license in writing of the Congregation of the same Cardinals, which he is bound to print at the beginning of the work, publish by himself or through another books and writings in which Missions or matters pertaining to Missions are treated, under the penalties of excommunication latae sententiae, from which no one can be absolved by anyone except by Us, or the Roman Pontiff existing for the time, unless constituted in the article of death, and of privation of office and of active and passive voice, and also of suppression of the works, to be incurred by the very fact." Clement X, Brief Creditae nobis, 6 Apr. 1673.

"It is in no way expedient that in the Empire of China and the Kingdom of Tonkin any writings or books be published, whether treating of Religion directly or indirectly, or discussing ecclesiastical matters, unless by prior examination and approval of the Sacred Congregation itself. Yet it declared small doctrines, catechisms, instructions, and prayers which serve the daily use of the faithful to be excepted from this law; nevertheless under this condition, that they cannot be scattered among the people unless the respective Bishops of the places, or Apostolic Vicars, shall first have seen them and permitted them to be emitted into the light." S. C. de P. F. 28 Dec. 1770; 31 March 1856 to the Apostolic Vicar of Cochinchina; 31 Aug. 1840 to the Apostolic Vicar of Siam; 30 Sept. 1848 to the Apostolic Vicar of Western Cochinchina.

"And since it has been discovered that in several Vicariates there are published books and booklets in which discourse is instituted concerning the morals and usages of the Gentiles, and which refer more or less directly to the interpretation of the Apostolic Constitution of Benedict XIV of holy memory which begins Omnium sollicitudinum, the Most Eminent Fathers judged that Apostolic Vicars and Missionaries are to be warned that an exemplar of whatsoever instructions and booklets must altogether be sent to this Sacred Congregation, in which there is question of matters pertaining in any way to the interpretation of the remembered Bull." Instr. S. C. de P. F. to the Apostolic Vicars of India, 8 Dec. 1868.

"Since from the year 1788 up to this day Breviaries, Diurnal Hours, Missals, Little Offices of the B. M. V., Offices of Holy Week, Rituals, and other things of that kind, which are newly committed to the press, no longer bear the attestations of the Reverend Ordinaries, by which it is declared that these exemplars agree with those which are printed at Rome according to the tracks of the Bulls of St. Pius V, Clement VIII, and Urban VIII, Supreme Pontiffs, which are found at the front of the Roman Breviary, the S. R. C. was supplicated that it be declared whether the recounted Pontifical Constitutions ought still to be observed, and whether transgressors incurred the penalties inflicted there. And the same Sacred Congregation, all things maturely weighed and accurately considered, judged that it must be rescripted and declared: the Pontifical Constitutions remain in their force, and the abuse is not to be tolerated." S. R. C. 26 Apr. 1834.

"1. Is it lawful to give one's name to societies whose proposal is to promote the use of burning human corpses? 2. Is it lawful to command that one's own or others' corpses be burned? Resp. To the 1st: Negatively, and if there is question of societies affiliated to the Masonic sect, the penalties laid against this are incurred. To the 2nd: Negatively. And when a report concerning these things had been made to Our Most Holy Pope Leo XIII, His Holiness approved and confirmed the resolutions of the Most Eminent Fathers, and ordered them to be communicated to the local Ordinaries, that they may take care opportunely to instruct the Christian faithful concerning the detestable abuse of burning human bodies, and that with all their strength they deter from it the flock entrusted to them." S. I. C. 19 May 1886.

Audifax, a regular missionary, after he had spoken many things against the Apostolic Delegate, was suspended by him from order and from office. Audifax, sent by his Superior to another mission, is absolved from the suspension laid upon him by the Apostolic Delegate of this mission.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. Since Audifax was suspended through a censure laid down ab homine, he surely could not be absolved from this censure by the Apostolic Delegate of another mission, although the latter was strong with the same authority as the other Apostolic Delegate. Although Audifax changed domicile and no longer depends on the former Apostolic Delegate, nevertheless, as regards absolution from the censure laid upon him, he is still dependent on him. "As regards censures," says St. Alphonsus, l. 7, n. 72, "laid down ab homine, if the censure is borne by way of a particular sentence against a determinate person, that person cannot be absolved except by the one bearing it, or by his superior, or by his successor or delegate. It is certain and common." And Suarez, d. 7, s. 2, n. 26: "One must distinguish," he says, "concerning one excommunicated by his bishop either through a general sentence or through a special one. For, if it is in the former mode, he can be absolved by another bishop to whose diocese he has transferred his domicile... But if he has been excommunicated through a particular sentence, he cannot be absolved by another judge, even if he has transferred domicile elsewhere, because the case was already begun before another judge, who consequently acquired as it were a permanent jurisdiction in such a case, and in those things which pertain to it, among which are the censure and absolution from it. But jurisdiction thus confirmed is not taken away because of transfer of domicile, as is clear from C. Proposuisti de Foro comp." And Schmalzgr., l. 5, t. 39, n. 85, 87, 93: "It is doubted who can absolve from censures specially laid down ab homine? Resp. From these only he who laid it down can absolve, and his successor, superior, or delegate, and no one else... even if the guilty party changes domicile. For he is still to be absolved by him who bore the sentence, arg. C. Proposuisti 19, de Foro comp.... The reason is that by change of domicile he cannot elude the jurisdiction of the author of the censure... And no one else; for besides those thus far enumerated, the power of absolving from a censure specially laid down belongs to no other. The reason is manifest; for to no other is found granted the dissolution of this bond; and rightly, lest the jurisdiction of judges be disturbed, or their authority be contemned. Exception is made if the guilty party is prepared to offer satisfaction, but on account of infirmity or some other impediment cannot approach the author of the censure in order to be absolved; for then he can be absolved by an equal or inferior judge, an oath having been offered that as soon as he can he will present himself to him to whom by law the absolution belongs, according to C. Ea noscitur 13, Quod de his 26, Quamvis 58, de Sent. exc. The reason is that, since a censure is a medicinal penalty, depriving one of many spiritual advantages, it was expedient that, correction being placed, it be removed."

Moreover, the doctrine and prescription of C. Proposuisti 19, de Foro comp., is very clear, and is of the following tenor: "You have proposed to us that a certain subject of yours, legitimately cited by you to a case at the petition of a certain adversary of his, because afterward he began to be of another jurisdiction, intends to decline your judgment. Now we do not believe it to be doubtful to your prudence that he, in the aforesaid case, does not have the right of recalling the forum, as one already anticipated by that forum."

Therefore Audifax cannot be absolved except either by that Apostolic Delegate by whom the censure was laid upon him, or by the Supreme Pontiff, who is the Superior of the author of the censure. Namely, if Audifax offers to the Apostolic Delegate whom he offended by his manner of speaking a fitting satisfaction, the latter is bound to absolve him. But if without reasonable cause he denies absolution to him, then he will be able to have recourse to the S. Congregation de Prop. Fid., and he will certainly obtain absolution from it if he himself is truly penitent.

"23. Excommunications are only external penalties and do not deprive a man of the common spiritual prayers of the Church. - 24. Christians are to be taught to love excommunication more than to fear it." Propositions of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

"44. With respect to the forum of conscience, when the guilty party has been corrected and his contumacy has ceased, censures cease." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

"90. The Church has the authority of excommunicating in order that she may exercise it through the chief pastors, with at least the presumed consent of the whole body. - 91. Fear of an unjust excommunication must never prevent us from fulfilling our duty: we never depart from the Church, even when through the wickedness of men we seem to be expelled from her, when we are attached through charity to God, to Jesus Christ, and to the Church herself. - 92. To suffer in peace an unjust excommunication and anathema rather than betray the truth is to imitate Saint Paul: so far is this from being to raise oneself against authority or to rend unity." Propositions of Pasquier Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

"19. Through the ecclesiastical censures of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, the clergy subjects the lay people to itself for its own exaltation, multiplies avarice, protects malice, and prepares the way for Antichrist. An evident sign, moreover, is that such censures, which they call fulminations in their processes, proceed from Antichrist, and by them the clergy proceeds principally against those who lay bare the wickedness of Antichrist, who will especially usurp the clergy for himself." Article of John Hus condemned by the Council of Constance.

"11. No prelate ought to excommunicate anyone unless he first knows him to have been excommunicated by God; and he who excommunicates in this way becomes by this fact a heretic or excommunicated. - 12. A prelate excommunicating a cleric who has appealed to the king or to the Council of the kingdom is by that very fact a traitor to the king and the kingdom. - 13. Those who cease to preach or to hear the word of God on account of the excommunication of men are excommunicated and will be regarded as traitors in the judgment of God. - 30. The excommunication of the Pope or of any prelate is not to be feared, because it is the censure of Antichrist." Propositions of John Wycliffe condemned by the Council of Constance.

"31. Likewise, whether he believes that the Pope or other prelates, the proper names of the Pope then reigning being expressed, or their vicars, can excommunicate their ecclesiastical or secular subject because of disobedience or contumacy, so that such a person is to be regarded as excommunicated. - 32. Likewise, whether he believes that, when the disobedience or contumacy of the excommunicated increases, prelates or their vicars in spiritual matters have the power of aggravating and reaggravating, of imposing an interdict, and of invoking the secular arm; and that inferiors must obey those censures. - 33. Likewise, whether he believes that the Pope or other prelates and their vicars in spiritual matters have the power of excommunicating disobedient and contumacious priests and laymen, and of suspending them from office, benefice, entrance into the church, and administration of the ecclesiastical Sacraments." Articles concerning which those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Hus are to be questioned by mandate of Martin V in the Bull Inter cunctas.

Cf. no. 1084.

"Those who are excommunicated by name, or are declared excommunicated by name, whether by the Supreme Pontiff or by bishops, are even today to be avoided according to the norm of the Constitution Ad evitanda of Martin V. Those communicating with excommunicated persons who must be avoided, however, do not after the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis incur major excommunication, except in the cases included in this Constitution. Notorious assailants of clerics are likewise excommunicated persons who must be avoided according to the Constitution Ad evitanda." Holy Office, 9 January 1884.

"Nearly all commentators on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis teach that minor excommunication was abolished by force of this Constitution. Can this opinion be safely taught in the Seminary? - Response. Affirmative." Holy Office, 5 December 1883.

"Whether, minor excommunication against those who communicate with persons excommunicated by name by the Supreme Pontiff having been removed, the prohibition is also considered to have been removed? - Response. Negative." Holy Office, 2 August 1893.

"Titius, a priest, while he was bound by a reserved occult excommunication, from which he afterwards obtained absolution, requested and obtained from the Sacred Roman Congregations certain personal favors which were granted to him by special Rescripts: namely, from the Sacred Congregation of the Index the faculty of reading prohibited books; from the Holy Office the faculty, or dispensation, from fasting; from the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences the faculty of blessing crowns and other objects with the application of Indulgences; from the Sacred Congregation of Rites the faculty of blessing sacred furnishings and other things.

"But, having now learned that the excommunicated are incapable of obtaining Pontifical favors, he finds himself in great straits from the doubt whether he can validly use the aforesaid faculties and favors, on account of which he asks through me:

"a) whether the aforesaid Rescripts obtained by Titius while he was bound by excommunication are to be regarded as valid;

"b) and, in the negative case, how Titius ought to conduct himself so as not to disclose the cause of the invalidity of the Rescripts obtained. - Response. Let the petitioner rest content concerning the foregoing. For the forum of conscience only." Sacred Penitentiary, 9 September 1898. Cf. M. E., vol. 15, pp. 166-167.

"At every time the Church has been solicitous that not only should advancement to sacred orders be forbidden, but also that criminals should remain suspended from the exercise of those same orders.

"Since, however, an easy and prompt coercion of occult crimes also, which it would not be expedient to disclose, namely one free from judicial forms, is sometimes necessary for protecting the dignity of the sacred ministry and the welfare of the faithful, the Fathers of Trent with most wise counsel decreed in Session 24, chapter 1, On Reformation: 'For one whose advancement to sacred orders has been forbidden in any manner by his own prelate for any cause whatsoever, even for an occult crime, even extrajudicially; or one who has been suspended from his orders or grades or ecclesiastical dignities: no license granted contrary to the will of that prelate for having himself promoted, nor restoration to his former orders, grades, and dignities or honors, shall avail him.'

"From this provident decree, in that which relates to crimes of clerics which merit extrajudicial suspension from ecclesiastical offices, the penalty of suspension for causes known to the prelate has long been in use; this, namely, is called suspension ex informata conscientia. Therefore, in order that the Ordinaries of Catholic Missions may proceed in inflicting it with the greatest caution and security possible, the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith judged that the present Instruction should be issued, to which those same Ordinaries will take care to conform themselves in employing this extraordinary remedy.

"1. Suspension ex informata conscientia, no less than that which is inflicted by a judicial sentence, prohibits an ecclesiastical person from exercising his orders or grades or ecclesiastical dignities.

"2. It differs from judicial suspension principally in this: that it is employed as an extraordinary remedy in punishment of a crime committed; and therefore neither judicial forms nor canonical admonitions are required for its imposition. It will accordingly suffice if the prelate inflicting this penalty uses a simple precept by which he declares that he imposes suspension from the exercise of sacred offices or ecclesiastical duties.

"3. A precept of this kind must always be intimated in writing, with the day and month designated; and therefore it must be done either by the Ordinary himself or by another person by his express mandate. In the same intimation, however, it must be expressed that a punishment of this kind is imposed by force of the Tridentine decree, Session 24, chapter 1, On Reformation, ex informata conscientia, or for causes known to the Ordinary himself.

"4. The parts of the exercise of order or office to which the suspension extends must furthermore be expressed; but if the suspended person is interdicted from an office for which another must be substituted in his place, as, for example, an administrator in the care of souls, then the substitute shall receive compensation from the fruits of the benefice in that portion which shall be assessed according to the prudent judgment of the Ordinary. But if the suspended person considers himself aggrieved in this assessment, he can seek moderation before the archiepiscopal curia or even before the Apostolic See.

"5. The time of duration of the same penalty must likewise be expressed. Let Ordinaries, however, abstain from inflicting it in perpetuity. But if for more grave causes the Ordinary judges that it should be imposed not for a determined time but at his good pleasure, then it is regarded as temporary and therefore will cease with the jurisdiction of the Ordinary inflicting the suspension.

"6. A just and legitimate cause for suspension ex informata conscientia is furnished by a crime or fault committed by the person suspended. This, however, must be occult and so grave that it merits such punishment.

"7. For it to be occult, however, it is required that it has been brought neither into judgment nor into the rumors of the people, and furthermore that it is not known to such a number and quality of persons that the offense must thereby be regarded as notorious.

"8. The suspension nevertheless holds even if one of several offenses was known among the people, or if the crime which had been occult before the suspension was afterwards divulged by others.

"9. It is left to the prudent judgment of prelates either to disclose to the delinquent, or to conceal, the cause of the suspension, that is, the fault itself. Otherwise, it will be the part of their pastoral solicitude and charity that, if they judge that a penalty of this kind should be manifested to the suspended person, through the paternal admonitions which they interpose it may serve not only for the expiation of the fault, but also for the amendment of the delinquent and for removing the occasion of sinning.

"10. But let the prelates remember that if recourse is made to the Apostolic See against the decree by which the suspension was imposed, then the fault which furnished the occasion for it must be proved before the same See. It will therefore be advisable that, before this penalty is inflicted, proofs of it be collected, although extrajudicially and secretly, so that, by the very fact that one proceeds with complete certainty of culpability in inflicting the punishment, if the case must afterwards be examined before the Apostolic See, the proofs of the crime may not encounter those difficulties which very often occur in judgments of this kind.

"11. From a decree of suspension ex informata conscientia no appeal is given to a tribunal of higher order. Therefore, after a cleric has received the intimation of suspension, if he nevertheless presumes to interpose an appeal and, under its pretext, to minister at the altar or solemnly to exercise his order in any manner, he immediately falls into irregularity.

"12. Access to the Apostolic See nevertheless always lies open, and in a case in which a cleric considers himself punished by this penalty without a sufficient and reasonable cause, he can have recourse to the Supreme Pontiff. Meanwhile, however, the decree of suspension remains in force until it has been rescinded or even moderated by the Pontiff himself or by the Sacred Congregation which must judge concerning the recourse.

"13. Finally, since a penalty of this kind is an altogether extraordinary remedy which is employed especially for the expiation of crimes without judicial forms, let prelates keep before their eyes that which the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XIV, of holy memory, most wisely admonishes in his Treatise On the Diocesan Synod, book 12, chapter 8, no. 6: namely, that a bishop would be blameworthy if in his synod he declared that henceforth, on private knowledge alone, he would punish with suspension from divine offices clerics whom he had discovered to have committed grave offenses, although their offense could not be conclusively proved in the external forum or it would not be expedient to bring it to the knowledge of others.

"Rome, from the offices of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 20 October 1884." A. S. S., vol. 19, p. 561 ff.

"The rite of the Church commands that the bodies of the faithful, in whatever manner they are conveyed (even by carriage), whether to the Church or to the Cemetery, must always be accompanied by a priest." Sacred Congregation of Rites, 15 July 1876; Santander.

"The practice of covering with branches and flowers the funeral monuments which are erected in churches on the occasion of funerals can be tolerated." Sacred Congregation of Rites, 16 June 1893; Goa, ad C.

"Bodies must be three cubits distant from the Altar; and three cubits are nearly one meter in length; and this distance of tombs from the Altar is sufficient." Sacred Congregation of Rites, 12 January 1897.

"The Sacred Congregation of Rites, adhering to the Rubrics of the Roman Ritual and to several other Decrees previously published, declares:

"I. The bodies of the dead are to be accompanied with one cross only, which must be that of the Church to which the body of the deceased is being carried; provided that the chapter of the cathedral church does not take part, under whose cross all accompanying the funeral must walk.

"II. The parish priest always has the right and duty, even when the chapter of the cathedral church is present, but outside that church, to put on the Stole and to perform all offices over the body of a deceased person belonging to his church, until it has entered the church of burial from the place of death; and the body is to be carried to that church by passing freely through other parishes also (by a direct route, however, unless custom provides otherwise).

"III. The same parish priest has precedence over all the clergy, except the chapter of the cathedral church, if it is present, which in the procession shall walk after the parish priest himself; except also the Chapter of a collegiate church, if custom so provides. In this case, however, the senior dignitary of the cathedral chapter shall walk with a Stole and also with a cope, which the parish priest, however, shall not wear; and the same shall be observed if the chapter of a collegiate church walks after the parish priest.

"IV. If the deceased is to be buried in another parish church, the rector of that church alone, likewise vested with a Stole, has the right and duty of performing the remaining offices there over the body and of preceding all others, not even excepting the parish priest of the deceased, who, when the body has been brought to the threshold of the church, shall withdraw.

"V. The Sacred Congregation of Rites orders all these things to be observed for any churches whatsoever, even collegiate churches, whether belonging to the secular or to the regular clergy, any custom whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding.

We must treat: 1. of the nature and division of censures; 2. of the principle or author of censures; 3. of the subject of censures; 4. of absolution from censures.

932. • A censure is commonly defined thus: It is a spiritual and medicinal penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived through ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods.

It is called: 1. a penalty, because it supposes fault; 2. spiritual, both because it is imposed by spiritual power for the spiritual utility of Christians and because it immediately takes away spiritual goods; 3. medicinal, because it is imposed for this end, that the soul may return to better conduct ¹; 4. upon a baptized man, because those who are not baptized are not subject to the power of the Church, while power is exercised over subjects; 5. delinquent and contumacious, because a penalty is inflicted only upon one who is delinquent, while medicine ought not to be offered except to those whose contumacy needs so great a remedy; 6. is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, namely, goods which are subject to the power of the Church, such as public prayers, the Sacraments, etc.

¹ Although the correction of the delinquent is despaired of, a censure can be imposed both in vindication of the offense and lest others be infected by communication with the wicked (Salmanticenses, On Censures, chapter 1, no. 10). Hence, when the end of correction ceases, the other ends do not thereby cease (Coninck, disputation 13, doubt 1, no. 9).

Hence a censure differs: 1. from deposition and degradation, which are not medicinal nor imposed for a time, but only as punishment and permanently; 2. from irregularity, which can be contracted even on account of a defect of mind or body alone, without any fault, and therefore of itself is not a penalty but only a canonical impediment, although, when inflicted on account of certain crimes, it can also have the character of a penalty.

Hence it is also apparent that a censure does not endure perpetually but reaches its end with the amendment of the delinquent; for then he ought to be loosed from the bond of the censure.

Suspension and interdict sometimes assume the nature of a censure and sometimes of a vindicative penalty. But you will recognize them to be a vindicative penalty both if they are imposed on account of a merely past offense and if they are inflicted perpetually or even for a determinate time, for example, for two or three months ².

² Therefore, one who violates interdicts or suspensions of this kind does not incur irregularity.

933. • Various censures are distinguished, namely:

1. Excommunication, suspension, and interdict, concerning which we shall speak specifically.

2. Censures latae sententiae or ferendae sententiae, according as the Superior establishes that they are to be incurred by the very fact by which someone violates the law, or are to be inflicted only after the sentence of an ecclesiastical judge.

3. Censures imposed a iure or ab homine, according as they are imposed after the manner of a judicial mandate or precept, whether upon one or upon several. If a censure affects determinate persons, it is particular; but if it is imposed generally and without determination of persons, it is general ³.

³ These things are somewhat obscure. Suarez speaks more clearly (On Censures, disputation 3, section 1, no. 2): A man can impose a censure in two ways. In one way, by making a stable and permanent law which obliges under this penalty, which its transgressors incur by the very fact. In another way, a man can impose a censure by pronouncing a sentence or by commanding something in a singular action or business, in which no right or permanent statute is established, but a transitory mandate. Therefore, when a censure is imposed in the first manner, it is said to be a iure, because ... such a censure is now contained in the law itself. But when a censure is imposed in the latter manner, it retains, as it were, the common name and, almost by antonomasia or accommodation, is called a censure ab homine. And in this sense that division is common among all theologians and canonists.

But they differ from one another in two ways. For: 1. a censure imposed a iure, when the author who imposed it dies, persists after the manner of all laws. But one imposed ab homine, since it depends upon his jurisdiction and authority, ceases when these cease through his death or removal from office. Understand this to mean that it is no longer incurred; for if someone has incurred it, the bond is removed only by absolution. 2. A censure imposed a iure can never be imposed for past offenses; but a censure ab homine is imposed not only for future offenses but also for past ones, for their satisfaction and correction (Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 39, no. 9).

Moreover, a twofold mode of censures ab homine is usually distinguished, namely: 1. by way of mandate, when a Prelate mandates or commands something; or prohibit something with the sanction of a censure annexed; and this mode regards future actions, as is apparent; 2. by way of sentence, when a judgment is instituted concerning some fact and a sentence is pronounced judicially, namely by imposing a censure, etc.; and this mode regards a past fact.

But either mode can be such that the censure is particular, namely, concerning some particular fact or certain persons, or general, which is imposed without determination of any singular fact or at least of a person.

St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 6) thinks that the censures which a Bishop imposes in a diocesan Synod are to be held as imposed by way of statute, and therefore, as imposed a iure, persist after the death of the Bishop; but those imposed outside the Synod are imposed ab homine and therefore cease through the death of the one imposing them.

4. Reserved or non-reserved censures, according as the Superior has reserved absolution from them to himself or has permitted ordinary Ministers to absolve from them. Some are reserved to the Pope, while others are reserved to Bishops. Censures ab homine are always judged reserved unless they have been imposed by a general sentence.

5. Notorious or occult censures, according as it is publicly established that someone has incurred them on account of a fact which is so known that it can no longer be concealed, or otherwise.

6. Just or unjust, valid or invalid censures, according as the Superior has or has not consulted justice, truth, and law in imposing the censure.

934. • For the validity of a censure it is required that the sin upon which it is inflicted be mortal, external, consummated, not merely past, and joined with contumacy.

1. Mortal; for a censure, since it is a most grave penalty, requires mortal fault ⁴.

⁴ It is the common opinion of the Doctors, as can be seen in St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 30) and Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 59), that some light censure, for example, minor excommunication, some light suspension, or some light personal interdict, can be imposed on account of light fault. St. Alphonsus adds, if the censure is imposed for a brief time; but then it will not properly be a censure, but a certain disqualification, as was said above, no. 932. Moreover, the Author speaks of major excommunication and of suspension and interdict as they are commonly imposed, namely, from every use; these, according to the common opinion of all, cannot be imposed on account of light fault. Nevertheless, a fault must be understood as light when it is such both in itself and by reason of the end; for the character or end gravely intended, or scandal or danger, can cause a thing light of itself nevertheless to be capable of a grave precept. See Suarez (On Censures, disputation 4, section 6, no. 12), Lugo (On Justice and Right, disputation 16, no. 61), Lessius (book 2, chapter 12, no. 54), Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 7, chapter 21, nos. 28, 29).

2. External; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain, and not concerning merely internal things ⁵.

⁵ Not only must the sin be external, but also grave by reason of the external act.

3. Consummated in deed, in its own genus ⁶; because penal laws are to be interpreted strictly according to the rule of Law: It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors amplified. - Except where the legislator expresses the contrary. external sin on account of which the censure is to be contracted must be complete in its own genus according to the proper meaning of the words which are contained in the precept or law. To this pertains the rule that, for a censure to be incurred, that effect which the legislator intends to prohibit under censure must be complete. Therefore, if the words, carefully inspected, signify that the ultimate effect is prohibited, for example, homicide, the censure is not incurred unless that final effect follows, namely, death. But when the action itself or the attempt is principally prohibited under censure, then, when it has been posited, the censure is immediately incurred even if the effect does not follow. See Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 1, point 4, nos. 12, 13) and Croix (book 7, no. 59).

⁶ Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 64) proposes this condition more clearly, so that it needs no exceptions: In order that a censure be incurred, the sin

But according to the more probable opinion, one who has revoked counsel or a mandate before execution does not incur the censure (Suarez, On Censures, disputation 44, section 5, no. 13; St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 40). But regarding one who, although he wished and attempted, was unable to signify the revocation of the counsel or mandate to the mandatary or executor, or who repents after the cause, for example of death, has been posited but before the effect which he could not impede has followed, according to the opinion of Cardinal de Lugo (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 453) and Suarez (On Sins, disputation 3, section 4, nos. 3, 7, 8), it is certain that he incurs the censure; nor does there appear to be any force in the reason which St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 40, and book 4, no. 149) brings to the contrary from the Salmanticenses.

** 1. Against this Note the VV. write fourteen columns (pages 841-848), and they contend two things (pages 846, 847), namely: 1. that Suarez in no way holds the opposite opinion and is in no way opposed to St. Alphonsus; 2. that Lugo hands down an entirely singular doctrine.

2. And as regards the first point, the VV. restrict the question to those things which Suarez discusses (On I-II, tract 5, On Sins, disputation 3, section 4), where he asks at what time someone is judged to sin by a sin of omission; and the VV. transcribe almost that entire disputation throughout four columns (pages 844-846). But there are two things upon which they insist. First, when Suarez (no. 7) premises: You will ask whether it can happen that the will which is the cause of the omission as such is a fault, and yet the omission which afterward follows is in no way a sin; for example, if someone, before the omission follows, repents of the prior fault and of the cause given, but nevertheless cannot impede the effect; he replies to this question (no. 8) that each manner of speaking is probable. Hence the VV. (page 846) conclude, as it appears, that the opinion of St. Alphonsus was probable to Suarez. Second, the VV. observe (page 846) that although Suarez affirms that the guilty person, however penitent, can justly be punished, nevertheless this is said only concerning irregularity and not concerning excommunication. For thus Suarez says (loc. cit., no. 7): However much that man afterward repents, he is justly punished on account of that act and remains irregular; therefore that exterior act has the character of sin. But the VV. there give this reason for the distinction which they devise for the present matter between irregularity and censure: that irregularity is a vindicative penalty ..., but the penalty of excommunication is medicinal. And concerning this latter they subjoin: If (the penitent guilty person) did what he could and was unable to impede the execution, he does not incur excommunication, because contumacy, which is necessarily required for incurring every censure, is absent.

3. Reply to the first. That Suarez says each manner of speaking is probable concludes nothing at all for the case of the VV. For the question concerns a mere denomination; and, as the same Suarez (no. 3) had said, perhaps the disagreement concerns the name. But otherwise, as the VV. themselves acknowledge, whether that omission of which there is question is called a sin or is not called a sin, the opinion of Suarez is certain that the guilty person is justly punished for that omission. Therefore, the VV. insist in vain upon these probable manners of speaking when the penalty is inflicted not probably but certainly.

4. Reply to the second. That Suarez, when he says that the guilty person is nevertheless justly punished, ought to be understood concerning irregularity alone and not concerning the penalty of excommunication is manifestly false. For in the preceding things (no. 3) Suarez openly indicates that, in the case, if the omission had truly followed and if the penalty of excommunication or irregularity had been imposed upon such omission, the guilty person would incur it. Therefore, when he afterward (no. 7) names only irregularity, he does this merely by way of example and not to the exclusion of other penalties and consequently of censures, if any have been imposed upon an omission of this kind.

5. But the reason on account of which the VV. say that in the case the guilty person, if he repents of the cause posited, indeed incurs irregularity but not excommunication, finally rests only upon a preposterous notion of the contumacy necessary for incurring censures, which notion they then gratuitously fasten upon Suarez. For contumacy in the present question does not consist in this, that after violating a law commanding under censure someone perseveres in the same evil will, but entirely in this, that someone knowingly and willingly has contemned the law and the censure by disobeying. Reiffenstuel aptly says (book 5, title 39, no. 14): When it is said that contumacy is required for incurring a censure, it is not to be understood as though express and formal contumacy were required; for virtual contumacy and interpretative contempt of the Church suffice, CONSISTING IN THIS: THAT SOMEONE KNOWS THAT SOMETHING IS PROHIBITED UNDER CENSURE BY A LAW OR BY A LEGITIMATE ECCLESIASTICAL SUPERIOR, AND NEVERTHELESS PRESUMES TO DO IT. Nor does Suarez speak otherwise (On Censures, disputation 4, section 3, no. 10): If the law commands absolutely and imposes a censure against transgressors, then that voluntariness which suffices for sinning deliberately and in a human manner against that law and for contumacy toward the censure is sufficient for incurring such a penalty imposed by the law itself. This rule appears manifest from the terms; because just as that law absolutely prohibits such an offense, so it absolutely pronounces the censure; therefore by force of such a law no more, nor another mode, of voluntariness is required for incurring the censure than for sinning against the law itself. Therefore, just as it does not pertain to the character of sin that the sinner afterward persevere in the evil will, so neither is anything more required for incurring the censure than contumacious disobedience in transgressing the law itself.

6. But there is no need to dwell upon more things when we have the present question resolved by Suarez no less than by Lugo and others. For, discussing (On Censures, disputation 20, section 3, no. 16) one who has an obligation to pay a pension within a month, and is now at the beginning of the month able to pay but, caring nothing about payment of the pension, spends everything and thus becomes unable to pay, he establishes these things: I say, therefore, that this man is not excused from incurring excommunication if, after the prescribed term has elapsed, he does not pay the required pension. The reason a priori is that he truly acts against the precept and consequently is contumacious; just as one who renders himself unable to recite acts against the precept concerning reciting the office.

7. But that he is not excused from incurring the censure however much he repents, Suarez continues and explains thus (no. 17): But it must be recalled that in cases of this kind one time is that at which the offense is committed before God, and another that at which excommunication is incurred. For someone commits the offense at the

time at which he becomes unable to pay according to the appointed term; but he does not incur excommunication until that term itself actually ends with the obligation unfulfilled, because the censure is not contracted until the omission of the precept has been externally consummated. But although the cause of the omission was posited earlier, and therefore the offense was then especially committed, nevertheless the omission itself was not consummated until the appointed term; and therefore until that time excommunication is not incurred, from which inability cannot then excuse him; because, since this inability was voluntary, it does not render the omission involuntary, but LEAVES IT SINFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS BY FORCE OF THE PRIOR CAUSE, EVEN IF PERHAPS IT NOW DISPLEASES HIM, WHICH IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO IMPEDE EXCOMMUNICATION.

8. But Suarez had explained in the place cited above (On I-II, On Sins, disputation 3, section 4, no. 8) how it can happen that even by the penalty of excommunication one is punished as guilty who has already been touched by sorrow for his sin, where he establishes that an omission culpable in its cause is better called a sin, even if the guilty person, before the omission itself follows, has so repented that he is now constituted in grace, as certain persons (ibid., no. 7) objected to the contrary: It ought to be said, says Suarez, that the PENALTY is imposed upon the external action not only because it is a sin when it occurs, but because it is culpable of itself and has an evil will as its cause, even if accidentally it should happen not to be a sin on account of a change of will; but perhaps those things would more properly be called sins because they proceed from a free and defective cause insofar as one is bound to avoid them. Nor does the subsequent will matter, because it is not the principle of the omission which follows, but another prior will which preceded. But the external action or omission is denominated a sin from the will from which it proceeds; hence at the same time the same omission both is willed as an effect by the will which is its cause and is unwilled after the manner of an object; and the first will is "I will"; the second is "I would not will the effect to follow." To the confirmation I reply that this omission has a twofold relation: one to the preceding depraved will, of which it is the effect; the other to the present circumstances and will; and as such it receives diverse denominations. Nor is it unfitting that the same external act be denominated good and evil from diverse wills. But the penalty concerning which Suarez speaks here is not irregularity alone, as the VV. said, but also censure, as was shown above.

9. Therefore, let it be concluded that the VV. did not rightly assert that Suarez in no way holds the opposite opinion and is in no way contrary to St. Alphonsus. Let us come to Cardinal de Lugo.

How consonant his doctrine is with those things which we have just reported from Suarez is apparent from the things which he replies (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 445) to those objecting (no. 442) that it can happen that a man is already justified through contrition or confession when the effect of the prior evil will is posited DE NOVO; therefore that effect does not suffice for giving a new denomination of sinner. Lugo therefore replies thus: However much the past will is in fact retracted, nevertheless, if the effect of death afterward follows, he who gave the poison will no less incur irregularity or excommunication, ACCORDING TO THE COMMON OPINION OF ALMOST ALL, than if the will had not been retracted; because through that retraction it is not removed that the effect which followed was voluntary, as proceeding from the will.

10. And a little afterward (no. 446) he adds a clearer explanation thus: That effect (namely, the death which followed from the poison) is voluntary and free denominatively insofar as it had its origin from a prior free will, not insofar as it now depends upon a will not retracted. And the reason is clear:

because denial of retraction does not cause the will now to influence the effect more, nor does retraction cause the will to influence less; for the whole influence on the part of the will was to posit the cause, which it now cannot remove. Therefore, since retraction does not diminish the positing of the cause, nor does the absence of retraction add strength to the cause already posited, it follows that the will influences the subsequent effect in the same manner whether it retracts or does not retract; because it influences in no way according to the present state, but only according to the past state, as it is past.

Hence it is permissible to conclude two things. For: 1. Lugo, as is apparent, testifies that in the case excommunication is incurred according to the common opinion of almost all. What, then, is this which the VV. affirm (page 847), that Lugo here hands down an entirely singular doctrine? 2. Therefore empty is the reason of those who excuse the penitent guilty person from incurring a censure because the effect is not imputable after the cause has been retracted. This reason would indeed prove, contrary to what even St. Alphonsus after others teaches, that not even irregularity is incurred.

11. And this is what Lessius also observes, where he writes (book 2, chapter 13, no. 17): If the revocation of the mandate does not become known to the mandatary, the one mandating is bound, when the effect follows, no less than if he had not revoked; because by force of the mandate the harm was done. Hence he also incurs censures and irregularity if perhaps these have been imposed upon the one mandating. Nor does it matter that he is now in the state of grace; because although such a censure is not contracted except through mortal sin, nevertheless it is not necessary that the fault of that sin then be committed, but it suffices that it has been committed and that its effect or the external work then occur by force of it, as happens in the proposed case.

12. But Coninck (disputation 14, no. 183) had already answered the little reason which the VV. appear to esteem greatly, namely, that the guilty person, employing every diligence to impede the effect, has put off contumacy. Even when, says Coninck, after all diligence of this kind has been employed it nevertheless remains established that the other (the mandatary) was still truly moved by the authority or reasons of the one mandating or counseling to perpetrate the crime ..., in that case, I say, he would truly incur the penalties established for those mandating or counseling such a work; because such penalties are generally established for those who mandate or counsel such a crime when the effect follows; but in this case such persons would truly have done this; therefore they would incur those penalties. Nor does it matter that the one mandating is now truly penitent for having mandated this, or that through contrition or confession he is in the state of grace ...; because, notwithstanding all these things, just as in that case he will truly be the cause of the injury, so he will incur those penalties; just as one who had mandated that a cleric existing elsewhere be mutilated, and afterward, penitent for the deed, contrite and confessed, seasonably sent even twenty messengers to revoke the mandate and impede the crime by any means, however much diligence he employed for this, if nevertheless those messengers, even from pure malice and fraud, failed to notify the revocation to the mandatary, when the effect followed the one mandating would incur excommunication, irregularity, and the obligation of restoring the harm which the cleric suffered, as all acknowledge. Note this: AS ALL ACKNOWLEDGE. How, then, do the VV. write that Lugo here hands down an entirely singular opinion?

13. But the VV. appear to have wished by these words not indeed to deny that the doctrine of Lugo set forth thus far was common to others, but to have ascribed to Lugo another certain portent of doctrine which everyone would truly call altogether singular and at the same time would vehemently marvel at. For they attribute to Lugo that he asserts that excommunication is incurred when the mandate is given; but that the one mandating is freed from excommunication when he repents before the effect follows, and then afterward falls again into excommunication when the effect follows!!! Thus they write (page 847): According to his

(Lugo's) opinion, the one mandating or counseling homicide, at the time at which he gives the mandate or counsel, would incur excommunication but not the penalties annexed to excommunication, because the Church does not will to punish him unless the condition of the effect following has been posited. But if meanwhile he performed true penance for the offense committed, he would be freed from the bond of excommunication; nevertheless, when the effect followed, he would incur excommunication DE NOVO, and indeed this time with the annexed penalties. Thus they write.

14. But indeed you will ask: where in Lugo's books did the VV. espy this new monster of doctrine? Yet at hand is the passage of Lugo which the VV. themselves report from disputation 16, On Penance, no. 453. Thus Lugo there: They object secondly: Because the censure is incurred now when the effect is posited, and not before; but this is not incurred except on account of sin; therefore a sin is also posited now. - It is replied by denying the consequent; for the censure is incurred now on account of a past sin which the Church nevertheless does not will to punish unless the condition of the effect following has been posited. Hence it can also happen that a censure is incurred by one who has already been justified from the past sin through contrition or through attrition with the Sacrament, because a censure is a penalty by which the Church can still justly punish a man on account of a past sin. And just as one excommunicated, although justified through contrition, still remains excommunicated until he is absolved, so one who is now contrite can incur excommunication DE NOVO on account of a past sin. And indeed, on account of the censure or reservation, it will sometimes be necessary in confession, only after the effect has followed, to explain also the effect which followed. Thus far Lugo.

How the VV. saw those portents in these words can scarcely be divined. For: 1. Lugo, when he concedes the antecedent of the objection and denies the consequent, thereby affirms that excommunication is not incurred before the effect has followed; how then do the VV. fasten upon Lugo that the censure is incurred when the mandate is given? 2. Lugo expressly says here that excommunication is not removed except through absolution, however much the guilty person has already been justified through contrition; how then do the VV. fasten upon Lugo that through penance the guilty person is freed from that imaginary excommunication and afterward incurs another excommunication when the effect follows? 3. Lugo recalls no other penalty here by which the guilty person is justly punished by the Church except the penalty of censure; how then do the VV. invent penalties annexed to excommunication which Lugo asserts are not incurred when the mandate is given but only after the effect has followed?

But the VV. themselves candidly disclose the origin of these phantasms. For after premising the words above (no. 13), they subjoin: We do not see how this opinion (of Lugo) can be explained otherwise, since he expressly says DE NOVO; namely, the VV. explain that phrase de novo as though it there signifies again. But everyone knows that de novo is also used for newly or anew (see the lexicon under Nove), that is, to designate that which had not occurred before. And indeed one could see that this phrase de novo was employed in this sense in Lugo himself a little before the text adduced (see above, no. 9), where he writes: When the effect of the prior will is posited DE NOVO; for it cannot be understood of an effect posited again, but of an effect newly or only now finally posited. Against these portentous phantasms let it suffice to remember that saying: What can excessive fervor in disputing not do?

15. I would not wish to omit here that those words of the Note under discussion, nor does there appear to be any force in the reason which St. Alphonsus brings to the contrary from the Salmanticenses, are not, I say, our words, but those of John de Dicastillo. He himself wrote thus concerning this question (On Censures, disputation 1, no. 291): But if, before (the revocation by the one mandating) comes to the knowledge of the mandatary, the latter perpetrates the offense, the one mandating incurs the censures.... Nor does it matter that perhaps he is now

in the state of grace; because although a censure and irregularity are not contracted except on account of mortal sin, nevertheless it is not necessary that the fault endure when they are contracted; but it suffices that it has been committed and that the effect or external work then occur by force of that fault, as we said concerning one who wounds unto death, etc. And again (disputation 2, no. 344), where he recalls the opposite opinion: Filliuccius adds that one is excused from a censure to be imposed who, when the appointed term arrives, is sorry for the fault committed. This limitation rightly displeases others; for it matters little that someone is now sorry, provided that he previously gave a sufficient voluntary cause for the omission. For a censure is often incurred even if, at the time of incurring it, someone has already been contrite for the sin and constituted in grace. Thus one who cast a missile at a cleric or administered poison to him, even if he becomes contrite for the sin before the effect follows, incurs excommunication and irregularity, because he voluntarily gave cause for such killing and striking. Let Suarez, etc., be read. But concerning the opposite opinion of Filliuccius, at the end he says most expressly that IT IS PROVED BY NO SUITABLE FOUNDATION.

4. Not merely past; because a censure is a medicinal penalty and therefore cannot be imposed upon those who have already returned to better conduct. Therefore, for a sin to be called merely past in the case, it is necessary that it cease so entirely that it is in no way joined with any present disobedience and contumacy. See St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 54).

5. Joined with contumacy against a law or precept. The reason is that the principal end of a censure is to break obstinacy. - See St. Alphonsus, no. 30 and following ⁷.

⁷ Therefore, it is not sufficient that the sin be contrary to natural or divine law unless it is also contrary to some law of the Church. For through censures contumacy against a law of the Church is punished, and indeed against a Church threatening a censure upon the contumacious.

935. • Resolutions. - 1. One who is excused from grave fault on account of some circumstance is also excused from a censure, although the matter is grave in itself.

2. If something altogether light is commanded under censure, the censure is not incurred, provided that the thing which appears light under some respect does not become grave from another source.

3. A Superior who imposed a censure on account of any grave fault whatever would act imprudently and illicitly, but nevertheless validly; for the end of the Church is to punish only the graver crimes ⁸.

⁸ The Council of Trent (session 25, chapter 3, On Reformation) has these words: Although the sword of excommunication is the sinew of ecclesiastical discipline and very salutary for keeping peoples in their duty, nevertheless it must be exercised soberly and with great circumspection; since experience teaches that, if it is inflicted rashly or for light causes, it is more despised than feared and produces ruin rather than salvation.

4. The excommunication which is said to be imposed upon harmful animals, for example, upon locusts, is not excommunication properly so called, but an adjuration or a prayer made for their destruction, lest they do harm.

5. Likewise, when the dead are said to be excommunicated, this must be understood of a certain execration or declaration of the excommunication which they incurred before death and in which they died ⁹.

⁹ Therefore, absolution imparted to excommunicated persons who have died with signs of repentance is extended directly not to them but to the living, insofar as the latter are released from the obligation not to communicate with the deceased in burial and public prayers. See Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 39).

936. • Questions. - QUESTION 1. How is a censure latae sententiae distinguished from a censure ferendae sententiae?

Reply 1. Generally, a censure will be latae sententiae: 1. if the words by which it is expressed exclude the action or ministry of anyone else, for example, if it is imposed with these words: by the fact itself, by the law itself, by that very fact, without another sentence;

2. if the words are in the present or past tense, for example, we excommunicate, we have excommunicated, etc.; 3. if the words are in the imperative mood, for example, let him fall under excommunication, let him remain suspended, interdicted, etc. - St. Alphonsus, no. 7.

Reply 2. But a censure is to be held as ferendae sententiae: 1. if the words by which it is imposed demand the work and ministry of another, for example, let him be excommunicated by the Bishop; 2. if they are only comminatory, for example, we command under threat of anathema, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances; 3. if they express the future tense, for example, he will be excommunicated, he will be an excommunicated person, etc. ¹⁰.

¹⁰ If the words are ambiguous, rule 49 of the Law in the Sext can be followed: in doubt concerning penalties, the more benign interpretation is to be made. Common opinion.

937. • QUESTION 2. Is one who doubts whether he has incurred a censure to be judged to have incurred it?

Reply. Negatively, whether you doubt that you sinned gravely or that the case falls under the censure. The reason is that, according to the commonly received axiom and the very rule of Law, odious things are to be restricted. Thus commonly. Nevertheless, you incur the censure if the doubt concerns the gravity of the matter itself, both considered in itself and in view of the end, etc. For then this matter is to be regarded as grave, since it is such in the judgment of the Superior who imposed the censure and, moreover, in doubt the presumption favors the Superior. - St. Alphonsus, no. 32; Salmanticenses, chapter 1, no. 207, etc. ¹¹.

¹¹ For other resolutions according to the diversity of the doubt, see St. Alphonsus (book 7, nos. 67, 68).

QUESTION 3. Is someone bound by a censure which he knows to be manifestly unjust?

Reply. Negatively, whether the Superior, relying upon a false presumption, condemned an innocent person as guilty, or omitted the legal forms, or exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction. - St. Alphonsus, no. 68. - Nevertheless, the danger of error in one's own cause must be carefully avoided ¹².

¹² Nevertheless, if it is not publicly established that the censure is null, it must be observed on account of scandal (see St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 68).

938. • QUESTION 4. Does ignorance excuse from a censure?

Reply 1. Ignorance of fact certainly excuses, namely, when someone does not know that he is positing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, for example, if someone strikes a priest whom he thinks to be a layman, he does not incur the censure imposed upon those who strike clerics. The reason is that the censure must be known to the sinner in order that he be contumacious. Thus in Canon Law, chapter Si vero aliquis, On the Sentence of Excommunication. - St. Alphonsus, no. 43.

Reply 2. Ignorance of an ecclesiastical law commanding or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is evident from the same reasons just given; for one who is ignorant of the law of the Church cannot be called contumacious against the Church, as is apparent from Canon Law, Sext, book 1, title 2, On Constitutions, chapter 2, where it is said: We do not will the ignorant to be bound, provided, however, that the ignorance was not crass or supine. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.

939. • QUESTION 5. Does vincible ignorance excuse from a censure?

Reply 1. Affirmatively, if it is not gravely culpable; because then the ignorant person cannot be called contumacious against the Church. Thus all.

Reply 2. Negatively, however, if that ignorance is gravely culpable; because then it can be called crass; moreover, crass ignorance does not excuse from a censure, as is evident from the cited Canon Law. - St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 43, and others commonly ¹³. Otherwise, however, ignorance does not prevent someone from being contumacious against a law of which he is culpably ignorant. Except, however, if it is said in the decree of censure: whoever shall have done this knowingly, deliberately, rashly ¹⁴, whoever shall have presumed, etc. For these words demand a perfect and direct voluntary act and certain knowledge of the censure. - St. Alphonsus, no. 46. Many nevertheless contend that gravely culpable ignorance excuses from a censure, although it does not excuse from mortal sin; because gravely culpable ignorance can exist without therefore having to be called crass.

¹³ It is scarcely apparent why St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 45) called this opinion common, when the Salmanticenses, from whom he borrowed this opinion, cite more Authors for the opposite than for it (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 196); indeed Suarez himself (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 12) admits that other modern authors departed into another opinion. But the reason given by Suarez, if it is to be called a reason, is of no weight. Therefore, nothing ought to prevent someone from safely following the opposite opinion, which the Author presently subjoins.

** Against this little Note the VV. write (page 849): A marvelous argument! As though the Salmanticenses had intended to compile an exact catalogue of Authors! And then, besides the four cited by the Salmanticenses for the opinion of St. Alphonsus, they add Laymann, Bonacina, Bossius, Molina, Salas, Filliuccius, Reginaldus, and Alterius.

Reply. Let the antecedent pass; and I deny the consequent. For the question is whether the opinion of St. Alphonsus is to be called common. Moreover, even after those eight are added, would this opinion be called common? For the Salmanticenses (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 196) cite eight for the opposite, namely, Tanner, Caelestinus, Diana, Henriquez, Peter de Ledesma, Palaus, Sanchez, and Avila. Add also that, among those cited by the VV., Filliuccius (On Censures, chapter 8, no. 262), contrary to what St. Alphonsus holds, supposes ignorance mortally culpable which nevertheless is not crass or supine; add that Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 2, point 1, no. 10) calls the opinion of Sanchez not improbable, whom St. Alphonsus admits to be opposed to himself. Therefore, even if we insist upon these citations alone, is not number now balanced by number?

But other Authors can easily be added to those cited by the Salmanticenses against the opinion of St. Alphonsus. Thus, for example, Pirhing (book 5, title 39, no. 46), Dicastillo (On Censures, disputation 2, no. 298), Babenstuber (tract 4, disputation 1, article 3, no. 10), Tamburini (Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, section 7, no. 22), Mazzotta (tract 8, disputation 1, question 2, chapter 3, section 2), Reuter (part 1, nos. 22 and 267), and, lest we seek others, Portellus, Serra, Quintanadvenas, Praepositus, and Barbosa in Diana (volume 5, tract 1, resolutions 33 and 35). Let us conclude, therefore, that the foundation is weak upon which the opinion of St. Alphonsus is called common. But let us come to the reason.

Since it is said in the little Note that the reason brought by Suarez is of no weight, the VV. subjoin (page 850): If someone judges the reasons brought by Suarez and other Authors to be of no weight, there is surely nothing by which he would be prevented from embracing the opposite. But the authority alone of Father B., who does not even adduce those reasons and nevertheless condemns them, is by no means sufficient; for no title is known to us by which he could claim this prerogative for himself.

Reply. Father B. claims no other prerogative for himself except that he advance nothing on his own authority, as he has professed more than once. Accordingly, behold Laymann, who writes concerning this question (book 1, tract 2, chapter 4, no. 5): But it appears to be a question of name. Namely, the entire controversy depends upon the sense in which crass or supine ignorance is taken. On this matter, behold Sanchez (Decalogue, book 1, chapter 16, no. 7), who writes: Vincible ignorance which is not affected is one thing when only mortally culpable, but another when crass or supine. Suarez, on the contrary (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 12): Every ignorance which suffices for mortal transgression or disobedience is to be called crass or supine.

But how does Suarez prove his thesis? Entirely by this argument (loc. cit.): Other modern Authors ... appear to distinguish degrees in that very ignorance which suffices for mortal sin, so that below a certain degree it is not crass or supine but only vincible, although mortal, and therefore excuses; but beyond that degree it is now crass or supine and does not excuse. But certainly the distinction of such degrees is founded upon no law and can be explained by no reason.

Therefore, the entire force of the argument resides in this: that the distinction of degrees cannot be explained. But does not Suarez himself admit this distinction of degrees? For he himself writes thus (On I-II, tract 2, disputation 4, section 1, no. 14): Because there can be more and less in this negligence, according to this various degrees of this ignorance are customarily distinguished. Hence Laymann also (loc. cit.): I admit this, he says, that among ignorances crass in the mind of Suarez there is a certain latitude, namely, one very crass and altogether supine, another less crass, all of which nevertheless can be mortal. Therefore, since, by Suarez's own admission, various degrees are distinguished among gravely culpable ignorances, to what does his argument finally amount, that the distinction of degrees cannot be explained?

Suarez insists: For who shall say that negligence sufficient for sinning mortally is crass in such a degree, but not in such another; or by what reason can these degrees be discerned?

Reply. Another will answer ad hominem: Who shall say that negligence sufficient for sinning mortally exists in such a degree, but not in such another; or by what reason can these degrees be discerned? Certainly, if it can sometimes be determined when ignorance is grave, and therefore, according to his opinion, crass, it will be possible to determine in the same manner when, among mortal ignorances, as Laymann says, ignorance is very grave and when less grave.

And behold the reason why it was said in the Note that the reason brought by Suarez is of no weight. For, finally, as Laymann says, it is a question of name. And just as it pleased Suarez, on account of that very slight little reason, to define as crass any ignorance however grave, so it seemed to others that only that ignorance should be called crass or supine which was distinguished by some greater gravity. Crass and supine ignorance, says Barbosa (Collections, volume 4, on book 1 of the Sext of the Decretals, title 2, chapter 2, no. 7), is called that which proceeds from THE GREATEST NEGLIGENCE, as happens when someone has employed no diligence or only slight diligence, etc. And from this he proves that Bonacina called the opinion of Sanchez and Navarre not improbable. And as to what Suarez cites for his own purpose from law 15, ff. On Contracting a Purchase, where a supine man is named, as though, namely, every ignorance which does not excuse from a grave obligation, for example, of restitution, were now to be called supine, the gloss explains it thus from other texts of Law: A supine man is one MOST negligent; which is apparent from law 9, ff. On Ignorance of Law and Fact, where it is read (section 2): But ignorance of fact only then does not harm anyone if THE GREATEST negligence is not charged against him. Moreover, does Suarez himself think that it is necessary for grave fault of ignorance that the negligence be the greatest? Hence Sanchez (loc. cit.), after distinguishing mortally culpable ignorance from crass and supine ignorance, well adds: Suarez denies this division, saying that every mortally culpable ignorance is crass or supine.... But I believe this division to be true.

I am led first because crass or supine ignorance is that which proceeds from the extensive fault of the ignorant person, namely, one who has employed no diligence or very slight diligence for knowing. And thus not every negligence, but the greatest, is what can constitute crass ignorance, as I proved from many sources in book 9, On Matrimony, disputation 32, nos. 32 and 33. Hence Valentia very well says that this ignorance exists when the ignorant person, although he could very easily overcome it, employed no diligence. But in order that ignorance be vincible and not excuse from mortal sin, such great negligence is not required; rather, as we shall say according to the mind of all in nos. 34 and 36, it is required that the moral diligence necessary according to the quality of the business was not employed. Secondly, because, in the matter of an unformed confession, the Doctors not to be condemned (Canus, Soto, Henriquez, Bartholomew de Ledesma, Peter de Ledesma, and many others) think that it will be valid when a sin has been tacitly omitted or when a sufficient examination was not previously made from mortal negligence or ignorance, provided that it was not excessively crass or supine. And Soto explains this crass ignorance, from which an unformed confession is rendered altogether invalid, as existing when almost no diligence was employed for recalling sins, which is the definition of crass ignorance. Sanchez draws a third argument from the Doctors, where they say that culpable ignorance perhaps excuses from the excommunication of particular Prelates, provided that it is not crass or supine, but not from censures of the common law. There they plainly speak in the former member of mortally culpable ignorance. For otherwise they would ineptly say that it does not excuse from excommunication of the common law; and still more ineptly would they use the particle perhaps, as though doubting whether it excuses from excommunication by particular Bishops, when it is clearer than the midday light that no excommunication is contracted except on account of mortal fault.

And let these things suffice so that it may be evident that it was not without cause said in the little Note: 1. that it is scarcely apparent why St. Alphonsus called his opinion common; 2. that the reason brought for it by Suarez is of no weight.

¹⁴ Sanchez rightly notes (On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, no. 38) that Suarez, who (On Censures, disputation 4, section 10, no. 3) here takes temerity for imprudence by which an ignorant person exposes himself to the danger of acting against the law; for temerity in reality designates an act posited against express knowledge of the law.

And indeed this observation of Sanchez appears to apply equally to affected ignorance; which nevertheless the same Sanchez, less consistently with himself, teaches to excuse in On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 10, no. 38, but denies to excuse in On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, nos. 39, 40. The Doctors also differ on this question, as may be seen also in St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 48), who says that he adheres to the negative opinion as though it were more common; but if you count the Authors cited for each opinion by the Salmanticenses (On Censures, chapter 1, no. 199), you will find more in reality for the affirmative. Hence, whether you consider authority or reasons, concerning which see Roncaglia (On Censures, question 5, chapter 5, question 1, reply 4), Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 2, part 1, no. 11), and the Salmanticenses (loc. cit.), you conclude that in an uncertain matter the general principle is to be employed, and that one is in possession of the right to enjoy spiritual goods where the opposite is not demonstrated.

** The VV. censure two things in this Note (pages 850-855). First (page 853), just as concerning the preceding Note, they complain that it is said that more Authors are cited by the Salmanticenses for the affirmative opinion than for the negative opinion.

Reply. Do the VV. perhaps think it wrong that readers be warned if at some time a doubt arises whether an argument drawn from authority may perhaps need some critical examination? Indeed, the Salmanticenses expressly cite only ten, and tacitly others in Diana, for the affirmative; but for the negative, seventeen are expressly recalled in St. Alphonsus, and tacitly others in Bossius and the Salmanticenses. But, for example: 1. Kazenberger, namely, the Author of the additions to Sporer, whom St. Alphonsus cites for the negative, writes thus (On Censures, chapter 3, no. 39): It is probable and safe that even affected ignorance in such a case excuses from incurring a censure, as Sporer teaches with Sanchez, Bonacina, and Tamburini, tract 2 on the First Precept of the Decalogue, chapter 5, no. 42. And since Palaus actually holds thus (tract 2, disputation 1, point 18, no. 1), whom St. Alphonsus nevertheless cites for himself, there now accede to the affirmative, besides the Salmanticenses themselves, as St. Alphonsus testifies, Sporer, Kazenberger, Palaus, and in addition Tamburinus (Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, section 7, no. 27), who are not named by the Salmanticenses. 2. To these must also be added Filliuccius (tract 22, chapter 7, no. 205), who is not well cited by St. Alphonsus for the negative, and with Filliuccius also Tanner and Roncaglia, whom St. Alphonsus rightly numbers among those affirming; and Merolla must also be numbered with these (disputation 1, chapter 2, from no. 645), who treats this controversy more fully and solidly. And this light specimen, without our dwelling longer upon these things, sufficiently shows that it is not futile for Arguments sought from authority to be recalled to some weighing, especially since St. Alphonsus himself indicates that he was moved to prefer the negative opinion by authority rather than by reason, saying: I do not dare call this second opinion (the affirmative) improbable; but I adhere more to the first, at least as the more common.

The other thing which the VV. censure is that it is said in the Note that Suarez is noted by Sanchez because he takes temerity for imprudence; consequently they observe (page 852) that mere imprudence OF ITSELF never induces mortal fault.

Reply. The VV. rightly say, mere imprudence OF ITSELF. But it is not so understood by Suarez, who derives the gravity of this lack of consideration in acting from the dangers into which one acting without consideration casts himself. Hence Sanchez writes thus concerning this matter (On Matrimony, book 9, disputation 32, no. 38): I do not approve what Suarez says ..., where he thinks that one is called a rash violator if, when he has a suspicion or doubt concerning such a law, he employs no diligence to know whether that law exists; because otherwise he rashly exposes himself to the danger of transgressing it, and if it happens that he violates it in reality, he will be called a rash violator. But this does not please me; because although he is called rash, by reason of the danger to which he exposes himself, for contracting mortal fault, nevertheless laws punishing a rash violator demand something more, as I proved. Otherwise every person culpably ignorant of law would then be punished; because every culpable ignorance of law or fact necessarily supposes that some doubt concerning it preceded.

Namely, temerity is sometimes taken for an inconsiderate facility in acting, but sometimes temerity is said to exist when we do something by our own will and apart from the authority of the one commanding. To this pertain the things contained in chapter Eum qui 18, On Prebends, in the Sext: Moreover, so that violent men who by their own authority (or, more truly, temerity) do not fear to occupy ... any ecclesiastical benefices whatever, even if they are not restrained by love of virtue, may at least be restrained by fear of penalty from THE AUDACITY OF THEIR TEMERITY; by that very fact, etc. And this is what Sanchez intends to intimate when he says that laws punishing a rash violator demand something more. Hence Merolla (disputation 1, chapter 2, no. 235) well adds against that interpretation of Suarez: Temerity properly, beyond precipitation and imprudence, requires contempt; for the word rashly properly imports doing something with contempt of the law, and thus it proceeds from that root of pride

which refuses to be subject to rule, as St. Thomas, II-II, question 55, article 3, reply to objection 2, and Cajetan there very well teach; he says that this is very much to be noted for interpreting Canons which inflict penalties upon those rashly doing something, and that these are to be understood of this proper temerity. Finally, the VV. by no means ought to despise the words of St. Alphonsus, where he expressly says (book 7, no. 61): TEMERITY REQUIRES TRUE KNOWLEDGE, according to the things said in book 1, no. 174. That citation, however, became fallacious when, after the edition of the year 1757, the order of numbers in book I was changed.

940. • QUESTION 6. Does grave fear excuse from a censure?

Reply. Affirmatively, generally speaking. The reason is that ecclesiastical penal laws do not appear to press with so great a rigor. For since ecclesiastical laws themselves cease to oblige where very grave fear presses, the penalty annexed to them must also fall ¹⁵. The difficulty is greater where there is question of precepts of natural law, from fulfilling which grave fear cannot excuse. But even in this case contumacy against the Church is absent. For a censure is not incurred on account of a violation of divine law, but on account of a culpable transgression of ecclesiastical law ¹⁶. - St. Alphonsus, no. 46.

¹⁵ Schmalzgrueber well adds the reason (book 5, title 39, no. 79), that the delinquent thus cannot be held as contumacious and a contemner of ecclesiastical power, since he sins from the infirmity of nature rather than from the malice of an obstinate will.

¹⁶ This doctrine nevertheless has exceptions. Reiffenstuel writes thus concerning the matter (book 5, title 39, no. 34): When observance of a human law appears morally necessary for conserving the public good, or if its violation tends toward contempt of the faith, or of the law, or of ecclesiastical power, one who, from grave fear even of life, transgresses a law placed under censure is not excused from it ...; because, since in such cases no fear excuses from observance of ecclesiastical law ..., so neither does it excuse from the censure.

1138. 1. Definition of censure. Censure is defined: a spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods, or goods annexed to spiritual things, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved.¹

¹ Code, c. 2241.

It is said: a) penalty, or something bringing trouble; and thus it is distinguished from irregularity, which is an inability for receiving or exercising orders, and from reservation, by which the jurisdiction of the confessor is limited without a penalty properly being inflicted on the penitent. b) This penalty consists in privation of certain spiritual goods, such as the sacraments, or of goods annexed to spiritual things, such as ecclesiastical benefices. c) Hence the penalty is spiritual. d) It is moreover medicinal, or tending to the amendment of the delinquent: whence it is imposed only until the guilty person, withdrawing from contumacy, receives absolution.²

² Code, c. 2248.

1139. 2. Division of censures. a) By reason of the manner in which they are established, censures are a jure, if the determined penalty is established in the law itself; ab homine, if it is brought by way of a particular precept, or by a judicial condemnatory or declaratory sentence, even if established in law.³ b) By reason of the manner in which they are incurred, censures are latae or ferendae sententiae, according as they are incurred by the fact itself before any condemnatory sentence, or only after such a sentence. c) By reason of the manner in which they are absolved, censures are reserved, or reserved to no one, according as absolution is reserved to Ordinaries, or even to the Roman Pontiff, or can be given by all confessors. d) By reason of divulgation, censures are notorious when either by the sentence of a judge, or by the confession of the delinquent made in judgment, or by the perpetration of the delict in a public place, it is so known that someone has incurred a censure that this cannot be concealed; otherwise, they are called occult.⁴ e) By reason of the effects, that is, of the goods of which the censured person is deprived, three censures are enumerated, namely: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. We shall speak of each species in the following article.

³ Code, c. 2217.

⁴ Cod. jur. can., 2197.

3. Concerning the author of censures.

1140. A) He who enjoys the power of making law or imposing precepts⁵ can bring censures. - A vicar general without special mandate does not have this power.⁶

⁵ Ibid., 2220.

⁶ Ibid.

a) Therefore the power of bringing censures is had by: 1) the Roman Pontiff and the ecumenical Council for the universal Church; 2) apostolic legates, for the territory assigned to them; 3) the provincial Council, for its province; 4) bishops,⁷ upon their diocesans while they are staying in the diocese; also upon diocesans staying outside the diocese when they violate not the law but a precept of the bishop (more probably), or after they have committed a delict in their own diocese, indeed outside the diocese; upon pilgrims who, while they are traveling in some diocese, there commit a delict; upon exempt persons in cases determined by law; 5) superiors of religious, according to the statutes of their order, upon their subjects existing in any place whatever, since their jurisdiction is personal rather than territorial.⁸

⁷ Say the same, when the see is vacant, of the capitular vicar, or of the Chapter itself before the deputation of the capitular vicar. Abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction are also assimilated to bishops in this respect.

⁸ Pastors cannot bring censures, because they never had true jurisdiction in the external forum.

b) All and only clerics to whom this has been committed by those having ordinary power have delegated power of bringing censures. But delegates cannot subdelegate unless this is expressly conceded to them, or they have been delegated by the Roman Pontiff, or for the universality of causes.

1141. B) Concerning the solemnities to be observed in bringing censures.

a) If there is question of censures ferendae sententiae and ab homine, a threefold warning, or at least one equivalent to three, which is called peremptory, must be sent beforehand;⁹ for censures can be brought only upon the contumacious (n. 1144). But the sentence must be delivered in writing, for liceity indeed, but not for validity.¹⁰

⁹ Cod. jur. can., 2233, 2242.

¹⁰ Cf. Code, c. 1877 and c. 2239, § 2.

b) But if there is question of censures latae sententiae or even of a censure ferendae sententiae but a jure, no special warning is required, since the law itself or the precept continually warns.¹¹

¹¹ Code, c. 2232, 2242, § 2.

1142. 4. Concerning the subject of censures.

From the definition itself of censure, it is required that the one to be censured be a man, baptized, delinquent, and contumacious.

A) A man,¹² wayfaring and capable of guile, that is, of sin, since censure supposes a delict.

¹² Excommunication against harmful animals, which was long in use, is not properly excommunication, but a suppliant prayer that God drive them away. Against demons, the Church uses exorcisms, not censures.

"Those who have not reached puberty are excused from penalties latae sententiae, and should be corrected by educative punishments rather than by censures or other more grave vindicative penalties; but those who have reached puberty, who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in the delict, themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law."¹³

¹³ Code, 2230.

B) Baptized. For the Church does not judge those who are outside.¹⁴

¹⁴ 1 Cor. 5:12; Trent, sess. XIV, De Paenit., c. 2.

1143. C) Delinquent. Now the delict must be external, mortal, and consummated.

a) External: for the Church does not judge concerning internal things. We do not say public; for even an occult sin can be external, for example, heresy pronounced by mouth, even without any witness.

b) Mortal: otherwise there would not be proportion between the delict and the penalty, since censure is a most grave ecclesiastical penalty.

Therefore whatever excuses from mortal sin also excuses from censure.¹⁵ Hence if in fact the one against whom a censure has been brought has not committed a subjectively mortal sin, although in the external forum he must be held and conduct himself as censured in order to avoid scandal, nevertheless he is not truly censured before God, nor therefore deprived of those spiritual goods of which censure deprives.

¹⁵ "Not only the things which excuse from all imputability, but also those which excuse from grave imputability, likewise excuse from any penalty, whether latae or ferendae sententiae, even in the external forum, if the excuse is proved for the external forum." Code, 2218.

Moreover, the delict must be mortal insofar as it is external, so that, if the sin is mortal but not insofar as it is external, censure is not incurred: for example, a very slight striking of a cleric from a gravely evil intention.

c) Consummated: that is, it is required that precisely that delict which the legislator intends to prohibit under penalty be perfectly completed; for penal laws are of strict interpretation.¹⁶ Yet if the attempt of a delict is punished in law by a peculiar penalty, it constitutes a true delict and suffices for incurring censure.¹⁷

¹⁶ Cf. Cod. jur. can., 2219, 2228.

¹⁷ Code, c. 2212.

1144. D) Contumacious. For contumacy it is required that the delinquent know, at least habitually, even if he does not actually think about the prohibition and penalty, that something is prohibited by ecclesiastical law and under censure, and nevertheless freely act against the ecclesiastical prohibition.

But the following excuse from contumacy: a) grave fear, indeed even light fear when the censure is brought against those presuming, acting with rash daring, doing something spontaneously or knowingly or deliberately; b) ignorance of the law or penalty which is not affected, crass, or supine.¹⁸

¹⁸ Yet when a censure is brought against those who sin "rashly," "with rash daring," "knowingly," "deliberately," etc., even crass or supine ignorance excuses, but not affected ignorance. Cod. jur. can., 2229. - If there is question of a penalty ferendae sententiae, he is called contumacious who, having been canonically warned, perseveres in the delict (can. 2233, § 2).

1145. Various things to be noted. a) "Unless they are expressly named, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church are not comprehended under a penal law, nor Bishops under penalties latae sententiae of suspension and interdict."¹⁹ Moreover those who hold the supreme principate of peoples, and their sons and daughters, or those who have the right of immediately succeeding to the principate, incur only penalties inflicted or declared by the Roman Pontiff.²⁰

¹⁹ Code, c. 2227, § 2.

²⁰ Code, c. 2227 and 1557.

b) In censures, the more benign interpretation is to be made.²¹ Hence censures brought upon the people do not bind the clergy; those brought upon the clergy do not bind the people, nor regulars who emit solemn vows, but more probably they bind religious of simple vows.

²¹ Code, c. 19, 20, 2219.

c) Someone can be simultaneously liable to several censures of different species (excommunication, suspension), or to several of the same species (for example, several excommunications): either because by the same or distinct action he has committed different delicts, each of which has a censure annexed; or because the same delict is punished by different censures by distinct Superiors; or because the delict punished by censure is repeated several times. - Censure ab homine is multiplied if several precepts or several sentences are violated.²²

²² Ibid., 2244.

d) In doubt whether a censure has been contracted or not, the censure does not bind,²³ unless there is doubt whether the penalty, inflicted by a competent Superior, is just.²⁴

²³ Can. 2233.

²⁴ Can. 2219.

1146. 5. Concerning absolution from censures.

Censure properly so called, once it has been contracted, is not removed by the death either of the censured person or of the one censuring; nor by the cessation of the law or precept; nor by the amendment of the guilty person, but only by absolution given by a competent superior.²⁵

²⁵ Can. 2248.

A) No one can absolve from censures brought ab homine, except the one who brought the censure, or his successor, or superior (provided he has jurisdiction over the censured person), or their delegate. In danger of death, every reservation ceases.

1147. B) Censures brought by common law are either reserved to no one, or reserved to the Roman Pontiff or to the Ordinary.

a) From censures reserved to no one, any confessor validly and licitly absolves in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum, anyone who has jurisdiction over the guilty person in the external forum.²⁶

²⁶ Code, c. 2253.

b) From censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff, the following can absolve: the Roman Pontiff himself and the Major Penitentiary; bishops; delegated priests; indeed sometimes any priest, under conditions and with limitations to be explained in the Treatise on Penance.

c) In occult cases, the Ordinary can, by himself or through another, remit penalties latae sententiae established by common law, except censures reserved to the Holy See in a most special or special manner.²⁷

²⁷ Code, c. 2232, § 2.

1148. d) But from censures reserved to the Ordinary, the Roman Pontiff, the Bishop, the capitular Vicar, the vicar general, the regular Prelate (his own subjects), the Archbishop in the case of visitation or appeal, and their delegate absolve;²⁸ indeed sometimes any priest, as is explained in the Treatise on Penance.

²⁸ He who has delegated power of absolving from censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff is not for this reason able to absolve from censures reserved to the Ordinary. But he who has a special faculty of absolving from censures even reserved to the Roman Pontiff can absolve from censures (of common law) reserved to the Ordinary.

1149. C) From censures brought by particular law and not reserved, any confessor can absolve validly and licitly in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum, anyone who has jurisdiction over the guilty person in the external forum.²⁹ - But if they are reserved, no one can absolve from them, except the one to whom they are reserved, or his superior, or successor, or delegate; yet in an urgent case, and in danger of death, any priest can absolve, under certain conditions, as is explained in the Treatise on Penance.

²⁹ Code, c. 2253, 1.

1150. Things to be noted concerning absolution from censures. A) For absolving from censures, jurisdiction over the one to be absolved is required in the one absolving, but not necessarily sacramental jurisdiction; for absolution from censures can be given by a Superior, or his delegate, even one who is not a priest.

B) Absolution from censures can be separated from absolution from sins.

Hence if sacramental confession cannot be had immediately, and on the other hand reasons are present that the guilty person be absolved immediately from censures, he can be absolved from censures, although not from sins: for example, if a priest having power of absolving from reserved censures does not have time to hear an integral confession, or if the guilty person is not prepared to make it, the priest can hear only the cases which have a censure annexed, and absolve from censures, and send the penitent to another who, after hearing the confession, would absolve from sins.³⁰

³⁰ Gury-Ballerini, n. 954.

"But if there is question of a censure which does not impede the reception of the Sacraments, the censured person, rightly disposed and withdrawing from contumacy, can be absolved from sins, with the censure remaining firm" (can. 2250).

If, from a rescript, absolution from censures cannot be given unless sacramental confession has first been heard, care must be taken that the penitent be disposed for the absolution of sins. But the absolution from censures would be valid provided the sacramental accusation of sins had preceded.³¹

³¹ S. Penit., January 4, 1839.

C) No special formula is required for imparting absolution from censures in the sacramental forum, unless otherwise prescribed in the rescript. The confessor absolves by the very formula of absolution. Yet for absolution from excommunication in the non-sacramental forum, it is regularly fitting to use the form handed down in the ritual books.³²

³² Can. 2250.

D) Absolution from censures can be given to one absent, indeed even unwilling. But absolution given to one unwilling does not have its effect as to a censure which is annexed to a sin still enduring, for example, adherence to a Masonic sect.

E) He who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, without being absolved from the others. Hence "one seeking absolution must indicate all cases; otherwise the absolution is valid only for the expressed case; but if the absolution, although a particular petition was made, was general, it is valid also for things concealed in good faith, excepting a censure reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner."³³

³³ Can. 2249.

1151. I. Nature. Excommunication is a censure by which someone is separated from the communion of the faithful.

Among the excommunicated, some are tolerated, others are to be avoided, according as it is lawful or not to communicate with them.

Formerly, all who were struck by major excommunication had to be avoided by the faithful. Now, no one is to be avoided unless he has been excommunicated by name by the Apostolic See, the excommunication has been publicly denounced, and in the decree or sentence it is expressly said that he must be avoided.¹

¹ Can. 2258.

1152. II. The effects are expressed by canonists in these little verses:

Sacred things, rites, communion, crypt, power,
Sacred estates, forum, civil rights are forbidden.

1. Sacred things. By these words there is interdicted to the excommunicated person both the reception and the administration of the sacraments.

A) As to the reception of the sacraments, the excommunicated person is prohibited under grave sin from receiving the sacraments,² unless grave necessity excuses, for example, fear of death, danger of grave infamy, etc.³ Yet an excommunicated person validly receives any sacraments, even penance itself, at least if he approaches it in good faith. But the excommunicated person is bound to dispose himself for absolution, so that he may satisfy the precept concerning paschal Communion.

² Code, c. 2260. Cf. can. 855, § 1.

³ Thus D'Annibale (I, n. 360) judges that an excommunicated person, even one to be avoided, is not kept from Penance if he is in lethal sin and would long be deprived of a confessor. For then grave necessity presses.

B) As to the administration of the sacraments: a) the excommunicated person is prohibited from licitly confecting and administering Sacraments and Sacramentals, with the exceptions which follow preserved:

a) The faithful can for any just cause seek Sacraments and Sacramentals from an excommunicated person, especially if other ministers are lacking; and then the excommunicated person who is requested can minister the same and is held by no obligation of questioning the one requesting about the cause; b) but from excommunicated persons to be avoided, and also from other excommunicated persons after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has intervened, the faithful can, in danger of death alone, seek both sacramental absolution and also, if other ministers are lacking, the other Sacraments and Sacramentals.⁴ - Any excommunicated person is also prohibited from the right of electing, presenting, and nominating.⁵

⁴ Code, c. 2265.

⁵ Code, c. 2261.

1153. 2. Rites. Any excommunicated person lacks the right of assisting at divine offices, but not at the preaching of the word of God. If a tolerated person assists passively, it is not necessary that he be expelled; if one to be avoided does so, he must be expelled, or, if he cannot be expelled, the office must cease, provided this can be done without grave inconvenience; but from active assistance, which carries with it some participation in celebrating divine offices, not only one to be avoided is to be repelled, but also anyone who, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence or otherwise, is notoriously excommunicated.⁶

⁶ Code, c. 2259.

3. Communion. By this word is indicated privation of common suffrages, that is, spiritual helps which are accustomed to come to the faithful from good works done in the name of the Church, or from the treasury of the Church. Of this kind are the fruits of Mass and the Breviary, insofar as they are performed in the name of the Church, indulgences, sacramentals, etc. - Excommunicated persons, even those to be avoided, are not deprived of private suffrages which, from good works done in a private name, are applied by private intention. - Indeed priests privately and with scandal removed can apply Mass for an excommunicated person; but if he is to be avoided, only for his conversion.⁷

⁷ Code, c. 2262.

1154. 4. Crypt, that is, ecclesiastical burial, must be denied: A) To excommunicated persons after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence.⁸ If, without signs of penance, an excommunicated person dies after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, the cemetery is violated by his burial;⁹ but if he dies penitent, he must be absolved (cf. Rit. Rom., tit. 3, c. 4), and buried in a sacred place. B) But as to tolerated persons, although they have no right to ecclesiastical burial, this nevertheless can be conceded to them. Yet often it will have to be denied to them for another reason, namely if they are public sinners, or notorious heretics (or apostates).

⁸ Code, c. 2260.

⁹ Code, c. 1207, 1172.

To this pertain, for example, the responses of the Sacred Penitentiary concerning deputies or senators who in France approved laws against religion by their vote. They must be held as excommunicated; they are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial if it is notoriously established that they died in their sin; but if they died penitent, they are not to be deprived of the customary honors. In doubt, let them be buried without solemnities, for example, let only a low Mass be conceded, with a simple absolution of the corpse.¹⁰

¹⁰ S. Penit., May 20, 1908; cf. Canoniste, XXXI, p. 558.

5. Power, that is, jurisdiction, is taken away from an excommunicated person if a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has been brought against him, so that he exercises it illicitly and invalidly, whether in the external forum or in the internal forum, except the case of necessity in danger of death. But a tolerated person, even a notorious one, is not deprived of jurisdiction, and exercises it licitly if he has been asked by the faithful.¹¹

¹¹ Code, c. 2261, 2264.

6. Sacred estates, or benefices, cannot validly be conferred upon an excommunicated person,¹² even a tolerated one. But an excommunicated person retains benefices previously possessed, and makes their fruits his own, provided a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has not intervened.¹³ But any excommunicated person is prohibited from performing ecclesiastical offices or functions and from enjoying privileges previously conceded by the Church.¹⁴ But one to be avoided remains at once deprived of dignity itself, office, or benefice.¹⁵

¹² Code, c. 2265.

¹³ Code, c. 2266.

¹⁴ Code, c. 2263.

¹⁵ Code, c. 2266.

By the new law, graces of every kind conceded by the Holy See, even to those entangled in censure, are ratified and legitimate, unless there is question of those who are excommunicated persons to be avoided, or excommunicated persons by declaratory or condemnatory sentence. The same things have been sanctioned as to the suspended and interdicted.¹⁶

¹⁶ Code, c. 2265, § 2; c. 2283; c. 2275.

7. Forum: namely every communication in the forum (formerly even in the civil forum) with the faithful is interdicted to the excommunicated person.¹⁷ And so: a) he cannot be judge, arbiter, advocate, procurator, notary, witness, etc. But if he is cited as accused, he can do all things which are required for his defense, unless he is one to be avoided or has undergone a declaratory or condemnatory sentence.¹⁸ b) But a tolerated person is excluded from no function by the law itself,¹⁹ but can be repelled by the judge, by the plaintiff, or by the accused.

¹⁷ Code, c. 2263: "An excommunicated person is removed from legitimate ecclesiastical acts."

¹⁸ Code, c. 1654.

¹⁹ Ibid.

1155. 8. Civil rights. "The faithful must avoid communion in profane matters with an excommunicated person to be avoided, unless there is question of spouse, parents, children, servants, subjects, and generally unless a reasonable cause excuses."²⁰

²⁰ Code, c. 2267.

Formerly communication in civil matters, even with tolerated persons, was prohibited. But Martin V (Const. Ad evitanda) benignly granted to the faithful that, scandal or danger of one's own perversion being excluded, no one was bound to abstain from communion with a tolerated person.

A) The acts prohibited with one to be avoided are expressed by this little verse:

Mouth, prayer, greeting, communion, table are denied.

Hence it is not lawful (unless in excepted cases) to write to one to be avoided, to give a kiss or some sign of special benevolence (mouth); nor to pray with him, even privately, at least under venial sin, unless a state of subjection excuses (prayer); nor to greet him for the sake of exhibiting honor, unless civility requires (greeting); nor to enter into society with him (communion), or to feast as a table-companion (table).

B) Excepted cases. Communication in civil matters with one to be avoided is lawful when necessity or utility excuses, whether spiritual or temporal, either of the excommunicated person himself, or of the faithful person communicating with one to be avoided, or of some third person.

C) Penalties against those communicating. That prohibition of communicating with one to be avoided, although in itself it does not oblige under mortal sin unless the communication is in divine matters, still subsists,²¹ and those violating it sometimes undergo certain penalties.

²¹ Holy Office, August 2, 1893, A. S. S., XXXI, 401.

25. The laws of the Index contain a few censures latae sententiae; they strictly command or forbid many things, with arbitrary penalties being threatened; they commend or advise some things; finally, they grant certain faculties.

General rule

On censures

1. That these censures latae sententiae are to be interpreted strictly, no one today doubts; formerly it was denied by Suarez.¹

¹ De Fide, disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 10. Cf. the responses of Schmalzgrueber, in book 5, title 7, n. 55; and Castropalao, treatise 4, disp. 20, point 10, section 1, n. 3.

Usefulness. - Concerning this especially canonical treatise, these things must chiefly be known in sacred ministries: a) how far penalties and censures can stand in the way of receiving or administering the sacraments; b) what things excuse from contracting them; c) how far they can be absolved or dispensed; d) what certain few censures, more easily known to those who by committing a delict are liable to these penalties, suppose.

Since most censures have each been declared in their own place in our work, it will be permitted to contract the discussion to a few things.

— I. Notions. 1. A censure is a penalty by which the correction of the delinquent is primarily intended. Wherefore it is called medicinal, and is distinguished from a vindicative penalty, which immediately follows upon the punishment of the delict.

But it is defined by the Code: "A penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods or goods annexed to spiritual things, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved" (c. 2211, §1).

It always supposes a grave, external delict, consummated in its juridic character, joined with some present contumacy. Wherefore, for a past delict, to which no obligation, at least of repairing consequences, is joined, a censure cannot be imposed; but there lies place only for a vindicative penalty. Thus a thief can be punished by censure not because of the theft, but that he may restore what was taken.

But there are three censures: excommunication, suspension, interdict; but suspension and interdict can also be vindicative penalties.

2. Penalties which are established in the law itself are called from the law, or latae sententiae; while those are from man which have been imposed by way of precept or by a condemnatory sentence. "A penalty of ferendae sententiae added to a law, before a condemnatory sentence, is from the law only; afterwards it is from the law and at the same time from man, but it is considered as from man" (c. 2217). If a merely declaratory sentence is pronounced, the censure remains from the law, and is considered to have been contracted from the moment of the delict.

3. "A penalty is always understood to be of ferendae sententiae, unless it is expressly said to be of latae sententiae, or to be contracted by the very fact or by the law itself, or unless other similar words are used" (c. 2217, §2).

Nevertheless, not once only must censures concerning which those words are lacking be ascribed to penalties of latae sententiae. This happens whenever a censure is declared reserved to the Ordinary or to the Holy See. For a censure of ferendae sententiae is necessarily reserved to him who brought the sentence.

— II. Author and subject of censure. 1. All who possess the power of making laws or imposing precepts by force of jurisdiction can annex censures to their law or precept.

Yet an Ordinary cannot bring another censure reserved to himself against a delict to which a censure reserved to the Holy See is annexed (c. 2247, §1).

2. a) They who hold the supreme principate of peoples, and their sons and daughters or those to whom there is the proximate right of succeeding in the principate; Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church; Legates of the Holy See, are subject only to penalties inflicted or declared by the Roman Pontiff. Nor are Cardinals comprehended by any penal law nor Bishops by suspension or interdict unless they are expressly named (c. 2277).

b) The impubes are exempt from penalties latae sententiae; but the puberes who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in the delict, by physical or moral causality either necessary or principal, themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law (c. 2230). Here impubes can be understood as all who, even girls, have not completed 14 years.

c) Cooperators of the kind described under b) are held by penalties unless the law has expressly provided otherwise, while the other cooperators, by secondary and non-necessary action, escape penalties unless they are expressly named.

d) Affected ignorance, whether of the law or of the penalty alone, excuses from no penalties of latae sententiae; if the law has used words: has presumed, knowingly, studiously, etc., any diminution of imputability whatsoever, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties of latae sententiae. If these words are lacking in the law, ignorance which was neither crass nor supine excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties latae sententiae (c. 2229).

e) Grave fear of itself excuses, unless the delict tends to contempt of faith, or of ecclesiastical authority, or to the public harm of souls (c. 2229, §3, 3°).

f) An ecclesiastical penalty always supposes grave sin (cf. I, 63 and c. 2218, §2).

— III. Obligation of censure. A censure latae sententiae indeed holds the delinquent, conscious of the delict, by the fact itself in both forums; before a sentence, however, he is excused from observing the penalty as often as it cannot be observed without infamy (c. 2232, §1).

— IV. Absolution of censure. 1. A censure once contracted is not removed except by legitimate absolution; yet this cannot be denied as soon as the delinquent has withdrawn from contumacy. But once removed by absolution, it does not revive unless the burden imposed under penalty of reincidence has not been fulfilled (c. 2248).

2. But some censures are not reserved (for absolution), others are reserved.

Concerning the various reservations and absolution, cf. what was said, nn. 473-476.

Only observe that absolution from censure in the sacramental forum is already contained in the customary form of absolution from sins; in the non-sacramental forum it can be given in any manner whatsoever, yet, for excommunication, a form is handed down in the ritual books which it is fitting to observe (c. 2250, §3).

Moreover c. 2252 does not strictly impose in danger of death the admonition concerning recourse to be made, which c. 2255 enjoins to be made by the confessor who in more urgent cases absolves from reserved censures.

— Unless perhaps scandal given or the special gravity of transgression requires otherwise, the violator of a law which has no sanction placed upon it (you may say the same of the violation of a precept) cannot be punished unless first an admonition has been made with threat of penalty.

A vindicative penalty is now recognized by this sign: that it is brought for a definite time or in perpetuity. Brought without a term, or indefinitely, it is equated with a perpetual one. When the day to which it was brought arrives, the vindicative penalty ceases by the fact itself; while a censure is not removed except by received absolution.

— I. On Excommunication. 1. Excommunication is a censure by which someone is excluded from the communion of the faithful with the inseparable effects enumerated in the Code. An excommunication solemnly imposed is called by the special name anathema.

2. Excommunicates: a) some are to be avoided, others not. No one is to be avoided unless he has been excommunicated by name by the Apostolic See, has been publicly denounced, and in the decree or sentence it is expressly said that he must be avoided, or unless he has notoriously laid violent hands upon the person of the Supreme Pontiff; b) some are before such a sentence [printed/OCR: "have avoided the sentence"], others have been marked by a condemnatory or declaratory sentence of censure.

3. Effects of excommunication. It deprives: a) of the right of assisting at divine offices, preaching excepted; b) of the reception of the sacraments (which nevertheless are validly received), and, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, also of sacramentals; c) of licit confection and administration of the sacraments, saving the temperaments indicated at n. 211; d) of indulgences, suffrages, and the public prayers of the Church. Yet priests can privately and with scandal removed apply Mass for an excommunicate; but, if he is one to be avoided, only for his conversion. Moreover, an excommunicate is removed from legitimate ecclesiastical acts (e.g., the office of sponsor); he is prohibited from performing ecclesiastical offices, from placing acts of jurisdiction; from electing, presenting, nominating; he cannot obtain ecclesiastical offices. For the validity of acts, an excommunicate who is to be avoided, or who by sentence has been condemned or declared excommunicated, must be distinguished from another excommunicate (cf. cc. 2259-2266).

Communication in profane matters is not imposed as to be avoided except with an excommunicate to be avoided, and the excuse of kinship, service, and reasonable cause is admitted, so that this prohibition is not judged grave (c. 2257).

— II. 1. "Interdict is a censure by which the faithful, remaining in the communion of the Church, are prohibited from the sacred things" enumerated in the Code.

It is distinguished into personal, by which certain persons are directly prohibited from those goods, and local, by which in certain places the dispensation or reception of the same is forbidden. It is subdivided into general, of some territory or people, and particular (cf. cc. 2268-2276).

Interdict from entrance into a church contains the prohibition "that someone celebrate divine offices in church or assist at them or have ecclesiastical burial; but if he assists, it is not necessary that he be expelled, nor, if he is buried, is it necessary that the corpse be removed" (c. 2277).

— III. 1. "Suspension is a censure by which a cleric is prohibited by office or benefice or both" (c. 2278). Therefore it directly deprives at least of the licit use of ecclesiastical power. And it can be total or partial. Suspension brought without addition is understood as total, and it carries with itself all the effects indicated by the canons. Partial is suspension from office, which forbids every act of the power of order and jurisdiction, indeed of mere administration competent from office, except the administration of the goods of one's own benefice (c. 2279, §1); and suspension from benefice. And there are more partial ones. Thus suspension from jurisdiction forbids every act of the power of jurisdiction for both forums, both ordinary and delegated; suspension from divine things forbids every act of power which someone obtains either through sacred ordination or through privilege; from orders, every act of the power of order received through ordination; from sacred orders, every act of the power of order received through ordination in sacred orders; from exercising a certain and definite order, suspension prohibits every act of the designated order, and besides the conferral of the same order and the reception of a higher order and the exercise of this, if it has been received after the suspension (c. 2279, §2, 3°-5°).

2. Suspension from informed conscience is an extraordinary remedy, whose use is not licit if the Ordinary can proceed by the ordinary juridic way without grave inconvenience. But it consists in this, that the Ordinary expressly, by simple decree, declares that he, from causes known to himself, imposes suspension. The Ordinary must be certain concerning the delict and its gravity; he can never act thus on account of a notorious delict (cf. cc. 2186-2191).

St. Alphonsus, VII, 1-133; ed. G., IV, p. 171; H. Ap., tr. XIX, c. 1; Suarez, de Cens.; Berardi, Comment. in Jus, vol. II, Diss. III; Aichner, Comp. Jur. eccl., sect. III, c. 2, a. 2; Lega, de Judic. eccl., l. 2, P. 1, tit. 3; Bucceroni, de Cens.; Hilarius a Sexten, Bargilliat, Hollweck and others, on the same matter.

We must treat: 1. of the notion and division of censures; 2. of their infliction, valid or licit; 3. of causes excusing from censure; 4. of absolution from censures.

1251. DEFINITION. A censure is a spiritual and medicinal penalty, inflicted by ecclesiastical power, through which the use of certain spiritual goods is taken away from a baptized man who is delinquent and contumacious.

It is called: 1. a penalty, strictly speaking, that is, an evil inflicted by legitimate authority because of fault; 2. spiritual, because it deprives one of spiritual goods, as is clear from the Bull Auctorem fidei under n. 46; 3. medicinal, that is, inflicted so that the guilty person may come to his senses and be amended: this is the primary and specific end of censure; it is not inflicted on those whose correction is despaired of, except sometimes for the terror of others; 4. on a baptized man; for an infidel is not subject to the Church; 5. delinquent and contumacious, namely, one who, by an external action, from a certain at least virtual contempt, does not obey the warnings of the Church; 6. the use of certain spiritual goods, namely of those which are subject to the power of the Church, as will presently be explained.

1252. ON THE SPIRITUAL GOODS OF THE CHURCH. In the Church there exist goods of a threefold kind: 1. Some proceed immediately from the Head, or Christ, as various graces. Censure does not deprive one of these, because they do not depend on the Church; whence censure can coexist with the state of grace, for example in one who incurs a censure because of a sin concerning which afterward he is perfectly contrite. 2. Others proceed from the members taken privately, as the prayers and good works of individual faithful. Nor does censure take away these goods, at least of itself, because the Church cannot impede that communion of Saints which proceeds from faith and charity. 3. Finally others proceed from the body, or the Church, as the use of the sacraments, divine offices, indulgences, jurisdiction, benefice, common suffrages. Censure deprives one of these, either wholly or in part. It can also deprive one of the use and commerce of the faithful in civil matters, for example honor, salutation, etc., but only secondarily and in order to spiritual things (Suarez, l. c., disp. I, s. I, n. 6).

1253. From these things you will gather: Censure differs: a) from deposition, degradation, and privation of benefice; for these penalties are primarily vindicative, in such a way indeed that of themselves they are perpetual, and can be inflicted even after amendment of sin, and, when the sinner has now been amended, still endure; b) from irregularity, which of itself is not a penalty, but is a canonical impediment; whence it is removed only by dispensation; c) from cessation from divine things, which is imposed primarily for repelling an injury inflicted on the Church (VII, 2-5).

Note. The effects of censure in particular are indicated in n. 1291 sqq., 1304, 1308.

1254. DIVISION. Censure is distinguished in manifold ways:

1. By reason of species it is threefold, namely: excommunication, suspension, and interdict.

The last two are not always censures; sometimes they are merely medicinal penalties, but sometimes they also assume the nature of a vindicative penalty, as we shall say below (n. 1300).

2. By reason of the mode by which it is inflicted, one is from law, another by man.

a) A CENSURE FROM LAW is that which is issued through canons or ecclesiastical laws, for example through a synodal statute. This does not cease by the death or removal of the legislator. - b) A CENSURE BY MAN is that which is inflicted by a legitimate Superior, whether by way of judicial sentence, or by way of precept.

But a precept, although transitory, is either general, without determination of persons, for example: if anyone knows the perpetrator of this delict, he is bound to denounce him, under penalty of excommunication; or particular, affecting determinate persons. A censure of this kind ceases by the death or removal of him who issued it, that is, it is no longer incurred; for if it had already been contracted, the bond would be removed by absolution alone (VII, 6; Lehmkuhl, II, 1102).1

Note. A censure by man can also be issued ex informata conscientia, as we shall explain below (n. 1301).

3. By reason of the mode by which it is incurred, a censure is latae sententiae or ferendae sententiae.

a) A CENSURE LATAE SENTENTIAE (which is proper to the Church, unknown in the civil Code) is that which is incurred by the very fact by which someone has violated the law, without a condemnatory sentence of the judge being required.

Such it is: if in the law it is said: by the very fact, by the very law, by law, by that very thing, from then, immediately, forthwith, without another sentence; if the words are of past or present tense, for example: we have excommunicated, I excommunicate, they are suspended, they are interdicted; if it is said in the imperative mode: let him fall into excommunication, let him remain suspended or interdicted, we will or command that he be excommunicated, suspended; or even: let him be excommunicated, let him be suspended, etc., namely absolutely without the ministry of another; but not if the precept of excommunicating, suspending, etc., is imposed on another, say, the Bishop.

b) A CENSURE FERENDAE SENTENTIAE is that which is not contracted unless the sentence of a judge accedes.

Such it is judged to be: if the words are of future tense, for example: he will be excommunicated, he will be suspended; if they express the precept of excommunicating, suspending, for example: let him be excommunicated by the Bishop; if they are comminatory, for example: under penalty of excommunication, under threat of anathema, etc.; unless, however, something else is gathered from the adjuncts; likewise, if they are ambiguous; for according to Rule of Law 49 in the Sixth: "In penalties the more benign interpretation must be made." But ambiguous would be, for example, these words: let him be excommunicated. But in the case of heresy, they are latae sententiae, as all teach (H. Ap., XIX, at the beginning).

4. By reason of the power of absolving, censures are reserved or non-reserved. a) NON-RESERVED are those which can be absolved by inferiors. b) RESERVED are those which cannot be absolved except by the one issuing them, or by another to whom they have been reserved.

Some are reserved to the Roman Pontiff, either in a special way, or simply. Others are reserved to Bishops or prelates, either by common Law, that is, through canons or papal constitutions, or by particular Law, for example through the statutes of a diocese or Religion.

Censures by man, however, are always judged reserved, unless they have been issued through a general precept.

Note. 1. From the fact that something is prohibited under censure, as penalty, it does not always follow that the law obliges under mortal sin (cf. n. 1263, 2). 2. He who can absolve from censures as censures, can also absolve from them as penalties (D'Annibale, Summula, I, n. 358).

1 There are not lacking those who think that censures issued by a Bishop outside a synod are from Law (cf. Ami du Cl., 1910, p. 229). Nevertheless those things which the Salmanticenses, Roncaglia, and Croix establish, with St. Alph., l. c., are more pleasing to us.

The conditions required for censures to be inflicted validly and licitly regard their author, subject, matter or cause, and form.

1255. PRINCIPLES. I. The power of issuing censures is in the possession of the Church. This is of faith, against the innovators, and is clear both from the fact that Christ gave pastors the power of punishing; and from the use of the apostles and the constant practice of the Church; and finally from the Council of Constance, Sess. 8, err. 3, as well as from the Bulls of Martin V and Leo X (VII, 9).

1256. II. The ordinary power of issuing censures is in the possession of all and only ecclesiastical Superiors having jurisdiction in the external and contentious forum. This is clear from various places of Canon Law. The external forum is the place, territory, in which matters pertaining to the external government of the Church are treated. The contentious forum supposes lawsuits and judicial noise.

Hence, the following can issue censures: 1. The Pope and a general Council, with respect to the whole Church. 2. Roman Congregations, as the Congregation of the Council, of the Holy Office, of Religious, etc., even for the universal Church, in those things which have been committed to them to execute. 3. Apostolic legates, in the territory assigned to them; Cardinals, in their churches. 4. Patriarchs and Archbishops with respect to the subjects of their own diocese; but not in the diocese of suffragans, unless at the time of visitation, or unless a cause is devolved to them by appeal. 5. Bishops, with respect to their own diocese, provided they have been confirmed, although not yet consecrated. 6. Vicars general of Bishops, with respect to the diocesans; because they constitute one tribunal with their own Bishop. 7. Generals, Provincials, and local Superiors of Religions, namely of regulars, as priors, guardians, rectors, with respect to subjects, and according to the various statutes of the Orders.⁰¹ - 8. Provincial Councils, Congregations of Religions, the Chapter of a cathedral church when the see is vacant and the Vicar has not yet been elected; then the capitular Vicar: each respectively for his own subjects. 9. Certain others by privilege, as many Archdeacons, Archpriests, and Deans are. 10. All who, through common error, with a presumed title, are regarded as Superiors (cf. n. 139-144).

Note. Parish priests cannot issue censures; for they have no power in the external forum (VII, 10, 11); nor does custom favor them.

1257. • III. The delegated power of issuing censures is usually committed to clerics alone. The reason is that ordinarily clerics alone are capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Married clerics, however, are declared by Law incapable of this jurisdiction (c. de Cler. conjug., in 6).

It is said: to clerics alone; but it suffices that they be marked with first tonsure; is usually committed: by these words regard is had only to ordinary cases. For in an extraordinary case, a baptized layman could be deputed to issue censures, but from the sole Commission of the Supreme Pontiff. Baptized, we have said; for he who is not in the Church is not capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as the truer opinion teaches.

It is a great question whether a woman, for example an Abbess, can be delegated.

The first opinion says: a woman by divine Law is incapable of an office properly ecclesiastical; yet from this it does not necessarily follow that the Supreme Pontiff, from absolute power, can commit no delegation to a woman, by way of a transitory act (Suarez, de Cens., disp. 2, s. 3, n. 7). Lugo defends the same opinion (Resp. mor., l. 6, c. 6, n. 9), where he asks whether the Supreme Pontiff can delegate spiritual power to an unbaptized man (cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1118).

But the second opinion, to which St. Alphonsus adheres (VII, 12), holds with St. Thomas (in 4. D. 19, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 4), the Salmanticenses, and others, that a woman can in no way have either the key of order, or the key of jurisdiction (cf. Vind. Alph., P. VIII, q. 5). But an Abbess could obtain a Decree by which, under penalty of censure, her commands must be observed.

Note. a) Delegated power ceases by the death or removal of the delegating one, unless the cause has already been begun by the delegate, at least by citation of the accused. b) A delegate cannot subdelegate, unless he has a special commission for this, or unless he is delegated by the Roman Pontiff or for the universality of causes, and, in both cases, by way of office (cf. n. 322).

1258. IV. For the valid exercise of the power of issuing censures there are required: the intention of binding and a power unimpeded as to use. The first is evident. As to the second, everyone knows that the excommunicated, suspended, heretics or schismatics, if they are to be avoided, can issue no censures, since their power is bound by Law (VII, 12).

Note. He who issues a censure from grave fear validly binds the censured person; because an act done from grave fear does not of itself take away the voluntary; it is therefore valid, unless it is specially nullified by positive Law. Concerning absolution from censures extorted by grave fear, see what is to be said n. 1286.

Corollaries. Since the power of issuing censures is something annexed to legislative power, the following things follow:

1. A Bishop existing OUTSIDE his own diocese can issue censures upon subjects, by way of statute, or precept, for preventing future crimes, because for issuing a censure in this way judicial noise is not required; but not by way of sentence, because no one is able to exercise contentious jurisdiction in another's territory.

Except: a) If the contumacy of the delinquent subject is so manifest that it does not need cognition of the cause. b) If the cause has already been judicially cognized in his own territory. c) If the Bishop has been unjustly expelled from his diocese; in which case, he can exercise his jurisdiction in nearer places, permission having been sought from the Ordinary of the place, although not obtained. d) If, in other cases, the Ordinary of the place consents; provided that the consent of the parties also accedes, because no one can unwillingly be drawn outside his territory (VII, 21).

2. Regularly it is not expedient that a Superior issue censures in his own cause; this is reputed in Law as vengeance.

Except: a) if it is done not by way of judgment, but by way of defense, against him who inflicts violence; because it is permitted to repel force by force; b) if the cause is so public and manifest that it can neither be denied nor needs any examination (Konings, 1662).

1259. PRINCIPLES. I. A Superior can issue censures upon all and only his subjects. The reason is that subjection and jurisdiction are correlative (VII, 13). Therefore, that someone may be able to be bound by censure, it is required: 1. That he be a man; for against demons the Church uses exorcisms, not censures. 2. Baptized; whence heretics can be excommunicated, but not catechumens. 3. A wayfarer; because the dead are only declared excommunicated, or are deprived of suffrages and ecclesiastical burial. 4. Not exempt; because through the privilege of exemption jurisdiction is taken away, namely within the limits of the exemption.

1260. From these things you will gather: a) THE POPE cannot be bound by censures; not indeed by another, because he has no superior; nor by himself, because he is not bound by his own precepts by coercive force.

b) BISHOPS are not bound by censures emanating from themselves, because no one is his own subject. Indeed, by privilege of Law, Bishops and Cardinals do not incur suspension or interdict, unless express mention is made of them, at least indirectly, for example by the clause: "even those worthy of special or individual note." But they are subject to papal excommunication excepted above, even if in the law no mention is made of them (Giraldi, Exp. Jur. pont., P. I, s. 623).

c) KINGS and QUEENS, although they are subjects to Bishops in spiritual matters, nevertheless cannot, by custom, be bound by censure by them. But they are subject to pontifical censures, even those issued by Law, for example against invaders of the temporal dominion of the Holy See and their helpers (VII, 16).

d) EXEMPT RELIGIOUS cannot be bound by the censure of a Bishop. Except if they offend concerning those things in which they are subject to the Bishop as apostolic delegate, for example concerning the celebration of Mass. Indeed, some religious, as mendicants and Jesuits, enjoy a broader privilege, so that they can never be punished by episcopal censure, except in one or another case in which their privileges have expressly been derogated. Nevertheless they can be coerced by other penalties (St. Alph., de Privil., 75; H. Ap., XIX, 43; cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1117).

1261. • II. Censures are not usually issued against prepubescent persons, nor against indeterminate persons. Thus from the practice of the Church (VII, 14-19).

1. As regards prepubescent persons, if they are already capable of deceit,1 all authors indeed affirm that they can be bound by censure, by way of law or precept. But since prepubescents cannot defend themselves in judgment except through another, there is controversy whether they can also be bound by a censure which is issued by way of sentence.

Each opinion indeed is probable; but in fact, from the common interpretation of laws it is certain "that censures generally issued by Law or by man are not incurred by prepubescents, unless this is expressed in the law: as it is expressed concerning the entrance of boys into monasteries of nuns, and concerning prepubescent strikers of clerics," as we shall note below, n. 1329 and 1333.

2. But as regards indeterminate persons, they indeed can be punished by censures which are issued after the manner of statute or precept (cf. n. 1254).

However: a) EXCOMMUNICATION which is inflicted by way of sentence is null, if it is issued against some uncertain person from a community, for example in these words: he who has perpetrated such a delict, let him be excommunicated.

But if all of some community, after examination has been made, are found guilty, the whole community can validly and licitly be excommunicated by the Pope; but by other Superiors it would be excommunicated illicitly, since this is prohibited by positive Law; and also invalidly, according to the probable opinion. Wherefore the Bishop or prelate ought to excommunicate each guilty person by name.

b) SUSPENSION and INTERDICT can indeed be issued by way of sentence against a whole community, for example against a college or chapter; but then personal rights remain intact, as will be explained in its own place (n. 1303, 5).

1262. III. A subject offending in another's territory or in an exempt place cannot of himself be punished by his own Superior with censure. For a censure issued through a general statute immediately affects the territory, and is restricted to it; when intimated through a particular precept, it touches the delinquent only in the case in which the Superior, before the delinquent's departure, should impose on him the precept under censure (VII, 23). Here the axiom holds: "He who pronounces law outside his territory is not obeyed with impunity" (l. fin., ff., de Jurisdict.).

This opinion is probable, St. Alphonsus being witness (l. c.). There is another opinion, which appears a little more probable to our holy Doctor, resting on this principle, that a precept affects the person and clings to the bones. Whatever the case may be, a censure inflicted by way of sentence touches the subject, even if he exists in another's territory: if he offended in his own territory, or if the delict has its effect in it, for example if a cleric ordered to go to a synod does not obey. But otherwise in other cases (VII, 22).

IV. Travelers or wanderers can be bound by censure by the Superior of the place in which they offended, provided it is done by way of sentence. For any delinquent obtains the forum of the place in which he has sinned.

Yet observe: 1. an inferior cannot bind his own Superior by censure if that Superior has offended in the territory of the inferior; 2. a delinquent traveler, that he may be punished, must by law be warned: for only the contumacious obtain the forum of the place; furthermore, he must be anticipated by citation before he leaves the territory, so that thus, by reason of the judgment begun, he remains subject to the Superior of the place.

We have said: provided it is done by way of sentence; for more probably a delinquent traveler cannot be punished by the Superior of the place by way of statute or particular precept; because a traveler (cf. n. 204), unless he has acquired at least a quasi-domicile, is not certainly subject to the Superior of the place (VII, 26, 27).

IT IS ASKED. Can someone be bound by SEVERAL censures at the same time?

Resp. In the affirmative, because it is not repugnant for someone to be constrained by several chains at the same time, and, being released from one bond, to remain bound by others.

This indeed can happen in a threefold way:

1. If the guilty person has committed several sins to which some censure is annexed. Thus, for example, he who believes a heretic and reads his book is entangled in a double excommunication (cf. n. 1314, 1316). Likewise, he who twice absolves an accomplice from the sin of complicity, or struck two clerics, although by one act.

2. If several legislators have inflicted a censure on the same sin. Thus, for example, he who kills a cleric, although already excommunicated by the Pope, can also be excommunicated or suspended by the Bishop, either by sentence, or by statute, for example one issued against murderers. Thus more probably Suarez with others; and the reason is that the jurisdiction of one legislator does not take away the jurisdiction of another. "This, however, must be understood if the second Superior intends to impose a new penalty; otherwise regularly, the second censure, if it is of the same species, is held as an innovation or publication of the first."

3. If, because of one and the same sin, the same legislator has inflicted several censures of diverse species. Thus, for example, Bishops, because of intrusion, incur the double penalty of suspension and interdict: from the Constitution Romanus Pontifex (cf. n. 1375 and 1376). - We have said of diverse species; for it seems alien to Law that someone, because of the same sin, be punished by the same legislator with several censures of the same species, for example one reserved and another non-reserved (VII, 28).

1 This must always be presupposed; for censure, since it is a penalty, always prerequires on the part of the one to be punished the use of reason: whence the perpetually insane cannot be punished. As regards those who have lucid intervals, they can be bound by censures to which they gave cause during the use of reason. The Superior of whom there is speech here is not the Supreme Pontiff, to whom the whole world is subject, nor a regular Prelate, who governs his own by precepts, and therefore can everywhere touch persons subject to himself. The question concerns other Ordinaries.

1263. PRINCIPLE. Censures are not usually inflicted except because of a grave, external sin, consummated in its own genus, conjoined with contumacy. Thus from the use and practice of the Church. Therefore, unless the law expresses otherwise, all these conditions are required for the validity and effect of the censure. If doubt is present in relation to the enumerated conditions, see below n. 1273.

There must be present: 1. SIN: for censures are medicinal penalties, as has been said (n. 1251).

Among censures, however, there is this distinction: a) excommunication, as being the gravest penalty, is not inflicted except because of personal fault; b) but suspension and interdict can be issued against a community, because of its fault or that of its head, so that they even bind the innocent, insofar as and as long as they belong to the community. To this pertains Rule 23 of Law in the Sixth: "Without fault, unless a cause is present, someone is not to be punished." Yet it is probable that suspension and interdict, for those who have admitted no fault, do not assume the nature of a true censure, but rather of a simple privation, whose violation, although culpable, does not carry irregularity with it.

2. GRAVE, either of itself, by reason of matter, or from an adjoined circumstance of scandal, danger, intended end, and the like. The reason is that a penalty, by both natural and divine Law, ought to be proportionate to the fault (VII, 31).

In doubt concerning the gravity of the matter, a precept imposed under censure obliges, because the power of the Superior possesses. But prelates ought carefully to beware lest they burden subjects with censures because of matters not so grave, when it is not established for them that those matters conduce greatly to a good end. These things are to be understood of a grave and properly so called censure; for suspension or interdict for a short time, and depriving one only of some use, can be inflicted because of venial sin, as is commonly taught (VII, 337).

3. EXTERNAL, although perhaps it remains occult; for the Church, in the external forum, does not judge concerning merely internal sins: therefore neither can she punish them. Indeed, for a grave censure, the sin ought to be grave as to the substance of the external work.

Whence a mortal act from evil intention alone, or from an erroneous conscience, does not suffice. Thus, for example, he does not incur excommunication who strikes a cleric altogether lightly, although with the intention of killing him; nor he who strikes a table, or says: "so it is," intending to confirm an internal heresy etc.; nor finally he who falsely thinks himself to violate a law, for example by reading a book which he believes to be condemned: for all these indeed sin against conscience, but not against Canon Law (VII, 34).

4. CONSUMMATED IN ITS OWN GENUS, that is, completed in work and indeed as to the lowest species; unless the words of the law express otherwise. The reason is that penalties and odious things are to be restricted. Hence he is not bound by censure who only counsels some crime, if in the law no others than the perpetrators are noted; but he will be bound if the law also designates counselors, or those cooperating in any way.

Wherefore St. Alphonsus notes: a) If the censure is issued principally against doers, and accessorily against commanders, counselors, etc., the commander, counselor, or one casting a vote does not incur it if the command, counsel, or vote did not effectively influence the crime, or if the crime was not carried through to effect. Thus, for example, he is exempted from excommunication who gave a command or counsel to him who was already prepared to perpetrate the delict; likewise, the one commanding a cleric to be struck is exempted if in reality the striking did not happen. And the same must probably be said if it is doubted whether the command or counsel influenced. b) On the contrary, if the censure is issued principally against commanders, counselors, etc., it is incurred as soon as the command or counsel is given, although the effect does not follow. The reason is that then the censure is imposed precisely because of the command or counsel, and not because of the work to be caused from the command or counsel (VII, 36-39).

5. CONJOINED WITH CONTUMACY, which indeed imports at least virtual contempt of the censure.1 For it is clear from the use of the Church and from the nature of censure that this is not incurred except by him who spurns the warnings of the Church, or who, after the precept or statute of the Superior issued under penalty of censure has been known, does not desist from sin. The words of Christ indicate the same, saying (Matt. 18:17): But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican (VII, 43, 54).

1264. From these things you will gather: a) Censure cannot be inflicted because of a PAST sin, for example blasphemy, unless this has, as they say, a successive tract into the future. - Therefore, because of theft someone can be excommunicated if, warned under penalty of censure, he refuses to restore. - Apply the same to the case of scandal given and not yet repaired.

b) More probably censure is not incurred if someone, BEFORE the evil work is consummated, revokes the command or counsel as much as he can, or, not being able to impede the consummation of the delict, at least warns the one to be injured that he should take care for himself. - Likewise, one who gave poison to a cleric, and before the poison begins to operate retracts his intention and sees to it that the effect is impeded, probably does not incur excommunication. - The reason is that, in these cases, the delinquent is no longer contumacious at the time at which the sin can be said to be consummated in work. - Nevertheless, restitution is subject to other rules, as was seen n. 949.

Note. Some authors with Ballerini indeed defend another opinion, but the opinion of the holy Doctor seems safe to us (cf. Vind. Alph., P. VIII, q. 1).

1 Virtual contempt is present if someone habitually knows that such an action is prohibited under penalty. Others use the name: general contempt.

FORM, or the formality required in issuing censures, regards either the warning of the guilty person, or the sentence of the judge.

1265. • A. On warning. Warning is defined: a declaration made by the judge to the delinquent that he is about to incur censure if he does not come to his senses, or does not obey. It differs from citation, which is intimated to the accused, that he should present himself before the judge for his defense, or to hear the sentence.

1266. PRINCIPLES. I. Censures should never be issued without some previous warning. For censure is issued to break the contumacy of the guilty person;

but the guilty person cannot be said to be contumacious unless he has been forewarned concerning the penalty to be inflicted (VII, 51-53).

We have said 1. Censures, that is, properly so called; because, if suspension or interdict is issued by way of pure penalty, warning is not necessarily to be sent beforehand.

2. Should never be issued; because warning is required for the liceity of a censure, in every case.

But whether it is also required for validity is a controverted question. The more common and more probable opinion indeed affirms; but the denying opinion is also probable, at least with respect to the Roman Pontiff, if he should act from the plenitude of power.

3. Without some warning; so that it may be understood that a different one is required according to the diversity of the case.

For if a censure is issued by man by way of sentence, canonical warning is required, as above. But if it is issued by Law or by man, by way of precept, with respect to a future act, then the law itself or the precept sufficiently warns, nor is another warning required, unless Law prescribes it. And the same must more probably be said if the censure is threatened by Law, or ferendae sententiae; because in this case also the law sufficiently admonishes (VII, 53, 55).

1267. II. From Canon Law, for the liceity of a censure judicially to be issued there is required a threefold warning, or at least one peremptory warning. This is gathered from c. Const., de Sent. excomm., in 6.

A peremptory warning is that in which it is expressed that it is valid for a threefold warning, and in which time for coming to one's senses equivalent to the time of three warnings is conceded, namely two days for each warning, and therefore a space of six days: for example, "we command that within six days you cast such a woman out of the house; otherwise by the very fact you are excommunicated." But from a just cause, the three spaces can be reduced to one day or to a briefer time; but if there is danger in delay, as if it is a question of repressing violence, for example of church-wardens refusing to open the doors of the church, a single warning suffices, provided that time for coming to one's senses, say the space of one hour, is designated (VII, 56-58).

1268. B. On the sentence of the judge. The following are to be noted:

1. That a censure be issued licitly by way of sentence, it is required that the judge issue it in writing, noting in it, and indeed distinctly, both the person, and the censure, and the cause in species. But if the one to be censured demands for himself a copy of this writing, it must be furnished.

It was said licitly; for if the censure is issued with the solemnities disregarded, it is indeed valid, but the judge, unless excused by necessity or ignorance, sins gravely (VII, 50).

2. The censured person, so that he may come to his senses more quickly, ought, unless circumstances suggest otherwise, to be denounced.

Moreover, if he has been censured by man, the denunciation is to be made by the author of the censure itself, or by his delegate, and indeed publicly, for example in the church, at the time of Mass or sermon, by the living voice, or through a sheet affixed to the doors of the church, according to the custom of the region. But if he has been censured by common Law, the denunciation, in the same way, is to be made by the Ordinary of the place in which the censure was incurred. But then, before denunciation, there ought to precede the citation of the guilty person, to be made by his own Superior, a term having been given to him for declaring his right; otherwise the denunciation will be null, unless perhaps, Bonacina excepts, the crime is so notorious that it is evidently established that no defense is available to the guilty person (VII, 55 and 65, note 3).

3. As soon as the guilty person offers satisfaction, he is to be absolved.

1269. Four things excuse from censure: 1. ignorance; 2. fear; 3. impotence; 4. nullity of the censure.

I. IGNORANCE excuses; because he who does not know the censure cannot be said to be contumacious. And this is true even if the ignorance is merely concomitant, for example when someone kills a cleric not knowing that he is a cleric, but so prepared in mind that, if he had known, he would also have killed him.

Hence: 1. Ignorance excuses both of law, when someone, namely, is ignorant either that the crime is prohibited by the Church, or that a censure is annexed to the crime; and of fact, when someone is ignorant that he is positing an act forbidden under censure. Thus, for example, you are excused if you do not know that the book which you read or retain has been prohibited by name through Apostolic Letters.

2. Even vincible ignorance excuses, if it is not gravely culpable. For light fault is not punished by a grave penalty. But ignorance GRAVELY culpable generally does not excuse; because this can practically be called crass. Now in Law it is said: "We do not wish the ignorant to be bound; provided, however, that their ignorance has not been crass or supine" (Boniface, c. 2, de Const. in 6).

3. Even gravely culpable ignorance excuses sometimes; namely when in the decree of censure it is said: "he who shall have done this knowingly, deliberately..." or also: "he who shall have presumed..., by rash daring," or something similar, by which certain knowledge or a direct and perfect voluntary is required (cf. n. 220).

But whether affected ignorance itself also excuses in this case is disputed. Others more commonly deny it; because this includes deceit and is equivalent to knowledge. But others, and not improbably, affirm it, at least if it is a question of a censure inflicted on those sinning knowingly; because he indeed who knowingly sins against the law truly contemns it; but he who sins from affected ignorance, although he wishes to be ignorant so that he may sin more freely, nevertheless demonstrates some reverence toward the law, while he seeks to be ignorant of it from fear that, if he should know it, he may be drawn back from sin: therefore he shows virtual deceit, not formal deceit (VII, 45-48, 301).

1270. II. GRAVE FEAR excuses as often as it frees from a delict against ecclesiastical law. The reason is that censure, as a sanction of law, is not incurred except because of transgression of the law itself.

We have said: as often as it frees from a delict against ecclesiastical law; now, grave fear of imminent harm from observing an ecclesiastical law, and consequently from delict, excuses, unless from neglect of the law a greater harm follows than is the inconvenience which its fulfillment carries with it (cf. n. 223).

This holds even in the case in which fear would not excuse from fault against divine Law. Thus, for example, he who from fear lest he himself be killed, kills a cleric, certainly sins against the law of God; but because of the straits of the case, ecclesiastical law ceases to oblige, and therefore the censure is not incurred. But otherwise, if the law of the Church is of such a kind that it obliges even with fear of grave evil; if, say, its observance is morally necessary for the public good, or if its violation yields to contempt of faith or of ecclesiastical power (VII, 46; H. Ap., XIX, 8, 2). Cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., 37, p. 524.

Note. If it is a question of a censure established against those presuming, even light fear would excuse from incurring it.

1271. III. IMPOTENCE, whether physical or moral, likewise excuses from censure, as is evident. Thus, for example, he who does not have whence to restore, or who cannot restore without grave inconvenience, does not incur censures issued against retainers of another's goods (VII, 42).

1272. • IV. NULLITY OF THE CENSURE can be had from a threefold head:1 1. From defect of the one issuing it, that is, if he lacks jurisdiction, whether he has it impeded through censure, or suspended through a legitimate appeal which has been interposed before the sentence was absolutely issued. 2. From defect of form, that is, if the substantial order of judgment is omitted; as, if the guilty person is not cited, nor warned under threat of censure, according to what was said n. 1266. 3. From defect of a just cause, or matter (VII, 50, 51, 66).

But a just cause can fail in a threefold way: a) "If it subsists neither on the part of the thing, nor according to the allegations of the external forum. b) If on the part of the thing the crime indeed subsists, but not in order to judgment, because the guilty person does not confess it, nor is he legitimately convicted of it. c) If on the part of the thing the crime does not subsist, although it is juridically proved, and therefore the judge has a presumed title or cause. In which case, although the sentence on the part of the thing is unjust, and therefore more probably the censure does not bind in the forum of conscience, nevertheless in the external forum it must be observed, because of scandal" (VII, 66). Whence for the external forum he needs absolution who contracted marriage before a little minister (Holy Office, 1892).

1273. IT IS ASKED. In DOUBTS concerning censures, what is to be held?

Resp. 1. In a doubt antecedent to action, he who suspects that a censure is annexed to his action ought to inquire into the truth. If, after diligence has been applied, he does not find it, he is excused from censure by reason of invincible ignorance.

But if in inquiring he neglects all diligence, or uses only very little, he will not be immune from crass ignorance, and consequently is not exempted from censure, unless in the law it is said: he who shall have done this knowingly, etc. See what was said n. 1269, 3.

2. In a doubt consequent to action, that is, in doubt whether a censure has been incurred or not, "in the forum of conscience we are not held to conduct ourselves as censured persons."

And this whether the doubt is of fact, that is, concerning the crime, for example whether the striking of a cleric was gravely injurious; or whether the doubt is of law, that is, concerning the sentence, suppose if it is doubted whether a censure was latae or ferendae sententiae, or whether a condition placed in the sentence has been fulfilled or not. The reason, for doubt of fact, is that no one in doubt is to be stripped of his right of communicating with the Church, which he possesses; but for doubt of law, because penalties are to be restricted, whence in doubt they are not incurred.

3. In a doubt concerning the cessation of a censure certainly inflicted, that is, if the censured person doubts concerning absolution obtained, concerning the effect of an appeal interposed, and similar things, he ought still to hold himself as censured; because possession stands for the law, or for the Superior.

And the same must be said if he doubts concerning the power of the Superior, when this Superior peacefully possesses it. Likewise, more truly, in doubt whether the censure is just or not, whatever some say; because even in such a doubt, the power of the Superior possesses (n. 55). Cf. St. Alphonsus, VII, 45, 67, 68; D'Annibale, Summula, I, 312.

1 The things noted here refer to censures issued by man alone. Cf. Aertnys (l. VII, n. 17), who explains these things lucidly.

Three things are to be weighed: 1. how incurred censures are released; 2. who can absolve; 3. what conditions are required.

1274. DEFINITION. The absolution of a censure is the relaxation of the penalty itself, made by the power of the keys, through a fit Superior. Of itself and primarily it is an act of jurisdiction of the external forum, just as the infliction itself of censure is. It differs from dispensation, which takes away the bond of a law or precept (cf. n. 227).

DIVISION. Someone can be absolved from censure in manifold ways: 1. as to all effects, or only as to some; 2. absolutely or conditionally; 3. with falling back; 4. for caution (D'Annibale on the Constitution Apost. Sed.).

Now: 1. Absolution is given ordinarily to take away ALL EFFECTS; sometimes it is given FOR A PARTIAL EFFECT, for example to remove privation of active voice in a canonical election.1

This, however, is improperly called absolution, because it presents the appearance of a dispensation (VII, 125, end).

1 Thus, for example, censures by which the Cardinal electors of a new Pontiff perhaps are punished are suspended for the effect of election, while otherwise remaining in their force (Const. Vacante Sede Apost., n. 29 and 79; Acta Pii X, vol. 3, p. 253 and 282).

2. Absolution can be given UNDER CONDITION, either concerning the past, for example: "if you have already satisfied, I absolve you"; or concerning the present: "if I can absolve"; or concerning the future: "if you will satisfy hereafter, now for then I absolve you."

This last absolution, however, is illicit, unless it is made honorable by some grave cause, say, if afterward he from whom the censured person can be absolved would be lacking (VII, 123).

3. Absolution is sometimes given WITH FALLING BACK, which is a species of condition; namely so that the absolved person, unless within a certain time he shall have performed something, for example unless within a month he shall have restored, or gone to the excommunicating one, falls back by the very fact into the same censure.

Moreover, falling back is by man or by Law: a) It is by man, as often as it is adjoined by the will of the absolving Superior himself. b) It is by Law, when it is imposed by force of law: which is done, for example, when someone, either in urgent necessity, or in the article or danger of death, is absolved from censures reserved to the Pope in a special way (VII, 86, 87, 125). See what is to be said n. 1282 and 1284.

4. Absolution FOR CAUTION is that which is given to remove or to suspend a censure perhaps unknown.

Of this kind is that which is given before absolution of sins, to avoid irreverence; or before conferral of orders, benefices, etc., to remove the impediment of a censure perhaps forgotten, or incurred with crass ignorance. Cf. Sanchez, Decal., l. I, c. 10, n. 55.

Note. It is EXPEDIENT to give absolution for caution as often as there is doubt concerning excommunication incurred: a) because, once it has been given, the censure ceases, even if afterward it appears certain; b) lest perhaps, in doubt of fact, whether someone has really contracted it, whether he has been absolved from it, he remain outside the Church, bereft of her goods; for in such a doubt, our false estimation does not change the truth of the thing. Nor ought the form of absolution from the Roman Ritual to be vain and useless. Otherwise in doubt of law, because a doubtful law certainly does not oblige (Lugo, de Poenit., disp. 20, n. 22, 23).

1275. • PRINCIPLES. I. Censures once incurred are removed through the absolution alone of a legitimate judge. This is clear from the sacred canons (VII, 122).

Hence: 1. Censure is not removed through the amendment of the guilty person; which moreover is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Alexander VII: "As regards the forum of conscience, when the guilty person has been corrected and his contumacy has ceased, the censures cease." 2. It is not removed by the death or removal of the one issuing it, as is clear from c. Pastoralis, de officio judicis ordinarii; and the reason is that a penalty once inflicted passes into a matter adjudged. 3. It is not removed by the death of the censured person, as is clear from c. Sacris, de Sent. excomm. Wherefore a dead person, although he died contrite, is deprived of the suffrages of the Church and ecclesiastical burial.

It was said: 1. Censures, that is, properly so called; for suspensions and interdicts which are inflicted by way of vindicative penalty cease, not through absolution, but through time elapsed, or a condition fulfilled, or through dispensation of the Superior (cf. n. 1305). - 2. Once incurred; because censures not yet incurred are deleted either by abrogation of the law, or by revocation of the precept, or also by the death of the Superior issuing a particular sentence.

1276. II. Absolution from censures can be given both in the external forum and in the internal forum. Indeed, since censure without fault cannot even be understood, in the sacramental forum absolution must be given at the same time from censures and from sins, but first from censures. If absolution from censures is given after absolution from sins, it is gravely illicit, nevertheless valid; and if the penitent, in receiving it, was in good faith and otherwise disposed, absolution from sins also will be valid (VI, 430, end; VII, 70, 126).

1277. • III. The value of absolution from censures is one thing in the external forum, another in the internal forum. Absolution given in the external forum always avails for the internal forum. Given in the internal forum, it does not profit before the judge or the faithful unless it is publicly established, for example if it is known that the censured person has confessed and has offered satisfaction, if any was necessary. But prudence forbids that absolution in the internal forum be granted if the case has already been brought into the contentious forum or is soon to be brought there (Suarez, de Cens., disp. 7).

A great difference intervenes between absolution from SINS and absolution from CENSURES.

1. The former is given to reconcile us to God; but the latter to restore those things which are proper to the Church militant. 2. The former extends to all sins, but the latter is sometimes restricted to one censure. 3. The former is given only to the contrite and willing; the latter is validly granted even to the contumacious, and to the unwilling themselves; indeed also licitly in some cases, for example when this conduces to the common good. 4. The former, of itself, is absolute; the latter is often given under condition, from day to day, with falling back, for caution, for a particular effect, etc. 5. The former is given only to those present; the latter is rightly given also to the absent by letters or telephone or intermediary, if an urgent cause is present, except if it has been committed to someone to absolve in the form customary to the Church. 6. The former is given by an approved priest alone; the latter can be given by a simple cleric endowed with due faculty. 7. Finally, sins can be absolved not only directly, but also indirectly, that is, by concomitance with those things which are subject to the keys; but censures are absolved only directly; because among them there is not a necessary connection, but they are held like chains, some of which are released without the others (VI, 597, 618; VII, 117, 131).

1278. PRINCIPLES. I. From a censure inflicted through a particular sentence upon a determinate person, no one can absolve except he who inflicted it, or his successor, or Superior, or the delegate of these. Such a censure, from its own nature, is most specially reserved, even in a Jubilee; and the reason is that otherwise the order of judgments would be disturbed (VII, 72; H. Ap., XIX, 11).

Wherefore St. Alphonsus notes: "1. That a Bishop, even in another's territory, can absolve his own subjects, in the forum both external and internal, whenever the absolution is without judicial noise. 2. That if someone offends in another's territory, and is specially excommunicated by that Bishop, he cannot be absolved by his own Bishop, except by permission of the Bishop of the place" (cf. n. 204).

1279. II. From censures issued, whether by Law, or by man through a general sentence against indeterminate persons, which censures are equated with censures issued by Law, if they are not reserved, any confessor can validly and licitly absolve, for both forums. Thus commonly, from the concession of Innocent III, c. Nuper, de Sent. excomm., and from the universal practice of the Church.

We have said: 1. From censures, for otherwise, if some penalty, stated under the form of censure, is really vindicative (cf. n. 1300). 2. Any confessor, namely approved, and having jurisdiction over the censured person. But a simple priest, outside the case of danger of death, cannot absolve anyone even from excommunication reserved to no one, whatever some say. 3. For both forums: whence this absolution can be given both outside and within confession, and it avails also for the external forum, in non-contentious cases, according to what was said n. 1276 (VII, 70-73).

1280. • III. From censures reserved by Law no one can absolve, except he to whom they are reserved, or his Superior, or successor, or one duly delegated. This is clear from c. Nuper, de Sent. excomm., and from Trent, Sess. 14, c. 7.

As regards delegated faculty let the following rules stand:

FIRST RULE. If censures are reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a special way, for absolving, outside the case of necessity, a special concession is required, which is not usually granted by the Holy See except for a time, or for the life of the person, or for a certain number of cases.1 This is clear from the practice of the Holy See and from the Constitution of Pius IX, by which censures were limited, and at the same time all real privileges were revoked, as regards absolution from censures, whether specially or simply reserved.

Moreover, the SPECIAL concession is made, for example, through the indult of a Jubilee, through a little document of the Sacred Penitentiary, through quinquennial faculties and other personal faculties of this kind. The Pontiff did not revoke these faculties, as is clear from an oracle of the living voice promulgated by the Holy Office, 1 Feb. 1871.

SECOND RULE. If censures are simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, Bishops in their own diocese can, by themselves or through another specially to be deputed for this, absolve any of their subjects; but only in occult cases, and in the forum of conscience. Thus from the celebrated chapter Liceat of the Council of Trent, whose disposition Pius IX confirmed in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis.

Now these are the words of Trent (Sess. 24, c. 6, de Reform.): "It is permitted to Bishops, in all irregularities and suspensions proceeding from an occult delict, except that which arises from voluntary homicide, and except others brought to the contentious forum, to dispense; and in any occult cases whatever, even those reserved to the Apostolic See, to absolve, gratuitously, in the forum of conscience, any delinquent subjects of their own, in their own diocese, by themselves or by a vicar specially to be deputed for this, a salutary penance having been imposed."

Under the words: 1. Bishops, there also come Abbots having territory, capitular Vicars, and others enjoying episcopal jurisdiction (VII, 79); but not Vicars general from their general commission (de Privil., 31); nor regular prelates, as is clear from the Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 Dec. 1873. Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1123. 2. Through another specially to be deputed... understand either for one case, or for all cases, provided the delegation is made not to all in common, but to individual persons, this faculty being expressly named, as the authors most commonly interpret (VII, 93; de Privil., 34; cf. Ami du Cl., 1911, p. 223). 3. Their subjects... understand those staying in the diocese, or even outsiders approaching the sacred Tribunal in the diocese: because by this very fact they become subjects as regards absolution, although not yet as regards dispensation from an irregularity or suspension reserved to the Pontiff (VI, 593). 4. In occult cases, which namely are not formally notorious, either by notoriety of law, or by notoriety of fact, according to the sense which we stated n. 1190. 5. In the forum of conscience, that is, in the sacramental forum, as St. Alphonsus judges more probably (de Privil., n. 29); or at least not in the external and contentious forum, as is altogether certain from Trent (cf. n. 138).

THIRD RULE. If censures are reserved to Bishops, or Ordinaries, by pontifical Law, Bishops, Abbots, capitular or general Vicars, and all Ordinaries can absolve, in both forums, from cases even notorious.1 In the internal forum, regulars can absolve from cases not brought to the judicial forum nor easily to be brought there (I, App. II, n. 100; ed. G., I, p. 239): for nothing, as regards cases reserved by law to ORDINARIES, has been innovated through the Bull Apostolicae Sedis.

Under the name of Ordinaries regular prelates also come with respect to their own subjects: for these, as exempt, have no other Ordinaries than their own prelates. Therefore these can absolve their own, even novices and familiars, from cases reserved to the Ordinary, but not from cases, whether public or occult, reserved in any way to the Roman Pontiff. S. Poenit., 5 Dec. 1873 (ap. Noldin, de Poenit., n. 381). As regards absolution from cases pertaining to internal governance, nothing indeed has been innovated through the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (Holy Office, 22 Mar. 1881), but see the new Decree, 5 Aug. 1913 (cf. what is to be said n. 1762).

1281. • FOURTH RULE. If censures have been reserved by other Bishops, any Bishop can, by himself or through another, absolve from them, but only in occult cases. For it is read in c. Liceat: "In any occult cases whatever, EVEN those reserved to the Apostolic See." Whence, the authors say, lest the particle "even" seem to have been placed uselessly, it must be understood that the faculty of absolving from occult censures which other Bishops reserved to themselves is conceded to Bishops. Thus Bonacina (de Cens., disp. 1, q. 3, punct. 2, n. 6), who adds that this seems to be received by custom, which is wont to confer jurisdiction. Cf. St. Alph., de Privil., n. 35.

Nevertheless censures issued through a particular sentence are excepted (cf. n. 1278).

Hence: A simple confessor cannot absolve a traveler from a censure reserved in the traveler's homeland; but a regular validly absolves novices as regards episcopal censures contracted before entrance (VI, 583).

Concerning the faculty of absolving from censures in the time of Jubilee, see the treatise on Penance (cf. n. 1736, B).

1282. PRINCIPLES. I. Any priest, even not approved, can absolve a censured person constituted in the article or danger of death from all censures issued or reserved in whatever way. This is clear from Trent declaring thus (Sess. 14, c. 7): "Very piously, lest by this occasion itself of reservation anyone perish, it has always been guarded in the same Church of God, that there be no reservation in the article of death, and therefore all priests can absolve any penitents whatever from any sins and censures." See nevertheless what is to be said n. 1753.

1283. Absolution should not be given except those things having been enjoined which must be enjoined by law, as will be explained below (n. 1287). But especially these things are to be noted:

1. If it is a question of censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a special way, the obligation, from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, remains firm for those absolved to stand by the commands of the Church if they recover: understand under grave sin and under penalty of falling back, as the S. R. U. Inq. defined, on 19 August 1891; on which day it also decreed that the obligation of standing by the commands of the Church imports the burden, either by oneself or through a confessor, of recurring to the Supreme Pontiff and obeying his commands, or of seeking a new absolution from one having the faculty of absolving from censures reserved to the Supreme Pontiff in a special way (Nouv. Rev. Theol., 24, p. 166).

2. If it is a question of censures simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, the obligation of presenting oneself to the Supreme Pontiff does not subsist. Holy Office, 17 Jun. 1891 (Nouv. Rev. Theol., ib., p. 159). The same must be said concerning censures which a Bishop has issued, provided the Bishop has not specially reserved the censure to himself (cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1125).

This chapter is divided into six articles: 1. on the notion and division of censure; 2. on its author; 3. on its subject; 4. on its object; 5. on excusing causes; 6. on absolution from censures.

We must treat 1° of the nature and division of censures; 2° of the principle or author of censures; 3° of the subject of censures; 4° of absolution from censures.

Note. - In this Treatise we have taken many things from the little work both of Peter Avanzini, whose title is: On the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, and of the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Fr. Aegidius Mauri, O.P., whose title is: Commentaries on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis. The former is cited according to the 3rd Edition by the word: "Avanz."; the latter according to the 2nd Edition by the word: "Comm."

1660. - Censure is commonly accustomed to be defined thus: It is a spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods.

It is said:

1° Penalty, because it supposes fault.

2° Spiritual, both because it is brought by a spiritual power for the spiritual utility of Christians, and because it immediately takes away spiritual goods, and because, as the Bull Auctorem fidei defines, condemning the contrary doctrine as false, pernicious, and at least erroneous (p. XXXII. p. 46), it binds in heaven and obliges souls.

3° Medicinal, because it is brought for this end, that the soul may return itself to better fruit. From this, however, you will not infer that those of whose correction there is despair are never to be punished by this penalty, or that those who have amended themselves are immediately to be absolved from it. For although this is generally true, nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus¹ and St. Thomas, this does not impede that censure can also be brought for the terror of others, and that absolution from it can be deferred either for a fuller repentance of the matter, or for the edification of the faithful and for repairing scandal; wherefore the correction of the delinquent is not the only end of censure.

4° A baptized man, because those who are not baptized are not subject to the legislative or coercive power of the Church; but power is exercised over subjects.

5° Delinquent and contumacious, because a penalty is inflicted only on the delinquent; but medicine ought not to be extended except to those whose contumacy needs so great a remedy. Yet formal contempt is not required for this contumacy, but virtual contempt suffices, consisting in this, that someone, knowing, or at least doubting, that something is prohibited by the Church under censure, nevertheless wills to do it.

6° Is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, namely of goods which are subject to the power of the Church. For goods of a threefold kind exist in the Church. Some proceed immediately from the head, or Christ, as the various graces; others proceed from the body, or the Church, as the administration of the Sacraments, common suffrages, etc.; but others proceed from the members, such as the prayers and good works of individual faithful. Now, therefore, censure does not take away the use of goods of the first kind, since they do not depend on the Church; and hence censure can stand together with the state of grace, e.g. in him who incurs censure because of a sin concerning which he afterward is perfectly contrite;² likewise, per se, neither does it take away the use of goods of the third kind; for the Church cannot impede that communion of Saints which exists from faith and charity among the members; but it only takes away or prohibits the use of goods of the second kind, sometimes indeed entirely, but sometimes only in part.

"Secondarily" censure can also deprive one "of the use of corporal goods, or of external actions, namely human communication, honor or salutation, etc.; which, however, is always as it were indirectly, and in order to spiritual things." Thus Suarez.

Hence censure differs:

1° From deposition and degradation, which are not medicinal, nor for a time, but only for penalty and perpetually, and because of a past sin, even one amended, can be inflicted.¹

2° From irregularity, which can be contracted because of only a defect also, either of soul or of body, without any fault, and therefore per se is not a penalty, but only a canonical impediment, although, inflicted because of certain crimes, it can also have the character of penalty, yet not medicinal, but punitive, and of itself perpetual.

3° From cessation from divine things: because this is indicated for warding off an injury inflicted on the Church, not for amending the guilty person.

4° From privation of a benefice, prison, etc.; because these do not deprive one of the use of spiritual goods.

Particular suspension and interdict³ sometimes put on the nature of censure, sometimes of vindicative penalty. But you will recognize that it is a vindicative penalty both if it is brought because of a merely past delict, and if it is inflicted perpetually or even for a determined time, say for two or three months. - They add that those penalties also then have the character of pure penalty, if some condition is lacking, from the defect of which censure, but not a pure penalty, is invalidated, or if the will of the Superior of constituting a mere penalty can be known from something.⁴ Moreover, to penalties of this sort, if they are not censures, those things cannot be applied which the law establishes concerning censures as such.⁵ Yet it is otherwise if something else is expressly provided by the law itself. See n. 1771. I said: 4°.

1661. - They are distinguished in various ways, namely:

1° By reason of species, into excommunication, suspension, interdict, concerning which we shall speak in particular.

2° By reason of the mode by which they are inflicted, into censures brought by law or by man, according as they are brought through canons or ecclesiastical laws (under which also come statutes established in a diocesan synod), or are brought by a legitimate Superior, whether by way of judicial sentence, e.g. if satisfaction is commanded by sentence of the judge under threat of censure to someone who has been found culpable; or by way of precept upon one or upon several. If censure by man affects determined persons, it is particular; but if it is brought generally and without determination of persons, it is general. - But they differ from each other especially in this, that a censure brought by law, when the author who brought it is dead, perseveres after the manner of all laws. But one brought by man, since it depends upon his jurisdiction and authority, when this ceases, he being dead or removed from office, also ceases, unless it has already been contracted; for, if someone has incurred it, the bond is taken away only by absolution.

3° By reason of the mode by which they are incurred, into censures of sentence already passed or to be passed, according as the Superior establishes that the censure is incurred by the very fact by which someone violates the law, or only after the sentence of an ecclesiastical judge has been inflicted. It is asked how these are distinguished from each other.

a) They are of sentence already passed: 1) if the law says: by the very fact; by the law itself; without another sentence;¹ 2) if the words are of the past or present tense, e.g. we have excommunicated, I excommunicate;² 3) if absolutely, in the imperative mode, it is said: let him be excommunicated, let him be suspended, etc.; but not if by these words only a precept of excommunicating, suspending, etc., is imposed on another, say the Bishop.³ Nearly the same distinction, according to Suarez⁴ and Croix,⁵ is to be employed if it is said: immediately; continuously; from then; on the spot.

b) They are of sentence to be passed, if the words are either 1) of the future tense; or 2) threatening, unless something else is gathered from the adjuncts;⁶ or 3) ambiguous; for, from Rule of Law 49 in 6°, "in penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made."⁷ But ambiguous would be, for example, these words: let him be excommunicated.⁸

4° By reason of the power of absolving, into reserved censures or non-reserved censures, according as the Superior reserved to himself absolution from them, or permitted ordinary Ministers to absolve from them. Some are reserved to the Pope, others to Bishops. Those reserved to the Pope are reserved either specially, or simply (see n. 1701 sq.). But to Bishops some are reserved by law (see n. 1733 sq.), and these are properly reserved to the Pope with the faculty made to Bishops that they can absolve from them; others are reserved by Bishops themselves. Censures by man are always judged reserved, unless they were brought by a general precept. - Finally, these also deserve to be distinguished:

5° Notorious or occult censures, according as it is clear to others that someone has incurred them because of a fact which is so known that it can no longer be hidden; or otherwise; and

6° Just or unjust, valid or invalid censures, according as the Superior has consulted justice, truth, and law, or not, in imposing the censure.

1662. - For the validity of censure there is required sin, and this proportioned to the censure, external, regularly consummated, not merely past, and joined with contumacy.

1° Sin. Hence, if the crime on account of which censure is inflicted either does not subsist, or has not been legitimately proved, the censure does not bind in the forum of conscience. But if for the external forum it appears valid, it must be observed externally to avoid scandal and disturbance of judgments.¹ Furthermore, censure ought not to be fulminated in one's own personal cause, since this is reputed in law as vengeance.² Except, however, 1) if this is done not by way of judgment, but by way of defense against him who inflicts violence, because it is lawful to repel force by force;³ 2) where the cause is so public and manifest that it can neither be denied, nor needs any examination.⁴

2° Proportioned to the censure, and hence ordinarily mortal; for censure, since it is a most grave penalty, requires mortal fault. Yet I said: ordinarily mortal; for suspension or interdict for a brief time and depriving one only of some use, likewise minor excommunication, can be brought because of venial sin.⁵

3° External; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain; but not concerning merely internal things. Moreover, the sin ought not only to be exterior, but also grave as to the substance of the external act. Whence it does not suffice that the act is mortal from a depraved intention or from an erroneous conscience. - Thus, e.g., he who strikes a cleric only lightly, although with the mind of killing him, does not incur excommunication; nor does he who strikes a table, or says: thus it is, intending internally to confirm heresy, etc.; nor finally he who falsely thinks himself to violate the law, e.g. by reading a book which he falsely believes condemned. For all these indeed sin against conscience, but not against Canon Law.⁶

4° Regularly consummated by work in its own kind, according to the property of the words which are contained in the precept or law inflicting the censure, and according to the principal end of the law. The reason is because penal laws are to be strictly interpreted according to the Rule of Law: Odia are to be restricted, favors ought to be enlarged.

I said: 1) regularly. For sin begun, or even an attempt or assistance toward it, can be punished by censure and in fact sometimes is punished, as, e.g., provocation to duel or acceptance of it, even though the fight does not follow; likewise to furnish work or favor to the same. But unless it is expressed in the law, an extension of this sort is not to be made. Therefore,

I said: 2) according to the property of the words, etc. Wherefore, he who only counseled some crime is not bound by censure, if in the law no others than perpetrators are noted; but he will be bound if also counselors or those in any way cooperating in the same are noted.¹ Hence also, as St. Alphonsus notes,² if the censure has been brought principally upon those doing, and accessorily upon those commanding, counseling, etc., the one commanding, the one counseling, the one carrying a vote, does not incur it, if the command, counsel, or vote does not efficaciously influence the crime; or if the crime is not brought to effect. Thus, e.g., he is exempted from excommunication who gave a command or counsel to him who was already prepared to perpetrate the delict; likewise the one commanding a cleric to be struck is exempted if in fact the striking does not occur. And the same must probably be said if it is doubted whether the command or counsel influenced. - On the contrary, if the censure has been brought principally upon those commanding, counseling, etc., it is incurred immediately whenever the command or counsel has been furnished by them, even with the effect not following; the reason is because then the censure has been imposed precisely because of the command or counsel, and not because of the work which would be caused from the command or counsel.

5° Not merely past, or not having, as they say, a successive tract, because censure is a medicinal penalty, and therefore cannot be brought upon those who have already returned themselves to better fruit. "Therefore, when someone is excommunicated because of theft, he is excommunicated by reason of contumacy, either because the thief knew theft to be forbidden under censure, or because, having been admonished under penalty of censure, he refuses to restore."¹ Apply the same to the case of scandal given and not yet repaired.

6° Joined with contumacy against the law or precept of the Church. The reason is because the principal end of censure is to break pertinacity. Recall the things said n. 1660. It is said: 5°.

1663. Resolves. - 1° Because one is excused from grave fault because of some circumstance, he is also excused from censure, although the matter is grave in itself.

2° If something altogether light is commanded under censure, this is not incurred, provided that the thing which appears light under some respect does not become grave from elsewhere.

3° The Superior would act imprudently and illicitly, but nevertheless validly, who brought censure because of any grave fault whatever; for the end of the Church is to punish only graver crimes.²

4° More probably, censure is not incurred if someone, before the evil work is consummated, as far as he can revokes the command or counsel, or, not being able to impede the consummation, at least warns the person to be harmed, that he may be on his guard; for he would not be contumacious at the time at which the work obtains the final effect required for incurring censure. Concerning restitution in this case see nn. 760. q. 1°. 5; a. 168. q. 1°.

5° Excommunication which is said to be brought upon harmful animals, e.g. locusts, is not excommunication properly so called, but adjuration, or a prayer made for their destruction, lest they harm. Cf. n. 376. III.

6° Likewise, when the dead are said to be excommunicated, this must be understood of a certain execration or declaration of excommunication which they incurred before death, and in which they died. Therefore, absolution imparted to the excommunicated who died with signs of penitence is extended directly not to the dead themselves, but to the living, inasmuch as they are loosed from the obligation not to communicate with the departed in burial and public prayers.

1664. Questions. - Query 1° Whether one doubtful concerning a contracted censure in the internal forum is to be held censured?

Resp. Negatively, in a doubt both of fact and of law, i.e. whether you doubt whether you have offended, or whether the case falls under censure. The reason is both because in doubt no one is to be stripped of the right, which he possesses, of using spiritual goods, and because odia are to be restricted. Thus commonly. Hence regularly you do not incur censure unless the sin is so certain that no prudent doubt remains whether it was perpetrated; whether it is internally and externally grave; whether it is consummated in its species; whether it was committed by one past puberty (see n. 1668. II.).

It is said in the question: he who doubts whether he has incurred it; for in a doubt preceding the action, the things to be said in the following questions 2° and 3° are to be applied.

In a doubt concerning absolution obtained, concerning an appeal interposed in time, and similar things, the guilty person ought to bear himself as censured; likewise in a doubt concerning the power of the Superior when this Superior peacefully possesses it, and more truly also in a doubt whether the censure is just, because in these doubts the power of the Superior possesses. - A censure brought from a false presumption of fact, unless or until its injustice is publicly known, must be observed in public, lest scandal be given.

Query 2° Whether ignorance excuses from censure?

Resp. 1° Certainly ignorance of fact excuses, namely when someone is ignorant that he is placing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, e.g., if someone strikes a priest thinking him to be a layman, he does not incur the censure brought upon strikers of Clerics. The reason is because censure ought to be known to the sinner, so that he may be contumacious. Thus in Canon Law.²

Resp. 2° Ignorance of ecclesiastical law commanding or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is clear from the same reasons just adduced; for he cannot be called contumacious against the Church who is ignorant of its law, as is clear from Canon Law,³ where it is said: "We do not will that the ignorant be bound, provided however that the ignorance does not smack of crassness or supineness."

Query 3° Whether vincible ignorance excuses from censure?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if this is not gravely culpable; because then the one ignorant cannot be called contumacious against the Church. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° But negatively, if that ignorance is gravely culpable; because then practically it can be called crass: moreover, crass ignorance does not excuse from censure, as is clear from the cited Canon Law. For this ignorance does not impede that someone be contumacious against the law which he culpably ignores. - St. Alphonsus¹ and others commonly.

Except, however, if in the Decree of censure it is said: whoever shall have done this knowingly, deliberately, rashly, whoever shall have presumed, etc. For these words demand a perfect and direct voluntary act, and from certain knowledge of the censure.² But more commonly they deny that by these clauses even affected ignorance, as including fraud and being equated to knowledge, is excused; and to this sentence, as more common, St. Alphonsus, although the opposite does not seem to him improbable, adheres the more.³

Query 4° Whether those who have committed some sin to which censure has been annexed by law are to be admonished by the confessor both concerning the sin and concerning the censure annexed to it, if they are ignorant either of the sin or of the censure?

Resp. The question must be resolved according to the things said in n. 1423, and according to the things to be said in nn. 1753-1757. q. 3°.

Query 5° Whether grave fear excuses from censure?

Resp. Affirmatively, even when there is question of a censure established against those transgressing a divine precept, whether positive or natural, provided that a) fear of this kind is such that it excuses from fault those violating the precept, if it were ecclesiastical; b) the law does not dispose otherwise. The reason is because ecclesiastical laws, such as are those which establish censures, cease to oblige where grave fear presses. - Yet I said: a) fear of this kind is such, etc. Hence, when the observance of human law seems morally necessary for preserving the public good, or if its violation redounds to contempt of the Faith, or of the law, or of ecclesiastical power, one transgressing from grave fear, even of life, a law placed under censure is not excused from it. I said: b) the law does not dispose otherwise, whether explicitly, or implicitly, as, e.g., with regard to duelists.⁴

Query 6° Whether it is required that admonition of the delinquent precede the censure?

Resp. 1° No admonition is required for censures established by law, because the law itself, having been brought and known, sufficiently admonishes the subjects. - Thus all. Yet, more probably, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ citation of the guilty person is required where there is question of censure of a sentence to be passed, in the case in which the delict and contumacy are not so notorious that it is evidently clear that no defense belongs to the guilty person.

Resp. 2° But admonition is required for censures to be brought by man, and indeed more commonly and more probably for validity. The reason is because he is not contumacious who previously was not admonished concerning the precept and concerning the penalty annexed. Indeed, from Canon Law, for liceity, a triple admonition is required, or at least one peremptory admonition, or one in which it is expressed that it has the force of three, and in which time for repentance equivalent to the time of three admonitions is granted, namely a period of two days for each admonition, and therefore a space of six days, e.g. "we command that within six days you cast such a woman out of the house; otherwise by the very fact you will be excommunicated."² But for a just cause three spaces can be reduced to one day or to a shorter time, and, if there is danger in delay, as if there is question of repressing violence, e.g. of trustees refusing to open the doors of the church, one admonition suffices, provided however that time for repentance, say the space of one hour, be designated.³

Except: 1° if there is question of censure by man by a general precept, or even a special precept with respect to a future act; for then admonition is not necessary, since the Decree concerning bringing censure holds the place of admonition.

Except: 2° if there is question of suspension and interdict of this kind, which are not censures properly so called and medicinal, but are brought only by way of penalty.⁴

Note. - Concerning the solemnities required for censures strictly such to be brought licitly, see, if you wish, Canon Law⁵ or St. Alphonsus.⁶ - Concerning these, observe: a) that they are required only in censures by man, and indeed brought by a particular sentence; but not in censures established by law, or by man indeed, but by way of a general or particular precept;¹ b) that among other things it is required that the censure and its cause be pronounced in writing, and that an authentic copy of the writing be handed over to the guilty person asking for it within a month. But since, as Kenrick astutely remarks,² "in this region lawsuits are sometimes brought against a Bishop bringing censures, he ought to take care here that he hand over nothing in writing which could furnish occasion for a civil action, or which otherwise would redound to the detriment of Religion; but a civil action does not seem to be given, if to the guilty person asking, the cause proved in judgment" (ecclesiastical) "is set forth; otherwise if the Bishop communicates the judgment" (ecclesiastical) "to others whom it does not concern."

1665. Principles. - I. The Church enjoys true power of bringing censures. See the arguments among the Dogmaticians.

II. All and only ecclesiastical Superiors having jurisdiction in the external and contentious forum can bring censures by ordinary right. This is clear from the words of Christ in Matthew:³ Whatever things you shall bind, etc. For by these words Christ gave to the Prelates of the Church, in the person of the Apostles, every power for the good and right administration of the Church. It is also clear from several places of Canon Law.

III. Censures can be brought, by that delegated power, by all and only Clerics to whom it has been granted by a Superior having ordinary jurisdiction. The reason is because every and only Cleric is capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which is required for bringing censures.⁴

1666. Rules. - 1° By ordinary right the Pope and a General Council can bring censures with respect to the universal Church; - the Roman Congregations, as the Congregation of the Council, of the Holy Office, of Bishops and Regulars, etc., likewise for the universal Church, in those things committed to them to be executed; - Archbishops both in their own dioceses and in the dioceses of suffragans at the time of visitation, and also when there is question of a cause brought to their tribunal by appeal, because then they have jurisdiction over suffragans; - Bishops with respect to their own diocese, provided they have been confirmed, even if not consecrated, and more truly also their Vicars General, because with the Bishop they constitute the same tribunal. Except the case of which in n. 1164. I. 10); - Legates in the territory of the legation, and Cardinals in the Church of their own title; - provincial Councils in their provinces; Generals, Provincials, and local Superiors and general Chapters (among some regulars also provincial Chapters) of religious Orders according to their various statutes; - the Chapter of the cathedral Church, the See being vacant, and before the election of the capitular Vicar, who (among us, the Administrator) thereafter will enjoy such power exclusively.¹

2° Pastors cannot, by ordinary right, bring censures, because today they do not have jurisdiction in the external and judicial forum, but only administration for the right order of the parish.²

3° Women, more probably not even by delegation, can bring censures. Therefore Abbesses of Nuns cannot bring them by their own authority, but can only obtain a Decree by which their commands must be observed under penalty of censure. - But the incapacity of a lay man is only by ecclesiastical law. Therefore the Pope can delegate this power to a lay man.³

4° Delegated power ceases by the death of the one delegating, or by his removal from office, unless the cause has already been begun by the delegate, at least by citation (cf. n. 151. 6°). But one delegated for bringing censures cannot subdelegate another, unless he has express license from the one delegating, or unless at least he is delegated to any causes whatsoever by way of office, or by the Pope (cf. however n. 150. R. 2°).

1667. Questions. - Query 1° Whether heretical, excommunicated, and suspended Bishops can validly bring censures?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if they are occult heretics, excommunicates, or suspended persons. The reason is because the Church, on account of the common good, does not take away from them the use of jurisdiction. Yet they act illicitly whenever they bring censures. - Thus commonly the Theologians with St. Alphonsus.⁴

Resp. 2° Negatively, if they are excommunicated persons to be avoided, or not tolerated, because then they are deprived of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction. (The same, for the same reason, holds concerning those suspended from jurisdiction.) But what if they are indeed notorious, but not to be avoided? It seems that they nevertheless can validly bring censures, because, they say, it is gathered from the Constitution of Martin V, Ad evitanda, where it is sanctioned that an excommunicated tolerated person, in those things which pertain to public office, is not to be avoided, not even by those who know it.¹

Query 2° Whether a Bishop can bring censure if he is outside the diocese?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the censure is brought by way of precept or statute for guarding against future crimes.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively also, if the censure is brought by way of sentence, which nevertheless does not need knowledge of the cause and judicial process (whether because the contumacy is so manifest that it does not need knowledge of the cause, or because the cause was already known in the proper territory), or, even if it needs judicial process, permission nevertheless has been given by the Ordinary of the territory and the parties consent, since no one unwilling can be drawn outside his proper territory.

Resp. 3° Negatively, if the censure must be brought with judicial process, and the Ordinary of the place denies license. Except, unless the Bishop was unjustly expelled from his own territory; for then in the nearer places he will be able to exercise his jurisdiction, license having been sought from the Ordinary of the place, although not obtained.²

The reason for the threefold response is that, in the case of Response 1st and 2nd, either contentious jurisdiction is not exercised, or it is exercised with the consent of the Ordinary of the territory; but in the case of Response 3rd, such jurisdiction is truly exercised, and indeed without the consent of the Ordinary. But the reason for the exception in Response 3rd is that then it does not stand through the Ordinary that it be exercised in the proper territory from which, as is supposed, he was unjustly expelled.

Query 3° Whether, vice versa, a Bishop existing in his own diocese can bring censure against a subject existing outside the diocese?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if there is question of a crime committed in his own diocese. The reason is because otherwise the delinquent could be punished by no one; and, although he has gone away, nevertheless he does not cease to be subject to the jurisdiction of his own Bishop. Nor does it stand in the way that citation cannot be made outside the territory; for it suffices for incurring the censure that the guilty person be cited in his own house or in a public place.¹

Resp. 2° Indeed, the Bishop can bring censure against a subject sinning outside the diocese, if there is question of a matter pertaining to his diocese. Thus Clerics can be excommunicated who, having been ordered to come to the Synod, do not obey; but otherwise, more probably, if the crime were consummated outside the territory, or in an exempt place of the same territory, e.g. in a church or convent of Regulars. Except, if the discussion is of a censure brought against someone by way of a special precept for guarding against crime, as St. Alphonsus more probably teaches, although the contrary sentence also is probable for him, "since one who speaks law outside the territory is not obeyed with impunity."²

Query 4° Whether a Bishop can bind with censure the subject of another, who, namely, has neither domicile nor quasi-domicile in that diocese, but sins in his diocese?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is because every delinquent obtains the forum of the place in which he sins. Thus from Canon Law.³ Except, if the delinquent were the Superior of that Bishop, e.g. the Metropolitan of that Bishop. But although a Bishop cannot bring censure against a stranger before admonition, nevertheless, after he has offended in the place and the Bishop has cited him, he can. - These things are said concerning censures by man through sentence. For if the discussion is of censures inflicted by the special law of that place upon delinquents, whether against common law or against the proper laws of that same place, according to the more common and more probable sentence, which exempts newcomers and travelers from the obligation of observing the proper laws of those places, they do not incur them.⁴

Query 5° Whether Regular Prelates can bring censure against subjects existing in whatever place?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common sentence. The reason is because the jurisdiction of Superiors is not only territorial, but more personal; whence a change of place on the part of the subject detracts nothing from the jurisdiction of the Superior.

1668. Principles. - I. The subject of censure can be nothing except a baptized man, capable of reason, and a subject: 1° he must be baptized, because according to the Apostle the Church does not judge concerning those who are outside; 2° capable of reason, because censure is ordered toward the correction of the delinquent; but this has no place in him who lacks the use of reason. Yet he who has lucid intervals is bound by censures, provided that at the time when he was possessed of reason he gave the cause; 3° a subject, because censure is an act of jurisdiction, which can be exercised only over subjects. Cf. however n. 1667. q. 4°.

II. Those not yet of puberty, although they can be bound by censures absolutely, nevertheless, because of the lightness of age, from the indulgence and benignity of the Church they do not incur them, unless it has been specially expressed in the law, or unless the censure is brought by way of particular precept, and in each case, as is clear of itself, there is question of those not yet of puberty who are capable of fraud.²

But a twofold case only is found expressed in law, namely: 1° if they have entered monasteries of Nuns. Trid.³ - 2° if they have struck Clerics.⁴

1669. Questions. - Query 1° Whether Kings and Queens can be bound by censures by Bishops?

Resp. Negatively. For although in spiritual matters they are subject to Bishops, nevertheless by privilege they cannot be punished with censure by them. But this privilege was legitimately introduced by the course of time, and is commonly attributed to them by the Doctors.⁵ Yet they are subject to Pontifical censures, even those brought by law, e.g. against those invading cities, lands, places, or rights pertaining to the Roman Church.

Query 2° Whether Bishops and Cardinals are subject to censures?

Resp. 1° Certainly they cannot be subject to censures brought by themselves, because no one is subject of himself.

Resp. 2° But they are subject to papal censures, because the Pope is the Superior of all, even of Bishops. Nevertheless, by privilege of law they are bound neither by interdict nor by suspension, unless mention of them is made in decreeing those censures,¹ at least indirectly, e.g. through the clause: even those worthy of special or individual note.²

Query 3° Whether religious can be bound by episcopal censures by the Bishop of the place?

Resp. Distinguish. Either they are exempt, or they are not. - If they are not exempt, affirmatively, as is clear of itself. - If they are exempt, subdistinguish. - Affirmatively, if they enjoy only a general privilege of exemption, but then only in those things in which they are subject to the Bishop, whether as Ordinary or as Apostolic delegate. What these are, see nn. 1197-1202. - But negatively, if from a special privilege they cannot be struck with censures even in those things in which otherwise they are subject to the jurisdiction of Ordinaries, although by the same they can be coerced and punished by other penalties. The Mendicants and Jesuits enjoy such a privilege.³

Query 4° Whether someone can be bound by several censures at the same time?

Resp. Affirmatively. For nothing prevents someone from being constrained by several bonds at once. For just as someone can perpetrate several sins diverse in species and number, so also he can be bound at the same time by censures diverse in species and number, e.g. by excommunication, suspension (if he is a Cleric), and interdict, and also by several excommunications, etc. Indeed, because of one delict someone can be bound at the same time by law and by man, by the Pope and by the Bishop, so that he must be absolved by each, provided that the one Superior intended to impose a new penalty; otherwise, regularly, the later censure is held as an innovation or publication of the prior one. - Thus commonly and absolutely more probably according to St. Alphonsus.⁴

Hence: 1° If someone by one act commits two sins diverse in species, to each of which censure is annexed, he incurs two censures, e.g. he who kills a Cleric in a place where homicide is prohibited under penalty of censure. But it is otherwise if that one sin does not have malices diverse in species.¹

2° If someone repeats the same crime to which a censure is annexed, by an act morally distinct from the first, he again incurs the same censure; but it is otherwise if the repeated acts are not morally distinct from each other. Thus one striking a Cleric three or four times, with a notable interval posited between the individual blows, incurs three or four censures, while he incurs one if he strikes him several times continuously.

3° Likewise, an excommunicated priest will incur several irregularities who absolves several penitents successively, because so often he confers a new Sacrament.²

Query 5° Whether an appeal excuses from incurring censure?

Resp. 1° A legitimate appeal excuses from a conditional censure, i.e. from a censure of a sentence to be passed or to be incurred in the future, provided it is made before the lapse of the time granted for fulfilling the condition.

Resp. 2° A legitimate appeal from a censure already brought, i.e. which someone has already incurred, generally does not suspend it. Whence the common saying of the Canonists is that the appeal then is devolutive, but not suspensive. - Thus Benedict XIV, Constitution Ad militantis, March 30, 1742, § 38.

Query 6° Whether the subject of censure can be an entire community?

Resp. 1° Negatively with regard to excommunication, and this probably not even validly. Hence a Bishop who wishes to excommunicate a body of church trustees (trustees) trampling on the rights of the Church must name the individual members of the body.³ Yet the Pope can excommunicate all from a community whom he has found guilty, without designating the individuals by name.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively with regard to suspension, yet so that it strikes the individual members of the community only as regards the functions and rights belonging to the community itself as such; but not as regards the functions and rights which belong to them singly.

But if suspension is inflicted on the community and on the individual persons of it, then it does not affect the innocent, but only the delinquents.

Resp. 3° Affirmatively also with regard to interdict; this censure has this singular thing, that, if it is general, it binds an entire community, and in this even the innocent.¹ Yet he who brings the censure cannot for that reason be charged with injustice; since by such an interdict, properly speaking, the innocent are not punished, but the Church for just causes withdraws its benefits and offices from the guilty as well as the innocent. Common.²

Things to Be Noted Beforehand. - Someone can be absolved from censure in a multiple way:

1) As regards all effects, or as regards some effect only; 2) absolutely or conditionally; 3) to reincidentia; 4) for caution.

Now therefore: 1° Absolution is ordinarily given as regards all effects, but sometimes it is given for a partial effect, e.g. for taking away privation of active voice in canonical election; this absolution, however, is improperly so called, and bears the species of a dispensation.³ Another for an effect, see n. 1403. q. 1°.

2° Absolution can be given under a condition either concerning the past: e.g. if you have already satisfied, I absolve you; or concerning the present: if I can absolve; or concerning the future: if you will satisfy hereafter, now for then I absolve you. This last, however, is illicit unless it is made honorable by some grave cause, say if afterward there would be lacking someone who could absolve the censured person.⁴

3° A species of conditional absolution is that which is given to reincidentia; in such a way, namely, that the one absolved, unless within a certain time he furnishes something, e.g. unless within a month he restores, or approaches the excommunicator, relapses by the very fact into the same censure. - Moreover, reincidentia is by man or by law: a) it is by man whenever it is added by the will of the Superior himself absolving; b) it is by law when it is incurred by force of law: this has place in only two cases, namely when someone either, detained by a lasting impediment [n. 1402. II. 2)], or in danger of death, is absolved by him who has no jurisdiction over the censure reserved to the Bishop or specially to the Pope.⁵ He, namely, although truly absolved and amended, when the impediment or sickness ceases, ought, as soon as he conveniently can, by himself or through another, to present himself to the excommunicator (or his delegate), not indeed to be absolved again, but humbly to receive a mandate² from him, as the Canons say; otherwise he relapses by the law itself into the same censure (because of his new contumacy).

4° Absolution for caution is that which is given, e.g., before absolution from sins, to take away a censure perhaps unknown.

1670. Principles. - I. Censures which the guilty person has already incurred are not loosed by the delinquent's penitence alone or obedience toward the mandates of the Church, nor, if you except suspensions from informed conscience (see n. 1686. 1° at the end), by the death of him who brought the censure; but absolution imparted by a judge, or legitimate Superior, is necessary. It is manifest from Canon Law,³ and from the 44th proposition condemned by Alexander VII, p. XIV. But if a similar penalty has been brought not as a censure but as a pure penalty, it is taken away by relaxation or dispensation.⁴

II. From a censure brought by man through a particular sentence, only these can absolve: 1° he who brought the censure; 2° his Superior as such. Therefore not the Metropolitan, except in the case of appeal or visitation of the diocese of the suffragan; 3° his successor; 4° another delegated by one of these. The reason is because it belongs to him to absolve to whom it belongs to bind. Therefore this holds even if the guilty person changes domicile. Hence St. Alphonsus⁵ warns that, if someone in another territory has offended in such a way that he was specially excommunicated by the Bishop of that place, he cannot be absolved by his own Bishop, unless with the license of the excommunicating Bishop.

But note that this is said concerning a censure by man brought through a particular sentence; for censures by man indeed, but brought through a general sentence, according to the more probable opinion, are equated to those brought by law which are not reserved; and therefore whoever has jurisdiction over the guilty person can absolve him.⁶

What has been said concerning absolution from a censure brought by man through a particular sentence, the same must be said concerning censures reserved by law. See also n. 1403. q. 7°.

But if a censure is specially reserved to the Pope, for absolution from it to be imparted a general concession of absolving from cases and censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff in no way suffices, but a special one is required. But those presuming to absolve without due faculty, even under whatever pretext, incur by the very fact an excommunication simply reserved to the Pope, provided there is not question of the article of death; in this, however, the obligation of standing to the mandates of the Church remains firm for those absolved, if they recover. - Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, dated October 12, 1869, § A quibus.

III. Any confessor can absolve from censures not reserved to the Pope or Bishop,¹ except however censures brought by law against some place or against a community; for a place and a community are not subject to the penitential forum.²

But absolution of this kind can be given by confessors both outside and within Confession, and also holds for the external forum.³ But if the penalty is notorious, because of scandal it will be necessary that the absolution also be publicly clear; for this, however, it suffices that it be known that the censured person has confessed,⁴ and that satisfaction, if any was necessary, has been exhibited by him. Wherefore absolution would be given imprudently, even only in the internal forum, from a case already brought to the contentious forum, or soon to be brought there.

Note. - 1° In what cases Bishops, or their delegates, can absolve from censures reserved to the Pope, see n. 1402. II.

2° When, and in what manner, someone can absolve from censures reserved either to the Pope or to the Bishop, whether every priest or a simple confessor, see n. 1402. IV and n. 1403. q. 1°. q. 2°. q. 4°. q. 5°. q. 7°.

1671. Resolves. - 1° An ecclesiastical Superior or delegate can absolve from censures, even if he is not a priest. The reason is because jurisdiction, which is required for absolving from censures, can reside in a Cleric even initiated only by tonsure.

2° A faculty granted by the Bishop for reserved sins is not understood for sins reserved with censure; otherwise if the concession has been made by the Pope, because papal cases are all reserved with censure, except those two which are indicated in n. 1400. IV.

3° Absolution for caution does not seem necessary to me in a doubt (even of fact) whether a censure has been contracted. Sanchez has one exception.¹ But absolution from excommunication, at least for caution, is always given (and, if some probable suspicion is present that it has been contracted, it must be given under venial sin) to any penitent, before he is absolved from sins, so that an impediment to receiving the Sacrament, if any perhaps exists, may be removed. Yet absolution from sins is valid although absolution from excommunication was not premised, provided the penitent is in good faith and otherwise rightly disposed.² - From the Roman Ritual.

A determined form of words is not required per se for valid absolving, but the will of the one absolving, manifested by some sign, suffices and is required. Let the one absolving use, for the internal forum, that form which is already contained in sacramental absolution itself; but for the external forum, that which is described in the Roman Ritual. - "The rite," says Kenrick,³ "of lightly striking the shoulder of the man with a rod," which is prescribed in the form for the external forum, "will be able to be committed to execution with difficulty, on account of the customs of the region being opposed ... Busembaum teaches," according to St. Alphonsus,⁴ "that this striking can be omitted for a just cause."

1672. Questions. - Query 1° Whether an absent person can be absolved?

Resp. Affirmatively, at least validly. The reason is because just as a penalty can be established against an absent person, so also it can be taken away. This is also evidently deduced from Canon Law. Except, if the faculty of absolving has been so granted that the absolution must be given in the act of Sacramental Confession.

Query 2° When is a faculty of absolving judged to have been so granted that it must be exercised in the act of Sacramental Confession?

Resp. There is not one sentence of all concerning this matter. St. Alphonsus teaches that it must be exercised in the act of Sacramental Confession if in the faculty it is said: in the forum of conscience. This is clear from those things which he teaches concerning the faculty of Bishops from the chapter Liceat, or from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, § Firmam tamen.¹ Cf. n. 1402. II. 1).

Query 3° Whether an absent Bishop can absolve one existing in the diocese?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to all. The reason is because for absolution there is not required knowledge of the cause, nor judicial process; and therefore nothing prevents the Bishop from exercising such an act of jurisdiction in another territory. But it is otherwise if judicial process is sometimes required, or if the faculty given to the Bishop perhaps has been restricted in this.²

Query 4° Whether one unwilling can be absolved?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided he is absolved by the Superior; for just as a penalty can be brought against an absent and unwilling person, so also it can be taken away from him; nevertheless it is not expedient that this be done without a very grave reason, and care must be taken lest, while he does not cease from contumacy, the censure be held in contempt. Hence it is required that the censured person ask absolution, although it is valid even when not asked, provided (if it is given by a delegate) there is question of one amended.³

Query 5° Whether absolution extorted unjustly by force or grave fear is valid?

Resp. Negatively, as is clear of itself, and as the law itself disposes.⁴⁵

Query 6° Whether he who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, the others remaining?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is because among them there is no necessary connection. And mortal sins indeed can in no way be absolved one without the others; but it is otherwise concerning censures, the absolution of which does not confer sanctifying grace on the censured person. Therefore they are had after the manner of chains, of which some can be loosed without others.

Query 7° Whether he can be absolved from censures who has not yet publicly repaired the scandal because of which he was subject to censure?

Resp. Negatively, at least per se, and speaking generally. It is clear from the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary on the 5th day of July, 1857.

Query 8° In what way must scandal in the said case be repaired by those to whom such reparation is difficult and exposed to dangers?

Resp. The Sacred Penitentiary, December 10, 1860: "that the reparation of scandal is necessary by divine law, and that it must be made in the better way in which it can be, by the judgment of the Ordinary or confessor."¹

Query 9° In what way is satisfaction to the injured party, if it is necessary for taking away censure, to be exhibited?

Resp. See n. 1402. IV. c). And these things indeed must be observed under penalty of nullity, if absolution from reserved cases is given through a delegate under this condition: but that a condition of this kind is expressed by the clause: the party having been satisfied, is taught by the opinion which seems truer to St. Alphonsus.²

Query 10° Whether and when an oath must be exacted before absolution?

Resp. It must be exacted universally whenever it is prescribed; but specifically: 1° in the case of which in n. 1402. IV. c), if absolution is given by a delegate with this condition, and then more truly³ it is required for validity, unless there is question of a penitent who would be perpetually unable to satisfy;⁴ 2° in the case of which in n. 1402. IV. e);⁵ 3° in the case in which absolution is given by a Bishop because of an impediment of approaching the Holy See, which is not perpetual; before absolution, namely, the censured person in this case ought to swear (or, if there is question of absolution in the internal forum, to promise), that when the impediment ceases he will approach the Holy See.⁶

Note. - From the things said it follows that a great difference intervenes between absolution from sins and absolution from censures. For:

1° The former is given for reconciling us to God; but the latter for restoring those things which are proper to citizens of the Church militant. - 2° The former must be given from all sins; the latter is rightly given even from one censure. - 3° The former can be bestowed only upon the contrite and willing; the latter is validly imparted even to the contumacious and unwilling, at least by the Superior. - 4° The former must be given purely; the latter can be given under condition, from day to day, to reincidentia, for caution, etc. - 5° The former, because it is part of a Sacrament, is given only to those present; the latter is rightly given also to the absent. - 6° The former, extorted by fear, is valid; the latter is not so. - 7° The former can be imparted only by an approved priest; the latter by a simple cleric obtaining external jurisdiction.

Furthermore: 1° Whenever a censure is reserved, the sin also is liable to reservation. But between reservations introduced by the Roman Pontiff and reservations introduced by Ordinaries there is very much distance, as is clear from the things said in n. 1400. IV., 1401. q. 2°. - 2° Sins liable to reservation can be absolved not only directly, but also indirectly, from a just cause (n. 1403. q. 1°. q. 2°); but censures can be absolved only directly.²

S. Th., Suppl., q. 21-24.

681. A censure is the sentence of a censor deputed for correcting morals; but in canonical speech it is not so much the sentence itself as the penalty inflicted upon sinners. By usage now received it is now said exclusively of a medicinal penalty, in no way of a vindicative one. It can be defined: an ecclesiastical medicinal penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods or goods annexed to spiritual goods, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved (can. 2241, § 1). It can be from the law or from man; of a sentence to be pronounced or of an incurred sentence; reserved or not reserved.

A censure 1) is an ecclesiastical penalty, therefore it deprives of goods concerning which the Church can dispose, such as the administration and reception of the sacraments, common suffrages and indulgences, the exercise of Orders, ecclesiastical burial, offices, benefices, and their revenues; but not of goods which immediately proceed from Christ, such as the sacramental character and the power of Order, grace, virtues, nor of goods which come from individual faithful, such as good works and private prayers; - 2) it is a medicinal penalty, namely ordered primarily to the amendment of the sinner, whence it cannot be brought for a merely past delict which does not have a successive fear or which has already been amended, nor for a determined time or in perpetuity, but when the amendment of the delinquent has been obtained, absolution from the censure must be given (can. 2248, § 2); - 3) it is a penalty which supposes contumacy, whence it cannot be brought unless a warning has preceded; otherwise contumacy is judged to be absent: but one warning is legal, which is made by the law itself for censures latae sententiae, another personal or canonical, which is made by man, and can be repeated with an interval or be one peremptory warning, according to the prudent judgment of the superior, for censures ferendae sententiae (can. 2242, § 2; 2233, § 2; 2309); but if the particular precept was already fortified by a censure ferendae sententiae, immediately after the delict has been proved this censure can be inflicted (com. int., July 14, 1922).

A. The power of bringing censures is implicitly included in the universal power of binding, which pertains to the keys according to Mt. 16:19; indeed for excommunication it is suggested in Mt. 18:17; and it is clear from the constant practice of the Church, from the Council of Constance, sess. 8, n. 30, against Wicleff, and sess. 15, n. 19, against Hus. By ordinary power, all who generally have ordinary power of jurisdiction in the external forum can bring censures, because it pertains to the external governance of the Church, namely, the Supreme Pontiff by himself or through the Roman Congregations and Tribunals; an ecumenical Council; a bishop and a vicar capitular, but not a vicar general; a particular Council; a vicar and prefect apostolic; an abbot and prelate nullius; a major superior of an exempt clerical religion according to the statutes, and a general chapter (can. 2220), but not pastors; - by delegated power, however, all clerics to whom it has been committed by those who have ordinary power.

B. The subject of a censure is a baptized man, a wayfarer, and a subject of him who brings the censure (can. 2226), possessed of reason and capable of malice (can. 2200-01), indeed pubescent (having 14 years, even probably if it is a female) according to the discipline now in force for penalties latae sententiae (can. 2230).

Hence the following are incapable of censures: the non-baptized, children and those deprived of the use of reason, the dead, and the Supreme Pontiff, as having no superior on earth and subject to no one.

It should be noted that bishops, outside the diocese, can bring censures upon subjects by way of a particular precept, but not by way of a judicial sentence; in the diocese even upon pilgrims sinning there, but generally only by a particular sentence, because they are not bound by territorial censures, and the pilgrim who sins is usually denounced to his own Superior so that he may be punished by him; - but that a metropolitan in suffragan dioceses can bring censures in the time of canonical visitation according to can. 274, 5. - On the contrary, a penalty cannot be inflicted or declared except by the Supreme Pontiff upon those who hold the supreme rule of peoples and their sons and daughters, and those to whom belongs the right of next succeeding in rule; and unless they are expressly named, Cardinals are not included under a penal law, nor bishops under penalties latae sententiae of suspension and interdict (can. 2227).

Someone can incur several censures, because he can be bound by several bonds and be deprived of the same goods under several titles; censures are multiplied, namely, by reason of diversity, or multiplication of acts or of penalties. Hence can. 2244: "1. Not only diverse censures, but even a censure of the same species can be multiplied in the same subject. - 2. A censure latae sententiae is multiplied: a) if diverse delicts, each of which carries a censure with it, are committed by the same or by distinct action; b) if the same delict, punished by a censure, is repeated several times so that there are several distinct delicts; c) if a delict, punished by diverse censures by distinct superiors, is committed once or several times. - 3. A censure from man is multiplied if several precepts, or several sentences, or several distinct parts of the same precept or sentence each inflict its own censure."

C. The object or matter of a censure is an external, grave delict, consummated in its own kind and not merely attempted, joined with contumacy or with at least virtual contempt of the censure; moreover a censure can be brought even against unknown delinquents (can. 2242, § 1).

From the censure itself the following excuse: nullity of the censure, whether because of defect of jurisdiction, or because of a substantial defect of juridical order, or because of defect of a just cause, namely, not proved or not true; - defect on the part of sin; - physical and moral inability to observe the law; - grave fear, unless the delict tends to contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or to public harm of souls; - ignorance, never however affected ignorance, nor crass ignorance unless the law requires presumption, perfect knowledge, or temerity (can. 2205 and 2229).

From the effects of censure before the sentence of the judge the following excuse: grave infamy (can. 2232, § 1), grave scandal, and grave harm extrinsic to the observance of the censure and proportioned to it.

D. Absolution from censures is necessary for removing them (can. 2248, § 1); hence the dead are absolved from them if they have died with signs of penance, so that suffrages and ecclesiastical burial may be granted to them.

Now, according to can. 2253, the following can absolve:

1. From a censure not reserved, in the sacramental forum any confessor; outside the sacramental forum, whoever has jurisdiction over the accused in the external forum.

2. From a censure from man, he to whom the censure is reserved according to the norm of can. 2245, § 2, namely, he who inflicted it, or pronounced the sentence, or his competent superior or successor or delegate; he himself can grant absolution even if the accused has transferred his domicile or quasi-domicile elsewhere.

It is from man if it is brought by way of a particular precept or by a condemnatory judicial sentence, even if established in law; wherefore a penalty ferendae sententiae, added to a law, before the condemnatory sentence is only from the law, afterward from the law and from man at the same time, but is considered as from man (can. 2217, § 1, 3).

3. From a censure reserved by law, he who established the censure or to whom it is reserved, and their successors or competent superiors or delegates.

When a confessor can absolve from reserved censures was declared in n. 597, C.

The conditions for absolving are: a) on the part of the one absolving, legitimate power and a free will immune from force and grave fear unjustly extorting it (can. 2238); b) on the part of the one to be absolved: that he be a subject, that he seek absolution at least regularly, and that he firmly promise that he wishes to execute the commands of the Church concerning satisfaction and amendment; c) on the part of the delict, that satisfaction be made as far as possible to the injured person, scandal be repaired, and salutary penance be imposed besides sacramental penance.

It should be noted: a) Absolution can be given in the internal forum and in the external forum. Given in the external forum, it also has force in the internal forum; hence if someone has been absolved from a reserved censure, the sin is no longer reserved. Absolution in the internal forum of itself does not have force in the external forum; but, scandal having been removed, the one absolved can behave as such even in acts of the external forum; but, unless the granting of absolution is proved or legitimately presumed in the external forum, the censure can be urged by superiors of the external forum, whom the accused must obey, until absolution has been had in the same forum (can. 2251).

b) It is possible to be absolved from one censure and not from another (can. 2249, § 1).

c) Sometimes someone is absolved only from some effect of the censure: then the censure remains but the effect is taken away.

d) Absolution from censure can also be given to one absent, or even in writing (can. 2239).

e) Absolution in the sacramental forum is contained in the customary formula of absolution from sins; in the non-sacramental forum it can be given in any way, but for absolution from excommunication it is regularly fitting to use the form handed down in the Ritual (can. 2250, § 3).

E. There are three species of censure: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. For in a well-constituted republic there is the power of excluding from its social body certain persons harmful to it, of suspending others who administer badly from their office, and of forbidding to others certain acts and functions; therefore also in the Church, which was constituted by Christ as a perfect society.

According to can. 2255: a) "excommunication can affect only physical persons, and therefore, if at any time it is brought upon a moral body, it is understood to affect the individuals who have concurred in the delict; interdict and suspension can affect also a community, as a moral person;

b) excommunication and interdict can affect even laymen; suspension, clerics only; interdict, even a place;

c) excommunication is always a censure; interdict and suspension can be either censures or vindicative penalties, but in doubt they are presumed to be censures."

Excommunication is graver, because it deprives of greater and more numerous goods.

I. The obligation of the confessor as regards excommunications. - Not rarely penitents occur who have contracted the penalty of excommunication. Hence it seems opportune summarily to set forth those things which concerning this matter are more necessary in practice and therefore specially to be attended to.¹ And indeed the confessor has the obligation both of knowing sufficiently those things which regard excommunications, and of admonishing penitents concerning these things.

¹ Authors who have written after the promulgated Code can be inspected, such as Prummer and Vermeersch. Cf. Revue Eccl. de Liege, Nov. 1928.

A. There is the obligation of knowing with habitual knowledge:

1. At least the better known or more frequently occurring censures.

Therefore let him know that the following are excommunicated by the very fact from law: apostates, heretics, schismatics; those publishing, defending, reading, or retaining books of these persons defending apostasy, heresy, schism, or other books prohibited by name through apostolic letters; authors or publishers of books of Sacred Scripture or commentaries printed without license; those issuing laws, commands, decrees against the liberty or rights of the Church, or impeding the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by recurring to lay power; those giving their name to a Masonic sect or similar association plotting against the Church or legitimate civil power; those laying violent hands on clerics or religious persons, especially on bishops and cardinals, most of all on the Supreme Pontiff; whoever communicate in the offense, and clerics in divine things, with an excommunicated person to be avoided; those sacrilegiously casting away the consecrated species or carrying them away or retaining them for an evil end; those procuring abortion when the effect has followed; those dueling and their accomplices; those absolving accomplices in a base sin; those falsely denouncing a confessor concerning solicitation; those solicited by a confessor and not denouncing him; apostates from religion; those presuming to enter marriage while the impediment of a vow of chastity stands, whether solemn, or simple and perpetual emitted in religious profession; those violating religious enclosure; those entering marriage before a non-Catholic minister or with a pact of educating offspring in a non-Catholic religion; likewise those handing over children to be baptized by a non-Catholic minister or to be instituted in a non-Catholic religion; those commanding or compelling non-Catholics or others interdicted to be handed over to ecclesiastical burial; those usurping ecclesiastical goods, and those alienating precious things or things exceeding the value of 30,000 fr.,² etc.

² Several understand this of value in gold.

2. Also to know which of these are reserved.

For there are altogether few which are reserved to no one and can be absolved by any confessor, namely those which affect persons publishing books concerning Sacred Scripture without license, those handing over the unworthy to ecclesiastical burial, those illegitimately alienating ecclesiastical goods of great value, those compelling one to embrace the clerical or religious state, and those not denouncing the confessor by whom they were solicited. All the others are reserved either to the Ordinary, or to the Supreme Pontiff: either simply, or specially, or even most specially, such as sacrilegious casting away or carrying off or retaining of the consecrated species, laying a violent hand on the Supreme Pontiff himself, and absolution of an accomplice. It should be noted:

a) those absolving from an excommunication latae sententiae reserved in a most special or special manner without due faculty incur by the very fact an excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See, can. 2338, § 1; nevertheless in doubt either of law or of fact, reservation does not urge, can. 2245, § 4;

b) besides, all censures ab homine by that very fact are reserved to him who inflicted the censure or pronounced the sentence, can. 2245, § 2.

3. To know also the conditions required for incurring them.

They are: a) on the part of the subject, that he be baptized; in possession of reason and capable of malice; pubescent, according to the discipline now in force; and subject to the jurisdiction of the one excommunicating;

b) on the part of the object, that the sin be external, grave, consummated, and not only attempted, in the species which is reserved, in this sense that it fulfill all the conditions placed in the pronouncement of the censure, and joined with present contumacy, can. 2242, § 1. Hence in the sinner there is required knowledge both of the law prohibiting and of the special penalty to be inflicted on transgressors;³ and therefore ignorance, even culpable, excuses, not however affected ignorance, which is equated with knowledge, nor always gross ignorance, unless the censure is brought against those who presumed, dared, knowingly, studiously, deliberately, rashly acted, can. 2229.

³ Prummer, Th. M., III, n. 485, observes: "In the external forum presumed contumacy sometimes suffices. For when some ecclesiastical law has been sufficiently promulgated, knowledge of it is presumed in all subjects, who, if they transgress this law, must pay the penalties and censures sanctioned. Hence, for example, a Catholic who contracts marriage before a non-Catholic minister incurs the excommunication brought, although he is ignorant of the existence of this censure, Holy Office, 11 May 1892. Therefore such a Catholic truly ignorant of the excommunication can be absolved in the internal forum by any confessor, but still needs absolution in the external forum."

B. Generally there is the obligation of admonishing delinquents who are ignorant of excommunication, so that, namely, they may know the obligation of ecclesiastical law and conceive greater horror of sin, and thus the law attain its end.

Nor in the case can the principle rather often praised be applied: admonition is not to be made if it is not hoped that it will profit. For this principle can be invoked only when it is a question of ignorance of law and sin, for the good of the penitent and unless graver inconveniences are feared, namely for avoiding formal sin. For if he in good faith is ignorant of law and sin, and it is not foreseen that he will be amended, it is better to abstain from admonition and to permit inculpable transgression and material sin than by admonishing to provoke culpable transgression and formal sin. But that does not hold in the case when it is a question of mere ignorance of the penalty; for formal sin is already present. Hence then there is no reason for omitting admonition, but it must be made with every solicitude so that sin may be avoided in the future. - But if some do not care concerning this, or even deliberately omit it, they act thus so that they may avoid for themselves the inconveniences of future recourse to the Ordinary or to the Sacred Penitentiary. This is to seek one's own convenience, not the good of the penitent or of the Church, concerning which alone the faithful minister must be solicitous.

II. When the confessor can absolve from reserved censures. - One who is excommunicated is not freed from a censure except by legitimate absolution, can. 2248, § 1; but a simple confessor of himself cannot absolve from a reserved censure, but only he who has due jurisdiction for this, ordinary or delegated. Yet when the cause is more urgent, delegated jurisdiction for absolving from reserved censures is granted by the law itself, namely:

1. In danger of death, any priest, even if an approved priest is present, can licitly and validly absolve in the sacramental forum any penitents whatever from all censures without exception, can. 882. Nevertheless the dying person, after he has recovered, is held to have recourse within a month, by himself or through the confessor, to the legitimate superior or to another furnished with faculty, under penalty of falling again into the censure, and to stand by their commands, but only in two cases: if the censure was brought ab homine through a particular sentence, or if it is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff in a most special manner, can. 2252.

2. In more urgent cases, any confessor can directly absolve in the sacramental forum from all reserved censures latae sententiae, but by explicitly imposing the burden of having recourse, under penalty of falling again, within a month, at least by letter and through the confessor, if this can be done without grave inconvenience, the name being kept back, to a superior furnished with faculty and of standing by his commands; or of approaching another confessor furnished with faculty, so that from him, confession being repeated at least of the offense with the censure, he may obtain absolution and receive commands from him.

The more urgent cases are determined by law: if namely censures latae sententiae cannot be observed

a) without danger of grave scandal, e.g., if because of the excommunication of a parish priest or magistrate grave anger or disturbance would arise in the people; or

b) without danger of infamy, e.g., if all things are now prepared for nuptials, or a parish priest or vicar cannot omit celebration, or a layman Easter communion, without infamy; or

c) if it would be hard for the penitent to remain in the state of grave sin for the time necessary for the competent superior to provide, Holy Office, 16 June 1897, and can. 2254, § 1 and 2; yet this is not hard for all.

3. Indeed in an extraordinary case, when this recourse is foreseen as morally impossible, any confessor, except in the case of absolution of an accomplice, can grant absolution without the burden of recourse, or of confession to be made before a privileged confessor, but with a twofold condition: a) the things to be enjoined by law having been enjoined, namely removal of scandal or proximate occasion, and reparation of damage, and b) a fitting penance and satisfaction for the censure having been imposed, besides the sacramental penance. This indeed in such a way that the penitent, unless within a fitting time to be determined beforehand by the confessor he has done penance and given satisfaction, falls again into the censure, can. 2254, § 3.

Recourse can be made orally, or by letter, or through another, e.g., the confessor. In this last case it is morally impossible if neither the confessor, because, for example, he must depart before the response and while absent cannot safely communicate the response without others suspecting, nor the penitent, perhaps inexperienced, can send a letter, and at the same time it is hard for the penitent to approach another confessor, Holy Office, 9 Nov. 1898; 5 Sept. 1900. But if the penitent is a priest, he is never excused from recourse, because he himself can easily write to Rome and seek a response under a fictitious name, Holy Office, 3 June 1899.

III. Absolution of excommunication in the external forum and in the internal forum. - Excommunication latae sententiae of itself holds the delinquent who is conscious of the offense in each forum; yet in such a way that before declaratory sentence he is excused from observing the penalty as often as he cannot observe it without infamy, and in the external forum no one can exact the observance of the penalty from him unless the offense is notorious, can. 2232, § 1. Hence absolution can be given in each forum: by the confessor in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum by him who has ordinary or delegated jurisdiction in the external forum over the guilty person.

Absolution given in the external forum holds also in the internal forum; hence if someone was absolved from a reserved censure, the sin is no longer reserved. Absolution in the internal forum of itself does not hold in the external forum unless it is proved or legitimately presumed, and otherwise the superior can urge observance until absolution in the external forum has been had, can. 2251. Therefore, scandal having been removed, e.g., if the excommunication was not public in the place or if it is sufficiently established concerning absolution received, one absolved in the internal forum can conduct himself as such in acts of the external forum.

Ordinarily, however, for public offenses, absolution is not to be given in the internal forum before absolution in the external forum has been obtained; hence what was said above concerning more urgent cases, namely danger of grave scandal or infamy, holds only if reputation is still intact and the offense is not notorious; and therefore it does not hold concerning penalties ferendae sententiae, which are considered as ab homine, can. 2217, § 3. But if then for someone it would be especially hard to remain in the state of grave sin, he could be absolved, but only from a censure latae sententiae, in the internal forum provisionally under the burden of recurring within a month; but in the external forum he would have to conduct himself as excommunicated and abstain from public reception of the sacraments until, scandal having been sufficiently repaired, he has also been absolved in the external forum.

In the sacramental forum the customary form of absolution is to be employed, in which absolution from censures is contained; in the external forum, unless the superior granting the faculty has prescribed a more solemn form, it can be given in any manner; nevertheless it is fitting to observe the form handed down in the rituals, can. 2250, § 3.

IV. Manner of proceeding in practice. - Therefore the confessor receiving accusation of a sin which incurs excommunication should proceed thus:

1. First let him carefully examine whether all conditions, on the part of the subject and object, necessary for incurring the censure are present.

2. Likewise whether the further conditions of the censure as it is reserved are present; but if some founded doubt remains, the case is not reserved, can. 2245, § 4.

3. But if all required conditions are present, then it must be investigated whether it is a more urgent case or not; but if it is not, the penitent cannot be absolved, but is to be sent to another privileged confessor, or first the faculty of absolving is to be sought.

4. If it is a more urgent case, the penitent is to be admonished concerning the reserved censure and concerning the obligation of recurring within a month; and if he seriously promises, he can be absolved. And meanwhile the due faculties should be sought from the superior.

5. If he does not promise to recur, and does this because he foresees that recourse is morally impossible, then both reparation of scandal and damage and a special and fitting penance to be fulfilled within a fixed time are to be imposed on him; and if he promises to fulfill them, he will be able to be absolved.

6. If without sufficient reason he refuses to promise, he cannot be absolved, but can be sent to the superior or to another confessor having special faculties, from whom he may seek absolution.

7. If the penitent, notwithstanding the first promise, does not return to hear the commands of the superior, and thus acts from culpable negligence, he falls again into excommunication, because he makes little of the gravely prescribed recourse, which is not completed until the penitent has accepted the commands. But if he could not return without great inconvenience, he does not fall again into excommunication, but the obligation of recurring remains afterward as soon as he can;⁴ but if recourse becomes morally impossible, what was said above under 5 must be done, and due reparation and a fitting penance imposed.

⁴ From the nature of the thing it is established that a determined time was fixed for urging the obligation.

V. Observations. - 1. The reservation of the sin ceases when the reservation of the censure ceases.

2. When there exists a censure which impedes reception of the sacraments, as excommunication does, the censured person cannot be absolved from sins unless he first has been absolved from the censure, can. 2250, § 2. Nevertheless if absolution were granted by one having power, it would be valid, while the penitent was in good faith.

3. Ignorance of the censure generally excuses from its reservation, but ignorance of the reservation of the censure, once the censure is known, does not excuse.

4. "If the confessor, ignorant of the reservation, absolves the penitent from censure and sin, the absolution of the censure holds, provided it is not a censure ab homine or a censure reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See," can. 2247, § 3. Indeed also absolution from the sin holds; for if someone has been absolved from a censure, the reservation of the sin altogether ceases.

5. Not only diverse censures, but even a censure of the same species, can be multiplied in the same subject, can. 2244, § 1. Hence "if he is held by several censures, he can be absolved from one, with the others by no means absolved. One seeking absolution must indicate all the cases; otherwise the absolution holds only for the case expressed. But if the absolution, although a particular petition was made, was general, as it is customarily given in sacramental confession, it holds, provided the one absolving has the competent faculty, also for those kept silent in good faith, excepting a censure reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See, but not for those kept silent in bad faith," can. 2249.

6. The absolution which a competent confessor has given from a reserved censure holds even if the confession was null or sacrilegious, provided the penitent accused the reserved things. If this accusation was omitted in good faith, several judge that even then the censure has been taken away, since the confessor is judged to wish to use his power efficaciously as far as he can.

I say 1°. The subject of censure can be only a baptized man, capable of reason, and a subject. Therefore 1°. he must be baptized, because, according to the Apostle, the Church does not judge concerning those who are outside; 2°. capable of reason, because censure is ordered to the correction of the delinquent, which certainly does not have place in him who lacks the use of reason; 3°. a subject, because censure is an act of jurisdiction, which cannot be exercised except over subjects.

I say 2°. Those under puberty are excused from penalties latae sententiae, and are to be corrected rather by educative punishments than by censures or other more grave vindicative penalties; but those of puberty who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in a delict according to the norm of can. 2209, §§ 1-3, themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law (Can. 2230).

Among those under puberty, on account of defect of age, rigor must be tempered with meekness. c. 60, X, v. 39. In children much is usually left alone which, in others of more advanced age, human laws say must be punished more severely; in them sins seem not to be punished in the same way as in adults. But those of puberty who induce them to violate the law, or physically concur with them by common design, or join themselves to them in a delict which demands an accomplice, or as those commanding, or inducing toward the consummation of the delict or concurring toward it, themselves incur the penalty.

Question 1. Are Cardinals and Bishops subject to censures?

Resp. § 2. Unless expressly named, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church are not comprehended under a penal law, nor Bishops under penalties latae sententiae of suspension and interdict (Can. 2227).

Question 2. Can exempt Religious be bound by episcopal censures by the Bishop of the place?

Resp. Affirmatively, they can be punished by the Ordinary of the place in all things in which they are subject to him. - Cf. Can. 619.

Question 3. Can the subject of censure be an entire community?

Resp. § 2. Excommunication can affect only physical persons, and therefore if at any time it is brought against a moral body, it is understood to affect the individuals who have concurred in the delict; interdict and suspension can affect also the community (Can. 2255).

Question 4. Can someone be bound by several censures at the same time?

Resp. § 1. Not only a censure of diverse species, but even a censure of the same species, can be multiplied in the same subject.

§ 2. A censure latae sententiae is multiplied:

1°. If diverse delicts, each of which carries a censure with itself, are committed by the same or by distinct action;

2°. If the same delict, punished by censure, is repeated several times so that there are several distinct delicts;

3°. If a delict, punished by diverse censures by distinct Superiors, is committed once or several times.

§ 3. A censure ab homine is multiplied if several precepts or several sentences, or several distinct parts of the same precept or sentence, each inflict its own censure (Can. 2244).

Question 5. How is the subject of censure to be interpreted?

Resp. Strictly; a censure brought against the people does not strike the clergy, nor conversely does one brought against the clergy strike the people; one brought against clerics does not strike Regulars who are not clerics; one brought against Regulars holds only them and not other religious. - Cf. D'Annibale, n. 325.

Question 6. What is the law concerning censures to be reserved?

Resp. § 1. Let no censure be reserved unless attention has been paid to the peculiar gravity of the delicts and the necessity of more suitably providing for ecclesiastical discipline and of healing the consciences of the faithful.

§ 2. Reservation receives a strict interpretation.

§ 3. The reservation of a censure impeding the reception of the Sacraments imports the reservation of the sin to which the censure is annexed; but if someone is excused from the censure or was absolved from it, the reservation of the sin completely ceases (Can. 2246).

Question 7. Can the Ordinary bring a censure reserved to himself against a delict to which a censure reserved to the Apostolic See is attached?

Resp. Negatively; § 1. If a censure is reserved to the Apostolic See, the Ordinary cannot bring another censure reserved to himself against the same delict (Can. 2247).

Question 8. What is the law with relation to the reservation of censure in a particular territory?

Resp. § 2. Reservation of censure in a particular territory does not exert its force outside the limits of that territory, even if the censured person goes out of the territory to obtain absolution; but a censure ab homine is reserved everywhere, so that the censured person can nowhere be absolved without the due faculties (Can. 2247).

Question 9. If a confessor, ignorant of the reservation, absolves a penitent from censure and sin, is the absolution of the censure valid?

Resp. The absolution of the censure is valid, provided it is not a censure ab homine or a censure reserved in a most special mode to the Apostolic See (Can. 2247, § 3). - Cf. S. Off., 11 May, 1892.

§ 1. Censures are:

1°. Excommunication;

2°. Interdict;

3°. Suspension.

§ 2. Excommunication can affect only physical persons, and therefore, if at any time it is brought against a moral body, it is understood to affect the individuals who have concurred in the delict; interdict and suspension, also a community as a moral person; excommunication and interdict, also laymen; suspension, clerics only; interdict, also a place; excommunication is always a censure; interdict and suspension can be either censures or vindicative penalties, but in doubt they are presumed censures (Can. 2255).

In the canons which follow:

1°. By the name of divine offices are understood the functions of the power of order, which by the institution of Christ or of the Church are ordained to divine worship and can be performed by clerics alone;

2°. But by the name of legitimate ecclesiastical acts are signified: to carry out the office of administrator of ecclesiastical goods; to act the parts of judge, auditor and relator, defender of the bond, promoter of justice and of the faith, notary and chancellor, courier and apparitor, advocate and procurator in ecclesiastical causes; to carry out the office of sponsor in the sacraments of baptism and confirmation; to cast a vote in ecclesiastical elections; to exercise the right of patronage (Can. 2256).

Divine offices are the public celebration of Mass, solemn celebration in choir of the canonical hours, solemn blessings; or all functions annexed to some order, ordained to worship by the institution of Christ or of the Church and accustomed to be performed by clerics alone.

I suppose 1° that invincible ignorance of law or fact, which excuses from all sin, excuses from penalty, because just penalty is decreed only on account of guilt, otherwise it would be

I said: « Which excuse from all sin; » because, if ignorance should excuse from sin against one law only, suppose a human law which is ignored, and not excuse from sin against another law, suppose divine or natural which is not ignored, I judge it more probable that the sinner be not exempted from penalty by human laws enacted, if there be no ecclesiastical censure; because the human legislator intends not only to urge by penalties observance of his own law, but also of natural or divine law, of which he ought to be guardian and protector. Whence a thief who, conscious of natural law, ignores theft to be prohibited by human law, nevertheless incurs the penalty of hanging.

I suppose 2° that vincible ignorance of law or fact which excuses from mortal also excuses from penalty at least so great, because positive laws are not reckoned to decree grave penalties for venial sins. But that vincible ignorance is reckoned as excusing from mortal which is not gross and supine; for thus it is reckoned light.

I suppose 3° that vincible ignorance, even gross and supine, of a law bearing penalty under these or similar formulas: « Whoever knowingly, rashly, with rash daring shall act against, or shall have dared to act against, or presumed, » excuses from penalty; because, as Cajetan says, 2ª 2ae, q. 53, a. 3, « the words of law are not appended in vain nor to be taken improperly; » in vain would they be appended, nor would they be taken with restrictive propriety, if delinquents through ignorance even gross incurred the penalty. Otherwise, more probably, must be said if ignorance be affected; because, according to the laws, affected ignorance is equated with knowledge, and it is not likely that legislators wish to exempt from their laws and penalties those who affect to ignore them, that they may transgress them more freely.

The question therefore remains whether ignorance of penalty excuses from it him who sins gravely against a law he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance. For whose resolution

I say 1°: Ignorance even invincible of penalty does not exempt from it him who sins gravely against a law which either he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance, unless it be an ecclesiastical censure.

It is proved. Laws establish penalties condign to guilts. Ergo whoever commits guilt is liable to penalty, even though invincibly ignorant of it; for it is not of the nature of penalty that it be known or willed, since it has of itself that it be violent and against the will.

I said: « Unless it be an ecclesiastical censure. » For which I say 2°: Invincible ignorance of an ecclesiastical censure exempts from it one sinning knowingly against the law by which it is decreed. This is common opinion.

It is proved. That is special and proper to ecclesiastical censure, that it be not incurred except on account of contumacy against the Church — not in whatsoever manner, but against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure, whose sign is that no one incur censure unless there precede warning of law or judge, not any whatsoever, but with threat of censure. Yet he who invincibly ignores the censure is not contumacious against the Church in this manner. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Ecclesiastical censure is not so much vindicative punishment in vengeance for crime as medicinal punishment deterring from crime. Yet unknown punishment does not deter. Ergo.

I say 3°: It seems more probable that ignorance even vincibile, provided it be not gross and supine, exempts from an ecclesiastical censure one sinning knowingly against the law by which it was established. So Sylvester, under Excommunicatio I, q. 3, Navarrus, Covarruvias, and many others.

It is gathered from Cap. Ut animarum, de Constitutionibus in Sexto, lib. I, tit. 2, c. 2, where we have this: « Lest perils of souls be encountered, we do not will that those ignorant be bound by sentences issued through statutes of whatever Ordinaries, provided however their ignorance be not gross and supine. »

The Reason supports it. He who ignores the censure, even though vincibly, but with lightly culpable ignorance not gross and supine, is not properly called disobedient and contumacious against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure. Yet contumacy of this kind is required for incurring censure, as was said. Ergo. Otherwise, we judge, must be said of irregularity, even from delict, which we do not reckon a censure, as we shall say elsewhere.

You will ask whether, as often as the will sins, some practical error precedes in the will.

I answer. affirmatively ¹. Because insofar the will sins, insofar it prefers useful or delightful good, as ¹ Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

^{1 1} Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

fitting itself, to honest good. Yet the will, since it is a blind potency, born to follow the guidance of intellect, cannot prefer delightful good, as fitting itself, to honest good, unless the intellect judge here and now delightful good to be fitting itself and preferable to honest good: wherein practically it errs. Ergo. And in this sense is verified that Prov., XIV, 22: They err that work evil. And this common saying taken from the Philosopher, I Ethic., c. 3: « Every sinner is ignorant, » namely practically and in particular, not speculatively and in common; otherwise every sinner would be heretic.

I. QUESTION I. What is a censure, and of how many kinds is it? ANSWER. It is an ecclesiastical medicinal penalty of the exterior forum, by which a baptized believer is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, that he may depart from contumacy. It is called a penalty, because it supposes a fault. Medicinal, because it wills amendment. Of the exterior forum, because he who inflicts it must be endowed with jurisdiction. It deprives of the use of certain spiritual goods, which are proper to Christians. The very conversation with the faithful of which excommunication deprives one is a certain spiritual good.

II. A censure is distributed into three species: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. Irregularity from a delict, deposition, and degradation are not medicinal penalties. Cessation from divine offices is not a censure, but a precept.

III. One censure is from man, another from law. All indeed are from man; but when superiors by force of a law or statute inflict a censure, it is called a censure from law. Wherefore the Pontiffs alone and oecumenical Councils can pass censures from law in the universal Church, and a bishop in his own diocese. Censures from man all superiors who have jurisdiction in the exterior forum can inflict. This censure, if it be not contracted, vanishes when the superior dies; if it be contracted, it lasts even when the superior is dead, until absolution be obtained. A censure passed from law lasts as the law lasts. Another censure is called general, passed against all who, for example, steal in such a place; another particular, passed against this or that person. Another is of sentence passed, which by the very deed binds the guilty before the judge's sentence. Another of sentence to be passed, which is incurred only after the judge's sentence. It is reputed of sentence passed when it is said by that very deed, straightway, forthwith, immediately. It is judged of sentence to be passed when the superior says We command under penalty of excommunication or interdict, or he shall be excommunicated, he shall be suspended. In doubt it is to be judged that the censure is of sentence to be passed, not of sentence passed. When it is said let him be anathema, or let him be excommunicated, the censure is of sentence passed.

IV. QUESTION II. Who by ordinary right can pass censures? ANSWER. It is a truth of faith that the Church can pass censures. In the first place, the Supreme Pontiff by ordinary right has power in the universal Church of passing censures. Similarly general Councils in the universal Church, provincial ones in the province, diocesan ones in the diocese, enjoy the same power; and likewise Patriarchs, Archbishops, and Bishops; Cardinals in their own Churches can pass censures; likewise Generals, Provincials, Rectors, Provosts, Priors, and Guardians of Regulars in respect of their own subjects; and the Chapter of a cathedral Church, the See being vacant.

V. This power can be delegated by ordinary right even to a cleric, and not only to a priest, provided the cleric be not married. This power delegated by the Supreme Pontiff can be subdelegated by force of a privilege granted by the Apostolic See to papal delegates. No one can excommunicate himself, just as neither can he pass sentence in his own cause. He who inflicts censures is required to be baptized, a cleric not married, marked at least with the first tonsure.

VI. The mode of passing censures has no determinate formula or precise words; but it is enough to employ those which suffice for expressing the judge's will. But tribunals have their own prescribed formulas. An admonition ought to precede a censure, because a censure is not passed save against the contumacious. But he is not called contumacious who was not first admonished. And this admonition must needs be canonical, even if the delict be notorious. This admonition ought to be threefold, or one which is equivalent to three. Then a threefold admonition precedes when the guilty party is thrice admonished at a congruous time, the space of two or more days flowing between. One is equivalent to three when the judge assigns a congruous time for three, for instance of six or ten days. If there be danger in delay, within the same day, nay within a few hours, three intervals being always assigned for the threefold admonition, he can pass the censure. This admonition must needs be made in writing or before witnesses. If a censure is to be passed against several, it is enough that it be made in the church before the people. If an interdict is to be passed against a community, not individuals but only those are to be admonished whose fault is the cause of the interdict. If the delinquent study to decline the admonition, it suffices that the admonition be made either in the church or at his house. Authors assert no censure valid unless a threefold admonition, or one equivalent to three, precede.

VII. On festal days censures ought not to be passed; they are nevertheless valid, though unlawful, even when passed on these days. Those who have a limited territory cannot pass censures outside it. When nevertheless the cognizance of the cause has been made in their own territory, or when the contumacy is so notorious that it needs no discussion, and a canonical admonition has preceded, a censure can validly be passed by a bishop even dwelling in another's territory. When a bishop has been unjustly expelled from his own diocese, he can in places nearer to it exercise contentious jurisdiction over his own subjects, licence having been sought from the Ordinary, although not obtained, as is had in the Clementine Quamvis on the competent forum. A bishop can also inflict censures upon a subject delinquent in his own territory, even if he has passed to another territory: otherwise delicts would remain unpunished, and ecclesiastical discipline would be frustrated, since a subject could not be punished by another bishop. But a bishop cannot punish with censures a subject sinning in another's territory. If nevertheless he return to his own diocese, and there be convicted by the injured party of a delict committed in another's territory, he can be compelled by censures by the bishop to repair the injured party. Another's subject delinquent in his own diocese a bishop can punish, unless he depart before the cause be known.

Caius, a missionary priest, gravely offended Titius, a parishioner, by reproving his vices. Afterwards, while drinking with companions, Titius repeated to them the insulting words of Caius and affirmed that he would pay the penalty. While returning home at night, he met a priest whom he thought was Caius and, placing his foot between the priest’s legs, threw him down in the public street with a thrust of his shoulder. On the next day he read in the newspaper that Paul, a priest and Caius’s assistant, had broken his arm by falling in the place where Titius met the priest; he was afterwards informed that no harm had happened to Caius, who remained at home. In the following week, repenting of the deed, Titius approached a confessor and confessed with great shame what he had done. Hence it is asked:

1. What is the privilege of the canon, and is the law penal or prohibitory?

2. What is the purpose of this privilege, and how must it be interpreted?

3. Does error concerning the person to whom an injury is inflicted prevent it from being a formal injury and a voluntary act?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the privilege of the Canon and is it a penal or prohibitory law?

The privilege of the Canon grants to all ranks of the clergy and to religious Orders personal inviolability, so that any one who unlawfully uses violence against them incurs excommunication, the absolution of which is reserved to the Pope. It is a law which both prohibits and penalizes such violence.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, 130.

2. What is the object of this privilege and how is it to be interpreted?

The object is to safeguard the dignity and honor of the clerical state. In accordance with this object it must be interpreted favorably, and as widely as possible.

3. Does a mistake about the person injured prevent the injury being formal and the act voluntary?

Many teach that it does on the ground that there was no intention to injure this person, and so the act is casual, not voluntary, with respect to him.²

2 St. Alphonsus, lib. iii, n. 628.

4. The case. Titius certainly committed a grave sin by his unwarranted and malicious act. The excommunication, however, inflicted now by the second of the censures reserved to the Pope by the Constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae Sedis, must be interpreted strictly with regard to the conditions which are necessary that it may be incurred. As many authorities of weight deny that an injury inflicted by mistake on the wrong person is voluntary, and an action which is involuntary is not punished by censure, therefore Titius did not incur the excommunication.

Caius, a priest and religious who, although he does not have the care of souls, nevertheless enjoys faculties from the Ordinary for administering the sacraments of Baptism, Matrimony, Extreme Unction, and Holy Viaticum, with the permission of the priest exercising the care of souls, is called to his friend Paul, who lies dangerously ill. Caius indeed knows that the priest who exercises the care of souls there obstinately stands upon his rights and requires that his permission be sought on every occasion; nevertheless, because the priest seems unreasonable to him, without seeking permission he hastens to his sick friend and administers the last sacraments to him. His superior therefore considers him excommunicated and commands that he first seek absolution from the censure before he celebrates Mass. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a censure?

2. What are the effects of excommunication?

3. Explain the censure in question in the case.

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a censure?

A censure is a spiritual and remedial penalty by which a baptized and contumacious delinquent is deprived by ecclesiastical authority of the use of certain spiritual advantages.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 307.

2. What are the effects of excommunication?

Excommunication deprives the excommunicated person of the use of the sacraments, sacramentals, and indulgences of the Church, of public suffrages and prayers; of the administration of the sacraments; of participation in the liturgical offices; of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; of the right to ecclesiastical burial; and it makes null and void presentation to a benefice, or the conferring of an ecclesiastical dignity with jurisdiction annexed to it.²

2 Ibid., 377.

3. Explain the censure to which the case alludes.

The fourteenth excommunication of those reserved to the Holy See by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis is as follows: “ Religious who presume to administer to clerics or laypeople, outside a case of necessity, the Sacrament of Extreme Unction or the Eucharist as Viaticum without the permission of the parish priest.” The terms of this censure should be strictly interpreted and therefore any ignorance or good faith will excuse a person from incurring it, and probably it is not incurred in countries like Great Britain and most parts of the United States, where parishes have not yet been erected and where therefore there are not parish priests.³

3 Génicot, vol. ii, n. 604; Sabetti, n. 1002.

4. The case. Caius may be excused from the censure because he acted to some extent in good faith, inasmuch as he thought the priest of the place an unreasonable stickler for his rights. Even if we grant that this idea of his was false, nevertheless it prevented him from presuming in the technical sense. If there are no parish priests in the place where the case happened, Caius may be excused on this ground also. However, he did wrong in intruding into the district assigned to another without leave. His Superior, therefore, was justified in forbidding him to say Mass until he had obtained absolution. The Superior regarded him as under censure in the external forum.

Caius, a priest of the province of England, began to indulge in drunkenness and other vices and, neglecting clerical obligations also, visited a public theater where stage performances were being given. Shortly afterwards, having been deprived of his faculties by the Bishop, he withdrew to Scotland, where under another Bishop he again began to exercise priestly functions. When Titius, Caius’s confessor, had learned all these things, he consequently doubted what was to be done, for Caius had never sought absolution from any censure imposed upon priests in England for attendance at the theater. Hence it is asked:

1. What penalty is imposed upon English priests for attendance at the theater?

2. What are the effects of suspension?

3. How does a censure cease?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What penalty is imposed on English priests for frequenting the theater?

The Fourth Council of Westminster decreed as follows: “ We strictly prohibit ecclesiastics who have received sacred Orders from being present at stage representations in public theaters, or in places temporarily made use of as public theaters, under the penalty to transgressors of suspension to be incurred ipso facto such as has hitherto been the rule in all parts of England with reservation to the respective ordinaries.”¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, 614.

2. What are the effects of suspension?

Total suspension deprives the cleric of the use of all sacred Orders, the exercise of his office, and the fruits of his benefice.²

2 Ibid., vol. ii, 380.

3. How does a censure cease?

As a general rule a censure which has been incurred only ceases when absolution has been obtained by the delinquent from one who is competent to give it. Sometimes, however, a censure is imposed to last as long as certain conditions last, and then on the termination of those conditions the censure ceases.³

3 Ibid., 373.

4. The case. Caius incurred suspension reserved to his bishop by going to the theater. He had never been absolved from this censure. His confessor Titius, or else Caius himself, should wi-ite to his former bishop and ask him for powers to put Caius straight. On the receipt of those powers Titius may deal with the case. In the meantime Caius should abstain from the exercise of his office as a priest under pain of grave sin. If since his suspension he has exercised sacred Orders solemnly, he has incurred irregularity from which he must be dispensed before again exercising his functions.

Caia came for confession to Paul, a missionary priest in England, to whom she disclosed that in the preceding year in Italy she had stood by at a duel in order to encourage a friend fighting a duel. Caia further said that she had not been able to obtain absolution from the parish priest in Italy, since he affirmed that the case was reserved to the Pope. In answer also to Paul’s question, Caia replied that she knew the Church forbids every participation in a duel under penalties, but that she had performed a work of charity which it would have been inhuman to refuse; indeed, that she would do the same thing again in the same circumstances. Paul, however, wishes to know what he can and ought to do in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a censure, and what conditions are required in order that it be incurred?

2. How does a censure cease?

3. What is persistence in a censure, and what effects does it produce?

Father X has been forbidden by his bishop, under pain of suspension, to be incurred ipso facto, to enter a saloon for a period of one year, for any purpose whatever, except to administer the last sacraments. This is the condition on which the faculties of the diocese have been restored to Father X. He has given the bishop grievous cause for complaint in the past, and caused considerable scandal to the faithful, and the bishop does not feel justified in restoring the faculties of the diocese to him, except on the condition stated above. Father X is careful to observe the condition, while within the limits of the diocese, but whenever he goes beyond the limits of the diocese he feels free to enter a saloon, if he chooses, and does not believe that he incurs the suspension. He argues that a bishop's authority is limited to the territory of his diocese, and never reaches beyond the diocese, because that would be an invasion of another bishop's authority, which is evidently forbidden by the canons of the Church.

He desires to know whether he has incurred the censure of suspension by entering a saloon beyond the limits of the diocese, and whether (in case he has incurred the suspension) he has become irregular by violating the censure of suspension and exercising his office of the priesthood.

Answer.—In answering this question, we desire to say a word about the reasons for which a bishop may suspend a priest. Entering a saloon is not a grievous sin. Now the law says that suspension, being a grave punishment, requires a grave sin. How then can a bishop inflict a grave punishment on a priest who is guilty only of a venial sin, or, perhaps, of no sin at all? To this I we answer: While the thing forbidden by the bishop may be of lesser consequence when viewed in itself, nevertheless, it may take on a serious aspect, when viewed in the light of circumstances which make it a source of grave scandal or personal danger or subversive of some serious object which the bishop wishes to attain. “Therefore, since the end of the precept is grave and the thing commanded is necessary for that end, the gravity is derived not from the matter but from the end.” (Schmalzgr. l. 5, tit. 39, n. 60.)

But if the thing commanded or forbidden by the bishop under pain of suspension, be in itself of small consequence, and have only a slight connection with the object proposed by the bishop, then the transgression of the bishop's precept is only a venial sin at most, both in itself, and by reason of its object, and therefore induces no suspension. In the words of Ballerini:

“Although a precept concerning a matter slight in itself does not bind under grave obligation, and therefore its transgression entails neither grave fault nor the penalty of censure, nevertheless a matter slight when considered in itself can be commanded under grave obligation and sanctioned by censure when it becomes grave by reason of scandal, danger, or the intended end, etc. Thus, for example, excommunication is imposed for striking a cleric even slightly—slightly, namely, in respect of the blow, but not slightly in respect of the dishonor—because of the grave irreverence toward the clerical state; thus it is justly commanded under censure that certain persons take part in a public procession ordered for a grave purpose; likewise against those entering even a very little way through the door of a monastery; likewise against clerics who grow their hair. It is otherwise, however (St. Alphonsus, no. 31), if the matter were both slight in itself and contributed only slightly to the intended end.” (Vol. VII, 128.)

When there exists doubt as to the gravity of the thing commanded, or forbidden, or its close connection with the end the bishop hopes to attain, we must decide in favor of the bishop and the validity of the censure— one must stand by the authority of the Prelate, which is in possession, and therefore the edict of censure must be asserted to retain its force.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the bishop acted wholly within his rights, when he forbade Father X to enter a saloon, under pain of suspension ipso facto; because there was both scandal and grave danger connected with the saloon for Father X. And while entering a saloon may not be a grave matter in itself, still under the present circumstances it becomes a grave matter, and may justly be forbidden by the bishop under pain of suspension.

We come now to the second question, viz.: Could Father X's bishop suspend him for entering a saloon outside of the diocese? We must distinguish here between a diocesan statute and a personal command given to an individual. There is question here of a personal command. A diocesan statute is limited by the territory or boundaries of the diocese. It binds no one outside the diocese. A personal precept or command, on the contrary, follows the individual like his shadow, say the canonists, "haeret ossibus," no matter where he goes.

St. Alphonsus, treating this question (l. 7, n. 23), gives two opinions of the theologians, one that a bishop can lawfully bind by censure a subject of his diocese, outside the limits of the diocese, the other that he can not, and both of these opinions the holy Doctor calls probable, though the one that holds that a priest incurs suspension, even outside the diocese, seems to him the more probable. There are a number of theologians who hold that the power of a bishop is restricted to his diocese even in the matter of a personal command to an individual, but as Ballerini, after Laymann, points out, they rest for their argument on the chapter "Ut animarum, de constitutionibus, in 6°" of the Corpus, where there is question only of episcopal laws or diocesan statutes, and not of personal commands. And therefore their opinion has no solid probability. When a bishop forbids a priest of his diocese to do something, under pain of suspension, he pronounces judgment within his own territory. That the judgment goes into effect outside the diocese, when the crime is committed outside the diocese, does not imply that there is any invasion of another bishop's territory, because the censure is incurred ipso facto, without a trial at law or any legal proceedings “without cognizance of the cause and without judicial formality,” because, as it says in the Canons, “an excommunication and any censure imposed automatically carry with them a tacit and, as it were, imperceptible execution.” (C. Pastoralis 53, de Appell.)

The true reason why a bishop may not lawfully punish by censure in another bishop's diocese is that such a proceeding would be an invasion and a violation of another's judicial territory, which is strictly forbidden by the law. But where a bishop's sentence of censure goes into effect ipso facto, without any legal proceedings or trial in court there is no invasion or violation of another's jurisdiction.

Ballerini says that a bishop certainly has the right to suspend his priest for the transgression of his command, even though the priest transgress outside the diocese, nor can the opinion that denies this be said to have any other than a certain external probability, which suddenly vanishes, if you examine the reasons on which it rests. (cf. Ball. VII, 101.)

As regards the irregularity that Father X might have incurred, by exercising the ministry while under censure, it will suffice to say, that as such an irregularity would be "irregularitas ex delicto," which is not incurred except where there is full knowledge and consent of the irregularity, it all depends on the state of Father X's conscience, when he exercised his ministry. If he was in good faith, he is not irregular. If he acted with a doubting conscience not knowing whether he was incurring an irregularity or not, but willing to take a chance, he incurred the irregularity, because he acted "cum conscientia practice dubia" and made himself liable for the consequences.

Titus, a bishop, before placing the case of a certain holy man in the hands of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, with the hope of his beatification, issues a general decree commanding all who may have in their possession any writings of this holy man to send the same to the Chancellor within two months from the date of the decree under pain of excommunication, to be incurred ipso facto. The decree likewise threatens with the same punishment all who, having knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of any such manuscript, do not make known the same to the proper authorities. Caius, a priest, has in his possession several letters written to him personally by the dead and saintly man. He is unwilling to part with these letters because they were written for the direction of his own conscience, and if made public would lead to grave injury of his reputation. In his anxiety he seeks the advice of a neighboring priest. Here he is told that he may either remove his name from the letters in his possession, and then turn them over to the bishop, or he may burn them, as human laws, especially when penal, do not oblige under such grave inconvenience. Caius revolves the whole matter in his mind for some time and finally concludes to burn the documents. In a short time the valuable letters are destroyed.

The question is asked (1) whether fear of loss of reputation or such like inconvenience saves one from incurring censure; (2) whether the advice given to Caius by his brother priest was lawful and proper; (3) whether in the case given the censure was really incurred by the two priests, and to what are they bound.

1. Censure is a canonical punishment which has for its purpose the prevention of sin. It is inflicted, therefore, only after the infraction of some law. It follows, therefore, that any cause which excuses from the transgression of a law will likewise exempt one from the annexed censure. There are times when grave fear of evil will exempt one from the observation of some law; at other times neither the fear of a graver evil nor the fear of the gravest evil will destroy the obligation of the law.

However, it must be clearly understood that for the incurring of censure sin and contempt of the censure are required. Hence, if there is question of some precept of the natural law from the observance of which grave fear does not excuse, yet the presence of fear may preserve one from incurring a censure that is annexed to the sin. Owing to the presence of fear we may in truth say that the law is broken rather from the weakness of nature than from any malice or contempt of the church threatening the censure. And, therefore, says St. Alphonsus (I. 7, n. 46): "He who through fear commits murder, which is forbidden under pain of censure, sins truly, but does not incur censure, because he does not sin against the right of the Church, against whose authority no special contempt is shown." The censure would be incurred, however, even if the gravest fear were present, when the observation of the law is made necessary by public good, or when the fear would lead directly to contempt of religion or of the authority of the Church (St. Alph. I.,c.).

2. The counsel given to Caius, to remove his own name from the letters in question, was right and proper. Had he done so he would have taken away all cause of fear of loss of reputation, and the speculative and practical doctrine contained in the letters would have been available in the cause of the beatification of their writer. It is clear from this that the second part of the advice given to Caius, viz., to burn the letters, was improper and unjust. For, as said above, by the removal of the name contained in the letters, all danger of loss of reputation was irrevocably prevented, and with it was taken away all grave inconvenience. Caius therefore acted unlawfully in burning the letters.

3. The priest who advised Caius in his anxiety did not incur the penalty of excommunication, even though he did not make known to the proper authorities the existence of the letters held by Caius. For he knew of these letters only because his counsel was sought in reference to them. Therefore he was bound by the strictest obligation to secrecy. Now while he was thus bound the letters were destroyed, and consequently he was not then bound to broach the matter to the bishop.

Caius, on the other hand, objectively speaking, incurred the penalty of excommunication. The reason of this is plain. He had in his possession the manuscript sought after by the bishop, and could have transferred it to his ordinary without detriment to himself or others. Consideration must be given, nevertheless, to the fact that Caius acted in 'good faith, and by reason of this ignorance he was practically excused from the penalty of his fault. Strictly speaking he did not commit sin, and where there is no sin there is no excommunication. He is, moreover, not bound to anything further, since the letters are no longer in existence. Certainly he is not bound to reveal his part in the affair; for such a revelation would be productive of no good and would endanger his good name.