Article I: On the Nature, Division, and Conditions of Censures

1660. - Censure is commonly accustomed to be defined thus: It is a spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods.

It is said:

1° Penalty, because it supposes fault.

2° Spiritual, both because it is brought by a spiritual power for the spiritual utility of Christians, and because it immediately takes away spiritual goods, and because, as the Bull Auctorem fidei defines, condemning the contrary doctrine as false, pernicious, and at least erroneous (p. XXXII. p. 46), it binds in heaven and obliges souls.

3° Medicinal, because it is brought for this end, that the soul may return itself to better fruit. From this, however, you will not infer that those of whose correction there is despair are never to be punished by this penalty, or that those who have amended themselves are immediately to be absolved from it. For although this is generally true, nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus¹ and St. Thomas, this does not impede that censure can also be brought for the terror of others, and that absolution from it can be deferred either for a fuller repentance of the matter, or for the edification of the faithful and for repairing scandal; wherefore the correction of the delinquent is not the only end of censure.

4° A baptized man, because those who are not baptized are not subject to the legislative or coercive power of the Church; but power is exercised over subjects.

5° Delinquent and contumacious, because a penalty is inflicted only on the delinquent; but medicine ought not to be extended except to those whose contumacy needs so great a remedy. Yet formal contempt is not required for this contumacy, but virtual contempt suffices, consisting in this, that someone, knowing, or at least doubting, that something is prohibited by the Church under censure, nevertheless wills to do it.

6° Is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, namely of goods which are subject to the power of the Church. For goods of a threefold kind exist in the Church. Some proceed immediately from the head, or Christ, as the various graces; others proceed from the body, or the Church, as the administration of the Sacraments, common suffrages, etc.; but others proceed from the members, such as the prayers and good works of individual faithful. Now, therefore, censure does not take away the use of goods of the first kind, since they do not depend on the Church; and hence censure can stand together with the state of grace, e.g. in him who incurs censure because of a sin concerning which he afterward is perfectly contrite;² likewise, per se, neither does it take away the use of goods of the third kind; for the Church cannot impede that communion of Saints which exists from faith and charity among the members; but it only takes away or prohibits the use of goods of the second kind, sometimes indeed entirely, but sometimes only in part.

"Secondarily" censure can also deprive one "of the use of corporal goods, or of external actions, namely human communication, honor or salutation, etc.; which, however, is always as it were indirectly, and in order to spiritual things." Thus Suarez.

Hence censure differs:

1° From deposition and degradation, which are not medicinal, nor for a time, but only for penalty and perpetually, and because of a past sin, even one amended, can be inflicted.¹

2° From irregularity, which can be contracted because of only a defect also, either of soul or of body, without any fault, and therefore per se is not a penalty, but only a canonical impediment, although, inflicted because of certain crimes, it can also have the character of penalty, yet not medicinal, but punitive, and of itself perpetual.

3° From cessation from divine things: because this is indicated for warding off an injury inflicted on the Church, not for amending the guilty person.

4° From privation of a benefice, prison, etc.; because these do not deprive one of the use of spiritual goods.

Particular suspension and interdict³ sometimes put on the nature of censure, sometimes of vindicative penalty. But you will recognize that it is a vindicative penalty both if it is brought because of a merely past delict, and if it is inflicted perpetually or even for a determined time, say for two or three months. - They add that those penalties also then have the character of pure penalty, if some condition is lacking, from the defect of which censure, but not a pure penalty, is invalidated, or if the will of the Superior of constituting a mere penalty can be known from something.⁴ Moreover, to penalties of this sort, if they are not censures, those things cannot be applied which the law establishes concerning censures as such.⁵ Yet it is otherwise if something else is expressly provided by the law itself. See n. 1771. I said: 4°.

1661. - They are distinguished in various ways, namely:

1° By reason of species, into excommunication, suspension, interdict, concerning which we shall speak in particular.

2° By reason of the mode by which they are inflicted, into censures brought by law or by man, according as they are brought through canons or ecclesiastical laws (under which also come statutes established in a diocesan synod), or are brought by a legitimate Superior, whether by way of judicial sentence, e.g. if satisfaction is commanded by sentence of the judge under threat of censure to someone who has been found culpable; or by way of precept upon one or upon several. If censure by man affects determined persons, it is particular; but if it is brought generally and without determination of persons, it is general. - But they differ from each other especially in this, that a censure brought by law, when the author who brought it is dead, perseveres after the manner of all laws. But one brought by man, since it depends upon his jurisdiction and authority, when this ceases, he being dead or removed from office, also ceases, unless it has already been contracted; for, if someone has incurred it, the bond is taken away only by absolution.

3° By reason of the mode by which they are incurred, into censures of sentence already passed or to be passed, according as the Superior establishes that the censure is incurred by the very fact by which someone violates the law, or only after the sentence of an ecclesiastical judge has been inflicted. It is asked how these are distinguished from each other.

a) They are of sentence already passed: 1) if the law says: by the very fact; by the law itself; without another sentence;¹ 2) if the words are of the past or present tense, e.g. we have excommunicated, I excommunicate;² 3) if absolutely, in the imperative mode, it is said: let him be excommunicated, let him be suspended, etc.; but not if by these words only a precept of excommunicating, suspending, etc., is imposed on another, say the Bishop.³ Nearly the same distinction, according to Suarez⁴ and Croix,⁵ is to be employed if it is said: immediately; continuously; from then; on the spot.

b) They are of sentence to be passed, if the words are either 1) of the future tense; or 2) threatening, unless something else is gathered from the adjuncts;⁶ or 3) ambiguous; for, from Rule of Law 49 in 6°, "in penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made."⁷ But ambiguous would be, for example, these words: let him be excommunicated.⁸

4° By reason of the power of absolving, into reserved censures or non-reserved censures, according as the Superior reserved to himself absolution from them, or permitted ordinary Ministers to absolve from them. Some are reserved to the Pope, others to Bishops. Those reserved to the Pope are reserved either specially, or simply (see n. 1701 sq.). But to Bishops some are reserved by law (see n. 1733 sq.), and these are properly reserved to the Pope with the faculty made to Bishops that they can absolve from them; others are reserved by Bishops themselves. Censures by man are always judged reserved, unless they were brought by a general precept. - Finally, these also deserve to be distinguished:

5° Notorious or occult censures, according as it is clear to others that someone has incurred them because of a fact which is so known that it can no longer be hidden; or otherwise; and

6° Just or unjust, valid or invalid censures, according as the Superior has consulted justice, truth, and law, or not, in imposing the censure.

1662. - For the validity of censure there is required sin, and this proportioned to the censure, external, regularly consummated, not merely past, and joined with contumacy.

1° Sin. Hence, if the crime on account of which censure is inflicted either does not subsist, or has not been legitimately proved, the censure does not bind in the forum of conscience. But if for the external forum it appears valid, it must be observed externally to avoid scandal and disturbance of judgments.¹ Furthermore, censure ought not to be fulminated in one's own personal cause, since this is reputed in law as vengeance.² Except, however, 1) if this is done not by way of judgment, but by way of defense against him who inflicts violence, because it is lawful to repel force by force;³ 2) where the cause is so public and manifest that it can neither be denied, nor needs any examination.⁴

2° Proportioned to the censure, and hence ordinarily mortal; for censure, since it is a most grave penalty, requires mortal fault. Yet I said: ordinarily mortal; for suspension or interdict for a brief time and depriving one only of some use, likewise minor excommunication, can be brought because of venial sin.⁵

3° External; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain; but not concerning merely internal things. Moreover, the sin ought not only to be exterior, but also grave as to the substance of the external act. Whence it does not suffice that the act is mortal from a depraved intention or from an erroneous conscience. - Thus, e.g., he who strikes a cleric only lightly, although with the mind of killing him, does not incur excommunication; nor does he who strikes a table, or says: thus it is, intending internally to confirm heresy, etc.; nor finally he who falsely thinks himself to violate the law, e.g. by reading a book which he falsely believes condemned. For all these indeed sin against conscience, but not against Canon Law.⁶

4° Regularly consummated by work in its own kind, according to the property of the words which are contained in the precept or law inflicting the censure, and according to the principal end of the law. The reason is because penal laws are to be strictly interpreted according to the Rule of Law: Odia are to be restricted, favors ought to be enlarged.

I said: 1) regularly. For sin begun, or even an attempt or assistance toward it, can be punished by censure and in fact sometimes is punished, as, e.g., provocation to duel or acceptance of it, even though the fight does not follow; likewise to furnish work or favor to the same. But unless it is expressed in the law, an extension of this sort is not to be made. Therefore,

I said: 2) according to the property of the words, etc. Wherefore, he who only counseled some crime is not bound by censure, if in the law no others than perpetrators are noted; but he will be bound if also counselors or those in any way cooperating in the same are noted.¹ Hence also, as St. Alphonsus notes,² if the censure has been brought principally upon those doing, and accessorily upon those commanding, counseling, etc., the one commanding, the one counseling, the one carrying a vote, does not incur it, if the command, counsel, or vote does not efficaciously influence the crime; or if the crime is not brought to effect. Thus, e.g., he is exempted from excommunication who gave a command or counsel to him who was already prepared to perpetrate the delict; likewise the one commanding a cleric to be struck is exempted if in fact the striking does not occur. And the same must probably be said if it is doubted whether the command or counsel influenced. - On the contrary, if the censure has been brought principally upon those commanding, counseling, etc., it is incurred immediately whenever the command or counsel has been furnished by them, even with the effect not following; the reason is because then the censure has been imposed precisely because of the command or counsel, and not because of the work which would be caused from the command or counsel.

5° Not merely past, or not having, as they say, a successive tract, because censure is a medicinal penalty, and therefore cannot be brought upon those who have already returned themselves to better fruit. "Therefore, when someone is excommunicated because of theft, he is excommunicated by reason of contumacy, either because the thief knew theft to be forbidden under censure, or because, having been admonished under penalty of censure, he refuses to restore."¹ Apply the same to the case of scandal given and not yet repaired.

6° Joined with contumacy against the law or precept of the Church. The reason is because the principal end of censure is to break pertinacity. Recall the things said n. 1660. It is said: 5°.

1663. Resolves. - 1° Because one is excused from grave fault because of some circumstance, he is also excused from censure, although the matter is grave in itself.

2° If something altogether light is commanded under censure, this is not incurred, provided that the thing which appears light under some respect does not become grave from elsewhere.

3° The Superior would act imprudently and illicitly, but nevertheless validly, who brought censure because of any grave fault whatever; for the end of the Church is to punish only graver crimes.²

4° More probably, censure is not incurred if someone, before the evil work is consummated, as far as he can revokes the command or counsel, or, not being able to impede the consummation, at least warns the person to be harmed, that he may be on his guard; for he would not be contumacious at the time at which the work obtains the final effect required for incurring censure. Concerning restitution in this case see nn. 760. q. 1°. 5; a. 168. q. 1°.

5° Excommunication which is said to be brought upon harmful animals, e.g. locusts, is not excommunication properly so called, but adjuration, or a prayer made for their destruction, lest they harm. Cf. n. 376. III.

6° Likewise, when the dead are said to be excommunicated, this must be understood of a certain execration or declaration of excommunication which they incurred before death, and in which they died. Therefore, absolution imparted to the excommunicated who died with signs of penitence is extended directly not to the dead themselves, but to the living, inasmuch as they are loosed from the obligation not to communicate with the departed in burial and public prayers.

1664. Questions. - Query 1° Whether one doubtful concerning a contracted censure in the internal forum is to be held censured?

Resp. Negatively, in a doubt both of fact and of law, i.e. whether you doubt whether you have offended, or whether the case falls under censure. The reason is both because in doubt no one is to be stripped of the right, which he possesses, of using spiritual goods, and because odia are to be restricted. Thus commonly. Hence regularly you do not incur censure unless the sin is so certain that no prudent doubt remains whether it was perpetrated; whether it is internally and externally grave; whether it is consummated in its species; whether it was committed by one past puberty (see n. 1668. II.).

It is said in the question: he who doubts whether he has incurred it; for in a doubt preceding the action, the things to be said in the following questions 2° and 3° are to be applied.

In a doubt concerning absolution obtained, concerning an appeal interposed in time, and similar things, the guilty person ought to bear himself as censured; likewise in a doubt concerning the power of the Superior when this Superior peacefully possesses it, and more truly also in a doubt whether the censure is just, because in these doubts the power of the Superior possesses. - A censure brought from a false presumption of fact, unless or until its injustice is publicly known, must be observed in public, lest scandal be given.

Query 2° Whether ignorance excuses from censure?

Resp. 1° Certainly ignorance of fact excuses, namely when someone is ignorant that he is placing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, e.g., if someone strikes a priest thinking him to be a layman, he does not incur the censure brought upon strikers of Clerics. The reason is because censure ought to be known to the sinner, so that he may be contumacious. Thus in Canon Law.²

Resp. 2° Ignorance of ecclesiastical law commanding or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is clear from the same reasons just adduced; for he cannot be called contumacious against the Church who is ignorant of its law, as is clear from Canon Law,³ where it is said: "We do not will that the ignorant be bound, provided however that the ignorance does not smack of crassness or supineness."

Query 3° Whether vincible ignorance excuses from censure?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if this is not gravely culpable; because then the one ignorant cannot be called contumacious against the Church. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° But negatively, if that ignorance is gravely culpable; because then practically it can be called crass: moreover, crass ignorance does not excuse from censure, as is clear from the cited Canon Law. For this ignorance does not impede that someone be contumacious against the law which he culpably ignores. - St. Alphonsus¹ and others commonly.

Except, however, if in the Decree of censure it is said: whoever shall have done this knowingly, deliberately, rashly, whoever shall have presumed, etc. For these words demand a perfect and direct voluntary act, and from certain knowledge of the censure.² But more commonly they deny that by these clauses even affected ignorance, as including fraud and being equated to knowledge, is excused; and to this sentence, as more common, St. Alphonsus, although the opposite does not seem to him improbable, adheres the more.³

Query 4° Whether those who have committed some sin to which censure has been annexed by law are to be admonished by the confessor both concerning the sin and concerning the censure annexed to it, if they are ignorant either of the sin or of the censure?

Resp. The question must be resolved according to the things said in n. 1423, and according to the things to be said in nn. 1753-1757. q. 3°.

Query 5° Whether grave fear excuses from censure?

Resp. Affirmatively, even when there is question of a censure established against those transgressing a divine precept, whether positive or natural, provided that a) fear of this kind is such that it excuses from fault those violating the precept, if it were ecclesiastical; b) the law does not dispose otherwise. The reason is because ecclesiastical laws, such as are those which establish censures, cease to oblige where grave fear presses. - Yet I said: a) fear of this kind is such, etc. Hence, when the observance of human law seems morally necessary for preserving the public good, or if its violation redounds to contempt of the Faith, or of the law, or of ecclesiastical power, one transgressing from grave fear, even of life, a law placed under censure is not excused from it. I said: b) the law does not dispose otherwise, whether explicitly, or implicitly, as, e.g., with regard to duelists.⁴

Query 6° Whether it is required that admonition of the delinquent precede the censure?

Resp. 1° No admonition is required for censures established by law, because the law itself, having been brought and known, sufficiently admonishes the subjects. - Thus all. Yet, more probably, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ citation of the guilty person is required where there is question of censure of a sentence to be passed, in the case in which the delict and contumacy are not so notorious that it is evidently clear that no defense belongs to the guilty person.

Resp. 2° But admonition is required for censures to be brought by man, and indeed more commonly and more probably for validity. The reason is because he is not contumacious who previously was not admonished concerning the precept and concerning the penalty annexed. Indeed, from Canon Law, for liceity, a triple admonition is required, or at least one peremptory admonition, or one in which it is expressed that it has the force of three, and in which time for repentance equivalent to the time of three admonitions is granted, namely a period of two days for each admonition, and therefore a space of six days, e.g. "we command that within six days you cast such a woman out of the house; otherwise by the very fact you will be excommunicated."² But for a just cause three spaces can be reduced to one day or to a shorter time, and, if there is danger in delay, as if there is question of repressing violence, e.g. of trustees refusing to open the doors of the church, one admonition suffices, provided however that time for repentance, say the space of one hour, be designated.³

Except: 1° if there is question of censure by man by a general precept, or even a special precept with respect to a future act; for then admonition is not necessary, since the Decree concerning bringing censure holds the place of admonition.

Except: 2° if there is question of suspension and interdict of this kind, which are not censures properly so called and medicinal, but are brought only by way of penalty.⁴

Note. - Concerning the solemnities required for censures strictly such to be brought licitly, see, if you wish, Canon Law⁵ or St. Alphonsus.⁶ - Concerning these, observe: a) that they are required only in censures by man, and indeed brought by a particular sentence; but not in censures established by law, or by man indeed, but by way of a general or particular precept;¹ b) that among other things it is required that the censure and its cause be pronounced in writing, and that an authentic copy of the writing be handed over to the guilty person asking for it within a month. But since, as Kenrick astutely remarks,² "in this region lawsuits are sometimes brought against a Bishop bringing censures, he ought to take care here that he hand over nothing in writing which could furnish occasion for a civil action, or which otherwise would redound to the detriment of Religion; but a civil action does not seem to be given, if to the guilty person asking, the cause proved in judgment" (ecclesiastical) "is set forth; otherwise if the Bishop communicates the judgment" (ecclesiastical) "to others whom it does not concern."