ARTICLE III: On Causes Excusing from Censure

1269. Four things excuse from censure: 1. ignorance; 2. fear; 3. impotence; 4. nullity of the censure.

I. IGNORANCE excuses; because he who does not know the censure cannot be said to be contumacious. And this is true even if the ignorance is merely concomitant, for example when someone kills a cleric not knowing that he is a cleric, but so prepared in mind that, if he had known, he would also have killed him.

Hence: 1. Ignorance excuses both of law, when someone, namely, is ignorant either that the crime is prohibited by the Church, or that a censure is annexed to the crime; and of fact, when someone is ignorant that he is positing an act forbidden under censure. Thus, for example, you are excused if you do not know that the book which you read or retain has been prohibited by name through Apostolic Letters.

2. Even vincible ignorance excuses, if it is not gravely culpable. For light fault is not punished by a grave penalty. But ignorance GRAVELY culpable generally does not excuse; because this can practically be called crass. Now in Law it is said: "We do not wish the ignorant to be bound; provided, however, that their ignorance has not been crass or supine" (Boniface, c. 2, de Const. in 6).

3. Even gravely culpable ignorance excuses sometimes; namely when in the decree of censure it is said: "he who shall have done this knowingly, deliberately..." or also: "he who shall have presumed..., by rash daring," or something similar, by which certain knowledge or a direct and perfect voluntary is required (cf. n. 220).

But whether affected ignorance itself also excuses in this case is disputed. Others more commonly deny it; because this includes deceit and is equivalent to knowledge. But others, and not improbably, affirm it, at least if it is a question of a censure inflicted on those sinning knowingly; because he indeed who knowingly sins against the law truly contemns it; but he who sins from affected ignorance, although he wishes to be ignorant so that he may sin more freely, nevertheless demonstrates some reverence toward the law, while he seeks to be ignorant of it from fear that, if he should know it, he may be drawn back from sin: therefore he shows virtual deceit, not formal deceit (VII, 45-48, 301).

1270. II. GRAVE FEAR excuses as often as it frees from a delict against ecclesiastical law. The reason is that censure, as a sanction of law, is not incurred except because of transgression of the law itself.

We have said: as often as it frees from a delict against ecclesiastical law; now, grave fear of imminent harm from observing an ecclesiastical law, and consequently from delict, excuses, unless from neglect of the law a greater harm follows than is the inconvenience which its fulfillment carries with it (cf. n. 223).

This holds even in the case in which fear would not excuse from fault against divine Law. Thus, for example, he who from fear lest he himself be killed, kills a cleric, certainly sins against the law of God; but because of the straits of the case, ecclesiastical law ceases to oblige, and therefore the censure is not incurred. But otherwise, if the law of the Church is of such a kind that it obliges even with fear of grave evil; if, say, its observance is morally necessary for the public good, or if its violation yields to contempt of faith or of ecclesiastical power (VII, 46; H. Ap., XIX, 8, 2). Cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., 37, p. 524.

Note. If it is a question of a censure established against those presuming, even light fear would excuse from incurring it.

1271. III. IMPOTENCE, whether physical or moral, likewise excuses from censure, as is evident. Thus, for example, he who does not have whence to restore, or who cannot restore without grave inconvenience, does not incur censures issued against retainers of another's goods (VII, 42).

1272. • IV. NULLITY OF THE CENSURE can be had from a threefold head:1 1. From defect of the one issuing it, that is, if he lacks jurisdiction, whether he has it impeded through censure, or suspended through a legitimate appeal which has been interposed before the sentence was absolutely issued. 2. From defect of form, that is, if the substantial order of judgment is omitted; as, if the guilty person is not cited, nor warned under threat of censure, according to what was said n. 1266. 3. From defect of a just cause, or matter (VII, 50, 51, 66).

But a just cause can fail in a threefold way: a) "If it subsists neither on the part of the thing, nor according to the allegations of the external forum. b) If on the part of the thing the crime indeed subsists, but not in order to judgment, because the guilty person does not confess it, nor is he legitimately convicted of it. c) If on the part of the thing the crime does not subsist, although it is juridically proved, and therefore the judge has a presumed title or cause. In which case, although the sentence on the part of the thing is unjust, and therefore more probably the censure does not bind in the forum of conscience, nevertheless in the external forum it must be observed, because of scandal" (VII, 66). Whence for the external forum he needs absolution who contracted marriage before a little minister (Holy Office, 1892).

1273. IT IS ASKED. In DOUBTS concerning censures, what is to be held?

Resp. 1. In a doubt antecedent to action, he who suspects that a censure is annexed to his action ought to inquire into the truth. If, after diligence has been applied, he does not find it, he is excused from censure by reason of invincible ignorance.

But if in inquiring he neglects all diligence, or uses only very little, he will not be immune from crass ignorance, and consequently is not exempted from censure, unless in the law it is said: he who shall have done this knowingly, etc. See what was said n. 1269, 3.

2. In a doubt consequent to action, that is, in doubt whether a censure has been incurred or not, "in the forum of conscience we are not held to conduct ourselves as censured persons."

And this whether the doubt is of fact, that is, concerning the crime, for example whether the striking of a cleric was gravely injurious; or whether the doubt is of law, that is, concerning the sentence, suppose if it is doubted whether a censure was latae or ferendae sententiae, or whether a condition placed in the sentence has been fulfilled or not. The reason, for doubt of fact, is that no one in doubt is to be stripped of his right of communicating with the Church, which he possesses; but for doubt of law, because penalties are to be restricted, whence in doubt they are not incurred.

3. In a doubt concerning the cessation of a censure certainly inflicted, that is, if the censured person doubts concerning absolution obtained, concerning the effect of an appeal interposed, and similar things, he ought still to hold himself as censured; because possession stands for the law, or for the Superior.

And the same must be said if he doubts concerning the power of the Superior, when this Superior peacefully possesses it. Likewise, more truly, in doubt whether the censure is just or not, whatever some say; because even in such a doubt, the power of the Superior possesses (n. 55). Cf. St. Alphonsus, VII, 45, 67, 68; D'Annibale, Summula, I, 312.

1 The things noted here refer to censures issued by man alone. Cf. Aertnys (l. VII, n. 17), who explains these things lucidly.