Drunkenness

Gluttony is of itself a venial sin, but it becomes mortal if it leads to violating precepts, such as those of fasting and abstinence, which bind under grave sin, or if it seriously injures health, or if it makes a man unfit to pursue his ordinary avoca- tions, or if eating and drinking become the end for which a man lives, whose God is his belly,¹ or if it causes complete loss of reason through drunkenness.

¹ Phil. iii 19.

Complete drunkenness which deprives a man of the use of reason, so that he cannot distinguish between what is right and wrong, is a mortal sin, for St Paul numbers it among those vices which exclude from the kingdom of God.¹ The malice of this sin does not consist merely in the depriving one’s self of the use of reason, for it is allowed to do that for a good cause, but in the depriving one’s self of the use of reason in such an unnatural way by the inordinate use of drink for a considerable time during which the recovery of the use of reason is out of one’s power, and without any just cause. Theologians more commonly teach that if there were a sufficient cause, it would not be morally wrong to make a man drunk as a substitute for the use of chloroform, or in order to counteract the effect of poison.

To drink to excess but not so as to be perfectly drunk is only a venial sin per se, but it may become mortal on account of the serious harm done thereby to one’s own health, or the spending in drink of money which is required for the support of one’s family or the payment of one’s creditors, or on account of grave scandal caused by such a sin, or on account of other sins to which it gives rise.

¹ Gal. v 21.

If a man could be prevented from committing a more serious sin, as murder, for example, in no other way except by making him drunk, many theologians teach that this would not be unlawful. For very probably I may induce another who is determined to commit some grave crime to be content with doing something which is less bad. Under such circumstances, to persuade another to do what is a less evil is a good action.¹

¹ St Alphonsus, 2, n. 57.

Bad actions committed in drink are imputable to the agent if they were foreseen in some confused way, for they are voluntary in their cause. The same must be said of blasphemy, indecent language, and other sins of word which retain their objective malice even when said by a drunken man. Mere abuse of others, inasmuch as nobody cares what a drunken man says, would not be sinful. However, when sins in word are committed in drink, there is so: nething wanting to them for their full and proper signification, and so, if blasphemy, for example, were punished by ecclesiastical censure or reservation, these would not be incurred for blasphemy uttered while drunk.

Morphia may be given to ease pain, and brandy to strengthen a sick person, even though they cause loss of reason. This follows from what has been said and from the principle of a double effect. It is not lawful to administer such medicines in order to deprive a dying man of the use of reason, so that he may die while unconscious. The time just before death is very precious; a sinner may then be reconciled with God and save his soul; one who is in the state of grace may very much increase his merit by a good use of that time. Euthanasia then, in this sense, is unlawful; it is virtually shortening a man’s life.

The terrible evil of drink should be combated by all the means, spiritual and temporal, which are at the disposal of the Christian. The general means which may be used are especially the frequent reception of the sacraments, the avoiding of dangerous companions and the occasions of sin, the cultivation of modes of taking innocent recreation while not at work either at home or outside, the joining of Catholic temperance societies whose members encourage each other by mutual example, and the taking of the pledge if its nature and obligations be properly understood.

IV. Drunkenness. 1. Notion. Drunkenness is the inordinate appetite for intoxicating drink; it is opposed to sobriety.

2. Division. Drunkenness is distinguished:

a) Into perfect and imperfect, according as reason is wholly or not wholly disturbed.

b) Into direct and indirect. It is direct when the intoxicating act, insofar as it is such, is intended as an end or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Otherwise it is indirect.

3. Morality. a) Perfect and direct drunkenness is a grave sin, at least if it is induced for a notable time. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture, which excludes drunkards from heaven;¹ 2. from reason; for a grave disorder is contained in an act which induces deprivation of the actual use of reason, indeed even of the proximate faculty of using reason for every sudden necessity; a deprivation, I say, which subsists in so unnatural a manner (St. Alphonsus, V, 75, 76). Now the unnatural manner consists in this, that the lower powers operate without reason directing them.² Therefore the malice of drunkenness is not found precisely from the deprivation of the actual use of reason - for this also has place in sleep - but from the said deprivation subsisting in such a manner. Nevertheless, according to most authors drunkenness is not mortal "if it deprives one of reason for a short time. But La Croix says that a long time seems to be one hour" (St. Alphonsus, V, 75). But this observation is of lesser importance, because a slight duration of drunkenness commonly cannot be foreseen.

b) Perfect and indirect drunkenness likewise is per se gravely illicit; but for a proportionate cause it is licit, if the end cannot be obtained by a more harmless means. The reason for the former is that it is per se gravely illicit to posit a cause from which a gravely evil effect will follow, such as the deprivation of the use of reason while the lower powers are operating. The latter follows from what was said concerning a cause with a double effect (St. Alphonsus, V, 76; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; II-II, q. 150, a. 3, ad 3).

c) Imperfect and direct drunkenness of itself is only venial, because in it the lower powers are not simply deprived of the guidance of reason. It can become mortal, for example, on account of harms to the family that will follow, on account of foreseen blasphemies, on account of grave scandal that will arise, etc.

Likewise, imperfect and indirect drunkenness is per se venial; for a just cause it is licit, if the end cannot be obtained by a more harmless means.

d) Finally, alcoholism, as it is called, must be very greatly condemned, since it harms the health of the body, gradually dulls the mind, incites to venereal things, extinguishes religious and moral sentiments, and takes away the happiness and prosperity of the family. Add that alcoholics not rarely beget children who are prone to venereal things, labor under abnormal affections, or are even exposed to the danger of mental deficiency. Hence the remedies, concerning which we shall speak under VI, should be diligently inculcated upon those given to alcoholism.

Corollary I. With the required conditions posited, it is licit to make oneself drunk to expel disease, or to lessen grave pains to be undergone in a surgical operation. The reason is that the act of drinking is not chosen insofar as it is intoxicating, but insofar as it is healing. I said, "with the required conditions posited," because to lessen pains a more natural means can commonly be used just as safely, and therefore must be used in preference to drunkenness, for example, ether taken by inhalation. Driving away melancholy does not constitute a sufficient cause (St. Alphonsus, V, 76, q. 1; cf. St. Thomas, cited place).

It is disputed whether it is licit for someone to make himself drunk in order to avoid death with which another threatens him unless he becomes drunk. Several affirm it, but with St. Alphonsus (V, 76, q. 2) it seems this must be denied, because evils are not to be done that goods may come. But in the hypothesis posited the act of drinking is evil. The reason is that the act of drinking is evil when it has no other effect than drunkenness; and this obtains in the case, because immunity from death is not an effect of the act of drinking itself.

Corollary II. For a grave cause it is licit to give another an occasion of making himself drunk; likewise it is licit to induce another to drunkenness so that he may be impeded from a greater evil, for example, from homicide (St. Alphonsus, V, 77; II, 57). These things will be further explained and proved in the treatise on charity.

Corollary III. Sins committed in drunkenness are imputed according to what was said in n. 60. By most authors insults against men are excepted, because they are usually reckoned as nothing. The contrary seems to be said of blasphemies, because the honor of God seems to demand that they be forestalled; likewise the contrary must be said of obscene words, by reason of scandal, and of defamation of one's neighbor, by reason of the harm that will arise (St. Alphonsus, V, 78).

¹ Gal. 5:21.

² This does not happen of itself in sleep or after the use, for example, of morphine; besides, sleep deprives one only of the use of reason, but not of the proximate faculty of using it, because a sleeping person can immediately be aroused from sleep.

V. The daughters of gluttony are: 1. dullness of mind; 2. foolish merriment; 3. much talking; 4. buffoonery; 5. uncleanness of body (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, 74).

VI. Remedies of gluttony, especially of drunkenness. 1. Consider its very evil effects. 2. Flee occasions. 3. Exercise sobriety, even by sometimes withdrawing from the appetite things which are licit. Especially let heavy drinkers be advised to enroll in a society instituted for promoting sobriety.¹ Let habitual drunkards be required to abstain entirely from intoxicating liquor, because moderate use is morally impossible for them.

On the use of chloroform, morphine, etc., consult the treatise on charity toward oneself.

¹ Societies of this kind have more than once been approved by the Holy See and enriched with indulgences (cf. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 6 May 1914; 12 June 1914).

I. The use of chloroform, ether, and other things by which the use of reason is removed, is of itself illicit, but lawful on account of a proportionate cause. It is said:

1. It is of itself illicit, because it not only deprives one of the actual use of reason without any utility that will follow of itself, but also of the proximate faculty of using it for a sudden necessity, as was said about drunkenness (n. 320; St. Alphonsus, V, 73).

2. It is lawful on account of a proportionate cause; this follows from what has been said about an act with a double effect. But the avoiding of pains in a surgical operation constitutes a proportionate cause; likewise the forestalling of extraordinary pains of childbirth;¹ but the avoiding of ordinary pains does not seem to suffice.

Corollary. More probably, it is lawful for a dying person, by means for example of chloroform, to deprive himself of the use of reason, so that he may die without very acute pain. The things opposed by authors to this doctrine prove at most that a graver reason is required in the article of death than in the course of life. But the relief of very acute pains seems to involve a sufficient reason, although it is better to endure them patiently; indeed, the spread of a practice of this sort would give occasion to consequences to be disapproved. Yet it is supposed that the dying person is sufficiently prepared for death; nor is it lawful for another to deprive a dying person of the use of reason without his consent.

Objection 1. If ever, at such a time it is necessary that the faculty of meriting be preserved for man.

Response. Why would it not be lawful, on account of a graver cause, to deprive oneself of the faculty of meriting in the article of death, just as the same thing is permitted on account of a lesser cause in the course of life?

Objection 2. Privation of the use of reason would then be entirely equivalent to abbreviation of life.

Response. It would be equivalent to abbreviation of moral life, I concede; but that seems lawful on account of a graver cause, just as outside the article of death it is lawful, on account of a lesser cause, to take away something from moral life.

II. The infrequent use of morphine, opium, and cocaine in small quantity is not harmful, and therefore is lawfully employed for alleviating pains or driving away sleeplessness. But there is easily danger lest use pass over into abuse and habit (morphinomania), which produces the worst consequences and therefore must be put away with all one's strength. These things noted generally, receive these special points, especially from Antonelli.²

1. The external causes which induce morphinomania can be: 1. physicians who abuse morphine, either by administering too great a quantity or by too frequently prescribing injections for the calming of pains; 2. the sick themselves, who, after they have once known this solace of pains, ask the physician that they may be able to use morphine more often; and he, either because the disease is chronic, or to avoid troublesome complaints, or because the sick person is poor and is no longer able to pay for medical visits, not only permits it, but hands over the prescription into his hands, to be renewed at his discretion; 3. directors and attendants in hospitals, who, for procuring the quiet of the sick who are too talkative or too affected by pains, admit too many injections; 4. pharmacists who, either from excessive love of profit, or from fear lest those clients desert them, or for shamefully capturing the pleasures of women, sell morphinic solutions without caution; 5. writings which treat of the morphinic matter, examples, and persuasions of others. But once the passion has been contracted, it is altogether incredible how many means, how many pretexts, and how much cunning morphine addicts employ in practice for making injections as often as they wish, wherever they stay.

2. The consequences that will follow from a habit contracted and continued are: memory is weakened; the will grows sluggish and gradually lacks every force; whence it happens that the morphine addict is incapable of correcting himself and very quickly rushes into his own ruin; the individual character is changed; instability of spirit, irascibility, and impotence occur; the moral sense is diminished and can even be wholly lost; then the way is opened to crimes of every kind, for thefts and carnal crimes occur very frequently; women often forget modesty; like those affected by hysteria, morphine addicts continually lie so that their habit may remain hidden; they frequently suffer hallucinations and illusions in the same way as those who are affected by alcoholism; sexual excitations at first are increased, but generally for a short time; in those who labor under chronic morphinomania, they are absent; infants who are born from a morphinomanic mother sometimes die immediately because of the lack of morphine which they were drawing in the womb through the maternal placenta. Nor is this enough; since the nervous system is especially badly affected, sleeplessness occurs with headaches, tremors of the hands and tongue, and disturbances in the pronunciation of words. The heat of the body also is increased, about 38 degrees C., bringing on fever, which presents the same characters as malarial and typhoid fever.

3. The sole and necessary remedy is placed in this, that they be deprived of the faculty of procuring new morphine for themselves, and be subjected to diligent custody. It is better to send them to hospices established for this purpose. But if this can be obtained, within a few weeks they obtain restoration of health; nevertheless after the cure it must greatly be guarded against and feared lest they fall again into abuse, which indeed certainly occurs unless they are most vigilantly guarded in all things.

¹ For the infant - thus Aertnys-Damen, relying on the testimony of a specialist concerned only with giving narcosis - harmful consequences from the mother's narcosis are not to be feared, provided that the narcosis is not too deep and does not last too long; this also holds concerning the narcotic which is called chloroforme a la reine (Theologia Moralis, I, 259).

² Medicina Pastoralis, I, n. 354 sq.

The Sins against Sobriety.—(a) The sin of excess may be called, for want of a special name, over-sobriety. It is committed by those who condemn all liking for or enjoyment of intoxicants as intrinsically evil (e.g., the Manichees, who said that wine was the gall of the devil); also by those who deny to themselves or others intoxicants when the use of them is necessary (e.g., the Encratites, who would allow only water for the Eucharist, or a fanatical teetotaler who would see a man die rather than give him a necessary dose of whisky).

(b) The sin of deficiency against sobriety is drunkenness, which is a voluntary and unjustified loss of the use of reason brought on by the consumption of too much intoxicating liquor. Drunkenness as a sin (active drunkenness), therefore, is to be distinguished from drunkenness as a condition (passive drunkenness). There is active drunkenness or the sin of drunkenness when intoxication is both voluntary and inexcusable; there is passive drunkenness or the mere state of drunkenness when one or the other of these two conditions is lacking. Usually those who sin by drunkenness seek the pleasure or forgetfulness which potations bring, but this is not essential, it seems, to the sin of inebriety; the malice of drunkenness is found not merely in the excessive pleasure, but especially in the subordination of spirit to the flesh and in the damage done to mind and body. Hence, a person who yields to the insistence of a banquet companion that he drink wine which is disgusting to him, is guilty of drunkenness if he takes too much.

Cases of Mere Passive Drunkenness.—(a) Involuntary Drunkenness.—This occurs when there is invincible ignorance of fact (e.g., when an adult becomes intoxicated in good faith, because he had no reason to suspect that a cocktail or eggnog was very strong, or that his stomach was very weak), or of law (e.g., when a child gets drunk because he does not know that it is wrong to do so), or when there is lack of intention (e.g., when drink is forced on a person who does not want it).

(b) Excusable Drunkenness.—This occurs according to most theologians when there is a proportionately grave reason which justifies the evil of intoxication (see 103 sqq.). Such grave reasons are the saving of life (e.g., to escape death from snake bite), the cure of serious disease (e.g., cholera or influenza), the avoidance or mitigation of severe suffering (e.g., before a surgical operation, or after a very painful accident, or when there is no other means of helping a grave case of insomnia). In all these cases it is generally admitted that one may bring on unconsciousness by the use of anesthetics and sedatives (such as chloroform, ether, morphine, opium); and there is no reason why we should not view intoxicants also in the light of remedies which may be taken on the advice of physicians or other competent persons if other remedies cannot be had. Some theologians, however, refuse to excuse intoxication for any reason, since they regard drunkenness as intrinsically evil. In addition to the excuses just mentioned some also give that of escape from violent death, as when a burglar threatens to kill unless those present make themselves helpless by intoxication. But all agree that intoxication is not excused by ordinary advantages, such as escape from slight physical pain (e.g., toothache, seasickness), nor by the desire to avoid what can be avoided by other and more suitable means (e.g., worry about one’s troubles, an unpleasant meeting or conversation).

The Morality of Total Abstinence.—(a) Obligation.—Per se, there is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of intoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and drink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of intoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is found by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an excellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water into wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of the elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not sinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the Bible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36), recommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23), and declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt., xv. 2).

But, per accidens, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a greater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good be of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one’s health or morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them) or of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal, Rom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through drunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the most reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection to prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that particular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by impartial study.

(b) Lawfulness.—Per se, it is also permissible to abstain freely from all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order the better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence calumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example. But, per accidens, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the celebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who cannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits. Examples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson (Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist (Luke, i. 15).

Degrees of the Sin of Drunkenness.—(a) The sin of perfect or complete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so far that one loses temporarily the use of reason. This does not mean that one must become insensible or fall in a stupor or be unable to walk or have delirium tremens (dead drunk), but only that one loses the mental power to direct oneself morally, even though one still retains enough judgment to direct oneself physically (e.g., to cross the street or ascend the stairs safely, or to find one’s own quarters without help). The indications of perfect drunkenness are that the intoxicated person no longer distinguishes between right and wrong, perpetrates evils he would abhor in his right senses (e.g., beats his wife, runs down a pedestrian, blasphemes, or provokes quarrels), and cannot remember on sobering up the chief things he said or did while drunk.

(b) The sin of imperfect or incomplete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so far that one is somewhat confused in mind, but does not lose the use of reason. Hence, a person who is physically impeded though not mentally incapable on account of drink, who staggers, speaks incoherently, or sees uncertainly, but who knows that he should not beat his wife, or kill, or blaspheme, or quarrel, etc., is imperfectly drunk. There are also circumstances that aggravate the evil of perfect or imperfect drunkenness. Thus, it is worse to be a toper or habitual drunkard than to be an occasional drunkard, and worse to go on a long spree than to be drunk only for an evening.

Malice of the Sin of Drunkenness.—(a) Perfect drunkenness is a mortal sin, because it is a grave disorder to deprive oneself of moral judgment and thus expose oneself to the danger of perpetrating serious crimes and injuries. Moreover, it is a monstrous thing to despoil oneself unnecessarily of reason, the greatest natural good of man, and to make oneself for the time being a maniac, more like a beast than a human being. St. Paul declares that those who would put on Christ must put away drunkenness with other works of darkness (Rom., xiii. 13), and that drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 21). The opinion that perfect drunkenness is only venial if not habitual is now obsolete, and the opinion that perfect drunkenness is not mortal unless it lasts a considerable time (say, more than an hour) is commonly rejected; for the essential malice of drunkenness depends on its nature, not on its frequency or duration. A person who takes enough to make himself completely drunk and then escapes the consequences by artificial means (e.g., by using a drug or bringing on a vomit), does not sin mortally by drunkenness; but it seems that such a swinish person must sin mortally by reason of gluttony, injury to health, or scandal.

(b) Imperfect drunkenness is a venial sin, because the harm done is not considerable, for a tipsy man usually suffers nothing more than a slightly fuddled brain and some unsteadiness of body. Indeed, if wine or beer produces nothing more than a spirit of moderate hilarity and talkativeness, there is no sin.

Accidentally, imperfect drunkenness may be a mortal sin by reason of circumstances, as when the person who is intoxicated gives great scandal on account of his position or office, or when the motive is to inflame passion or to commit other serious sin, or when the drunkenness is constantly repeated, or when the drunkard seriously neglects his business, family, or religious duties, or does other grave harm in consequence of his love of the bottle. In fact, there may be grave sin when one is not intoxicated at all, but is only a tippler. For the habit of drinking alcoholic beverages frequently (e.g., a nip or dram of whisky several times a day) is, according to medical authority, more harmful to the system (alcoholism) than intoxication at long intervals, especially if the portion is generous and the drinker is young.

Drunkenness Compared with Other Sins.—(a) It is not the worst of sins. Sins against the theological virtues are more wicked, since they offend against divine good, whereas drunkenness is against human good. Many sins against the moral virtues are worse, since they injure a greater human good; for example, it is more harmful to take away life than to suspend the use of reason.

(b) It is one of the most ruinous of sins in its consequences (see 2472, 2473): first, for society, since a large percentage of crime, insanity, destitution, and misery is due to intemperance; secondly, to religion, since indulgence in one sensual pleasure sharpens the appetite for others, while creating a distaste for spiritual things, for effort and self-sacrifice; thirdly, to the intellect, for strong drink steals away the mind and memory; fourthly, to the body, for drunkenness not only prostrates the nervous system at the moment and has most painful after-effects in bursting headaches and disabled stomach, but it also causes permanent disasters (to brain, heart, nerves, kidneys, and liver), weakens the resistance to disease and brings on an early death; fifthly, to goods of fortune, since drunkards squander their all for drink; sixthly, to posterity, since intemperate parents transmit constitutional weakness to their children.

Responsibility of Drunkard for Sins Committed While Intoxicated.—(a) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, he is responsible for all the sins he foresaw or should have foreseen; for then these sins are willed in their cause (see 94 sqq.). Hence one who is accustomed while under the influence of liquor to blaspheme, betray secrets, quarrel, etc., should confess that he committed them while drunk, or that he was prepared to commit them in getting drunk. Under similar conditions one who misses Mass because he was drunk is responsible for the omission; one who is too drunk to attend to a business appointment and thereby causes loss to another is held to restitution. But, if grave sins are foreseen only in a very confused way, generally they will be imputable only as venial in themselves.

(b) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, but the sins that ensued were not foreseen and could not humanly have been foreseen, the drunkard is excused at least in part from the guilt of these sins. Hence, a person who gets drunk for the first time or who usually sleeps after getting drunk is not responsible for the bad language he uses, if the thought of profanity was farthest from his mind when he became drunk. But if this person was not completely drunk and had some realization of the malice and scandal of bad language, he is at least venially guilty of profanity and scandal.

(c) If the drunkenness was involuntary, the drunken person is excused entirely in case of complete drunkenness; he is excused partially in case of incomplete drunkenness that did not exclude some realization of the sinfulness of what he said or did while intoxicated (see Canon 2201, Sec.3). In the civil law drunkenness is not held to be an excuse for a criminal act, but it may negative a specific intent (Robinson, Elements of Law, Sec.Sec.471, 525, 531).

Material Cooperation in the Sin of Drunkenness—(a) If there is no grave reason for the cooperation, it is illicit. Mere hospitality is not a sufficient reason for furnishing a table with a great supply of strong drinks when some of the guests are dipsomaniacs, and mere good fellowship does not justify one who has been treated to order another round of treats if some of the drinkers are already inebriated. Parents or others in authority who get drunk before their subjects are guilty of scandal; those who encourage drunkenness are guilty of seduction; those who supply others with drink in order that these may become drunkards are guilty of formal cooperation.

(b) If there is a grave reason for cooperation, it is not illicit (1515 sqq., 1538 sqq.). Whether it is lawful to persuade another to get sinfully drunk in order to keep him from the commission of a greater evil (e.g., homicide or sacrilege), is a disputed question (see 1502).

Is it lawful to make another person drunk when he will be guiltless of sin, and there is a grave reason?

(a) According to one opinion this is not lawful, because drunkenness, like impurity, is intrinsically evil and never permissible, since the end does not justify the means. Hence, just as it would be wrong to induce a drunken person to impurity, so it would also be wrong to intoxicate a child or an insane person (see 306).

(b) According to the common opinion, it is lawful to intoxicate oneself for a grave reason (see 2477 b), and hence also it is lawful to intoxicate another for a similar reason. Thus, if a criminal were about to blow up a building and destroy many lives, it would be permissible or even obligatory to put powerful intoxicants into his drink so as to make him helpless. If one were about to be roasted by cannibals and could escape by making the cannibals drunk, it would not be sinful to make them drunk.

Licit Use of Narcotics.—There are a great many substances that produce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors, namely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform, ether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given above in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to make oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just reason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when having a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to relieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (The Pope Speaks, Summer, 1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the use of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions submitted to him for consideration were the following:

1. Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to accept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in certain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of serious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with the spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and does prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may licitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted in fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior purification.

2. Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to make use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The Pope responded; “Yes—provided that no other means exist, and if, in the given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out of other moral and religious duties.” The duties referred to include settling important business, making a will, or going to confession. (Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist in asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without rendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed, which results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the patient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the licit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: “if the dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons clearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the permitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the treatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents to it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally permissible.”

3. Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be accompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that “every form of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in order to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one presumes to dispose directly of life ... If between the narcotics and the shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed either by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of things (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be attained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the administration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is lawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is important also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does not make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means. Finally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the limits which are actually necessary.”

What is drunkenness? - The malice of drunkenness is in the voluntary privation, by an artificial, unnatural, and violent mode through immoderate intoxicating drink, of the use of reason, not merely negatively, as in sleep, but contrarily through the disturbance of reason. "Drunkenness is a mortal sin, because according to this man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, by which he operates according to virtue and avoids sins; and thus he sins mortally by committing himself to danger of sinning. Hence drunkenness, speaking per se, is a mortal sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 2; 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; Gal. 5:21; L. 75. Drunkenness is opposed to the virtue of sobriety, whose office is to apply measure "concerning drink, not any whatsoever, but that which by its smokiness is naturally apt to disturb the head, as wine, and everything which can intoxicate." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 149, a. 1. Alcoholism pertains to drunkenness. By alcoholism is signified drunkenness produced by alcoholic drinks, abuse of alcoholic drinks, and the grave effects produced by abuse of this sort. But since these effects, gravely harmful to health, are produced gradually, it is difficult practically to define when, by this reason, the sin begins to be grave.

332 bis. Note: The promise (the pledge), which is customary in America and other regions, of abstinence from every intoxicating drink, of itself brings no obligation under grave or under light sin. For it is a certain simple purpose, and the declaration made of it, of not drinking wine and other alcoholic drinks. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it can also be made under sin. But societies which are established for extirpating the vice of drunkenness are greatly to be praised.

Resolves: If someone knowingly and willingly takes so great a draught of wine as is apt to intoxicate, he is in no way excused from mortal sin, although before he is deprived of his senses he gives himself over to sleep, by which he may escape the effect of the wine; because that drink is already intrinsically evil, since of itself it is already apt to deprive man of the use of reason, and it is per accidens that he himself is deprived of the senses through sleep. Nor indeed in sleep does he have the proximate power for the use of reason. He does not sin mortally who from drinking wine does not totally lose the use of reason, although the mind is disturbed, yet so that he is able to discern between good and evil, as theologians commonly say. Theologians also commonly add that drunkenness is not mortal if it deprives one of reason for a little time. But La-Croix says that a long time seems to be one hour, and that it is licit, in order to avert pain, sadness, and melancholy, to drink up to hilarity, as also to propose a toast to someone's health, or to foster the union of friends and charity. La-Croix, l. 5, nn. 314, 317, 327; L. 75, 78.

Is it licit, in order to drive away illness, to take drink, if drunkenness is foreseen to follow from it? R. More probably affirmatively, if the drink is taken to correct depraved qualities; for then the privation of reason follows per accidens and indirectly, and therefore can licitly be permitted. But if the drink is taken in order directly to procure drunkenness or privation of reason, St. Alphonsus and others deny it, because to deprive oneself of the proximate faculty of the use of reason is intrinsically evil; but Busemb. and others affirm it, relying chiefly on the authority of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1, where he says: "For that man, without necessity, should render himself incapable of using reason, by which man is ordered to God and avoids many occurring sins, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue." Note "without necessity, from the pleasure of wine alone." Therefore, if necessity is present, and not from the pleasure of wine, it is not contrary to virtue. Laymann, l. 2, s. 4, n. 5; La-Croix, l. 5, nn. 310, 311, 312, 313; Struggl 25; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 2 ad 3; L. 76.

Is drunkenness licit for undergoing a surgical operation? - The first opinion, which St. Alphonsus, 76, and others hold, denies it, because in this case drunkenness would be directly intended, or the privation of reason, which is intrinsically evil, as a means of removing the pain of the senses. But the second opinion affirms it. 1. Because privation of the use of reason at least for a brief time, and from a grave cause, does not seem intrinsically evil. 2. Because drink is not directly given for causing the privation of reason, but for the sleep of the senses; and therefore drunkenness follows indirectly per accidens. For neither does the sleep of the senses proceed from privation of reason, but from relaxation and dulling of the nerves; and from the sleep of the senses proceeds privation of the use of reason. Gur. Baller. 182.

Therefore in no way is to be condemned the use of other medicines whose primary power is to bring on sleep, or to make the nerves numb, such as opium and the inhalation of ether. Antonelli, vol. 1, p. 2, de 5 Praec., c. 6; La-Croix, l. 5, n. 314. Chloroform: Its use is licit for lessening or preventing pains in a surgical operation, in difficult childbirth, and even in ordinary childbirth, since the danger which some affirm would arise to mother and child does not in reality exist. Morphine: Taken in great quantity it causes death; in small quantity, it produces sleep of the senses and privation of the use of reason; in smallest quantity, it is useful for calming the nerves and for restoring strength. Injections, for lessening pains, if they are done sometimes and in small quantity, are not illicit. In great pains they provide true relief. But if they are used repeatedly, and in greater quantity, they gravely harm bodily health, and consequently are illicit. Cocaine: Insofar as it is used for lessening pains, if it is done with due moderation, and no grave danger afterward is present either to health or even to life, it is licit per se.

Is it licit to induce someone to drunkenness, so that he may be impeded from a graver evil, e.g., from committing sacrilege or homicide? - The first opinion affirms it, because this is to diminish an evil which otherwise cannot be impeded. "That which is contrary to reason has more of the account of evil than that which removes the use of reason for an hour."

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 3 ad 2. The second opinion distinguishes, and says that it is licit to induce another to material drunkenness, i.e., when the other becomes drunk without sin, for instance by setting before him very strong or medicated wine, because then on the one hand he does not sin, and on the other the harm of drunkenness is permitted in order to avoid a graver harm of others. But they say it is not licit to induce him to formal drunkenness, namely with his own sin, since this is intrinsically evil, and therefore never to be permitted. But the third opinion grants neither, because, since such a person is in no way thinking about wine, to induce him positively to drunkenness is accordingly evil. "Nevertheless, these things notwithstanding," St. Alphonsus, 77, concludes, "the first opinion seems sufficiently probable to me and to other learned men consulted by me, whether the drunkenness is material or formal, on account of the reason already brought forward, because it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil, so that he may be impeded from a greater." Namely then it is not to counsel evil, but good, that is, the choice of the lesser evil.

Is it licit to intoxicate someone so that he may reveal secrets? Struggl, 25, has these things: "It is licit materially to intoxicate another... for eliciting secrets which the other is bound to manifest; but if this were done to elicit secrets which the other could manifest with a good conscience, yet is not bound to manifest, an injury would be done to him, because he is reasonably unwilling against such intoxication and such a mode of eliciting secrets. This is true a fortiori when the other cannot manifest similar secrets with a good conscience." La-Croix has the same, l. 5, nn. 328, 329.

Does someone sin gravely by inducing a madman into drunkenness? R. Negatively per se, because a fool, as already deprived of the use of reason, cannot any longer be deprived of the use of reason. Per se, because if a fool after excessive drink is accustomed to do shameful things, or to break out into blasphemies, and the one who induces him to drink knows this, the latter will sin gravely against the natural law; because the fool violates it materially, since he is subject to it in first act. Elbel 679-681.

Are evils committed in drunkenness imputable? - R. Negatively, if they were not foreseen at least in confusion, as is clear; affirmatively, if they were foreseen at least in confusion, at least evils of deed, as again is clear from what has been said. At least evils of deed; for injurious words, or even contumelious deeds, probably are not imputable if they are uttered against men, since according to common estimation they are judged to inflict no injury and contumely; otherwise, however, if they are uttered against God, as blasphemies, etc., because even that material utterance alone of blasphemies, voluntary in the cause, tends to the diminution of divine honor. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus, 78, does not dare to call the contrary opinion of the Salmanticenses improbable. - But since blasphemy uttered in drunkenness does not have in itself the true nature of blasphemy, although it was foreseen, it is not subject to reservation and censure, if perhaps there is any. - Likewise obscene words, by reason of the scandal of others, are also imputable as sin if they are foreseen. - L. 2, 78; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 30; Sanch., in dec., l. 1, c. 16, n. 42 seqq.; C. B. 827; C. A. 1307; C. I. 1151; C. L. 2361.

What is the special malice of scandal? In direct scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue to whose violation the neighbor is induced. But in indirect scandal, both the opinion affirming and the opinion denying this other special malice are probable. Proof of the first part: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2.

Because any virtue prohibits not only that someone injure it, but also that he will and cause it to be injured by others. Proof of the second part: 1. because for each opinion there are grave theologians. 2. Because, as the indirect voluntary suffices for sinning, so also it suffices for sinning against such a virtue with respect to which it is indirectly voluntary; whence it is that in morals the direct and indirect voluntary pertain to the same species. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue which is injured by the neighbor. But against this is that virtues do not oblige us to impede in others opposed vices, even if foreseen, but only that we not intend and procure that others injure them. It is proper only to charity alone to forbid giving another an occasion of injuring it. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is not given sin against the virtue which the neighbor violates. "For just as in natural things that which is per accidens does not constitute species, so neither in moral things, in which that which is intended is per se, but what follows beside intention is as it were per accidens." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 39, a. 1. - Lugo, de Poen., d. 16, nn. 159, 168; Struggl, q. 5, n. 21 seqq.; L. 44, 45, 46, 47; l. 3, n. 537.

If someone has received a depraved book lent by another to be read, can he restore it to the owner? - R. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience persuades otherwise. This flows of its own accord from the obligation of impeding the sins of others by reason of charity, when this can be done without grave inconvenience. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this sort from the owner.

181. • Drunkenness is voluntary excess in drink up to the deprivation of reason. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., no. 75.

Perfect drunkenness, namely reaching to the deprivation of reason, is grave sin of itself. This is established 1. from reason; for voluntarily to deprive oneself of the use of reason, disturbing it in a violent and unnatural mode, at least without grave cause and for pleasure ¹, is gravely opposed to rational nature. For thus man casts himself down to the state of brutes, and disfigures the image of God in himself. - St. Lig., no. 75, and others very commonly.

¹ Indeed St. Thomas expressly writes: from the pleasure of wine alone. Thus the Holy Doctor (1.2, q. 88, art. 5, ad 1): But concerning drunkenness it must be said... that it is mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself impotent for using reason, by which man is ordered to God and avoids many occurring sins, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue.

It is established 2. from Sacred Scripture, 1 Cor. 6.10: Nor drunkards... shall possess the kingdom of God. - And Isaiah 5.11: Woe to you who rise in the morning to follow drunkenness... Now the particle woe in Sacred Scripture denotes a most grave evil.

But more probably it is of itself only venial sin if the drunkenness is imperfect. Thus commonly. - St. Lig., ibid. ².

² Thus St. Alphonsus: It is certain among all that for drunkenness to be mortal sin, it is required that it be perfect, namely that which wholly deprives of the use of reason.

182. Questions. - QUESTION 1. What are the signs of perfect drunkenness?

I answer: The following are reported, namely 1. not to know how to distinguish good from evil; 2. not to remember things said or done in drunkenness; 3. to do wholly unusual things, which namely at other times are never usually done with a sound mind..., etc. - But hesitation of the tongue, staggering of the feet, sight of double objects, or of objects turning themselves in a circle, are not certain signs. - St. Lig., no. 78.

QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to intoxicate oneself for driving away illness?

I answer: Yes, more probably, if drunkenness follows only as an effect of a means licit of itself, for example if a notable quantity of generous wine is required for warding off illness. This is established from what was said On Human Acts, no. 9. - St. Lig., no. 76, and others commonly ³.

³ St. Thomas (2.2, q. 150, art. 2, ad 3): When someone drinks much... according to the counsel of medicine..., the drink is not to be reputed superfluous.

QUESTION 3. Whether drunkenness is licit for undergoing a surgical operation?

I answer: It is controverted. St. Lig. with others denies it, because drunkenness would be directly intended, and the good effect would follow from evil. But Busemb. with others affirms it, because the deprivation of the use of reason for a brief time from a grave cause does not seem something intrinsically evil. St. Thomas agrees, 2.2, qu. 150, art. 2 ⁴. And in reality just as in such a case opium and ether are employed, so also wine could be employed. Moreover, a question of this kind scarcely pertains to practice now, since other easier means are available for that end.

⁴ St. Thomas places the vice of drunkenness in superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone. See the text related above from 1.2, q. 88, art. 1, ad 1.

** The VV. (page 913, no. 22) bring forward these words of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 76): The first opinion seems sufficiently probable, indeed more probable to me, in the case in which a draught of wine is furnished for expelling or correcting depraved humors; for then the deprivation of reason happens by accident and indirectly, and therefore can licitly be permitted.... It must be said otherwise if the draught were given directly for drunkenness, or for causing deprivation of reason; for this would always be intrinsically evil. Hence, as Croix well observes (book 5, no. 331)... it is never licit to intoxicate oneself for stupefying the senses.

I answer: 1. Croix discusses one condemned to death, and rightly disposed, and says that there is grave sin 1. because this is not the end of drink, 2. nor is there sufficient reason for taking away reason when it is then maximally necessary. Let the first reason, truly futile, be omitted; for neither is the end, for example, of the feet to kill flies; nor nevertheless does he sin gravely who destroys a fly by treading on it. But the other reason concerning necessity then urging militates for that special case, not however for others. Therefore that allegation seems less to the point.

I answer: 2. To the reason of St. Alphonsus there will be one who replies that even in our case the draught is not given directly for causing deprivation of reason, but for stupefaction of the senses; and therefore drunkenness follows indirectly and by accident: for stupefaction of the senses does not come from deprivation of reason, but from relaxation and dullness of the nerves.

183. • QUESTION 4. Whether it is licit to induce someone to drunkenness, so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

I answer: 1. Yes, if drunkenness is only material for him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. - Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc.

I answer: 2. More commonly they deny it, if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done so that goods may come. - Yet St. Lig., no. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others ⁵. An opinion of this kind can be admitted in this sense, insofar as formal drunkenness is only permitted, for example, by supplying wine..., etc.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 77): The first opinion seems sufficiently probable to me and to other learned men consulted by me, whether the drunkenness is material or formal, on account of the reason already brought, because it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater one, according to those things which we have said about scandal. Therefore from St. Alphonsus this opinion can be led into practice, when that necessity urges.

QUESTION 5. Whether all evils done in drunkenness are imputable?

I answer: 1. No, if they were not foreseen, not even confusedly, because whatever things were not foreseen must be held wholly involuntary.

I answer: 2. Yes, for the opposite reason, if they were foreseen, at least as to evils of deed, whether of commission or of omission.

I have said, at least as to evils of deed; for as to evils of mouth, or words or even deeds merely contumelious, they are probably not imputable if they are uttered against men; since by common estimation they are judged to infer no contumely. Otherwise, however, if they are uttered against God, such as blasphemies, etc..., because these are intrinsically evil, and consequently turn to the contumely of divine honor; otherwise, as foreseen, they are voluntary in the cause itself. - St. Lig., no. 78, who nevertheless does not dare to call the contrary opinion improbable ⁶.

⁶ Namely the opinion of the Salmanticenses was (treat. 25, ch. 2, nos. 30, 31) that blasphemies or perjuries, however much foreseen, are not imputed to a drunk man, because, as they say, a concept of the mind does not correspond to the words; which opinion moreover they wrongly ascribe both to Sanchez and to Dominic Soto. But the Salmanticenses seem to have confused two things which are plainly disparate, namely having no concept of the mind, and lacking dominion over oneself or one's faculties. This latter is easily conceded concerning drunk persons; but as to the fact that they have no concept of the mind, while, for example, already drunk they ask for wine, while they are angry at those denying wine, while they curse, imprecate, and threaten, I do not know whether anyone will consent. Therefore the foundation of that opinion collapses.

END OF THE TREATISE ON SINS

184. Resolves. - 1. They sin gravely who, drinking by day and night, knowingly expose themselves to the danger of drunkenness. Likewise those who by command or counsel induce others to drunkenness; or who provoke to equal draughts with foreseen danger of drunkenness.

2. They sin gravely who, knowing by experience that they become drunk in these or those companies, nevertheless are engaged in the same. Likewise those who, while drinking, adverting to the danger of drunkenness, still continue to drink.

3. They also sin gravely who drink so much that drunkenness must follow, although they commit themselves to sleep before they are deprived of senses and reason, because in sleep they do not have proximate power for the use of reason.

4. Nor are they excused from grave sin who, under pretext of native custom, or good affection, or urbanity, urge and as though necessitate guests to drinking up to the danger of drunkenness; but it is otherwise if only more liberal drink is offered and proposed rather often, yet in moderate quantity.

5. They do not sin gravely of themselves who are so strong, and accustomed to wine, that they are never made drunk, even if they drink more largely than others, unless they so exceed temperance that grave detriment of health can deservedly be feared. - See Cases, no. 176 and following.

541. (A) Its malice. The special malice of drunkenness is situated in this, that it induces privation of the use of reason without cause, and brings the drunken man into danger of perpetrating actions contrary to good morals. - There are degrees in drunkenness: it is called imperfect when the use of reason is diminished, without being utterly taken away, as, for example, when the feet and knees totter, the tongue hesitates, the eyes look upon objects duplicated or moving themselves in a circle; - but it is called complete when the use of reason is utterly taken away, for example, when someone does unusual things which, in control of himself, he is not accustomed to do, or does not know how to distinguish between good and evil, or does not remember notable things which he did while drunk, or collapses destitute of the senses. These things being posited:

542. (a) Voluntary drunkenness, at least that which deprives one of every use of reason, even admitted once, is of itself a mortal sin. It is declared; here the question is of voluntary drunkenness, namely that which is incurred knowingly and willingly; for if someone drinks wine or liquor too strong, yet whose power of intoxicating he did not know, so that he did not foresee at least probably that drunkenness would follow from it, he does not sin; say the same if, on account of weakness of strength or an empty stomach, unexpectedly from a few draughts, without moral foresight, he becomes drunk. - Likewise the question is of drunkenness which is full, or at least gravely disturbs reason and induces the danger of grave disorder; for imperfect drunkenness does not exceed venial sin, as long as someone retains that knowledge which is necessary for acting morally rightly.¹ - This drunkenness, even admitted once, is a grave sin, whatever a few theologians say to the contrary, who think only the custom of drunkenness to be a mortal sin.

¹ Some say that he does not gravely sin who for a short time, which does not reach an hour, deprives himself of the use of reason; thus Noldin, n. 509. - Yet we reject this as less probable; for if someone knowingly and willingly drinks in such a way that he certainly foresees that for half an hour he will be deprived of the use of reason, and indeed without any necessity, this is a grave disorder, and therefore a mortal fault. Besides, as Noldin himself rightly notes, it can scarcely be foreseen that drink will not deprive one of the use of reason for longer than the space of an hour.

It is proved. Scripture vehemently reproves drunkenness, and reckons it among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Woe to you who rise in the morning to follow drunkenness, and to drink until evening, that you may be inflamed with wine... But take heed to yourselves lest perhaps your hearts be weighed down in surfeiting and drunkenness... Neither thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards... shall possess the kingdom of God."²

² Isa. 5:11; Luke 21:34; 1 Cor. 6:10.

In reality, through drunkenness, man voluntarily, without necessity, on account of mere pleasure, deprives himself of the most excellent good by which he is distinguished from beasts, namely the use of reason, so that the lower faculties, which are not lulled to sleep, lack the guidance and rule of reason: thus he is made not only unfit for good, but prone to evil. This indeed is a grave disorder, which certainly is not excused by pleasure alone, as is certainly gathered from the common sense of honorable persons.

543. (b) Nevertheless drunkenness is not so intrinsically evil that it cannot be permitted for a grave cause, for example, for curing a disease, or for breaking the force of poison taken from a serpent's bite. Thus more probably, with St. Alphonsus (n. 76), against Collet, Billuart, etc., who think that voluntary privation of reason is wholly and utterly evil. For through drunkenness reason itself is not lost, but only the use of reason for some time; now to render oneself impotent, in a transitory manner, for using reason is something evil if it is done from pleasure alone, because an inferior good is preferred to a superior good; but if this is done on account of a grave cause, which compensates for the evil effect, it cannot be called illicit, because then the lesser of two evils is chosen. Who, for example, will ever blame him who takes an intoxicating drink absolutely necessary for saving life?

544. Hence it is probable that it is licit to bring about privation of the use of reason through intoxicating drink, if this is necessary for more safely performing a surgical operation. - Likewise, more probably, he does not sin who, from fear of death struck into him, drinks with the danger of making himself drunk, because he does not intend drunkenness, but only wishes to avoid death.

545. To provide someone the occasion of drunkenness, without a grave cause, is not licit, as is clear from the things said concerning cooperation in evil, above, n. 185; but, when a proportionately grave cause exists, this is probably licit; for materially to cooperate in an evil action is not prohibited, provided the act is not intrinsically evil, and besides there is a proportionate reason for cooperating, from what was said above, n. 185. Thus he seems to be excused who, captured by robbers, gives them wine abundantly, so that he may be able to escape from their hands. - But we think it is not licit by positive counsel to induce someone to formal drunkenness: for this is nothing other than positively to advise sin. But if it can be foreseen from the circumstances that the drunkenness is not going to be culpable, because, for example, those of whom the question is are ignorant of the strength of the wine or liquor, it is probably not illicit to induce them to drink, with the foresight that they are going to be made drunk, when this is necessary for avoiding a greater evil, for example, homicide: for then moral evil is not advised, but an action of itself indifferent is placed, with foresight of the evil effect, and indeed for avoiding a greater evil. In any hypothesis, account must also be taken of scandal, or of the effects which are foreseen to follow from drunkenness, even material drunkenness.

546. (c) Sins committed in drunkenness are imputed in the way in which they were foreseen; wherefore, if they are foreseen only confusedly, generally they are not mortal; but if rather clearly and distinctly, by him who knows by experience that in the state of drunkenness he is liable to such sins, nothing prevents them from being mortal in the cause, from the things said above, n. 171.

547. (B) Concerning the use of morphine, cocaine, and chloroform.¹ Today, for easing the pains of the sick and for performing surgical operations more safely, narcotic remedies are often employed, which sometimes take away the use of reason for some time. It is expedient to note a few things concerning their use.

¹ Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis, 11th ed., Aachen, 1896, p. 34-42.

(a) Morphine (say nearly the same concerning cocaine) is taken not only by way of drink, but also, and more often, by subcutaneous injection. It is altogether efficacious for easing pains; indeed it provokes a certain sense of cheerfulness; but at the same time it weakens the nerves, and induces a great desire of receiving again and again new injections. If the physician, overcome by repeated complaints of the sick person, acquiesces, the power of resisting pains decreases in the sick person, and the injection of morphine is sought more frequently day by day. But the more frequent and more copious use of this remedy soon brings morphinomania with it: then the sick person appears now livid and sluggish, now agitated; he trembles like a drinker, loathes food and digests only with difficulty; he labors under insomnia and anxiety of soul, and not rarely falls into fury and delirium tremens.

548. These things being posited, physicians can use so dangerous a remedy only cautiously and moderately, namely when it is judged necessary or very useful; therefore let them strenuously resist the importunate complaints of the sick, whenever these seek morphine without sufficient reason. But those who already labor under morphinomania generally can be cured only in a special hospital, where for some time they are kept as though imprisoned: otherwise, they soon fall into dementia.

At the article of death, it is not licit to furnish morphine for the purpose that the sick man be deprived of the use of reason and depart without consciousness of pain. This indeed would be wicked, if the sick man were not yet prepared for death, because he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation. - If he is rightly disposed for death, generally it is not licit to deprive him of the use of reason, because thus he would lack the opportunity of acquiring merits, and of immediately preparing himself for death, and also of eliciting acts of obedience, patience, confidence, love, by which his glory in heaven can be so greatly increased. - Nevertheless if the pains are excessive, and the sick man is very liable to movements of impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he may fall into sin, the aforementioned use of morphine indeed cannot be positively permitted, but can be tolerated.

549. (b) Chloroform, employed in surgical operations, induces sleep and insensibility, and from this head operations are performed much more easily and safely. But sometimes, although rarely, death is caused from it. Wherefore it is licit to use this remedy only for a grave cause and cautiously, after a diligent examination, from which it is clear that in the case there is no probable danger of death for the sick person. But before someone gives himself over to physicians, prudence suggests that he consult his conscience through devout reception of the sacraments.

550. By the name alcoholism is designated the habit of frequently drinking various alcoholic liquors, even without drunkenness, from which it happens that a nearly invincible desire of drinking is contracted, and the whole body, infected by alcoholic poison, is weakened day by day.

¹ Centennial Temperance Volume, New York, 1876; Farrar, Talks on Temperance, London; Cyclopaedia of Temperance, New York; M. Vanlaer, L'alcoolisme et ses remedes, Paris, Colin, 1897; Mgr Turinaz, Trois fleaux de la classe ouvriere, Nancy et Paris; id., Le clerge catholique et la lutte contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Racl, Alcoolisme et decadence, Paris, 1900; Riemain, Plan de campagne contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Dr Legrain, Un fleau social, l'alcoolisme, Paris, Gautier; Oudaille, Le Foyer familial et la femme contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1904; J. Bertillon, L'alcoolisme et les moyens de le combattre, Paris, 1904; Cheysson et Riemain, Premier Congres national contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, Asselin, 1904 (which work we allege below with one word, Congres).

(A) The origin and causes of alcoholism. This vice, very common among pagans,² and never entirely extirpated by Christianity, began to revive and creep everywhere from the time when alcoholic liquors, by the help of the chemical art, could more easily be extracted from almost all substances: for then it prevailed not only among the rich, but also among workers and the poor. Politicians favored this vice not a little: for, to obtain the votes of citizens, they did not hesitate to multiply taverns and drinking-shops more than enough; indeed, to capture popular favor, they did not blush to distribute money to be dissipated in drinking bouts. Workers, who often live in sordid houses or rooms, do not care to remain at home in the evening hours, but prefer to converse with companions in taverns and other places where liquors are sold. Moreover, nourished by light and scant food, they not rarely seek a certain compensation in alcoholic drinks.³ - Sometimes, even among the richer, there are those who, given over to idleness, seek consolation in often repeated libations.¹ - By force of heredity, the propension to drinking is frequently transmitted, and is confirmed by education: for there are not lacking parents who do not blush to pour harmful liquors even for infants! And thus the way is prepared for innumerable evils, which are born from alcoholism.²

² A. Westphal, L'alcoolisme dans l'antiquite, in Congres, p. 31-50.

³ Concerning alcoholism prevailing among workers, cf. Pelloutier, La vie ouvriere en France, Paris, 1900, p. 303-322; Congres, p. 341 and 487-518.

¹ M. Peter, L'alcoolisme chez les gens du monde, apud Congres, p. 550.

² From the following table, which we borrow from Bertillon, op. cit., p. 5, the reader will understand what quantity of alcohol is consumed in the principal regions.

Number of liters of brandy (reduced by calculation to 50 per cent alcohol), of beer and of wine absorbed in one year by one inhabitant (1891-1895):

In some regions alcoholism increases, while in others it gradually diminishes, according as laws and private associations favor or oppose it.³

³ From the same work, p. 11, these things are to be noted concerning the quantity of spirits of wine (brandy) consumed at different times:

551. (B) The evils which arise from the abuse of alcohol. These are almost innumerable with regard to individuals, the family, society.⁴

⁴ Two distinguished physicians, Debove, dean of the Paris Faculty of Medicine, and Faisans, physician of the hospital which is called Hotel-Dieu, briefly described these effects in a publicly published document, in the year 1902 (apud Bertillon, op. cit., p. 217-218): "The habit of drinking brings with it alienation from the family, forgetfulness of all social duties, disgust for work, misery, theft, and crime. It leads, at the least, to the hospital; for alcoholism engenders the most varied and most deadly diseases: paralyses, insanity, affections of the stomach and liver, dropsy; it is one of the most frequent causes of tuberculosis. Finally it complicates and aggravates all acute diseases: a typhoid fever, a pneumonia, an erysipelas, which would be benign in a sober man, quickly kill the alcoholic drinker."

(a) For alcoholism not only diminishes physical powers, but also induces grave diseases, especially paralysis, dropsy, tuberculosis, alteration of the stomach and liver, sometimes delirium tremens, insanity, etc.; moreover it renders incidental diseases much graver, such as pleurisy, pneumonia, erysipelas, and renders them lethal.¹ - It has intellectual and moral effects: thus it gradually dulls the acuteness of mind, diminishes memory, extinguishes noble and generous affections, increases depraved propensions, and little by little makes man like a brute in body and soul. Hence many more crimes are committed by drunkards and alcoholics than by sober men.²

¹ Bertillon, op. cit., p. 44-72; Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 23-36; Congres, p. 375-388; 421-426.

² E. Masoin, L'alcool et le crime, apud Revue neoscolastique, Nov. 1901, p. 362-369; cf. Congres, pp. 89 and 92-95.

(b) Moreover, it dissolves the bonds of the family; for generally alcoholic liquors are taken not at home, but at taverns, and therefore fathers of families and adolescents spend a long time in drinking-shops, far from wife, sweet children, or brothers. Meanwhile the money necessary for sustaining the family is dissipated, and children, very badly educated, lead a miserable life. Not rarely they themselves labor under the same vice: infected with the alcoholic plague already from the womb, they desire nothing more eagerly than to imitate paternal morals;³ if money is lacking, they steal. - How many quarrels, dissensions, divorces must be attributed to this vice? From it families are dissolved and perish.

³ Roux, L'alcoolisme et l'enfance, apud Congres, p. 321-331.

(c) From it even society itself is endangered; for with the strength of citizens weakened, agriculture, commerce, and industry languish;⁴ if war arises, soldiers and leaders, enervated by alcoholism, are unable to repel the invasion of enemies, and soon are forced to give conquered hands.⁵ Since alcoholic propension is propagated by heredity, and by education puts down deep roots, the restoration of the nation becomes more difficult day by day, and can be accomplished only by strenuous and heroic efforts.¹

⁴ Roy, apud Congres, p. 349-352.

⁵ Cf. Congres, pp. 87, 95-96; 666-674.

¹ What harms alcoholism has brought upon one of the wealthier provinces of France, namely Normandy, Douarche set forth apud Congres, p. 52-84.

552. (C) Remedies against alcoholism. Against so destructive an evil all honorable citizens ought unanimously to fight with manly and assiduous effort:

(a) The necessity of temperance is to be inculcated by word and example upon infants themselves at home, and upon the young in schools, by clearly and strenuously laying open the harms induced by alcoholism.² In colleges, academies, and seminaries, and also in public sermons, this plague should be openly denounced and reproved as something shameful, harmful to body and soul, pernicious no less to country than to religion. But parents, teachers, priests, or other educators will profit little or nothing unless by example they confirm what they teach by mouth, and therefore abstain not only publicly, but privately, from the frequent and useless use of liquors, even that which by many is held as moderate: for experience establishes that alcoholism is induced not only by the immoderate, but also by the assiduous, although moderate, use of alcohol.³

² Galtier-Boissiere, L'enseignement de l'anti-alcoolisme; id., Tableau mural d'Anti-alcoolisme, Paris, Colin; cf. Congres, p. 685-687.

³ Bertillon, op. cit., p. 37-43.

553. (b) The mother of the family, according to her condition, should keep the home so clean and decorous, and furnished with all things which please husband and sons, that they may not think of deserting the paternal home, but rather may seek in it the honorable recreations of which they are in need.⁴

⁴ "Considering only her action in the anti-alcoholic struggle, the woman who is the first to suffer from the plague can exercise a twofold apostolate: to the child, she will make alcohol unknown; to the man, that great child, she will make him forget it." (Oudaille, op. cit., p. 217). Cf. M. Duclos and Knutzel, apud Congres, p. 558-581; Willard, Woman and Temperance, Hartford.

(c) Everywhere associations favoring temperance should be established. Many already exist: some, such as the societies founded by T. Mathew and spread not only in Ireland and England, but also throughout the whole world, preach total abstinence from every alcoholic liquor, even wine;⁵ others prescribe abstinence from distilled liquors, as they say, but commend the moderate use of wine or other liquors of this kind; others, however, only forbid access to taverns and other places where intoxicating drinks are drunk; others establish hospitals for the cure of drunkards, or build shops where non-fermented drinks are sold, in which alcoholic poison is not contained.¹

⁵ Father T. Mathew (1790-1856), born in Ireland, entered the order of the Capuchins, and founded temperance societies in Ireland, Great Britain, and the United States of America, to which, before he died, about 4,000,000 had already adhered; therefore he is deservedly called the apostle of temperance. Cf. J. F. Maguire, Father Mathew, a biography, 1863.

¹ Concerning these societies, cf. Winskill, History of the Temperance Reformation, New York, 1886; Congres, pp. 590-603; 604-610; 627-638. - In France, various anti-alcoholic societies have decreed to constitute one federation; cf. Congres, p. 741-742.

554. (d) Nor is the discreet cooperation of the State to be rejected, which by opportune laws can restrain the vice of intemperance, and furnish help to those societies which favor temperance. In certain States of America the sale of intoxicating liquors has been entirely prohibited; yet generally the law was not observed. In other regions the number of taverns has been limited within certain limits, either by exacting a greater tax from tavern-keepers, or by proportioning taverns to the number of inhabitants. Elsewhere a certain monopoly has been instituted, both for diminishing the quantity of liquor sold and for improving the quality. By these various experiments alcoholism was indeed not extinguished, but weakened.² But what is more efficacious depends on many circumstances, and therefore in any region it must be determined from the counsel of the prudent, and especially by experience.

² Bertillon wrote concerning these various methods and their outcome, op. cit., p. 80-214.

555. (e) Finally religion can and ought to provide the most efficacious remedy for the diminution of so great a vice: for it is necessary that it instruct the young about the pernicious effects of this vice, and admonish parents that they turn their sons away from it. By inculcating virtues, especially fortitude of soul and mortification of sensuality, it disposes wills for strenuously resisting the temptation of abusing liquors. In the pulpit, and also in the sacred tribunal, priests should frequently teach temperance and sobriety. Where there are sodalities, patronages, and other Catholic societies, certain articles concerning temperance and the means of preserving it should carefully be inserted among the statutes. Finally let them keep before the mind that for extirpating this vice nothing is more efficacious than the example of clerics themselves: wherefore worthy of all praise are those who not only enroll in temperance societies, but, on account of love of souls, abstain from every intoxicating drink.¹

¹ To the matter, Council of Baltimore III, n. 262: "We approve and greatly commend the laudable custom of many, who in our times abstain entirely from the use of intoxicating drinks, that they may more safely restrain the vice of intemperance, either by removing from themselves occasions of the same, or by displaying to others a distinguished example of the virtue of temperance." - But concerning priests it establishes, n. 261: "Let them never cease to cry out strongly against drunkenness and its occasions; but especially when they have spiritual exercises for the people... Moreover, since words only move, but examples draw, let priests themselves, who, with the Apostle admonishing, ought to be a form of the flock from the heart, be examples of the virtue of temperance." - In France a Catholic temperance society has recently been established, La Croix Blanche, 1271, Boulevard Raspail, Paris.

All these means being wisely and assiduously employed, it is to be wished that the alcoholic plague may gradually be diminished, and finally utterly extinguished.²

² J. B. Dumas thus contracts all these things, apud Vanlaer, op. cit., p. 165: "Let us therefore appeal at once to science, to laws, to morals, and to religion. For the enemy whom we have to combat will not be easily conquered. It has as accomplices all the evil sentiments of humanity, all its fatal inclinations. It personifies, in the highest degree, the insubordination of matter against spirit, the subjection of the soul to the fierce appetites of the body. In the name of the family, of the country, and of religion, let us therefore once again appeal to the lights of science, to the devotions of charity, and to the foresight of reason of State, to remove from our beloved country moral miseries which have had their part in its past misfortunes and which could bring about its ruin."

St. Alphonsus, III, 366-375; ed. G., I, p. 622; H. Ap., VIII; authors cited at the beginning; Krose, Selbstmord, Erg.-Hefte, 90 and 91; Hauviller, du Suicide; Tanquerey, II, p. 123; Linz. Quart. Schr., 1909, p. 55; Willems, III, p. 251.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 150; St. Alphonsus, V, 75; ed. G., II, p. 759; H. Ap., VIII, n. 4; Antonelli, de Alcoolismo (Med. past., II, n. 113); Noldin, I, n. 340, who cites many authors; Willems, III, p. 257.

757. Definition. Drunkenness, insofar as it is a vice, can be defined: a vice causing inordinate drinking and from it a violent deprivation of the use of reason. - Insofar as it is an act, it is voluntary excess in drink even to violent deprivation of the use of reason.

Several things concur to constitute drunkenness: a) immoderate drinking; - b) relaxation of the nerves; - c) deprivation of the use of reason, and indeed a deprivation so bestial that the lower powers exercise completely entire dominion; - d) finally, absence of a sufficient cause that may render such deprivation of reason honorable, so that this immoderate drinking is truly done from pleasure. Therefore the malice of drunkenness consists in this, that a man without cause deprives himself of the faculty of using his reason, although he is awake, or awakened.

Therefore it makes no difference whether someone first drinks immoderately, but afterward commits himself to natural sleep: that man stains himself with drunkenness, because he deprives himself of the ready power of using his reason if he is roused from sleep. Yet it would be less grave if someone by a medicine impeded the effect of the drink.

Division. 1. Drunkenness is called perfect or full, if it totally takes away the use of reason.

The signs of this perfect drunkenness are: a) If someone cannot distinguish between the licit and the illicit. - b) If he does not remember things said or done in drunkenness. - c) If he does things entirely unusual, as if contrary to custom he speaks shameful things, disturbs the household, beats his wife, etc.

2. But it is called imperfect or half-full, if it does not totally take away the use of reason, but only clouds it.

Only imperfectly drunk is he judged to be who is still able to discern between good and evil, although the imagination is somewhat disturbed, or vomiting follows, the tongue stammers, the feet totter, the eyes see double things, or the house seems to turn around, etc. (V, 78, 7 and 8).

758. Principles. I. Perfect drunkenness is a sin mortal from its whole genus. This is established from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor., 6, 10): Neither drunkards ... shall possess the kingdom of God. And reason supports it: for drunkenness deforms the image of God, insofar as it casts man down into the condition of beasts, by taking away the moderation of the senses and fitting governance (H. Ap., VIII, 4). Cf. 2.2, q. 150, a. 2.

It was said: from its genus; for drunkenness is not mortal if it deprives one of reason for a short time.

Most authors say that a long time seems to be one hour; some judge that a half-hour can no longer be called a short time (Tanquerey, II, n. 542, note). Besides, in practice, scarcely is there given a deprivation of the use of reason prolonged for so short a time only.

II. Imperfect drunkenness is of itself a venial sin; for it is not gravely opposed to right reason.

Yet often it is mortal by accident, namely by reason: 1. of scandal that, for example, a priest would give, even if he were imperfectly drunk only once, or a father of a family, if often; 2. of a wicked intended end, as if someone were to drink in order to excite more vehement lust in himself; 3. of harm that he brings upon health or family; 4. of grave sadness that he creates for wife, children, parents, etc. Confer n. 759, q. 2.

Corollaries. 1. He who directly intends drunkenness sins: because he wills something evil.

2. He who induces, invites, or compels someone to drink copiously, even under pretext of courtesy, sins, except the case in which moderation is preserved in quantity, although the drink is more liberal (V, 77).

3. He who induces someone into drunkenness, so that the latter may be turned away from committing a greater sin, rather probably does not sin: because he urges toward a lesser evil (cf. n. 509, 2).

4. He who foresees that he truly will be drunk in these or those circumstances, and notwithstanding this does not avoid such company, commits sin. - Likewise, he who during drinking plainly adverts to the danger of drunkenness, and nevertheless still goes on drinking.

5. Sometimes it is licit to take a great quantity of intoxicating drink, even if drunkenness is foreseen as about to follow.

Here, however, a multiple distinction is needed:

a) If this is done to drive away a grave disease, for example typhus, cholera, it is licit. Reason: the immediate effect of the drink is acceleration of the blood, from which the intended end is obtained (V, 76, q. 1).

b) If it is done so as not to feel pains in a surgical operation, likewise it is licit; for such drink of itself has a soporific power, from which the proportionate intended effect arises. Besides, since there is no one who does not permit in the same circumstances the use of chloroform, ether, or opium, it is not seen why the aforesaid manner of acting should be prohibited of itself. See also what will be said n. 761.

c) If finally immoderate drinking is applied to expel ordinary sleeplessness, common sadness, or to soften ordinary pains, it is not licit: because what is intended does not have proportion with the evil that is permitted. Besides, other remedies are present. Yet it would be licit to drink even to hilarity, if sadness had to be driven away.

Note. Sometimes they use chloroform to mitigate pains in childbirth. This remedy is licitly applied if the pains are foreseen as truly intolerable, especially if chloroform is administered in an interrupted manner, and analgesia, as they say, does not become total (Capellmann-Bergmann, ed. 16, p. 58; Ami du Cl., 1910, p. 16 and 1088).

759. Questions. Q. 1. Whether it is licit for someone to make himself drunk in order to avoid death, which another threatens him with unless he becomes drunk?

Resp. A twofold opinion is given: The first (which is that of St. Alphonsus, V, 76, q. 2; l. El. qq. ref., 56) denies that this is licit. For liberation from death (i.e. an act of the will on the part of him who must desist from inflicting death) will intervene only after the fact of completed drunkenness on the part of the other. Therefore the prerequisites under the heading of the indirect voluntary do not fit. Besides, the use of reason of itself is not ordered to the life of the body, but to preserving the integrity of the soul. Thus also Cajetan, the Salmanticenses, and others.

The other opinion (which is that of Lessius, Bonacina, and recent authors) affirms. Reason: the use of reason is ordered to the good of the whole. Hence, for conservation of the whole, man can permit deprivation of the use of reason. Besides, copious drinking of wine, besides deprivation of reason, produces another effect (namely liberation from death to be inflicted) equally immediately. Hence the principles of the indirect voluntary do not stand in the way.

Q. 2. Whether and how evils committed in drunkenness are imputed?

Resp. They are imputed to the drunk man unto fault, according to the measure of advertence and voluntariness that is found in the cause, or in the act of making himself drunk. Hence a) If drunkenness is involuntary, the evils that follow from it will not be imputable unto fault. b) If it is semi-voluntary, they cannot be imputed unto grave fault. c) If it is voluntary, grave evils will be imputed unto grave fault, provided they were foreseen, whether distinctly, or at least confusedly. "Hence those evils are reputed foreseen which drunkards ordinarily are accustomed to commit, or which someone from other drunken bouts has known himself to commit before; and also all sins to which he knows himself prone. For since in drunkenness, with the use of reason lost, nature necessarily operates, it will easily break forth into the vices to which it is inclined. But, on the contrary, other evils that happen by chance are not reputed foreseen" (H. Ap., VIII, 8).

Note. Several authors say that evils of the mouth, such as insults, blasphemies, and perjuries, are not imputed; because those words, uttered by a man lacking the use of reason, are purely material, as if they were uttered by a parrot; nor consequently do they have formal malice. "I accede to this opinion," says St. Alphonsus (H. Ap., l.c.), "concerning insults against men: because truly, when those are uttered by a drunk man, they are not held as dishonoring, provided he does not reveal some infamous crime; but not concerning perjuries and blasphemies, because these, although materially uttered, are always injurious to God; and if they are not voluntary in act, they are voluntary in the cause."

760. Practical Rules. 1. Young men and fathers of families who are held by the vice of drunkenness are to be corrected and reproved with grave words. Let the confessor insist opportunely, let him insist inopportunely, that they become temperate and conquerors of themselves. Let him place before their eyes the inconveniences, sins, and innumerable crimes of which alcoholism exists as the perpetually flowing origin and source. - 2. Let him prudently and moderately promote all those things that have as their end propagating associations either of abstinence or of temperance. For complete abstinence has restored many men healthy to themselves and to their family. Cf. the little works that set forth the necessity or utility of abstinence.

761. Notions. From the poppy is extracted opium, which, among other principles, contains morphine. Opium, when it is smoked, and morphine, when it is injected beneath the skin, possess the following properties: a) if the quantity is very small, they soften pain, from the fact that they act upon the nerves; b) if the quantity is increased, they procure a state of narcosis, in which all things are affected with a certain sense of particular satisfaction and pleasure; c) if the quantity is great, death is induced. - Opium and morphine, insofar as they deprive one of the use of reason, bring grave harms to health if someone often uses them: namely, the powers are diminished, the body is broken, memory is weakened, sexual appetite is excited, indeed even perverted, harm is brought to the protoplasm (Forel, Quest. sex., c. VIII), the moral sense vanishes, the will is dulled, indeed life is shortened. Many, from an unbridled desire of pleasure, come to this point, that, laboring under an invincible mania, they are driven as if necessarily to the use of these things. Physicians, in treating the sick, use morphine much; some also, whether by their own action, or in order to satisfy sick persons asking it, by help of morphine procure euthanasia, that is, a placid and tranquil death. Cf. Antonelli, II, 129. Therefore let the following principles stand:

I. As regards those not sick. 1. They do not sin who use morphine or opium in a quantity so very small that it serves rather for the quieting of the nerves. Yet let them beware of frequent use. - 2. They sin venially who, with the quantity increased, without sufficient cause apply these remedies; but mortally, who bring grave harm upon themselves from these things, even if narcosis is not present: a fortiori, if without cause they should deprive themselves of the use of reason.

II. As regards the sick. It is licit for them to use morphine, in the same cases and under the same conditions under which it is not prohibited to deprive oneself of the use of reason for procuring goods of great moment for oneself.

III. As regards the dying. 1. It does not seem illicit, in the case in which they suffer great pains, to lull dying persons for a time. - 2. But it is gravely illicit, for those not prepared for a Christian death, even if great torments are present, to administer morphine in such a way that they die while lulled: the reason is evident. - 3. Likewise, even for those well disposed, it seems prohibited under grave sin to procure such relief. The reason is: on the one side, pains are of themselves felt less in agony; on the other, such deprivation of the use of reason is a certain shortening, imposed upon the sick person, of spiritual life, which life then is especially necessary, or at least salutary. Besides, very often we are ignorant whether the dying person is truly well prepared. Since these things are so, we judge that deprivation of spiritual life at such a moment is not compensated by the temporal good (tranquillity) procured for the dying person by help of morphine. Therefore it belongs to the priest to resist the attempts of physicians. Yet he can tolerate it as regards those dying persons who otherwise would be in danger of sinning gravely again. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 892; Noldin, I, 343; Ami du Cl., in various articles, 1900, 1902, 1905, 1908. Cf. also, for the contrary opinion, Wouters, Nederl. Kath. Stemmen, 1911, bl. 348; Collat. Brugenses, 1911, p. 412.

Note. As regards the cultivation and commerce of opium, several Decrees of the Holy Office exist. See A. S. S., 24, p. 506; Canon. Contemp., vol. 15, p. 424, and especially Ami du Cl., 1908, p. 689.

243. • Drunkenness is the immoderate use of drink up to the unnatural privation of reason. - Thus commonly.¹

Perfect drunkenness, namely reaching even to the privation of reason, is a grave sin of itself. This is established 1° from reason; for voluntarily to deprive oneself of the use of reason, by disturbing it in a violent and unnatural mode, at least without a grave cause, is without any doubt gravely repugnant to rational nature. For man thus casts himself down to the state of brutes and defiles the image of God in himself.²

This is established 2° from Sacred Scripture:³ Nor drunkards ... will possess the kingdom of God. - And Isaiah:⁴ Woe to you who rise in the morning to pursue drunkenness. ... Moreover the particle woe in Sacred Scripture denotes a most grave evil.

But more probably drunkenness is of itself only a venial sin if it is imperfect. I say: of itself; because very often by accident it is mortal, namely by reason either 1) of scandal, which for example a priest would give, even if he were imperfectly drunk only once, or a father of a family if often; or 2) of the depraved end intended, as if someone should drink to excite in himself more vehement lust; or 3) of damage to be brought upon health or family; or 4) of grave sadness caused to wife, children, or parents; or 5) of other sins of which drunkenness is the voluntary cause, as we shall say presently at n. 245, q. 5°.

244. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the signs of perfect drunkenness?

Resp. The following are adduced, namely: 1° not knowing how to distinguish good from evil; 2° not remembering words said or deeds done in drunkenness; 3° doing things altogether unusual, which namely would never otherwise be done with a sound mind, ... etc. - But certain signs are not: hesitation of the tongue, staggering of the feet, the sight of objects doubled, or of objects turning themselves in a circle.¹

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to make oneself drunk for expelling illness?

Resp. The affirmative opinion of St. Alphonsus² seems sufficiently probable, indeed more probable, in the case in which the drink is taken and is suitable for opposing the cause of the illness; for then privation of reason, as happening by accident and indirectly, can licitly be permitted, just as it is licit for a mother to take a drug directly tending to preserve her own life, although the expulsion of the fetus happens indirectly (n. 474, II). Hence it will be licit for you to take a notable amount of generous wine, for example of Champagne, to expel cholera once heat has been restored to the viscera, although you foresee that from it you are to be made drunk; or of the drink called "Whiskey," that the poison introduced by the bite of a serpent may be opposed. St. Thomas³ adds that a drink necessary for health cannot be called immoderate.

Omitting the question whether drunkenness is licit for undergoing a surgical operation, which today scarcely pertains to practice, since other easier means are available for that end, concerning these means:

Quaer. 3° Is the use of opium, ether, chloroform, and similar things licit for this end?

Resp. Affirmatively, since the primary power of these is soporific or sedative of the nerves, not intoxicating. Yet dangers must be avoided.

245. • Quaer. 4° Is it licit to induce someone to drunkenness, that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

Resp. St. Alphonsus:⁴ "The affirmative opinion seems sufficiently probable (not improbable, H. A. Tr. VIII, 7) to me and to other learned men consulted by me, whether the drunkenness be material or formal, because of the reason that it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil, that he may be prevented from a greater one."

Quaer. 5° Are all evils done in drunkenness imputable?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if they were not foreseen, not even in a confused way; because whatever things were not foreseen must be held wholly involuntary.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, for the opposite reason, if they were foreseen, at least as to evils of deed, whether of commission or of omission.

I said: at least as to evils of deed; for as to evils of the mouth, or words, or even deeds merely contumelious, probably they are not imputable if they are uttered against men, since according to common estimation they are judged to inflict no contumely. Yet otherwise if they are uttered against God, as blasphemies, etc. ... because these things are intrinsically evil, and therefore tend to the contumely of the divine honor; but otherwise, as having been foreseen, they are voluntary in the cause itself. Thus St. Alphonsus, who in H. A. rejects the contrary opinion, while in the Work he does not dare to call it improbable.¹

246. Resolves. - 1° They sin gravely who, drinking by day and night, knowingly expose themselves to the danger of drunkenness. Likewise those who by command or counsel induce others to drunkenness; or who provoke to equal draughts when the danger of drunkenness has been foreseen.

2° They sin gravely who, knowing through experience that they are made drunk in these or those associations, nevertheless spend time in them. Likewise those who, while drinking, advert to the danger of drunkenness and nevertheless continue to drink.

3° They also sin gravely who drink so much that drunkenness must follow, although they commit themselves to sleep before they are deprived of senses and reason, because in sleep they do not have proximate power for the use of reason; besides, the thing is evil of itself.

4° Nor are they excused from grave sin who, under pretext of the custom of the fatherland, or of good affection, or of civility, press and as it were necessitate guests to drink even to the danger of drunkenness; otherwise, however, if only more liberal drink is offered and proposed more often, yet in moderate quantity.

5° They do not sin gravely of themselves who are so strong, and so accustomed to wine, that they are never made drunk, even if they drink more largely than others, unless they so exceed temperance that grave detriment of health can rightly be feared (those mighty at drinking).

1451. - The dangers of taverns are: 1) drunkenness, and the disorders which ordinarily accompany drunkenness (see n. 243); 2) play, and the sins which are accustomed to arise from play; 3) neglect of prayer, of the obligation of Mass, indeed even of the Paschal precept; 4) lust; 5) quarrels, beatings, indeed, especially among us, homicides.

1452. Questions. - Query 1° Can a tavern-goer render this occasion remote by abstaining from excesses, without entirely leaving the tavern?

Resp. "If the tavern-goer," says Berardi, "frequents the tavern without grave necessity, and if from a vice too inveterate he has contracted a great passion for drinking excessively, then in no way can he have hope of rendering this occasion remote without total separation. Indeed it is necessary besides to desert those companions who are accustomed to turn aside to the tavern, and sometimes, especially in the beginning of conversion, it will not be enough to wish to desert the companions, but it will also be necessary to place oneself in the impossibility of complying with their invitations: which can be done by handing over to the wife the money as soon as it has been earned; for thus, destitute of money, he is compelled to repel every temptation of turning aside to the tavern."

Query 2° Are there any causes which render this occasion of the tavern necessary?

Resp. Affirm., namely the necessity of one's own craft, e.g. because someone is a driver, broker, merchant, brewer, etc. (26) p. 421.

1466. - I. Certain occasions of drunkenness. The principal are: taverns and drinking-houses; - companions and friends given to this vice; - certain special days, whether of the week or of the year, as the day on which the weekly wage is accustomed to be paid to workers; the Fourth of July; the day designated annually by the Government for public giving of thanks; the first of the year; Carnival; Easter; Monday of Easter and Pentecost; the feast of St. Patrick; days fixed for political elections; - certain fairs; - festivities which come under the name of picnics, excursions, etc.; - the day on which Baptism is conferred on an infant; - banquets or nuptial feasts; - vigils beside the bodies of the dead (wakes); - funerals.

668. 1. On sobriety.

Sobriety is taken in a threefold sense: 1. generally, and then it signifies moderation in any matter whatsoever; in this sense St. Paul exhorts one "to be wise unto sobriety."¹²⁷³ 2. It is taken more strictly for the virtue of abstinence; for those are called sober not only who drink sparingly, but also who eat sparingly. 3. Taken in its proper sense, sobriety can be defined: a virtue moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink.

Sobriety taken in this last manner is a special virtue, because intoxicating drink is a special impediment to reason, insofar, namely, as by its fumes it disturbs the brain. For while immoderate pleasure in another drink disturbs only the order of reason, this immoderate pleasure in intoxicating drink disturbs the very organ of reason, namely, the brain, and impedes its action.¹²⁷⁴ Moreover, where there are customarily special temptations enticing one to act contrary to reason, there a special moral virtue must be posited for overcoming such temptations. But intoxicating drink greatly entices man to act contrary to right reason, as, alas, is evident from daily experience. Therefore, a special moral virtue must be posited for rightly moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink, and this virtue is sobriety.

Although sobriety is necessary for all men, nevertheless, as St. Thomas teaches,¹²⁷⁵ it is especially necessary for youths, women, and persons constituted in some dignity. Sobriety is indeed very necessary for youths, because on account of the heat of the blood there is in them a greater propensity toward concupiscences, which must be restrained through sobriety. Sobriety is most necessary for women, because, as sorrowful experience testifies, a woman given to drunkenness falls into every disgrace and vice. Sobriety is exceedingly necessary for persons constituted in some dignity (especially ecclesiastical persons), because reason ought to flourish in them for the instruction of others. But reason is disturbed by drunkenness, and persons constituted in dignity are customarily despised by inferiors if they frequently sin against the virtue of sobriety.

¹²⁷³ Rom. 12:3.

¹²⁷⁴ Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 149, a. 4.

¹²⁷⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 149, a. 4.

669. 2. On drunkenness.

Notion. Drunkenness can be taken in two ways: in one way passively, insofar as it signifies the very defect of reason which occurs, for example, from much wine having been drunk, from which it comes about that a man is not master of his reason; and according to this, drunkenness or intoxication is a certain morbid state and rather a punishment and defect following from a preceding fault. In another way it is taken actively, insofar as drunkenness names the act by which someone falls into this defect. This act can cause drunkenness in two ways: in one way, from an excessive strength of the wine beyond the expectation of the drinker; and thus drunkenness can occur even without sin (in this manner Noah is believed to have become drunk). In another way, from an inordinate concupiscence and use of wine or of another intoxicating substance; and thus drunkenness is posited as a sin and is contained under gluttony generally taken, as a species under a genus; for gluttony generally taken is divided into feasting and drunkenness.¹²⁷⁶ Drunkenness (insofar as it is a sin) can therefore be defined:

A voluntary excess in intoxicating drink (or substance), committed unto the violent privation of the use of reason from an inordinate concupiscence for intoxicating liquor, that is, without relation to preserving health.

It is said, 1. a voluntary excess; for no act is a sin if will is absent. Hence the sin of drunkenness is not present unless the excess and the privation of the use of reason could and ought to have been foreseen by the drinker. Moreover, it is required that an excess truly be present, that is, that the drinking be altogether contrary to right reason; hence, if there were drinking which even brought on the privation of the use of reason, but which was nevertheless undertaken according to right reason for the health of the body, the sin of drunkenness would not be constituted. This seems also to be the mind of St. Thomas when he writes: "Food and drink are to be moderated according as befits bodily health. And therefore, just as it sometimes happens that food or drink which is moderate for a healthy man is excessive for a sick man, so conversely it can also happen that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for a sick man. And in this manner, when someone eats or drinks much according to medical counsel in order to provoke vomiting, the food or drink is not to be considered excessive."¹²⁷⁷

It is said, 2. in intoxicating drink or substance; for if the drink is not intoxicating, then the excess constitutes not the sin of drunkenness but of gluttony. Nevertheless, too much insistence is not to be placed upon the word drink; for those who, even by means of other substances, contrary to right reason deprive themselves of the use of reason commit the same sin, which is drunkenness.¹²⁷⁸ Sins of this kind are the abuse of opium, against which the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith issued several statutes; likewise the abuse of morphine, which is so pernicious and which often grows into so-called morphinomania; and, in general, the abuse of all means which are called anesthetics or narcotics by physicians.

It is said, 3. unto the violent privation of the use of reason; for the use of reason is interrupted in a natural manner through sleep. If through drink there occurs a complete violent privation of the use of reason, there is also complete drunkenness; but if the use of reason is not completely lost, then there is imperfect drunkenness. He is considered, for example, to labor under complete drunkenness who, after taking intoxicating drink, does altogether unusual and irrational things; who no longer knows how to discern between good and evil; who on the following day does not remember even notable things which he said or did under the influence of intoxicating drink. Drunkenness, however, is considered imperfect if the imagination is indeed somewhat disturbed, the tongue not so ready, the senses somewhat clouded, and the feet unsteady, but the man nevertheless still remains master of himself and does nothing irrational.

It is said, 4. from an inordinate concupiscence for intoxicating liquor, that is, without relation to preserving health. There are indeed several theologians (Billuart, Concina, Collet) who do not admit this clause, teaching that drunkenness is present even if the intoxicating drink was taken not from inordinate concupiscence but for another reason. Nevertheless, this seems alien both to the truth and to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, who in the place cited above requires for the sin of drunkenness that the excess in intoxicating drink arise from an inordinate concupiscence and use of wine.¹²⁷⁹ Therefore, it does not seem unlawful that someone, in order to avoid an immediately impending typhoid fever, take (as is sometimes counseled by physicians) a large quantity of cognac, although he falls into drunkenness. For such a quantity of that intoxicating liquor is mere medicine, nor is any inordination present if someone for a brief time deprives himself of the use of reason in order to expel a disease;¹²⁸⁰ otherwise, it would also be unlawful to use chloroform and other narcotic medicines before a surgical operation, which certainly no one would say. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to infer from this that the sin of drunkenness is present only when someone has taken intoxicating liquor with sensible pleasure; for it often happens that a man exceeds in intoxicating drink because of vain human fear, in order to drive away sadness, etc., without any pleasure; and nevertheless, even in these circumstances the sin of drunkenness is present. Therefore, it suffices for the sin of drunkenness that someone take intoxicating liquor to excess unto the privation of the use of reason, without bodily health demanding this. For drink was ordained by the Creator for the health of the body; consequently, man sins if he uses it otherwise, especially unto the privation of the use of reason. Therefore, it is never lawful to make oneself drunk except for preserving bodily health, because otherwise an inordination against the will of the Creator is always present. Hence those doctors (Lessius, Busembaum, Lacroix, Noldin, etc.) do not seem to teach correctly who assert that drunkenness is not evil if it is induced from any honorable motive whatsoever, "provided the harm of the temporary privation of the use of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good on account of which it is permitted and the disturbance of reason is not intended."¹²⁸¹ St. Augustine¹²⁸² says the contrary: "The drunken are accustomed to excuse themselves in such a way that they say: a powerful person compelled me to drink more, and at the banquet of a king I could not do otherwise. We put these things forward as excuses for excusing sins.... Even if it came to this, that it were said to you: Either you will drink, or you will die, it would be better that your sober flesh be killed than that your soul should die through drunkenness." Concina¹²⁸³ inveighs with sufficiently sharp satire against those authors: "Father Busembaum placed in the definition of drunkenness that it is unlawful without a just and grave cause. On the contrary, if a just and grave cause is present, then it becomes lawful and honorable. Is a city to be betrayed? Let the traitor be made drunk. Are you to be carried off into servitude? Let the captor be made drunk. Are you unjustly detained in prison? Make the guard drunk. Are you unable to sleep? Make yourself drunk. Does he refuse to disclose a secret which he is bound to disclose? Make him drunk. These things seem like dreams."¹²⁸⁴

¹²⁷⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 150, a. 1.

¹²⁷⁷ Ib., a. 2 ad 3.

¹²⁷⁸ Billuart thinks that such a sin does not properly fall under drunkenness (De temperant. diss. 3, a. 2).

¹²⁷⁹ Cf. also S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 1.

¹²⁸⁰ Thus also St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 76.

¹²⁸¹ Noldin, De principiis n. 345 (2).

¹²⁸² Sermon 232, or more truly St. Caesarius, Sermon 245 in the appendix to the works of St. Augustine (Migne, Patr. lat. 39, 2307).

¹²⁸³ De pecc. et virt. l. 4, n. 12.

¹²⁸⁴ St. Alphonsus agrees, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 76.

670. Malice of drunkenness. The malice of complete and imperfect drunkenness must be distinguished.

1. Complete drunkenness (as it has just been explained) is a mortal sin of its kind. Thus holds the opinion which today is most common and certain.¹²⁸⁵ It is proved:

a) From Sacred Scripture, which vehemently reproves drunkenness and numbers it among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Neither thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards ... shall possess the kingdom of God."¹²⁸⁶

b) From St. Thomas, who has these words: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its nature it has the character of a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity render himself incapable of using reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the sole pleasure of wine, is expressly contrary to virtue."¹²⁸⁷ But since the Angelic Doctor so expressly teaches that drunkenness according to its nature is a mortal sin, other places in his works in which he does not speak so expressly are to be interpreted according to the text of the Summa theologica, which is his principal and most perfect work. The places to be so interpreted are: II, dist. 24, q. 3, art. 6; De malo q. 7, art. 4 ad 1; De malo q. 2, art. 8 ad 3; cf. also Cajetan's Commentary on 2, 2, q. 150, art. 2. Certain theologians assert that St. Thomas when older changed the opinion he had previously proposed.

c) From reason. It is gravely repugnant to right reason: α) that a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself violently of the use of reason from the pleasure of wine, without the necessity of health requiring it; β) that he exposes himself to the danger of sinning; γ) that he furnishes the proximate occasion for several other evils, for example, of health, family, fortune, society, etc., as is customarily done through drunkenness; moreover, δ) drunkenness is a grave abuse of drink granted to us by the Creator solely for preserving the health of the body. For man is the steward of God and therefore cannot use things according to his own pleasure, but according to the will of God. Therefore, voluntary drunkenness is a mortal sin of its kind. Indeed, complete drunkenness, procured with full voluntariness and without regard for the utility of bodily health, seems always to be a mortal sin; and therefore we do not admit the opinion defended by Lacroix,¹²⁸⁸ Noldin,¹²⁸⁹ and others, who say that even complete drunkenness is not a mortal sin unless it is prolonged beyond an hour. For whenever complete drunkenness is present, its whole malice is also committed, which by no means consists solely in the inordinate and violent privation of the use of reason, as has been proved. Lightness of matter in drunkenness, therefore, is not to be weighed according to its duration, but according to the greater or lesser abuse of intoxicating drink.

2. Imperfect drunkenness is of itself only a venial sin. The reason is that such drunkenness is of itself a light inordination which does not destroy the use of reason. When a sufficient cause, even an extrinsic one, is present, for example, for driving away melancholy, at weddings and other worldly festivities, imperfect drunkenness is of itself no sin, unless scandal or another grave inconvenience nevertheless arises from it. Hence to drink unto hilarity is not indeed unlawful of itself,¹²⁹⁰ but a cleric, a head of a household, and other persons constituted in dignity ought to avoid hilarity of this kind, since grave scandal and other grave inconveniences can easily arise from it.

Authors ask here whether there is a grave sin of drunkenness if someone takes such a quantity of intoxicating liquor that drunkenness would naturally follow from it unless it were artificially prevented, for example, through some medicine or through vomiting deliberately procured. Those who place the essence of drunkenness in the violent privation of the use of reason through intoxicating drink must answer negatively, since the privation of the use of reason is not actually present; but in this case there certainly is an enormous excess in intoxicating drink, although the privation of the use of reason does not follow accidentally. Moreover, health is customarily gravely injured and scandal given by such a manner of acting. Hence, in practice, such gluttons are scarcely excused from mortal sin.

¹²⁸⁵ In the time of the Scholastics many authors, led by some apocryphal text of St. Augustine, thought that drunkenness of itself was not a mortal sin unless it was habitual or arose from an evil end; cf. Joseph Membres, La sobriété. Luther taught the same: "Then I would allow you a good bout of drunkenness, for drunkenness is tolerable, but habitual drunkenness by no means" (in Grisar, Luther II, 256).

¹²⁸⁶ 1 Cor. 6:10; cf. Isa. 5:11; Gal. 5:21.

¹²⁸⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; cf. 2, 2, q. 150, a. 2.

¹²⁸⁸ In St. Alphonsus, l.c.

¹²⁸⁹ De principiis n. 346.

¹²⁹⁰ Noldin, l.c. n. 345.

671. Corollaries. 1. From what has been said it follows that drunkenness is never lawful, nor is it lawful directly to induce another to drunkenness. For just as it is not lawful to induce someone to fornication, as being contrary to the existing natural law, so also it is not lawful to induce someone to drunkenness. Several theologians indeed¹²⁹¹ teach that it is lawful to induce someone even to formal drunkenness so that he may be prevented from committing a graver evil, for example, sacrilege or homicide. But this is rightly denied by others, because this is nothing other than positively persuading someone to sin. Certainly, it is lawful for a grave cause to cooperate materially in drunkenness, as was said above, I, n. 619, concerning cooperation; consequently, for a grave cause it is lawful to set intoxicating liquors before those who are foreseen to be about to make themselves drunk. In practice, the rules given concerning the indirect voluntary must then be applied, namely, when it is lawful to posit a cause from which a twofold effect follows, one good and the other evil.¹²⁹²

2. Sins committed in drunkenness are to be imputed in the manner in which they were foreseen. Thus, at least, if there is question of complete drunkenness, by which the use of reason is wholly lost; for sins perpetrated in imperfect drunkenness are imputed at least partially even if they were not foreseen, because reason is then not totally clouded. Generally speaking, sins which were committed in a first complete drunkenness are not mortal sins, since they could not have been foreseen even in a confused manner. But sins which are committed during drunkenness by those drinkers who have an evil habit of making themselves drunk commonly must be imputed, because they could and ought to have been foreseen.

¹²⁹¹ Busembaum, Lessius, Sanchez, Diana, Gobat, St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 77), Göpfert (Moraltheol. II, n. 208), etc.

¹²⁹² Cf. above, I, n. 57.

672. On the use of morphine, opium, cocaine, chloroform, ether, and other narcotic remedies.

The older authors do not speak of these things, since they were unknown at that time; but in our times these remedies are in daily use. All these remedies taken in a large quantity are deadly; indeed, sometimes even when employed moderately and according to the requirements of the art they cause sudden death. According to a modern statistical review, in every 3,000 instances in which chloroform was employed by physicians, death occurred once.¹²⁹³ Therefore, some danger to life, although not so proximate, is always joined with the use of medicines of this kind. There is added that such use, even moderate, if it endures for a longer time, gravely harms bodily health and provokes a most vehement craving for morphine, etc., which is called morphinomania and by other names by physicians, and which can be overcome with much greater difficulty than even an inveterate habit of drunkenness. From all these things it is evident that the use of remedies of this kind is dangerous and is to be avoided unless necessity demands otherwise. And this is all the more so because all these narcotic remedies interrupt the use of reason for a time. Hence it is a grave sin to use these remedies without a grave cause. Their use, however, seems lawful in the following cases, provided nevertheless that they are always employed according to the rules of the medical art:

1. In greater surgical operations, so that, namely, the sick person may yield himself without resistance to the hands of the surgeon and may not feel the bitter pains.

2. For alleviating pains even if they are not so atrocious, at least if there is question of a very brief narcosis, such as that which is caused by means of weaker narcotics, for example, Lachgas [laughing gas], laughing gas, gaz hilarant [laughing gas]; or if there is question of an imperfect narcosis in which the use of reason is not wholly taken away. Such imperfect narcoses seem lawful in the extraction of a tooth and even in ordinary childbirth.¹²⁹⁴ Moralists do not agree whether in the article of death it is lawful to administer narcotic remedies to a dying person so that he may not feel pain so vehemently, or for procuring so-called euthanasia (εὖ, θάνατος [well, death]). It is certainly better if this is not done, since by patiently tolerating those pains the dying person may alleviate the punishments of sins and of purgatory; but if the pains are excessively atrocious, and especially if there is a founded fear that after receiving the sacraments the dying person may sin by sins of impatience and murmuring against God, there is no reason why the physician cannot administer soporific remedies, provided they do not shorten life.¹²⁹⁵

¹²⁹³ Cf. Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoralmedizin, 19th ed., 84.

¹²⁹⁴ Cf. ib., 47.

¹²⁹⁵ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, 893; Marc, Inst. mor. I, 761.

673. Scholion. On remedies against alcoholism. In our days alcoholism, that is, the vice of indulging too much in intoxicating liquors, spreads widely in almost all regions, and most grave evils arise from it. It is scarcely possible to enumerate all the evils which are customarily produced by alcoholism. Excellent men have written entire books concerning the close relation between alcoholism and criminality.¹²⁹⁶ Every priest is bound, according to his ability, to commend and spread remedies against the pernicious evil of alcoholism. The first and best remedy is good instruction concerning these evils, and indeed instruction to be given not only frequently from the pulpit in church, but especially also to youths in schools and colleges. The second and efficacious remedy is the good example both of parents and especially of priests. A pastor would speak altogether in vain against alcoholism if he himself were a drinker or indulged too much in wine. The third remedy consists in those Catholic associations of temperance or abstinence which in our times have happily been established in all regions. Let priests not only refrain from holding these associations in little account, but also prudently foster them. Already innumerable men and women addicted to drunkenness have been cured of their vices by the aid of these societies. Finally, the diligent exercise of the Christian religion, which inculcates temperance and mortification, furnishes an efficacious remedy. But if all these remedies are either despised by the drunken or have produced no effect, then care must be taken that such persons be received into some hospital designated for curing alcoholics. This last remedy is almost always necessary for those who are addicted to morphinism. For experience establishes that morphine addicts of this kind have lost all resistance of the will.

¹²⁹⁶ Cf. Hugo Hoppe, Alkohol und Kriminalität, Wiesbaden, 1906; C. Wright, Influence of Intemperance upon Crime, Boston, 1889.

III. Drunkenness and its gravity. - Drunkenness is the inordinate appetite for intoxicating drink, or voluntary excess in intoxicating drink.

It is called:

1. an inordinate appetite or excess, because it is a species of intemperance;

2. in intoxicating drink, that is, violently inducing privation of the use of reason. Thus drunkenness is distinguished from gluttony strictly so called, which is excess in food or in non-intoxicating drink;

3. voluntary, whether intended in itself, when someone expressly wishes to be deprived of the use of reason, for example in order to forget pains, or only in the cause, when someone foresees that from it perhaps he will be deprived of the use of reason and nevertheless prefers to incur drunkenness rather than to abstain from drink.

Fully voluntary drunkenness is a mortal sin from its genus, both on account of the grave intrinsic disorder of the act by which someone voluntarily and without necessity deprives himself of a most excellent good, namely the use of reason and the proximate power of recovering it, and renders himself unfit for acting in a human mode and according to virtue; and on account of the grave evils which it brings with it, such as lust, blasphemies, quarrels, grave affliction of the family, neglect of children, defrauding of creditors, omission and neglect of the duties of Christian life; and the drunken man, if he has foreseen these at least in a confused way, is guilty of them.³

³ Cf. Gal. 5:21; 1 Cor. 6:10; Rom. 13:13; Luke 21:34; Isa. 5:11; Prov. 23:20, 21, 29. The printed text has "Prov. XXII, 20, 21, 29"; the cited drunkenness passage is Prov. 23.

Hence a) perfect drunkenness, which totally removes the use of reason, is of itself mortal; nevertheless it could be venial either on account of a certain inadvertence or ignorance of the drink, which nevertheless cannot be admitted in those having a habit; or on account of lightness of matter if the drunkenness does not last long but only for some moments. This, however, scarcely holds in practice, because no one can know how long it will last;

b) imperfect drunkenness, which only somewhat disturbs reason, is of itself a venial sin; per accidens it becomes mortal either on account of scandal, or on account of an evil end, or on account of damage to be inflicted on health or family, or on account of grave sadness to be brought to wife, children, or parents, or on account of the danger of another grave consequence.

Signs of drunkenness are customarily indicated by authors:

1. The signs of perfect drunkenness are: a) if someone by reason no longer discerns between moral good and evil; this is a certain sign, while the rest are conjectural, namely b) if he does unusual things which he would never do while master of himself, for example swears, speaks shameful things, stirs up quarrels, breaks vessels, strikes his wife; c) if the following day he does not remember notable words or deeds, for example what quarrels he excited, how he returned home, by what road, with what companion; d) if someone scarcely, or hardly even, suffices for directing common or easy actions; e) if he has lost the use of the senses and members, for example of sight, walking, speech.

2. On the contrary, probable signs of imperfect drunkenness, or ambiguous signs, are: staggering of gait, some stammering of the tongue, an apparent whirling of things, the sight of doubled objects, forgetfulness of minute things, difficulty in executing due offices, a certain disturbance of the head or of the imagination, vomiting; for these also occur while sufficient presence of reason remains.

IV. Warnings for confessors. - 1. Penitents who accuse themselves of eating or drinking for pleasure are not always guilty. For it is not illicit to intend and seek the pleasure which God willed to be present in foods and drinks, provided that it is ordered, at least implicitly, to the principal honorable end of sustenance; but it is a sin to eat for pleasure alone, sought for its own sake and by resting in it, excluding the principal end, or principally for pleasure, not for an honorable good, so that the honorable good is subordinated to delight.

2. Rarely do penitents sin mortally from gluttony. More easily they sin from drunkenness, not in the sense that they often drink even to the privation of the use of reason, indeed if this happens once or again, commonly it happens beyond intention, but that certain persons too much given to drinking, by this reason, fail in their duties and functions, create grave affliction for the family, dissolve its bonds, do not provide for the education of offspring, cannot pay debts, etc. The confessor, nevertheless, can presume drunkenness to have been voluntary in him who is accustomed frequently to become drunk, for example ten times in single months. But if some man sufficiently intelligent confesses that within a month he was drunk once or again, let him be asked whether he foresaw the drunkenness. One who has been drunk once or a second time, without any habit, is to be presumed not to have foreseen the drunkenness.

3. Drunkenness, even when carried to perfect privation of the use of reason, is not so essentially evil that it cannot be induced in any case; but it can be licit to commit oneself to drunkenness, if it is a necessary means for obtaining a proportionate good, for example for driving away a disease, such as typhus, or for restraining the force of poison from the bite of a serpent, because the good of the part yields to the good of the whole man. On the contrary, it can be a sin, although per accidens privation of the use of reason does not follow. Whence, says St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book V, n. 78, he is not excused from mortal sin who takes a quantity of drink of itself apt for inducing perfect drunkenness, although, before he is deprived of his senses, he commits himself to sleep, by which he escapes the effect of the wine; because that drinking of itself is intrinsically evil, since of itself it is apt to deprive that man of the use of reason, and it is per accidens whether he is deprived of his senses by sleep or by intoxication. Namely, he posited the whole cause of the evil, and there will remain an incapacity of recovering the use of reason which would not have arisen from natural sleep.

4. A sin similar to drunkenness is to bring on privation of the use of reason from another cause than from drink, for example by smoke, the smoking of tobacco, the odor of hops, the use of opium or morphine, etc., concerning which it was said above, c. 2, sec. B, q. 1, IV and VI.

5. Those sin gravely, by cooperating in the drunkenness of others, who invite others to draughts by which they are probably foreseen to become drunk; likewise those who provoke or compel them to equal draughts with probable danger of drunkenness; likewise those who without grave proportionate cause minister drink to drunkards or to those near drunkenness. Nevertheless it can be licit, for a grave cause, to set wine before another with foresight of drunkenness. But those who lead others to drunkenness by their example alone sin by the sin of scandal.

6. To the gluttonous and drunken properly, or rather grossly, so called, let there be recalled to mind the proximate effects of gluttony and drunkenness in body and soul: in the body, uncleannesses and illnesses; in the soul, dullness of mind and the defacing of the image of God. To them let there be strictly prescribed avoidance of occasions, mortification of the flesh, prayer to God, confession after relapse, together with a severe penance voluntarily imposed on themselves; and sometimes enrollment in a society of sobriety or abstinence will be counseled. For the vice of drunkenness is counted among those from which men emerge with difficulty, unless they labor in eradicating it with all their strength and divine help.

7. To spiritual men who manifest a propensity to gluttony, let there be earnestly commended the avoidance of incitements of gluttony, the subtraction at table of some food more pleasing to the palate, moderation of the appetite which is borne toward foods more ardently than is just, serious expiation of faults of gluttony, even slight ones, and the reduction of the quantity of foods to a just estimation to be taken from experience.

8. Let priests strive in every way against the vice of alcoholism, insofar as they can, by warning parents that they turn their children away from it; by inculcating strength of soul and mortification, by which virtues of the will they are disposed to resist strenuously the temptation of abusing liquors; by frequently teaching temperance and sobriety in the pulpit and also in the sacred tribunal; and by corroborating the doctrine by their own example.

S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; II-II, q. 150, a. 1, 2, 3.

985. Drunkenness (dronkenschap) is taken: a) for the state, namely the defect of reason which happens from much wine having been drunk, and thus it is not sin, but can be the effect of sin; b) for the act by which someone falls into this defect, whether it happens contrary to the opinion of the drinker, and then it can be without sin, especially if it does not happen from man's negligence; or whether it happens from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine, and thus it is sin, and can be defined: a voluntary excess in intoxicating drink, for the sake of pleasure. This indicates:

1. The genus: excess, for it pertains to intemperance, and thus it is distinguished from the opposite insensibility.

2. The material object: in intoxicating drink, that is, drink violently inducing privation of the use of reason. Thus it is distinguished from gluttony strictly so called, which is excess in non-intoxicating drink.

Hence if someone exceeds in non-intoxicating drink, for example in milk, chocolate, coffee, or in an intoxicating drink which in fact is not intoxicating, that is, does not reach defect of reason, as happens in those who by nature, custom, or means of pharmaceutical science are powerful, it is not the sin of drunkenness but of crapula. On the contrary, if someone were deprived of the use of reason by something other than drink, for example, by the odor of hops, or the smoke of tobacco, or by the use of morphine, chloroform, or opium, this is not properly drunkenness, although he can sin if it is done voluntarily and without proportionate cause.

3. The formal object: for the sake of pleasure; for the proper object of every temperance and intemperance is the delightful according to the sense of touch. For if someone drank even to alienation of mind, not for the sake of delight, but for some honorable cause, there is the state, but not the sin, of drunkenness. But if sufficient reason is absent, the privation of the use of reason is sought from such drink for its own sake, and therefore for one's own pleasure.

Namely, privation of the use of reason seems not to be in itself and essentially evil, but something indifferent. It is evil if it is done without a just and grave cause, only for pleasure or gluttonous excess, not through rest and in the natural mode, namely sleep instituted by God, but violently and in an unnatural mode, by disturbing the organs: for thus a lower good is preferred to a higher good. But it can be good if it is necessary in order to health of body, for example, for curing or driving off a disease such as typhus, for checking the force of poison from a serpent's bite, for performing a surgical incision more safely, etc.: not only if the good effect follows from the cause, namely from drink by which the senses are dulled, as immediately as the privation of reason does, but also if privation of the use of reason is a means for obtaining an intrinsic good, because for the good of the whole it is licit to deprive oneself of the good of a part, namely the use of reason for a time; indeed, according to some, even for avoiding harm or danger from outside, for example, for avoiding death which another threatens to someone unless he becomes drunk. This, however, cannot be admitted if it is formally requested, or requested from contempt.

4. The condition: voluntary, either in itself or intended, when someone expressly wills to be deprived of the use of reason, for example, to forget pains; or only in the cause, when someone foresees that he will be deprived of the use of reason from it and nevertheless prefers to incur drunkenness rather than abstain from drink.

986. Fully voluntary drunkenness is of itself a mortal sin from its kind, even if admitted only once. - It is proved:

1. From the Scriptures: Gal. 5:21; 1 Cor. 6:10; Rom. 13:13; Luke 21:34; Is. 5:11; Prov. 23:20, 21, 29... And "although it can seem that only the habit of drunkenness is in question, it does not appear how this very habit could per se arrive at grave malice, if its individual acts contained only light malice" (Genicot).

2. From reason: It gravely repugns right reason that a man, knowingly and willingly, for the mere pleasure of wine, without necessity, should deprive himself of the use of reason, and of the proximate power of recovering it and using reason for every sudden necessity: namely, of the most excellent good by which he is distinguished from brutes and operates in a human mode according to reason and avoids sins. From this inordination another follows, that he exposes himself to the danger of perpetrating many and grave evils which are apt to follow from drunkenness, and of omitting goods which he ought to perform.

Yet it can be venial: a) from imperfection of the act, through some inadvertence of the act or ignorance of the drink, which nevertheless is not to be admitted in habitual drunkards; b) from lightness of matter, namely from a slight excess, when drunkenness is imperfect, lightly disturbing reason, or also from shortness of time, if perfect drunkenness does not last long, for example, only some moments. Yet in practice this hardly applies, because no one can know how long it will last.

987. Drunkenness is not the gravest of sins: for other sins either directly deprive one of a divine good, if they are directly against God, or directly deprive one of the good of reason or virtue, which is always a good; but drunkenness itself only deprives one of the use of reason, which can be good or evil. Therefore it is among the lesser complete mortal sins.

Yet it is especially to be fled, because by depriving one of the use of reason, it can be the source of all sins accidentally, insofar as these are impeded by the use of reason.

988. The signs of drunkenness are: a) the certain sign of perfect drunkenness: 1) if someone by reason no longer discerns between moral good and evil. Conjectural signs are: 2) if he does those things which, in possession of himself, he would never do; for example, if he swears, speaks shameful things, starts quarrels, breaks vessels, strikes his wife; 3) if on the following day he does not remember notable words or deeds, for example, what quarrels he stirred up, how he returned home, by what way, with what companion; 4) if he scarcely, or not even scarcely, suffices for directing his common or easy actions; 5) if he has lost the use of the senses and members, for example, of sight, walking, speech.

On the contrary, b) probable signs of imperfect drunkenness or ambiguous signs are: some staggering of gait, stammering of the tongue, an apparent turning of things, seeing things doubled, forgetfulness of small matters, difficulty in carrying out due offices, a certain disturbance of the head or imagination, vomiting: for these also occur while sufficient presence of reason remains.

989. On the use of narcotics (morphine, opium, cocaine, chloroform, ether, etc.), whether for soothing pains or for dulling the senses, since from them can follow privation of the use of reason and great detriment to health, it is useful to say briefly:¹

¹ The question rather belongs to pastoral theology, where it is usually developed more fully. Cf. our little work De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis, c. 2, § B, IV and VI.

1. A transitory use, and so slight that it produces no other effect than restoration of strength and calming of the nerves, is licit.

2. Use in greater quantity or frequency, employed for pleasure alone, or for quieting the craving for narcotics which is generated most vehemently from repeated use of them, is gravely illicit if notable detriment to health and life can follow from it; lightly illicit if the detriment to health or shortening of life certainly is not notable.

3. Use employed in such quantity that the senses are dulled and temporary privation of the use of reason follows, if employed without a just cause, is a grave sin, just as drunkenness is; but from a proportionately grave cause of necessity or utility it is licit, as if it is done so as not to feel sharp pains, or in a major surgical operation, so that the sick person permits himself to be treated without resistance.

4. Use employed at the point of death so that the sick person is deprived of reason and dies without sense of pain is gravely illicit, not only if he is not yet prepared for death, so that he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation; but also if he is rightly disposed, because thus he would lack the opportunity of meriting and of immediately preparing himself for death and notably increasing heavenly glory. Hence there is lacking a proportionately grave reason for permitting this; indeed, if there is danger that he will not return to the use of reason, it is an equivalent shortening of life.

According to some, however, this could be tolerated, with the consent of the sick person, who is already well prepared for death, namely on account of sharp pains, especially if he is very liable to impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he will fall into grave sin; indeed, as has sometimes been said, even if at the same time an indirect shortening of life would follow in a sick person certainly about to die. But this is more doubtful and rather to be omitted. Without doubt, however, direct acceleration of death would be gravely illicit, so that insensibility and privation of the use of reason would be only effects of the very shortening of life: for evils are not to be done that good things may come.

990. Remarks. - 1. As St. Alphonsus notes, l. V, n. 78, he is not excused from mortal sin who takes a quantity of drink apt of itself to induce perfect drunkenness, even though, before he is deprived of his senses, he gives himself to sleep, by which he escapes the effect of the wine; because that drinking is already of itself intrinsically evil, since of itself it is already apt to deprive that man of the use of reason, and it is accidental whether he is deprived of his senses through sleep or through intoxication. He placed the whole cause of the evil, and there will remain an incapacity of recovering the use of reason which would not have arisen from natural sleep.

2. The confessor can rightly presume that drunkenness was voluntary in him who is accustomed to become drunk frequently, for example, ten times in individual months. But if a fairly intelligent man confesses that within a month he was drunk once or twice, he should be asked whether he foresaw the drunkenness. He who was drunk once or twice, without any habit, is to be presumed not to have foreseen the drunkenness.

3. To drive away sadness or melancholy it would be licit to drink only up to cheerfulness: for such a reason would not have proportion with the evil of perfect drunkenness. But clerics, fathers of families, and persons established in dignity ought also to avoid cheerfulness.

S. Th. II-II, q. 150, a. 4.

991. On sins committed in drunkenness. - On the occasion of drunkenness various sins and evils are committed by the drunkard himself. These sins and evils which can follow from drunkenness are imputable:

1. Insofar as they were foreseen, even if accidentally they do not follow. Hence a) they are imputed in their proper species and objective gravity if they are distinctly foreseen, either in their proper species, or only in genus and confusedly in species, because thus the agent really wills the evil of that species and gravity to whose danger he exposes himself. Hence drunkenness which of itself would be venial becomes grave if grave evils to follow from it are foreseen, for example, grave scandal, harm to health, lust, grave sadness to wife, children, parents, etc.; b) if they are foreseen confusedly under the general account of evil, they are imputed only in a general way in the sin of drunkenness, which for this reason becomes graver because on account of it someone is prepared to commit many other sins and evils; c) they are not imputed if in no way they were foreseen;

2. And insofar as the drunkenness was voluntary: for the effect cannot be more voluntary than the cause. Hence its gravity also must be measured according to the gravity of the drunkenness, so that if the drunkenness is only imperfectly voluntary, and therefore venial, even the evils to follow, although grave in themselves, are only venial.

That drunkenness is either a) imperfect, leaving the use of reason, and then the sins also are voluntary in themselves, and are mortal or venial according to the gravity of the matter and the present use of reason; or b) perfect, and then the evils are voluntary and culpable in their cause, the drinking; yet less voluntary than if they were voluntary in themselves. They are committed by an internal act and as to affection, when someone deliberately wills drunkenness from which effects are foreseen to follow; by an external act and as to effect, when sins or evils are externally done. Hence in confession it must be declared which sins were foreseen, and which were externally completed from foresight.

992. Remark. - Words spoken in perfect drunkenness sometimes lose their meaning, or do not preserve it fully. Thus, for example:

1. Injurious words sometimes lose the nature of injury, not indeed if they are determinate detractions or contumelies directed against determinate persons, or even directed against God; but if they are certain general injuries uttered against all men and things which occur everywhere. For these are considered by all as if they had no meaning.

2. Likewise a lie does not exist, because speech against the mind is not given; even a pernicious lie does not remain a lie, although it can preserve its harmfulness.

3. Likewise a vow and an oath do not exist, because for these actual free will is required; but those words can externally sound as an oath, and therefore as perjury. In the same way blasphemous utterances externally sound as blasphemy, and thus dishonor God.

993. On cooperation toward the drunkenness of others. - On the occasion of drunkenness various sins are also committed by others who cooperate in drunkenness. Cooperation toward drunkenness is of two kinds. 1) One is negative, which happens by not impeding drunkenness, when someone by office ought to impede it. 2) The other is positive, which happens by influencing the drunkenness of another. This is a) improperly so called, which happens by inducing him to drink, for example, by commanding, counseling, or provoking equals to draughts. According to some, this is probably licit for impeding a graver evil, for example, sacrilege or homicide, because it is licit to persuade a lesser evil as lesser (cf. treatise on charity I, n. 968); otherwise it is illicit, and constitutes direct scandal. Or b) it is properly so called, which happens by furnishing drink to one who is foreseen to become drunk from it. This of itself is illicit, even for innkeepers, because it gives another the occasion or means of sinning which we are bound to avert from him; accidentally, however, it can be licit on account of a just cause proportioned to the evil and to the occasion of sinning, such as a graver evil to be avoided, for example, a quarrel, blasphemies, a fight, or notable harm, for example, if the tavern would be notably deserted, but not merely the indignation of the guest or merely profit which otherwise would come to others.

The cooperator is guilty in many ways, not only by reason of cooperation or scandal in himself, but also by reason of drunkenness in the other, and by reason of the evils and harms which he foresaw would follow from drunkenness; and therefore he is held to restitution for them after the principal causes, as a cooperating cause.

Capital sins are so called because they are as it were the heads or fountains of other sins. Hence they should be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in general.

Seven are enumerated, namely: 1st. Pride; 2nd. Avarice; 3rd. Lust; 4th. Envy; 5th. Anger; 6th. Sloth; 7th. Gluttony. But how fittingly all sins are reduced to seven heads St. Thomas explains excellently, 1-2, q. 84, art. 4.

We shall say very few things here about the individual capital sins, but we shall carefully indicate the places of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus to which recourse must be had for a fuller exposition of the doctrine.

Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence, and is distinguished into perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect. It is called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is pleased with himself that he is in the disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of superiors. But this, by that very fact, always includes mortal sin in itself. In other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it is accustomed to introduce only venial sin. From pride proceed ambition, vain glory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 162; and QQ. DD. De Malo, qq. 8 and 9.

Avarice is the disordered appetite of temporal goods. It is opposed to justice or to liberality. If the former, it will easily issue into mortal sin, namely as often as it impels one to grave injustice toward the neighbor. - If the latter, of itself it will produce only venial sins. For the rest, excessive affection toward earthly things can impel, and indeed is accustomed to impel, into other even grave sins. From avarice also proceed hardness of heart toward the miserable, disquiet of soul, perfidy, deceit, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 118; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 13.

Lust is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing. Lust is a grave sin from its whole genus; but this is to be understood if venereal delectation is deliberate in itself and directly willed. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it sometimes admits smallness of matter, as will be said more fully below where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is treated.

Blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, hatred of God, languor of faith, indeed even loss of faith, are effects of lust. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, qq. 153 and 154; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 15.

Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is judged as one's own evil, or at least as one's lesser good. To it is reduced joy concerning the evil of another, which is judged an increase of one's own good. Envy is directly against charity, and from its genus, although not from its whole genus, imports grave sin. From envy proceed detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 36; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 10.

Anger is the kindling of the soul, and a disordered motion against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is the habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial, if it is only a disordered motion of the soul. - Anger generates indignation, rancor, shouting, insults, blasphemies, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 158; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 12. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 80 and seq.

Sloth in general sounds the same as laziness; but more strictly it is torpor of mind and weakness of will, from which distaste for spiritual things flows because of the labor and trouble attached to them. - If it is so great that grave obligations are omitted from it, it must be held grave; if otherwise, it is to be judged slight. Torpor, wandering of the mind, nausea in prayer, etc., are the fruits of sloth. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 35; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 11. - St. Alphonsus, n. 84.

Gluttony is the disordered appetite of food or drink, and from its genus it is nothing but venial sin. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone unfit for duties. - From gluttony come drunkenness, about which more fully presently, dullness of mind, buffoonery, much speaking, and uncleanness of every kind. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 148 and 150; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 14. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 74 and seq.

Note. - It would perhaps be very fitting to consult St. Thomas concerning sobriety. Sobriety is especially concerned with drink having the power of making drunk. For sobriety preserves measure: "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor, 2-2, q. 149, a. 1, "it especially assigns to itself that matter in which it is especially praiseworthy to preserve measure. But of this kind is drink capable of making drunk, because its measured use contributes much and a moderate excess harms much, because it impedes the use of reason more than excess of food." And ibid. ad 3: "although measure is required in all things, nevertheless sobriety is not properly said in all things, but in those things in which measure is especially necessary." Now then, "it pertains to moral virtue to preserve the good of reason against those things by which it can be impeded. And therefore," he says ibid. a. 2, "where a special impediment of reason is found, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue for removing it. But intoxicating drink has a special account of impeding the use of reason, insofar as namely it disturbs the brain by its fumes. And therefore ... a special virtue is required, which is sobriety." And although "food and drink commonly can impede the good of reason, by absorbing it through immoderation of delectation, ... drink capable of making drunk impedes according to a special account." Would that also the following words of the Angelic Doctor were noted by some: "in all drinks capable of making drunk there is one and the same account of impeding the use of reason. And thus that diversity of drinks is related accidentally to virtue." Ibid. ad 3. No food or drink, speaking according to itself, is illicit. Yet drink can be rendered illicit by accident, either "because by wine [a man] is easily harmed, or because by a special vow he is obliged not to drink wine," or "from the manner of drinking, because namely he exceeds measure in drinking," or "on the part of others who are scandalized by this." Ibid. art. 3. To the objection that the use of wine is totally illicit, because it impedes wisdom without which someone cannot be in the state of salvation, the Angelic Doctor responds: "Wisdom can be had in two ways. In one way according to the common mode, insofar as it suffices for salvation. And thus it is not required for having wisdom that someone altogether abstain from wine, but that he abstain from the immoderate use of wine. In another way according to a certain degree of perfection. And thus it is required in some persons, for perceiving wisdom perfectly, that they altogether abstain from wine, according to the conditions of certain persons and places." ad 1. But for women and young people, if we regard proneness to pursuing bodily pleasures, "for old men in whom reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others, and for Bishops or any ministers of the Church who with devout mind ought to insist upon spiritual offices, and for kings who by wisdom ought to govern the subject people, sobriety is specially enjoined." Ibid. a. 4. - Cf. the places to be cited at n. 148 from St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; 2-2, q. 150, a. 2.

Drunkenness is a voluntary excess in drink unto disturbance of reason, whether this is done from or with pleasure, or without pleasure. But it is divided into perfect and imperfect. The first is had when the use of reason is altogether taken away, so that the drunk man is incapable of acting morally; but the other is that by which the mind is indeed disturbed, yet still has the power to discern between good and evil.

But many others, following St. Thomas, define the vice of drunkenness as: superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone unto deprivation of the use of reason.

Perfect drunkenness is always a mortal sin, but imperfect drunkenness of itself is only venial. The reason for the first is gathered both from the consent of theologians and the estimation of God-fearing men, and because to deprive oneself of the use of reason in a violent and unnatural way, and indeed in such a way that it cannot immediately be recovered, gravely repugns rational nature; and finally because in the Scriptures, for example, I Cor. vi, 10, drunkards are excluded from the kingdom of God. But the reason for the second is both because there is no grave disordering as long as one can act morally, and because the consent of theologians so holds. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 75. But St. Thomas speaks thus, 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its own account it has this, that it is a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself unable to use reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue. But that it is venial sin happens on account of a certain ignorance or infirmity, for instance when a man does not know the strength of wine or his own weakness, whence he does not think that he will be made drunk: for then drunkenness is not imputed to him as sin, but only overabundance of drink. But when he is frequently made drunk, he cannot be excused through this ignorance, without his will seeming to choose rather to suffer drunkenness than to abstain from superfluous wine, whence the sin returns to its own nature." Therefore the drunk man is guilty of a twofold disordering according to St. Thomas: by drinking wine from pleasure alone; and by drinking from excess unto the loss of the use of reason without any motive which would justify even the account of excessive drink. Cf. Baller., tr. 4, n. 381, seq. - Azor., l. 7, c. 33, q. 5. - Lessius, lib. 4, c. 3, d. 3, n. 13. - Dicastillo, lib. 1, disp. 3, d. 11, n. 104.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is lawful to use any liquors whatever, as medicine for driving away diseases, for example, typhus, even if drunkenness is foreseen as going to follow, provided nevertheless that it is not directly intended, and the salvation of the soul is not placed in danger. It is required namely 1st. that drunkenness follow only indirectly, and 2nd. that no danger be present that the sick man die without reception of the sacraments. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, a. 2, ad 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 76. St. Thomas speaks thus: "When someone drinks much according to the counsel of medicine ... the drink is not reputed superfluous." l. c.

2nd. The same seems able to be said of those of our country who take a great quantity of liquor in order to expel or restrain the poison which they have drawn from the bites of serpents; for drunkenness, if any follows in such a case, would be said to have followed only indirectly. In this case it is not taken from the pleasure of wine alone nor without necessity.

3rd. It can never be lawful to assume drunkenness as a means for obtaining some effect, however good, because evils are not to be done that goods may come. But if a great quantity of liquor were taken, not indeed for violent deprivation of the use of reason, but for relaxing and thus soothing the nerves, so that from this some surgical operation may be done more easily, it does not appear why this would be illicit, since it is said to be lawful to use opium or ether for performing similar operations.

4th. Those mothers or nurses are altogether to be condemned who, for quieting the tears of children, use alcoholic or opiated drinks, and thus from the first age introduce an evil custom into them.

5th. A fortiori doctors are to be condemned who recur to the same remedy in order to provoke the sick to gladness or to lessen pains of the body; for those acting thus, although perhaps they can be excused from the sin of drunkenness, because they procure it only indirectly, nevertheless certainly introduce an evil custom into the sick if they recover; or, if they die, expose them to the danger of eternal damnation.

6th. Certainly they sin gravely who by command, counsel, or provocation induce others to drunkenness, or induce them to drink with foresight of future drunkenness: something which here and there is done under the vain pretext of friendship or civility.

7th. Likewise he who drinks to excess in order to free himself from the death which another threatens against him does not drink from the pleasure of wine alone or without cause; hence it is not sin.

Question 1. What must be said concerning the promise not to drink (the pledge) as it is accustomed to be made among us?

Response. Although a promise of this kind is good in itself, and, as daily experience establishes, offers an excellent remedy for amending the life of many, nevertheless the practice of receiving it is not without difficulties. For if it is said openly, what theologically speaking is certainly true, namely that violation of that promise is no sin or only venial sin, it will scarcely not happen that the whole efficacy of the remedy vanishes. But from the other side, if nothing is said, many and grave sins will be perpetrated from an ill-formed conscience; since there are many who judge violations of that promise to be graver sins than perfect drunkenness. Therefore much prudence and discretion is needed in receiving promises of this kind. - Wherefore, if there are those who doubt concerning the quantity of that obligation and inquire about it, or if they are not so untaught that they can easily grasp an explanation, or are not drawn to liquors by an utterly mad and ruined love, it will be useful, indeed necessary, to explain to them what the nature of that promise is; for since this is not a vow, but only a purpose manifested to a priest, it cannot of itself oblige under grave sin. But in the other hypothesis perhaps it would be better to say nothing, and to bear oneself permissively concerning those grave sins which would follow; for the lessening of drunkenness will be a sufficient reason for permitting them. - Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, May 1883, pp. 338 and seq.

Question 2. What must be said concerning those sodalities recently instituted for extirpating the vice of drunkenness?

Response. That they are very good and are preferred by many apostolic laborers to the other remedy which consists in the promise not to drink. The reason is that these more recent remedies, while from one side they foster piety more, which is the beginning of every true conversion, from the other side offer no occasion of new sins. The Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore indeed alluded to these remedies in the following words: "Since monstrous scandals arise from excessive drinking, we exhort pastors, and beseech them by the bowels of Jesus Christ, that they put every zeal into eliminating the vice of drunkenness. To this end, we judge worthy of praise the zeal of those faithful who abstain from every ardent liquor in order to decline more safely the danger of excesses. But those who spontaneously enter a society among themselves, so that by mutual examples of virtues they may help and strengthen one another, ought first of all to employ those aids which Christ the Lord left in the Church, by which human vices are amended and infirmity is sustained; and by prayer, frequent reception of the sacraments, and other exercises of piety, to obtain heavenly aid for themselves, and to trust not in themselves, nor in their purposes, but in God, without whom human effort profits nothing." But the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, speaking more explicitly, say: "The societies which come under the name of 'Catholic Union for promoting Total Abstinence' and 'Sacred Thirst,' we acknowledge as worthy of great praise; for they are governed by a truly Catholic spirit, and seek the necessary strength not so much in firmness of their own will as in the power of prayers and of the sacraments. Moreover it is known that the Head of the whole Church and Vicar of Christ on earth has more than once enriched them with his apostolic blessing and with the indulgences of the Church. Therefore we also exhibit to the same the signs of our benevolence, and that they may flourish the more, we commend them to the paternal care of all our priests, that they may not only add courage to them but also always show them the Catholic path." Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 470 and seq.; and Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 260 and seq.

Very recently special spiritual graces in favor of the faithful enrolled in societies of Temperance or Abstinence from intoxicating drink were conceded by the Supreme Pontiff Pius X on 21 May 1914 - namely: indulgences both plenary and partial, and also an altogether singular favor by virtue of which all Masses which are applied by any priest whatsoever for the soul of some deceased member can assist that soul as if they had been celebrated at a privileged altar. These graces were granted by the Supreme Pontiff wishing to show his more favorable will toward the aforesaid Societies and to find their Members more eager in advancing so salutary a purpose. - Acta Apost. Sed., v. VI, p. 309.

Question 3. Is it lawful to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

Response. Affirmatively, if drunkenness is only material to him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc. But they more commonly deny it if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done that goods may come: nevertheless St. Alphonsus, n. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others, "because it is lawful to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater." For when someone can be deterred from perpetrating a greater evil by no other means, to persuade the lesser evil has the account of good. See below n. 185. Q. 5th.

Note. - 1st. Habitual excessive drink produces enormous harms for the individual, the family, and society. It harms the health, fortune, and morals of individuals: domestic peace departs from the family, horrible crimes are committed, reason itself day by day becomes degenerate and more vicious.

Personal remedies: for all to avoid the occasions of this sin and those persons and assemblies by whom temperance is violated; to acquire strength by exercise of this virtue and of Christian mortification, and by consideration of motives both natural and supernatural by which men may become stronger against the vice of drunkenness, finally by petition of divine aid. - Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath., under the word Gourmandise.

2nd. The use of morphine, chloroform, and other medicines bringing exile of reason must be ruled by these general principles. The use of morphine, etc., for calming grave pains by soothing the senses is permitted in surgical operations, in more difficult births, and in general when there is a just cause. The use of morphine, etc., taken habitually induces an unquenchable thirst, to which follows unfitness for performing grave duties, and servitude under the medicine itself: such use is gravely prohibited; indeed doctors sin gravely who so frequently prescribe these things to the sick that there is proximate danger of inducing this habit or desire for morphine. The use of morphine which does not bring with it this danger but only a lessening of pains is not illicit of itself. The use of morphine, etc., inducing the loss of the exercise of reason for a long time without cause is certainly a grave sin.

The use of morphine, etc., employed with the dying without their consent so that they may remain in a state of semi-wakefulness is a grave sin and against natural right: such use in those circumstances, that is, with one dying, is gravely illicit when he is not prepared by the sacraments for dying, nor is it lawful for him to consent to it. If he is prepared and there is no danger of falling into grave sin, doctors are to be deterred from employing these means. But what if the pains are most bitter and extraordinary, for example, if someone is burned by slow fire in a conflagration, and cannot be removed from the flames themselves, because, say, he is held by the beams of the house? Is it lawful in this case, when there is no danger of falling into a state of sin, without the consent of the dying man so to soothe his senses that he will remain in fainting until death? It is not lawful: because he has a right to acquire enormous merits. What if he himself wishes it, or if there is danger of falling into grave sin? In those most difficult circumstances let the priest assist him with every help and exhortation so that he may suffer the pains bravely. If at last the sacred minister himself fears, let him be silent; indeed it does not seem altogether certainly prohibited so to soothe the senses, because in the case, morally speaking, he is a prepared sick man: to this indeed he is bound, but it is not clear that he is bound to acquire greater merits. It is his right: but whether a grave obligation rests upon him, this is not evident. Cf. Villada, Cas., v. 3, p. 309. Lehmkuhl speaks more severely, n. 892, ed. 11a.

3rd. Nor does artificial sleep seem illicit, by which, induced by medicinal injections, a woman giving birth does not fully perceive the pains of birth. During this state, so it is reported, she is not deprived of the use of the senses; afterward, however, she is said not to remember those things which then happened, and the sleep is called twilight. Moreover we affirm that if the woman in that state is duly protected, if the doctor is prudent, if care is applied so that nothing harmful happens either to the woman or to the fetus, the matter is done licitly. But another thing would have to be said if these conditions were not verified.

Drunkenness is an excessive drinking of an intoxicating liquor, as I said in the preceding question.

I assert, first, that drunkenness is a sin mortal of its genus.

It is proved, first, by D. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 3. from 5. ad Galat., who numbers drunkenness among the mortal works; and he adds: They who do such things shall not attain the kingdom of God.

Second, he proves it by the reason which D. Thomas also uses here, Tanner d. 3. quaest. 3. deg. num. 49., Valencia d. 9. quaest. 3. puncto 2. and others, and it is indicated by D. Isidore lib. 2. de summo bono, cap. 43. sent. 1. et 2., cited by D. Bonaventure lib. 2. Phar. cap. 12.: for he who, foreseeing the strength of the wine, makes himself drunk with it, voluntarily deprives himself of the use of reason, and consequently exposes himself to the perils of all sins. Hence Ambrose lib. 1. de Abraham, cap. 6. and it is related in 15. quaest. 1. cap. sane, where it is had: We learn drunkenness to be avoided, through which we cannot avoid crimes; for the things which we, being sober, guard against, being ignorant through drunkenness we commit.

The holy Doctor, however, observes ad cap. 2. Ioan. on these words: And when they had drunk, etc. In drunkenness there are three degrees. For the first drunkenness is unto a certain dimming of reason. The second is unto a heaviness and disturbance of the organs and heart. The third unto the subversion of reason. The first is venial, unless perhaps by reason of the person, or office, or time, as in the Levitical Priests it was during the time of their office, Levit. 10. Drunkenness in the second manner is dangerous; whence the Savior says, Lucae 21. Let not your hearts be weighed down with surfeiting and drunkenness. The third, however, is mortal, which he proves from 23. Prou. To whom is woe? whose father is woe? to whom strife? to whom the pit? etc. Do not these linger over wine, and study over cups to be drunk? and from 5. Isa. Woe to you who are mighty at drinking. Woe to you who rise early unto drunkenness.

It is certain, moreover, that when God intimates that there is woe on account of a grave crime, as the holy Fathers and Expositors commonly observe, especially S. Bonaventure in Evang. frequently.

The SAME is proved from D. Basil homil. 14., Ambrosiaster lib. de Elia, et ieiun. cap. 16., Jerome in cap. 5. ad Galat., Chrysostom homil. 57. ad populum Antioch. and homil. 18. in Matth., Augustine serm. 231. and 232. de temp., who all inveigh against drunkenness as a grave sin.

The holy Doctor also OBSERVES in speculo animae, cap. 3. that drunkenness can be without sin, if it was not foreseen invincibly. But if it was foreseen, and other sins follow, they are not excused. Hence also D. Augustine lib. 22. cont. Faustum, cap. 44. excuses Lot from drunkenness. But on this I treated in prima secunda, Tract. 1. disput. de voluntario.

They ask, however: Whether drunkenness for medicine is licit.

Cajetan answers here art. 2. that it is licit, because it is drunkenness only materially, since it is not for pleasure. The same D. Thomas has art. 2. ad 3., where he denies only that drunkenness is not licit for provoking vomit, because here it can be provoked by other means, as Tanner noted num. 53. He proves it, because if one may take a soporific drink, so in the said case.

He ADDS, however, that it is not licit for mitigating or not feeling pain in the cutting off of some member, or for tempering another grave pain; otherwise it would be licit to make drunk those who are led to punishment, after they have been disposed for death.

These things do not please me; for if it is not licit on account of the gravest pain to be tempered in mutilation, from which death often follows, I do not see when it would be licit for health; nor is that inference good concerning those who are led to death, who by justice are held to those punishments, and in the article of death need time for the acts of virtue unto repentance. In antiquity, indeed, wine mingled with myrrh was given to the crucified, which Christ would not take, as is said in the Gospel.

I ASSERT lastly, that the less drunkenness is voluntary, the more it diminishes the sin consequent upon it, and therefore when it is involuntary it altogether excuses from sin. So the holy Doctor in speculo animae, cap. 5., D. Thomas quaest. 150. art. 4., which they prove from D. Augustine lib. 22. contra Faustum, cap. 44., where he says that Lot is excused from incest on account of drunkenness, saying, Lot is to be blamed, not as much as the incest, but as much as the drunkenness deserved; and since this was involuntary, it follows that he is excused.

BUT if drunkenness was venially voluntary, the ensuing sins will not be mortal, because they are not themselves more voluntary than their cause, as Valencia notes puncto 2.

FINALLY, to make another drunk, either by directly inducing, or by indirectly inviting him to drink, when with attentive circumstances it can and ought to be foreseen that he will make himself drunk. So D. Thomas art. 1. ad 3., D. Bonaventure ad 2. Ioan., and others; for to cooperate in evil is the same as to do evil. So Ambrose de Elia, cap. 13., Augustine serm. 131. de Temp. and serm. 132. in Valencia.

The holy Doctor NOTES in the places cited above Hexaëmer. that the vice opposed to drunkenness by defect is unnamed, as also insensibility, which refuses the necessary delights of Taste and Touch, as the Philosopher teaches 2. Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 3. cap. 11.; and he gives the reason, because few are found who fall short in pleasures, and therefore this sin is rare.

But this sin CAN be mortal, if anyone from insensibility rejects the delights necessary for preserving life, as of food or drink, or for satisfying the debt of marriage. So D. Thomas quaest. 142. art. 1. and D. Bonaventure in serm. 5. Hexaëmer., Cajetan verb. Insensibilitas, Valencia quaest. 3. puncto 1.

Vasquez teaches, however, tom. 1. d. 227. cap. 3., cited by Diana part. 4. Tract. 6. Miscel. resol. 52., that certain actions of drunkards are not imputed to them, even if they had foreseen their drunkenness. Such are insults, from which no harm to a neighbor follows. Similarly blasphemies and perjuries, because these require to be done knowingly. The same opinion teach Salas prim. 2. tract. 13. disp. 5. sect. 14., Sayrus lib. 2. cap. 9. num. 41., Tanner prim. 2. parte 4. disp. 4. quaest. 3. dub. 3. num. 65.

To ME, however, this opinion is not proved, because these things are voluntary in cause, and they are true insults against God or neighbor. So Sanchez sum. tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 16. num. 44., Medina prim. 2. quaest. 71. art. 5., Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 150. art. 4. d. 2. Sanchez adds against Vasquez that fornication in dreams is to be guarded against, since it redounds to the harm of offspring, as Vasquez himself confesses that those things are to be guarded against which tend to the harm of a third.

DIANA judges both opinions probable.

He NOTES also, against Soto 4. d. 12. quaest. 1. art. 7., Medina prim. 2. quaest. 71. art. 5., Henriquez lib. 8. cap. 5 §. 1. in Glossa, litt. F., Sanchez de matrim. tom. 3. lib. 9. d. 45. num. 28., Salas prim. 2. tract. 13. d. 2. sect. 9., Becan prim. 2. tract. 2. cap. 3. quaest. 6., Tanner prim. 2. d. 4. dub. 3. num. 35., Suarez tract. 5. d. 3. sect. 4., that acts occurring in drunkenness, and all other things that no longer remain in the power of the doer, are not informed by moral malice, and therefore are not sins, but only effects of sin. Vasquez consents prim. 1. Tom. 1. d. 94. cap. 2., Azor Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 7. quaestio 1., Sayrus lib. 2. cap. 6., Herera in 2. disp. 20. quaest. 8., and Sanchez himself judges it probable. Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 16. num. 46.

YET I judge these things true only when, after the drinking, before he goes beyond, he has repentance, because the cause was intrinsic. So Soto in 4. dist. 12. quaest. 1. art. 7., Henriquez lib. 5. cap. 5. in Gloss. litt. H., Medina prim. 2. quaest. 71. art. 5., Becan prim. 2. tract. 2. cap. 3., Graff decis. part. 1. lib. 2. cap. 88.

INDEED Diana adds, with Soto above, Sanchez de matrim. tom. 3. lib. 9. d. 45. n. 29., Salas prim. 2. tract. 13. d. 6. sect. 8. num. 59. and others, that if before drunkenness, or before such sins follow, he confesses and accuses himself of the cause given, he is not afterward bound to confess, should such sins follow.

Henriquez ADDS that those sins do not even bring excommunication; but Vasquez teaches the opposite prim. 2. d. 94. cap. 4., Azor Tom. 1 lib. 1. cap. 7. quaesit. 1. and others.

Sanchez, however, LIMITS sum. tom. 1. lib. 1. c. 16. 24 that it does not proceed in sins already dissolved. The same Suarez teaches de Relig. Tom. 2. lib. 3. cap. 8. de excom. lata in periurium inadvertenter prolatum ratione consuetudinis.

Titius, a Catholic, gets himself drunk not rarely; and since for that reason he rather frequently omits hearing Mass on Sunday, and indeed, while drunk, beats his wife, although, when his reason has been recovered, on hearing this he grieves greatly; and since his son, having seized the occasion of his father’s drunkenness, not only omits hearing the commanded Mass but spends the whole Sunday in revelries and games with dissolute companions, Titius, being about to confess, consequently doubts what and in what manner he is bound to confess. Hence it is asked:

1. What sort of sin is drunkenness, and in what does its malice consist?

2. Are the sins of children imputed to their parents?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What sort of a sin is drunkenness, and in what does its malice consist?

St. Paul enumerates¹ drunkenness among the sins which prevent those who commit them from entering the kingdom of God, and so it is a mortal sin. This should be understood of complete drunkenness, which deprives one of the use of reason, so that he does not know what he is doing and can not distinguish between right and wrong. Partial drunkenness is only a venial sin, unless by reason of scandal or harm done to health or fortune, or some similar extrinsic reason, it becomes a grievous sin.

1 Gal. v. 21.

The malice of drunkenness does not consist merely in voluntarily depriving oneself of reason, for we may do that for a good cause, as we do when we take chloroform. Its malice consists in depriving oneself of the faculty of reason without good cause by yielding to an inordinate appetite for intoxicating drink. Drunkenness not only deprives one of the use of reason but also of the capacity to recover it for a considerable time.

2. Are the sins of children imputable to their parents?

Yes, certainly. “Parents sin gravely if, insofar as it lies in them, they do not take care that their children be imbued with good morals . . . avoid the company of the wicked, observe the commandments of God and the Church, frequent the sacraments, and abstain from sins.”¹

1 Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, lib. iii, n. 339.

3. Titius committed grave sin every time he got completely drunk so that he did not know what he was doing. We must suppose that he foresaw that he would not be able to hear Mass on the following Sunday when he got drunk, and so he is guilty of mortal sin on this account also. If he knew that he usually beat his wife when he got drunk, he committed sin also on this account, even though he was sorry afterward; his sorrow should have prevented him from getting drunk. If his son was of age to be corrected and compelled to go to Mass and avoid bad company, Titius was obliged to see to this, and he committed grave sin by neglecting his duty and by giving bad example to his son. The sin which he commits is against his obligation as a parent, and the sins of his son are imputable to him under this head; not that the father is guilty of the specific sins committed by his son on account of the father’s neglect. Titius, then, must confess these sins with the number of times that he has been guilty of them.

Titius had heard that voluntary drunkenness is not of itself and necessarily a sin, but only when someone gets himself drunk without necessity. Hence, when by misfortune he had broken his arm and was suffering the greatest pains from it, having no other remedy, he got himself drunk while the doctor who would treat the arm was being summoned. On another occasion, when for several nights he had taken scarcely any sleep, he got himself drunk and was sunk in a profound sleep for twelve hours. When he had also lost his dearest daughter by death and had fallen into great melancholy, he at length extinguished his grief by copious drinking to the point of drunkenness. Finally, when occasions of drunkenness were multiplying gradually and imperceptibly, moved by conscience he approached a confessor, who asks:

1. Is drunkenness intrinsically bad, and in what is its malice to be placed?

2. Is it lawful to make oneself or another drunk?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. Is drunkenness intrinsically evil, and in what is its malice to be placed?

Yes; drunkenness is intrinsically evil, or, in other words, it is inordinate and wrong in itself; it is not wrong merely because it is prohibited. Its malice more probably does not consist in any single element, but in several. It consists in voluntarily depriving oneself of the use of reason for a considerable time by drinking intoxicating liquor to excess without good cause. The malice of drunkenness, then, does not consist merely in depriving oneself of the use of reason; we may do that both naturally in sleep and artificially by using an anesthetic for a good reason. Probably, at least, a man bitten by a poisonous snake may make himself drunk by way of antidote. But without sufficient cause to deprive oneself of man’s noblest attribute by worse than brutish excess in drinking intoxicating liquor is inordinate and wrong.

2. Is it lawful to make oneself or another drunk?

These are disputed questions among theologians. According to St. Alphonsus¹ a man may take intoxicating drink in order to expel bad humors from the body, even though he foresees that the drink will deprive him of the use of reason, but he may not take it to make himself drunk, for that is always intrinsically evil. However, other theologians, in keeping with what was said above, allow a man to make himself drunk for a sufficient reason. The only question will be about the sufficiency of the reason. As to the question whether it is lawful to make another person drunk, St. Alphonsus acknowledges that the opinion is probable according to which one may make another drunk even with his knowledge when it is the only means available to prevent him from committing a still greater sin on which he is determined.²

1 Book v, no. 76.

2 St. Alphonsus, book v, no. 77.

3. The case. Titius had heard of the theological doctrine that drunkenness is not always and necessarily sinful, but only when a man gets drunk without sufficient reason. He applied the doctrine first when he broke his leg and suffered great pain. Having no other remedy at hand, he made himself drunk till the doctor came and set the limb. Titius may be excused for this. On another occasion when he had got scarcely any sleep for several nights, he made himself drunk and slept for twelve hours. Some theologians would excuse Titius from sin in this case also; but it is preferable to say that he should consult a doctor, or take exercise in the fresh air, or adopt some other remedy, as taking drink in excess for sleeplessness would almost certainly lead to abuse, and therefore it must be forbidden.

In taking drink to drown his sorrow for the loss of a dearly loved daughter Titius committed sin. For such spiritual evils spiritual remedies should be used, or at least not such remedies as getting drunk; otherwise terrible abuses would creep in and have to be condoned. The confessor therefore will know what to say to Titius, whose wrong application of a right principle led to abuse in his own case.