appendix — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Appendix. On Drunkenness

181.
    • Drunkenness is voluntary excess in drink up to the deprivation of reason. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., no. 75.
181.

Perfect drunkenness, namely reaching to the deprivation of reason, is grave sin of itself. This is established 1. from reason; for voluntarily to deprive oneself of the use of reason, disturbing it in a violent and unnatural mode, at least without grave cause and for pleasure 1, is gravely opposed to rational nature. For thus man casts himself down to the state of brutes, and disfigures the image of God in himself. - St. Lig., no. 75, and others very commonly.

1 Indeed St. Thomas expressly writes: from the pleasure of wine alone. Thus the Holy Doctor (1.2, q. 88, art. 5, ad 1): But concerning drunkenness it must be said... that it is mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself impotent for using reason, by which man is ordered to God and avoids many occurring sins, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue.

181.

It is established 2. from Sacred Scripture, 1 Cor. 6.10: Nor drunkards... shall possess the kingdom of God. - And Isaiah 5.11: Woe to you who rise in the morning to follow drunkenness... Now the particle woe in Sacred Scripture denotes a most grave evil.

181.

But more probably it is of itself only venial sin if the drunkenness is imperfect. Thus commonly. - St. Lig., ibid. 2.

2 Thus St. Alphonsus: It is certain among all that for drunkenness to be mortal sin, it is required that it be perfect, namely that which wholly deprives of the use of reason.

182.
  1. Questions. - QUESTION 1. What are the signs of perfect drunkenness?
182.

I answer: The following are reported, namely 1. not to know how to distinguish good from evil; 2. not to remember things said or done in drunkenness; 3. to do wholly unusual things, which namely at other times are never usually done with a sound mind..., etc. - But hesitation of the tongue, staggering of the feet, sight of double objects, or of objects turning themselves in a circle, are not certain signs. - St. Lig., no. 78.

182.

QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to intoxicate oneself for driving away illness?

182.

I answer: Yes, more probably, if drunkenness follows only as an effect of a means licit of itself, for example if a notable quantity of generous wine is required for warding off illness. This is established from what was said On Human Acts, no. 9. - St. Lig., no. 76, and others commonly 3.

3 St. Thomas (2.2, q. 150, art. 2, ad 3): When someone drinks much... according to the counsel of medicine..., the drink is not to be reputed superfluous.

182.

QUESTION 3. Whether drunkenness is licit for undergoing a surgical operation?

182.

I answer: It is controverted. St. Lig. with others denies it, because drunkenness would be directly intended, and the good effect would follow from evil. But Busemb. with others affirms it, because the deprivation of the use of reason for a brief time from a grave cause does not seem something intrinsically evil. St. Thomas agrees, 2.2, qu. 150, art. 2 4. And in reality just as in such a case opium and ether are employed, so also wine could be employed. Moreover, a question of this kind scarcely pertains to practice now, since other easier means are available for that end.

4 St. Thomas places the vice of drunkenness in superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone. See the text related above from 1.2, q. 88, art. 1, ad 1.

** The VV. (page 913, no. 22) bring forward these words of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 76): The first opinion seems sufficiently probable, indeed more probable to me, in the case in which a draught of wine is furnished for expelling or correcting depraved humors; for then the deprivation of reason happens by accident and indirectly, and therefore can licitly be permitted.... It must be said otherwise if the draught were given directly for drunkenness, or for causing deprivation of reason; for this would always be intrinsically evil. Hence, as Croix well observes (book 5, no. 331)... it is never licit to intoxicate oneself for stupefying the senses.

I answer: 1. Croix discusses one condemned to death, and rightly disposed, and says that there is grave sin 1. because this is not the end of drink, 2. nor is there sufficient reason for taking away reason when it is then maximally necessary. Let the first reason, truly futile, be omitted; for neither is the end, for example, of the feet to kill flies; nor nevertheless does he sin gravely who destroys a fly by treading on it. But the other reason concerning necessity then urging militates for that special case, not however for others. Therefore that allegation seems less to the point.

I answer: 2. To the reason of St. Alphonsus there will be one who replies that even in our case the draught is not given directly for causing deprivation of reason, but for stupefaction of the senses; and therefore drunkenness follows indirectly and by accident: for stupefaction of the senses does not come from deprivation of reason, but from relaxation and dullness of the nerves.

183.
    • QUESTION 4. Whether it is licit to induce someone to drunkenness, so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?
183.

I answer: 1. Yes, if drunkenness is only material for him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. - Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc.

183.

I answer: 2. More commonly they deny it, if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done so that goods may come. - Yet St. Lig., no. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others 5. An opinion of this kind can be admitted in this sense, insofar as formal drunkenness is only permitted, for example, by supplying wine..., etc.

5 St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 77): The first opinion seems sufficiently probable to me and to other learned men consulted by me, whether the drunkenness is material or formal, on account of the reason already brought, because it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater one, according to those things which we have said about scandal. Therefore from St. Alphonsus this opinion can be led into practice, when that necessity urges.

183.

QUESTION 5. Whether all evils done in drunkenness are imputable?

183.

I answer: 1. No, if they were not foreseen, not even confusedly, because whatever things were not foreseen must be held wholly involuntary.

183.

I answer: 2. Yes, for the opposite reason, if they were foreseen, at least as to evils of deed, whether of commission or of omission.

183.

I have said, at least as to evils of deed; for as to evils of mouth, or words or even deeds merely contumelious, they are probably not imputable if they are uttered against men; since by common estimation they are judged to infer no contumely. Otherwise, however, if they are uttered against God, such as blasphemies, etc..., because these are intrinsically evil, and consequently turn to the contumely of divine honor; otherwise, as foreseen, they are voluntary in the cause itself. - St. Lig., no. 78, who nevertheless does not dare to call the contrary opinion improbable 6.

6 Namely the opinion of the Salmanticenses was (treat. 25, ch. 2, nos. 30, 31) that blasphemies or perjuries, however much foreseen, are not imputed to a drunk man, because, as they say, a concept of the mind does not correspond to the words; which opinion moreover they wrongly ascribe both to Sanchez and to Dominic Soto. But the Salmanticenses seem to have confused two things which are plainly disparate, namely having no concept of the mind, and lacking dominion over oneself or one's faculties. This latter is easily conceded concerning drunk persons; but as to the fact that they have no concept of the mind, while, for example, already drunk they ask for wine, while they are angry at those denying wine, while they curse, imprecate, and threaten, I do not know whether anyone will consent. Therefore the foundation of that opinion collapses.

END OF THE TREATISE ON SINS

184.
  1. Resolves. - 1. They sin gravely who, drinking by day and night, knowingly expose themselves to the danger of drunkenness. Likewise those who by command or counsel induce others to drunkenness; or who provoke to equal draughts with foreseen danger of drunkenness.
184.
  1. They sin gravely who, knowing by experience that they become drunk in these or those companies, nevertheless are engaged in the same. Likewise those who, while drinking, adverting to the danger of drunkenness, still continue to drink.
184.
  1. They also sin gravely who drink so much that drunkenness must follow, although they commit themselves to sleep before they are deprived of senses and reason, because in sleep they do not have proximate power for the use of reason.
184.
  1. Nor are they excused from grave sin who, under pretext of native custom, or good affection, or urbanity, urge and as though necessitate guests to drinking up to the danger of drunkenness; but it is otherwise if only more liberal drink is offered and proposed rather often, yet in moderate quantity.
184.
  1. They do not sin gravely of themselves who are so strong, and accustomed to wine, that they are never made drunk, even if they drink more largely than others, unless they so exceed temperance that grave detriment of health can deservedly be feared. - See Cases, no. 176 and following.