Article II: On Other Sins Committed on the Occasion of Drunkenness

S. Th. II-II, q. 150, a. 4.

991. On sins committed in drunkenness. - On the occasion of drunkenness various sins and evils are committed by the drunkard himself. These sins and evils which can follow from drunkenness are imputable:

1. Insofar as they were foreseen, even if accidentally they do not follow. Hence a) they are imputed in their proper species and objective gravity if they are distinctly foreseen, either in their proper species, or only in genus and confusedly in species, because thus the agent really wills the evil of that species and gravity to whose danger he exposes himself. Hence drunkenness which of itself would be venial becomes grave if grave evils to follow from it are foreseen, for example, grave scandal, harm to health, lust, grave sadness to wife, children, parents, etc.; b) if they are foreseen confusedly under the general account of evil, they are imputed only in a general way in the sin of drunkenness, which for this reason becomes graver because on account of it someone is prepared to commit many other sins and evils; c) they are not imputed if in no way they were foreseen;

2. And insofar as the drunkenness was voluntary: for the effect cannot be more voluntary than the cause. Hence its gravity also must be measured according to the gravity of the drunkenness, so that if the drunkenness is only imperfectly voluntary, and therefore venial, even the evils to follow, although grave in themselves, are only venial.

That drunkenness is either a) imperfect, leaving the use of reason, and then the sins also are voluntary in themselves, and are mortal or venial according to the gravity of the matter and the present use of reason; or b) perfect, and then the evils are voluntary and culpable in their cause, the drinking; yet less voluntary than if they were voluntary in themselves. They are committed by an internal act and as to affection, when someone deliberately wills drunkenness from which effects are foreseen to follow; by an external act and as to effect, when sins or evils are externally done. Hence in confession it must be declared which sins were foreseen, and which were externally completed from foresight.

992. Remark. - Words spoken in perfect drunkenness sometimes lose their meaning, or do not preserve it fully. Thus, for example:

1. Injurious words sometimes lose the nature of injury, not indeed if they are determinate detractions or contumelies directed against determinate persons, or even directed against God; but if they are certain general injuries uttered against all men and things which occur everywhere. For these are considered by all as if they had no meaning.

2. Likewise a lie does not exist, because speech against the mind is not given; even a pernicious lie does not remain a lie, although it can preserve its harmfulness.

3. Likewise a vow and an oath do not exist, because for these actual free will is required; but those words can externally sound as an oath, and therefore as perjury. In the same way blasphemous utterances externally sound as blasphemy, and thus dishonor God.

993. On cooperation toward the drunkenness of others. - On the occasion of drunkenness various sins are also committed by others who cooperate in drunkenness. Cooperation toward drunkenness is of two kinds. 1) One is negative, which happens by not impeding drunkenness, when someone by office ought to impede it. 2) The other is positive, which happens by influencing the drunkenness of another. This is a) improperly so called, which happens by inducing him to drink, for example, by commanding, counseling, or provoking equals to draughts. According to some, this is probably licit for impeding a graver evil, for example, sacrilege or homicide, because it is licit to persuade a lesser evil as lesser (cf. treatise on charity I, n. 968); otherwise it is illicit, and constitutes direct scandal. Or b) it is properly so called, which happens by furnishing drink to one who is foreseen to become drunk from it. This of itself is illicit, even for innkeepers, because it gives another the occasion or means of sinning which we are bound to avert from him; accidentally, however, it can be licit on account of a just cause proportioned to the evil and to the occasion of sinning, such as a graver evil to be avoided, for example, a quarrel, blasphemies, a fight, or notable harm, for example, if the tavern would be notably deserted, but not merely the indignation of the guest or merely profit which otherwise would come to others.

The cooperator is guilty in many ways, not only by reason of cooperation or scandal in himself, but also by reason of drunkenness in the other, and by reason of the evils and harms which he foresaw would follow from drunkenness; and therefore he is held to restitution for them after the principal causes, as a cooperating cause.