Article I: On Drunkenness in Itself

S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; II-II, q. 150, a. 1, 2, 3.

985. Drunkenness (dronkenschap) is taken: a) for the state, namely the defect of reason which happens from much wine having been drunk, and thus it is not sin, but can be the effect of sin; b) for the act by which someone falls into this defect, whether it happens contrary to the opinion of the drinker, and then it can be without sin, especially if it does not happen from man's negligence; or whether it happens from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine, and thus it is sin, and can be defined: a voluntary excess in intoxicating drink, for the sake of pleasure. This indicates:

1. The genus: excess, for it pertains to intemperance, and thus it is distinguished from the opposite insensibility.

2. The material object: in intoxicating drink, that is, drink violently inducing privation of the use of reason. Thus it is distinguished from gluttony strictly so called, which is excess in non-intoxicating drink.

Hence if someone exceeds in non-intoxicating drink, for example in milk, chocolate, coffee, or in an intoxicating drink which in fact is not intoxicating, that is, does not reach defect of reason, as happens in those who by nature, custom, or means of pharmaceutical science are powerful, it is not the sin of drunkenness but of crapula. On the contrary, if someone were deprived of the use of reason by something other than drink, for example, by the odor of hops, or the smoke of tobacco, or by the use of morphine, chloroform, or opium, this is not properly drunkenness, although he can sin if it is done voluntarily and without proportionate cause.

3. The formal object: for the sake of pleasure; for the proper object of every temperance and intemperance is the delightful according to the sense of touch. For if someone drank even to alienation of mind, not for the sake of delight, but for some honorable cause, there is the state, but not the sin, of drunkenness. But if sufficient reason is absent, the privation of the use of reason is sought from such drink for its own sake, and therefore for one's own pleasure.

Namely, privation of the use of reason seems not to be in itself and essentially evil, but something indifferent. It is evil if it is done without a just and grave cause, only for pleasure or gluttonous excess, not through rest and in the natural mode, namely sleep instituted by God, but violently and in an unnatural mode, by disturbing the organs: for thus a lower good is preferred to a higher good. But it can be good if it is necessary in order to health of body, for example, for curing or driving off a disease such as typhus, for checking the force of poison from a serpent's bite, for performing a surgical incision more safely, etc.: not only if the good effect follows from the cause, namely from drink by which the senses are dulled, as immediately as the privation of reason does, but also if privation of the use of reason is a means for obtaining an intrinsic good, because for the good of the whole it is licit to deprive oneself of the good of a part, namely the use of reason for a time; indeed, according to some, even for avoiding harm or danger from outside, for example, for avoiding death which another threatens to someone unless he becomes drunk. This, however, cannot be admitted if it is formally requested, or requested from contempt.

4. The condition: voluntary, either in itself or intended, when someone expressly wills to be deprived of the use of reason, for example, to forget pains; or only in the cause, when someone foresees that he will be deprived of the use of reason from it and nevertheless prefers to incur drunkenness rather than abstain from drink.

986. Fully voluntary drunkenness is of itself a mortal sin from its kind, even if admitted only once. - It is proved:

1. From the Scriptures: Gal. 5:21; 1 Cor. 6:10; Rom. 13:13; Luke 21:34; Is. 5:11; Prov. 23:20, 21, 29... And "although it can seem that only the habit of drunkenness is in question, it does not appear how this very habit could per se arrive at grave malice, if its individual acts contained only light malice" (Genicot).

2. From reason: It gravely repugns right reason that a man, knowingly and willingly, for the mere pleasure of wine, without necessity, should deprive himself of the use of reason, and of the proximate power of recovering it and using reason for every sudden necessity: namely, of the most excellent good by which he is distinguished from brutes and operates in a human mode according to reason and avoids sins. From this inordination another follows, that he exposes himself to the danger of perpetrating many and grave evils which are apt to follow from drunkenness, and of omitting goods which he ought to perform.

Yet it can be venial: a) from imperfection of the act, through some inadvertence of the act or ignorance of the drink, which nevertheless is not to be admitted in habitual drunkards; b) from lightness of matter, namely from a slight excess, when drunkenness is imperfect, lightly disturbing reason, or also from shortness of time, if perfect drunkenness does not last long, for example, only some moments. Yet in practice this hardly applies, because no one can know how long it will last.

987. Drunkenness is not the gravest of sins: for other sins either directly deprive one of a divine good, if they are directly against God, or directly deprive one of the good of reason or virtue, which is always a good; but drunkenness itself only deprives one of the use of reason, which can be good or evil. Therefore it is among the lesser complete mortal sins.

Yet it is especially to be fled, because by depriving one of the use of reason, it can be the source of all sins accidentally, insofar as these are impeded by the use of reason.

988. The signs of drunkenness are: a) the certain sign of perfect drunkenness: 1) if someone by reason no longer discerns between moral good and evil. Conjectural signs are: 2) if he does those things which, in possession of himself, he would never do; for example, if he swears, speaks shameful things, starts quarrels, breaks vessels, strikes his wife; 3) if on the following day he does not remember notable words or deeds, for example, what quarrels he stirred up, how he returned home, by what way, with what companion; 4) if he scarcely, or not even scarcely, suffices for directing his common or easy actions; 5) if he has lost the use of the senses and members, for example, of sight, walking, speech.

On the contrary, b) probable signs of imperfect drunkenness or ambiguous signs are: some staggering of gait, stammering of the tongue, an apparent turning of things, seeing things doubled, forgetfulness of small matters, difficulty in carrying out due offices, a certain disturbance of the head or imagination, vomiting: for these also occur while sufficient presence of reason remains.

989. On the use of narcotics (morphine, opium, cocaine, chloroform, ether, etc.), whether for soothing pains or for dulling the senses, since from them can follow privation of the use of reason and great detriment to health, it is useful to say briefly:¹

¹ The question rather belongs to pastoral theology, where it is usually developed more fully. Cf. our little work De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis, c. 2, § B, IV and VI.

1. A transitory use, and so slight that it produces no other effect than restoration of strength and calming of the nerves, is licit.

2. Use in greater quantity or frequency, employed for pleasure alone, or for quieting the craving for narcotics which is generated most vehemently from repeated use of them, is gravely illicit if notable detriment to health and life can follow from it; lightly illicit if the detriment to health or shortening of life certainly is not notable.

3. Use employed in such quantity that the senses are dulled and temporary privation of the use of reason follows, if employed without a just cause, is a grave sin, just as drunkenness is; but from a proportionately grave cause of necessity or utility it is licit, as if it is done so as not to feel sharp pains, or in a major surgical operation, so that the sick person permits himself to be treated without resistance.

4. Use employed at the point of death so that the sick person is deprived of reason and dies without sense of pain is gravely illicit, not only if he is not yet prepared for death, so that he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation; but also if he is rightly disposed, because thus he would lack the opportunity of meriting and of immediately preparing himself for death and notably increasing heavenly glory. Hence there is lacking a proportionately grave reason for permitting this; indeed, if there is danger that he will not return to the use of reason, it is an equivalent shortening of life.

According to some, however, this could be tolerated, with the consent of the sick person, who is already well prepared for death, namely on account of sharp pains, especially if he is very liable to impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he will fall into grave sin; indeed, as has sometimes been said, even if at the same time an indirect shortening of life would follow in a sick person certainly about to die. But this is more doubtful and rather to be omitted. Without doubt, however, direct acceleration of death would be gravely illicit, so that insensibility and privation of the use of reason would be only effects of the very shortening of life: for evils are not to be done that good things may come.

990. Remarks. - 1. As St. Alphonsus notes, l. V, n. 78, he is not excused from mortal sin who takes a quantity of drink apt of itself to induce perfect drunkenness, even though, before he is deprived of his senses, he gives himself to sleep, by which he escapes the effect of the wine; because that drinking is already of itself intrinsically evil, since of itself it is already apt to deprive that man of the use of reason, and it is accidental whether he is deprived of his senses through sleep or through intoxication. He placed the whole cause of the evil, and there will remain an incapacity of recovering the use of reason which would not have arisen from natural sleep.

2. The confessor can rightly presume that drunkenness was voluntary in him who is accustomed to become drunk frequently, for example, ten times in individual months. But if a fairly intelligent man confesses that within a month he was drunk once or twice, he should be asked whether he foresaw the drunkenness. He who was drunk once or twice, without any habit, is to be presumed not to have foreseen the drunkenness.

3. To drive away sadness or melancholy it would be licit to drink only up to cheerfulness: for such a reason would not have proportion with the evil of perfect drunkenness. But clerics, fathers of families, and persons established in dignity ought also to avoid cheerfulness.