Killing the Innocent

IN defence of my own life from unjust attack I may use whatever violence is necessary and even go to the length of killing the aggressor, if I cannot otherwise save my life. This right of self-defence all laws, human and divine, concede, as Innocent III declared. Nature herself teaches us that an act which is necessary for self-defence is lawful, and even if it lead to the taking of the life of the unjust aggressor it does not cease to be lawful. A higher value must be set on the life of the innocent than on that of the guilty, especially when the guilty one is the cause of his life being put in jeopardy. No one is justified in using greater violence than is necessary for the purpose of self-defence,so that if by striking or wounding an assailant of my life I can effectually defend myself, I am not justified in killing him. On the same principle no private person can take vengeance for violence which has already been done, by offering violence in return; vindictive justice is reserved for public authority, at any rate in more serious matters. Nor may one whose life is threatened anticipate the attack; defence is only lawful when the attack is practically being made or is at any rate imminent. Unless the attack is practically imminent it is always possible to resort to other means than homicide for the defence of one’s own life; one may invoke the protection of the law or at least fly the intending assailant.

What one may lawfully do, that, as a rule, another may help him to do; and so I may kill or maim an unjust assailant not only of my own life, limb, chastity, or property, but when any innocent person is similarly threatened I may also do the same in his defence. Although I may lawfully do this, yet there is seldom an obligation of doing it, for the obligation would only arise from charity, and as we saw above, this virtue does not usually bind with such serious inconvenience as would always be involved in taking life in defence of another. Those who have charge of the public peace and security are more strictly bound to perform their duty of protecting life and property even at the sacrifice of the lives of wrongdoers.

It is never lawful directly to kill the innocent, or, in other words, it is never lawful to kill the innocent when the death is intended in itself, or when it is inflicted as a means to the attaining of some other object. Such an act is expressly forbidden by God: “‘ The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death.”¹ Reason, too, teaches us the same truth; for if ever it were lawful directly to kill the innocent, it would be so when such a death would be of great advantage to the commonwealth. But even to save the State an innocent man’s life must not be taken directly, for the State exists that good men may lead honourable and peaceful lives; the State is for the good citizens, not the good citizens for the State. Not even the good of the State, then, makes it right to take an innocent man’s life, and if that does not justify the act, nothing does.

¹ Exod. xxiii 7.

The death of the innocent may be permitted, not intended, when it follows from some action lawful in itself which also produces an equally immediate and good effect, and when this counterbalances the evil effect. This, again, is but the application of the principle of a double effect, and it is evident from what has been said before. The general of an army who orders the bombardment of a beleaguered town knows that his order cannot be executed without killing perhaps many innocent non-combatants, yet the action is not unlawful.

Casual homicide which was not intended in itself, but which was the consequence of doing some dangerous action, as furious driving in a frequented street, is imputable to the agent if he adverted to the probable danger of killing someone, If such probable danger did not exist, or was not adverted to, casual homicide will not be imputable in conscience, although if the action be forbidden by law, even on other grounds than the chance of its causing another’s death, and someone is killed by it, English law punishes it as manslaughter.

It is usual to treat here of abortion, and of certain surgical operations concerned with child-bearing. Abortion is the premature ejection of the living fetus. The human fetus reaches maturity about nine months after conception, but it is capable of living even if born a considerable time before maturity. A child may live when born at seven months or even somewhat earlier, especially if artificial means are taken for preserving its life. When the foetus is ejected at such a time that in the judgement of a skilled medical man it will probably live, this is called acceleration of birth rather than abortion in the strict sense. We are here concerned with the lawfulness of procuring abortion and of performing such operations as craniotomy and embryotomy, which destroy the life of the foetus. There is only question of the living, not of the dead, foetus, as is obvious.

Inasmuch as it is never lawful directly to kill the innocent, it is never lawful directly to procure abortion at a time when there is no probability that the foetus can live outside the mother’s womb. This is clear, for the foetus is a human being, with a human soul, which, as is commonly held by theologians, is infused into it by God at the moment of conception; it has, then, as much right to live as anyone else, and it certainly is innocent of all personal crime. To deprive it directly of the medium in which alone it can live is to kill it directly, just as to deprive a man of air by plunging him under water is to kill him directly. The direct procuring of abortion, then, is never allowed, inasmuch as it is the direct killing of the innocent, and intrinsically wrong. In the same way, anticipated homicide and a grievous sin are committed whenever means of whatever sort are taken to prevent conception.

However, just as the indirect killing of the innocent is lawful for a just cause, as we have seen, so a pregnant woman who is suffering from disease or tumour, or any complication which threatens life, may lawfully adopt the necessary means to save herself, even if what is a remedy for her causes the death of the foetus, In all these cases we have but the application of the principle of a double effect; the mother is not bound to sacrifice her life by abstaining from adopting the remedy indicated, especially as her own death would also involve the death of the child. Thus we may approve of the following solution by Dr. Capellman of the “ case where the uterus with the foetus is locked in the upper strait, as may happen through retroversion, sinking, and prolapsus of the pregnant womb. If all other known means of turning or replacing the uterus fail, I believe it to be allowable to induce abortion indirectly, by procuring the discharge of the waters, or by the perforation of the foetal membranes.”¹ On the same principle P. Antonelli thinks that it is lawful to remove an ulcerated womb which is threatening the life of a pregnant mother though the operation cause the death of the foetus, as also to remove an extrauterine foetus whose further growth would cause the certain death of the mother.²

All who unlawfully procure abortion incur the penalty of excommunication, the absolution of which is reserved to the Bishop by Canon 2350.

¹ Pastoral Medicine, p. 16.

² Medicina pastoralis, p. 220.

Craniotomy, or any other similar operation which has for its immediate and direct effect the destruction of the life of the foetus, is a direct killing of the innocent, and is never allowed. If the child is already dead, there is of course no difficulty in permitting craniotomy or embryotomy, but if it is still alive it is not lawful to kill it, even if otherwise both child and mother were certain to die. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. The end does not justify the means. Some medical men consider the foetus, until it is born, as a portion of the mother which may be destroyed to save her life. This view is not in keeping with Christian principles, according to which the child has a soul of its own, and has its own independent right to live.

Some theologians used to think that such operations were lawful if the mother’s life could not otherwise be saved, because the child might be considered a materially unjust assailant of its mother’s life, and so be lawfully killed; or because when there is a conflict of rights the stronger right should prevail. However, in no sense can it be allowed that the child is an unjust assailant of its mother’s life; it is where nature placed it, through no fault of its own, and it has a right to be there and to be born. If either is an unjust assailant of the other’s life, it is the mother, who voluntarily undertook the obligations of motherhood. In the same way, when the stronger of two conflicting rights prevails, this is due to the fault of the other party, and such fault is out of the question in this case. This doctrine is now theologically certain after the repeated declarations of the Holy See that no operation which tends directly to the destruction of the life of the foetus is lawful.

When the child cannot be born in the natural way, and the life of both mother and child is in danger, Caesarian section or some similar operation may be, and should be, performed, by which the lives of both may very probably be saved. The operation which takes its name from Dr. Porro, and which consists in removing the uterus together with the foetus, requires some special reason to make it lawful, for such mutilation of the mother is only allowed when it is necessary in order to save life.

In all operations which involve danger to the life of the child, Catholic parents should be careful to have the living foetus baptized, which may be done by the doctor or nurse while it is still in the womb. But according to Canon 746 this should not be done as long as there is any hope of the child being born alive.

ACCORDING to Canon 985, the following are irregular from crime. These crimes, however, do not cause irregularity unless they were grave, external sins, whether public or occult, and committed after Baptism, except in the case of receiving Baptism from non-Catholics (Can. 986).

The sins against charity toward self are:

I. Direct killing of oneself. This occurs when the self-killing act, as such, either is intended as an end or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained.

1. Direct killing of oneself is always prohibited under grave sin. For first, an act of this sort is against natural inclination, "because naturally every thing loves itself; and to this it belongs that every thing naturally preserves itself in being, and resists corrupting things as much as it can" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5). Then self-killing "is against charity, by which each one ought to love himself" (St. Thomas, ibid.). Then the killer "does injury to the community" (St. Thomas, ibid.), because each one, as part of the community, is ordered also to the good of the community. Moreover, it is illicit to destroy what is not yours, but God's alone; and such is life. Hence Sacred Scripture: "You shall not kill";¹ "I will kill and I will make to live";² "You are Lord, who have power of life and death."³

It is indeed reported that some Saints killed themselves; but these things can be explained either through the inspiration of God, who, as Lord of life and death, permitted it, or through good faith (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, III, 366, 361).

2. It is disputed whether the killing of oneself, by which certainly one sins against charity toward self, also involves a sin against commutative justice; not indeed with respect to oneself - for justice and injustice are toward another - but with respect either to the community or to God, or to both. St. Alphonsus leaves the matter undecided (III, 366); St. Thomas indeed states: "It must be said that homicide is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is contrary to charity, which one ought to have toward oneself: and on this side killing oneself is a sin by comparison with oneself; but by comparison with the community and with God, it has the character of sin also by opposition to justice" (II-II, q. 64, a. 5); but the holy Doctor can be understood of social or general justice, and perhaps he did not intend a sin distinct in species.

Question. Whether it is lawful for one condemned to death, by command or by positive permission of legitimate authority, to kill himself.

Response. More commonly it is denied, because punishment is an act of vindicative justice, which is essentially toward another. Yet St. Alphonsus (III, 369) and others hold it as quite probable that this is lawful, because nothing prevents the condemned man from acting as two persons, namely as the one executing the sentence and as the punished one. Therefore they hold as probable that vindicative justice is not essentially toward a physically different person. Hence practically it is lawful. Yet there is no obligation of satisfying a precept of this sort - and consequently the guilty person cannot be compelled to such an act - because the judge probably cannot impose it, and it is a matter that is arduous (n. 146). "Yet they commonly concede that the guilty person can climb the ladder, fit his neck to the sword, etc.; since these actions tend only remotely toward death" (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

¹ Exodus 20:13.

² Deuteronomy 32:39.

³ Wisdom 16:13.

III. Indirect killing of oneself occurs when the self-killing act, as such, is neither chosen as an end nor assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Now indirect killing of oneself is of itself illicit; it becomes lawful if a proportionate cause is present. The former is clear from the fact that charity toward self of itself demands that I guard life at least by ordinary means, much less does it permit that I neglect it (n. 521). The latter is deduced from what has been said about an act with a double effect, one good, the other evil.

Corollary I. They sin gravely: 1. who by living intemperately notably accelerate death; 2. unskilled tightrope walkers, acrobats, and other performers who, induced by greed for profit alone or by empty glory, expose themselves to grave danger of life; the skilled do not expose themselves to such great danger and are more easily excused; this also holds concerning skilled persons who undertake courses by means of a flying machine.

Corollary II. They do not sin: 1. who, with danger of death but with hope of fruit, preach the Gospel, or with hope of usefulness in time of persecution do not flee; yet those things seem illicit on account of the sole desire of martyrdom. Likewise they do not sin who by vigils, fasts, etc., shorten life even by some years, or from a just cause undertake unhealthy labors or seek a region very harmful to health, even if it is foreseen that life must be lessened by some years; 2. who in a shipwreck yields a plank, even one already grasped, to another, with his own death even certainly permitted, or throws himself before a missile or blow to save the life of a ruler or friend, or takes the place of a friend unjustly condemned to death; nor is it illicit to throw oneself from a ship into the sea, lest all perish; 3. who ignites gunpowder to overturn an enemy fortification, or sinks a ship lest the enemy gain possession of it, even if he foresees that he himself will perish at the same time; yet the latter is illicit if it is done solely for preserving honor, although there are many prejudices which more easily excuse; 4. who, to avoid a more bitter death actually to be undergone or inflicted, casts himself into the danger, even certain danger, of a less bitter death, "for example, if someone throws himself through a window to escape a fire; especially if there is some hope of escaping death.... And Elbel permits this also to guilty persons detained in prison, for escaping a certain sentence of death, or even perpetual prison" (St. Alphonsus, III, 366, 367, 370-372). Likewise it is lawful for a virgin "to cast herself into certain danger of life, but not into certain death, for preserving chastity from an assailant" (St. Alphonsus, III, 372, question 2). For the rest, in the cases set forth, commonly either there is some hope of safety, or time for serious thought is lacking, and subjectively they are excused at least on account of a good intention.

Corollary III. Bullfights are not prohibited under grave sin; since, with attention to the skill of the fighters, grave danger is commonly absent. Yet they are prohibited under light sin, because, considering the nature of the act and a danger not altogether to be despised, there seems to be lacking a sufficient cause for conducting them. Horse and bicycle races are lawful, even though they are not without any danger.

V. Ecclesiastical penalties established for suicide and self-mutilation are:

1. Those who have mutilated themselves or others, or have attempted to take life from themselves, are irregular from delict (can. 985, 5).

2. Those who have killed themselves by deliberate counsel are deprived of ecclesiastical burial (can. 1240, § 1, 3); to one excluded from ecclesiastical burial there must also be denied both any funeral Mass, even anniversary Mass, and other public funeral offices (can. 1241).

3. Those who have laid hands on themselves, if death has not followed, are to be barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and if they are clerics, they are to be suspended for a time to be determined by the Ordinary, and removed from benefices or offices having care of souls annexed in the internal or external forum (can. 2350, § 2).

4. A lay person who has been lawfully condemned for the delict of grave mutilation or wounding or violence is to be considered excluded by the law itself from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and from any office, if he has any in the Church, with the obligation of repairing damages remaining firm (can. 2354, § 1).

By the fifth precept there is prohibited "the unjust killing, mutilation, beating, and other similar affliction" of oneself and of one's neighbor (St. Alphonsus, III, 363).

Killing is distinguished:

1. Into direct and indirect. It is direct when the act of killing, as such, is intended as an end or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Otherwise it is indirect.

2. Into simple and qualified, according as circumstances which contain a special malice are not joined or are joined to it. Qualified killing is again distinguished:

a) Into parricide, by which name the killing of some relative is designated. In parricide there is added a sin against piety, if the killing concerns parents or other blood-relatives. Moreover, the killings of the aforesaid persons quite probably do not differ from one another in species.

b) Into regicide, which is the killing of a king, pope, or prince. In regicide, which is also called the crime of lese-majesty, there is added a sin against observance.

c) Into robbery-killing, which is killing done with the intention of plundering. Another species of injustice is added.

d) Into sacrilegious killing, which is the killing either of a sacred person or one done with profanation of a sacred thing or place. The sin of sacrilege is added.

Civil laws for the most part distinguish killing or voluntary homicide, and homicide that is voluntary and perpetrated with deliberate purpose.

With these things noted beforehand, we shall speak first about the killing of an innocent person, then about the killing of a criminal, finally about the killing of an unjust aggressor. About the killing of oneself, something was said in the treatise on charity (n. 523).

I. Direct killing of an innocent person is a grave sin from its whole genus. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture,¹ and from the fact that the murderer: 1. destroys what is not his, but God's; 2. deprives his neighbor of the use of life and of the faculties, to which the neighbor has a right from divine ordination; 3. cuts off a member of the commonwealth (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 393).

Corollary I. It is illicit to kill those lethally wounded, the dying, so that they may not suffer longer, and so forth.

Corollary II. Puncture of the heart or artery is illicit when done for this end, that one who seems to be dead may certainly be deprived of life, lest, namely, he be buried alive (euthanasia). But if it is certainly established that life has passed away, it is indeed per se lawful for a physician to puncture the heart or artery; yet since by acting thus a practice to be disapproved is promoted, that manner of acting is illicit unless both the physician signifies that he does not approve the wicked intention of those requesting it, and a grave cause is present.

II. Nor is it ever lawful for public authority directly to kill an innocent person; both because public authority does not have a right over the life of innocent subjects, and because the common good itself, for which public authority must provide, is promoted above all by the protection of the life of the innocent.

"The killing of a sinner," says St. Thomas, "becomes lawful, namely for public authority, by comparison to something else: considering man indeed according to himself, it is lawful to kill no one, because in any man, even a sinner, we ought to love the nature which God made, and which is corrupted by killing; but, as was said above (art. 2 of this question), the killing of a sinner is by comparison to the common good, which is corrupted by sin; but the life of the just is preservative and promotive of the common good, because they are the more principal part of the multitude; and therefore in no way is it lawful to kill an innocent person" (II-II, q. 64, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Hence neither "is it lawful to kill hostages, even if those who sent them do not keep faith, because they are innocent" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); nor can an innocent person be killed even if, for example, a tyrant besieging a city threatens that, unless he is killed, he will overturn the city. Nevertheless an innocent subject, when the besieging tyrant demands it, can be sent and handed over to the enemies, especially because the innocent person, if he is not a stranger, seems bound to expose his life for his own commonwealth (St. Alphonsus, III, 393).

Corollary. The killing of an innocent person can become lawful by the authority of God. "For God has dominion of death and life: by His ordination both sinners and the just die; and therefore he who kills an innocent person by the command of God does not sin in such a case, just as neither does God, whose executor he is; and he is shown to fear God, obeying His commands" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 6, ad 1).

III. Indirect killing of an innocent person likewise is per se illicit; it becomes lawful if a proportionate cause is present. It is said:

1. Indirect killing of one's neighbor is per se illicit, because charity per se demands that I avert damage from my neighbor, much less does it permit that I create it for him.

2. It becomes lawful if a proportionate cause is present; this follows from what was said about an act with a double effect (St. Alphonsus, III, 393).

Corollary I. Homicide is not imputed if someone places a work, even an illicit one, that is little dangerous, so that death rarely comes from it, provided, if it can be done, due diligence is used for forestalling death; as if someone rings a bell, and by chance the little bell, falling, crushes a traveler; if someone, giving attention to hunting wild beasts, by chance kills a man; if someone fornicates, and the woman dies from childbirth (St. Alphonsus, III, 398).

Corollary II. "For taking a city and winning victory, if it is necessary, it is lawful to direct cannons at that place where there are many innocent persons, because their death follows outside the intention" (St. Alphonsus, III, 393); in other words, because the aforesaid act is not assumed as a means insofar as it is killing of an innocent person.

¹ Gen. 4:10; Exod. 20:13.

I. Public authority has the power of killing criminals. This is clear first from Sacred Scripture,¹ likewise from the doctrine² and practice of the Church;³ then from reason. For public power has a power which is very useful, and sometimes necessary, for the common good, for example for the security of citizens. But such is the power of imposing the penalty of death (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 2).

With the primary natural end of punishment considered, which is the reparation of a violated order or retribution, it seems one must say that all grave transgressions of the public order can be punished with the penalty of death without injustice. Yet such a use of power would have to be disapproved, both because it would tend toward the harm of the community, and because "the punishments of the present life are more medicinal than retributive; for retribution is reserved to divine judgment, which is according to truth upon sinners; and therefore, according to the judgment of the present life, the punishment of death is not inflicted for any mortal sin whatever, but only for those which bring irreparable harm, or also for those which have some horrible deformity" (II-II, q. 64, a. 2, ad 2). Note, however, that sometimes deservedly, especially by military law, capital punishment is established for faults light in themselves but, with the circumstances considered, grave.

II. Only the supreme authority in the commonwealth has the power of killing criminals. This is drawn both from the fact that it belongs to the governor alone of the commonwealth to establish those things which are ordered to the safety of the whole community (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 379), and from the fact that it belongs to the governor alone of the community to subtract from the community what pertains to the community. But "man himself and all his parts" belong to the community (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1). For the rest, observe:

1. It is another question to what extent public authority is bound to use the aforesaid power; the solution of this question depends on whether, with the circumstances of things and also the condition and character of subjects considered, certain very grave crimes, such as homicides and seditions, can be sufficiently forestalled in another way. Yet the safety of the commonwealth seems to require that in time of war and sedition the penalty of death be decreed against certain persons.

2. Authority, where the penalty of death is concerned, is per se bound to observe the order of law; namely, per se it is not lawful to kill criminals unless they have first been both cited and heard, and, with the crime legally proved, have been condemned, "because by the law of nature a public act must be done from public knowledge and authority" (St. Alphonsus, III, 377). I said per se, because on account of an extraordinary necessity of the commonwealth it is lawful to depart from the order of law, provided, however, that the crime is established. Moreover, an extraordinary necessity can occur especially in time of sedition or war.

Corollary I. Killing which in English is called lynching is altogether to be rejected, although perhaps good faith can excuse by reason of custom; likewise killing of traitors in time of war carried out by one's own authority. Officers cannot kill a criminal, even if he flees or wrests himself from their hands, unless they have a special mandate (St. Alphonsus, III, 380).

Corollary II. It is not lawful to kill either a tyrant of government, as it is called, that is, a tyrant who possesses rule by a just title but greatly abuses it (n. 727), or a tyrant of title who possesses the kingdom peacefully.⁴ But a tyrant of title who does not yet possess the kingdom peacefully can be killed by the authority of the legitimate Prince (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 8, n. 13).

¹ John 19:11; Rom. 13:4.

² The doctrine of the Church is known, for example, from the profession of faith proposed by Innocent III to the Waldensians, where it was read thus: "Concerning secular power we assert that without mortal sin it can exercise judgments of blood, provided that in inflicting vindication it proceeds not from hatred but from judgment, not incautiously but advisedly." Then among the errors of Luther proscribed by Leo X in the bull Exurge Domine, this proposition 33 is read: "That heretics be burned is against the will of the Spirit" (Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, 2nd ed., n. 524).

³ As regards the practice of the Church, history teaches that formerly Superiors of the Church often handed over heretics or other criminals to the secular judge to be punished with death; something the Church certainly would not have done unless the State had the right of punishing evildoers with death (Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, 2nd ed., n. 524).

⁴ These things in practice also have force in the case in which the one who peacefully possesses the kingdom is not yet judged a legitimate prince (n. 727).

I. It is lawful to repel an unjust aggressor against life, even, with the necessary conditions posited, by killing him. This is clear from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the doctrine of the Church contained in the old Law.² And indeed what prevents me from repelling unjust force by force, if otherwise it cannot be repelled? Or: what prevents me from returning like for like to him who is on the point of inflicting unjust harm on me, if otherwise the damage cannot be averted? For the rest, if the proposition were denied, sufficient provision would not have been made for the security of life (St. Alphonsus, III, 380).

Nor is it an obstacle that the one attacked, by killing the attacker, seems to prefer his own temporal life to the eternal life of his neighbor, since we are bound only to give life for a neighbor who is placed in extreme spiritual necessity. But the attacker is not placed in extreme spiritual necessity, because he can rescue himself from necessity by ceasing from the attack. In a word: his spiritual necessity is voluntary, and therefore not extreme (St. Alphonsus, III, 380).

I said: it is lawful, because a man is not bound to use an extraordinary means, of which sort is the killing of one's neighbor, for saving life. Indeed it is even an act of charity "to permit one's own killing, lest another be deprived of temporal and eternal life" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Make an exception, however, if the life of the one attacked is necessary or quasi-necessary to the community or family.

I said: with the necessary conditions posited. Moreover, the conditions required so that it may be lawful to kill an aggressor against life are: 1. that the aggression be unjust; 2. that the aggression be physical; 3. that the moderation of blameless defense be observed. It is said:

1. That the aggression be unjust; this is clear. Thus it is not lawful to kill an executioner who carries out a sentence of death. Yet it suffices that it be materially unjust, for example if it is done by a madman, by a drunk person, and so forth. The reason is that a right, in this case the right to life, by its nature can be defended absolutely or always without injustice; without any sin, if charity does not stand in the way. But charity stands in the way only in the case in which the one attacked is in the state of grace, while the aggressor, for example a drunk person, is morally certainly in the state of mortal sin, and therefore, in the posited hypothesis, is placed in extreme spiritual necessity (St. Alphonsus, III, 390).

2. That the aggression be physical; for the negation of this condition would give occasion to delusions and would gravely harm public order. Thus it does not suffice, for example, that another has merely decided on or threatened aggression; that someone persuades or orders an attack on you; that a judge pronounces an unjust sentence against you. Hence proposition 18 was rightly condemned by Alexander VII: it is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even a judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if an innocent person cannot avoid damage in another way³ (St. Alphonsus, III, 388). Yet it suffices that the aggression has begun in some way; therefore it is not required, for example, that the enemy already aim a gun, but it suffices that he take up arms to kill you at once (St. Alphonsus, III, 387).

3. That the moderation of blameless defense be observed, as it is usually said, that is, that in defending oneself one not proceed beyond necessity. Thus it is not lawful to kill an aggressor if the one attacked can flee or by beating or wounding rescue himself from danger of death. But if he cannot flee without great dishonor, which nevertheless today generally has no place unless perhaps you except a military man, especially one constituted in a higher rank, he is not bound to flight (St. Alphonsus, III, 381). And generally it is not evident that one attacked who is bound to flight is bound to it from justice. Moreover, observe that those who in the case, especially of a sudden attack, exceed in their own defense are easily excused from grave sin, namely because of disturbance of mind and lack of time for deliberating.

¹ Exod. 22:2.

² Chapter Significasti nobis (18, book 5, Decretals, title 12); chapter Si perfodiens (3, book 5, title 12); the single Clementine De homicidio, etc. Civil laws agree.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1118.

I. Spiritual damages consist in this: that the one killed is deprived of the last sacraments, of time for meriting, etc. Moreover, they must be restored only if both the damage that followed is certain and the damage can truly be compensated; for example, if the killer prevented Masses from being celebrated which the one killed certainly would have taken care to have celebrated for his soul.

Homicide.—Life destroyed is either that of an irrational being (i.e., of a plant or beast) or of a rational being. In the latter case we have homicide, which is defined as follows: “an act or omission of a human being that is the efficacious cause (see 1763) of the death of a human being.” A parent who denies his child the food, remedies or climate which it needs and which he can afford commits homicide by omission; a physician who practises abortion commits homicide by act. The following distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its substantial morality (i.e., its lawfulness or unlawfulness):

(a) in reference to the intention, homicide is either voluntary or involuntary, and voluntary homicide is intended either as a punishment or as a defense;

(b) in reference to the slayer, homicide is either the act of a public or of a private person, of a cleric or of a layman;

(c) in reference to the person slain, homicide is either the killing of one who is guilty or of one who is innocent, either the killing of a neighbor or of self (suicide);

(d) in reference to the manner, homicide is either direct or indirect, according as the action from which death results is from its nature (finis operis) productive of death or of some other effect. Thus, it is directly homicidal to practise embryotomy (i.e., the destruction of the vital organs of a fetus) or abortion (i.e., the ejection of a fetus at a stage of development when it is unable to live outside the mother), but it is not directly homicidal to give a pregnant woman remedies necessary for her life, although harmful to the fetus; for the object or purpose of the former is to kill, of the latter to cure.

When Homicide Is Lawful.—Killing of human beings is lawful in two cases. (a) It is lawful when the common safety requires that the State inflict death for a crime (capital punishment); for just as it is lawful to amputate a gangrenous member which threatens to destroy the body, so is it lawful to remove from human society by death an individual who menaces the safety of the community. (b) It is lawful when the safety of an individual demands that he kill an unjust aggressor (self-defense); for a man owes his first duty to his own life in such a case, and the aggressor in making a deadly attack voluntarily assumes the risk of being killed. It is more correct, however, to say here that it is lawful to defend one’s life with resultant death to the offender (as will be explained below, in 1826, 1828, 1834).

Arguments for the Lawfulness of Capital Punishment.—(a) Scripture.—In the Old Testament the death sentence was prescribed for certain more serious crimes, such as murder (“whosoever shall shed man’s blood, his blood shall be shed,” Gen., ix. 6); in the New Testament Our Lord recognizes that the power of a judge to sentence to death comes from above (John, xix. 10), and St. Paul declares that princes do not wield the sword without reason, but act as ministers of God when they punish evil-doers (Rom., xiii. 4).

(b) Tradition.—The Church has always taught the lawfulness of capital punishment and rejected contrary errors, as in the case of the Waldensians condemned by Innocent III.

(c) Reason.—The State has both the duty and the right to promote the common good and to defend it against its enemies, whether by war against external foes or by coercive measures against internal disturbers of the peace. Now, the experience of all the centuries and of all countries has shown that, generally speaking, the lives of law-abiding persons and the general peace are not sufficiently protected unless the supreme penalty be appointed for certain crimes.

Unlawful Killing of Offenders.—The killing of offenders is, therefore, unlawful in the following cases:

(a) when the offense is not serious or fully deliberate (e.g., involuntary manslaughter), or when it has not been sufficiently established (e.g., if it is not certain that the supposed victim of murder is dead or that he died from a homicidal act). In civilized countries today the law inflicts capital punishment only for the most serious crimes, and the State has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt before the punishment can be decreed. But in the past death was often the penalty for horse- or sheep-stealing, or even smaller offenses, and in times of excitement men have sometimes been sentenced to death without a fair trial;

(b) when the sentence of death is not pronounced or executed legally. Those who lynch the perpetrators of heinous crimes are often in good faith, especially if the processes of the law are too slow or uncertain, but since they act without authority, their deed is really murder. The same is true of a husband who kills his wife taken in adultery, of the relative of a seduced girl who kills the seducer, of an officer of the law who unnecessarily or without authorization kills a man sentenced to death when the latter is trying to escape. The State has the right, though, to declare a notorious malefactor outlawed, and thus to give to private citizens the right to take him dead or alive, or to kill him on sight; but it is clear that the exercise of this right is a dangerous remedy and one to be used sparingly;

(c) when the mode of killing or the circumstances are repugnant to Christian feeling. Today capital punishment is generally inflicted in a humane manner, but history records many cruel forms of execution, as when men were hanged, drawn and quartered, or burned at the stake, or put to death amid the jeers and curses of the populace.

Is Tyrannicide Lawful?—(a) If the ruler is a tyrant in act (that is, one who has a lawful title to rule but who abuses his authority), it is not lawful to kill him on account of his misdeeds or crimes, since the subject has not the authority to act in the name of the nation (Rom., xiii. 1 sqq.; I Peter, ii. 18). In case of self-defense, however, as when the tyrant unjustly makes a personal attempt on the life of a citizen, the latter has the right to kill. The Council of Constance condemned the doctrine of Wycliff that every subject has the right to assassinate a tyrannical prince, a doctrine that would make the position of every ruler unsafe, since there are always persons who think they are victims of persecution. The nation, however, has the right to depose or even to execute a wicked ruler, for government is given to rulers for the benefit, not for the destruction, of the common good.

(b) If the ruler is a tyrant in title (that is, a usurper), it is not lawful to kill him, when he has already obtained peaceful possession; for here again it cannot be said that the killer would have the authorization of the nation. If, however, the tyrant has not obtained possession but is struggling for it, his status will not be that of ruler but of public enemy, and it will be lawful to kill him as an act of war, provided the conditions of a just war are present (see 1384).

The Right of Self-Defense.—The second case of lawful homicide mentioned above (1819) is the killing of an unjust aggressor, not intended by the slayer, but consequent on his defense of his life against the aggressor. This right of self-defense is granted by natural law itself, and has been denied by but few moralists.

(a) Thus, nature inclines man to prefer his own life to that of another, other things being equal, and therefore it authorizes him to defend his life even at the cost of an aggressor’s life. Even the brute animals are armed by nature to defend themselves against attack.

(b) The natural law also permits one to perform an act from which two effects will follow, one good and the other bad, provided the good effect alone is intended and there is a sufficient reason for permitting the evil effect (see 104). In the present case the killing of the aggressor is an evil, while the protection of the innocent party is a good; but it is only the protection that is intended, and the killing is not an extreme measure in view of the greatness of the good that is at stake.

Killing of the Innocent.—So far we have spoken of the killing of malefactors and unjust aggressors, which under certain conditions is not sinful. The next subject is the killing of the innocent, that is, of those who are neither malefactors nor unjust aggressors worthy of death.

(a) The killing of the innocent by human authority, if it is done directly and intentionally, is always sinful, whether the cause be a private individual or society. But since God is the Master of life and death, He could command the death of an innocent person, as was done when he bade Abraham to sacrifice his son (Gen., xxii. 12).

(b) The killing of the innocent, if it is indirect and unintentional, is not sinful when there is a serious reason for performing an act from which the killing results; for it is lawful to perform an act from which two effects follow, if the good is intended but the evil only permitted, and there is a sufficient justifying reason (see 103 sqq.).

Indirect or Unintentional Killing of the Innocent.—Indirect and unintentional killing of the innocent is lawful (1872) only when there is a reason of sufficient gravity (i.e., one of a value proportionate to the life of the innocent person).

(a) The public safety is such a sufficient reason. Thus, in time of war it is lawful to attack a city, even though the death of many non-combatants will result, or to charge the enemy, even though innocent persons have been placed by the latter as a shield to his front ranks.

(b) Private safety from death is not a sufficient reason, if it does not compensate for the loss, or if it is secured unlawfully (see 104). Thus, if Balbus cannot escape from an unjust aggressor without running down and killing an unbaptized infant or a man whose life is very necessary for the community, the temporal life of Balbus does not compensate for eternal life lost by the infant in the first instance, and the mere private good of Balbus does not compensate for the public good sacrificed in the second instance. Again, if Caius cannot escape from drowning without pushing a shipwrecked companion from the only plank which is insufficient for both, or if Sempronius who has been sentenced to death for crime cannot escape execution unless he kills his guard, the means of securing safety are unlawful.

(c) Private safety from death is a sufficient reason, if it compensates for the loss and is secured lawfully. Hence, if the life of the innocent person is only of equal importance, self-defense against an unjust aggressor by means of flight that will involve the innocent person’s death does not make one guilty of homicide (e.g., Titus is speeding in his car in order to escape a pursuer bent on murder and he cannot avoid hitting and killing a cripple who crosses the road). If self-defense is conducted by means of attack, one may use violence against the aggressor (e.g., one may shoot at him, although an innocent person whom he is using as a shield will be killed), but not against the innocent person (e.g., one may not shoot at the innocent person in order to deprive the aggressor of his shield, nor may one hold the innocent person before one in order that he receive the assailant’s bullet).

Destruction of the Unborn.—(a) Direct and intentional destruction of this kind is unlawful and is known as feticide, when the fetus is killed within the womb, or abortion, when a non-viable fetus is expelled from the womb. It is not abortion to hasten the birth of a viable fetus (i.e., one which is about six or seven months old and can live outside the womb), since the child can be kept alive, but grave reasons are required to make it licit, since it presents a risk to the child’s life. But to deliver or expel a non-viable fetus is abortion. Every direct abortion is regarded by the Catholic Church as murder and is penalized with the censure of excommuuication (Canon 2550, Sec. 1). It might be argued that the direct killing of what is surely a human being is murder, but when does the fetus become a human being? The ancient theory of Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas and most medieval authors, maintains that the embryo did not become human until some time after conception, an opinion that still has great probability physically. Others maintain that animation is simultaneous with conception. Since we do not know the exact moment of animation, the moment of conception must be accepted in practice as the beginning of human life. Probabilism is ruled out in this instance, for there is no doubt about the law and its application: we must not directly kill what is probably a human being. Accordingly, abortion is considered to be murder. Hence, even in the case of a girl who has been raped—although it is a probable opinion that measures may be taken to remove the semen from-her body—it would be gravely sinful to give any treatment which would abort an impregnated ovum.

(b) Indirect and unintentional killing, or rather permission of death, is not unlawful in such a case, when there is a proportionately grave reason, such as the life of the mother. Thus, it is permissible to give the mother a remedy necessary to cure a mortal disease (e.g., medicinal drugs, baths, injections, or operations on the uterus), even though this will bring on abortion or the death of the fetus; for the mother is not obliged to prefer the temporal life of the child to her own life. But the baptism of the child must be attended to, for its salvation depends on the Sacrament, and the eternal life of the child is to be preferred to the temporal life of the mother, if the conditions of 1166 are verified.

(c) Contemporary moral opinion considers that in tubal pregnancies (ectopic gestation) the tube itself is in a pathological condition long before rupture of the tube, as experts in obstetrics teach, and hence can be excised as a diseased organ of the human body. As such, the excision of such a tube would be in itself a morally indifferent act and, granting verification of the other conditions for the principle of double effect, could be licitly performed. (For a history of the moral question, medical testimony and full argumentation see Chapter X of Medical Ethics by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A.) Some theologians, however, believe that the tube cannot be removed unless it can be proved in each case that a pathological condition, placing the woman in danger of death, exists. The first view is accepted as sufficiently safe to be followed in practice. (See Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., Morals in Politics and Professions, p. 118.)

Canonical Penalties for Homicide and Abortion.—(a) Homicide, if voluntary, produces irregularity (Canon 985, n. 4) and subjects the guilty party to exclusion from legitimate ecclesiastical acts or to degradation from the ecclesiastical state (Canon 2354). Moreover, a church is violated by the crime of homicide (Canon 1172). (b) Abortion of a human fetus, when the effect is produced, brings irregularity on those who procure it and also on the cooperators (Canon 985, n. 4). Moreover, those who procure abortion effectively, the mother not excepted, incur excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Ordinary, and, if clerics, they are to be deposed (Canon 2350).

Accidental Homicide.—Accidental homicide is that which happens without any direct purpose to kill. But the following cases should be distinguished:

(a) when the homicide is not voluntary, either in itself or in its cause (see 35, 94), that is, when the slayer had no intention to kill and could not foresee that death would result from his act or omission;

(b) when the homicide is voluntary only in its cause, inasmuch as the person who kills is guilty of negligence in a lawful thing, or of something unlawful, and death results from the negligence or from that which is unlawful, although there was no direct wish to kill.

Moral and Legal Guilt.—The law may hold one responsible for homicide, even though there is no theological guilt (see 1766 sqq.). (a) Thus, one may be held responsible for the consequence of acts only juridically negligent, as when an automobilist while driving at a speed unreasonable in law, but not in fact, kills a pedestrian. (b) One may be held responsible for acts committed by those subject to one’s care or control, as when a man keeps a dog loose not knowing that it is vicious and it kills a neighbor’s child, or when he illegally lends his car to a minor, thinking the latter is a good driver, and the minor carelessly runs down a person in the road.

Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? Is it ever lawful to rebel? Is it ever lawful to kill a Prince? R. To the 1st: As was already said above, n. 171, 4. Laws unjust through contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust through contrariety to divine good are in no way lawful to observe. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful, and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even to the difficult, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in Br. 9 Jun. 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. Pius VI, Br. Pastoralis, 5 Jul. 1796; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, aa. 5, 6.

R. To the 2nd: It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "In this matter," says St. Liguori, "the principle of John Gerson was exceedingly pernicious, who dared to assert that a monarch can lawfully be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the Prince, by judging and punishing him. L. H. A. Tr. 8, n. 13; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2; q. 60, a. 6; q. 64, a. 3; q. 69, a. 4. But it is one thing to make rebellion, or to bring violence against a legitimate prince in order to depose him; another thing to resist unjust laws and their execution. Rebellion is a kind of aggression, not defense. But if a force plainly unjust is brought, resistance is then made not to authority, but to unjust force. "And therefore, just as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful in such a case to resist bad Princes, unless perhaps because of scandal, when from this some grave disturbance would be feared," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 42, a. 2, or there were no hope of a good outcome, and greater public evils were to be feared. Cf. also the Letters of Leo XIII, Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, who, speaking of laws openly disagreeing with divine right, injurious to the Church and contrary to Religion, then says, "to resist is a duty, to obey a crime." Therefore it is lawful to oppose passive resistance to unjust laws. For one must obey God rather than men, Acts 5:29. "For this reason to cast off obedience, and by the force of the multitude to call the matter to sedition, is the crime of treason, not only against human majesty, but also against divine." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1895, section Non est magni toward the end. For "whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere, but from that supreme Prince of all, God. There is no power except from God, Rom. 13:1... Nature itself testifies that whatever power there is anywhere proceeds from God." When this is known and persuaded, "those things are understood altogether to pertain to justice: to revere the majesty of Princes, to be subject constantly and faithfully to public power, to do nothing seditiously, to preserve the holy discipline of the city."

Leo XIII, l. c., sections Talis, Eiusmodi; Pius X, Ep. Notre charge, 25 Aug. 1910.

R. To the 3rd: It is never lawful for anyone to kill a Prince, neither for a private man nor for the multitude; for the reason is the same for him and for this. The contrary opinion of the ancients is called by St. Alphonsus, l. c., improbable, false, most false. "I ask," says the Holy Doctor, "is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to expel him from life or goods. The doctrine of the holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, however private, and however iniquitous he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life." And the very same holds whether the Prince is good or bad; whether legitimate, or an usurper of the kingdom. Prop. condemned by the Council of Constance, Sess. 15, d. 6 Jul. 1414; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 12, a. 2; q. 42, a. 2; q. 64, a. 3; q. 101, aa. 1, 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 5; Aertnys 178; E. M.

What is the order of the precepts among themselves? - "After the three precepts pertaining to religion, by which the debt is rendered to God, and after the fourth precept, which belongs to piety, by which the debt is rendered to parents, in which is included every debt which by some special reason is owed, it was necessary that consequently some precepts be placed pertaining to justice properly so called, which renders the debt indifferently to all." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 6.

Therefore the six precepts of the Decalogue which follow, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches, l. c. a. 1, are "about the acts of justice commonly so called, which is considered between equals." In these six precepts are prohibited homicide, adultery, theft, and false testimony. "But all other harms which are inflicted on neighbors can be reduced to these, which are prohibited by these precepts, as to certain more common and principal things. For all harms which are inflicted on the person of a neighbor are understood to be prohibited in homicide, as in the more principal thing. But those which are inflicted on a connected person, and especially by way of lust, are understood to be prohibited together with adultery. Those, however, which pertain to damages inflicted in things, are understood to be prohibited together with theft. But those which pertain to speech, such as detractions, blasphemies, and any such things, are understood to be prohibited in false testimony, which is more directly contrary to justice." S. Th. l. c. a. 6 ad 2.

Is suicide lawful? Without divine authority it is wicked directly to kill oneself. Someone is said directly to kill himself or another when truly, per se and directly, by doing something, he intends to take life from himself or another; but indirectly, when he does not positively intend this, yet voluntarily does something from which he foresees the death of himself or another will follow. Proof: For 1. this is openly prohibited by Sacred Scripture, Ex. 20:13; Deut. 52:39; Wis. 16:13. 2. It is contrary to charity toward oneself, and is injurious both to God, who alone is the direct and absolute master of human life, and to society and the commonwealth, which is unjustly deprived through suicide of its part or citizen. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 5. Hence suicide is deservedly punished by both laws. For by Common Civil Law both suicides and those who attempt this crime, even if death has not followed, are punished with the penalty of infamy. By ecclesiastical law, however, suicides are deprived of sacred burial and the suffrages of the Church, as is established in C. 12, c. 23, q. 4, and as may be seen in the Roman Ritual; this penalty nevertheless does not include those who, by madness, insanity, or imagination disturbed through most grave sadness of soul, have taken life from themselves, or those who repented of the crime before death. Struggl 7; Ithur. Cas. 40, n. 3 seqq.; L. 366, 375.

Is it lawful by public authority to kill the guilty? - It is lawful by public authority either to imprison, or to beat, or to mutilate in some member, or even to kill malefactors, according to the various gravity of offenses. The reason is that this is a necessary means for procuring the common good of the whole society. Indeed, for preserving society itself; which indeed cannot be obtained except by these penalties, and often not except by the death of wicked men. Therefore God must be said to have conferred the power without which society could not stand. "Every singular person is compared to the whole community as a part to the whole. And therefore, if some man is dangerous to the community and corruptive of it because of some sin, he is laudably and wholesomely killed, so that the common good may be preserved... he is deprived of a member because of some lesser faults." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 2; q. 65, a. 1. And by the same reason it is lawful to beat him and imprison him because of the abuse of the free use of his members to the harm of the community. S. Th. 2, q. 65, aa. 2, 3. This is also clear from the practice of every legislation, from Sacred Scripture, and from the universal consent of all. Lugo d. 10, n. 64; Struggl 34; Ithur. Cas. 40, nn. 11-12; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, aa. 2, 3; q. 65, aa. 1, 3; q. 66, a. 6 ad 2, a. 8; q. 67, a. 3; q. 108, aa. 3, 4; L. 375; E. M.

Is it lawful to kill an aggressor against one's life? - Anyone can kill an unjust aggressor against his life, with the moderation of blameless defense. Thus S. Thomas, and he confirms his thesis from the fact that in Exod. 22:2 it is lawful to kill a nocturnal thief. Therefore much more, he says, is it lawful to defend one's own life. Then, all laws and all rights proclaim that force may be repelled by force. Finally, nature itself teaches that there is in man a true right of defending his own life if it is unjustly attacked, and of preferring it to the life of the unjust aggressor, who from his own malice has cast himself into such danger. And this holds not only for secular persons, but also for clerics themselves and religious; for the right of defense is implanted in each one by nature. If it were otherwise, weapons would be supplied to injustice, to the slaughter of the good, and to the overthrow of commonwealths. Hence the Roman Catechism, n. 8, attributes this right to all without distinction. C. Significasti 18 de Homic. vol.; C. Si vero de Sent. exc.; C. L. 2367; S. Th. 1. 2, q. 64, a. 7; L. 380.

Is it ever lawful to kill an innocent person? - It is never lawful directly to kill an innocent person, whether by private or public authority, even for procuring the public good. For it is an intrinsically evil action, and expressly prohibited by divine law, against charity and against justice, inflicting injury upon God, Society, and neighbor. Exod. 23:7: The innocent and the just you shall not kill. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 2 ad 3, a. 6; L. 393; Struggl 11, 32; Lugo d. 10, n. 104.

You will resolve: It is not lawful to kill those lethally wounded, nor any others whatever who are dying, lest they suffer longer; nor the rabid, lest they harm others, provided they can otherwise be restrained from doing harm. The reason is that, according to the well-known maxim, evils are not to be done in order to obtain good. It is not lawful to kill an innocent person in order to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death, even under penalty of the city being overthrown, and even if he should consent to his own death, because he does not have dominion over his own life. More probably, however, he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good, and probably, if he were unwilling, even be handed over. For he has this obligation for the public good, to expose himself to a danger of this sort. L. 393; Struggl 11. But it would be otherwise if the tyrant should demand a girl to be violated, or sacred books to be burned. For each is intrinsically evil. In the former case the girl would be exposed to the proximate danger of sinning; in the latter there would be contempt of God. Cf. Lugo d. 10, nn. 114-116.

It is not lawful to kill legates or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the faith given, and have unjustly killed the hostages or legates sent to them, because they are innocent. L. ib.

Is it lawful at least indirectly to concur in the death of an innocent person?

It is lawful, because of a grave cause, to posit an action good in itself, from which, besides the intention, the death of an innocent person follows. The reason is that then from a proportionate cause the death of the innocent person is merely permitted.

You will resolve: It is lawful in war to direct artillery against the stations of enemies, although from this also some innocent persons are going to suffer death, because their death follows besides the intention. L. 393. If, when an enemy is pursuing, you cannot flee death except through a narrow way, in which someone sitting there would be crushed, nevertheless it is lawful to flee with his danger and destruction, besides your intention, provided however that, if he is an infant, he has been baptized. The same must be said if the aggressor, by placing the body of an infant before himself, protects himself. For if the death of the innocent person follows, it will be imputed to the aggressor. Lugo d. 10, nn. 124-127; Struggl 13; L. 393, 599.

Note: He is not guilty of homicide who, even without cause, but with diligence used, posits an action, even otherwise illicit, which does not of itself bring death, although it is dangerous, but from which death rarely occurs. For then the homicide is altogether fortuitous and involuntary; for example, if a cleric, engaging in prohibited hunting, by chance kills a man, provided he used due diligence that this not happen. But it is otherwise if he posits an action which, although it does not of itself bring death, is nevertheless commonly dangerous, even if diligence is used for guarding against harm. For it is voluntary in its cause, provided however that he foresees it at least confusedly; for example, if someone, for instance, hurls stones with a sling into a public road. Inst. l. 4, t. 3, sections 3, 4, 5; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 8; L. 398. By the name of voluntary homicide, where the matter concerns reservation, is understood not homicide culpable in any way whatever, but homicide sought on purpose and procured by design. Otherwise that added word would be altogether useless. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 40, n. 19 seqq.

Is it lawful to kill a drunken or insane aggressor? R. Affirmatively, more probably, unless it is evident to you that he is in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that although a drunken or insane man is not your formally unjust aggressor, nevertheless he is materially unjust, and you preserve your right of repelling force by force. The right of defense arises from the right to one's own life, not from the injustice of the other. But if you know certainly, which is rare, that he is in the state of lethal sin, and there is hope that he will do penance after the frenzy or drunkenness, but on the contrary you morally believe that you are in the state of grace, since he is in extreme necessity, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to the preservation of your temporal life. Yet nothing prevents you from striking or wounding him in such a way that, with his life preserved, you take away from him the power of harming. Lugo d. 10, n. 143.

To what is the damager bound because of unjust homicide? - Homicides or mutilators more probably must restore nothing precisely for life, member, etc., because these are not estimable by price. But they are bound to compensate all other temporal damages of which homicide was the efficacious cause. L. 7, de His qui effuderint, Dig.; C. A. 1325 ff., 1329; C. B. 823; L. 626.

Can an innocent person under inquiry defend himself against those who wish to apprehend him? - The practical case can exist especially in a time of anarchy or tyranny, and it is commonly answered affirmatively, since it is a just defense of oneself, if the mandate of arrest is truly unjust, and consequently there is no danger of hallucination, and danger of scandal or public disturbance is absent.

And the same is commonly affirmed also after sentence has been passed, if the sentence is unjust either formally or, more truly, only materially, provided again that the injustice is manifest and the danger of hallucination and scandal is absent. For if the sentence is formally unjust, it is not a judgment; if materially, it is not justice, for justice is in the thing, not in appearance. In the first case the judge does not pronounce the sentence as judge, because he exceeds the limits of the mandate. In the other, innocence itself protects the condemned man.

But, with the order of law preserved, in the external forum, speaking in itself, the sentence must be observed; for as far as it pertains to the judge it is just, nor is it violated without contempt of public power. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 69, a. 4; S. Alph. 279, 281; Kenrick tr. 3, n. 112; Frassinetti, Comp., etc., ed. 6, note 98; D'Annibale ed. 3, p. 2, n. 601; Lugo d. 40, n. 38 ff.; cf. 81-83.

II. Those, with the devil urging, laying violent hands upon clerics or monks of either sex, with exception, as regards reservation, of cases and persons concerning whom by law or privilege it is permitted that a Bishop or another absolve.

Violent hands: by this is understood any injurious exterior action by deeds, not words, mortal against the person of a cleric; whether by it someone injures his body by striking him, wounding him, giving him poison, when an action of this kind has begun to harm; or injures his liberty by thrusting him into prison, C. Nuper 29, de Sent. exc., etc.; or injures his dignity by bringing force against him in any way, e.g., if he stops the carriage in which he is carried, violently takes away his hat, fouls him, etc. L. 272-275, 280. But an injurious striking would be had even if the cleric consented to it, since this law is in favor of the state. C. Contingit 36, de Sent. excomm. On the contrary, they do not incur excommunication if some strike a cleric for the sake of defense, or in jest; or if parents, teachers, superiors strike a cleric for the sake of correction. C. Cum voluntate 54, sec. 2, ibid.; C. Ex tenore 10, ibid.; C. Si vero 3, ibid.; C. Super eo 1, ibid.

With the devil urging: this "only imports a striking with grave sin." L. 275, 48; Suarez, De Cens., disp. 22, sec. 1, n. 2; Schmalzgrueber, n. 228; Elbel, n. 132. Laying: not those commanding, counseling, consenting, ratifying, or not impeding the laying on. Clerics: by this name is understood everyone initiated at least by first tonsure, even if married, provided he is married to one virgin only and wears the clerical habit and tonsure, C. single chapter, de Cler. coni., in VI; likewise, even one excommunicated, suspended, interdicted, only verbally deposed, or irregular. Monks: "understand any religious, even a lay converse, novice, of either sex. Likewise Tertiaries of St. Dominic and St. Francis if they wear the habit and live in community. Likewise hermits subject to some rule or superior.... Fagnanus says the same of women living together in conservatories, although the religion has not yet been approved.... And Renzius says the same of seminarians, etc." L. 271; Schmalzgrueber, n. 219.

Excepted, etc. Therefore the cases and persons are excepted concerning which by law or privilege it is permitted that a Bishop or another absolve. Cases: a threefold striking must be distinguished: enormous, moderate or grave, light. Striking is enormous if by it someone has mutilated a cleric or monk, put out his eye, broken a limb, inflicted a huge wound, caused a great quantity of blood to be poured out from somewhere other than the nose. It is moderate if the striking brings contusion or deformity, for instance if a tooth is extracted, if an amount of hair is plucked out, if bruising of the flesh is made, if a quantity of blood is poured out, yet without a graver injury of the body. Finally, striking is called light here, not because it imports venial sin, but because, although it is mortal, by the judgment of the prudent it is considered light compared with enormous striking, e.g., if it is done with the palm, fist, staff, stone, without leaving a trace. But it must be observed that light striking can become grave or enormous by reason of circumstances, namely by reason of the person injured, the person injuring, the person before whom the striking is done, and by reason of scandal, place, time, and injury. L. 276-278; Extravagant Perlectis apud the Holy Doctor, n. 277. From light striking, even public, Bishops can absolve from C. Pervenit 17, C. Si vero 3, de Sent. exc. And likewise their Vicars General can do this, because Bishops have this by ordinary law. The same can be done by others having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction. L. 79, 279. From enormous or moderate striking, if it is public, only the Pope or a Legate a latere, who enjoys pontifical authority, can absolve, from C. Ad Eminentiam 20, de Sent. exc. The same can be done by Legates sent to some province from C. Excommunicatis, penultimate, de Off. Legati, but only in their province, and not as regards outsiders. But if the striking was occult, Bishops also can absolve from it by Trent, C. Liceat 6, sess. 24. L. 88, 279.

Persons: Bishops can absolve nuns and all other women from striking, even public, from CC. Mulieres 6, Ea noscitur 13, De monialibus 32, de Sent. exc.; Ithur., case 43, n. 29. "And this even if the striking was enormous.... Likewise those who live collegially, if the striking was grave, but not if enormous.... Likewise all impeded from going to Rome." L. 279; C. Canonica 50, de Sent. excomm.; C. Quoniam 9, de Vit. et hon. cl. Add also regulars, "if the striking was light or enormous but occult..., with the license of their prelates." L. 107; appendix de Privil., n. 97. Cf. Suarez, De Relig., tome 4, book 2, chap. 3.

Or another: therefore regular prelates can absolve their subjects, even novices: 1. if they have struck a fellow member of the same order, unless the striking is enormous or hands have been laid upon a Bishop or Abbot. 2. If they have struck a religious of another order, provided the judgment of the prelate to whom the one struck is subject is also applied. But they cannot absolve them if they have struck a secular cleric, but they must be absolved by the Apostolic See, except in the case of light striking, in which they can be absolved by the Bishop. CC. Monachi 2, Cum illorum 32, Canonica 50, de Sent. exc.; Religioso 21, e.t., in VI; St. Alphonsus, n. 107, where he adds: "It must be noted... that the aforesaid things proceed according to common law; for when privileges are considered, religious can well be absolved by their prelates even if the striking was enormous, from several privileges..., even if a religious struck another of another order, or a secular cleric..., even if the striking was public." Cf. Lucidi, de Visitat., etc., chap. 4, de Clero regul., sec. 4, nn. 96-98; Scavini, book 1, n. 954. Or another: "when the penitent is impeded from approaching the superior, or in danger of death, he can be absolved by any confessor." D'Annibale, Summ., part 1, n. 368, 3rd ed. C. 29, cause 17, q. 4; Suarez, disp. 22, sec. 1; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 97, 243-262; Elbel, nn. 125-149; Bonacina, disp. 2, q. 3, part 6.

XV. Those extracting relics from the sacred Cemeteries or Catacombs of Rome and its territory without legitimate permission, and those furnishing help or favor to them.

Of relics which are found in the Crypts and Cemeteries of the City, it is established that some are of the Holy Martyrs, e.g., "when glass or earthenware phials stained with blood are found at the tombs of the buried in the sacred cemeteries, either inside or outside them"; Sacred Congregation of Relics and Indulgences, December 10, 1863. But it is established that some are not of martyrs, such as those which are found in open loculi. Finally, concerning some it is doubtful whether they are of Martyrs or not. The present excommunication is incurred by one who extracts those former relics of Holy Martyrs, but by no means by one who extracts the rest, whether it is certainly established that they are not of Saints, or whether it is doubted. Relics, namely bones and ashes. Paul V, decree of August 23, 1613, and May 16, 1614, prohibited under grave obligation to take away without permission even the smallest particle of these, and at the same time declared that theft of this kind is never excused because of smallness of matter. Legitimate permission must be given by the Eminent Cardinal Vicar, with the form preserved which was established by Paul V in the places cited and by Clement X in the Brief Ex commissae nobis, January 13, 1672. Namely written permission is required, subscribed by the Eminent Cardinal Vicar of the City, furnished with his seal, and extraction from the catacombs must be done in the presence of a delegated priest. And to them, those extracting. Bonacina, disp. 2, q. 3, part 13, sec. Incidens.

Irregularity is incurred from homicide. In this matter homicide can occur in three ways: justly, accidentally, unjustly. For just homicide no irregularity is incurred, since then no fault is had. L. 382, 388, 389. For merely accidental homicide no irregularity is also incurred, whether it happens while giving work to a lawful thing or to an unlawful thing. The reason is that such homicide then is not voluntary. But laws establishing irregularity from homicide intend to punish those truly delinquent by the fault of homicide. Clementina Si furiosus un., de Hom. But irregularity is incurred first, if the action is lawful, but the effect is foreseen, and sufficient diligence is not applied to prevent it, namely such diligence as would excuse from grave sin. L. 366, 377, 382, 383-386. Second, if the action is unlawful and commonly dangerous of death, although all diligence is applied lest the foreseen death follow, because since the work is of itself proximately dangerous, no diligence can make it not dangerous. L. 386, 387; book 3, n. 398. If the homicide is unjust, whether directly willed in itself or indirectly willed in a cause inseparably and proximately joined with homicide, irregularity is incurred. Chap. Si quis 1, de Hom.; Trent, sess. 14, chap. 7, de Ref.; L. 365; book 3, n. 628.

All those incur irregularity who by their own action kill a man. Chap. Si quis 1, de Hom.; Trent, sess. 14, chap. 7; L. 367, 368, 369. Likewise all those incur irregularity who command homicide, or counsel it, truly influencing the homicide, and others cooperating in any way efficaciously and positively. Chap. Si quis viduam 8, Dist. 50; chap. Significasti 18, de Hom.; chap. Sicut 6, same title; L. 370-376.

Irregularity contracted through homicide is removed by baptism; or rather, sin having been destroyed by baptism, irregularity is not had. Chap. Si quis, Dist. 50; and by dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff. L. 390. But Bishops, if the homicide was voluntary, can in no way dispense in the irregularity, even if it was occult. Trent, sess. 24, chap. Liceat 6; sess. 14, chap. 7; L. 391, 392. But if the homicide was accidental, it is very probable that the Bishop can dispense in the irregularity contracted from it when the crime was occult, since the Council in the said chap. Liceat denies to Bishops the faculty of dispensing only if the homicide was voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. L. 393. Besides, they most commonly teach that Bishops can dispense in irregularity from accidental homicide, even notorious, for receiving minor orders and simple benefices; because Bishops already could do this by the old law. But Trent reserved only irregularity from voluntary homicide, not public accidental homicide. L. 393, 394, 395, de Priv. 51, 52; book 3, n. 397. As regards regular prelates, cf. L. 396. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, art. 8; supplement, q. 39, art. 4; D'Annibale, part 1, n. 424, 3rd ed.; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 2, dub. 8, 9, 11.

From defect of gentleness he is irregular: 1. who kills or mutilates in a just offensive war, but not if others kill; nor he who kills in a just defensive war; nor he who exhorts to killing, even if the war is offensive, provided it is just. Chap. Petitio tua, chap. Dilectus, chap. Significasti, de Homic.; Benedict XIV, Notification 191; L. 457-460; La-Croix 528. 2. In a just judgment those become irregular who cooperate toward death or mutilation actively, efficaciously, and proximately by an action of its nature ordered to this. Clementina Si furiosus, de Hom.; chap. Clericis, chap. Sententiam, Ne Cler. vel Mon.; chap. Ex litteris, de Exc. prael. Therefore judges become irregular, advocates or procurators acting against the accused, notaries, apparitors, lictors, executioners, voluntary witnesses, otherwise coerced witnesses, accusers or denouncers; otherwise nevertheless if they accuse the guilty person only so that they may prevent their own harm, or that it may be repaired for them, protestation being made that they do not will the penalty of blood, chap. Praelatis, de Hom. in 6, in their own cause or even that of relatives up to the fourth degree; or unless the cause is that of their own Church; or if harms are to be inflicted in the future on others, so that they cannot be impeded by another way. L. 461, 468. 3. Clerics constituted in sacred orders, or monks, practicing medicine with cutting and burning, are also irregular from defect of gentleness, chap. Sententiam 9, Ne Cler. vel Mon., if from such cutting or burning mutilation or death follows. If nevertheless another skilled person is absent, then a cleric or monk will well be able, without sin and consequently without danger of irregularity, to apply cutting or burning. L. 384, 385, 389. St. Thomas, supplement, q. 39, art. 4; D'Annibale, part 1, nn. 426, 427, 3rd ed.

1. Sempronius, wearied of his wife, made espousals with another. Wherefore, in order to free himself from his present wife, while she was on a journey, in a certain solitary place, he pierced her with a bullet; and seeing her as though struggling with death, he commanded his servant, whom he had taken with himself as a companion of the journey, under penalty of death to be inflicted immediately upon him likewise, to slaughter the still-breathing mistress with a sword, and without delay to commit her, slaughtered, to the earth.

Q. 1. Is homicide ever licit? 2. Could the servant in this case licitly obey his master?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 719 seqq., 736 seqq.; E. M. 722. - To the second. The servant could not obey his master by slaughtering the mistress with a sword; nevertheless he could licitly obey by committing her to the earth after death. The reason for the disparity is this: because to commit a dead woman to the earth is not evil, but rather good, or certainly indifferent of itself. But what is good, or at least indifferent, we licitly do from a just and grave end, namely that of escaping death or another grave evil threatened to us. On the contrary, to slaughter an innocent person was evil, intrinsically such, forbidden by natural and divine right. But an evil intrinsically such may never be committed, however grave a fear of death may impend over us. - Elbel, De Act. hum. 43.

Hence another case is resolved: whether, at the time of the Paris Commune, and generally, whether in a time of anarchy, regular soldiers of the preceding Government, from fear of death, could fire upon religious, clerics, and honest citizens, and slaughter them. Altogether negatively, since neither by private nor by public authority is it licit to kill the innocent. And this is intrinsically evil; and accordingly it remains evil even when most grave fear of death stands.

2. "The Catholics of this diocese are inexorable in vengeance, and this because there is no one in those regions who administers justice. Therefore it is asked: 1. Whether, every other means of obtaining redress for their wrongs being excluded, Christians can consider themselves with respect to this point as if they were in the natural state. 2. Whether they are capable of the sacraments so long as they persist in this desire of vengeance. The reason which they bring forward to prove the necessity in which they are of avenging themselves is that the killer and his supporters would become fiercer and more intolerable against the relatives of the killed man, and would commit new homicides, if these did not resist and did not oppose force to force.

R. Negatively to each part." S. C. de P. F., 21 May 1759; Collectan., n. 2092, 2094, 2098.

3. A popular disturbance having been made in a certain great city, the Prince is expelled, and Anarchy is proclaimed for several weeks. Meanwhile thieves and highway robbers commit thefts, robberies, and homicides with impunity. Carolus, a powerful and honest man, judging that crimes ought to be punished, in order to protect honest citizens, public authority being lacking, himself assumes this office for himself. Hence, when he hears that either thefts and robberies or homicides have been committed by someone, judging that no other punishment in the present circumstances is possible and efficacious except the punishment of death, by night he himself with his servants kills thieves and homicides. And the matter always succeeds prosperously for them, so that it is altogether unknown by whom they were killed. What of Carolus?

R. Carolus acts altogether badly. For he himself has no power of exercising public vindication of crimes, since he has no authority in civil society. But citizens, for protecting themselves, can rightly use, if thieves and homicides attack them, the natural right of defense, repelling force by force, with the moderation of blameless defense. For indeed, "to kill evildoers is licit insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the whole community; and therefore it belongs only to him to cut off a rotten member, when the care of the safety of the whole body has been committed to him. But the care of the common good is committed to Princes, having public authority, and therefore it is permitted only to them to kill evildoers, not to private persons." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 64, a. 3. Nor indeed does it avail to object from the same Holy Doctor, ibid., q. 108, a. 1, that vindication is a virtue of a private person, and accordingly that it is also permitted to private persons at least to avenge injuries inflicted on themselves. For it is singular in this virtue of vindication that the person who is the subject of the virtue cannot through himself consummate the proper action of that virtue because of the necessity of the matter; because namely its matter is the evil of punishment, which requires coercive power in the author; and accordingly, although vindication is a virtue of a private person, nevertheless a private person cannot consummate his action unless public power is joined, on account of the condition of the matter to be rendered, namely the evil of punishment for the evil of the inflicted injury. Cajetan, in l. c. Cf. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 8.

4. Gaspar, a physician, gave a drug to a certain woman to impede conception, namely in order that he might remove the most grave danger of death which he knew from experience threatened her; and accordingly he intended this only, that is, to procure her safety. But that woman, already made pregnant, is in reality placed in the highest danger of life, together with the offspring, which consequently would die without baptism together with the mother. Hence Gaspar, in order to save the mother from death and to procure baptism for the offspring, at the suitable time procures abortion by medical art. And thus the mother is in reality saved, and the offspring, having come forth alive, dies only after baptism.

Q. 1. Is it licit to procure abortion? 2. Has Gaspar acted rightly?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 742 seqq.; E. M. 742, 745; Comment. Theolog. Moral., fifth commentary, De Procuratione Abortus; sixth commentary, De Responso S. Officii circa craniotomiam.

To the second. Gaspar first sinned gravely by impeding generation, which in reality he himself intended, although he illusorily asserts that he intended only to procure the woman's safety. He indeed intended this as an end; but as a means to obtaining that end, he assumed this means: to impede generation by a drug, whence the woman's safety, from asserted experience, was being brought into danger. Therefore he intended this also. G. 400.

Gaspar also sinned gravely by directly procuring abortion, which from its intrinsic nature is true homicide. Nor indeed can he be excused from the excellent end of saving the mother and baptizing the offspring; for evils must not be done so that goods may come. But in the case the abortion is procured directly; for abortion is assumed and is intended in itself as the means to each. G. 400 seqq.

Hence Gaspar, on account of the direct procurement of abortion, incurs the excommunication reserved to bishops from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis. Moreover, he becomes irregular; for since the question concerns a fetus which is so harmful to the health of the mother, it cannot be doubted that it is now informed by a rational soul. Cf. I. M. V. 2, n. 1204, 1335.

5. Hortensia, pregnant and now near birth, seized by a grave disease in the West Indies, dies. Richardus, a new missionary, judging himself obligated to perform the Caesarean operation, soon carries it out and baptizes the offspring still alive, which then continues to live. But as soon as the matter is made known, he is nearly slaughtered by the inhabitants of the place as the murderer of the mother. Immediately Richardus flees, and no further report of him is had in that place.

Q. 1. Whether and when can the Caesarean operation be done, and what precautions are there in practice? 2. Has Richardus acted rightly?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. V. 2, 469 seqq. - To the second. Richardus did not act rightly. For, as appears from the case itself, the most grave danger of scandal was not lacking. Besides, there is the prohibition made to missionaries by the decree of the Holy Office, 15 Feb. 1760. Cf. Enchir. Moral. 471.

If, the mother now being dead, the Caesarean operation cannot be done, then the infant in the mother's womb can be baptized in the best way in which it can be done, namely by the aid of a small siphon or another instrument by which the infant in the maternal womb may be reached and water poured upon it. Hence, by the aid of an instrument of this sort, the membranes in which the fetus is enveloped must be cut, so that the water may immediately reach the fetus. This operation is easy and can rightly be done by a midwife or by another woman. - If, as is gathered from the case, a surgeon or another skilled man was truly lacking for carrying out the Caesarean operation, Gaspar could have procured that baptism be administered to the infant through some experienced woman in the way said. - G. v. 2, 218, 220; Gennari, Consultazioni, etc., p. 1, cons. 21.

1. Caius, a priest, opened a vein for a pregnant woman so that abortion would follow; and since it was not established that there had been an abortion, he gave her counsel of immersing her feet in hot water for half an hour; nor nevertheless, even this time, could it be established that there had been an abortion. Is Caius irregular?

R. "Diana says with Nav. etc. that if a physician opened a vein for a pregnant woman so that abortion would follow, but afterward it is not established that an abortion followed, he is not to be judged irregular... because proceedings are not taken against someone for penalties unless the body of the crime is established. But otherwise it must be said if the means applied for abortion were so efficacious that from them the effect commonly follows, because then presumption is made from things commonly occurring." St. Alph., l. 7, n. 347, dub. 3. But since even that washing of the feet is not a remedy altogether efficacious for procuring abortion, it does not seem that Caius incurred irregularity. But a fortiori he is to be excused from irregularity if it is not established that the fetus was animated, and still much more if the pregnancy itself is not established. St. Alph., l. 3, n. 395, 396; I. M. 1330.

2. Sempronius, a priest, doubts whether by his counsel he procured an abortion that in fact followed. Is Sempronius irregular?

R. Negatively. St. Alph., l. 3, n. 396, says: "What must be said if there were doubt whether someone by his counsel or work cooperated in the certain death of a fetus now certainly animated? See what is to be said, l. 7, n. 371." Now in that place the Holy Doctor raises the general question whether one commanding or counseling homicide is irregular in doubt whether the mandate or counsel was or was not the efficacious cause of the homicide. And then he brings forward two opinions, one more common, affirming, the other, which does not seem to have to be called improbable, denying. Wherefore Sempronius, in the Case, can probably be excused from irregularity. I. M. 1318.

3. Fuscus, a priest, so that he might sin more freely with a certain woman without danger of infamy, persuaded her to procure for herself the perfect excision of each ovary by a surgical operation, so that she would thus be made sterile or impotent with no danger of generation. That woman did this, and thus both continued in sin for several years. On the occasion of the Holy Year Fuscus is converted to good fruit, and asks whether he ought to be dispensed from irregularity.

R. Irregularity here would be first by reason of mutilation. St. Alph., l. 7, n. 380, raises the question: "Whether he is irregular who cuts off the testicles of another." And he responds: "Bon. etc. deny it, because, as they say, those are not a member, but part of a member. But Roncaglia etc. more probably affirm it, because the testicles now have their proper operation." Now the same seems to have to be said concerning the ovaries. Moreover, not only he who mutilates another incurs irregularity, but also he who proximately cooperates in that mutilation, as in homicide, because mutilation is equated to homicide. "Hence," says Reiffenst., l. 5, t. 12, n. 57, "by the same reason the doctors commonly hold that in those cases in which he contracts irregularity who counsels, commands, cooperates toward an unjust homicide, or does not prevent it, or ratifies it, in the same cases one counseling, commanding, etc. mutilation also contracts the same irregularity." Therefore Fuscus, as one commanding or at least counseling mutilation, contracts irregularity in the Case.

But Fuscus would have to be punished with still graver penalties. For "Sixtus V in the year 1588 issued a Bull which begins Effraenatam, in which he subjected all knowingly procuring abortion of a fetus, whether animated or inanimate, and in any way consenting in this or furnishing to women poisons of sterility, to all penalties which are owed to homicides by civil and canon law, such as privation of every clerical privilege, dignity, or ecclesiastical benefice, and also inability to obtain them in the future, etc." St. Alph., l. 3, n. 395. Fuscus indeed did not procure abortion, nor did he furnish poisons of sterility for killing a fetus. But did he not furnish more than poisons of sterility, by commanding or counseling that excision for impeding generation?

1. To all moral theologians the question concerning craniotomy is known, and known is the response which concerning it came forth from the Congregation of the Eminent Fathers of the S. R. and U. I. As soon as a response of this sort was published, doubt began to arise concerning its value, namely whether it really settled the controversy, and truly condemned the opinion concerning the lawfulness of that surgical operation. For there were not lacking, nor are there lacking, grave theologians who thought and still think that that decree has no other value except a merely disciplinary one, and that it does not render improbable the opposite opinion concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Therefore it will not be unpleasant to students of moral matters briefly to weigh the force of the aforesaid decree.

2. The preceding Response can be explained by a twofold consideration, extrinsic and intrinsic. Let us begin from the first. A similar question was proposed to the S. R. U. I. concerning Ontologism, namely: "whether the following propositions can safely be handed down:" there follow the seven known propositions concerning Ontologism. The Sacred Congregation, Feria IV, on the day 18 Sept. 1861, rescripted: "The Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords, the vote of the Consultors having first been had, and all and singular of the propositions above enunciated having been maturely weighed, responded to the proposed doubt: Negatively," namely: that they cannot safely be handed down.

3. By this decree theologians and the Philosophers themselves understood a true condemnation and proscription of the doctrine. Wherefore those who were defending Ontologism attempted to show that in those seven condemned propositions there was not contained the doctrine of Ontologism which they themselves were maintaining, but another doctrine quite different. Cf. the little work of the most learned philosopher and theologian Joseph Kleutgen, L'Ontologismo e le sette tesi censurate dalla Sacra Inquisizione, Rome, with the types of La Civilta Cattolica, 1867, p. 10 ff.

4. Nor did private and public Professors alone interpret that decree in this way; but also the Roman Congregations themselves understood that decree in this sense, namely of true condemnation and proscription. These things are read in the Decree transmitted through the Most Eminent Card. Patrizi to the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin concerning the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs, decurial doctor in the University of Louvain. "Moreover, what already, as from my letters given to the individual Bishops in Belgium on the day 11 Oct. of the year 1864 they had reserved to themselves to be done, the aforesaid Cardinals undertook to examine other doctrines which are contained in the more recent editions of the works of the same author. And indeed they had to perceive that in those books are handed down doctrines plainly similar to some of the seven propositions... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. of the year 1861 judged could not safely be handed down; ... hence it will be altogether necessary that not only those books and those similar to them be kept away from the Catholic University and from all Schools; but also," etc. Rome, 2 March 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 84 ff.

5. After the decree related in the preceding number, new doubts arose on the part of the defenders of Traditionalism and Ontologism. For they said that the decisions given were disciplinary, not doctrinal; that those things which had previously been handed down could not be taught, but could be kept in the heart; and that they were still probable and lawful. When these things had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff by the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin and other Bishops of Belgium, by letters given 1 Aug. 1866, the Most Eminent Patrizi in the name of the Most Holy Father rescripted these things to them: "In the letters... given to Most Holy Pius IX, a judgment is sought from the Apostolic See concerning certain doubts stirred up... concerning the responses of the sacred Congregations of the Holy Office and of the Index, both in the year 1864 and in this year 1866, sanctioned by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff. But those doubts are not of such a sort as to require a new interpretation and declaration of a matter already defined: for to dissolve them utterly, through the very responses of the Sacred Congregations, more than enough is done. Indeed it has been heard not without admiration that doubts of this sort have been proposed.... Moreover, Catholic men, much more indeed ecclesiastics, have this duty, that they subject themselves fully, perfectly, and absolutely to the decrees of the Holy See, contentions being removed from the midst which would obstruct the sincerity of assent." Rome, on the day 30 Aug. 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 86-89.

6. The preceding letter having been received, the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin and other Bishops of Belgium, on the day 17 Dec. of the year 1866, gave letters to the Rector and Professors of the University of Louvain, in which, speaking of the resolution of both Congregations, of the Holy Office and of the Index, on the day 2 March of the year 1866, cf. above n. 5, they assert these things: "These decisions are so clear that the cause must be held as definitively decided. But we know that the most firm will of the Most Holy Lord is that, errors having been removed, all think the same. And so, that all dissensions may remain extinguished forever, and that in a question long agitated and now defined there may remain nothing to be wished for or expected, we send the formula of letters to be subscribed by all who either handed down the reprobated doctrines or adhered to the same in any way." But in the formula it is said: "To the decisions of the Holy Apostolic See of the day 2 March and 30 August of this year, 1866, cf. above nn. 4, 5, I submit myself fully, perfectly, and absolutely, and from the soul I acquiesce. And therefore from the heart I reprobate and reject whatsoever doctrine opposed," etc. Cf. cited little work, p. 90, 91.

7. The retractation of Ontologism, by force of the condemnation pronounced by the Holy Office, was required from Rev. Dr. Ugonin when he was proposed for the Episcopate. This was the formula of retractation: "Since I, the undersigned, have received from the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord Archbishop of Myra, Apostolic Nuncio in France, that the doctrine which I set forth in my philosophical work on Ontologism (Etudes philosophiques-Ontologie) is disapproved by the Holy Apostolic See, as especially either explicitly or implicitly favoring those propositions which the S. R. and U. I. C. in the year 1861 decreed could not safely be handed down; I myself, no delay having been interposed, freely and spontaneously declare that I hold and disapprove the aforesaid doctrine in precisely the same way as the Holy See has judged, as wandering more or less from sound principles of philosophy; and at the same time I promise that, as far as will be in me, I will take care in the future that it be no longer handed down in the schools. Given at Paris on the day 13 Oct. 1866." Cited little work, p. 15.

8. Therefore, if craniotomy has been condemned by the Holy Office in the same manner in which Ontologism was condemned, if parity stands for each condemnation, it plainly appears how great is the force of that juridical censure concerning craniotomy, it cannot safely be taught. Nor indeed should it be objected that not once but several times proscriptions and decisions intervened against Ontologism on the part of the Most Holy Congregations and of the Holy See itself, which has not yet been had against craniotomy. For those repeated proscriptions and decisions do nothing else than inculcate and confirm that first condemnation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. 1861, by force of which the Most Eminent Card. Patrizi, in his Letter and Decree on the day 2 March 1866, pronounces books infected with that doctrine to be kept away from the University of Louvain and from all Schools, and the Most Reverend Bishops of Belgium hold the cause as definitively decided; and the cause also concerned Ontologism; and, errors having been removed, they exhort all to subscribe to sound doctrines.

9. We now make a step to the intrinsic consideration of the matter. That is called safe which is without danger. Therefore an opinion which cannot safely be taught is an opinion which cannot be taught without danger. And thus in the cited Decree of 2 March 1866, given through the Most Eminent Patrizi, after it had been affirmed that in the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs "doctrines plainly similar to some of the seven propositions... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. of the year 1861 judged could not safely be handed down" are handed down, it is then said that in the same books there are found doctrines or opinions which cannot be handed down without danger.

10. Moreover this danger is the danger of error, if we wish to understand the mentioned decision of the Holy Office in its proper and obvious sense. For it is said that it cannot safely be taught, and danger in teaching some opinion, properly and in the obvious sense, is nothing other than the danger of error. Wherefore that Decree is not some mere disciplinary prohibition of teaching or handing down in public or even private schools that opinion; but it is a true doctrinal judgment concerning the truth and falsity of the same opinion, which consequently can no longer be handed down in any schools, but must be altogether kept away from them.

11. Nor indeed should it be said that this danger is to be understood from the subject matter, which is some practical thing. For the matter about which there is question is practical and most practical, but it is a matter not regarding ecclesiastical and positive discipline, but regarding morals and touching the natural law itself. Wherefore from the consideration of the subject matter it does not follow that that decree is merely disciplinary, but that it is doctrinal in a matter of morals. For that decree involves this in other words: that that opinion concerning craniotomy cannot be taught without danger of error in a matter of morals. Nor should it be urged by saying that it can very well happen that that opinion cannot be safely taught, even speaking speculatively, because practically someone could easily abuse it, by applying it badly to practical cases, and by not rightly distinguishing the cases in which it can lawfully be given to execution from the cases in which that would be altogether illicit. This objection has no force, for that confusion of the case of lawful application and the case of unlawful application is impossible, and thus that danger is not this danger, of badly applying practically the aforesaid opinion and of confounding case with case. For indeed the opinion concerning craniotomy has not been condemned in the abstract, considered according to itself and generally; but the opinion concerning craniotomy has been condemned in the concrete, according to determined circumstances and considered in particular. For the question proposed, which the Sacred Congregation resolved by its decision, is not: "Whether it can safely be taught in Catholic Schools that the surgical operation which they call Craniotomy is lawful," thus, generally; but in that peculiar and determined case concerning which there was question and controversy among theologians, "namely when, if it is omitted, the mother and child would perish, but if it is admitted, the mother would be saved, the infant perishing." In this case, surely, the doctrine concerning craniotomy is declared dangerous. Therefore the very application to a determined case is declared a dangerous doctrine; IT CANNOT SAFELY BE TAUGHT. Therefore that danger is not the danger of practical abuse, the danger of unlawful application, but it is the danger of error in the opinion enunciating the lawfulness of craniotomy in that aforesaid case.

12. But it is still objected that the aforesaid opinion could well be called not safe, although determined to that peculiar case concerning which there was question, because of the practical danger itself of discerning the case of true necessity, namely that, if craniotomy is omitted, the mother and child truly would perish, but if it is admitted, the mother truly would be saved, the infant perishing. This cannot reasonably be objected. For that case of necessity is supposed as certain in that proposition concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Only in such a hypothesis was the question made by Theologians and proposed to the Sacred Congregation, and the Sacred Congregation certainly understood it in this sense; for it says in its Response, "account also having been taken of those things which in this matter were written by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation." Besides, that objection would then have force when that case of necessity were truly difficult to know; but where craniotomy is concerned the matter is most clear and subject to no difficulty, unless the Surgeon is wholly stupid, which is accidental and is not attended to in the condemnation of a general proposition. For the matter is considered in itself.

13. Danger is one thing intrinsic, another extrinsic; and likewise one is proximate, another remote. The danger of error in asserting the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be from a circumstance extrinsic to craniotomy itself, insofar as it is applied in such circumstances of things as render it unlawful. For, as has just been observed, what is condemned is not the lawfulness of craniotomy in general, but the lawfulness of craniotomy in the stated circumstance of the death of the mother and child, if that operation is omitted, and of the safety of the mother and death of the child, if it is done. Moreover, if any circumstance can be thought up which could render craniotomy lawful, this plainly is no other than the one just enunciated, since without that operation neither mother nor child is saved, while, when it is applied, the child is not placed in a worse condition and the mother is saved. But the Holy Office, in this very case, declares it dangerous to teach the lawfulness of craniotomy. Therefore the danger of error is intrinsic to craniotomy itself; namely because it is the direct killing of an innocent person. The danger of error is intrinsic to the complex itself, that is, to craniotomy clothed with the aforesaid circumstance; for in that complex craniotomy remains with its whole nature, which is not changed in the least by that maximally favorable circumstance. But if the danger of error is intrinsic, namely by force of craniotomy itself, consequently that danger of error cannot be remote, but proximate and most proximate; for nothing is more proximate to any thing than its intrinsic and innermost nature. Therefore the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be taught without proximate and intrinsic danger of error.

14. An action which is a danger of sin is an action distinct from the action itself of sin, and is sin not properly and strictly speaking by reason of itself, but by reason of that action sinful in itself with which it is connected. Likewise an opinion containing danger of error is an opinion distinct from another certain and unshaken doctrine against which that opinion contains the danger of erring, and thus is connected with it insofar as it is opposed to it. Therefore, generally and speaking in itself, an opinion which cannot safely be taught, or which contains danger of error, is an opinion which, although it is not in itself error, nevertheless is connected with error; at least insofar as of itself and in the obvious sense, and not accidentally from mere inconsideration, it so labors under equivocation between error and truth that by an easy way it turns aside toward error rather than toward truth, and one who adheres to it is judged to embrace error indeed, not truth. Nevertheless, when from the subject matter a proposition is so determined that no way lies open to truth, although it is defined merely as not safe, and by reason of the note itself or censure cannot be held except as merely dangerous, or containing danger of error, consequently that proposition must nevertheless be held as error, namely by reason of legitimate deduction. And hence it is easily explained why, although those seven propositions of Ontologism were not marked with any other censure than that they cannot safely be handed down, nevertheless in the Schools they have commonly been held as altogether improbable after that Decision of the Holy Office. The same seems to happen in our case. For no true sense can be thought up, since in the very case most favorable it is said that it cannot safely be taught. Wherefore it does not appear how craniotomy can still be defended probably.

15. That adverb, safely, can be explained in another way; but the conclusion is nearly the same. That adverb can be resolved into an adjective, and then the substantive understood under it is to be sought. Moreover this substantive, which can be thought up more favorably in the present matter, is conscience; so that it cannot safely be taught is the same as it cannot be taught with a safe conscience. This interpretation, which pertains most greatly to a moral and practical matter, seems altogether to agree with the decision of the Holy Office which we are treating; for in it there is question of a moral and practical matter. Moreover, in Moral matters, that opinion is called safe which someone can follow practically without danger and fear of violating some precept or some law. Likewise in a moral matter an opinion is called safe in the merely speculative order which someone can hold in the mind and teach externally to others without danger and fear of erring against some certain law or precept. In our case that certain and unshaken law is the law, Thou shalt not kill. Wherefore that craniotomy in that case set forth above cannot safely be taught is the same as that craniotomy cannot be taught without danger and fear of error against the law, Thou shalt not kill. But this danger and fear of error would then remain on the part of the thing a mere danger of error, and would not consequently become error, if a case could be given in which the law Thou shalt not kill was in reality not infringed. But here this case cannot be given. For if this case were given, it would be no other than the proposed case itself. But that proposed case would then on the part of the thing remain a mere danger of error, and would not become error, directly against that law Thou shalt not kill, since it would not yet be ultimately determined by every favorable circumstance, and could still be further determined. Therefore, although by force of the condemnation that opinion is only a doctrine not safe, nevertheless in reality by force of the matter that opinion becomes altogether improbable.

16. But someone will ask why then the Holy Office negatively said that sentence was not safe, and did not positively say that it was erroneous, if not safe is in reality the same as erroneous? It is responded, first: it did not say this, because this was not asked, but that; and Sacred Congregations respond with customary formulas to proposed doubts, nor are they accustomed in their brief responses to make a treatment of the matter about which there is question, so as to set it forth and explain it. It is responded, secondly: although the sentence not safe in our case falls back in reality, by reason of the matter, by legitimate conclusion, into an erroneous or false sentence, nevertheless that theological censure, not safe, is not the same as the other censure: erroneous or error, which is a far graver censure. We contend for the former, not the latter. But we say erroneous or false also to restrict the signification of error, since strictly speaking error and false are not the same. "From Augustine, in the Enchiridion, ch. 17, and Contra Academicos, ch. 4, to err is nothing other than to approve true things for false, or false things for true. In this signification error is nothing other than a false proposition, and so it can be found not only in the matter of faith or Theology, but also in any natural or human matter: but according to the common manner of speaking, error, as it were by antonomasia, is accustomed in each matter to signify not just any false judgment, but, by a certain exaggeration, that which is more evidently or more certainly false." Suarez, De Fide, D. 19, S. 2, n. 11. Hence the same Suarez, discoursing on an erroneous proposition, as it is distinguished from a heretical one in theological censures, says that it is one "which is opposed to a truth certain by theological certitude, which does not attain the certitude of faith; because it is in no way immediately revealed, as is supposed, but is a conclusion evidently inferred from one proposition of faith and from another evident by the natural light.... A proposition contrary to such a proposition does not attain the grade of a heretical proposition, because it does not have the highest opposition with a proposition of faith, such as immediate opposition is: but that it is erroneous is manifest; because after a heretical proposition, it has the highest repugnance with the truth of faith, namely mediate through evident inference." l.c., n. 14. The doctrine of Cardinal Lugo, De Fide, D. 20, S. 3, n. 73, is the same. "The word error, taken most broadly, can be attributed to any false proposition in any matter; for he who believes the false as true errs from the true and is deceived. Commonly, however, that word is accustomed to be restricted to the false which is opposed not only to the true, but to the evident or certain, which among all is commonly known certainly. Nor in Philosophy is just any false opinion called error, but one which is opposed to a certain dogma and received as such among philosophers. Wherefore in Theology that will not be called error unless it is opposed to some certain truth which is held as certain among Catholics and Theologians." But insofar as error is a special censure below heresy, according to the same Lugo, "error properly is that which is not opposed immediately, but only mediately to the doctrine of faith, insofar as it immediately denies a proposition which is not of faith, but only a theological conclusion, evidently deduced from one proposition of faith and another evident by the light of nature." l.c., n. 78.

17. Wherefore if that censure, it cannot safely be taught, is taken altogether properly and strictly by reason of itself, according to the general rule of interpreting condemned propositions, the aforesaid opinion concerning craniotomy is a dangerous opinion, which namely cannot be taught without danger of error; consequently, moreover, it is also a dangerous opinion, which cannot be reduced to practice without danger of sin. But if the censure, it cannot safely be taught, is considered in the subject matter, that same opinion concerning craniotomy is simply false, and in this sense can also be called not safe and dangerous in the true and proper sense; for it contains an intrinsic and proximate danger of denying a truth, evident, certain, received by all; namely, Thou shalt not kill.

18. Finally it must be noted that if craniotomy cannot safely be taught, neither can the direct procurement of abortion in the same circumstances be safely taught. This follows by legitimate reasoning. For first, the arguments by which craniotomy was defended are the same as the arguments by which the direct procurement of abortion is defended. Besides, it matters little whether the infant's head is cut or compressed, or whether the infant is infected with poison, or an immature fetus by mere ejection from the maternal womb is directly and of itself deprived of the natural element altogether necessary to it for life. It is surely the same thing to kill a man by steel, poison, or projection into fire, or immersion into water.

400. Principles. - I. It is never lawful directly to kill an innocent person, whether by private or public authority, even for procuring the public good; for it is an intrinsically evil action and expressly prohibited by divine law. Exod. 23. 7: Thou shalt not kill the innocent and just. - St. Alphonsus, n. 393.

II. It is lawful on account of a grave cause to place an action good in itself from which, besides the intention, the death of an innocent person follows, according to the principle of St. Thomas set forth above.

III. He is not guilty of homicide who, even without cause, but with diligence applied, places an action which does not bring death per se, from which nevertheless by accident homicide follows; because that homicide is altogether fortuitous and involuntary. But otherwise if he places an action which brings death per se, or is very dangerous, and from which death often follows, even if diligence is applied for forestalling damage. - St. Alphonsus, n. 398.

401. Resolves. - 1. It is not lawful to kill those lethally wounded, nor any other dying persons, lest they suffer longer; nor mad persons, lest they harm others, provided they can be restrained from harming otherwise. The reason is that, according to the well-known saying, evils are not to be done in order that good may be obtained.

2. It is not lawful to kill an innocent person for satisfying a tyrant demanding his death, even under penalty of the city to be overthrown, and even if he consented to his own death; the reason is that he does not have dominion over his own life. Yet more probably he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good, and probably, if he were unwilling, even be handed over. - St. Alphonsus, n. 393, with others.

3. In war it is lawful to direct cannons against enemy positions, although from this some innocents also are going to suffer death; because their death follows besides the intention. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.

4. It is not lawful to kill legates or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the given faith and have unjustly killed the hostages or legates sent to them; because they are innocent. - Busembaum and others commonly with St. Alphonsus, ibid.

5. Physicians, midwives, and guardians of infants and the infirm sin gravely if from grave negligence they either do not impede their death, or cause it, or hasten it. Likewise if from gravely culpable ignorance they furnish harmful things to the sick.

Abortion is the premature ejection of a fetus from the womb of the mother.

¹ On the title above. In order that questions on this argument may be aptly instituted and solved, the principles indeed of the older Theologians must be retained; but their application must also depend on the theories which the more accurate study of medical art has brought in over the passage of time.

And 1. indeed as regards the causes of abortion, with those things passed over which the older authors disputed concerning medicines killing the offspring in the womb, for medical science now admits no medicines of this sort, those causes can be recalled to these heads. 1. Cutting or rather rupture of the uterus, or of the membrane by which the fetus is enclosed, by the aid of an instrument; by which it happens that, the humor in which the fetus swims being withdrawn, it cannot long live there, but is necessarily ejected, although it can come forth into the light even alive. - 2. Force brought from without through blows or compressions, which would strike the infant born and deprive it of life. - 3. Violent shakings, which can have a cause both extrinsic and also intrinsic, for example convulsions. - 4. Finally, relaxation of the fibers, by which it happens that the fetus, pressed by its own weight, is born prematurely; which relaxation or acceleration of birth can have either natural causes or be obtained by art, for example by baths, medicated drinks, etc.

2. But it will be very useful to distinguish both causes which directly and positively injure the fetus, of which sort, for example, would be a violent blow, or even a wound inflicted by the aid of an instrument on the fetus itself still hidden in the womb, and causes which merely bring it about that preservation of the life of the offspring ceases; of this sort is acceleration of birth before the seventh month of gestation, whether this happens through mere relaxation or through cutting of the membrane containing the fetus.

3. Already from his own age St. Alphonsus wrote (lib. 6, n. 124): "Since today the opinion flourishes, received not without applause by experts, that the fetus from the beginning of conception, or at least after some days, is informed by a soul," etc.; which "some days" in the edition of the year 1748 he says are three or four. Moreover this opinion, insofar as it admits no inanimate fetus, since it is now more commonly received, especially after more accurate observations instituted by physiologists, and is defended as more consonant not only with philosophical, but also with theological principles, it follows that there is scarcely any cause why a special question be made concerning the hypothesis of an inanimate fetus.

4. Since surgical art has now found an instrument by which the membranes enveloping the fetus are cut in such a way that water injected by the aid of a little siphon can certainly touch the fetus immediately, and therefore since according to those things which St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 107), after Benedict XIV, discusses, we can be altogether certain of the validity of baptism thus conferred on infants enclosed in the womb, consequently the difficulties and questions raised by the older Doctors concerning the dangers which the mother would be bound to undergo so that the eternal salvation of the offspring may be provided for almost cease.

5. Since there can be no doubt as regards those causes by which there is a direct tendency positively to injure and kill the fetus, since a direct intention of killing, concerning the indirect see above, n. 396, can never be lawful from any cause; therefore the principal hinge of the controversy will reside in this: whether and when it is lawful to accelerate birth, and indeed through that time of gestation in which the offspring, however alive it may come forth into the light, must nevertheless soon succumb to death.

6. But this acceleration of birth, as doctors are accustomed to speak both concerning abortion and generally concerning the killing of the neighbor, can be considered as excited or promoted either directly or indirectly. It will be called indirectly excited when, for curing the disease of the mother, those remedies must be applied from which, besides the intention, that relaxation of the fibers follows on account of which premature birth follows. But directly, when means are used which per se are directed not to healing the mother's disease, but merely to unloading her of the fetus by accelerated birth. This indeed could happen from a twofold cause, namely either only on account of preserving the temporal life of the mother, or on account of procuring the spiritual salvation of the offspring through baptism, or also on account of each of these ends at the same time.

Besides, even when the remedy per se does not tend to curing the disease of the mother, but only to obtaining birth more maturely, nevertheless the abortion in another sense can be held as directly or indirectly sought, namely when one considers not the material reason of accelerating birth, but the will or intention of the one operating. For what the Doctors commonly have with St. Thomas, that the death of an unjust aggressor in just defense follows only indirectly, for the reason that the direct intention of the killer is borne only toward his own defense, but the other effect, namely the death of the aggressor, is besides the intention and by accident; this very thing can have place in the acceleration of birth, namely when the will tends directly not to the temporal damage of the offspring, which follows by accident and besides the intention, but to another end.

7. Finally, for the easier solution of the proposed question, it will be very useful to advert to that which we suggested above: that the controversy about acceleration of birth, whether this happens through relaxation of the fibers or through cutting of the membranes containing the fetus, does not regard whether it is lawful to deprive the offspring of life, but rather how far the mother is bound to guard and preserve life for the offspring. In this matter, account must indeed be taken not only of the general obligation which charity requires from all regarding the protection of others' life, nor only of the special obligation of parents toward children, but also of the singular office which binds the mother, since nature has especially committed this care to her. Nevertheless it remains to be inquired how far this obligation extends itself, just as it can be inquired how far the obligation of a mother can be urged not to let the infant whom she carries in her arms fall from her hands into waves or into some abyss, which indeed comes back to the same thing as if it were asked whether and what sort of just cause there can be on account of which the mother may lawfully cease from guarding the life of the offspring.

Moreover, for solving this question generally, those things bear which Cardinal de Lugo establishes as a certain principle (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 10, n. 133), where he writes: "A mother is not bound with so great danger and detriment of her own life to procure and preserve the fetus; just as she is not bound to feed and retain with danger of life a son already born, nor even, in order to nurse him, to preserve milk in the breasts when, for protecting her own life, it would be necessary for her to dry the breasts." And plainly that also pertains here which Lugo adds in the same place, diligently distinguishing the mere cessation of guarding life from damage positively inflicted on the offspring, although that hypothesis of poison infecting the offspring is not admitted now. "Yet the moderation pleases," he says, "which Vasquez afterward added to this doctrine..., saying that this is understood of bloodletting, a bath, and remedies of this sort, which do not tend to the killing of the fetus except negatively, through subtraction of the humor necessary for its sustenance, but not of remedies which would positively concur to the death of the fetus, such as would be a drink which through positive alteration would kill the fetus: for this would be to give poison positively to an innocent, so that you may free yourself from death, which is never lawful."

8. These things having been set down beforehand, the various questions will not with difficulty be solved according to the various hypotheses.

And I. Where the death of one or the other is certain, namely either of the mother or of the offspring, but the life of the other is certain, and the question is only of temporal death, because, for example, baptism could have been conferred on the offspring not yet born according to the aforesaid things; the mother is not bound to die so that she may preserve temporal life for the son. See Lugo, l.c.

But this case is altogether very rare; since, as St. Alphonsus says, lib. 3, n. 394, it is morally impossible, so that it would almost be a miracle, that when the mother perishes the offspring survives... And he adds: "Several experts of medical art whom I consulted confirmed this to me."

And this indeed is valid even if there is question of a caesarean operation; which besides, since it requires most skilled physicians and a robust mother, rarely has place, especially since this remedy is customarily required then, when other remedies have been applied in vain, and therefore when both mother and offspring have their strength prostrated by a long struggle.

II. Indeed St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 106), having before his eyes that saying of St. Thomas (3, q. 68, art. 11, ad 3): "Evils are not to be done that goods may come; and therefore a man ought not to kill the mother in order to baptize the child," concludes that the mother, when danger of death is proximate or probable, is not bound to undergo that danger so that the offspring may be baptized, nor can the surgeon lead her into this danger.

III. If the mother, seized by disease, labors under grave danger of death unless the fetus is expelled by accelerating birth, but there is probable hope that by the aid of medicine it can be brought about that the fetus comes forth alive into the light, and therefore is going to obtain, if not temporal, at least eternal life; then an expulsion of this sort seems not only lawful, but prescribed. The reason is that the danger and death of the mother would profit nothing for the temporal life of the offspring, and besides would cast the offspring itself into most grave peril of eternal salvation.

Nor ought it to obstruct that perhaps the death of the offspring is accelerated a little. For first indeed, from what has been said with Lugo, the mother is not bound with such danger to preserve the life of the offspring further. And then in that case, as St. Alphonsus says (lib. 6, n. 106, at the end), "that small loss of life can be disregarded, so that the infant may attain eternal life."

IV. When, the mother being sick, the danger of abortion is equally imminent whether she takes a remedy for curing the disease or does not take it, because the very force of the disease, as sometimes happens, brings on abortion, it is lawful for the medicine to be taken; for abstinence from remedies would not profit the offspring, and therefore the mother consults for her own life without greater detriment of the offspring. But if without greater detriment of the offspring the mother can consult for her own life, not only lawfully can she she can, but because of the obligation which each one has of preserving his own life through ordinary remedies, she altogether ought to use medicines.

V. If from the force of the disease a probable danger of abortion is imminent, but at the same time danger is imminent that, if the abortion in reality follows from the disease, the offspring may die in the womb; but, on the contrary, probable hope shines forth that, through birth accelerated by medicines, the offspring may come forth alive into the light, and thus its eternal salvation can be provided for; an uncertain hope of temporal life does not seem to be preferred to the more probable hope of eternal salvation, and therefore it would be lawful to accelerate birth. This indeed must be said to be valid even if the disease brings no danger to the life of the mother, but there is question only of the better good of the offspring.

VI. When, with account taken both of the physical and moral state of the mother, namely that she does not so dread the incision that even this horror alone could gravely harm the offspring, and at the same time after considering both the state of the offspring and the skill of the physician, it can prudently be judged that through a caesarean operation the mother will not be brought into grave danger, but that the offspring can be consulted for not only in temporal but also eternal life, it must be said that the mother is bound to suffer the incision, although the eternal salvation of the offspring could be provided for otherwise. Yet it is required that the hope of the salvation of the offspring and of the mother at the same time be much more probable; for otherwise, for the uncertain hope of the temporal life of the son, since the eternal can be cared for otherwise, as we said, the mother is not bound to undergo a probable danger of her own life (St. Alphonsus, lib. 6, n. 106).

402. Principles. - I. It is never lawful directly to procure abortion, even if the fetus were supposed still inanimate. The reason is that if the fetus is animated, it is homicide properly so called; but if it is not animated, it is anticipated homicide. For a fetus even not animated is ordered to forming a man; therefore its ejection is anticipated homicide. - St. Alphonsus, n. 394. - Lacroix, n. 825. per se directed to curing the disease; 3. that there be no hope of procuring eternal life for that fetus through Baptism. But hope of this sort can be absent in a twofold case: namely where it is morally certain that the fetus is not yet animated, as in the first days of conception; or that it, when the mother dies, will die at the same time or before. - St. Alphonsus, ibid. - Lacroix, n. 826 and following. - Billuart.

III. It is lawful to give to a pregnant woman who is sick remedies suitable for curing diseases, even if sometimes abortion could follow. The reason is that experience establishes that abortion very rarely follows from ordinary remedies, at least most of them. - Thus commonly.

403. Resolves. - 1. It is not lawful for a pregnant girl to take a drug for expelling the fetus, lest she lose her reputation, or lest she be killed by a furious father, because abortion would be procured directly ². This is also clear from proposition 34 condemned by Innocent XI.

² In order that you may lawfully place a cause of death, say the same of any damage of another, it is also necessary that you intend the killing neither as the end, nor assume it as a means to another end, for in either manner you would will it directly; but that you bring it about only indirectly, namely by placing the cause of that death not on account of the connection which that same cause has with that effect or death of the innocent, but only on account of the connection which it has equally immediately with another effect. For thus you do and intend it insofar as it is joined with an effect lawfully desirable, not insofar as by accident it is connected with another effect which you cannot intend, although you can permit it from a just cause. Moreover, in the hypothesis of the Author, abortion is assumed as a means directly chosen for obtaining another end, to which moreover abortion has no order per se at all as to its own effect. In these things a twofold reason shines forth on account of which the proposition was condemned by Innocent XI, n. 34: "It is lawful to procure abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl detected as pregnant be killed or made infamous."

2. It is not lawful, when a woman is pregnant, to kill the fetus ³ for freeing the mother from death. - St. Alphonsus, n. 394.

³ Take this resolution also in the sense set forth in the preceding note, namely that it is not lawful directly to will the death of the offspring. For if otherwise the death both of the mother and of the offspring is certainly imminent, the mother is in no way bound to undergo a death which does not save the offspring from simultaneous death. And to this surely pertains what the Salamancans (tr. XIII, cap. 2, n. 60) attribute to more than twenty Doctors, that in certain circumstances the fetus conducts itself after the manner of an innocent aggressor, whose death according to the doctrine of St. Thomas remembered above, in the note to n. 402, follows only indirectly.

3. It is not lawful for a pregnant mother, even in certain danger of death, to take, or even for medicine to be furnished to her, from an intention directly ordered to the ejection of the fetus. Yet if death is certainly or almost certainly going to happen if the medicine is not applied, and on the contrary the mother is certainly or probably to be saved if it is applied, this does not seem illicit, especially since either from the acceleration of birth or in some other way the eternal salvation of the offspring, otherwise going to be endangered, can be provided for through Baptism ⁴.

⁴ You may rightly say that the two parts of this resolution conflict with each other. You will reconcile them if in the first part, rather than saying from an intention directly ordered, you substitute directly ordered of itself; for so room is left for the sense in which the second part also must be understood, namely that the death of the offspring only follows indirectly, and is permitted.

4. It is lawful for a physician to furnish a remedy of itself ordered to curing the disease of the mother, if it is certain that, the remedy not being given, the mother otherwise is going to die, and the fetus will perish without Baptism; for thus both the mother and the fetus are helped in the better way in which they can be; but very rarely will there be certainty about each. But if there is equal danger of abortion whether the remedy is taken or not, it is lawful to apply it; because the life of the mother is consulted for without greater danger to the offspring. - St. Alphonsus, n. 394.

5. They are homicides who strike a pregnant woman, or terrify her, so that abortion follows. Likewise pregnant women who with grave imprudence place in various ways the proximate cause of abortion, for example by devoting themselves to excessive labors, carrying heavy burdens, washing the feet in cold water, etc.

6. A fortiori girls pregnant from fornication are guilty of homicide who apply repeated efforts to attempt abortion by potions, jumps, burdens, strong striking and compression of the belly, etc. When women of this sort confess, they must be questioned diligently, but not abruptly, about abortion desired or attempted.

Concerning the penalties against those procuring abortion, it will be said in the Treatise on Censures. - See Cases, n. 399 and following.

72. IV. On abortion and craniotomy². It is known that voluntary destruction of the fetus flourished among the Pagans; but the Christian religion, zealous for human life and the salvation of infants, strictly prohibited it as true homicide. Yet in our days not a few physicians have attempted to make honorable abortion and embryotomy or craniotomy (i.e., the destruction of a living fetus)³, at least in the case in which the life of the mother otherwise cannot be saved. Now as regards abortion, the violent ejection of an immature fetus, at the time when it cannot live outside the uterus, must be distinguished from acceleration of childbirth, which takes place when the fetus, already conceived for seven months, can live outside the uterus. - These things being posited, we set forth the responses of the Congregations on this matter:

² Eschbach, op. cit., pp. 273-286; 381-476; Surbled, op. cit., vol. II, p. 184-258; Dissez, Craniotomy from the theological point of view.

³ Embryotomy etymologically means the cutting of the embryo, craniotomy the cutting of the skull or head.

73. (A) On craniotomy. In the year 1884, on May 28, the Holy Office recalled for examination the doubt proposed by Cardinal Caverot: "Whether it can safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is licit, namely when, it being omitted, the mother and son would perish, but on the contrary, it being admitted, the mother would be saved, the infant perishing"; it judged that it must be answered: that it cannot safely be taught⁴. But when there was dispute concerning the sense and extension of this decree, especially in the Catholic Faculty of Lille, the Archbishop of Cambrai proposed new doubts concerning certain surgical operations akin to craniotomy; after three years, the Holy Office, on August 14, 1889, confirmed the first response, and declared that it cannot safely be taught that "any surgical operation directly killing the fetus or the pregnant mother" is licit⁵.

⁴ Apud Eschbach, op. cit., p. 461-462; Acta S. Sedis, XVII, p. 556.

⁵ Eschbach, p. 464-467; Acta S. Sedis, XXII, p. 748.

74. (B) On abortion of the immature fetus. Since procurement of abortion differs from craniotomy, some thought, even after the aforesaid decrees, that abortion was licit for saving the mother.

Therefore a new case was proposed to the Holy See: "Titius, a physician, when he was called to a pregnant woman lying gravely ill, everywhere observed that there was no other cause underlying the lethal disease except the pregnancy itself, that is, the presence of the fetus in the uterus. Therefore there was one way at hand for him, that he might save the mother from certain and imminent death, namely of procuring abortion or ejection of the fetus. He was accustomed to enter upon this way, having employed means and operations nevertheless not indeed tending of themselves and immediately to this, that they should kill the fetus in the maternal womb, but only that it should be brought to light alive, if it could be done, although it would soon die, as being still altogether immature." Now the Holy Office, on July 24, 1895, decreed that this could not be done¹.

¹ Eschbach, p. 468-469.

75. (C) On acceleration of childbirth. Wherefore nothing remained except to inquire concerning acceleration of childbirth; therefore the following doubts were proposed by the Bishop of Sinaloa (Sinaloa, in the Mexican region): "1. Will acceleration of childbirth be licit whenever from the narrowness of the woman the exit of the fetus at its natural time would become impossible? - 2. And if the narrowness of the woman is such that not even premature childbirth is judged possible, will it be licit to provoke abortion or to perform the Caesarean operation at its own time? - 3. Is laparotomy (i.e., section of the abdomen) licit when there is question of extra-uterine pregnancy, or of ectopic conceptions?"

Moreover the Holy Office on May 4, 1898 responded: "To 1. Acceleration of childbirth is not illicit of itself, provided it is performed from just causes and at that time and in those modes by which, from ordinary contingencies, care is taken for the life of the mother and fetus. - To 2. As regards the first part, negatively... But as regards the second, nothing prevents the woman concerning whom there is question from being subjected to the Caesarean operation at its own time. - To 3. Necessity compelling, laparotomy is licit for extracting ectopic conceptions from the womb of the mother, provided that for the lives of both fetus and mother, insofar as can be done, serious and opportune provision is made."²

² Eschbach, p. 470-471; Acta S. Sedis, XXX, p. 704.

The Holy Office again confirmed this response on March 5, 1902, renewing the prior decrees³.

³ Ami du Clerge, XXIV, 1902, p. 478.

76. From the aforesaid decrees it is permitted to infer a threefold rule: (A) It is not licit directly to procure immature abortion⁴ or to perform craniotomy; for each action is directly killing of an innocent. Therefore the following sin gravely: (a) pregnant girls who procure abortion lest they lose reputation or suffer some other grave evil; or women who, fearing lest they are pregnant, take potions or employ other means in order to induce abortion; (b) physicians who directly procure abortion, even for saving the mother; for evils are not to be done that goods may come¹; moreover there are other suitable means for helping the mother, namely acceleration of childbirth and the Caesarean operation, which today, especially in great cities, where skilled surgeons are found, is performed easily and safely².

⁴ This indeed is true even if it were admitted that the fetus, although living, is not yet informed by a rational soul; for by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, this proposition 34 was condemned (apud Denzinger, n. 1051): "It is licit to procure abortion before animation of the fetus, lest a girl found pregnant be killed or defamed." - The excommunication imposed against those procuring abortion is set forth in the Treatise on Censures.

¹ Nor can it be said that the fetus is an unjust aggressor; for, as Cangiamilla already said in his time, the infant is not an unjust invader, but compelled by nature, whose author is God; indeed compelled by the mother herself, as D. Huber says. Cf. Eschbach, op. cit., p. 424.

² Hence today many physicians, even non-Catholics, reject immature abortion and craniotomy as something scientifically antiquated: "To kill the fetus, under pretext of favoring delivery, is to misunderstand the certain resources of modern obstetrical surgery; it is to be behind the times." Thus Dr. Guerinoprez, apud Eschbach, op. cit., p. 389.

77. (B) It is licit indirectly to procure abortion from a proportionately grave cause; e.g., if the mother labors under a lethal disease which cannot be cured unless a remedy is furnished from which abortion will follow by accident; provided these conditions concur: (a) that the disease be truly lethal; (b) that the remedy be directly employed for curing the disease, not for expelling the fetus; (c) that in the best way possible provision be made for the baptism and salvation of the animated fetus.

(C) It is licit directly to procure acceleration of childbirth, when it is foreseen that the infant can live, provided there is a grave cause; for by such a manner of acting the life of the infant is not taken away, but only exposed to danger; and this indeed is licit whenever it is required for averting a greater danger of the infant itself or of death.

78. Note for practice. Since in some Schools of physicians it is taught that craniotomy is licit and expedient for saving the life of the mother, certain surgeons in good faith perform it when from various circumstances the Caesarean operation seems less opportune; in which case, as regards the past, they are indeed excused from sin, but they are prudently to be instructed as regards the future, according to the rules handed down in the Treatise on Penance.

Printed by the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Desclee & Co. - Tournai (Belgium).

312. Principle: The direct killing of an innocent person is a most grave sin, injurious to God, to the neighbor, and to society. - I say most grave, because by taking away life it inflicts a most grave injury.

(a) It is a sin injurious to God; for, since He is the supreme lord of life and death, His rights are violated by such homicide; hence He severely reproves this crime both by the words related above: You shall not kill; and by these, which declare the former: "The innocent and just you shall not kill, because I abhor the impious."⁴

⁴ Exod., XXIII, 7.

(b) Injurious to the neighbor; for since, from what was said above (n. 295), life is a very excellent good, and a means of enjoying many other goods, both natural and supernatural, he who voluntarily takes away the life of an innocent person does him the greatest injury; and this indeed is greater when he leaves him no time to be reconciled to God, if he is in the state of mortal sin.

(c) Injurious to society; for since the innocent person is a useful member of society, injury is done to the community by prematurely cutting off this member; whence the more useful the citizen was, the graver the crime is.

313. Corollaries. (a) It is not licit to kill the lethally wounded, the old, the sick, the dying, lest they suffer longer; nor the insane, lest they harm others, provided they can be restrained otherwise; nor a mother placed in extremis, so that the infant can be baptized; all these retain the right to life, and must be committed to God, who alone can dispose of their life.

(b) Nor can hostages (otages) be killed, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the faith given, indeed even if they have killed other hostages.

(c) They sin gravely who, from whatever motive, kill infants, or directly accelerate their death: for these are innocent. Parents are guilty of a horrible crime who hand over their own children to others to be killed, so that they may make the insurance price their own.¹

¹ "Parents without entrails insure at a high rate the head of very young children, and, coldly, slowly, let them die of starvation and misery. The death which carries off these little beings, revealing no manifest violence, is most often reputed natural, and secures good annuities to its skillful and sinister authors." (Dr. Surbled, op. cit., t. III, p. 238). - Concerning the killing of an infant in the mother's womb we speak in the Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 72-78.

(d) Sometimes relatives or kin of someone deceased ask from the physician that the heart of the dead man be pierced or an artery opened, lest perhaps he be buried alive. Now if the physician seriously doubts concerning death, he cannot perform this, since he would expose himself to the danger of killing a man who perhaps survives; but if certain signs of death are present, puncture of the heart is not illicit, since this is done only to free relatives from vain anxieties.

314. Principle: It is not licit to place an action from which certainly or probably the death of an innocent person will follow indirectly, unless from a proportionately grave cause and with a right intention. This is clear from what was said where indirect suicide was treated, above, n. 302.

Hence (a) in a just war it is licit to direct artillery (canons) against a besieged city, even if it is foreseen that many innocents will perish from this, provided this is held as a necessary and efficacious means for attacking the city; nevertheless it is equitable that the head of the city first be warned, so that women and infants can flee to a safe place.¹

¹ Bonfils, Manuel de Droit international, 3rd edition, Paris, 1901, n. 1083-1086.

(b) If someone, while an enemy pursues, cannot avoid death except by passing through a narrow way, with the danger of trampling an innocent person, he can do this.

(c) It is not licit for a physician, for the sake of experiment, to use a new remedy, or to perform a dangerous operation, when a more efficacious and less rash remedy is at hand.²

² Guermonprez, L'assassinat medical et le respect de la vie humaine, Paris, 1904.

315. (d) Likewise, in industrial matters, those sin who use dangerous materials or machines, from which the life of workers is placed in great danger, especially where the law prohibits this.³

³ P. Pic recounts the principal laws recently promulgated concerning this matter in various regions, Traite elementaire de legislation industrielle, Paris, 1903, n. 609-648.

(e) But he who places an action of itself not dangerous, or rarely and therefore not probably dangerous, from which nevertheless death follows by chance, is not morally guilty of homicide, provided he has applied ordinary diligence; thus a hunter who, while he gives himself to hunting with due diligence, by chance kills a man; for then he neither could nor ought to have foreseen death; otherwise it would have to be said if he is guilty of negligence, e.g., by imprudently playing with a gun; then he is gravely or lightly guilty, according as the negligence was grave or light.⁴

⁴ Concerning accidental homicide, with respect to French law, see Cod. pen., a. 319-320.

As every man is strictly bound to provide for his bodily welfare, that is, his life, health, and liberty, so he is also obliged, both in justice and charity, to respect the bodily welfare of his fellowmen by protecting and promoting their life, health, and liberty, and abstaining from whatever might unjustly endanger or injure these possessions.¹

¹ See this Handbook, Vol. III, 11 sqq., 21 sq., 24 sqq., 29, 33, 36, 57, 97.—Cfr. St. Augustine, De Moribus Eccl. Cath., l. I, c. 28, n. 56 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1334).

This general obligation assumes special form in the duties known as proper to one's state of life, e. g., those which bind parents in relation to their children, superiors in relation to their subjects, employers in relation to their employees, and so forth.

But life, health, and liberty are not supreme blessings, and may consequently be sacrificed whenever higher interests require or permit it. In other words, it is morally permissible, for the sake of some higher good,—for example, the public welfare,—to employ compulsion toward one's neighbor, to deprive him of minor goods, to subject him to bodily suffering, or to take away his liberty. Such higher goods are, for instance, education, life, health, and the public order.²

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 65.—IDEM, Contra Gent., III, 146, n. 3: "That which is necessary for the preservation of good cannot be evil in itself. But for the preservation of concord among men it is necessary that punishments be inflicted on the wicked. Therefore to punish the wicked is not evil in itself"; n. 4: "Likewise, the common good is better than the particular good of one person. Therefore the particular good must be taken away so that the common good may be preserved"; n. 5: "Furthermore, just as a physician in his operation intends health, which consists in the ordered harmony of the humors, so the ruler of a city in his operation intends peace, which consists in the ordered concord of the citizens. But a physician cuts off a putrid member well and usefully if corruption of the body threatens through it. Therefore the ruler of a city justly and without sin kills pestilential men, lest the peace of the city be disturbed."—Cfr. Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, pp. 462 sqq.

1. A father in raising his child may apply bodily force by inflicting pain or curtailing liberty, provided he does not endanger the child's life, health, or morals. But the application of such means must always proceed from morally good motives (causae correptionis et disciplinae) and not exceed reasonable bounds (correptio moderata).³

³ St. Augustine, Serm., 13 (al. 94 De Tempore), n. 8: "Let punishments be applied—I do not refuse them, I do not forbid them—but with the mind of one who loves, the mind of one who cherishes, the mind of one who corrects."—Ibid., n. 9: "For you do not fail to instruct your son. And first you act so that, if it can be done, he may be instructed by generosity, and may blush to offend his father, and not fear him as a severe judge. You rejoice in such a son. But if perhaps he despises those measures, you also apply blows, inflict punishment, bring pain upon him, but you seek his salvation. Many have been corrected by love, many by fear, but through the trembling of fear they have arrived at love." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 111).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 65, art. 2.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 405.

2. With the consent of the patient a competent physician may perform operations on his bodily organs, mutilate him or amputate a limb for the purpose of preserving his life and health, and, providing no danger arises therefrom to health or good morals, employ narcotics (opium or chloroform) in order to deaden or ease pain. In the case of children or mental defectives the necessary consent may be given by the parents or guardians; in the case of unconscious or seriously injured patients consent may be reasonably presumed.⁴

⁴ A. v. Gschmeidler, Der ärztliche Versuch am lebenden Menschen, Vienna 1906.

3. In the interest of the public welfare, the civil authorities have the right and the duty to employ compulsory measures in order to curb immorality and prevent the spread of opinions or views dangerous to society, for instance, to forbid the sale of obscene books and pictures. But this duty binds only when there is a political or moral necessity of taking such measures, i. e., when they are demanded by the common welfare and it is likely that they will produce the desired results. Since spiritual actions cannot be imposed or prevented by physical force, it is advisable at first to employ moral rather than physical means. The truth is strong enough to hold its own against any error.

“Take unto you the helmet of salvation and the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God,” says St. Paul.⁵ On the other hand, whatever does not come from God must die for want of vitality, for “if a council or a work be of men, it will come to nought”; but if it be of God, no human agency can overthrow it.⁶

⁵ Eph. VI, 17.—Cfr. The profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians by Innocent III: “We believe that by disputing and exhorting in every way according to God we ought to confound them and oppose them with the word of the Lord . . . with unfettered brow even unto death.” (See Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 426).—H. Roeren, Die öffentliche Unsittlichkeit und ihre Bekämpfung, Cologne 1906.—Marx, Der Kampf gegen die öffentliche Unsittlichkeit, Freiburg i. B. 1907.

⁶ Acts V, 38.

It must be admitted that physical force used against a man ill accords with his dignity as a human being, and is apt to dull his sense of honor. Nevertheless there may be circumstances in which corporal punishment appears as the only adequate means of retribution, for instance, for brutal crimes. Corporal punishment cannot abolish these crimes, but it usually acts as a deterrent on the criminals, for experience shows that even the most brutal criminals can be accustomed to some sort of order and discipline by whipping or imprisonment. The right of those in authority to inflict corporal punishment, nay, if necessary, even death, corresponds to their duty of protect- ing and defending the community against criminals, as well as to the right of self-defense.

In regard to punishment it is well not to lose sight of the fact, which modern humanitarianism endeavors to obscure, that punishment is primarily and essentially retributive in character, and corrective or deterrent only in a secondary way. Its effect is retrospective rather than prospective, and whatever other function may belong to punishment depends upon and presupposes the retributive or retrospective function. M. Guyau and others, therefore, err in maintaining that if punishment were not corrective, it would be as blameworthy as the crime for which it is inflicted.⁷

⁷ For a discussion of this question see M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 555 sqq.

The milder discipline prevailing in our prisons is undoubtedly a credit to modern civilization, because in inflicting punishment for crime, even though that punishment be primarily retributive and administered in social self-defense, the reformation of the criminal should likewise be kept in view. Besides, it is being recognized that many persons who would formerly have been considered as criminals, are in reality mental defectives and should be treated in special institutions. However, Dr. Ross is undoubtedly right in warning against excessive sentimentality in dealing with criminals. “While humane standards are gratifying,” he says, “there is a danger of sentimentality. There are some vicious criminals who will not respond to kindness, and there are also some men who need to be deterred from committing crimes by fear of condign punishment. Such criminals, whatever their intellectual status, are moral defectives, and if found incorrigible and not amenable to teaching or helping, should be made life prisoners.”⁸

⁸ Christian Ethics, p. 409.—Cfr. Stade, Gefängnisbilder, pp. 205 sqq.; F. Berolzheimer, Die Entgeltung im Strafrecht, Munich 1903, pp. 449 sq., 460.—F. Auer, Zur Psychologie der Gefangenschaft, Munich 1905, pp. 11, 50.—R. Wrede, Die Körperstrafen bei allen Völkern von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart, Dresden 1899.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 108, art. 1, 4; 1a 2ae, qu. 87.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 353 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 266 sqq., 409 sqq.—J. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 202 sqq., 359 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 554 sqq.; Vol. II, pp. 109 sq.

1. MURDER or voluntary homicide (homicidium voluntarium sive praemeditatum), is the unjust, intentional, and premeditated killing of an innocent man.¹ Sacred Scripture numbers this crime amongst those that cry to Heaven for vengeance.²

¹ Ex. XX, 13; XXI, 12; cfr. Matth. V, 21; XIX, 18.—St. Augustine, Epist., 204 (al. 61), n. 5: “That it is not lawful to kill another when no laws or legitimate authorities command it, even one willing and asking for it and now unable to live, is sufficiently shown by the Book of Kings, where King David ordered the killer of King Saul to be killed, although he had said that Saul, already wounded and half alive, had asked him to do this and to release the soul struggling against the bonds of the body and desiring to be set free from those torments by a single stroke of the weapon (2 Kings i, 1–16). Therefore, because everyone who kills a man without any authority of legitimate power is a murderer.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 940).—Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 6, qu. 9: “As regards those who commit killing, plainly no one is excepted—not the rich, not powerful men, not masters, not parents—but, with every distinction and discrimination removed, killing is forbidden to all.”

² Gen. IV, 10; IX, 5 sq.; cfr. Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 6, qu. 14.

Murder, like conscious and voluntary suicide, is an act of criminal interference with the supreme prerogatives of Almighty God (crimen laesae maiestatis divinae), a most grievous sin against justice and charity, and a crime against society.³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 100, art. 5, ad 5; cf. 2a 2ae, qu. 73, a. 3; qu. 122, a. 6, ad 4: “Homicide in itself is not something desirable, but rather something horrible, because it does not of itself have the character of any good.”—Ibid., qu. 47, a. 6, ad 3: “He who kills a man does injury not only to the man killed, but also to God and the commonwealth.”—Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 6, qu. 15: “For murderers are the bitterest enemies of the human race, and therefore of nature; insofar as lies in them, they overthrow the whole work of God when they take away man, for whose sake He testifies that He made all things whatsoever that were created; indeed, in Genesis (v, 9), when it is forbidden that a man be killed because God created him in His image and likeness, he who removes His image from the midst does an extraordinary injury to God and seems as though to lay violent hands upon Him.”

Murder may be either simple or qualified.

Simple murder (homicidium simplex) is the killing of a person towards whom one has merely the general obligations of justice and charity. Qualified murder (homicidium qualificatum) is voluntary homicide aggravated by circumstances which alter the nature or degree of the crime.

Such circumstances are: (a) the position or rank of the victim; (b) the latter’s relation towards the murderer, for instance, of husband to wife, father to child or child to father (parricidium), priest to layman (sacrilegium), ruler to subject (regicidium); (c) the conditions under which the crime is committed, for example, its object and purpose (robbery; latrocinium) or the means used in committing the crime, e. g., poison (veneficium), treachery (homicidium proditorium). All these circumstances increase the guilt of the crime, make it more atrocious and deserving of severer punishment.⁴

⁴ 2 Kings III, 27; 1 Mach. VII, 14–18.

a) The involuntary killing of a human being (homicidium involuntarium), commonly called manslaughter, is usually committed in a moment of passion and is imputable and punishable in proportion to the measure in which the use of free will was not hindered. Infanticide, i. e., the killing of an illegitimate child by its own mother during or soon after birth, is classed as manslaughter by the criminal law of some countries. But as passion does not always diminish imputability, the moralist must judge each case on its own merits. Morally equal to infanticide is the exposure of an infant, i. e., the intentional abandonment of the same in a helpless condition, unless there is the greatest probability that it will be picked up and cared for.

In regard to the killing of babies by their own mothers it should be remembered that this crime is quite often committed under compulsion, rather than voluntarily, for which reason the civil law usually deals with it le- niently. Great excitement, a delirious condition, bodily weakness, loss of blood, pains, the feeling of being deserted, worry about the future, fear of disgrace,—all these and other circumstances may conspire to create an exceptional state of mind in which the responsibility for the crime is realized either not at all, or but dimly.⁵

⁵ Huber, Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, 2nd ed., p. 234, note 1.

b) Accidental killing (homicidium casuale) i. e., homicide not by direct intention, but as a consequence of some dangerous act (voluntarium in causa), is imputable to the agent if he is aware of the danger of killing some one at the time he performs the act, e. g., driving at great speed in a crowded street, handling a gun carelessly, letting dangerous animals run amuck, and so forth. When no such probable danger exists, or when it is not adverted to, casual homicide is not imputable in conscience, although if the act is legally forbidden, even on other grounds than the chance of causing another’s death, and some one is killed by it, the secular law in many countries punishes it as manslaughter.

Accidental killing is committed by physicians, surgeons, and midwives who cause the death of their patients by culpable incompetency or lack of attention; by druggists who through ignorance or carelessness compound deadly medicines; by nurses and attendants who do not give proper care to their patients; by factory owners and mine operators who omit to take reasonable precautions for the protection of their employees and thus become responsible for serious accidents,—in short by all who cause the death of others by acts which, in virtue of their position, profession, or office, they know or ought to know are dangerous to life.⁶

⁶ Ex. XXI, 28 sq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 64, art. 8.—P. G. Antoine, Theol. Mor. Universa, t. III, tr. De Iust. et Iure, P. III, c. 2, qu. 12: “Wholly accidental homicide, namely, that which is voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, is not a sin, indeed not properly homicide, but a simple killing. Because sin is essentially voluntary, therefore that which is voluntary in no way is in no respect a sin. Hence one who kills another in inculpable drunkenness is not guilty of homicide, nor is he bound to restitution, because that killing is not voluntary, either in itself, since the use of reason is absent, or in its cause, namely drunkenness, since this was in no way willed or culpable. It is otherwise if the drunkenness was culpable and the drunk man foresaw or could have foreseen this event, for then the killing is voluntary in its cause and therefore imputable as guilt and damage.”—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 103 sqq.—For an interesting case at law see Pollock, Law of Torts, 8th ed. pp. 48 sqq.

Midwives or nurses who receive children with the silent understanding that they dispose of them, and then let them starve to death, are guilty of premeditated murder, unless their conduct is attributable to carelessness.

The Encyclical treats as a crime all attempts upon the life of the child in the womb of his mother.¹

¹ Pp. 40-42.

It means not only a child whose body is already formed, but also a child in the fetal or embryonic stage, in other words every fertilized ovum. In fact Canon 747 of the Code of Canon Law in prescribing the baptism of every fetus, however small, enjoins that every fetus be treated as a human being.

It includes in the first place feticide, that is the cruel operation which crushes the skull of the fetus or cuts his little body to pieces according to the need for saving the mother. Besides, it includes every direct abortion. Not only the majority of the more modern moral theologians, but the Holy Office itself consider direct abortion as similar to feticide.¹ For abortion

is not merely the placing of a child outside the surroundings which are indispensable for him to live, but it is the violent tearing away of the membranes and tissues by which the child is as it were one with his mother, and through which he breathes and receives nourishment—membranes which, at least in part, belong to him as an organ developed by his own growth. Abortion directly produced is a deadly wound inflicted on an innocent human being.

¹ See the reply of the Holy Office, August 19, 1889.

Catholic teaching is today unanimous in condemning all feticide and all abortion directly produced upon a fetus, unless it be morally certain that he is already dead. Outside of this Catholic tradition, some, holding that the unborn child has no rights,¹ allow the father or mother to decide his fate; others allow feticide only in case of imminent danger, where it is the only way to save the mother's life, or they allow abortion only for very grave medical, social or eugenic reasons. Such a determining reason of a medical nature would be to kill the child in order to solve the conflict which has arisen between the life or health of the mother and the existence of the child. Social reasons are to save the honor and reputation of the mother, or to leave her free to carry on her occupations and gain her livelihood. A eugenic reason is to prevent the birth of children who would be monstrous or idiotic. The idea of the required gravity of the motive is evidently more or less broad, according to the religion or “philosophical convictions” of the doctor or adviser. All of them, however, as the Encyclical goes on to state, demand that the “indication” which in one form or another they defend, be recognized as such by the public law and in no way penalized.² In other words, they insist that the law should conform itself to their theories and distinguish on the one hand between criminal feticide or abortion, punishable by legal penalties, and on the other, therapeutic or medical feticide or abortion, which should be legally authorized. In

fact, already a doctor is in no danger of prosecution as long as he is supposed to have acted according to the dictates of science. Worse still, it sometimes happens that a doctor is forbidden to practise laparotomy (cesarian section) in rural districts, although this operation might save both mother and child, while at the same time he is liable to prosecution for malpractice if he allows the mother to die under circumstances where he might have saved her by directly killing the child.

¹ They consider it as part of the organs of the mother, viscera matris.

² P. 40.

He opposes to them in the first place the peremptory argument embodied in the Divine commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”; and he rejects in passing the futile exceptions which have had a certain vogue. He declares that the right to take away life cannot be appealed to, since even public authority has no such power in the case of an innocent person; nor can the right of self-defense, since there is no question of an aggressor, even materially unjust, and the development of the child, even though it should become a fatal danger to the mother, does not violate objectively any of her rights, nor contain any injustice; nor the right of extreme necessity, since that never goes to the extent of killing a living person. The life of each of the two individuals is equally inviolable. Such a thing as a conflict in which one life might be regarded as of less value than the other, is an impossibility. We must, therefore, conclude with the Encyclical that physicians are bound to try to save both lives, both having an equal value in the eyes of God, the mother’s and the child’s. The physician has no right to set himself up as judge to pronounce a sentence of death. No diploma confers such power, which would exceed that of the most absolute monarch.

When the doctor abstains from interfering, he himself sacrifices no one; whereas if he does interfere by abortion or

feticide, he protects the life of the mother at the cost of committing a homicide. Here is a mere comparison, which we do not offer as an argument: suppose two men, for want

of provisions, are about to die of hunger; is it permissible for the stronger of the two to kill the weaker, in order to take his share of the provisions? That is the act of the physician who kills the weaker, the child, to save the stronger, the mother. If the parity is denied on the ground that in the supposed case the weaker person is not causing to the stronger any direct harm, whereas it sometimes happens that the fetal placenta poisons the mother, we answer in the first place that some good gynecologists have told us that the theory of placental poisoning is being more and more questioned. But suppose even that it is true, and return to our comparison. If the weaker person, forcibly held close to the other, involuntarily exhales a harmful vapor, is his right to life thereby impaired? May the stronger in that case resort to murder to free himself from this unhealthy environment? Besides, is it quite certain that unless an abortion is performed the mother and the child will die? It is very far from certain. There are not wanting cases in which a conscientious physician has saved both mother and child in spite of the medical indication of abortion. The doctor’s verdict is based on probabilities.¹

¹ See in the excellent little book of Dr. Clement, Le droit de l’enfant à naître (Bruges, Beyaert, 6th ed. 1931) the chapter, Vers la suppression de l’avortement thérapeutique.

It is not, when that principle is a saving one, which preserves greater values than those it sacrifices. Now faith in Providence assures us that every principle imposed by the law of God is a conserving force of higher values. In the present instance, one sees, it is true, some very sad, pitiable cases, in which a person dies, who might have been saved by abortion. But does not a more far-sighted vision see also a greater number of lives saved by the rigor of the principle? The severity intensifies the effort to save both lives; and this effort is sometimes rewarded with complete success. At the same time the spirit of invention is stimulated, and

this results in discoveries which render out of date even the medical indication for abortion or feticide. ‘‘Respect for the life of the child,” writes Dr. Clement,¹ “stimulates progress.” Is it not through this means that specialists now declare themselves able to control cases which were formerly despaired of, cases of so-called uncontrollable vomiting?² Let us in addition observe this psychological fact. When a physician who practices medical abortion is attending a woman who is pregnant and ill, everything conspires against the child. What reproaches are in store for the doctor if the mother dies when he had reason to believe he could save both her and the child! But the child, needlessly sacrificed, will make no complaint from beyond the grave! If one could get the statistics, we are persuaded that the number of real victims of medical abortion would be far greater than that of so-called victims who are supposed to have died for having been unwilling to consent to abortion.

¹ Work cited, p. 81.

² See for example one of the studies of Dr. Leven of Paris, Les vomissements au cours de la grossesse. La Médecine, April, 1929, in which he details the treatment which he finds successful. We have also direct assurances of the same fact from other gynecologists. Dr. Leven concludes with these words: “At a time when the birth-rate is so low, the fear of pernicious vomiting should no longer cause dread of pregnancy; nor should avoidable abortions any longer be practised.”

Because the death of the child may be a consequence, not willed, although foreseen and inevitable, of a medical treatment which is permitted in spite of this foreseen consequence. Although we may never do what is evil, still we have neither the obligation nor the power to prevent all evil from happening. We cannot be responsible for an evil consequence flowing from our good actions, when that consequence does not depend on us, and when the motive for acting is in proportion to the evil which is feared. In such cases the evil cannot be imputed to us as willed, because we do not will it; nor as permitted, because by our scrutiny of the reasons for acting, and by the precautions we have taken, we have fully satisfied our positive duty of removing, as far as is humanly possible, the accidental evil consequences of our action.

It is necessary that the abortion be not willed either as an end or as a means, but simply be permitted as occurring in spite of all, through the intervention of a factor which we cannot remove. It is, therefore, not sufficient that in an abortion the only purpose intended be to save the mother, if the abortion is a measure to that end, if the expulsion of the fetus is utilized as a means. In such a case, since the abortion is chosen, it is willed, and is, therefore, direct. Consequently, abortion will be indirect only in case the morbid condition of the maternal matrix requires the immediate removal of that organ, even though this removal necessarily entails the exit of the fetus which is enclosed in the uterus. The abortion, however, would be direct if the womb were to be emptied in order by that means to stop a hemorrhage. It is absolutely direct when it is practised because the mother is affected with tuberculosis or general weakness, or because it is feared that the child will be physically deformed or mentally affected.

It is notorious that in Soviet Russia, notably in Moscow, there is an official Institute where abortion is practised upon any woman who asks for it. About 30,000 abortions a year are performed there. But statistics supply us with precious information on the physical harm caused by these operations. Nature takes her revenge upon these unnatural mothers.¹

¹ Even outside of Russia, are not the statistics of abortion alarming? Take a single example. Already in 1923—and it is no better since then—there were in France 500,000 abortions a year, of which 85 per cent (425,000) were criminal, according to Doctors Pinard and Richet. (Speech of Mr. Zamanski at the Social Congress of Marseilles, 1929.) In Germany there are yearly one million abortions.

On the contrary, efforts and researches which tend to improve the health and vigor of the human race are in themselves praiseworthy. The Holy Father teaches that we may, and should, take account of the findings and recommendations of this science or art.

But the end does not justify the means. One cannot give to eugenics such primacy as to forget the law of God in order to satisfy its demands. On March 21 of this year (1931) the Holy Office, with the approval of the Holy Father, declared that we must absolutely reject and hold as false and condemned by the Encyclical “Casti Connubii” of December 31, 1930, the so-called “eugenic” doctrine, as well “positive” eugenics as “negative,” together with the means which it indicates for the improvement of the human race, by neglecting the laws of nature, of God, or of the Church, concerning marriage and the rights of individuals.¹ The Holy Father takes occasion in this connection to remind public authorities that it is their duty to protect the lives of the innocent, especially of those who cannot defend themselves. To deliver them to death, even at the hands of physicians, is to commit a crime that cries to heaven for vengeance.²

¹ Acta Ap. Sedis, Vol. XXXII, p. 118.

² P. 56.

We must distinguish between abortion (the moralists call it abortion when a child who is not viable is removed) and premature delivery. The latter will be allowed when it is practised at such a time and by such means that under ordinary conditions the lives of both the mother and the child will be provided for.¹

¹ Reply of the Holy Office, May 4, 1898, reply to question 2.

In the first place, the child must be already viable. At present, thanks to artificial incubators the child may be said to be viable after about six months of life within the womb. But this initial viability is a very different thing from full viability which requires at least eight months. Between these two periods viability goes through varying degrees, in which the chances of life are unequal. Moreover, premature delivery is more or less harmful to the child, according to his degree of maturity. Mere viability may not, therefore, always be a sufficient reason for delivering a child of six months. If there is imminent danger, the

operation will be legitimate as soon as the child has a chance to survive. If such a danger is not certain, then its probabilities must be considered, as well as the harm that would result from prolonging the pregnancy; and in the absence of a controlling reason of this nature, one should wait the full eight months. In short, the formula of the Holy Office gives us this rule: Consider the two lives, that of the mother and that of the child, as of equal value; and do what is for the best interests of both, everything considered, and without forgetting that the saving of the mother’s life is a very great benefit to the child himself.

— To the society which perhaps has insured the life of the person killed; to the State or institution which, on account of that homicide, must pay a pension to the children or widow, nothing seems to have to be restored. For the action was not injurious to them. Nor does the response seem to have to be changed if the crime was committed with the intention of obligating the society or the State to pay those monies. For intention can indeed remove the excuse which is sometimes sought from an effect too distant; but it cannot make unjust an exterior action which is not opposed to objective right.

Noldin, II, 466, rather argues from this, that the public treasury and the insurance society perhaps do not urge the obligation of repairing the damage inflicted upon themselves: "for concerning cases of this kind, even if foreseen, nothing is provided in their statutes." That reason seems to us of little efficacy. For another's right which arises from a delict must be satisfied spontaneously, unless positive condonation can be presumed; but no indication of this is demonstrated.

But if someone should have wished, by the death of the insured person, to obtain for himself the promised money, from the contract itself he has no title for obtaining it.

Principle. From the time when the rational soul has been infused, the fetus, even in the womb of the mother, is a person distinct from the mother and equally inviolable. Therefore in no way can it be said to belong to the viscera of the mother, concerning which she may reasonably determine what she wishes. Nor less are the calculations of certain persons to be repudiated, who, comparing the utilities of both lives, that of the mother and that of the offspring to be born, strive excellently to gather which life in the conflict, as they say, is to be immolated.

Corollary. To exercise embryotomy upon a fetus certainly or probably living (by which, either by the head being broken or by the body being cut, it is killed) is never lawful. The contrary sentence cannot safely be taught from the Holy Office, May 28, 1884, and August 19, 1889. For that action is a certain or probable (by probability of fact) homicide of an innocent, which cannot be intended even as a means to the greatest good. Nor is it an obstacle that the loss of life would be slight, because it is never right directly to shorten life, even in the dying. Nor can the fetus which is naturally developed in its own place be held as a materially unjust aggressor.

Grave Doubt. In cases where the safety of the mother altogether requires that the fetus be expelled, and, on account of the narrowness of the opening, it cannot be expelled except by embryotomy, Catholic physicians were accustomed to wait for the moment at which, taught by the stethoscope, they judged the infant dead, so that then, without fault, they might cut its body into parts or bore through the head. But since a recently spread opinion concerning many cases in which death is only apparent seems to defer certainty of death in such a case at least for an hour; since it also happens that in the case of suffocation, artificial respiration seems, as it were, to restore life to those whose heart was already not beating, it is asked whether or not it is lawful for the physician to exercise embryotomy as soon as the heart has now ceased from beatings.

Certainly, if the case tolerated delay, one would have to wait longer. But in the present case the delay would be lethal for the mother. Again, no positive probability is present by which we could say of such an infant: "probably he lives." But the experiment of artificial respiration cannot be attempted.

Therefore, since we cannot be directed by a mere possibility, and the necessity of the mother urges, will there not be someone who judges it lawful that, content with the sign of which there is an abundance, the surgeon hold the infant as dead and treat it as such? We had in mind to propose the doubt rather than to resolve it.

Ferreres, I, 501, II, end, would permit the matter without hesitation, since he thinks the certain right of the mother is to be preferred to the right, as he says, doubtful, of a fetus probably or more probably dead; and Prummer, II, 136, where he has these words: "Sometimes, however, the fetus is not certainly dead, but more probably now does not live. Then also several authors rightly teach that craniotomy is lawful for saving the mother, because a living mother is not bound to give her life for a fetus more probably now dead." Yet rather than there being question of life to be given for the fetus, there is question in the case of conserving one's own life with the death of the offspring if this offspring is living, as is sufficiently probable.

Tolerance of Good Faith. In various words, authors warn that it is to be permitted to the prudence of priests that, in extreme cases which, alas! occur, they not disturb the good faith of the surgeon. For when otherwise the death of the mother is imminent, and the eternal salvation of the fetus has probably been consulted by baptism at least in the womb, the dishonesty of an action which, by suppressing a fetus certainly going to die, saves the mother, is not so evident that it has not been denied or recalled into doubt by certain highest moral theologians, such as C. d'Ann. (II, 284) and Ballerini (Ball.-Gury, I, 403, note 13). And observe that in the present danger of death, abortion would be attempted too late, so that then there can be question only of craniotomy or embryotomy.

Concerning this tolerance of good faith, cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 1002; Noldin, II, 340; Prummer, II, 136; Gennari, Cons. mor., T. I, Cons. 77, where he proves these things from Kenrick, Theol. mor., I, 130: "if the surgeon asks what is lawful, let him answer: 'I do not know how the life of the fetus can be taken away without fault'" (and therefore with mention of the resolutions of the Holy See omitted). If the mother asks what is to be done by her, it seems it must be said that she ought to ask the surgeon to consult the life of the fetus in every way he can.

Notions. 1. Definition. Abortion is defined as the ejection of an immature fetus, or of one which cannot yet live outside the mother; while acceleration of birth, theologically, is the premature expulsion of a fetus which nevertheless can now be brought forth viable. For physicians, abortion is rather the ejection of a fetus not yet formed, whence they understand acceleration of birth more broadly, even of the expulsion of an immature fetus.

Regularly, that a viable fetus may be brought into light, it must be contained in the body of the mother for at least seven months; nor is it expelled before 34 weeks without special danger.

Now, however, by the help of a certain special incubation, some six-month fetuses can be preserved.

2. When the Rational Soul Is Infused. The fertilized little egg morally begins at once to live physiologically for itself. Yet do not thence conclude with several writers of the nineteenth century that immediately also, or from the first moment, the rational soul is infused by God. That immediate infusion of the rational soul, as Prummer, II, 138, notes, cannot be proved by any solid argument. On the contrary, right philosophical teachings concerning the soul, the form of the body, demand, with a miracle excluded, such as followed the conception of Christ, that with St. Thomas, Summa theol., 1 p., q. 76, art. 3, ad 3; q. 118, art. 2, ad 2, and all scholastics, after several Fathers, we hold that this infusion is delayed for some time; and this is confirmed by more recent observations of physiology, entirely different, of course, from those which were admitted in the age of St. Thomas.

Cf. our De Castitate, 3rd ed. Nevertheless, immediate infusion of the spiritual soul remains sufficiently probable that, theologically, the fetus from the first instant must be baptized and treated as a man.

3. What Abortion Is Materially. Observe also that voluntary abortion cannot be described as an action by which the mother ceases to carry the infant otherwise unharmed, and, as it were, places him outside her womb, in a place where, however, with respiration lacking, he cannot live; but "first and per se the living fetus itself is attacked in the same way in which someone whom another pierces with a lethal wound is attacked. For violently to rupture the membranes and the ligaments by which the fetus has grown together with the maternal uterus is in reality nothing other than to inflict a lethal wound upon the fetus" (Lehmkuhl, I, 1008); "it deprives the fetus of the office of the placenta by which he adheres to the mother and receives nourishment and purification of the blood" (Aertnijs-Damen, I, 571).

4. Baptism in the Womb. Not long ago an instrument was invented by which the membranes by which the fetus is covered are so cut that water can be injected by means of a little tube, and in the very womb of the mother a probable baptism can be conferred upon the infant.

5. Medical Causes of Abortion are of three kinds. For either: a) the mother labors under a disease by which she will be cured with more difficulty, or not at all, unless pregnancy is suppressed. An example is pulmonary phthisis; b) or the gestation itself of the uterus brings disease with it. Inexsuperable vomiting is reported as the worst; c) or, on account of the narrowness of the opening, the mother cannot bring forth the mature fetus. This difficulty can not rarely be met either by Caesarean section (cf. 625) or by symphysiotomy. By this latter operation, the fibro-cartilage by which both bones of the pubis are joined is cut; after that cutting has been performed, the opening of the pelvis can be dilated by one or two centimeters.

Moral Judgment. Directly to procure abortion is held as equally illicit as feticide. Thus the classical doctors think; if any seemed to admit an exception, they supposed that the fetus was not yet animated. Thus St. Alph., l. 3, n. 394; thus most more recent authors; thus the Holy Office, which assimilated abortion to an operation directly occisive, which, in any case, it declared could not safely be taught to be lawful, August 19, 1889. Cf. response of July 24, 1895; for example, Analecta Ecclesiastica, III, 483. Concerning the force of the formula "cannot safely be taught," cf. Gennari, Cons. mor., t. I, cons. 77, in which he cites Bucceroni. For to expel an immature fetus, who will not be brought forth viable, is to inflict a lethal wound upon him. But he who has brought upon a man the proximate cause of death contracts the malice of homicide. And even if the fetus is not yet animated by a rational soul, it cannot be directly expelled without contracting a malice similar in genus, but graver in degree, than that which is in pollution or the onanistic use of marriage. For in each case, even if bodily safety is to be procured, a faculty which has been conferred on us immediately on account of the good of the species is directed, in an order inverted from the species, to a singular good. Therefore it is a sin against nature.

Not a few writers, for example Lehmkuhl, I, 1003, condemn direct abortion of a fetus not yet animated by this reason alone, that it is "anticipated homicide." We confess that it is not distinctly grasped by us what force is in that reason. For how is a man killed before he exists? Nor is there any right of a future man. Wherefore by that form of argument the proper malice of that abortion is not declared, unless you add with Aertnijs-Damen, I, 576, that it, more than pollution, is opposed to nature, and thus suggest the reason just given by us.

Before the last responses of the Holy See, some authors otherwise approved, such as Ball.-Palm., II, 910 ff., and Lehmkuhl, I, 818, though not after the seventh edition, in certain most grave cases thought more benignly: either that by the intention of saving the mother the direct nature of abortion was removed, or that the mother could, as it were, cease from conserving the fetus. But since the safety of the mother follows abortion and is obtained through it, an intention of this kind does not remove the direct procurement of abortion; and the mother does not merely cease from conserving the fetus, but by a positive and often difficult effort expels it. It will indeed be able to happen that in an extreme case good faith is not to be disturbed much, yet with insistence that they apply themselves to those operations which preserve the mother and the offspring together, and that they bear solicitous care concerning the eternal salvation of the offspring.

Observe also that for saving the mother in an extreme case there would rather be need, if it were lawful, of craniotomy than of abortion, which, in the present danger of death, would be attempted too late.

Because men of our age are persuaded less by philosophical reasons than by practical ones, it is opportune to show them how the severity of the Holy See spares several human lives, far from being the cause, even per accidens, why more perish. For if, to save the temporal life of the mother, you should say that killing the infant is lawful, this will be exercised even on account of a probable necessity, nor will all things be attempted with the same solicitude for saving both lives. And note that no worldly reprehension will be incurred by a physician who, alleging necessity, kills an infant who could have been saved with the mother; while if the mother dies in a dangerous birth, this death will easily be imputed to the more prudent physician. Therefore by the very utility of his own reputation, the physician will be impelled to follow the safer parts against the fetus, thus immolating many who could have lived with the mother. Experience itself clearly confirms this. Add also that from one excusing cause men are led to admitting others: it is enough to read academic reports to see how broad a field some wish already to lie open to feticide and abortion.

— It will be lawful to accelerate birth whenever, by this reason, better provision is made for the very life of the infant. But that it be done on account of the safety of the mother, it is necessary that it be performed "at that time and in those ways by which, from things ordinarily happening, provision is made for the lives of the mother and the fetus" (Holy Office, May 4, 1898, ad II). The reason is that the will of the infant, where there is question of the danger of his life, cannot be supplied by the parents except so that provision is made for his good and utility; by no means, however, contrary to what Lehmkuhl, I, 1007, judges, so that there be made an act even of indirect immolation of life, which an adult could make from heroic charity. Yet this can be understood somewhat more broadly, because the mother herself is necessary to the infant.

On Caesarean Section. Caesarean section is an incision of the abdomen and uterus of the mother performed for extracting the fetus. Thus, immediately after the death of the mother, Caesarean section will be licit, indeed per se obligatory, for extracting even an immature fetus, who thus is snatched from equally certain and more prompt death and will be able to be baptized. Here again worldly prejudices stand in the way of eternal salvation; and those who were preaching abortion for saving the temporal life of the mother will condemn the cutting open of the dead mother for procuring eternal beatitude for the infant. On account of penal laws today, the priest will be able only to warn the physician and the family of their office. But although absolutely he can with difficulty resist the will of relatives, the physician or surgeon nevertheless possesses in his very skill an authority by which he can perform that operation safely. The best counsel often will be that immediately, asking nothing, he extract the fetus, as though a natural complement of the care promised. If there is morally no hope of baptism, the reason ceases on account of which, even after the death of the mother, the fetus is to be extracted. But in the very womb of the dead mother he will soon perish by asphyxia.

A surgical operation, for instance a Caesarean section, which is necessary for procuring baptism for her infant, per se must be undergone by the mother, even with her own danger, if the baptism which otherwise cannot be conferred is sufficiently certain. For preserving temporal life, she will not have to admit that danger. Since today operations are made much more safely than before, and they bring no true horror to a person put to sleep, the mother is gently to be induced to obey the counsels of an upright physician. Yet we shall beware lest a woman who is foreseen as going to die be placed in bad faith. Therefore often her grave obligation will have to be passed over in silence.

On Ecclesiastical Penalties. "Those procuring abortion, the mother not excepted, incur, the effect having followed, excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Ordinary; and if they are clerics, they are besides to be deposed" (c. 2350 §1). - "They are irregular from delict.... 4° Those who.... have provoked abortion of a human fetus, the effect having followed, and all cooperators" (c. 985, 4°).

They procure abortion who, by physical or moral action, efficacious and with direct intention, bring it about that a fetus not dead is expelled before seven months from conception. By the new law, from c. 2209 §§1-3, those commanding, and those furnishing positive and necessary cooperation, such as physicians, are comprehended by the censure; also those who, on account of a further good end, exercised an illicit abortion. Concerning the cooperation of a pharmacist who merely sells a potion, it will be more difficult to establish that it was necessary. The mother herself is no longer immune from censure. Yet one who has yielded to grave extrinsic fear escapes the censure. - But the censure is incurred from the moment at which the fetus is ejected, from the means applied. - If someone repents before the effect has followed, so that he has received absolution, he seems immune from the censure, which cannot now accede to the sin as accessory. If otherwise, without use of the sacrament of penance, he sincerely has grieved, today from can. 2209 §5 compared with 2229 §3, he seems to be held by the censure (cf. also c. 2231).

N. B. In interpreting the present censure, certain authors, although they wrote after the Code, seem to have passed over canons 2209, 2229-2231. Thus Pighi, Curs. theol. mor., l. 3, nn. 551, 552.

Craniotomy, although graver in itself, since it is plainly distinct from abortion, is not affected by this censure.

But irregularity today receives the same interpretation as the censure. Cooperators, however, seem to be positive cooperators only (from c. 2231), although Cerato (Censurae vigentes, n. 161, p. 229) also comprehends negative cooperators. Cf. Gen., I, 634; Pighi, l. 3, n. 602. But those who have exercised craniotomy do not escape irregularity from homicide.

— Indirect abortion, on account of a grave and proportionate cause, is admitted by all. For then another good effect is intended or chosen, which can be obtained by no other way, and the expulsion of the fetus is actively permitted.

But "in practice it is not always easy to discern whether a certain medical action is a direct or indirect killing of the fetus" (Prummer, II, 141). That it be indirect, no utility can be sought from the expulsion itself of the fetus, as such, or from the grave wound inflicted upon it.

Cases. 1. Therefore a mother affected by a lethal disease can use necessary remedies which, at the same time as they cure the disease, induce the danger of abortion; the very uterus morbidly affected, which cannot be tolerated longer without danger of life, can be taken away from her. And these things are certain.

2. But is it lawful, for replacing the uterus, to evacuate the liquid of the amnion? This is controverted. Certainly incision of the amnion is the most usual mode of procuring abortion. But, in the case, the incision is not made so that abortion may follow, but so that the uterus, which by its collapse brings the mother into danger of life, may be restored to its place. Hence you would say the matter is lawful. Yet a difficulty again arises from this, that that liquid is contained by a membrane which pertains to the fetus. Therefore the incision seems to have the nature of a lethal wound. Wherefore the matter is disputed, and the negative parts seem truer, unless, by an incision or puncture prudently made, by which only a part of the liquid flows out, the abortion itself can probably be avoided and follows only per accidens. And similar difficult cases can arise where the fetus itself seems to exercise an action positively and gravely harmful.

3. Therefore if, by new increases of science, similar difficult cases are proposed where the fetus itself, not simply as fetus, but, for example, as morbid, seems to exercise an action positively and gravely harmful, nothing is to be established precipitately, but the case is to be subjected to serious examination, with the principle always firm that no utility can legitimately be obtained through an action directly occisive as through a means.

132. - Most men alienated from the faith do not defend honorable morals in the matter of chastity in such a way as to exclude every exception from the rules which in themselves they approve and establish. Wherefore, if at any time conception is prohibited by health, if at any time the wife will be unable to bring forth a living fetus without danger, they will permit, or even advise, artificial sterility, indeed abortion or embryotomy, resting openly or tacitly upon these principles: that necessity is immune from law; that all things are to be weighed not by an absolute but by a relative rationale; and that accordingly, in individual actions, one must consider what prevails and what is to be preferred.

133. - They can be answered thus, in brief but efficacious words. Moral uprightness has either an absolute command or one subordinated to this condition: unless great difficulty excuses transgression. An absolute obligation suffers no exception; but a conditional one will consequently be tempered by exceptions in every kind of uprightness. For no reason can be alleged why it would lose its force only in the subject of chastity and when offspring is at issue. What, therefore, if the physical state of the body, or a prolonged separation, should prohibit even imperfect conjugal intercourse? Will they dispense the healthy spouse from the obligation of fidelity? What, moreover, if the gravest harm threatens unless a theft is committed? Very few indeed will admit this, and rightly and deservedly so, on account of the absolute dictate of conscience. But this dictate is general and ought to prevail in every moral matter. Indeed, do they not celebrate as the fruit of the most atrocious war which raged for more than four years the fact that the rationale of right is acknowledged to be absolutely inviolable and can no longer be passed over on account of an alleged excuse of necessity? Will not all confess that there are duties, for example of devotion to the fatherland, on account of which life itself is to be held of no account? Can they, therefore, without absurdity deny such force and efficacy to moral duties that, in order to observe them, less than life itself - a certain delight and pleasure of life - must sometimes be subordinated?

"What kind of philosophy is this," the pagan writer Cornelius Tacitus was already vigorously exclaiming, "which would not bring about the destruction of moral gravity, but would be content with a mediocrity of vices?" ¹.

¹ Annals, 14, 38.

But they deny that there is anything absolute for man, since he himself is wholly relative.

Yet, if man is constituted by an essential relation to God, and if all the things of this world are contingent and subject to relative considerations, nevertheless God is absolute, and by His authority He confirms and sanctions the absolute precepts of the moral order.

Yet we freely admit this: when faith in God has been lost and the hope of a future life has been cast aside, those accidental contrarieties between the honorable and the pleasurable lack a sufficient explanation, and the commands of absolute uprightness cannot be perceived well. But for us they assume the excellent form of divine worship and obedience by which we humbly acknowledge the dominion of God.

Nevertheless, all sensible men feel that nothing is more worthy of man than that, besides the impediments which he is forced to obey physically, so that he must confess, "I am unable," he should equally revere the moral impediments on account of which, without any exception, in private and public life, he says, "I cannot."

But the more vehement the venereal appetite is accustomed to be, the more the firmness of a purpose of this kind honors a man and renders him strong and capable of accomplishing great things.

What of the fact that difficulties concerning the begetting of offspring most often flow from the imprudent levity with which marriages are entered, while consideration of vocation or aptitude is neglected? Shall we say that it is lawful for a man to redeem his fault at the expense of uprightness? On the contrary, will it not be obtained by moral vigor, as a thing greatly to be desired, that marriages be celebrated more circumspectly, with greater happiness for the spouses and for their stock, between persons who are well suited?

Therefore let this be settled and deliberate for us: pleasure, perfect copulation, and solicitude concerning the offspring, if any is born from it, are so joined by nature that it is never lawful to tear these apart in the mind and to admit one while repudiating the others.

134. - But at the same time, to the best of our abilities, we shall procure that parents deter from matrimony a daughter unequal to the burdens of conjugal life, and that they nourish their offspring physically and morally from tender years in such a way that it may become of itself fully capable of matrimony.

It is also to be desired that young men be less solicitous concerning the dowry of a bride than concerning her physical and moral suitability.

For this is among the desires of nature: that those insufficiently suited abstain from matrimony and aspire by another road toward a holy fecundity of good works.

The practical questions which occur in the pastoral ministry and regard Embryology appear to be of a twofold kind: some immediately regard Embryology itself; others have a special relation to the ministration of the sacrament of Baptism. Yet all these cannot be rightly understood unless altogether accurate physiological notions are sufficiently present. Hence, in the proemium of this little work, from the natural sciences we briefly add a general description concerning the mode in which the fetus is developed, lives in the maternal uterus, and is born from it; just as we also recall to mind the principles of moral theology from which the solutions of diverse cases in practice are to be sought.

Moreover, the questions to be treated can be reduced to the following:

I. Questions regarding embryology itself:

1. Physiological notions concerning the uterine life of the fetus and its development and birth;
2. Concerning the theological principles to be invoked in embryological questions;
3. Concerning incisions which injure the mother;
4. Concerning embryotomy, or concerning incisions which injure the fetus;
5. Concerning the procuring of abortion;
6. Concerning artificial premature birth;
7. Concerning ectopic or extrauterine fetuses.

II. Embryological questions which have relation to the ministration of Baptism:

1. Concerning theological principles regarding the matter of Baptism;
2. Concerning theological principles regarding the form of Baptism;
3. Concerning the baptizing of the unborn in the uterus of the mother;
4. Concerning the baptizing of immature fetuses;
5. Concerning the baptizing of monsters;
6. Concerning those to be rebaptized under condition.

I. Embryology is a rather recent science.¹

¹ Cf. Miller, Embryology, 4th ed., New York, 1921.

In the year 1600 Fabricius ab Aquapendente wrote the book On the Formed Fetus, and four years later another, On the Formation of the Fetus.

In 1651 Harvey established the principle: Every living thing is from a living thing; but he thought that the egg was formed in the wall of the uterus under the action of the sperm. He wrote the work Exercises on the Generation of Animals, in which he describes an embryo of two days' incubation.

In 1672 Regnier de Graaf discovered eggs in mammals, as he says, or rather the vesicles containing them. Hence he sets forth the principle, Every living thing is from an egg, in the book On the Organs of Women Serving Generation.

Van Leeuwenhoek (or perhaps his disciple L. Hamm) discovered nemasperms in 1677: the male semen is not a mere fluid, but contains mobile filaments.

Cangiamila published in 1745 in Italian, and in 1758 in Latin and more extensively, the celebrated work Sacred Embryology; in 1755 Wolff wrote On the Theory of Generation.

In 1827 von Baer discovered the human ovule, and in the work On the Egg in the Genesis of Animals and Man he describes the egg, the yolk, and the vitelline membrane. Semen consists, as it were, of little animals, which after the manner of animals consist of a head and tail and move themselves; these he calls zoosperms or spermatozoa.

Prévost and Dumas, in 1824, demonstrated the intervention of nemasperms in fertilization. About the same time the germinal vesicle was discovered by Coste and Purkinje (1834), and the germinal spot by Wagner (1836).

From the year 1840, several men, such as Pander, Kolliker, and Reichert, applied the cellular theory. Kolliker himself and Virchow (in the year 1855) established the principle: Every cell is from a cell, every nucleus from a nucleus. In 1841 Kolliker discovered the origin of zoosperms, namely, from the transformation of the testicular cell, but thought them to be incomplete cells; in 1865 Schweigger and Le Valette asserted them to be complete cells.

In 1843 Barry discovered sperm in the ovule, not acting at a distance, as de Graaf had thought; in 1879 Fol detected its penetration into the ovule; in 1861 Gegenbaur showed the ovule to be a true cell.

Thus all the elements essential to the forming of the fetus are now scientifically known.

Now embryology investigates the formation of the embryo and all the phases which the fetus passes through in its development up to perfect birth.

II. The moral and pastoral questions concerning embryology pertain per se to the matter of justice, and sometimes per accidens to the matter of chastity: per se, namely, to the fifth precept of the Decalogue; per accidens, for example, when an operation is performed to impede conception or generation, also to the sixth.

But that these questions may be understood, it is necessary to possess sufficient notions of physiological science concerning the manner in which the fetus is formed and developed in the maternal uterus, lives there, and is born from it. These we set forth briefly in the little work Questions on Embryology and the Ministration of Baptism, I, q. 1.

For the solution of the questions, however, it is necessary to have recourse to certain theological principles, which we recalled to mind in the said little work, I, q. 2.

Some operations and incisions are performed during pregnancy or childbirth, and properly and immediately regard embryology itself; others are performed at an earlier time to impede pregnancy and childbirth, and these can be called by the one name sterilizations. Hence we shall speak:

I. On operations during pregnancy or childbirth, especially:

1. On Caesarean section and other incisions which injure the mother;
2. On embryotomy, or on incisions which injure the fetus;
3. On the procuring of abortion, which acts upon the mother and the fetus at the same time;
4. On operations concerning ectopic fetuses.

II. On sterilization, especially:

1. On the morality of private sterilization;
2. On the morality of sterilization to be imposed by public authority;
3. On cooperation in sterilization.

To these will be added an appendix on the marriage of sterilized persons.

I. Therefore, in practice:

1. If a woman exhibits an internal tumor whose nature cannot be known, first of all the physician must do nothing and await the time when it can more easily be diagnosed. But if it is a fetus, the time when he is viable must be awaited in order to perform the laparotomy; otherwise, without any cause of necessity, the operation would tend toward injury to the fetus.

2. If the presence of a living fetus is certain and rupture of the cyst is near, perhaps bringing the death of mother and fetus, excision of the cyst is licit if there is hope of saving the fetus who is certainly or probably viable; otherwise it is illicit. In the first case a good effect immediately follows, namely, to repel the danger to the mother, and indeed probably to the offspring also, although the infant could perish indirectly. In the other case the infant is immediately and directly killed, and the danger to the mother is mediately averted. Thus it would be if excision were performed before the completion of the sixth month after conception.

3. If, however, some organ of the mother were diseased or infected, or a tumor independent of the fetus and not formed from him brought danger to the mother, these could be directly removed even if per accidens or indirectly they brought with them the expulsion of the fetus. In that case Baptism would immediately have to be conferred upon the fetus, since he might soon die.

4. On the contrary, if the existence of the fetus is even only truly and solidly probable, it is illicit to act upon the cyst, for example, by removal, electrical current, or morphine injection, because from these operations the certain death of the infant follows directly and per se, and only through it the safety of the mother. Moreover, the Baptism of the infant is rendered impossible.

5. If, by waiting until the fetus is viable, danger to the life of the mother is greatly feared, and the presence of the fetus is not yet known by ordinary indications, nor are there any positive or probable signs of his presence, nor are there means for resolving this doubt, laparotomy could perhaps appear probably licit, because the presence of the fetus is in no way probable but only negatively doubtful, while the danger to the mother is certain. For even in these grave circumstances we are not bound to attend to altogether slight probabilities, or mere possibilities or hypotheses, but a negative doubt, as founded upon nothing, is to be disregarded.¹ Hence the cyst then appears capable of being considered as a mere tumor which proceeds from another cause; and thus it is not directly intended to injure the fetus, of whose presence no sign is or can be had, but directly to remove the tumor, from which the cessation of danger to the mother follows immediately, although the death of the infant could follow indirectly and afterward, if he nevertheless exists.

¹ In this sense are to be understood those things which we proposed less clearly in little work A, I, q. 7, n. I, 2.

II. How the physician is to proceed.² The procedure is watchful waiting. So long as the cyst, by growing normally and regularly, affords signs of life, or so long as this is probable, one must wait until the normal term of nine months, or until the term when the fetus is certainly viable, in order to extract him. But let the waiting be accompanied by vigilance, so that, in a case of premature rupture, the physician is prepared to intervene. For this purpose the mother can be instructed concerning the indications of this rupture, or, better, she can be placed under observation in a hospital or clinic. Thus an unnecessary operation would not be performed in a case in which the fetus dies or is resorbed; at the same time the viable fetus is preserved and there is a possibility of bringing him to maturity; finally, the danger is reduced to a minimum because the mother remains under the vigilance of the physician or is even placed under observation. For in a case of rupture, hemorrhage rarely brings death to the mother if it is diagnosed in time; hence there is no compelling necessity to forestall or prevent hemorrhage.

² Cf. Capellmann-Bergmann, op. cit., 19th French ed., p. 54; Dr. Vincent, in Dr. Clément, Le droit de l'enfant à naître, pp. 69–71.

III. Observations.

1. Judgment concerning the opportuneness or necessity of the operation in the concrete pertains to the physician, given the liceity of the operation; but judgment concerning the liceity of the operation, even in the concrete, and concerning the necessity of this operation in order that it can be licit, pertains to the theologian.

2. In the question of the ectopic fetus, as in the matter of abortion, the principles have suffered a certain obscuring, both because of a less clear and less firm manner of proposing doctrine, and because of the laxer manner of thinking of certain theologians. From a desire to reduce obligations to a minimum, to excuse, or to permit many things and leave as much liberty as possible to physicians, so that their conscience may remain in tranquillity, they remain silent about the doctrine, or do not urge it, or propose it as somewhat doubtful, or even attempt to treat it as a matter of opinion. But this occurs to the detriment of truth and morality. Moreover, judgment concerning liceity and morality is not to be left to physicians; indeed, it pertains to the good of physicians that the matter not depend upon their own judgment, but, so that they may be able to resist depraved solicitations, they must be able to oppose to them the conscience of an honorable man and the immutable prohibition of the moral law.

3. Let physicians remember that their office is to preserve life and to heal, not to destroy, and indeed the life of the infant as well as of the mother; each has an equal right, equally to be preserved.

4. In the preceding pages we rejected several solutions without formally saying that they are unsafe in practice. Do not conclude from this that they are not certainly false or improbable, and therefore can be put into practice, as someone has thought.³ On the contrary, by the fact that we opposed sound reasons and sufficiently responded to the contrary arguments, the probability of the impugned solution of itself thereby vanishes, and it follows that it is not secure and is not to be employed in practice, unless the contrary is expressly noted.

³ Payen, op. cit., ch. XVIII, §3, n. 4.

131. Principle 1. Never and for no one is it lawful directly to kill the innocent.

It is proved. No one except God alone has full dominion over the life and death of man, as has already been said. Therefore no one can dispose concerning the life of man except insofar as he is delegated by God. Now God indeed gave to the supreme civil power the delegated power of killing malefactors, since this is necessary for the common good of society; but He never conceded the power of killing even the innocent, because this would not only not be useful, but would be very harmful to human society. Indeed God commands most strictly: "You shall not kill the innocent and just."¹⁶² Wherefore it is a most grave sin to kill, for example, hostages, legates, especially infants not yet born, those lethally wounded, the old, the sick, the dying, lest they suffer longer, etc.

The killing of the innocent is a sin crying to heaven.¹⁶³ To such an extent does God detest homicide in Sacred Scripture that He says He will demand back even from beasts the penalty of the slaughter of men,¹⁶⁴ and commands the beast which has struck a man to be killed.¹⁶⁵ Deservedly the Roman Catechism says:¹⁶⁶ "They are murderers of the human race and therefore most bitter enemies of nature, who, as much as lies in them, overthrow the whole work of God, since they take away man, on whose account He testifies that He made all things whatever which have been created; indeed truly in Genesis, since man is forbidden to be killed because God created him to His image and likeness, he who takes away His image from the midst seems to bring an outstanding injury against God, and as it were to bring violent hands against Him."

The killing of the innocent can be either simple homicide, namely when a man not marked out by a special dignity or relation is killed; or qualified homicide, when the killing puts on a special malice. Qualified homicides are, for example, parricide, i.e., the killing of a parent, spouse, or child; regicide, i.e., the killing of a king; sacrilege, i.e., the killing of a priest or another religious person; robbery-homicide, i.e., homicide done from thirst for money or another material good; assassination, i.e., homicide done by contract, etc.

Whether and in what way an obligation of restitution arises from homicide or mutilation will be said below, n. 204 sqq.

¹⁶² Ex. 23, 7.

¹⁶³ Cf. Gen. 4, 10.

¹⁶⁴ Gen. 9, 5.

¹⁶⁵ Ex. 21, 28.

¹⁶⁶ Part 3, c. 6, q. 9.

132. Principle 2. From a proportionately grave cause it is lawful to do or omit something indifferent in itself, from which, besides the intention, the death of an innocent person follows.

It is proved. In that case all the conditions are had for licitly placing a cause from which a double effect follows: one good, the other bad.

Hence, for example, in a just war it is lawful to direct warlike cannons against a city, although many innocent persons are killed; it is lawful to administer a necessary medicine to a pregnant mother, even if perhaps from it abortion and the death of the fetus will follow; it is lawful to hand over an innocent person whose life a tyrant demands; it is lawful to pierce through an innocent child whom an unjust aggressor has placed before himself, lest he himself be wounded. The reason is that in all these cases nothing else is directly intended except the preservation of one's own life, from which indirectly follows the death of the innocent person, to whom injury is inflicted by the tyrant alone or by the unjust aggressor alone.

It is not lawful to throw an innocent person into the sea in order to lighten a boat too much burdened and otherwise about to perish, nor to throw a child before pursuing wolves, who otherwise would devour both father and child. The reason is that in these two cases there is no unjust aggressor by reason of whom the innocent person ought to renounce his life.

Whether it is lawful to trample with a horse a child sitting on a narrow bridge, if there is no other way for saving life? Several authors answer affirmatively. Thus, for example, Busembaum says in St. Alphonsus:¹⁶⁷ "If you cannot flee death, with an enemy pursuing, except by a narrow way in which someone sitting there would have to be crushed, it is nevertheless lawful (provided nevertheless, if he is an infant, he has been baptized, as Cardinals Lugo and Escobar warn) to flee with his danger and destruction, beyond your intention."

But it seems better that the answer should be made with a distinction: If that danger of death has been caused to me by an unjust aggressor at least materially, it is lawful to act thus, because then the injustice of that aggressor redounds upon me and upon the child, and I can free myself by every means from such injustice; but if no injustice is present and the danger of death happens to me either from a just cause or from a physical cause, it is not lawful thus to crush the innocent person. For otherwise also abortion and craniotomy of the infant would be licit if the life of the mother cannot otherwise be preserved. Yet this is false, as will be said below. Hence, for example, if I cannot flee from a burning house except by trampling an infant, this is not lawful. The reason is that the infant has the same right to life as I do, nor am I excused on account of defense against an injustice inflicted upon me, because in reality no one has inflicted an injury upon me. Likewise one justly condemned to death, fleeing from the hands of the officers, cannot licitly trample a child coming in his way, even if otherwise he is again captured by the officers and punished with certain death.

The killing of the innocent in present times especially has place in the procurement of abortion and in the so-called craniotomy. Hence these must be treated specially.

¹⁶⁷ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 393.

There must be said: 1. concerning the killing of an innocent person in general; - 2. concerning the procuring of abortion.

The killing of an innocent person, by reason of imputability, is either voluntary directly or indirectly, or involuntary or casual.

Indirect killing supposes an action licit in itself, from which, beyond the intention, by accident, death follows. Casual killing supposes the action to be in itself rarely dangerous, and proportionate diligence to have been used. If the action is frequently dangerous and killing follows from it, it can no longer be said that casual killing is present, although some diligence was observed.

738. • Principles. I. Direct killing of an innocent person is never licit, unless from the special permission of God. For since the dominion of life belongs to God alone, such killing is intrinsically evil, and is prohibited by divine law (Exod., 23, 7): Thou shalt not kill the innocent and just. Cf. III, 393.

Hence: 1. It is not licit to kill hostages lethally wounded, nor any other dying persons, lest they suffer longer; nor rabid persons, lest they harm others, when they can otherwise be restrained from harming.

2. It is not licit to kill an innocent person in order to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death under penalty of the overthrow of a city, and this even if the innocent person should consent to his own death; because he does not have dominion over his own life. Nevertheless, more probably, he can be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good; and, if he is unwilling, even to be handed over as guilty, since from charity and legal justice he is held to expose his life for the republic (cf. n. 483). H. Ap., VIII, 21.

3. Physicians, midwives, guardians of infants and of the sick sin gravely if from their grave negligence they either do not impede their death, or cause or accelerate it.¹ Likewise, if from gravely culpable ignorance they furnish harmful things to the sick.

4. It is not licit for those sailing, tossed at sea and escaping from shipwreck in a skiff, in order to lighten the skiff, which otherwise they fear is about to sink, to cast into the sea any except those who, descending last into the skiff, are the cause why it is about to sink (Konings, n. 473, 6).

739. • II. Indirect killing of an innocent person is licit, the things to be posited for indirect voluntary having been posited. It is licit to posit a cause about to have immediately two effects, one good and the other evil, intending only the good and permitting the evil, provided there is present a sufficient reason proportioned to the evil effect about to follow (cf. n. 315). See III, 398, 1.

Hence: 1. If someone sitting on a horse cannot avoid assassins unless he flees through a narrow road where a child is found about to be crushed, he can pass, provided the child is baptized. 2. In war it is licit to direct war machines toward a besieged city, even if innocent persons are foreseen as about to perish. Cf. the case in the periodical Linz. Quart. Schr., 1898, p. 94. 3. It is licit to baptize with cold water a child soon about to perish, although from this his death is accelerated (VI, 106).

740. • III. Casual killing of an innocent person is not a sin. The reason is that such homicide is involuntary.

Hence: 1. A cleric is excused from homicide and does not become irregular who by chance should kill a man while applying himself to the hunting of wild beasts, otherwise prohibited to him, if he used due diligence. 2. But they are guilty of homicide who strike a pregnant woman with the heel, or terrify her, from which abortion happens; parents suffocating an infant in bed; men slaughtering a man by casting stones with a sling for the sake of playing. 3. He is guilty of homicide who posits an action of itself and commonly dangerous, from which death frequently follows; for homicide of this kind is voluntary in the cause, as we said above. Cf. III, 398.

Corollary. From these things it is understood why the operation which is named PUNCTURE OF THE HEART must be reprobated. Indeed the intention of those who demand it arises from compassion; they fear lest one who is believed dead be buried alive. But is not such a mode of acting true homicide of an innocent person, in the case in which life has not yet entirely departed? Therefore to demand this operation absolutely, in every event, is directly to intend evil. Nevertheless the physician would not sin if he performed this puncture after he had known from undoubted signs that death had truly occurred. Noldin, II, n. 339; Linz. Quart. Schr., vol. 54 (1901), p. 122.

St. Alphonsus, III, 394; ed. G., I, p. 644; H. Ap., VIII, 22; Lupellus, de Castit., I, p. 348; Antonelli, Med. past., II, de 5 Praec., de Bapt., de Usu Matrim.; Eschbach, disp. III and IV, in the work Disput. physiol.-theol.; Berardi, Capellmann, Olfers, Surbled, and many others.

Things to be noted beforehand. 1. Conception of the fetus. According to physicians, ordinarily conception by no means concurs with copulation; indeed most often it occurs with several hours or days intervening. - 2. Animation of the fetus. That the fetus from the beginning of conception, or at least after some days, is informed by a rational soul, St. Alphonsus already taught (VI, 124), and today it is commonly admitted.² Yet the matter is not proved by an altogether certain argument. Cf. Antonelli, Eschbach, l. c. - 3. Viability of the fetus. The fetus after the seventh month of pregnancy is, as they say, viable, so that, without proximate danger of destroying it, it can be drawn forth to light. In the case in which they use artificial incubation, couveuse artificielle, the fetus could be drawn forth from the completed sixth month without proximate danger. It belongs to the physician to judge concerning viability in individual cases. - 4. Ectopic being of the fetus. Although ordinarily the fetus lives in the uterus of the mother, sometimes it can happen that pregnancy occurs outside the maternal uterus: then ectopic fetuses are had. - 5. Life of the fetus. It is established by experience, and because of reasons taken from embryology it must be admitted, that the fetus in the uterus of a dead mother can live for some time.

741. Definition. Abortion is the ejection from the uterus of an immature fetus. Thus in the Constitution Effraenatam of Sixtus V.

Division. Abortion, by reason of imputability, is voluntary or casual. Voluntary is direct or indirect. Abortion is procured directly if deliberately, from whatever operation, an immature fetus is expelled; but indirectly, if a cause is posited acting of itself on the mother, but from which detriment can arise for the fetus, for example a bath, venesection, a remedy by which the health of the mother is consulted. All these things can produce contractions in the muscular coverings of the maternal uterus.

Note. Physicians directly procure abortion for several causes: if, the mother being ill, birth is foreseen as difficult; if, although the mother is healthy, she cannot give birth because of narrowness without danger, etc. Sometimes also through diverse operations, concerning which below, they directly attack the life of the fetus, afterward intending to expel it lifeless. It is plain that that very evil mode of acting cannot be called abortion properly so called, although, as regards the gravity of the crime, it is not less than abortion; see Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1911, vol. 43, p. 599.

742. Principles. I. Direct abortion is never licit. The reason: homicide, whether real or attempted, will never be licit. But if the fetus is animated, real homicide is committed, and indeed the more atrocious because soul and body at once are cast into ruin. But if the fetus is said not yet animated, this always remains: that there is danger lest a man truly endowed with spiritual life be killed. Therefore attempted homicide is had. Therefore Innocent XI rightly condemned the 34th proposition: "It is licit to procure abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl detected as pregnant be killed or defamed." Cf. Response of the Holy Office, 4 May 1898, ad 2, where the Decree of 25 July 1895 concerning the illicitness of abortion is confirmed. Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 31 (1899), p. 276; Anal., VI, 277.

Hence: 1. They are guilty of homicide: a) Those who so strike or terrify a pregnant woman that abortion follows. - b) Likewise pregnant women who, with grave imprudence, posit a proximate cause of abortion in various ways, say by washing the feet in cold water, carrying heavy burdens, indulging a violent commotion of mind, etc.³

2. Probably an oppressed woman does not commit sin who at once expels the seed emitted while she resisted. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 1013. - St. Alphonsus (III, n. 394; ed. G., I, p. 647; VI, n. 954) holds the contrary opinion. But there he supposes as certain what moderns often and more often think to be little probable: namely that conception happens immediately after emission. Indeed it cannot be denied that conception can happen at once, and therefore an unmarried woman who sinned voluntarily cannot expel the seed; but for the woman invaded the right of repelling aggression prevails.

3. Certainly they commit homicide who induce a falsely colored acceleration of birth, whether through puncture of the membranes or in another mode, at that time when the fetus certainly is not viable.⁴ For this is equivalent to direct killing, just as we are said truly to kill a fish if we draw it from the water. Thus from the grave Response of the Holy Office, 25 July 1895. After this Decree, let the controversy among authors have an end. Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 27, p. 599.

743. • II. Indirect abortion is sometimes licit.

It is said: 1. Indirect, that is, coming beyond the intention from an ambiguous action, for example by supplying to the mother a medicine indeed salutary to her, but dangerous to the offspring, as we have explained.

2. Sometimes, namely if the conditions from the indirect voluntary are present, and indeed: a) the remedy is of itself and directly curative of the illness; - b) another cannot be used; - c) provision is made for the extreme spiritual necessity of the fetus, as it can be provided.

The proposition is proved: The indirect voluntary, in which we are here, under due cautions, is no sin. The two prior conditions are required of themselves. The later condition here must necessarily be expressed, since charity and piety oblige the mother to prefer the spiritual life of the offspring to the health of her own body. - Now, abortion truly does not deprive the fetus of the hope of Baptism when, the remedy having been omitted, it would certainly die with the mother, or when it is hoped that it will be brought forth alive into the light, and therefore can be baptized, or finally if in fact it can be baptized in the uterus. - It is plain besides that it is licit to take such a remedy if the danger of abortion is equal whether it is taken or not: the condition of the fetus is not made worse from it (III, 394; H. Ap., VIII, n. 26).

Note. 1. Let the physician not be too anxious as regards medicines to be furnished to mothers. For it is morally impossible, the mother perishing, that the offspring can survive for a long time, unless the mother is near birth, or the disease is very brief (Antonelli, l. c.).

2. Nevertheless attention must be given to the cautions which we indicated above in the case in which, so that he may consult the mother, he wishes to diminish the volume of a sufficiently mature fetus (Lehmkuhl, I, 1009).

3. If the fetus is only probably viable, the timorous physician will wait, insofar as can be done, for the certain maturity of the fetus. But if from delay the danger for the mother or for the offspring becomes greater, it is sufficiently probable that acceleration of birth is licit. The reason: in a desperate case it is licit to use a doubtful remedy (cf. n. 84), the more so because here there is not lacking hope of conserving the fetus alive, which otherwise would be constituted in the highest danger.

744. • Corollaries. In our times, so that the very intricate question of very difficult and dangerous birth may be solved, physicians have recourse to various operations, in which, from the end of the one operating, the safety of the mother alone is sought, with no or almost no respect had to the rights of the infant. Of these: 1. certain ones directly offend neither the mother nor the fetus, for example compression of the abdomen, puncture of the membranes, by which birth is accelerated; - 2. others directly touch the fetus, as craniotomy and similar ones; - 3. finally others directly touch the mother, as symphysiotomy, Caesarean section, laparotomy, the Porro operation. It is licit to designate the whole series of these operations by the name: medical abortion.

The operations of the first genus we have already called back under the scales. Concerning others, some things. The hinge of the question is in this, that we see whether these operations can or must be reduced to direct or indirect abortion.

I. CRANIOTOMY, or EMBRYOTOMY. It consists in the perforation of the skull of the infant, and extraction of the cerebral mass. - Supposing that the fetus is not certainly dead, it is a most grave sin, even if it appears as the only remedy of saving the mother. For it is an action of itself and directly killing, and, since it is inflicted on an innocent person, intrinsically evil; nor can it ever be made honorable by the intention of saving the mother. Nor let it be said: only the death of the infant, otherwise certainly about to die, is accelerated; for is not this acceleration of death, willed in itself, although not for itself, true homicide? - Nor let the fetus be equated with an unjust aggressor: for one who from the sole natural course of things, for example a man infected with plague, becomes the cause of death to another cannot be held as an unjust aggressor. Whence, on 19 August 1889, the Holy Office declared: in Catholic schools it cannot safely be taught that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is licit, as was declared on 28 May 1884, and any surgical operation directly killing the fetus or the mother carrying it. These things were confirmed by the Decree of the same Holy Office on 25 July 1895. Cf. A. S. S., vol. 17, p. 601.

Note. To this operation must be assimilated and therefore condemned the mode of acting of those who attempt directly to extinguish an ectopic fetus, concerning whose presence there is certainty, by injection of morphine or by applied electrical force (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 1011).

II. CAESAREAN OPERATION. It consists in incision of the uterus, to this end that the fetus can be drawn out. This operation, which formerly they named difficult, barbarous, today is often performed by physicians, and indeed happily, while the mother is living, so that more or less 90 percent of mothers are saved. Cf. the things which Antonelli, Eschbach, and Capellmann narrate in the cited works.

A double question can be posited: 1. Whether it is licit for the mother to permit such an operation? - 2. Whether the mother is held to this?

To the first one must respond thus: It is licit if on the one side, because of her robust constitution and the skill of the surgeon, the danger of death becomes only remote, and on the other side hope shines out that the life of the offspring, both temporal and spiritual, can be consulted. But it is not licit if the danger of death as regards the mother appears proximate or truly probable, because such a danger must be equated with death (VI, 106; ed. G., III, p. 84). See the cited Response of the Holy Office, year 1898, ad 2 and 3.

To the second it must be said that if there is present a founded hope of drawing out the infant viable, of itself, from the precept of well-ordered charity, the mother is obliged to undergo the operation, which in our times, as we said, no longer remains an extraordinary means (cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 758, note, where he cites St. Alph., II, n. 26, 27); and even if it is supposed extraordinary, is not the eternal salvation of the infant worth so much? (cf. above n. 483). Yet let the prudent confessor see whether, with the natural horror of the mother toward such operations standing, the intimation of this obligation can be urged.

Note. a) What we said concerning the licitness of this operation can equally and under the same cautions be affirmed of SYMPHYSIOTOMY, by which narrowness of the pelvis must be removed through the cutting of the cartilage joining two bones. - For the rest, Antonelli adds (II, n. 94) that this operation and another similar one are not approved so commonly by surgeons.

b) The same must be said concerning LAPAROTOMY, by which a tumor is cut out so that an extrauterine fetus can be drawn out, or concerning the PORRO OPERATION, by which the uterus and ovaries are cut out. The Holy Office declared, 4 May 1898, that all these things are licit, provided that serious and opportune provision is made for the lives of both the fetus and the mother (Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 31, p. 276). The Holy Office confirmed these previous Decrees on 5 May 1902 (ibid., vol. 45, p. 161).

c) The pregnant woman having died, nothing prevents the Caesarean operation from being performed. In this case a strict obligation urges. But whatever some have said, it is certain that the priest is not obliged to this. The Holy See expressly declared that on 15 Dec. 1899, confirming the things which it had already prohibited on 15 Feb. 1780 (A. S. S., vol. 32, p. 503). Cf. Antonelli, II, n. 103.

III. DOUBTFULLY PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. Three very difficult cases are especially given, in which the licitness of the operation is not established: 1. The uterus of a pregnant woman sometimes prolapses and cannot be reduced except through puncture of the covering, so that the amnion flows. But from this abortion certainly follows. 2. Sometimes also the very uterus of a pregnant woman is so infected by malignant tumors, or in a healthy uterus such tumors are formed, that the health of the mother can be restored only by removal of the whole uterus. But removal of the uterus, in the case, unhappily draws with itself the extraction of a fetus perhaps immature. 3. Finally sometimes, in the case of extrauterine conception, the tumor will cast the mother into highest risk, and, if the organs rupture, into certain death; which seems to render removal of the tumor necessary.

Concerning the three aforesaid cases, there is no consensus of authors. There are not lacking those who think that puncture, removal, in the case in which the fetus is immature, is not licit, according to the Decree of the Holy Office, 5 May 1902, in which the Eminent Fathers refer themselves to the Response of 4 May 1898 cited above. But others judge that discussion of direct abortion cannot be instituted here, but of abortion which is procured only indirectly; and that the excusing cause is the highest and certain risk of life in which the mother is placed. Nevertheless all agree in this, that these things are in no way licit as long as true and certain danger for the mother does not exist. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 1011, who says the Response of the Holy Office of 1902 lacks pontifical approval; Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 44 (1912), p. 590; vol. 45 (1913), p. 154; Antonelli, II, n. 110.

745. • CONCERNING PENALTIES IMPOSED ON THOSE PROCURING ABORTION. I. From canonical right they are the following: 1. Papal excommunication reserved to the Ordinary (cf. n. 1349). Nevertheless those do not incur this who commit the crime of craniotomy. Cf. Noldin, de Poenis eccl., n. 93; Linz. Quart. Schr., 1910.

2. Irregularity, if nevertheless the fetus is animated (cf. n. 1946). 3. Inability for ecclesiastical titles, which is incurred ipso facto, but probably can be removed by the Bishop. 4. Privation of benefice, office, etc., but after a sentence declaratory of the crime (III, 395-397).

II. From civil right this crime is punished with grave imprisonment. Cf. French Penal Code, a. 317; Italian, a. 381; German, a. 218, 219, 220; Spanish, a. 425-428. It happens more and more often that physicians indiscriminately consider all those things which happen in birth, for rescuing the mother from certain death, as necessary consequences of their function.¹

Practical rules. 1. Good faith can be given concerning the licitness of medical abortion, whether in parents, or in mothers, or in physicians. The confessor, if he is not asked, should speak prudently concerning these matters: for his admonition, for the most part useless, indeed frequently harmful to those to be admonished, will become so, since it draws with it danger of formal sin. Asked by a physician, let him reprove the operation as illicit, yet without always making mention of the prohibition of the Church. - Asked by a mother, in many cases he will satisfy his function if he exhorts her that she herself say to the surgeon, in the best mode by which she can, that the life of the infant must be consulted. Let him not impose on the mother without consultation that she refuse the operation, nor indiscreetly manifest the prohibition of the Church. Yet sometimes, for example if a physician not very scrupulous advises a falsely colored acceleration of birth for avoiding inconveniences that are not grave, the confessor cannot be silent (Card. Gennari, Cons. mor., t. I, n. 77; cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 45, 1913, p. 160 seqq.). 2. Physicians, especially if they are called unexpectedly, often are placed in a state of perplexed conscience. Therefore they must be judged according to the rules fitting this state, and, if fruit is hoped, admonished and instructed. 3. Sisters of Charity, if some hospital proper to them exists, are held to choose truly upright men. If the manner of acting, on the part of the physician, is less conformable to the Decrees of the Holy See, they are not held to resist his work, unless in the case in which his intention of prevaricating would evidently disclose itself (S. Poen., 7 July 1911; Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 44, 1912, p. 35 and Rev. Eccl. de Metz, 1911, p. 588).

472. Principles. - I. It is never licit directly to kill an innocent, whether by private authority or public, even for procuring the public good; for it is an intrinsically evil action and expressly prohibited by divine law.⁴ The innocent and just you shall not kill.⁵

II. It is licit, on account of a grave cause (that is, equal to the life of the innocent), to posit an honest action from which, beyond the intention, the death of an innocent follows, according to the principle of St. Thomas set forth at n. 461.

III. He is not guilty of homicide who, even without cause, but with diligence applied, posits an action which of itself does not bring death, from which nevertheless by accident homicide follows; because that homicide is altogether fortuitous and involuntary. But otherwise, if he posits an action which of itself brings death, or is very dangerous, and from which death often follows, even if diligence has been applied for preventing damage.¹

473. You will resolve. - 1° It is not licit to kill those lethally wounded, nor any other moribund persons whatever, lest they suffer longer; nor those who are rabid, lest they harm others, provided they can otherwise be held back from harming. The reason is that according to the known maxim evils are not to be done in order that goods may be obtained.

2° It is not licit to kill an innocent in order to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death even under penalty of a city to be overthrown, and even if he consented to his own death; the reason is that he does not have dominion over his own life. Yet more probably he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good, and probably, if he were unwilling, even to be handed over. St. Alphonsus² with others.

3° It is licit in war to direct artillery against the stations of enemies, although from this even some innocents are going to suffer death; because their death follows beyond the intention.³

4° It is not licit to kill envoys or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the faith given, and have unjustly killed hostages or envoys sent to them; because they are innocent. - Busembaum, and others commonly with St. Alphonsus.⁴

5° Physicians, midwives, and guardians of infants and the infirm sin gravely if, from grave negligence, they either do not impede, or cause, or accelerate their death. Likewise if from gravely culpable ignorance they furnish harmful things to the sick.

6° It is not licit for those voyaging, tossed at sea and escaping from shipwreck in a skiff, for the sake of lightening the skiff, which otherwise they fear is to be sunk, to throw into the sea any others than those who, last descending into the skiff, are the cause why it is to be sunk.

Abortion is the lethal expulsion of the ovum, embryo, or fetus from the maternal womb. Mar.

474. Principles. - I. It is never licit directly to procure abortion, even if the fetus were supposed to be still inanimate; which supposition today, especially now that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the B. V. M. has been proclaimed, lacks foundation.⁵ The reason is that if the fetus is animated, it is homicide properly so called; but if it is not animated, it is anticipated homicide. For the fetus even not animated is ordered to forming a man; therefore its ejection is anticipated homicide. St. Alphonsus,¹ Lacroix.²

II. Sometimes it is licit indirectly to procure abortion, or better, to permit it, namely by administering to a mother laboring under grave disease remedies harmful to the fetus, if the following conditions concur, namely 1° that there is question of a lethal disease; 2° that the remedies harmful to the fetus are directed of themselves to curing the disease; 3° that there is no hope of procuring for the fetus eternal life through Baptism. But hope of this sort can be absent in a twofold case: namely in the earlier days of conception; or where it is morally certain that the fetus, when the mother dies, will die at the same time or before. - St. Alphonsus,³ Lacroix,⁴ Billuart.

III. It is licit to give to a pregnant woman who is ill remedies suitable for curing diseases, even if sometimes abortion could follow. The reason is that it is clear from experience that abortion very rarely follows from ordinary remedies, at least most of them. - Thus commonly.

475. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is embryotomy, or the killing of an infant in the mother's womb, ever licit?

Resp. 1° It is certainly illicit, if either by a Caesarean operation, of which in the Treatise on Baptism, one can certainly consult the life of the infant and probably also of the mother, or if the fetus is soon to perish, and, its natural death having been awaited and it then extracted, some hope still probably remains of saving the mother. For where the good effect can be had from a certainly licit cause, it is illicit to use a cause concerning the liceity of which at least there is doubt.

Resp. 2° Since embryotomy is an action of itself or directly killing, but the direct killing of an innocent is licit in no case ever, embryotomy, although the sole remedy remains by which the life of the mother can certainly be provided for, cannot be permitted. And this is the common sentence of Theologians. Cf., if you please, Acta⁵ and Revue des sciences ecclés.⁶

Quaer. 2° Is at least the so-called medical abortion ever licit, or the acceleration of birth before the completed 28th week of gestation induced by art?

Resp. It is controverted. There are those to whom it seems the direct killing of an innocent, because from the very acceleration of birth before the seventh month of gestation the death of the fetus ought to follow of itself; for before that time it cannot live outside the mother's womb; therefore to extract it from that womb is the same as positively depriving it of precisely that thing without which it cannot live. Those who think the contrary say that in this case the fetus is only removed from a place in which it cannot live longer, and is placed in another in which it cannot continue life for long; wherefore they permit that acceleration of birth if the conditions are present of which in n. 474. II. Adhering to the former with Capellmann,¹ we apply the following admonition of Kenrick concerning embryotomy also to the acceleration of birth. If the mother asks what is to be done by her, it seems one must say that she ought to beg the surgeon to consult the life of the fetus in every way that he can.² (a) p. 469.

476. You will resolve. - 1° It is licit to expel a dead fetus, because the expulsion is no longer lethal. - Likewise, in the very violent oppression it will be licit to impede conception, yet not to expel a fetus actually already conceived.³ (b) p. 430.

2° It is not licit for a pregnant girl to take medicines (although these are generally taken in vain) for expelling the fetus, lest she lose reputation, because abortion would be directly intended. This is also clear from proposition 34 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

3° It is licit for a physician to furnish a remedy of itself ordered to curing the disease of the mother, if it is certain that, the remedy not being given, both the mother otherwise will die, and the fetus will be extinguished without Baptism; for thus both the mother and the fetus are helped in the better way in which they can be helped; but most rarely will there be certainty concerning both. But if the danger of abortion is equal, whether the remedy be taken or not, it is licit to apply it; because without greater danger to the offspring the life of the mother is consulted. - But if the danger becomes greater from the medicine, certainly one must proceed cautiously, since it is not lawful, in order to protect temporal life, positively to expose one's neighbor to the danger of eternal death. Yet it must be noted that, in order that this prohibition urge, there ought to be present a reasonable hope of saving the life of the offspring after the death of the mother, not indeed that a slight and most remote hope suffice; but most rarely does the offspring survive the pregnant mother. Hence the physician should weigh the circumstances conscientiously, yet not scrupulously.¹

4° They are homicides who strike a pregnant woman, or terrify her, so that abortion follows. Likewise pregnant women who with grave imprudence in various ways posit a proximate cause of abortion, for example by giving attention to excessive labors, by carrying heavy burdens. In both cases foresight of the danger is required.

5° A fortiori those girls are guilty of homicide who, pregnant from fornication, apply repeated attempts to try for abortion, by potions, jumps, burdens, strong striking and compression of the belly, etc. ... When women of this sort confess, they are to be questioned about abortion desired or attempted carefully, but not abruptly.

359. Thesis II. Direct killing of the innocent is a most grave sin, injurious not only to God and society, but also to one's neighbor. - It is proved: For by its own nature it contains a threefold injustice:

a) against God, whose dominion it violates, since He is the owner of human life and of the human body; whence it is never licit directly to kill an innocent person, unless God commands;

b) against society, which it unjustly deprives of the utility of one of its members, while it is unwilling;

c) against one's neighbor, whom, while unwilling, it deprives of the use of the greatest temporal good, which is the foundation or condition of every other good.

Whence also it is prohibited by divine law: Exod. XX, 13: You shall not kill; or more explicitly, XXIII, 7: "The innocent and just you shall not kill, because I abhor the impious."

Hence it is unjust: 1) to kill lethally wounded persons, old men, the sick, the dying, lest they suffer longer, or directly to hasten their death; likewise to kill madmen, lest they harm others, unless here and now they cannot otherwise be restrained, for then they are unjust aggressors; or also in shipwreck to cast some companions into the sea so that the rest may be saved;

2. to kill a mother placed in extremities, so that the infant can be baptized; but she herself, if her life can be hoped for, must undergo the operation so that the infant may be baptized;

3. to kill ambassadors or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept given faith, indeed have killed other hostages: for they are innocent;

4. to kill infants or directly hasten their death from whatever motive;

5. to ask for or perform puncture of the heart upon a deceased person, namely, to puncture the heart or open an artery in him who is reputed deceased, lest perhaps he be buried alive if death is not entirely certain, because this is to expose oneself to the danger of killing a man.³

³ To the question whether it is licit, by mandate of public authority, directly to kill those who, although they have committed no crime worthy of death, nevertheless on account of psychic or physical defects can no longer benefit the nation, and are judged rather to burden it and to obstruct its vigor and strength, the Holy Office recently responded: In the negative, since it is contrary to natural right and positive divine right (27 Nov. - 2 Dec. 1940).

Gentlemen:—In my first lecture I proved to you the existence and the binding power of a higher law than that of human legislators, namely, of the eternal law, which, in His wisdom, the Creator, if He created at all, could not help enacting, and which He is bound by His wisdom and justice to enforce upon mankind.

We are next to consider what are the duties which that higher law imposes upon the physician. In this present lecture I will confine myself to one duty, that of respect for human life.

A duty is a bond imposed on our will. God, as I remarked before, imposes such bonds, and by them He directs free beings to lead worthy lives. As He directs matter by irresistible physical laws, so He directs intelligent and free beings by moral laws, that is, by laying duties or moral bonds upon them, which they ought to obey, which He must require them to obey, enforcing His commands by suitable rewards and punishments. Thus He establishes and enforces the moral order.

Now the duties He lays upon us are of three classes. First, there are duties of reverence and honor towards Himself as our sovereign Lord and Master. These are called the duties of Religion, the study of which does not belong to Medical Jurisprudence. The other classes of duties regard ourselves and our fellow-men, with these we are to deal in our lectures.

I. Order requires that the meaner species of creatures shall exist for the benefit of the nobler; the inert clod of earth supports vegetable life, the vegetable kingdom supplies the wants of animal life, the brute animal with all inferior things subserves the good of man; while man, the master of the visible universe, himself exists directly for the honor and glory of God. In this beautiful order of creation, man can use all inferior things for his own benefit.

This is what reason teaches concerning our status in this world; and this teaching of reason is confirmed by the convictions of all nations and all ages of mankind. The oldest page of literature that has come down to us, namely, the first chapter of the first book of Holy Writ, lays down this same law, and no improvement has been made in it during all subsequent ages. Whether we regard this writing as inspired, as Christians and Jews have always done, or only as the testimony of the most remote antiquity, confirmed by the acceptance of all subsequent generations, it is for every sensible man of the highest authority.

Here is the passage: “God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness; and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that creepeth upon the earth.” And later on in history, after the deluge, God more explicitly declared the order thus established, saying to Noe and his posterity: “Every thing that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herbs have I delivered them to you.” But He emphatically adds that the lives of men are not included in this grant; they are directly reserved for His own disposal. “At the hand of every man,” He says, “will I require the life of man.”

All things then are created for man; man is created directly for God, and is not to be sacrificed for the advantage of a fellow-man. Thus reason and Revelation in unison proclaim that we can use brute animals as well as plants for our benefit, taking away their lives when it is necessary or useful to do so for our own welfare; while no man is ever allowed to slay his fellow-man for his own use or benefit: “At the hand of every man will I require the life of man.”

II. The first practical application I will make of these general principles to the conduct of physicians is this: a physician and a student of medicine can, with a safe conscience, use any brute animal that has not been appropriated by another man, whether it be bug or bird or beast, to experiment upon, whatever specious arguments humane societies may advance to the contrary. Brute animals are for the use of man, for his food and clothing, his mental and physical improvement, and even his reasonable recreations. Man can lawfully hunt and fish and practise his skill at the expense of the brute creation, notwithstanding the modern fad of sentimentalists. The teacher and the pupil can use vivisection, and thus to some extent prolong the sufferings of the brute subject for the sake of science, of mental improvement, and intelligent observation. But is not this cruelty? and has a man a right to be cruel? No man has a right to be cruel; cruelty is a vice, it is degrading to man’s noble nature. But vivisection practised for scientific purposes is not cruel. Cruelty implies the wanton infliction of pain: there are people who delight in seeing a victim tortured; this is cruelty or savagery, and is a disgrace to man. Even to inflict pain without benefit is cruel and wrong; but not when it is inflicted on the brute creation for the benefit of man, unless the pain should be very great and the benefit very small. Certainly it is right to cultivate habits of kindness even to animals; but this matter must not be carried to excess.

The teaching of humane societies condemning all vivisection is due to the exaggeration of a good sentiment and to ignorance of first principles. For they suppose that sufferings inflicted on brute animals are a violation of their rights. Now we maintain that brute animals have no rights in the true sense of the word. To prove this thesis we must explain what a right is and how men get to have rights. A right is a moral claim to a thing, which claim other persons are obliged to respect. Since every man has a destiny appointed for him by his Creator, and which he is to work out by his own acts, he must have the means given him to do so. For to assign a person a task and not to give him the means of accomplishing it would be absurd. Therefore the Creator wants him to have those means, and forbids every one to deprive him of those means. Here is the foundation of rights. Every man, in virtue of the Creator’s will, has certain advantages or claims to advantages assigned him which no other man may infringe. Those advantages and claims constitute his rights, guaranteed him by the Creator; and all other men have the duty imposed on them to respect those rights. Thus rights and duties are seen to be correlative and inseparable; the rights lodged in one man beget duties in other men. The same Creator that assigns rights to one man lays upon all others duties to respect those rights, that thus every free being may have the means of working out its Heaven-appointed destiny.

Thus it is apparent that rights and duties suppose free beings, persons; now an irrational animal is not a person; it is not a free being, having a destiny to work out by its free acts; it is therefore incapable of having duties. Duties are matters of conscience; therefore they cannot belong to the brute animal; for it has no conscience. And, since rights are given to creatures because of the duties incumbent on them, brute animals are incapable of having rights. When a brute animal has served man’s purpose, it has reached its destiny.

III. But it is entirely different with man: there is what we may call an infinite distance between man and brute. Every man is created directly for the honor and service not of other men, but of God Himself: by serving God man must work out his own destiny—eternal happiness. In this respect all men are equal, having the same essence or nature and the same destiny. The poor child has as much right to attain eternal happiness as the rich child, the infant as much as the gray-bearded sire. Every one is only at the beginning of an endless existence, of which he is to determine the nature by his own free acts. In this infinite destiny lies the infinite superiority of man over the brute creation.

That all men are equal in their essential rights is the dictate of common-sense and of sound philosophy. This truth may not flatter kings and princes; but it is the charter of human rights, founded deeper and broader in nature and on the Creator’s will than any other claim of mankind. As order requires the subordination of lower natures to higher, so it requires equality of essential rights among beings of the same nature. Now all men are of the same nature, hence they have all the same essential rights.

If any people on earth must stand by these principles, certainly the American people must do so; for we have put them as the foundation-stones of our civil liberty. There is more wisdom than many, even of its admirers, imagine in the preamble to our Declaration of Independence; upon it we are to base the most important rights and duties which belong to Jurisprudence. The words of the preamble read as follows: “We hold these truths as self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” I feel convinced, gentlemen, and I will take it for granted henceforth, unless you bring objections to the contrary, that you all agree with me on this important point that every man has a natural right to his life, a right which all other men are solemnly bound to respect. It is his chief earthly right. It is called an inalienable right; by which term the fathers of our liberty meant a right which under no circumstances can be lawfully disregarded. A man who takes it upon himself to deprive another of life commits two grievous wrongs: one towards his victim, whose most important right he violates, and one towards God, who has a right to the life and service of His creatures. “Thou shalt not kill” is a precept as deeply engraven on the human heart by reason itself as it was on the stone tables of the Ten Commandments by Revelation.

So far we have chiefly considered murder as a violation of man’s right to his life. We must now turn our attention to God’s right, which the murderer violates. It may indeed happen that a man willingly resigns his right to live, that he is tired of life, and longs and implores for some one to take it away. Can you then do it? You cannot. His life does not belong to him alone, but to God also, and to God principally; if you destroy it, you violate God’s right, and you will have to settle with Him. God wills this man to live and serve Him, if it were only by patient endurance of his sufferings.

For a man may be much ennobled and perfected by the practice of patience under pain and agony. Some of the noblest characters of history are most glorious for such endurance. The suicide rejects this greatness; he robs God of service and glory, he rebels against his Creator. Even Plato of old understood the baseness of suicide, when he wrote in his dialogue called “Phædon” that a man in this world is like a soldier stationed on guard; he must hold his post as long as his commander requires it; to desert it is cowardice and treachery; thus, he says, suicide is a grievous crime.

This being so, can a Doctor, or any other man, ever presume to contribute his share to the shortening of a person’s life by aiding him to commit suicide? We must emphatically say No, even though the patient should desire death: the Doctor cannot, in any case, lend his assistance to violate the right and the law of the Creator: “Thou shalt not kill.”

I have no doubt, gentlemen, that some of you have been saying to yourselves, Why does the lecturer insist so long upon a point which is so clear? Of course, none of us doubts that we can in no case aid a patient to commit suicide. My reason for thus insisting on this matter is that here again we are dealing with a living issue. There are to-day physicians and others who deny this truth, not in their secret practice only, but, of late, to justify their conduct, they have boldly formulated the thesis that present apparent expediency can lawfully be preferred to any higher consideration. Here is the fact. At a Medico-Legal Congress, held in the summer of 1895, Dr. Bach, one of its leading lights, openly maintained it as his opinion that “Physicians have the moral right to end life when the disease is incurable, painful, and agonizing.”

What his arguments were in support of his startling proposition, I have not been able to learn. But I know that a cry of horror and indignation has gone up from many a heart. Many have protested in print; but unless, on an occasion like this, moralists raise their voice against it with all the influence which sound principles command, the saying of Dr. Bach may at least shake the convictions of the rising generation of physicians. The only argument for Dr. Bach’s assertion that I can imagine—and it is one proceeding from the heart rather than the head—is that it is cruel to let a poor man suffer when there is no longer hope of recovery. It is not the Physician that makes him suffer; it is God who controls the case, and God is never cruel.

He knows His own business, and forbids you to thwart His designs. If the sufferer be virtuous, God has an eternity to reward his patient endurance; if guilty, the Lord often punishes in this world that He may spare in the next. Let Him have His way, if you are wise; His command to all is clear, “Thou shalt not kill.”

One rash utterance, like that of Dr. Bach, can do an incalculable amount of harm. Why, gentlemen, just think what consequences must follow if his principle were, admitted! For the only reason that could give it any plausibility would be that the patient’s life is become useless and insupportable. If that were a reason for taking human life away, then it would follow that, whenever a man considers his life as useless and no longer supportable, he could end it, he could commit suicide. That reasoning would practically justify almost all suicides. For, when people kill themselves, it is, in almost all cases, because they consider their lives useless and insupportable. Whether it results from physical or from moral causes that they consider their life a burden, cannot, it seems to me, make any material difference; grief, shame, despair are as terrible sufferings as bodily pains. If, then, we accept Dr. Bach’s principle, we must be prepared for all its baneful consequences.

IV. But are there no exceptions to the general law, “Thou shalt not kill”? Are there no cases in which it is allowed to take another’s life? What about justifiable homicide? There are three cases of this nature, gentlemen; namely, self-defence, capital punishment inflicted by the state, and active warfare. With only one of these can a physician, as such be concerned or think himself concerned. He is not a public hangman executing a sentence of a criminal court; nor is he acting as a soldier proceeding by public authority against a public foe. As to the plea of self-defence, it must be correctly understood, lest he usurp a power which neither human nor divine law has conferred upon him.

1. Self-defence. It is a dictate of common-sense, already quoted by Cicero as a universally received maxim of Jurisprudence in his day, that it is justifiable to repel violence by violence, even if the death of our unjust assailant should result. In such a case, let us consider what really takes place. A ruffian attempts to take away my life; I have a right to my life. I may, therefore, protect it against him; and, for that purpose, I may use all lawful means. A lawful means is one that violates no law, one that I may use without giving any one reasonable ground of complaint. Suppose I have no other means to protect my life than by shooting my aggressor; has he a right to complain of my conduct if I try to do so? No, because he forces me to the act; he forces me to choose between my life and his. Good order is not violated if I prefer my own life: well-ordered charity begins at home. But is not God’s right violated? It is; for God has a right to my life and to that of my assailant. The ruffian who compels me to shoot him is to blame for bringing both our lives into danger; he is responsible for it to God. But the Creator will not blame me for defending my life by the only means in my power, and that when compelled by an unjust assailant, who cannot reasonably find fault with my conduct.

But it may be objected that no evil act may be done to procure a good result, that a good end does not justify a bad means. That is a correct principle, and we will consider it carefully some other day. But my act of necessary self-defence is not evil, and therefore needs no justification; for the means I employ are, under the circumstances, well-ordered and lawful means, which violate no one’s rights, as has just been shown. Of course the harm I do to the aggressor is just only in as far as it is strictly necessary to defend the inalienable right I have to life or limb or very valuable property. Hence I must keep within the just limits of self-defence. To shoot an assailant, when I am in no serious danger, or when I can free myself some other way, or when I act through malice, would not be self-defence, but unjustifiable violence on my part.

2. The principles that make it lawful for a man to defend his own life with violence against an unjust assailant will also justify a parent in thus defending his children, a guardian his wards; and in fact any one may forcibly defend any other human being against unjust violence. A parent or guardian not only can, but he is in duty bound to, defend those under his charge by all lawful means. Similarly the physician would be obliged to defend his patient by the exercise of his profession in his behalf.

Now the only case in which the need of medical treatment against unjust aggression could become a matter for discussion in Jurisprudence is the case of a mother with child. Is the child under those circumstances really an unjust aggressor? Let us study that important case with the closest attention. Let all the rays of light we have gathered so far be focussed on this particular point. Can a physician ever be justified in destroying the life of a child, before or during its birth, by craniotomy or in any other manner, in order to save its mother’s life, on the plea that the child is an unjust assailant of the life of its mother? Put the case in a definite shape before you. Here is a mother in the pangs of parturition. An organic defect, no matter in what shape or form, prevents deliverance by the ordinary channels. All that medical skill can do to assist nature has been done. The case is desperate. Other physicians have been called in for consultation, as the civil law requires before it will tolerate extreme measures. All agree that, if no surgical operation is performed, both mother and child must die. There are the Cæsarian section, the Porro operation, laparotomy, symphysiotomy, all approved by science and the moral law. But we will suppose an extreme case; namely, the circumstances are so unfavorable for any of these operations—whether owing to want of skill in the Doctors present, or for any other reason—that none can safely be attempted; any of them would be fatal to the mother.

In this extreme case of necessity, can the Doctor break the cranium of the living child, or in any way destroy its life with a view to save the mother? If three consulting physicians agree that this is the only way to save her, he will not be molested by the law courts for performing the murderous operation. But will the law of nature and of nature’s God approve or allow his conduct? This is the precise question under our consideration. We have seen that the infant, a true human being, has a right to live, as well as its mother. “All men are created equal, and have an equal right to life,” declares the first principle of our liberty. The Creator, too, as reason teaches, has a clear right to the child’s life; that child may answer a very special purpose of Providence. But whether it will or not, God is the supreme and the only Master of life and death, and He has laid down the strict prohibition, “Thou shalt not kill.”

Now comes the plea of self-defence against an unjust aggressor. If the child is such, if it unjustly attacks its mother’s life, then she can destroy it to save herself, and her physician can aid the innocent against the guilty party. But can it be proved that the infant is an unjust aggressor in the case? There can be no intentional or formal guilt in the little innocent babe. But can we argue that the actual situation of the child is an unjust act, unconsciously done, yet materially unjust, unlawful? Thus, if a madman would rush at me with a sharp sword, evidently intent on killing me, he may be called an unjust aggressor; though, being a raving maniac, he does not know what crime he is committing, and is formally innocent of murderous intent. Materially considered, the act is unjust, and I can defend myself lawfully as against any other unjust assailant. Such is the common teaching of moralists. But can the innocent babe be classed in the same category with the raving maniac? Why should it? It is doing nothing; it is merely passive in the whole process of parturition.

Will any one object that the infant has no right to be there at all? Who put it there? The only human agents in the matter were its parents. The mother is more accountable for the unfortunate situation than the child. Certainly you could not, to save the child, directly kill the mother, treating her as an unjust assailant of her child’s life? Still less can you treat the infant as an unjust assailant of its mother’s life.

The plea of self-defence against unjust aggression being thus ruled out of court in all such cases, and no other plea remaining for the craniotomist, we have established, on the clearest principles of Ethics and Jurisprudence, that it is never allowed directly to kill a child as a means to save its mother’s life. It would be a bad means, morally evil; and no moral evil can ever be done that good may come of it; the end cannot justify an evil means. In theory all good men agree with us that the end can never justify the means. But in practice it seems to be different with some of the medical profession. Of late, however, the practice of craniotomy and all equivalent operations upon living subjects has gone almost entirely out of fashion among the better class of physicians.

Allow me, gentlemen, to conclude this lecture with the reading of two extracts from articles of medical writers on the present state of craniotomy in their profession. You will find them in accord with the conclusions at which we have arrived by reasoning upon the principles of Jurisprudence.

Dr. W. H. Parish writes (“Am. Eccles. Review,” November, 1893, p. 364): “The operations of craniotomy and embryotomy are to-day of relatively infrequent occurrence, and many obstetricians of large experience have never performed them. Advanced obstetricians advocate the performance of the Cesarian section or its modification—the Porro operation—in preference to craniotomy, because nearly all the children are saved, and the unavoidable mortality among mothers is not much higher than that which attends craniotomy. Of one hundred women on whom Cesarian section is performed under favorable conditions and with attainable skill, about ninety-five mothers should recover and fully the same number of children. Of one hundred craniotomies, ninety-five mothers or possibly a larger number will recover, and of course none of the children. The problem resolves itself into this: Which shall we choose—Cesarian section with one hundred and ninety living beings as the result, or craniotomy with about ninety-five living beings?”

Even if a liberal deduction be made for unfavorable circumstances and deficient skill, the results, gentlemen, will still leave a wide margin in favor of Cesarian section. My second extract is from an article of Dr. M. O’Hara, and it is supported by the very highest authorities (ib. p. 361): “Recently [August 1, 1893] the British Medical Association, the most authoritative medical body in Great Britain, at its sixty-first annual meeting, held at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, definitely discussed the subject before us. In the address delivered at the opening of the section of Obstetric Medicine and Gynecology, an assertion was put forth which I regard as very remarkable, my recollection not taking in any similar pronouncement made in any like representative medical body. The authoritative value of this statement, accepted as undisputed by the members of the association, which counts about fifteen thousand practitioners, need not be emphasized.

“Dr. James Murphy (‘British Medical Journal,’ August 26, 1893), of the University of Durham, made the presidential address. He first alluded to the perfection to which the forceps had reached for pelves narrowed at the brim, and the means of correcting faulty position of the fœtus during labor. He then stated: ‘In cases of great deformity of the pelvis, it has long been the ambition of the obstetrician, where it has been impossible to deliver a living child per vias naturales, to find some means by which that child could be born alive with comparative safety to the mother; and that time has now arrived. It is not for me to decide,’ he says, ‘whether the modern Cesarian section, Porro’s operation, symphysiotomy, ischiopubotomy, or other operation is the safest or most suitable, nor yet is there sufficient material for this question to be decided; but when such splendid and successful results have been achieved by Porro, Leopold, Saenger, and by our own Murdoch Cameron, I say it deliberately and with whatever authority I^† possess, and I urge it with all the force I can master, that we are not now justified in destroying a living child; and while there may be some things I look back upon with pleasure in my professional career, that which gives me the greatest satisfaction is that I have never done a craniotomy on a living child.’”

You will please notice, gentlemen, that when this distinguished Doctor said, “We are not now justified in destroying a living child,” he was speaking from a medical standpoint, and meant to say that such destruction is now scientifically unjustifiable, is a blunder in surgery. From a moral point of view it is not only now, but it was always, unjustifiable to slay a child as a means to save the mother’s life; a good end cannot justify an evil means, is a truth that cannot be too emphatically inculcated. This is one of the most important subjects on which Medical Jurisprudence has been improved, and most of its text-books are deficient. The improvement is explained with much scientific detail in an address of the President, Samuel C. Busey, M.D., before the Washington Obstetrical and Gynecological Society (“Am. Journal of Obstetrics and Diseases of Women and Children,” vol. xvii. n. 2).

Abortion, gentlemen, is the theme of my present lecture.

I. An important point to be determined is the precise time when the human embryo is first animated by its own specific principle of life, its human soul. It is interesting to read what various conjectures have been ventured on this subject by the learned of former ages. They were totally at sea. Though gifted with keen minds, they had not the proper data to reason from. And yet some of those sages made very shrewd guesses. For instance, as early as the fourth century of our era, St. Gregory of Nyssa taught the true doctrine, which modern science has now universally accepted. He taught that the rational soul is created by Almighty God and infused into the embryo at the very moment of conception. Still, as St. Gregory could not prove the certainty of his doctrine, it was opposed by the majority of the learned.

The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, while condemning abortion from the time of conception, preferred the opinion of Aristotle, that the rational soul is not infused till the fœtus is sufficiently developed to receive it. The embryo lived first, they taught, with a vegetable life; after a few days an animal soul replaced the vegetative principle; the human soul was not infused into the tiny body till the fortieth day for a male, and the eightieth day for a female child. All this sounds very foolish now; and yet we should not sneer at their ignorance; had we lived in their times, we could probably have done no better than they.

It was not till 1620 that Fienus, a physician of Louvain, in Belgium, published the first book of modern times that came near the truth. He maintained that the human soul was created and infused into the embryo three days after conception. Nearly forty years later, in 1658, a religious priest, called Florentinius, wrote a book in which he taught that, for all we know, the soul may be intellectual or human from the first moment of conception; and the Pope’s physician Zachias soon after maintained the thesis as a certainty that the human embryo has from the very beginning a human soul.

Great writers applauded Fienus and his successors; universities favored their views; the Benedictines, the Dominicans, and the Jesuits supported them. Modern science claims to have proved beyond all doubt that the same soul animates the man that animated the fœtus from the very moment of conception. The “Medical Jurisprudence” of Wharton and Stillé quotes Dr. Hodge of the Pennsylvania University as follows (p. 11): “In a most mysterious manner brought into existence, how wonderful its formation! Imperfect in the first instance, nay, even invisible to the naked eye, the embryo is nevertheless endowed, at once, with the principles of vitality; and although retained in the system of its mother, it has, in a strict sense, an independent existence. It immediately manifests all the phenomena of organic life; it forms its own fluids and circulates them; it is nourished and developed; and, very rapidly from being a rudis indigestaque moles, apparently an inorganic drop of fluid, its organs are generated and its form perfected. It daily gains strength and grows; and, while still within the organ of its mother, manifests some of the phenomena of animal life, especially as regards mobility. After the fourth month its motions are perceptible to the mother, and in a short period can be perceived by other individuals on close investigation.

I say. It is never licit directly to kill an innocent person, whether by private or by public authority. The reason is both because the killing of an innocent person is an action injurious to the rights of God, who alone has supreme dominion over life, and accordingly intrinsically evil; and because it is injurious to the right which the innocent person has to life; and because it is positively prohibited by God himself; for it is said, Exod. xxiii, 7: "The innocent and just person you shall not kill." But this does not prevent that sometimes an action of itself good or indifferent can be posited, from which the death of an innocent person follows beyond the intention, according to those things which were said concerning the indirectly voluntary in the treatise on human acts, nn. 8 and 9.

You Will Ask. Is it licit for the state to render an innocent man or woman sterile, either by performing vasectomy on a man or ovariotomy on a woman, precisely so that offspring may not be born?

Response. Negatively, because it is not licit to mutilate innocent persons even for saving the state: just as it is not licit for an individual to render himself sterile precisely for this end, that offspring may not be born, so neither is it licit for the state. Because this would be to rule subjects despotically and thus to invert the natural end of the state. The commonwealth cannot convert the life of its members to its own utility and consume it for the sake of its own utility, because citizens are not ordered for the commonwealth, but the commonwealth is ordered for citizens and for their utility and good. Namely, the subject is not a slave: the former is governed politically for the utility of the subject; the latter despotically for the utility of the master. Thus Lugo, disp. 10, 77, 104. Again: "it is licit for no one to violate with impunity the dignity of man, of which God himself disposes with great reverence." Leo XIII, Rerum Nov. Now to the dignity of man certainly belongs the generative power. Indeed not only is it not licit for the state to act thus, but on the contrary, for the protection of bodily goods, the state itself is bound by its own force; and it is necessary to rescue the wretched from the savagery of men. "Rights indeed, in whomever they are, are to be preserved sacredly, and that each one may hold his own, public authority ought to provide, by warding off and avenging injuries. Except that in protecting the rights of private persons, regard must especially be had for the weak and the needy." Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum. No law of men can take away from man the natural and primordial right of marriage or circumscribe in any manner whatsoever the principal cause of nuptials established in the beginning by the authority of God. "Increase and multiply" (Gen. i, 28). Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum. But those who wish this law to be enacted surely circumscribe that cause. Thus St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 104, a. 5: "Now man is bound to obey man in those things which are to be done outwardly through the body; in which, however, according to those things which pertain to the nature of the body, man is not bound to obey man, but only God, because all men are equal by nature; for example, in those things which pertain to the sustenance of the body and the generation of offspring." All such laws are unjust.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is not licit to kill those lethally wounded, nor any other dying persons, lest they suffer longer; because, according to the known saying, evils are not to be done to obtain a good.

2nd. It is not licit to kill an innocent person in order to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death, even under penalty of the overthrow of a city, and even if he himself consented to his own death: because he cannot properly consent, since he does not have dominion over his own life. Yet more probably he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good, and probably, if he refused, even be handed over. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 393.

3rd. It is not licit to kill envoys or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the pledge given, and have unjustly killed the hostages or envoys sent to them; because they are innocent. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

TO PROCURE AN ABORTION is most cruel if the fetus is living; for it not only destroys the body, but also loses the soul. Thus St. Bonaventure solemnly warns in the Dieta, tit. 3, cap. 4, and in the Confessionale, cap. 2, part 13.

I ASSERT that it is not lawful to procure the abortion of a living fetus, even to save the mother's life.

IT IS PROVED by Fagundez, because the offspring possesses life without injury to the mother: therefore a grave injury is done to it if it is destroyed in order to save the mother's life.

FURTHERMORE, because we are bound to prefer spiritual life to bodily life: therefore, if the offspring is believed to be living and to be born, grave sin is committed when, deprived of Baptism, it is killed.

So with St. Bonaventure; Lessius, Tom. 1, L. 2, dub. 10, num. 67; St. Antoninus, part 3, tit. 7, cap. 2; Sayrus, lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 22; Petrus Navatus, Lib. 2 on restitution, cap. 3, num. 138 and 143; Aragon, 2. 2, question 64, art. 7; Fagundez, Lib. 5, cap. 12, num. 19; Bassaeus, V. Homicidium, 1, num. 58; Diana, tract. 5, miscel. Resol. 11, part 5.

Fagundez, moreover, ADDS that in doubt whether the offspring is living, remedies may be applied, because the condition of the possessor is better; but the mother is in possession of her certain life: this holds a fortiori if the offspring is not animated. So too Covarruvias on the Clementine si furiosus, part 2, §. 3; Sylvester, V. medicus, question 4; St. Antoninus, part 3, tit. 7, cap. 2, §. 2; Lessius, and Petrus Navarrus, cited above.

But the FETUS, if it is a male, is animated on the fortieth day; if a female, on the eightieth. So Navarrus, Sum. Lat., cap. 15, num. 14; Covarruvias, cited place; Lessius, num. 67; Sà, V. homicid. But in doubt whether it is a male or a female, it is to be believed a male, as Covarruvias and Sà say.

Certain ANATOMISTS give thirty days for the male and forty for the female. See the Hexaëmeron on Anatomy, disputation 4, question 22.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is lawful to cut open the belly of a pregnant mother, whose life is despaired of, so that the child may be drawn out alive.

IT IS ANSWERED: Negatively, with St. Thomas in 4. dist. 6. quaest. 1. art. 1. quaestiuncula 1. ad 4, and 3. part. quaest. 68. art. 11; Domitol. lib. 1. quaest. 14; Corduba quaest. 38. dub. 2; Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 63; Alensis 4. quaest. 8. memb. 7. art. 1; Gabriel in 4. dist. 4. q. 2. art. 3. dub. 2; St. Antoninus 3. part. tit. 4. cap. 13. §. 1; Sylvester V. Baptismus, 4; Soto in 4. dist. 5. quaest. unic. art. 11; Angelus V. Baptismus, 6; Tabien. num. 5; Armilla num. 38; Victoria de sacer. quaest. 33. The reason is, because that section is a killing: Evils are not to be done that good may come of them. But a dead body may be cut open, L. Posth. ff. de inoffic. test.

It is also illicit to give remedies for sterility. See Fagundez L. 5. cap. 13; Sanchez l. 9. disput. 20. Sixtus V forbids this de abortu, §. 5, and cap. si aliquis, and homicid. For it is against the end of generation. Nor should you say that abortion in the unanimated is closer against that end.

For I say the fetus is an aggressor against the mother's life; but not fertility.

You will object: the emission of seed is never lawful. Therefore neither is that of the fetus, which is closer to generation.

I say neither is abortion directly intended. But if it be probable that the mother also would die together with her living child; whereas with the remedy given the mother can be saved; Bassaeus says a potion may be given to her.

Casual homicide is that which takes place beyond intention, as St. Bonaventure teaches serm. 6. in Decal.; St. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 8.

For casual homicide, therefore, the Saintly Doctor gives this rule: if, while engaging in a licit undertaking, he applied sufficient diligence that homicide should not follow, and it should nevertheless follow, it will in no way be imputed to him, because that death was willed neither in itself nor in its cause; wherefore he will not be irregular. So with St. Bonaventure; Lessius Tom. 1. Lib. 2. dub. 15. num. 703; Suarez de censur. disp. 45. sect. 5. and 6; Farinac. Tom. 4. quaest. 126. n. 74; Ayrenius Tract. de homic. casuali, part. 3. num. 10; Tolet. Lib. 5. sum. cap. 7; Fagundez L. 5. cap. 14. num. 10; Bassaeus, V. Homic. 2. num. 1; with St. Thomas quaest. 64. art. 8, where see Sylvestrus and Cajetan ad 1.

They state the same even if he were engaging in an illicit undertaking; because, although in this there would be fault in order to the prohibition, say the exploding of a war engine, or hunting, yet there would not be fault in order to the homicide or mutilation; and this perhaps is what the Saintly Doctor means when he says that then the killer is excused from so much, not from all.

You will ask: whether one who kills another in a sudden and unexpected brawl can be dispensed from irregularity by the Bishop, who, according to the Council of Trent, sess. 14. cap. 7, can dispense from irregularities contracted through occult casual homicide.

Molina denies it Tom. 4. de iustitia, tract. 3. disp. 70; so too Suarez in 3. part. tit. 5. de censur. disput. 94. sect. 1.

Diana maintains it p. p. Tract. 1. Miscell. resol. 19; so too Didacus Perez Lib. 8. ordin. tit. 13. in Rubr. fol. 256; Avila Tract. de censur. part. 7. disp. 6. sect. 2. dub. 1. and sect. 5. dub. 5; Coninchyus de sacr. disp. 18. dub. 14. num. 11; Rodriquez in summa, p. p. cap. 177; Henriquez, and Salzedo, as cited by Diana; Fagundez L. 5. cap. 12. num. 11.

In St. Bonaventure I find only in confessionali, cap. 5. particula 49. casu 1 that the dispensation of casual homicide is referred to the Bishop, not of voluntary homicide; but this is voluntary.

Caia, a Catholic mother of a family and already four months pregnant, was suffering from almost continual vomiting. The physician summoned to her declared that the indicated remedy for the vomiting was abortion, and that unless she procured it, she herself with the fetus would most certainly die within one or two months. If abortion were procured in time, the fetus could be baptized, and the mother herself would very probably be saved. Caia asked her confessor whether in the stated circumstances she could bring about abortion. Hence it is asked:

1. By what principal arguments is it defended that abortion is lawful in order to save the mother?

2. How is it proved that abortion is always intrinsically evil?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What were the chief arguments by which it was argued that abortion is allowed in order to save the mother’s life?

We are not concerned here with the arguments used by materialists, who look upon the child before birth as a portion of the mother which may be destroyed if it threatens her life, and see no difficulty in killing one in order that the other's life may be preserved when both can not be saved. We are only concerned with theologians, some of whom thought that in such cases as we are now discussing medical abortion may be permitted. They defended this view on the following grounds: Abortion is usually caused by puncturing the membranes, and this may be done to relieve the mother when pregnancy is threatening her life, though the puncturing also causes abortion and the consequent death of the fetus. In a collision between the right to life of the mother and that of the fetus, the fetus may be said to cede its right in favor of the mother, especially as otherwise both would perish, and the fetus would not be baptized; whereas if aborted, it can be baptized.

2. How is it shown that abortion is always intrinsically wrong?

Direct abortion is always intrinsically wrong because it is direct killing of the innocent. For to cause abortion is to deprive the fetus of the medium in which alone its life can be preserved, which is to kill it directly just as much as thrusting a man under water or into a chamber exhausted of oxygen is killing him directly. As, then, the puncturing of the membranes is the direct killing of the fetus, it is not allowable, even when necessary to save the life of the mother; for evil may not be done that good may come. Nor can the fetus renounce its right to life in favor of the mother, and permit itself to be killed directly ; for not man but God alone is the Lord of life and death. In a collision of rights the owner of the better right takes something to himself which is his; his better right gives him no title to take away that which is another's, and so collision of rights can not be applied to justify direct abortion; it takes away the life of the innocent victim.

3. The case. From what has been said it is clear that Caia may not consent to abortion, as the fetus is not viable. She must ask the doctor to prescribe some other remedy or palliative which will at least save her conscience if not her life. This solution is confirmed by the decree of the Holy Office, July 24, 1895, which declared that such medical abortion as is described in this case is not lawful.¹

1 See Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 844, ed. 9.

Titius, a young Catholic physician, asked Paul, his confessor, whether he could safely follow the doctrine commonly handed down in medical schools concerning the manner of treating ectopic fetuses. For sometimes a fetus is conceived outside the uterus and begins to grow, and it cannot always be distinguished from a tumor. Its growth, however, constitutes a grave danger to the mother, especially when the enclosing membrane is ruptured. According to the doctrine handed down in medical schools, an electric fluid is introduced into the cyst, and thus the fetus, if any is present, is deprived of life, ceases to grow, and the mother’s life is saved. Titius therefore wished to know whether it is lawful to act thus, and, if it is not lawful, what must be done when the mother’s life is endangered by a tumor which probably is an ectopic fetus, or which certainly is an ectopic fetus. Hence Paul asks:

1. What is an ectopic fetus, and why is it dangerous?

2. How are the direct and indirect killing of a human being distinguished, and when is it lawful?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is an ectopic fetus and why is it dangerous? The proper place for the fecundated ovulum to settle and grow to maturity is the uterus, but sometimes it remains in the ovaries, sometimes in the Fallopian tubes, sometimes it falls into the abdominal cavity, and in these cases it is c called ectopic or extrauterine. An ectopic fetus can not be delivered in the ordinary way, and its growth becomes a serious danger to the life of the mother, chiefly on account of blood vessels being ruptured in the mother’s body by the continual growth of the ectopic fetus.

2. The first part of this question is answered above, p. 226.

Direct homicide is lawful by public authority in punishment of crime, or in a just war, and by private authority in self-defence. Indirect homicide may be permitted for some object of great importance.

3. The case. It is obvious that if an ectopic fetus is living, it will be direct and unlawful homicide to kill it with electricity. If it is uncertain whether a cause of danger to a woman is an ectopic fetus, or a tumor, or some other growth, laparotomy may be performed and the cause of danger removed as soon as the danger becomes imminent. For in that case the certain danger of the woman must be considered and guarded against in preference to the danger to the life of a fetus which is only probable and perhaps non-existent. Even when the danger certainly comes from the presence of an ectopic fetus, the same operation may probably be performed when its growth causes the danger to the mother to be imminent and the fetus is already viable.¹

1 See Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis, vol. i, n. 338; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 1011, ed. 11.

On the other hand, when abortion is procured directly, the fetus is killed directly, and this is never lawful.

A physician was called to a case of antepartum eclampsia, and was informed that the patient had had three convulsions. Four hours - after he was called the patient had a fourth terrible convulsion. The physician at this stage contemplated calling a second physician and causing the child to be delivered by operation. There was no question, of course, of craniotomy, etc., but only of accelerating the delivery. However, the attending physician decided not to send for another doctor, nor did he attempt the operation. Medicinal treatment was resorted to. The mother thereupon became conscious, and was delivered in the natural way. The child was born alive and was immediately baptized, and it lived for ten minutes after.

Would it have been permitted for this attending physician to accelerate delivery by operation? In replying, kindly say a few words on this question of accelerating birth—Inquirer.

Answer.—Eclampsia is a very grave complication of pregnancy, characterized by convulsions and coma. If delivery is effected during these convulsions, the convulsions will cease immediately or soon after, and the maternal mortality is then about 11 per cent. If the expectant treatment is used in convulsive cases, about 28 per cent. of the mothers die. The condition is one of the most dangerous found in pregnancy.” (‘“Past. Med.,” O’Malley—Walsh.)

If pregnancy ends in the emptying of the uterus before the sixteenth week of gestation, the condition is called an abortion; if this happens between the sixteenth and the twenty-eighth weeks, it is miscarriage; if the child is born after the twenty-eighth week, but before the full term, the birth is premature. Physicians commonly use the term abortion for both abortion and miscarriage. The moralists call any delivery of an unviable child an abortion, while the delivery of a viable child is called a premature birth. If the abortion is brought about by natural causes, without artificial interference, it is called spontaneous; if the abortion is caused by outside interference, it is styled artificial. If the delivery takes place before the seventh month of gestation, or before the twenty-eighth week, it is called an abortion, because the child is not viable before the end of the seventh month. On the contrary, if the delivery takes place after the seventh month, but before term, that is, between the twenty-eighth and the thirty-sixth week, it is called a premature birth, because it is possible for a twenty-eight weeks' child to live outside the mother's womb.

1. It is lawful, for a grave cause, to bring about, artificially, a premature birth. First, we say that it is lawful, because a child, after the seventh month of gestation, is capable of living outside its mother's womb, and therefore to remove it from its mother's womb is not equivalent to killing it, since the mother's womb is not an absolute condition of its living. Secondly, we say that it is not lawful, except for a grave cause, to remove the child, even after the twenty-eighth week. The reason is because removing a viable child from its mother before the full term of gestation has been reached, is to expose the child's life to very serious danger, not alone of dying, but if it should live, of being weak and undeveloped. It is not lawful, however, to expose the child to this risk, except to ward off some graver evil, namely, the death of the mother or of the child.

2. It is never allowed directly to remove, or to cause to be removed, an unviable child from its mother, not even though it be the last hope of saving the mother's life.

Nunquam licet directe procurare abortum. An abortion is the removing from the mother of a child that is not yet viable, i. e., before the seventh month of gestation has been completed.

It is never allowed, because such a removal is tantamount to killing the child, and it is never permitted directly to cause the death of an innocent person. Even though the unviable foetus could be delivered alive and baptized, and thus its soul's salvation procured at the same time that the mother's life is preserved, it is strictly forbidden by the Holy See. The end cannot justify the means. A child that is not seven months cannot live outside its mother's womb. To remove it thence is to kill it. To kill it is to kill the innocent without justification. That is murder. Therefore there is a long list of prohibitions by the Holy See declaring the unlawfulness of directly procuring abortion, even though it be the only means of saving the mother's life, and the unborn child is doomed to die by nature in any case. Both the mother and child must be left to die, since it is not lawful to save the mother by destroying the child.

In the latest edition of his Moral Theology, 1910, Father Lehmkuhl says concerning this matter: "In former editions I endeavored to bring forward reasons that might probably justify the violent invasion of the unviable foetus and its vital element as a last resort for saving the mother's life. And although I proposed the matter as doubtful, not trusting to my own judgment in so grave a matter, still I thought that the considerations which I presented might have some weight in rendering less sure an obligation that created the very greatest hardships both for physicians and mothers. The reasons I advanced were these: The unviable foetus has a right to its vital element, namely, to dwell in its mother's womb, since nature has created this element for the child. But when special circumstances arise (as, for instance, when the mother's life is in jeopardy), the child's right to dwell in its mother's womb must give way to a prior right, namely, to the mother's right to preserve her own life. In this conflict of rights the child may be supposed to waive its right in favor of its mother. Living in its mother's womb is a condition extrinsic (bonum vitae extrinsecum) to the real life of the child, and therefore, for just and sufficient reasons, the child may sacrifice it, as a shipwrecked man may waive his right to a plank in favor of his friend, and trust himself to the waves, which speedily swallow him up. Indeed, it may be affirmed that the child does, in as far as it can, waive its right to dwell in its mother's womb, since the right has become wholly worthless, owing to circumstances, and not being necessary as a condition for procuring the child's baptism, since the child's baptism will be surer in the event of an abortion. And if dwelling in the mother's womb be considered as an intrinsic part of the child's life, bonum vitae intrinsecum, still any attack on the child's existence in the womb does not seem to be an attack on the child itself, but rather an attack on something common both to mother and child, to which the mother has as much right as the child, and in this dilemma the child yields its precarious right to its mother, just as one person might yield to another, where there is not air enough to keep both alive."

These were some of the considerations that led Father Lehmkuhl to say, in the earlier editions of his Moral Theology, that it was not clearly and beyond all doubt immoral to cause a premature delivery of an unviable child, when the same held out the only possible hope of saving the mother's life.

But all this notwithstanding, the Holy Office has repeatedly declared that artificial premature delivery, or abortion, is the same as craniotomy, is a direct killing of the child, and always and under all circumstances forbidden by the law of God. And Father Lehmkuhl admits that the reasons he brought forward in favor of artificial abortion speciosiores sunt quam veriores (Theol. moral. L, n. 1007).

In regard to the case under discussion, it is quite evident that if the woman was already past the seventh month of her pregnancy, artificial delivery might be resorted to to save the mother's life.

"When the grave complications enumerated above occur in the early months of pregnancy before the foetus is viable, the Catholic physician, since by the natural law and the decisions of the Holy Office he is forbidden to induce artificial abortion, must withdraw from the case. If there is no other physician to attend to the woman, he must let her die. He cannot withdraw without explanation, and in many cases the explanation of the condition will promptly result in the calling in of a physician who has no scruple in inducing this abortion, no matter how reputable he may be. The universal medical doctrine is to induce abortion in cases where abortion will save the mother's life, and the foetus is 'too young to amount to anything.' This is looked upon as legitimate abortion by the very best men that do not recognize the authority of the Holy Office; they deem the position of the Catholic physician in these cases as altogether erroneous, or even criminal" ("Past. Med.," p. 54, O'Malley & Walsh).

To resume, if the eclampsia occurred after the twenty-eighth week of gestation, an operation to hasten the delivery would have been lawful, since a seven months' child is viable, even though the chances are greatly against the child's living. If the child dies after being delivered, its death is not a necessary result of the operation, since many children live although prematurely delivered.

If the eclampsia occurs before the twenty-eighth week of gestation, it is not lawful to empty the uterus, though that is the only means of saving the mother's life, because such a procedure is a direct killing of the child. And what is said here of an operation holds equally well in regard to the administration of medicine. If the direct effect of the medicine is to empty the uterus, it is not lawful to administer it, except after the seventh month of gestation.

The means employed hitherto to overcome difficulties in childbirth, especially in cases of contraction of the pelvis, have been: prevention of conception, abortion, induced premature birth, Caesarean section, craniotomy, perforation, or cephalotripsy. Catholic moral teachers have always taken a decided attitude with regard to these proceedings. They have condemned all methods of preventing conception. Only under very difficult circumstances may "facultative sterility" be advisable (Capellmann, 5". Poenit., 16 June, 1880. Cf. Lehmkuhl, II. n. 851; Noldin, de sexto praecepto, n. 69; Goepfert, M. Th., III. n. 278)..Abortion, the artificially produced expulsion of the foetus at a time when it is not yet capable of independent existence, is strictly forbidden. Still more strictly is it forbidden to use any of the operations that directly cause the child's death, such as perforation, craniotomy, or cephalotripsy. Medical men are beginning to see that these operations are unjustifiable, although they do not think that they can altogether give up performing them. According to the teaching of Catholic moralists it is permissible to bring about a premature delivery at a time when the child is capable of independent existence, though it be weak when born. The Cesarean section is also allowed, except in cases where it would be of such danger to the mother as to be practically equivalent to killing her. Modern surgery and the use of antiseptics have made this operation less dangerous than it used to be, if performed in good time.

Quite recently there has been performed another operation which seems likely to be successful, viz., hebosteotomy. The bone of the pelvis is cut through at the os pubis, so that the pelvis is enlarged and a normal birth can take place. The operation does not involve any opening of the womb, but is performed by means of a very fine saw, resembling a needle, and it does not cause any very serious injury to the mother, so that no special danger or disastrous results follow it. It seems particularly useful in cases where it is impossible to induce a premature birth, or when the right time for doing so has passed. Surgeons consider that the operation can be performed privately, and that there is no need to transport a patient to a public operating room. We may therefore hope that it will result in saving the life of many children, who would otherwise perish at their birth. If my hypothesis is correct, I see no objection, from the point of view of Catholic morals, to the performance of this operation.—Dr. Goepfert.