Section II. On Sins Opposed to Charity Toward Self

The sins against charity toward self are:

I. Direct killing of oneself. This occurs when the self-killing act, as such, either is intended as an end or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained.

1. Direct killing of oneself is always prohibited under grave sin. For first, an act of this sort is against natural inclination, "because naturally every thing loves itself; and to this it belongs that every thing naturally preserves itself in being, and resists corrupting things as much as it can" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5). Then self-killing "is against charity, by which each one ought to love himself" (St. Thomas, ibid.). Then the killer "does injury to the community" (St. Thomas, ibid.), because each one, as part of the community, is ordered also to the good of the community. Moreover, it is illicit to destroy what is not yours, but God's alone; and such is life. Hence Sacred Scripture: "You shall not kill";¹ "I will kill and I will make to live";² "You are Lord, who have power of life and death."³

It is indeed reported that some Saints killed themselves; but these things can be explained either through the inspiration of God, who, as Lord of life and death, permitted it, or through good faith (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, III, 366, 361).

2. It is disputed whether the killing of oneself, by which certainly one sins against charity toward self, also involves a sin against commutative justice; not indeed with respect to oneself - for justice and injustice are toward another - but with respect either to the community or to God, or to both. St. Alphonsus leaves the matter undecided (III, 366); St. Thomas indeed states: "It must be said that homicide is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is contrary to charity, which one ought to have toward oneself: and on this side killing oneself is a sin by comparison with oneself; but by comparison with the community and with God, it has the character of sin also by opposition to justice" (II-II, q. 64, a. 5); but the holy Doctor can be understood of social or general justice, and perhaps he did not intend a sin distinct in species.

Question. Whether it is lawful for one condemned to death, by command or by positive permission of legitimate authority, to kill himself.

Response. More commonly it is denied, because punishment is an act of vindicative justice, which is essentially toward another. Yet St. Alphonsus (III, 369) and others hold it as quite probable that this is lawful, because nothing prevents the condemned man from acting as two persons, namely as the one executing the sentence and as the punished one. Therefore they hold as probable that vindicative justice is not essentially toward a physically different person. Hence practically it is lawful. Yet there is no obligation of satisfying a precept of this sort - and consequently the guilty person cannot be compelled to such an act - because the judge probably cannot impose it, and it is a matter that is arduous (n. 146). "Yet they commonly concede that the guilty person can climb the ladder, fit his neck to the sword, etc.; since these actions tend only remotely toward death" (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

¹ Exodus 20:13.

² Deuteronomy 32:39.

³ Wisdom 16:13.

II. Omission of self-preservation - for example by abstaining from food or drink until you die - seems altogether illicit, namely as it is exercised practically. For it is altogether illicit to intend death as a means of obtaining something (n. 523). But he who abstains from food or drink intends, as that manner of acting practically obtains, death as a means of obtaining something. It must be said otherwise of one who abstains from food or drink so that another may have that by which he can escape death, because he intends the preservation of another's life, but merely permits his own death. Likewise it seems lawful to abstain from food and drink for a time for the end that you may be freed from prison, provided there is hope of fruit. For diminution of health and strength - equally as mutilation - is lawful if it is ordered to the good or better condition of the whole (n. 526). But this seems to have place in the proposed hypothesis, because it is better to live freely and weakly than in prison.

Question 1. Whether one condemned to perish by hunger can refuse food secretly offered.

Response. It seems one must answer affirmatively, because to one condemned to perish by hunger there seems to have been granted permission to abstain from offered food; which permission, according to the things explained above, is quite probably valid.

Question 2. Whether it is lawful to wish death for oneself.

Response 1. Affirmatively, provided however it is done with due resignation: 1. if death is wished from desire of possessing God or of no longer offending Him. Hence St. Paul: "Who will deliver me from the body of death?";¹ 2. if life seems more bitter than death to someone, according to that saying: "Death is better than a bitter life"² (St. Alphonsus, II, 30, 2).

Response 2. Negatively, if someone wishes death for himself from anger or for a slight reason, for example on account of small troubles.

¹ Romans 7:24.

² Ecclesiasticus 30:17.

III. Indirect killing of oneself occurs when the self-killing act, as such, is neither chosen as an end nor assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Now indirect killing of oneself is of itself illicit; it becomes lawful if a proportionate cause is present. The former is clear from the fact that charity toward self of itself demands that I guard life at least by ordinary means, much less does it permit that I neglect it (n. 521). The latter is deduced from what has been said about an act with a double effect, one good, the other evil.

Corollary I. They sin gravely: 1. who by living intemperately notably accelerate death; 2. unskilled tightrope walkers, acrobats, and other performers who, induced by greed for profit alone or by empty glory, expose themselves to grave danger of life; the skilled do not expose themselves to such great danger and are more easily excused; this also holds concerning skilled persons who undertake courses by means of a flying machine.

Corollary II. They do not sin: 1. who, with danger of death but with hope of fruit, preach the Gospel, or with hope of usefulness in time of persecution do not flee; yet those things seem illicit on account of the sole desire of martyrdom. Likewise they do not sin who by vigils, fasts, etc., shorten life even by some years, or from a just cause undertake unhealthy labors or seek a region very harmful to health, even if it is foreseen that life must be lessened by some years; 2. who in a shipwreck yields a plank, even one already grasped, to another, with his own death even certainly permitted, or throws himself before a missile or blow to save the life of a ruler or friend, or takes the place of a friend unjustly condemned to death; nor is it illicit to throw oneself from a ship into the sea, lest all perish; 3. who ignites gunpowder to overturn an enemy fortification, or sinks a ship lest the enemy gain possession of it, even if he foresees that he himself will perish at the same time; yet the latter is illicit if it is done solely for preserving honor, although there are many prejudices which more easily excuse; 4. who, to avoid a more bitter death actually to be undergone or inflicted, casts himself into the danger, even certain danger, of a less bitter death, "for example, if someone throws himself through a window to escape a fire; especially if there is some hope of escaping death.... And Elbel permits this also to guilty persons detained in prison, for escaping a certain sentence of death, or even perpetual prison" (St. Alphonsus, III, 366, 367, 370-372). Likewise it is lawful for a virgin "to cast herself into certain danger of life, but not into certain death, for preserving chastity from an assailant" (St. Alphonsus, III, 372, question 2). For the rest, in the cases set forth, commonly either there is some hope of safety, or time for serious thought is lacking, and subjectively they are excused at least on account of a good intention.

Corollary III. Bullfights are not prohibited under grave sin; since, with attention to the skill of the fighters, grave danger is commonly absent. Yet they are prohibited under light sin, because, considering the nature of the act and a danger not altogether to be despised, there seems to be lacking a sufficient cause for conducting them. Horse and bicycle races are lawful, even though they are not without any danger.

IV. Mutilation of oneself. 1. Notion. Mutilation properly so called occurs when, with cutting off, an organic function or use of members is suppressed; hence under the name of mutilation there do not come, for example, circumcision, cutting off the extremity of the ear or nose; yet there are certain mutilations, even if less properly so called. Woundings are generally reduced to the latter. Now we shall present all mutilations and woundings in one treatment and under the one name of mutilation.

2. Division. Mutilation of oneself is distinguished, as killing of oneself, as direct and indirect. It is direct when the mutilating act, as such, is chosen as an end or assumed as a means by which another end is obtained; otherwise it is indirect.

3. Morality. a) Direct mutilation of oneself is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. Otherwise it is illicit; nevertheless mutilation improperly so called admits smallness of matter (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65; St. Alphonsus, III, 373). It is said:

Alpha) It is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. The reason is that a mutilation done so that you may preserve the whole, insofar as otherwise it cannot be preserved or be well, for the Lord, and so that you may use the whole well, does not contain an act of one's own dominion, but an acknowledgment of divine dominion, and it consults the end for which the whole has been granted, namely its use. Hence it is lawful to amputate a member infected with gangrene, lest the whole body be infected. The same is lawful if danger of death threatens from an extrinsic necessary cause, for example if the hand is attached to a burning beam. The same seems lawful if danger threatens from an extrinsic free cause, as if a tyrant says: I will kill you unless you cut off a member. For it does not appear why that should rather be permitted if danger threatens from an intrinsic cause than if it threatens from an extrinsic free cause. Yet it is not lawful to perform a lawful mutilation on another except by the consent of the one whose interest it concerns, or, if it is a question of one who lacks the use of reason, of the one under whom the person to be mutilated is subject.

Beta) Otherwise it is illicit; that is, it is illicit if it is not ordered to the good of the whole body, or indeed is ordered to it, at least by the agent, but is not necessary for obtaining that end. The reason is that mutilation of oneself in either hypothesis - that is, both in the case in which it is not ordered to the good of the whole body, and in the case in which it is indeed ordered to the said good, but is not necessary for that end, because the whole can be helped in another way - involves an act of dominion over a thing which belongs to God alone. Hence Aquinas: "A member is not to be cut off for bodily health except when the whole cannot be aided otherwise" (II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3). And St. Alphonsus: "It is not lawful to mutilate oneself unless it is necessary for the preservation of the whole" (III, 373).

Gamma) Mutilation improperly so called admits smallness of matter; as if someone without cause extracted a tooth, or amputated a little piece of the ear, or slightly weakened the eyes, or underwent the operation which is called transfusion of blood. Indeed, an altogether slight amputation is lawful for a proportionate cause, even if it is not ordered to the well-being of the whole, but to another end, for example that notable gain may be acquired; likewise it is lawful for a virgin to disfigure herself so that she may repel an assailant from herself. Yet note again that the gravity of mutilation must also be judged from the gravity of the function by which the member functions. Hence the operation which in a man is called vasectomy, and in a woman oophorectomy or fallectomy, even though light in itself, must be counted among grave mutilations, because it deprives a human being of a grave function, namely the power of procreating offspring. The same seems to have to be said about amputation or severing of one gland, even if the other suffices for intercourse; namely, by almost the same right as that is admitted concerning the removal of one eye.

b) Indirect mutilation of oneself is of itself illicit, but becomes lawful on account of a proportionate cause, as was said about indirect killing of oneself (n. 525).

Corollary I. It is illicit to mutilate oneself: 1. for collecting alms, for exercising a profitable art, or for avoiding military service.

The reason is that in the said cases there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 373). For the same reason, 2. castration for preserving sweetness of voice and singing divine praises is illicit. To this is added that a manner of acting of this sort does not serve the common good, that is, the piety of the faithful, since the singing of castrati feminizes minds and ears (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 374).

Corollary II. It is illicit to admit castration, vasectomy,¹ oophorectomy,² extirpation of the ovaries or procurement of their atrophy, for the end that conception and procreation of offspring may be prevented. For again there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, that is, insofar as it is injurious to a genital organ, is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body. To this is added that the acts set forth in the proposed hypothesis directly impede the good of the species; and this is always illicit, because the good of the species is ordered immediately to God alone, and therefore cannot be directly impeded on account of any intermediate end. Nor do the aforesaid operations become lawful if they are done because danger to life threatens from conception, and therefore at least by the agent they are ordered to the preservation of the whole. For even in that case avoidance of conception is directly and proximately intended as a means, so that even such a manner of acting is directly and proximately opposed to the good of the species. To this is added that the intended end, that is, the good of the whole, can be obtained in another way, namely by abstaining from intercourse.

Nor are the assigned mutilations lawful if they are done for quieting temptations and preserving chastity, because again there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, that is, insofar as it is injurious to a genital organ, is assumed as a means by which the said end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body. To this is added that the said mutilations commonly do not conduce to the intended end: for the stimulus of the flesh remains. Finally, chastity can be preserved by other means. "Spiritual welfare," says St. Thomas, "can always be helped otherwise than by cutting off a member; because sin is subject to the will, and therefore in no case is it lawful to cut off a member for avoiding any sin whatsoever" (II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3).

But the aforesaid mutilations seem lawful for forestalling sexual erethism arising from the fact that the genital organs are abnormally affected. The reason is that in the case, the mutilation is ordered to the well-being of the whole body, almost as the amputation of a member infected by disease.³

To what extent public authority can impose the said operations, see in the treatise on the Fifth Precept.

¹ Vasectomy is a surgical operation by which someone is rendered impotent for generating through the cutting of the organ which in a man carries seed to the penis.

² Oophorectomy is done through the cutting of the organ which in a woman carries ova to the womb.

³ Cf. De Smet, De sponsalibus et matrimonio, n. 440, 441; Grosam in Linzer Quartalschrift 1910, pp. 59, 285, 497.

V. Ecclesiastical penalties established for suicide and self-mutilation are:

1. Those who have mutilated themselves or others, or have attempted to take life from themselves, are irregular from delict (can. 985, 5).

2. Those who have killed themselves by deliberate counsel are deprived of ecclesiastical burial (can. 1240, § 1, 3); to one excluded from ecclesiastical burial there must also be denied both any funeral Mass, even anniversary Mass, and other public funeral offices (can. 1241).

3. Those who have laid hands on themselves, if death has not followed, are to be barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and if they are clerics, they are to be suspended for a time to be determined by the Ordinary, and removed from benefices or offices having care of souls annexed in the internal or external forum (can. 2350, § 2).

4. A lay person who has been lawfully condemned for the delict of grave mutilation or wounding or violence is to be considered excluded by the law itself from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and from any office, if he has any in the Church, with the obligation of repairing damages remaining firm (can. 2354, § 1).