The kinds of voluntariety

All human acts are voluntary. The voluntary and involuntary are treated so that the diverse modes may be known according to which the will tends into its object, or according to which acts proceed from the will, because this knowledge contributes much to determining the imputability of human acts and its grades.

42. What the voluntary is. The voluntary is called that which proceeds from the will, as an effect from its cause, with previous knowledge of the intellect. Therefore two things belong to the nature of the voluntary: a. that the act proceed from the will as from its cause; b. that it be placed with the knowledge of the intellect going before.

a. Something can proceed from the will positively, or through its positive influence, or negatively, or through omission of influence.

Something can proceed positively from the will in three ways: immediately, mediately, and effectively. The elicited acts themselves of the will proceed immediately; acts commanded by the will and elicited by other powers proceed mediately; the effects of these acts proceed effectively. Thus in the throwing of a stone by which a man is wounded, the intention of doing so proceeds immediately from the will, the throwing mediately, and the wound inflicted by the stone effectively.

Omissions and their effects are said to proceed negatively from the will. If someone does not extinguish a fire set to a house, the omission of extinguishing and the effect of the house burning are said to proceed negatively from the will.

Therefore four things are said to be voluntary to us: a. elicited acts of the will; b. acts commanded by the will; c. external effects of our actions; d. omissions and their effects.

b. The voluntary differs: a. from the willed: for that is called willed which is the object of the will, even if it does not depend upon the will; but only that object is called voluntary which depends upon the will; b. from the spontaneous, which proceeds from a power with sensitive knowledge; for which reason acts of the insane, of infants, and even of brutes can be called spontaneous, but cannot be called voluntary; c. from the free or from a human act: for the voluntary abstracts from whether the act proceeds from the will freely or necessarily, but a human act is a free act.

For him who kills his enemy, both the purpose of killing and the death of the enemy are voluntary; but for him who desires the death of one killed, but does not bring it about, the desire of death is voluntary, while the death is willed. The farmer's desire for rain is voluntary; the rain is willed. But for God the rain is willed and voluntary. Therefore everything voluntary is willed, but not conversely is everything willed voluntary.

43. On the divisions of the voluntary.¹ 1. The voluntary is necessary or free, according as the act of the will is so borne into the object that the will cannot abstain from it, or so that the will can, at its pleasure, place the act or not place it.

Therefore the voluntary and the free properly differ from each other in such a way that the free is a species of the voluntary. For the voluntary generically is an act which proceeds from the will with knowledge of the intellect. But an act of this sort can proceed either in such a way that man has dominion over it, or the power also of abstaining from it, which is the free; or in such a way that he does not have dominion over it, which is the necessary. Nevertheless, in moral matters voluntary and free are used promiscuously, because in man as wayfarer there are no deliberate acts of the will which are plainly necessary.

2. The voluntary is perfect and imperfect by reason of advertence. The former is done with full advertence of the mind and therefore also with full consent of the will; the latter is done with half-full advertence of the mind and therefore also with imperfect consent of the will. The imperfect voluntary is found, for example, in acts of one half asleep, in acts which are done in great disturbance of soul.

The voluntary is not called imperfect because the will embraces the object reluctantly and only with some repugnance; this is the voluntary in a qualified sense, which belongs to the perfect voluntary. Rather it is called imperfect because the will does not fully determine itself to willing the object, for example sin. For the determination by which the will determines itself to willing the object, as to the grade of perfection, depends upon knowledge more or less unimpeded, to such a degree that without full or unimpeded knowledge there cannot be a full and perfect tendency of the will into the object, such as is required for a perfectly human act.

Therefore, for example, a man who, stirred by great anger, in a quarrel with his adversary breaks forth into blasphemies or says insults to him, does not sin gravely, because the blasphemies and insults are either first-first movements on account of the defect of advertence, or are light sins, because on account of the defect of full advertence they are not perfectly voluntary, unless perhaps the blasphemies, on account of a neglected habit of blaspheming, are grave sins.

3. The voluntary is voluntary simply and voluntary in a qualified sense. The former is that which is done with the full inclination of the will without any repugnance at all; the latter is that which is done with full inclination of the will indeed, but at the same time with some repugnance of it. For example, the martyr who offers himself to death wills death simply, that is, he would not wish not to die; and the martyr who is dragged to death wills death in a qualified sense, that is, he would wish not to die.

a. In this division two diverse acts are considered and compared with each other, one of which is done without repugnance, while the other is done with repugnance. Voluntary simply is also called pure voluntary, and voluntary in a qualified sense is called mixed voluntary, because in the same act of the will an inclination is joined with repugnance.

b. The mixed voluntary, or voluntary in a qualified sense, contains in the same act an inclination or consent of the will joined with some repugnance toward that very thing into which the consent is borne, for example the migration of one who is sent into exile. Therefore the mixed voluntary is usually called voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense: voluntary simply, because the will in fact wills the thing and consents to it; involuntary in a qualified sense, because the will would choose the contrary if this were possible. For example, in one who hands over a purse to a robber, handing over the purse is voluntary simply, because he absolutely wills the handing over of the purse, but it is involuntary in a qualified sense, because he would not hand it over unless moved by fear. Likewise the unjust action of one who lends at usury is voluntary simply, because he wills it absolutely, but involuntary in a qualified sense, because he knows that it is unjust.

c. Those things which are done from fear, for example denial of the faith from fear of death, are voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense. A mixed voluntary of this sort is relatively imperfect on the part of consent if it is compared with the pure voluntary, but not of itself on the part of knowledge; therefore the mixed voluntary of itself constitutes a perfectly human act.

4. The voluntary is express and tacit. The former is present when elicited consent is manifested outwardly by words or other signs, as if a superior by stated words or a nod grants or denies something. The latter is present when elicited consent is not manifested outwardly, but is only gathered to be present from some fact or from the omission of a fact, as if a superior, knowing something to be done against the law, does not prohibit it; he is considered to consent tacitly or to give permission. Hence the axiom has prevailed: he who is silent seems to consent.

a. From tacit voluntary there must be distinguished presumed voluntary, which is had when in fact no act or consent of the will is present, but because of the fittingness of the matter it is supposed to be present; for if the matter were proposed, without doubt consent would in fact be present. For example, if someone says to a young man entering a tavern, from the presumed consent of the father: your father wishes you to return home. Sometimes even the tacit voluntary is called presumed, because its existence must be gathered or presumed from external signs and circumstances.

b. Concerning the saying, "he who is silent seems to consent," these things must be noted. Silence of itself signifies neither consent nor dissent; therefore in a particular case one or the other must be gathered from the circumstances. The following rules, however, are established so that the consent or dissent of one who is silent can be presumed from the circumstances according to prudent estimation:

a. One who is silent is considered to consent in favorable matters, namely where it concerns his favor and advantage, but not in odious matters, where it concerns his burden and prejudice. Hence one who is silent when another promises him something is considered to consent; but if someone asks that something be given to him by another and that other is silent, he is not considered to consent.

b. One who is silent is considered to consent even in odious matters if, not wishing to consent, he ought and could contradict; but he is not considered to consent if he is not bound to contradict or cannot. Now he is said not to be able when he cannot without harm or great inconvenience. One who takes a thing while the owner is present and not contradicting does not commit theft, because the owner is considered to consent, unless he is silent from fear or for another reason. And if a prince or superior knows that something is being done against order and does not contradict, he is considered to consent if he could easily contradict or impede it, but not if he could not easily impede it.

5. The voluntary is in itself and in another, or in the cause, which by others is called direct and indirect voluntary, by reason of the mode in which something is intended. The first is what the will immediately intends in itself; thus, for him who deliberately kills his enemy, the death of the enemy is voluntary in itself. The other is that which is not itself intended, but whose cause is intended, and which therefore is foreseen as going to follow from something which is intended in itself and immediately as from a cause; thus to one writing evil books, the sins of the readers, which he foresees but does not intend, are voluntary in the cause.²

a. In order that something be called voluntary in itself, it is not necessary that it be desired for its own sake or as an end, but it can also be desired for the sake of another thing or as a means. Thus for a shipmaster the throwing overboard of goods is voluntary in itself, although he does not will it for its own sake, but as a means for saving the life of those sailing.³ Likewise not only the cause but also the effect together with the cause can be voluntary in itself, provided the will also wills this in itself, as in one who wills, together with medicine, also the effect of health.

b. Something can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: either because by a positive action the cause is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow, and this indeed is called voluntary in a positive cause; or because by omitting an action, the cause is not removed or not impeded, although it can be impeded, and this is called voluntary in a negative cause. Let the death of innocent men in a military commander who fires cannon into a fortress, and the burning of a house in one who does not extinguish a fire set by another, serve as examples.

c. Cause here in a broader sense signifies everything in which another thing is contained, whether as an effect in a cause, or as a part in a whole, or as connected with the other, so that the will cannot desire one without being considered to desire also the other.

d. Therefore the voluntary in the cause is generally an effect which is not intended but which follows apart from intention from a cause which is voluntary in itself and is intended.

6. The voluntary is actual, virtual, habitual, by reason of the influence which the act of the will exercises upon the work, or upon the effect. Since this voluntary agrees in reality with actual, virtual, and habitual intention, it is better to set forth this division under that respect. Intention is the act or tendency of the will toward some end to be obtained through apt means.

a. Actual intention is that which exists here and now, influences the work, and is adverted to reflexively when the work is placed. Thus one who here and now wills to confer baptism and in fact confers it has actual intention in conferring baptism.

It can be twofold: explicit, if the will intends what is apprehended clearly and distinctly, as if someone intends to confer the sacrament of baptism; or implicit, if that which the will intends is in some way contained in that which is explicitly known and intended, as if one baptizing intends to do what he saw the pastor doing. The former has actual explicit intention in conferring baptism; the latter actual implicit intention.

b. Virtual intention is that which, elicited previously, continues here and now, influences the work, but is not adverted to when the work is placed. Thus one who confers baptism which he had previously proposed to confer, but now, when he confers it, no longer thinks of this proposal, has virtual intention in conferring baptism.

The influence of virtual intention is discerned from this example. If someone goes walking after setting for himself the end of the walk, he does not think of the end at each step, but the intention of the end latently continues and brings it about that each step is suitably disposed to the end. This intention is called virtual from the force or virtue by which the act or intention of the will influences the action. What that force is which flows from an act of the will previously elicited into the action now to be placed, and brings it about that the action is virtually voluntary, is explained by authors in diverse ways;⁴ but all agree in this rule to be assigned for practice, by whose aid it can be judged how long a previously elicited intention continues and influences the action: namely, a previously elicited intention influences the action as long as the agent, although he does not think about the intention, nevertheless, if asked what or why he is acting, without a new act of the will and without reflection, from the mere remembrance of the prior intention, immediately says: I am doing this, or, I am doing this for that.⁵

c. Habitual intention is that which, elicited previously, no longer exists nor influences when the work is placed. Thus one who elicited the intention of offering tomorrow's sacrifice of the Mass for a deceased friend, and thinking no more about this intention celebrates tomorrow, applies the Mass from habitual intention.

a. In order that an action proceed from intention as from its cause, the intention must be actual or virtual; habitual intention does not suffice, since this no longer perseveres when the action is placed, nor influences it.

b. Nothing prevents someone from having several intentions at once, or intending several objects at once, whether these are ordered to one another, as if someone wills medicine and through it health, or are not ordered to one another, as if someone undertakes a pious pilgrimage to venerate a saint and to visit a friend.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 15-32. St. Thomas I-II, q. 6. Suarez, De voluntario et involuntario, disp. 10. Frins I, n. 77 ff.

² Others, who follow more exactly the way of speaking of St. Thomas, distinguish direct and indirect voluntary from voluntary in itself and in the cause, and define it so that it agrees with positive and negative voluntary. Cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7.

³ Lehmkuhl I, n. 4.

⁴ On this matter Walsch n. 70 ff. and especially Frins I, n. 51-56 can be consulted.

⁵ Cf. Sporer-Bierbaum III, tr. 7, n. 107 ff.

44. On the involuntary. The involuntary is called that which does not proceed from the will. And since two things are required for the voluntary, consent of the will and knowledge of the intellect, it can happen in two ways that some action is involuntary to the agent: either because he is forced by an external force against the inclination of the will to place the action, as if someone is violently dragged to the shrine of an idol; or because he places the action ignorantly, as if someone kills a man thinking him to be a beast.

a. The involuntary is distinguished into negatively or privatively involuntary and positively involuntary. The former is had when no act exists in the will toward some object; the latter is had when there exists in the will toward some object an act of aversion or unwillingness.

The privatively involuntary is also called the non-voluntary. There are some who distinguish between involuntary and non-voluntary: they call involuntary what someone does while ignorant, which he would not have done if he had known, and therefore against the will; they call non-voluntary what someone indeed does while ignorant, but which he would have done even if he had known, and therefore without the will. The former is done from error, the latter with error. Thus if someone, wishing to kill a beast, kills the goat of his enemy, whom he has long intended to harm, the killing of the goat is indeed not involuntary, but nevertheless non-voluntary.

b. There is perfect and imperfect involuntary. The former is had when the will fully and, as far as lies in it, efficaciously rejects something; the latter is had when the will rejects something weakly and remissly, only with some hesitation. A temptation against faith, charity, or chastity which is entirely rejected without hesitation is perfectly involuntary; but one which is rejected with some hesitation and negligence is imperfectly involuntary.

Human acts, the subject-matter of moral theology, are also called voluntary acts to distinguish them from such actions as are produced under external compulsion. For voluntary acts are the effect of an internal principle, the will (voluntas). The term, however, is ordinarily used not of all actions which are produced by an internal principle, for some of these are specially denominated spontaneous or reflex actions. These latter are the immediate result of sense excitation without the intervention of consciousness. Thus the eyelid closes to protect the threatened organ, and the hand rises involuntarily to drive off a troublesome fly. Voluntary in the strict sense is used only of actions produced by the will with rational knowledge of, and inclination towards, the object. Voluntary actions are produced with consciousness and deliberation. Thus, practically and in the concrete, voluntary actions are identical with human acts, though their connotation is different. For human acts connote freedom, as we have seen, while an act may be voluntary and yet not free. The beatific vision by which the blessed see God face to face, and are thereby thrilled with ineffable delight, is a voluntary act; it proceeds from the will with full and clear knowledge of God, but it is not free; the blessed cannot avert their gaze from the Infinite Beauty which enraptures every fibre of their being. However, all voluntary acts of man are in this life free, and so, for the purposes of moral theology, human acts and voluntary acts are interchangeable terms.

An act may be voluntary in various ways:

(a) An act is perfectly voluntary if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; if the knowledge and deliberation are not full, the act is imperfectly voluntary.

(b) Simply or absolutely voluntary is distinguished from voluntary under a certain respect, or secundum quid. More commonly an action which under the circumstances is willed, but which would not be willed if the circumstances were different, is said to be simply or absolutely voluntary; while inasmuch as the same action would not be willed if the circumstances were different, it may also be said to be only voluntary under a certain respect. Thus, to take the well-worn example, when the merchant is willing in a storm that his goods should be thrown overboard to save the ship, the action is simply voluntary; he would not will it unless the ship were in danger, so that it is also voluntary only under a certain respect.

(c) An action is said to be voluntary in itself when it is in itself and by itself the object of the will; if it is merely the effect of something else which is willed, it is then called voluntary in something else, or voluntary in the cause.

Frequently directly and indirectly voluntary are used in the same sense as voluntary in itself and voluntary in the cause.

All voluntary action is imputed to the agent for praise or blame, merit or demerit; for the action is free, as we have seen, and proceeds from a positive inclination of the will. This inclination of the will is an important element in voluntary actions; the absence of it prevents the sin of man being imputed to God as voluntary, and the same principle sometimes justifies us in performing an action which is right in itself, though some of its effects are evil. But this is an important point and requires fuller treatment.

First of all then, let us see what is required before an evil effect of my action can justly be imputed to me and make me morally guilty.

(a) The evil effect must in some measure be foreseen, otherwise it will be involuntary and not imputable. And so no moral blame attaches to a man who, thinking that he is drinking water, swallows poison. (b) The agent must be able to prevent the evil effect, for we are only responsible for what is under our control. The engine-driver of an express train is not responsible for the death of a person who suddenly throws himself under the wheels of the engine.

(c) There must be an obligation not to perform the action by reason of the evil effect which would follow from it. If the evil effect follows merely by accident, it does not render an otherwise lawful action unlawful, and I am not bound to abstain from it on account of the mere possibility of the evil effect following from it. Thus, if a hundred people indulge in hunting or motoring for a considerable time, some one of them is morally certain to meet with an accident endangering lite or limb. But this does not make hunting or motoring morally wrong. Though I am conscious that the accident may happen to me, I may nevertheless hunt or use the motorcar as usual. If I kill myself or someone else, it will be merely by accident, for it is presumed that I use reasonable care to avoid mishap.

On the other hand, a superior, whose commands I am bound to obey, may have used his authority to forbid an action on account of the possible evil effect which may follow therefrom. In that case I must abstain from the action by reason of the command of my superior, though otherwise I should be free. And so if a father, for special reasons, forbids his son to go to the theatre, the son should obey, as long as he is subject to parental authority. Again, even though there may be no positive command of a superior, in cases where no good would come from the action, and where the only effects would be evil, I am bound to abstain from the action, which in that case itself becomes evil. Similarly, where the evil effects are largely in excess of the good, right reason tells me that I must abstain from the action. But there are many actions which are forbidden by no lawful authority, which have both good and evil effects, while it is not clear that the latter largely outweigh the former. Am I bound to abstain from such actions, or when am I bound to abstain from them ?

Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.—Having discussed human or voluntary acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are of this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.

Acts Elicited by the Will.—The first class of acts under the control of the will are those that are performed by the will itself—i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.

Acts Commanded by the Will.—The second class of acts that are under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.

Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the passions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).

The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b) sensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart.

What is the perfect and imperfect voluntary; the absolute voluntary and velleity; the voluntary simply and according to a certain respect? - These various divisions can be taken and explained in various senses, according as there is considered in the voluntary either precisely the notion of the voluntary, or the notion of the free, or the various object to which it is referred, according to its various state. We shall briefly explain them in the following paragraphs, according to the various acceptions which they have.

By reason of the voluntary, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply, or perfect; another is such according to a certain respect, or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will with the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance. In this way the most perfect voluntary is the love of God toward Himself and the love of the Blessed toward God, which proceed from the most perfect cognition of the object.

The second is that which proceeds indeed from the consenting will, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed volition actually, but mixed with a conditioned nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw away the merchandise, which nevertheless he would also, by deliberate will, wish to preserve if shipwreck were not imminent; hence, not without the deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious repugnance, he absolutely consents to throw them away. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6 ad 3; a. 7 ad 2; Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; L. 1. 5. n. 21.

By reason of the free, according to the varying degree of deliberation, one voluntary is perfect, and it is that which proceeds from the will with perfect cognition and full deliberation; another is imperfect, and that is what proceeds from the will with imperfect cognition and half-full deliberation. Such are the actions of a man half-drunk, half-asleep. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 3, 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. The voluntary that is perfect in this way can well be imperfect in the preceding way, as is clear from the example given of throwing merchandise into the sea in shipwreck.

By reason of deliberation, simply, one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is according to a certain respect, which is also called velleity. And thus, when the temptation of sin stands in the will, yet someone deliberately resists the sin, the will as nature, or according to a certain respect, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Aptly S. Th. 3. p. q. 21. a. 4, where he also gives the reason for this division: "The will simply of man is the will of reason. For we will absolutely what we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the movement of sensuality, or even according to the movement of simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, namely if nothing else stands in the way, which is found by the deliberation of reason. Hence such a will should rather be called velleity than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this if something else did not stand in the way."

By reason of the object, likewise one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is velleity and according to a certain respect, according as the object to which the will tends is considered absolutely, as it really is, according to all its circumstances, or only as it is in itself, with abstraction made from the circumstances.

To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6 ad 1: "Each thing, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, as it is considered with something added, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself contrariwise. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or living to the danger of the multitude, then it is good for him to be killed, and evil for him to live. Hence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain ones to be damned, according to the demand of His justice. And nevertheless that which we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Hence we will something simply according as we will it with all particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Hence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but according to a certain respect he would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Hence it can rather be called velleity than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God wills simply, happens; although that which He wills antecedently does not happen."

And thus also that throwing away of merchandise of which above in n. 30, under various respects, is voluntary according to a certain respect, and at the same time voluntary simply. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 142. a. 3; 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6.

By reason of its perfection, finally, one voluntary is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete; another is the voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete. The first is that which extends itself all the way to the attainment of the thing, by efficaciously willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed all the way to the attainment of the thing, but stops in simple complacency for it. When there is a twofold contrary will concerning the same object, that one is absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other, because one is absolute, the other as if conditioned; for example, someone truly wills to contract marriage, but nevertheless would not wish to receive the sacrament; he truly contracts marriage and receives the sacrament. De Lugo, de Sacr. in genere, d. 8, s. 8, n. 120 ff.

Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason for this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1: "It must be said that the will is intermediate between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the movement of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the will is not complete except concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will it if it were possible."

A sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will; for he has an absolute and efficacious will of health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to employ the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, of health, since he does not at the same time will the means inducing health. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken as if incomplete will were an undeliberated willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberated willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from His kingdom, if he could, and similar things, where it is clear that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompletion of the will is to be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the movement of the will toward the thing. Hence from the fact that the movement of the will is toward the thing to be attained, disposed, etc., by means of exterior operation, it is not perfect, with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of movement of the will, unless it is terminated at a good that can be done, although it is perfect as regards consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God, and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will.

The Angelic Doctor, q. 20. 2. a. 4, says: "If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has according to the matter and due circumstances, then it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected in this, that it attains the end or reaches the term. Hence the will is not perfect unless it is such that, when opportunity is given, it acts. But if possibility is lacking, while the will exists perfected so that it would act if it could, the defect of perfection which is from the exterior act is simply involuntary."

Therefore the will can be called and can be complete in two ways. In one way, according to that relation by which the willed thing is in the will. In another way, according to that by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first way, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that it wills perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that it has perfectly, or attains and possesses the thing willed. Hence the will prepared to act if it could is a perfect will, because it wills perfectly, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really has, attains, and possesses that which it wills, and which it is apt by nature to have. For every movement falling short of the term is imperfect by privation, which consists in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account from the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as the imperfect to the perfect, it follows that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, alone it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater love no one has than that someone lay down his life for his friends; He said lay down, not wish to lay down. Cajetan, on 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5; q. 20, a. 4.

What is the actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative voluntary? - The voluntary, by reason of the very act of the will and its efficacy, is one thing actual or formal, another virtual, another habitual, another interpretative. Actual voluntary is given when someone actually wills something, with actual attention on the part of the intellect, whether he wills explicitly, that is, clearly and in particular, or implicitly, that is, confusedly, by a universal or quasi-universal will, which extends also to this object.

The virtual voluntary is threefold. First, the virtual voluntary is that which perseveres in some power of itself, and it is given when the explicit and clear will itself, or intention of the end, no longer exists, but only volitions of the means explicitly and clearly exist, which volitions of the end itself, in a more remiss degree, with more remiss attention, accompany. Thus when a priest wills to celebrate Mass and then puts on the sacred vestments, approaches the altar, and performs the other customary things, without any longer having that clear actual will to consecrate, the consecration will be virtually voluntary if, while he performs all things voluntarily, there is always present to him, confusedly and weakly, some attention and will to consecrate. Or at least then acts of the cogitative or estimative power remain, which are first generated when the mind proposes its object to the will, and which acts then go on to influence all subsequent acts. When the mind apprehends that object, its apprehension is at the same time generated in the cogitative or estimative power, which pertains to sensitive cognition, and moves the sensitive appetite and the exterior members to motion.

The virtual voluntary, secondly, is that which perseveres in the exterior work itself, commanded by a prior act of the will, or in the voluntary execution of the means, which someone voluntarily employs by the force or virtue and impulse of the prior intention of the end, even though as regards the end not even remiss attention and volition any longer exists. Thus the pilgrimage undertaken by a traveler to the sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin will be virtually voluntary, even though on the journey he no longer attends to it, indeed thinks of entirely different things.

The virtual voluntary, thirdly, is that which perseveres in some moral effect of its own; thus, for example, a contract entered into by a procurator will be virtually voluntary to the principal agent, who gave him the faculty of acting in his name. In a moral effect, so that a merely physical effect may be excluded, into which perhaps that prior act of the will influenced as it is a physical act; for example, if, having had the will to consecrate, afterward while sleeping you consecrate in a dream, the consecration is null. For that prior act of the will does not influence this effect as it is a human or moral act, but merely as it is a certain physical action. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Lugo, de Sacr. in gen., d. 8, s. 5, n. 87; de Fid., d. 1, n. 98; de Poenit., d. 24, s. 4; Laymann, l. 1, c. 2, c. 3, n. 4.

The habitual voluntary is that which was, but is neither in itself, not even weakly, with no attention to it persevering on the part of the intellect, nor in an exterior commanded work, or in the execution of the means, nor in any positive moral effect, but is, morally speaking, in a merely negative effect, insofar as the prior will has not been retracted. Hence a will of this kind suffices for certain moral effects. Thus, if an adult invalidly baptized were rebaptized while he sleeps, the baptism is valid. Thus also "for contracting," says St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 769, "an interpretative or conditional will does not suffice, cf. below n. 773, but an actual or virtual will is required, or at least one had and not retracted, according to what is to be said, l. 6, n. 324." Habitual voluntary is sometimes called virtual voluntary, which in truth is a certain habitual voluntary, insofar as it is distinguished from actual. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Laymann, l. c.

Interpretative voluntary is an act of the will which neither is, nor was, because cognition of the object is not present and was not present, but would be if cognition of this kind were had. Just as actual and virtual voluntary is a true cause of the act which is posited by the force of an actual or past volition, so habitual and interpretative voluntary is not a cause of the act. Habitual makes it that the act is positively according to the will, for example, the reception of a sacrament by a dying person deprived of his senses, who while healthy had resolved to receive the sacrament in danger of death. Interpretative makes it that the act at least is not judged to be against the will. Its foundation is the disposition and inclination of the soul, on account of the suitability of the thing. And these concern the voluntary considered in itself. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 4.

What is expressed, tacit, presumed, interpretative voluntary? - If the voluntary is considered insofar as it is outwardly shown by some sign, then expressed, tacit, presumed, and interpretative will are distinguished.

Expressed will is that which is expressed by words, letters, nods, or some exterior deed. This is one thing explicitly expressed, namely when someone by an exterior sign clearly and explicitly, or in particular, manifests some act of the will; another is implicitly expressed, when someone by an exterior sign manifests that he wills something with which another thing is connected.

Tacit will is that which is manifested by silence itself. He who is silent seems to consent, if namely he can and ought to speak, or if there is question of a matter simply favorable, unless nevertheless from the nature of the thing or from law expressed consent is required. Hence tacit voluntary does not lack its effect. And tacit license is valid, as expressed license is valid. Rule 43 in the Sixth.

Presumed will is that which, although it is not known to us a posteriori by some exterior sign, or by silence itself, nevertheless is gathered a priori to be present. For there is some sufficient cause for judging thus.

Interpretative will is that which, although in reality it neither was present nor is present, and is not gathered to be or to have been present either by some exterior sign a posteriori or by some sufficient cause a priori, nevertheless there is some sufficient reason for gathering that it would be present if cognition of the object were had. Therefore no one sins by merely interpretative will. And therefore the confessor rightly imparts absolution to one retaining another's thing in good faith, if the same confessor does not admonish him for this reason, namely because the penitent, knowing the thing to be another's, would still retain it and would not restore it. Struggl, t. 1, q. 1, a. 2.

Presumed voluntary is sometimes had by the law itself, namely when in certain determinate cases the law presumes a priori that consent of the will was present. Thus formerly, by Canon Law, a silent son was presumed to consent to betrothals contracted for him by his parents. But this presumption of law, in the internal forum, always yields to the truth; and it yields to it also in the external forum, if it can be proved. C. un. de Despons. impub. in the Sixth.

What is the distinction between presumed and interpretative will? - Presumed will is often confused with interpretative will. It is also often distinguished from it by distinguishing presumed will concerning the present, which is properly called by us presumed, and presumed will concerning the future, which is properly called by us interpretative. So that the distinction between the two may be better known, the matter can be explained by this practical example.

A religious on a journey, while the superior is absent, wishes to buy a thing of some importance and of great utility for the whole community. He writes about the matter to the superior. While the superior, after receiving the letter, is writing back, the occasion for buying the thing presses, and he buys it, the response not yet having been received because of lack of time, presuming an affirmative response from the otherwise well-known will of the superior. Here you have will simply presumed, or presumed concerning the present. But whether the will of the superior is really present, or is falsely presumed to be present, the truth itself must be inspected, which the response of the superior afterward received will declare.

But if the same occasion presses for buying a thing very useful to the community, for example a great abundance of excellent books at a very small price, and no time is present for consulting the absent superior, nevertheless from the same otherwise well-known will of the superior that religious presumes that he would agree if he were asked, and he buys the books with the money received for the journey, preferring the utility of the monastery to a more comfortable journey, you have will presumed concerning the future or interpretative. L. 1. 3. n. 288, 700; l. 4. n. 18; Laymann, l. c. n. 3; Struggl, l. c. n. 20; La-Croix, l. 4. n. 1324 ff.

1. Blasius, wishing to harm Caius his enemy, intended to pierce his ass with lead. But alas! a double misfortune befell him. For the ass is not struck by the bullet, but leaps and springs away unharmed, while the cow of Titius his friend, which after a dense hedge was lying quietly, and could not be seen by him, is unhappily killed.

Q. 1. What is the not-voluntary and the involuntary? 2. Is Blasius held to restitution for the ass not harmed, or for the cow killed?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 8, 18. To the second, negatively to both. He is certainly not held to restitution for the ass, since it escaped unharmed. For to sin the mere will of causing damage suffices; but for restitution from damage caused, the mere damaging will does not suffice. There is also required a truly damaging action, and damage truly inflicted.

Nor is he held to restitution for the cow, since he neither intended that damage nor could foresee it, and so it was not voluntary; indeed it was altogether involuntary to him. For, for restitution from damage caused, an action actually damaging and damage actually inflicted do not suffice; it is required also that damage of this sort proceed from the will and be voluntary, so that it may be imputed to him and an obligation of reparation arise for him. Therefore in the forum of conscience, or before the sentence of a judge, he cannot be urged to any reparation of the damage. But what if the ass and the cow had belonged to the same Caius? In the rigor of principles, not even then would Blasius be held for the damage. For although it would not then have been involuntary, nevertheless it would still have been not-voluntary, because that damage would always have been unforeseen. For he had not seen the cow. - G. 3; I. M. 1358, 1370.

2. Faustinus, wishing to affect Nicolinus his enemy with injury, resolved to kill a pair of horses, which Nicolinus held very dear to himself. But amid the darkness of night, not discerning well, he kills another pair, namely asses of the same Nicolinus, which Nicolinus also held very dear to himself.

Q. Is Faustinus held to restitution; and, if affirmatively, what ought he to restore?

R. Faustinus is held to restitution from unjust damaging. For in the case there was a culpable, efficacious, and unjust cause of damage. Therefore no necessary condition for restitution is lacking. And indeed, knowingly and willingly, Faustinus killed the pair of asses, although he thought it was a pair of horses. Whence it cannot here be said that that killing was not-voluntary to him. The difficulty can only be in the estimation of the damage, because this cannot be taken from the horses, which he did not kill, nor from the asses, which he did not wish to kill. But certainly it cannot be taken from the horses, because their damage does not exist; and, on the contrary, it must be taken from the asses, because their damage does exist. In the present matter, error of person excuses from restitution, because then there is no injury of the person; but error of thing, since it does not remove injury of the person, does not excuse from restitution; for this always remains, whether by damage of horses or of asses; for in that damaging, the injury of the person, not of the horses nor of the asses, is considered. Therefore the damage unjustly inflicted must be repaired: the damage inflicted, by no means that which was not inflicted. If Caius, in order to inflict injury on Sempronius, were to snatch from him a golden necklace, judging it silver, and throw it into the sea, would he not certainly be held for the estimated value of a silver necklace? And if the necklace were silver, and he judged it golden, would he not again be held for the real value of the silver necklace? - Cf. 5. 1.

1. If the voluntary is considered in order to the act itself, which proceeds from the will, and in order to the object, about which that act is occupied, other divisions of the voluntary are had.

2. Two things concur in the voluntary, namely an intrinsic principle and cognition of the end. By reason of this cognition, one voluntary is perfect, another imperfect. But this division can be taken in two ways. For if only an imperfect cognition of the end is had, as to its intrinsic nature, as is sensitive cognition, which consists in the apprehension alone of the thing which is the end, without the fact that the account of the end and the proportion of the means to the end are known, then the imperfect voluntary is had, which also belongs to brute animals. But if perfect cognition of the end is had, as to its intrinsic nature, as is the intellective cognition of the thing which is the end, of the thing which is the means, and at the same time of the account of the end and of the proportion of the means, then the perfect voluntary is had, which belongs only to rational nature. Therefore the imperfect voluntary is the act of the sensitive appetite; the perfect voluntary, from the act, is the rational appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2.

3. The perfect and imperfect voluntary can besides be had in the very act of the will, according to its accidental perfection. The perfect voluntary is had in those acts of the will which proceed with full cognition and advertence. The imperfect voluntary is had in those acts of the same will which proceed with half-full cognition and advertence, as are sometimes the acts of children, and the acts of the half-fatuous, the half-asleep, the half-drunk, acts of sudden anger. The aforesaid deliberation is situated in the consideration of various objects, which are proposed as to be chosen to the liberty of the will, and it can be completed in a very brief time and in a single moment. Whence it happens that in this imperfect voluntary there can be great latitude, such as there can be in imperfect advertence. Yet in this division the imperfect voluntary is taken insofar as the perfect voluntary is excluded, and consequently insofar as there is excluded the perfect use of reason which may suffice for the exercise of liberty, according to the capacity of the object. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 3. 4.

4. By reason of the voluntary itself, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply or perfect, another is such secundum quid or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will, by the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance, as, for example, the leader of an army going on to triumph after victory has been obtained. The second is that which indeed proceeds from the will consenting, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed an actual volition, but one mingled with a conditional nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw out the merchandise, which nevertheless, by a deliberate will also, he would wish to preserve, if shipwreck were not threatening; whence not without a deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious one, he absolutely consents to throw it out. Whence “those things which are done through fear are not voluntary simply, but mixed.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 142. a. 3. Cf. n. 6 and S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 3., a. 7. ad 2., 3. q. 47. a. 1. — This division of the voluntary into the voluntary such simply and into the voluntary secundum quid, into the perfect and imperfect voluntary, can be taken in various senses, as is already clear from what has been said and will further be clear from what is soon to be said. For that denomination can be taken from various respects of the voluntary.

5. By reason of the free, or by reason of deliberation, one voluntary is absolute and simply, another secundum quid, which is also called velleity. And thus, while a temptation of sin stands in the will, which nevertheless someone deliberately resists, the will, as nature, or secundum quid, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Appositely St. Thomas, 3. p. q. 21. a. 4., where at the same time he gives the reason for this division: “The will of man simply is the will of reason. For this we will absolutely, which we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the motion of sensuality, or even according to the motion of the simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but secundum quid, namely if something else does not stand in the way, which is discovered through the deliberation of reason. Whence such a will is rather to be called velleity than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this, if something else did not stand in the way.”

6. By reason of the object toward which the will tends, one voluntary is absolute and simply, another is that which is velleity and secundum quid, namely insofar as it is considered absolutely, as it in fact is, according to all its circumstances, or only insofar as it is in itself, abstraction having been made from the circumstances. To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6. ad 1: “Everything, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, insofar as it is considered with some adjunct, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself in the opposite way. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or one living to the danger of the multitude, thus it is good for him to be killed and evil for him to live; whence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills the man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain men to be damned according to the demand of his justice. Nor however do we will simply that which we will antecedently, but secundum quid: because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Whence we will something simply, according as we will it with all the particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Whence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but secundum quid would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Whence it can rather be called velleity than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills, comes to be, although that which he antecedently wills does not come to be.” And hence it is clear that the throwing of merchandise into the sea, which was spoken of above in n. 4, by one account is voluntary secundum quid, but by this account must be called voluntary absolutely and simply, namely by looking at the thing as it is done here and now.

7. The voluntary, also by reason of the object and by reason of its perfection, is one kind of voluntary that is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete, as it is called by St. Thomas, and another is voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete, as it is called by the same Holy Doctor. The first is that which extends itself even to the attainment of the thing, by willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed as far as the attainment of the thing, but rests in simple complacency toward it. Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason of this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5. ad 1: “It must be said that the will is middle between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the motion of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in the universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the motion of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is a good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the complete will is only concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But the incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will that, if it were possible.” And thus a sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will: for he has an absolute and efficacious will for health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to apply the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, for health, since at the same time he does not will the means inducing health.

8. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken thus, as if incomplete will were a non-deliberate willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberate willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from his kingdom if he could, and similar things; where it is certain that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompletion of the will must be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the manner of the motion of the will to the thing. Hence, from the fact that the motion of the will is to the thing, to be attained, disposed, etc., by the mediation of exterior operation, it is not perfect with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of the motion of the will unless it is terminated at an achievable good, although it is perfect as to consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will. Cajetan in l. c. And in q. 20. a. 4 the same Angelic Doctor says: “If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act, which it has (the exterior act) according to the matter and the due circumstances, thus it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or motion is perfected in this, that it obtains the end or reaches the term: whence there is no perfect will, unless it is such that, given the opportunity, it operates. But if possibility is lacking, the will existing perfect, so that it would operate if it could, the defect of perfection, which is from the exterior act, is simply involuntary.” Therefore the will can be called and be complete in two ways. In one way according to that relation by which the thing willed is in the will. In another way according to that relation by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first mode, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that there is willing perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that there is having perfectly, or attaining and possessing the thing willed. Whence a will prepared to operate if it could is a perfect will, because it perfectly wills, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really have, attain, and possess that which it wills and which it is naturally ordered to have. For every motion falling short of the term is imperfect through privation consisting in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account than the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as imperfect to perfect, the consequence is that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, by itself it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater charity no one has, than that someone lay down his soul for his friends; he said “lay down,” not “wish to lay down.” Cajetan in l. c.

9. The voluntary, by reason of the very act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one kind direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting. And here one must distinguish between omission and the effect of omission. An omission is voluntary, although there is no obligation of positing the act. For if the intellect adverts to that which is omitted, now that omission depends upon the will, so that it be posited or not posited, and thus it is always voluntary. Nor is it required for this, that it be voluntary, that there be a precept of positing the act. He who, intent on study, omits Mass on a weekday, omits it no less freely than on a feast day. Whence an omission is not always culpable; for this other thing depends upon a precept, which certainly can be present, of positing the act, but such a precept is not always had. Indeed there are many voluntary omissions which nevertheless at the same time are not culpable. He who gives himself to prayer or study omits lawful recreation, not through a direct volition of that omission, but from the voluntary choice of prayer or study at that time, and certainly he does not sin, indeed he merits. But the effect accompanying or following an omission is not voluntary apart from an obligation of impeding it, unless perhaps the omission is ordered to this effect. For the aforesaid effect does not proceed physically from the will; for the will, not acting, can exercise no physical influence into it. Nor indeed does it proceed morally from the will; for, since it does not proceed physically from the will, the will in no way influences it, and therefore neither can it be attributed to it morally, except insofar as the will can and ought to impede it. For then that effect is imputed to the will, insofar as the care of impeding the effect is incumbent upon the will. Wherefore, setting aside this obligation of impeding the effect following from the omission, an effect of this kind is not voluntary. Appositely the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3: “Not always is that which follows upon a defect of action traced back, as to a cause, to the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or if the governance of the ship had not been committed to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, because the will by willing and acting can impede this which is not willing and not acting, and sometimes ought to do so, this which is not willing and not acting is imputed to it, as existing from it.”

10. “It is confirmed 1.º from the distinction which exists between the omission itself and that effect following or accompanying it, respectively to the will. An omission of itself immediately, no other cause intervening, depends upon the will; for the will can no less immediately not will than will. Whence, in order that non-volition or the omission of willing be voluntary indirectly, it does not need another cause, but only advertence and the suspension of influence in a vital mode, which it provides by eliciting another act incompossible with the act which is omitted; for then the omission proceeds indirectly from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end. But the effect following or accompanying an omission is not of itself immediately from the will, but by the mediation of another intervening cause; if, for example, while I omit to separate two men fighting, the killing thereafter following is caused neither by my will nor by my omission, but by the sword of the killer; likewise when a sailor omits to govern the ship, neither his will nor his omission sinks the ship, but the storm. Therefore, in order that such an effect be referred back to the will as to a cause, and be called interpretatively voluntary, something must be assigned by which it happens that it pertains in some manner to the will and has some connection with it; and nothing else can be assigned except the precept of impeding that effect. 2.º There are effects following or accompanying a voluntary omission which in no way are voluntary, because of a defect of obligation to impede them: thus God voluntarily omits to impede the sins of men, and nevertheless the sins are not voluntary to him, because he is not bound to impede them.” Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 1, a. 1.

11. But it has been said, unless perhaps the omission is ordered by way of means to this effect; for if the aforesaid omission is ordered by the agent himself as a means to this effect, “then it is manifest that such an effect would be directly intended and willed, and consequently positively and directly voluntary: as, if someone, to this end that he suffer cold, for the sake of mortification, omits to approach the fire; the cold is positively voluntary to him, because intended and willed of itself.” Billuart, l. c. But if the aforesaid omission of itself is ordered as a means to this effect, as, for example, if someone omits to eat and drink and then dies from hunger and thirst, then, because of that intimate conjunction between the omission and the effect, the effect with it is judged to constitute one object, and pertains to the same species with its cause. He who wills the antecedent also wills the consequent intimately connected with it, sufficient cognition being supposed. Whence in a voluntary of this kind, a precept can contribute only to this, that that voluntary be base or honorable, but not to this, that it be voluntary, since the voluntary is from the intrinsic, and the precept is extrinsic. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

12. The voluntary, likewise by reason of the very act of the will and by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing as voluntary in itself, another as voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; but the second when someone wills the cause from which he foresees that some effect will follow; for then he does not will this in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. He is said to foresee, that is, merely to foresee; for if besides he wills it, now that effect will be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not only in the cause. Hence, moreover, it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect in respect of the will will have the character of an end, and the cause the character of a means. For that which someone wills for its own sake has the character of an end; that which someone wills for the sake of another has the character of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that, if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, now that effect is outside the intention, and can in no way be voluntary even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to do so, the effect is imputed to it; and consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3., q. 71. a. 5. And thus the evil things of the deed, committed against the neighbor in drunkenness, are voluntary in the cause for him who has been voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. Cf. the following number and Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4, etc.

13. Many Theologians wholly distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says: “the voluntary in itself is clear enough; for then something is called voluntary in itself, when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately occupied about it, either through a proper act, if it is direct voluntary, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirect voluntary.” D. 1. S. 4. Likewise St. Thomas, q. 77. a. 7: “Two things,” he says, “seem to have to be considered. First indeed, that something can be voluntary, either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it; or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause, and not into the effect; as is clear in him who is voluntarily made drunk. For from this, that which he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed, that into which the will is borne; indirectly, however, that which the will was able to prohibit, but does not prohibit.” — But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause direct and indirect voluntary, and they express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. For the positive voluntary is that which proceeds from a positive voluntary action. The negative voluntary, on the contrary, is that which depends upon the voluntary omission of some action. And thus the positive voluntary is in him who by his command or counsel provokes another to committing theft; the negative voluntary is in him who does not impede a theft when he can and ought to impede it. Cf. Gury-Ballerini n. 5., Suarez, l. c.

14. Further, a comparison having been established between both divisions, of the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and of the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting on the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary comprehends under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause: for the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be “that which proceeds from the will as from an agent,” q. 6. a. 3. ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing. — But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be “that which is from the will, as from one not acting,” l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the will acting and willing. Therefore the indirect voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Yet it can be reduced to each. For the indirect voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since exteriorly not acting is as it were the object exteriorly completing that not willing, as the latter is in some manner voluntary in itself, so also the former; since, as it were, one complete non-act is constituted, for example, not willing to hear Mass and not hearing Mass in fact, from both the lack of the interior and of the exterior act, as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act, of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass. Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so upon the omission of an act another act can follow; and although this is not properly the effect of that omission, as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect; whence it can be called voluntary in the cause, and thus, for example, the death of those sailing is indirectly voluntary, and, in the sense stated, is voluntary in the cause for the helmsman of the ship ceasing from governing.

15. Concerning a bad effect in particular, the question is raised: what is required so that a bad effect following, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will unto fault? — The matter concerns only a bad effect; for if the discussion is about a good effect, if this is outside the intention, it can attribute no morality to the act of the will by reason of itself. The will does not touch it by its act; therefore the goodness of the will cannot arise from it. “For this,” says S. Th. q. 18. a. 7. ad 3, “that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of the good, i.e. that it will the good on account of the good.” On the contrary, if the effect is bad, although the will does not intend it, it can receive its imputation, namely if it is bound to impede it, and consequently to abstain from positing its cause. It is said by reason of itself; for by reason of the cause itself we have already seen how the exterior act adds something of goodness or malice. Cf. n. 7.

16. Further, for the aforesaid imputation three conditions are required. The first is that he who posits or omits the cause advert at least confusedly that such an effect is going to follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless it is in some manner foreknown. Wherefore, with ignorance of the future effect standing, no one can be held by any obligation of not positing the cause, namely the cause either by doing something or by omitting to act. Therefore the effect will be able in no way to be imputed to him. Hence death is not imputed to him who offered to another a liquid which he did not know to be poisonous. Nor is drunkenness imputed to him who, ignorant of the strength of the wine, drank to satiety. Precognition of the effect can be had in two ways: first, if it is directly foreseen; secondly, if it is in the power of the one acting to forethink and notice it, and from negligence he omits to do this.

17. The second condition is that the agent be able to impede such a cause, i.e. physically, which is clear of itself; there is no obligation to impossible things; and likewise morally, or without a graver inconvenience, according to the nature of the thing. For, with attention to the matter in question, not only physical but also moral impossibility can excuse. Consequently the sins of subjects are often not imputed to a Superior, because it is impossible for the Superior himself to impede them, at least without a graver inconvenience.

18. Finally, the third condition is that the agent ought to omit or remove that cause, by reason of the aforesaid bad effect that is going to follow; because an effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in fact does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. Appositely S. Th. q. 6. a. 3: “But it must be known that not always is that which follows upon a defect of action traced back as to a cause into the agent, from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman (of the ship) could not direct the ship, or if the governance of the ship had not been committed to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him.” And thus also if someone has not kept the ecclesiastical fast, and at night experiences pollution, this pollution perhaps following from the aforesaid intemperance is not imputed to him; for he was not bound to observe the law of fasting by reason of impeding this effect, but from elsewhere, by reason of the precept of the Church. On the contrary, he sins who gives alms to a poor man whom he knows will abuse it to make himself drunk; for although that alms is a cause wholly per accidens of the aforesaid drunkenness, nevertheless one is bound from charity to abstain from giving the alms precisely by reason of the aforesaid bad effect. The reason is that when there is an obligation of not positing the cause by reason of such an effect, although cause and effect are not connected physically and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless they are connected morally, insofar as, with the obligation standing of impeding the effect as far as possible, its cause, although only per accidens, constitutes with it one moral object, according to the account of disconvenience, and therefore the will of one is judged to be the virtual will of the other. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

19. These things having been set down, another question is easily resolved: when is someone bound to remove or not posit a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, which he foresees? It is said, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow; for the question is not about the obligation of a cause not to be posited or to be removed by reason of itself. For if it is good in itself, it is not to be removed by reason of itself; but if it is evil, whether a bad effect follows or does not follow, it cannot be posited, because it is evil in itself. Thus, for example, someone eating meat then suffers shameful motions; abstracting from this effect, he indeed can eat meat on Sunday, but cannot eat it on Friday, not on account of that effect which happens on Friday, for otherwise he could not eat it even on Sunday, but because on Sunday it is permitted by the Church to eat meat, and on Friday it is prohibited. Wherefore the question in this case is such: whether, namely, on account of that foreseen bad effect, he ought to abstain from meat, both on Friday and on Sunday and on any other day.

20. Now someone is bound to remove a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, 1.º when from it per se, or from its intrinsic nature, directly and primarily, and uniquely, a bad effect follows. The reason is that then a cause of this kind must be evil in itself. For a cause according to moral estimation is judged from the effect into which of itself, or from its nature, it directly and primarily tends; since this is nothing but bad, consequently the cause is bad. And then the case is verified that, abstracting from the effect, someone cannot posit the cause by reason of itself; and thus neither can he tend in any manner into the effect, since, the cause being removed, the effect is removed. And thus it is not licit to offer poison to someone, from which nothing but death would follow.

21. Someone is bound 2.º to remove a cause, if, although a good effect follows from it, nevertheless the bad effect follows from it per se, directly and primarily; and only through this as medium, another good effect follows from it per se, namely secondarily and indirectly. The reason is that, notwithstanding that secondary and indirect good effect, the cause remains evil; and evils are not to be done that goods may come. The same must be said if the good effect follows only per accidens, in whatever way it happens. For a cause is specified not by an effect per accidens, but by an effect per se. “The power of a cause is estimated according to effects per se, but not according to effects per accidens.” S. Th. q. 20. a. 5. “For judgment concerning some thing is not given according to that which is per accidens, but only according to that which is per se.” S. Th. ib. c. And thus a girl cannot procure abortion in herself in order to avoid infamy; for the good effect follows from another preceding bad effect, from the killing of the innocent through the procured abortion, which is assumed as a means to that end.

22. Someone is bound 3.º to remove a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless one is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept which urges as to be fulfilled. Hence a physician and a surgeon, suffering bad motions in the exercise of their own art, do not sin, because they are not bound, by reason of impeding such an effect, to omit the exercise of their own art. But he would sin if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 152. “For he who is obligated to a law must necessarily be obligated to procure the ordinary means, and those proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things.” Ithurriaga, Cas. 32. n. 4. But the reason, as has already been said, is taken from this: that by reason of the precept, that cause and the effect following from it, although physically they are connected only per accidens, and neither is the cause of the other, nevertheless morally they are judged to have the account of one disconvenient object, or of one to be avoided by the will; and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4. 5. Therefore homicide would deservedly be imputed to him who, against a law prohibiting it, left heavy vessels upon a window without securing them, or impeding them by some barrier from falling into the public way, if they then were carried away by the wind and killed a man.

23. From this it is understood that for this voluntary, not just any precept of avoiding the cause is sufficient, one which is wholly extrinsic to such an effect, as appears in the example brought forward in him who in the time of Lent is bound to fasting and to abstinence by reason of the precept of the Church, but not lest pollution follow. Rather, there is necessary a precept which induces an intrinsic obligation of avoiding that cause, precisely by reason of such an effect, and consequently which induces a moral mutation in that object, by reason of that moral connection with the effect, that precept standing. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

24. Finally, someone is bound 4.º to remove the aforesaid cause, by reason of the bad effect, when, although that cause is honorable in itself or indifferent, nevertheless from the part of the agent there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness. The reason 1.º is that natural equity requires this, that we avoid evil as far as can reasonably be done. Wherefore a reasonable cause for permitting a bad effect is necessary, and this can be nothing other than either necessity, or utility, or at least the fittingness of the action, or the good which is in that action, or which comes from that same action. 2.º Because then an honorable end of the one acting is lacking from the part of the agent. 3.º Because then to will a cause of this kind without any proportionate reason shows of itself a bad affection directly toward that evil future effect, or at least there is often the proximate danger of such a bad affection directly toward the aforesaid evil effect. Wherefore a priest does not sin when administering Communion to a hidden sinner publicly asking, because he does this to avoid the public harm which would follow from that public denial of the Eucharist. On the contrary, he would sin administering Communion to a public sinner publicly asking, because now that honorable end is lacking for impeding that immense sacrilege, which would not be without public scandal.

25. On the contrary, someone is not bound to omit or remove a cause by reason of the aforesaid bad effect when, setting aside that special obligation from charity, from justice, from an urgent precept, of impeding the effect, the bad effect follows merely per accidens, or from extrinsic circumstances, or follows only from another preceding good effect. For since the cause must be judged from the effect per se, and from the effect into which it tends directly and primarily, that cause is either good, or at least indifferent, in itself. Wherefore, if an honorable end of the one acting is not lacking from elsewhere, the agent can posit or preserve it. “And although also the goodness of the action is not caused from the goodness of the effect, nevertheless from this the action is called good, that it can induce a good effect; and thus the very proportion of the action to the effect is the reason of its goodness.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2. ad 3. And thus the leader of an army in war directing fiery balls against a fortress in which there are enemies attacking is not bound to desist from the assault of the fortress from the fact that those enemies therefore blaspheme God. For that assault is a cause wholly per accidens, from extrinsic circumstances, of those blasphemies.

26. Likewise someone is not bound to omit or remove a cause, precisely by reason of the bad effect, if from it there follows at the same time a good effect which the agent intends; at the same time, because namely that cause tends equally directly and primarily, by an almost parallel influence, into a good and bad effect. For then the cause in itself according to moral estimation is indifferent, but honorable insofar as it is subject to the intention of the agent; for the bad effect is not intended, but only permitted. Wherefore the agent can posit that cause, if again one is not bound to impede that effect in the particular case on account of charity, justice, or another special precept to be fulfilled, nor from the part of the one acting is an honorable end lacking. “Nothing prevents,” says the Angelic Doctor, “one act from having two effects, of which one only is in the intention, but the other is outside the intention. But morally acts receive their species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention, since it is per accidens.” 2. 2. q. 44. a. 7. Therefore it is licit to repel force by force; for equally from this repulsion of force by force inflicted there follows the defense of one’s own life and the destruction of another’s. Cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

27. Nor indeed is it required that the good intended in the positing of the cause equal the evil which also follows from it. For first, morally speaking, that equalization is impossible, since good and evil are in a diverse genus. Besides, the liceity of such an action does not depend on this equalization, but on the fact that that action is honorable in itself, since, objectively speaking, it is indifferent, but, subjectively speaking, only an honorable end is intended in it. It is confirmed from the fact that, where the matter concerns avoiding the evil of others, we are often not bound to that except from charity, and charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience: the gravity of this inconvenience, from the doctrine of all, is considered per se, namely independently of equalization with the evil to be permitted. Moreover, if that equalization were always required, already it would be a most grave inconvenience if someone always had to abstain from acting in order to avoid the evil which also follows from it; and such an inconvenience would be still graver if it had to be undergone by all. Wherefore, although that equalization between good and evil is not had, if the inconvenience to be undergone is considered in the particular case, nevertheless it is had if it is considered generally with respect to all, and with respect to all cases. Finally, confirmation is added from what Theologians commonly teach. For from the common doctrine, one is not bound, on account of bad effects against chastity, to abstain from horseback riding, from a more comfortable manner of lying in bed, from the moderate taking of drink or hot foods, from leading honorable dances. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483. A woman can go to church to hear Mass, although scandal of someone follows from his own malice. Nor indeed is someone bound to give a driver a wage greater than is just, lest he blaspheme. The bad effect in these cases certainly exceeds, and far exceeds, the good effect.

28. Now, since that cause of permitting the bad effect is situated in the good itself which is had or follows from the action whence that bad effect arises, although compensation and equalization are not required between the good and bad effect, nevertheless a proportionate reason is required for positing the cause of the bad effect, as was said in n. 24. Wherefore a reason for acting is required to be greater in proportion as the cause touches the bad effect more proximately and immediately, in proportion as the influence of the aforesaid cause into the bad effect is more necessary, in proportion as its influence into this effect is greater, in proportion as the bad effect is more certain and graver, in proportion as less right to the action considered in itself is had. And this consideration has place especially where the matter concerns avoiding harm to others, whether temporal or spiritual. And if the discussion is about spiritual harm or sin, that must be weighed in particular: whether, namely, the sin arises rather from another’s malice than from our action. — If therefore a cause influences the bad effect remotely and lightly, and from it some good effect also follows, for this reason there is not an obligation of taking away the cause, because a lesser reason is required for positing a cause influencing evil only lightly and remotely than if it influenced gravely and proximately. Hence you are not bound to abstain from honorable and useful conversation with a woman on account of bad motions arising thence. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 1, art. 1.

29. Another question concerning this matter remains to be resolved: whether an effect that has followed, gravely culpable, voluntary in the cause or indirectly, is always imputable unto grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if someone illicitly posits the cause, without any sufficient reason. — The aforesaid malice cannot be contracted in the case except insofar as someone wills the cause; for the matter concerns the voluntary in the cause, or the indirectly voluntary; the effect, as going to follow, is foreseen only from the cause. But the cause cannot contain in itself the malice proper to the effect except insofar as it influences the effect. If therefore the cause influences the effect merely per accidens, and there is no special obligation of not positing the cause by reason of the bad effect, cf. nn. 18, 19, 22, 23, no malice from the effect can redound into the cause. Therefore although someone posits the cause without sufficient reason, not for that reason does he contract any malice of the effect, although he sins from elsewhere. With respect to such an effect the will has itself merely permissively. The reason is that, since the effect follows only per accidens, there is no connection, so far as is from the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. And for this reason he who wills the cause does not also will the effect, but wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause per se, but merely per accidens, someone willing the cause, every intention of the bad effect being excluded, contracts no malice of this, neither grave nor light, although perhaps from elsewhere he even sins gravely. And thus if someone foresees pollution from excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly or perhaps even gravely by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of luxury. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing some bad effect only per accidens, by reason only of the bad effect itself; and in no way also is he bound to abstain from positing that cause if, supposing that it is honorable or at least indifferent in itself, there is present a reasonable motive for positing a cause of this kind. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

30. But if the cause per se, that is from its own nature, influences the effect, and influences gravely, grave malice redounds from the effect into the cause. Wherefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, he who wills a cause per se gravely influencing a bad effect, gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in fact directly wills the bad effect itself; since on the one hand the cause and effect are inseparably connected with each other, so far as is from the very nature of the thing, and on the other hand, since there is no other honorable reason present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed, this is certainly a sufficient sign that someone wills the effect itself. He who, for example, knowingly and prudently sets fire to another’s house, whence the whole house is burned, certainly wills the burning of the house, and this is deservedly imputed to him. Yet except the case in which, although the cause per se gravely influences the bad effect, nevertheless in the particular case, on account of peculiar dispositions of the agent or of the patient, that cause is deprived of such an effect, although per accidens.

31. If finally the cause indeed influences the effect per se, but only lightly, only light malice can redound from the effect into the cause. Wherefore he who wills the cause of that bad effect gravely evil, without sufficient reason, can sin only lightly, always excluding the proximate danger of further consent. Moreover, practically speaking, in such a case a sufficient indication of bad affection directly toward the effect itself is not had. For since the cause per se has only a light influence into that effect, gravely bad, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and thus, so far as is from the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with each other. Wherefore, at least practically speaking, it is not because someone wills the cause that he also wills the effect; but he can have himself only permissively with regard to this effect. And indeed there are many who utterly shudder at mortal sin, but do not hate venial sin in such a way that they would not admit it even by a deliberate purpose. These easily consent to a lightly bad cause; but they are in no way borne into a gravely bad effect. — Hence the proper reason must be sought why, although smallness of matter is not given in the venereal matter, nevertheless it is given in those acts of mere sensuality, such as lookings, from a cause of mere curiosity, at things less honorable, with the intention of the venereal thing itself being again excluded, as the most common opinion of theologians holds. For since here the cause influences the effect only lightly, only light malice can redound from the effect into the cause, nor must someone willing the cause necessarily will also the effect.

32. In the last place it must be noted “that the same act can be voluntary in another causally, and nevertheless be involuntary in itself objectively, as if someone by a direct act wholly does not will to kill a man, and nevertheless wills to shoot an arrow, sufficient diligence not being used, lest he kill a man; for then homicide, if it should happen to occur, is in itself involuntary formally by reason of the prior act, and nevertheless it is voluntary in another and virtually by reason of the posterior act. And the reason is that those two acts in themselves are not formally contrary; and otherwise, since the will is free, although it does not will homicide, it can fail to be applied actually to showing the necessary diligence lest homicide follow; and therefore I said that it is involuntary objectively rather than causally.” Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, s. 4.

33. You will resolve from all that has been said about the voluntary in the cause: 1.º “If the cause of pollution is gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed unto sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was foreseen at least confusedly. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which per se are grave faults in the genus of luxury, namely touches or looks upon the shameful parts of another’s or one’s own body with base and deliberate pleasure; the sight of human intercourse and lingering thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions coming from these causes certainly are mortal sins. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act, which is the cause of pollution, has special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45. n. 23, and all consent.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 482. Special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in the pleasure excited from a base object. Cf. Salmant., Theol. Schol., Tr. 13, D. 10, n. 274.

Gravely influencing: wherefore if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow; since then it follows outside the intention and per accidens. Salmant., Theol. Mor., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.

Per se they are grave faults: “the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of luxury... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — In the genus of luxury: whence “it is inferred that pollution is not mortal which happens outside the intention from causes illicit still mortally in another genus than luxury, for example from drunkenness, or from eating, excessively immoderate or on a forbidden day.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.

34. 2.º “If someone, about to do some necessary or licit and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends; then, provided the danger of consent to pleasure is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action, because an effect per accidens and outside the intention following upon one pursuing his own right is not imputed. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is licit to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace them according to the custom of the country, if otherwise he would have to be regarded as uncivil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 481. “It is licit for someone who suffers great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows.” l. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either per se influence only lightly, or, although per se they gravely influence, nevertheless since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and pleasure, but from an honorable cause, necessary, useful, fitting, they no longer have the same force and influence into the effect, which is gravely increased from that bad propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished from the will being turned to another thing and, so far as is in itself, resisting. Whence the bad effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to the infirmity of nature than to the aforesaid acts as to a cause. Moreover, the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the bad effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, having itself permissively toward the evil. Therefore that bad effect in the case truly follows per accidens and outside the intention. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483.; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

35. 3.º “It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not long conversation with a girl, or from a light look, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as was said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.; Billuart, Dissert. 1, art. 1. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing, St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 29. A just cause is “any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484., l. 5. n. 29. And “if in some body by reason of infirmity... or of another cause, there is a positive indisposition to venery, although causes are applied to him which otherwise of themselves gravely influence into pollution or carnal pleasure with respect to others..., nevertheless with respect to him... they will not be gravely influencing, but only lightly, or even in no way, or they will be causes only materially of the genus of luxury; wherefore commonly... by reason of their influence into pollution he will not sin mortally.” Salmant., Tr. 16, c. 7, v. 41.

36. 4.º A fortiori, grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and per accidens, since they are outside the genus of luxury. Therefore, although pollution or bad commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is licit to ride horseback not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for the sake of recreation; to lie down in some position for resting more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drinks; to lead honorable dances, etc. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent: for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the future effect, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, “because, as they say, then pollution arises rather from the infirmity of nature than from that cause, which concurs in pollution only per accidens and remotely. But more probably Sanchez, Lessius, and others affirm it... because to permit pollution without a rational cause always seems something indecent and disordered.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — Sanchez, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45.; Sporer, De Matr. n. 644 and following; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.; St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.; Salm., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.; Lessius, De Iust. et Iure, L. 4, C. 3, Dub. 14, nn. 97-102.

37. Since the cause as such participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a diverse malice, it suffices to accuse only the malice of the effect in confession; or, if the cause in itself has another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if on account of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if on account of theft you likewise omitted Mass, then you can accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 9.; Lugo, De Poenit., D. 15, n. 479.

38. The last question concerning the same matter remains to be resolved, namely: when is an effect willed in the cause imputed? — If the discussion is about internal sin, this certainly is first committed then, when the will consents to the culpable cause to be posited. But if the matter concerns the external act itself of sin, an effect voluntary in the cause and imputable is imputed, speaking per se, first then, when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. “The reason is that the free volition, or the non-impeding of an evil effect, is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and thus formal sin is committed when a perverse volition or nolition of this kind is had... Thus therefore he who, for example, offered poison to another... does not sin when the death of the other follows... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect”; Struggl, q. 1, art. 3, n. 32.; and sin is always committed then, whether the effect follows or does not follow, because, for example, the other did not take the poison, the poison did not harm, etc. It is said, speaking per se, for if someone can impede an effect of this kind up to its very execution, and does not impede it, or takes complacency for himself in its futurition or existence, in his mind he continues the sin whose cause he earlier freely and culpably posited. Struggl, l. c. But whether, when the effect from the posited cause in reality follows necessarily, it is imputed, or at least imputability is so increased that someone ought to explain it in confession, some affirm, others deny. St. Alphonsus affirms it, l. 5. n. 10. “An omission,” says the Holy Doctor, “voluntary in the cause is also imputed unto sin, even if afterwards the will cannot operate; for instance if someone makes himself drunk, foreseeing that by reason of drunkenness he will omit Mass, then he is bound to confess the cause and its effect, namely drunkenness and the omission of Mass, as Salm. etc. better say, with others commonly against Vasq. etc., provided the will is not retracted before the effect has followed, as Sanch. etc. probably teach; for then it is probable that he is not bound to confess the effect that followed. From this also it is deduced that if the effect happens after retraction, a censure imposed against sinners is not incurred, because that requires contumacy in the act of sin.” Cf. also l. 4. n. 149 and l. 7. n. 40. But Lugo denies it, who has these things: “It must be supposed in the sin, for example, by which you killed another with poison, that there intervenes first an internal act of the will, by which you willed to give him poison; then an external action, by which you prepared and gave the poison; then the effect that followed, namely his death.... The first and sufficiently common opinion affirms that the external effect must be explained... Father Vasquez, etc., broadly defends the contrary opinion. That opinion has always seemed truer to me... The more common reason... is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual liberty of the internal act, is truly and properly sin; but the effect afterward following, in sleep for example, is not properly sin... but the effect of sin; but in confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore the external act must be explained when it is actually free, but not the effect afterward following... because there cannot be actual sin in him who actually does not sin, nor can he actually sin who actually does not act: but he who sleeps, while his enemy dies by poison, then does nothing; therefore then he does not sin.” De Poenit., D. 16, nn. 437, 439, 440, 449. But this opinion must be limited, unless the penitent has incurred a censure or a reserved case on account of the effect that followed. Lugo himself has this limitation, indeed he adds: “It can also happen that a censure is incurred by him who already through contrition, or through attrition with the sacrament, has been justified from the past sin”; n. 453. Cf. also n. 460 and Laymann, l. 1, Tr. 2, c. 2, n. 5. But, as Ithurriaga observes very well, Cas. 40, n. 31 and following, Cas. 50, n. 26 and following, there is no reservation where there is no subject of reservation, or sin, since it has already been absolved. For of no being there are no properties. What is not, is not such. But where only a retraction of the will has preceded, the cause retracted by the will is no longer in itself a culpable effect. But reservation or censure cannot be incurred when there is no sin through the act.

5. • DIVISION. The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1. Perfect, or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full cognition and full consent of the will. But the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure cognition or imperfect consent ².

² Understand: where full deliberation is not present; in which matter there can be many degrees.

2. Voluntary simply, or in a certain respect. The former is that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will. But the latter is that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite ³.

³ More commonly the Doctors employ this partition only with those acts in which there is something of the voluntary and at the same time of the involuntary; namely, when the affection of the will tends to two things which it cannot have at the same time, and therefore, concerning one, rises efficaciously and embraces it; toward the other, inefficaciously, and therefore leaves this. Concerning one there is will, concerning the other velleity; toward one the will is borne absolutely, but toward the other conditionally, namely if the former is not to be lost; and thence comes the appellation of absolute or simple will, and of will in a certain respect, namely according to some regard or inefficacious complacency.

3. Direct, or indirect ⁴. The former is that which is intended in itself, or per se, that is, that which is the immediate object of the will ⁵, as theft perpetrated by a thief, or killing intended by a malevolent murderer. The latter is called that which is not willed in itself, but in another directly willed, either as effect in cause, or as something connected with it, for example drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone.

⁴ Others, with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 6, art. 3), understand by the name of direct and indirect voluntary that which the Author soon designates by the expressions positive and negative voluntary. But the things handed down here express another partition of the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause.

⁵ The immediate object of the will can also be an effect very remote, provided that it too is intended in itself. But you will call voluntary in cause that which is not indeed intended in itself, yet is foreseen to follow.

4. Positive, or negative. The former is said to be that which is from the will itself really acting, or that which requires a positive action, for instance reading. The latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will. Such is the omission of Mass in him who, adverting to the instant celebration of it, nevertheless continues to devote himself to study at home ⁶.

⁶ More briefly and clearly you will say that it is called positive when the will elicits an act; negative, when the will elicits no act, but remains suspended. This distinction is employed when it is asked whether omission can be given without any act of the will. See Suarez on I-II, Treatise V, Disputation 3, Section 2.

5. Express, or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if it is known to be present from some fact or even omission. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a Superior if he does not oppose them, when otherwise he can and ought to do it ⁷. Hence rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent ⁸.

⁷ In that example you have 1. tacit voluntary, as is clear; 2. voluntary in cause (the Author calls it indirect), insofar as the sins are judged effects of correction omitted by the Superior; and 3. negative voluntary (others with St. Thomas call it indirect), insofar as the effect comes from omission.

⁸ For rightly understanding the axiom, He who is silent seems to consent, these rules can help. I. Someone is judged to consent in favorable matters. II. Likewise one silent where otherwise there intervenes some obligation or necessity of contradicting, and an available faculty for doing it; to this also pertains that saying: Knowledge and patience in those things which are of slight prejudice works consent. III. One silent, if anything is decreed unjustly or less rightly, where deliberation is made by common counsel and vote. IV. Likewise, one asked several things, who is silent concerning one thing while he refuses the rest. V. Add cases from the disposition of law, for example of a son silent in betrothals contracted for him by a parent.

71. The primary distinction of free acts is taken from the principle from which they proceed: some indeed are elicited and others commanded. Elicited or immanent acts proceed immediately from the will and are perfected and consummated in it,² such as volition, intention, election, etc.; commanded acts are those which do not proceed immediately from the will, but, from its command, from another power, whether internal or external, such as thinking, walking, etc. A few things must be said concerning these, so that the nature of the free act may be better understood.

² In a general way those acts are called elicited which are performed by that faculty which is the proper subject of those acts; thus an act of faith is elicited by the intellect and commanded by the will. But in moral matters, an elicited act is so called in relation to the will, to which it belongs to act morally.

72. 1. Concerning elicited acts. Six elicited acts of the will are generally distinguished, when we act not precipitately, but prudently and maturely: simple volition, intention, consent, election, use, fruition.

(a) When the intellect apprehends something as good, the will is borne toward it as lovable in itself, and that inclination is called simple volition, or complacency, or love.

(b) But this volition moves the intellect to weighing whether that good is fitting and possible for the subject; and if the intellect truly judges that the matter is so, intention is born, by which the will tends toward the end as attainable.

(c) By force of this intention, the intellect inquires concerning means suited to obtaining the end, and the will gives consent, or desires the means useful for attaining the thing.

(d) By force of this consent, the intellect is applied to discerning what are the more apt means for attaining the object, and on the part of the will there is election, by which it approves one means before others.

(e) When the means has now been chosen, the will, with the intellect directing, commands the execution of this means, and consequently applies the executive powers to the act; this indeed is called active use, or the command of the will for acting.

(f) Finally, when the will has attained the good, it rests in it and enjoys it, and from this is born fruition, or joyful rest in the possessed end.

73. 2. Concerning commanded acts. For judging rightly concerning the liberty, and consequently concerning the morality, of these acts, it is of the greatest importance that it be defined over which faculties the will can command, and by what kind of command. For a twofold command is distinguished: one absolute, or despotic, which cannot be resisted; and another non-absolute (which was called political by the Scholastics), which we can resist.

(a) Now the will exercises no command over those apprehensions of the intellect which precede every volition; for example, it cannot prevent reason from perceiving the truth proposed to it; directly it does not influence the judgment which is made concerning a thing evidently true or false, but indirectly, insofar as affections of soul incline the judgment in some way toward that part which is more pleasing. - The intellect is subject to the free will as to application, insofar as it can be applied to this or that object, but not absolutely, as is clear from the wanderings of mind to which we are subject; and in some way as to adherence, when the truth is not evidently clear, for example, in the mysteries of faith; for then the will is able to command an assent firmer than the weight of the reasons which are brought forward deserves.¹

¹ It is clear from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition: "The will cannot effect that the assent of faith in itself be firmer than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves." (Denzing., n. 1036.)

74. (b) The will cannot exercise command over the first representations of imagination or recollections of memory, which moreover were not willed, nor over the first movements of the sensitive appetite (or of the passions); for all these things anticipate its act. But as to the other acts of these faculties, it is able to exercise some command; for it can excite phantasms, recollections, or passions, and on the contrary in some way restrain the movements of concupiscence, by commanding these faculties that they turn themselves aside to other objects. Often, however, phantasms, recollections, or movements of the passions return even against the command of the will: "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, which is in my members."¹

¹ Rom., VII, 23.

(c) Almost the same must be said concerning the external senses: they depend on the will as to application, or turning away from objects, but not as to sensation, or impression: for the senses are so disposed that sensation is produced whenever a sensible object strikes the organs; but from that sensation there necessarily follows some pleasure or sadness. Nevertheless, often the will, when there is place for deliberation, can indirectly prevent sensations and the movements following from them, by commanding the senses to turn themselves away from certain objects. But when pleasure or sadness has arisen, the will can freely consent or dissent.

75. (d) But the motive power of the external members of the body is subject to the command of the will almost absolutely, provided only that it is not impeded by some defect, such as paralysis, or by some extraordinary state, such as hypnotic sleep or diabolical obsession.

(e) Certain functions of vegetative life, such as nutrition, depend on the will only indirectly, insofar as, for example, it can command that this or that food be eaten; certain functions, however, such as respiration, are directed by the will; all are remotely subject to some command of the will, insofar as dispositions of soul, such as joy or sadness and other passions, influence not a little the exercise of these faculties.

All these things indeed must be kept before the eyes for judging rightly concerning the liberty and morality of acts which are more or less commanded by the will.

76. By reason of manifestation, human acts are merely internal, when they are performed by the powers of the soul without any exterior sign, such as thought, imagination, volition; external, when they are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as walking, inclination of the head, etc.; mixed, which are exercised by external and internal powers together, such as pious recitation of the rosary, devout genuflection, etc. - There are other divisions, concerning which we shall speak below in their own place.

Not all human actions are ethically free. There are various degrees of self-determination corresponding to the measure of knowledge with which a man acts.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 59, art. 3: "Some things do not act from any judgment, but as if acted upon and moved by others, just as an arrow is moved toward its end by the archer. Other things act by a certain judgment, but not a free one, as do irrational animals. For a sheep flees a wolf by a certain judgment by which it considers the wolf harmful to itself; but this judgment is not free in the sheep, but implanted by nature. Only that which has intellect can act by free judgment, insofar as it knows the universal character of the good, from which it can judge this or that to be good. Hence wherever there is intellect, there is free choice."

A spontaneous or reflex action is one produced by the will without due knowledge. A spontaneous act, as such, is not ethical. "Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum." To the category of spontaneous actions belong the primary perceptions of the external and internal senses, the first stirrings of the imagination and the memory, as well as all acts performed in the state of sleep or disease, under external compulsion or in ignorance.

2. VOLUNTARY AND FREE ACTS. —An act is voluntary and free (voluntarium et liberum) if it is performed by the will with knowledge and deliberation. ² For an act to be voluntary and free, therefore, two conditions must cooperate: a) The act itself must be produced by an internal principle, i. e., the will; b) The person acting must have some knowledge of the end towards which his act tends.

² "Actus procedens a principio intrinseco seu a voluntate cum cognitione finis." —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 1.

Acts performed under external compulsion, therefore, or without knowledge of their purpose, cannot be called free.

In order that an act be entirely free, it must, moreover, be perceived by the agent in all its I parts and circumstances. When even one circumstance is unknown to the agent, the act is not free with regard to this circumstance. For instance, if a man appropriates to himself an object, not knowing that it belongs to another, he is not a thief; or if he knowingly possesses himself of the property of another without being aware of the fact that it is devoted to a sacred purpose, he is not guilty of sacrilege.

There are different degrees of voluntariness, according to the measure of reflection accompanying an act. (1) An act is positively voluntary (voluntarium positivum) if it is directly intended; negatively (voluntarium negativum) if it involves an inexcusable or culpable omission.³

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 71, art. 5, ad 2: "Not willing itself can be called voluntary, insofar as it is within man's power to will and not to will."

(2) An act is perfectly voluntary (voluntarium perfectum) if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; it is imperfectly voluntary (voluntarium imperfectum) if the knowledge and deliberation are not full.

(3) An act is immediately voluntary (voluntarium elicitum) if it is produced directly by the will; it is mediately voluntary (voluntarium imperatum) if it is dictated by the will and performed by some other faculty of mind or body.

(4) An act is expressly voluntary (voluntarium expressum) if the consent of the will is manifested by word or sign; it is tacitly voluntary (voluntarium taciturn) if the consent of the will can be deduced from some act or omission. Thus a superior wills expressly what his spoken or written command enjoins; he wills tacitly what he permits, though he be able and in duty bound to prevent it.

(5) Something is said to be willed directly or in itself (voluntarium directum s. in se) when it is in and by itself the object of the will, e. g., a premeditated crime. It is willed indirectly or in the cause (voluntarium indirectum s. in causa) when it is merely the effect of something else which is directly willed. For anything to be willed in the cause, therefore, the effects of that cause must be foreseen but not intended, for if they were intended, the action would be willed in itself or directly. A drunkard, e. g., directly wills the gratification of his appetite for strong drink; indirectly he also wills to ruin his health and squander his money, because he foresees these inevitable effects in the cause.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6. —V. Frins, S.J., De Actibus Humanis, Vol. I, Freiburg 1897, pp. 85 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 34 sqq. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 22 sq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 22nd ed., New York 1915, pp. 11 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 34 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 57 sqq.

I. The notion of the voluntary. The voluntary is "that whose principle is in the agent himself, he knowing the particulars in which the action is" ¹; or, as St. Thomas says more briefly (2), "that whose principle is within, with the addition of knowledge."

Moreover this voluntary is divided: from the object, from the mode by which it attains the object, from its figure or subjective account of being, from its manifestation, and finally from its objective perfection.

¹ Aristotle, Ethic., 3, c. 3. - (2) 1, 2, q. 6, art. 1.

II. Divisions. 1. From the object. Since the will is a rational appetite, it follows the formal presentation of end and means, so that an act has some acts concerning the end, others concerning the means.

a) Concerning the end there can be: simple willing, or complacency in an object which is apprehended as fitting to the subject, or lovable in itself (St. Th., 1, 2, q. 8).

Then intention, in some way prosecutive of the thing. For an end is "that for the sake of which something is done."

Then fruition, that is, rest in the end obtained or the good possessed ¹. In its fruition, the will approves, and holds as ratified, the pursuit of the end (or the efforts made) and its attainment.

b) Concerning a means or means there can be: consent, by which one adheres to a judgment proposing what has seemed useful for attaining the end (1, 2, q. 15);

or election, by which, from several means, one is preferred (1, 2, q. 13);

and active use, by which powers are applied to acting.

Therefore we have voluntary complacency, intention, fruition, consent, election, execution.

And so not only acts of the will can be voluntary, but also acts of other powers, or effects; yet formally only acts of the will are voluntary; the rest are voluntary denominatively.

Moreover these things are to be observed about those acts. Use pertains to the order of execution; all the rest to the order of intention ². If use has been lacking, there will not be a voluntary external deed, for example the death of an enemy. Yet this death can be the object of complacency, fruition, and thus terminate the will. If it has thus terminated it, formerly more than today, that death was called willed, although not voluntary ³.

Intention is distinguished as perfect or efficacious, and inefficacious. The efficacious is of itself connected with the existence of the object, because the means are in the power of the will and the will admits or chooses all the necessary things. If, on the contrary, it neglects to admit the necessary means, it is called velleity.

¹ 1, 2, q. 11.

² Therefore let us not confuse the order of intention, which comprises intention, election, and consent, with intention strictly so called.

³ Thus in Italian volita is said of rain desired by farmers.

2. From the mode by which the object is attained. a) The will, as it is appetite, has, without organic transmutation, prosecutive and aversive acts, by which the eleven passions of the sensitive appetite are denominated: love and hatred, desire and flight, hope and despair, fear and daring, anger, delight and sadness ¹. Therefore, insofar as these proceed knowingly from the will, all these can be voluntary.

b) The object can be attained in itself or in another object. In itself is attained that toward which the will is immediately affected. In another the will attains what it wills only as connected with the object which it wills in itself. Moreover it can be connected as a part: as the obligation of support is part of conjugal life; as an accessory: as the vow of chastity is added to the subdiaconate; as an effect (strictly or broadly so called) foreseen together with the thing toward which the will is affected: as quarrels and blasphemies which are foreseen as going to follow from drunkenness.

If the question concerns an effect which is foreseen as going to follow but which is not loved, the voluntary is more strictly said to be in the cause only, and the effect is called merely permitted. Therefore, what must be well held, the will neither intends nor chooses what it merely permits; but permission means mere foresight without affection. Permission is active when it flows from an action on account of the concurrence of another cause which cannot be impeded; it is passive when the effect is merely not impeded.

¹ St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 22, art. 3, ad 3; and q. 23, art. 2, c.

3. From the subjective account of being, or the figure of the voluntary, there is distinguished:

a) The voluntary on account of action, or the positive voluntary, and the voluntary on account of omission, or the negative voluntary, as when someone omits to impede what he ought to impede: for example, damage through an animal possessed by him ¹.

And while we act, our act itself can be called positively voluntary; while we do not wish to act, our non-acting will be negatively voluntary.

N.B. Concerning the signification and use of several words, not all agree: this must be attended to when reading writers. Thus some call direct voluntary what is from the will positively operating; indirect, what is from the will insofar as it passes over an obligation of acting. While others call direct the voluntary in itself, but indirect the voluntary in another.

b) The explicit voluntary, which in itself is present before the mind, and the implicit, which is contained in the former. Thus the will of sorrow for sin contains the purpose of not sinning; the will of loving all contains the will of loving enemies. Thus the will of the legislator implicitly wills the law according to the true sense. This division is sufficiently akin to the distinction of the voluntary in itself and in another; but here there is more regard to attention than to intention.

¹ That which follows an omission will be called voluntary when it follows per se; permitted, when it follows per accidens.

4. From manifestation, you have the voluntary that is expressed, tacit, presumed (for the present). Expressed is what is manifested by speech or another sign ordered to this; tacit, what is gathered from an expressed concession or from some deed or omission of a deed. A superior, permitting a journey, tacitly consents that in the customary manner you seek money for yourself; an owner, who can easily dissent, tacitly consents to someone, observed by him, using his thing. Presumed for the present is what, from an inclination or disposition of the mind, is conjectured to be truly present now. A friend of the bishop from whom by letter he asked jurisdiction to be sent to him at once, after the letters have been received, conjectures that the jurisdiction has been sent.

Presumed for the future is the same as interpretative, concerning which see n. 46, c.

On the adage "He who is silent seems to consent". (R.I., 43 in 6°). In doubt, provided no reason suggests the opposite, "he who is silent seems to consent" ¹: a) in a matter which benefits the silent person without a burden; b) when some necessity of contradicting is joined with a ready faculty of contradicting. Here belongs the saying: "Knowledge and sufferance are held for expressed consent" ². This at least is valid in matters of slight prejudice. - c) Where several come together to deliberate about a common opinion. Those who are silent will be judged, per se, to add their assent to those consenting.

¹ The Rule of Law (142 Dig. L, 17) has this: "He who is silent certainly does not confess; but nevertheless it is true that he does not deny."

² Marginal note to the Gloss on § Caius, law 25, De legatis (D. 31, 1).

5. Division of the voluntary from its objective perfection.

a) The voluntary can be perfectly and imperfectly deliberated. The former, which is also called perfect, requires full knowledge and deliberation. Knowledge is called full insofar as, morally, all the notes of the thing are known and the mind is not subjectively impeded. The imperfectly deliberated is had in sudden movements, in a great heat of passion, in partial wakefulness.

b) The voluntary simply and according to something. The former is estimated from the object as it exists; the latter from a peculiar note which is in it. Marriage, besides the common life of spouses, is wont to bring association with parents. This can be pleasing or displeasing. If it has been appetible, marriage will be voluntary simply and according to something (that is, according to that note); if displeasing, it will be voluntary simply, but not according to something.

Quite often they call something voluntary according to something when consent to the thing is denied, although some note of it is pleasing: as if you should be unwilling to possess a thing which you would acquire as precious, because it belongs to another; but this use seems to us less correct. For since nothing proceeds from the will, nothing voluntary is had except complacency concerning that note.

c) Formal and interpretative voluntary. The former is present when the will truly adheres to a thing proposed by the intellect. The latter is present when, indeed, no consent either was or is, but from the inclination of the mind, from the fittingness of the thing with the rational appetite now perceived, it is conjectured that consent would have been future if the object had been proposed. The interpretative will is sometimes called presumed for the future. Since this is not and was not at all in act, it can effect nothing. Wherefore a dispensation, which must loose the bond of law, can never be presumed in this way; but a permission can be presumed, with which an act, valid in other respects, obtains the due mode of subordination to the will of the superior.

d) Actual, virtual, habitual voluntary. Actual denotes assent which is now deliberately present; virtual shows itself in the effect of a prior actual will; habitual denotes a past and not retracted will, although it perseveres in no effect.

Thus, from the will of going on foot to St. Peter's, someone who knows the way well, without a conscious choice of roads, turning over many things in his mind, converses with a companion, and makes the journey: he virtually wills to visit the basilica. He who formally asked for extreme unction and then is deprived of the senses has the habitual will of the sacrament.

The virtual will possesses the same efficacy as the actual. The habitual can suffice for certain juridical or spiritual effects which do not require action.

Lugo ¹ (De Sacr. in genere, d. 8, 15; De Paenit., d. 7, n. 40) thought that the virtual will was present, but confused and scarcely perceptible, or, as we would say, subconscious. But another explanation seems preferable. The association of ideas and images brings us this facility, that by one act of command we can determine a whole series of partial actions which we have done often enough. Under a given command, every series which has been foreseen and has been effected by that command is voluntary in a manner similar to that in which the explosion will be called voluntary which is determined in a deep cavern by one who, placed outside the cavern, causes an electric contact. This alone differs: that it remains in our power consciously to break off the commanded series. Therefore, although actual willings are easily mixed in the series to be executed, nevertheless the series is virtually voluntary, insofar as it derives from the first command; and, according to the law of human action, this voluntariety is entirely sufficient.

¹ Frins still adheres to him, De actibus humanis, I, 53.

On the involuntary. At the same time we know what the involuntary is, and how it is divided. We shall observe this one thing: strictly, that is called involuntary which is done against the will; non-voluntary, that which is done apart from the will, insofar as the thing does not depend on the will, although it can be pleasing to it. In the broader signification, both are called involuntary.

48. Definition. The voluntary (that is, a voluntary act or effect) is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end; or that "whose principle is within, with the addition of knowledge." Thus with St. Thomas²⁵ all theologians.

This definition is explained. It is said, first: a voluntary act or effect is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle. This principle or cause indeed is the will or appetite. Therefore an act is not voluntary if it is produced a) by an extrinsic principle, b) by a principle indeed intrinsic, but without the influx of the will or appetite. Hence the voluntary is distinguished: alpha) from the violent, since it is produced by an extrinsic cause, and is customarily defined by the scholastics: "The violent is that whose principle is outside, with the one suffering force contributing nothing."²⁶ Such a violent act (but not voluntary and therefore not imputable), for example, is a coerced violation for a virgin. It is distinguished beta) from the willed, which is indeed the object, but not always the effect of the will. Hence every voluntary thing is indeed willed, but not every willed thing is voluntary. Thus, for example, rain can be something willed for the farmer, but not voluntary, since the farmer is indeed able to desire rain, but not to produce it. - The other internal powers of man can indeed sometimes produce human acts and therefore be the subject of sin, as, for example, reason and the inferior powers of the soul; but such acts are not truly voluntary except insofar as the will moves those powers to acting.²⁷

It is said, second: with cognition of the end, that is, insofar as the known end allures and moves to acting. Cognition here is taken in the strict sense, that is, for intellectual cognition; whence sensible perception does not suffice (at least if the discussion is about the perfect voluntary). For even brute animals sensibly and instinctively perceive the end in their actions. Thus, for example, the swallow perceives the nest to be made as an end and the mud to be gathered as means to this end. Yet all these things do not constitute true and perfect cognition of the end, and therefore the swallow gathering mud and making a nest does not elicit voluntary acts (at least perfectly voluntary acts).²⁸ Because of this required cognition of the end, the voluntary is distinguished: a) from a natural act, which indeed proceeds from an intrinsic principle, but to which cognition of the end is lacking. Such natural acts, which are not voluntary, are, for example, acts of the vegetative power, such as to sleep, to digest foods, etc. b) from a spontaneous act, that is, from a first-first act, which indeed proceeds from an intrinsic principle, but which precedes every cognition or advertence.

Note. From an intrinsic principle, that is, from a cognitive and appetitive power, there can proceed not only positive acts and effects, but also negative ones, that is, voluntary omissions and their effects. Wherefore these also pertain to the voluntary. Thus, for example, it is voluntary if parents omit a good education and from this the children commit sins.

Divisions. The voluntary is chiefly distinguished:

²⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 1. In the German language voluntarium can be rendered: das Willentliche, das Selbstgewollte.

²⁶ Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3, 1.

²⁷ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 24, a. 1-3.

²⁸ Cf. below n. 52.

49. 1. Necessary and free. The first is that which is necessarily produced by the will, so that liberty of omitting that act is lacking. A voluntary of this kind is the desire of felicity on this earth and beatific love in heaven. - The free voluntary is that which is not only immune from coercion, from natural instinct, and from determination to one without potency toward another, but which is produced by the will in such a way that there remains to it the potency of acting or not acting. Of this kind are all properly and perfectly human acts except the two necessary acts cited above. - From these declarations given it follows that everything free is voluntary, but not vice versa is everything voluntary free. For in order that the voluntary be free, it is altogether required that liberty of indifference be added.

It is not of this place to investigate more deeply the nature of a free act. Perhaps there is no more difficult question in all Theology than that concerning the nature of a free act. For our mind is scarcely able to perceive how liberty can stand together with the immutability of God; and yet it is most certain that it is so. Divine acts "ad extra" are free, indeed in the highest degree of liberty, and yet they are immutable. God perfectly knows all and each free act of all men from eternity. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is infallible, every act of every man is infallibly produced, and indeed exactly in that manner just as God foresaw from eternity. Notwithstanding this certitude, all those acts are free. Concerning the nature of liberty, from the times of St. Augustine very many heresies and controversies have arisen. Heretical opinions concerning the nature of the free act have been brought forward especially by the Jansenists, Lutherans, and Calvinists. In our times liberty is denied by very many, for example, by Determinists and Fatalists. Against them a few things are to be said here concerning the notion and existence of free choice.²⁹

²⁹ Concerning the true and false notion of liberty, Leo XIII treats in a truly excellent manner in the encyclical Libertas, June 20, 1888.

50. Definition of free choice. Free choice is best defined by St. Thomas:³⁰ "The elective power of means, the order of the end being preserved." It is said a) an elective power of means, because it belongs to free choice to choose means without any external coercion. It is said b) the order of the end being preserved, because it in no way belongs to free choice that it can reject the last end, or that it can choose evil; otherwise God, the angels, and the saints would not have free choice, because they cannot decline from the last end nor choose evil.

For true liberty there is required a) liberty from coercion; for in coercion or violence every choice is taken away; b) liberty of contradiction, that is, the faculty of acting or not acting, of doing this or of not doing this. The reason is the same, because otherwise no choice now exists. But there is in no way required: alpha) liberty of contrariety, that is, the faculty of choosing contraries in moral matters, namely, good and evil. The reason is that such a choice does not conduct to the end, but on the contrary often leads away from it. Therefore to be able to choose sin in no way pertains to liberty; otherwise neither God nor the angels would be free. beta) Liberty of specification, that is, the faculty of choosing objects diverse in species. Certainly this faculty belongs to God and the angels, but it is not necessarily required for liberty, since even without it there is sufficient faculty of choosing. Besides, liberty of contrariety and specification are not rarely confused and are held for the faculty of choosing evil. But it was said above that the faculty of choosing evil is in no way required for the essence of liberty. - These things having been explained, there is proved:

³⁰ S. theol. I, q. 83, a. 4.

51. The existence of free choice, which is denied by the Stoics, Manichaeans, Lutherans, Calvinists, and almost all modern Atheists, Materialists, and Pantheists, who are customarily called by the common name Determinists:³¹

a) From Sacred Scripture: "Stretch forth your hand to that which you will; before man are life and death, good and evil; what pleases him shall be given to him."³² "An option is given to you; choose today what pleases."³³

b) From the definitions of the Church: "If anyone says that man's free choice, moved and stirred by God, cooperates nothing by assenting to God stirring and calling ... let him be anathema."³⁴ - "If anyone says that man's free choice after Adam's sin was lost and extinguished, or that it is a thing in title only, indeed a title without reality, finally a fiction introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be anathema."³⁵

c) From the very nature of man. The human soul is a spiritual being having both intellect, whose object is universal truth, and will, whose object is universal good. But such a being is necessarily free. Therefore the human soul has free choice. The major of this syllogism is supposed to have been proven more than sufficiently in psychology. But the minor is plain even from the terms themselves. For the will, which is led by the intellect knowing every truth and which does not tend necessarily toward this or that good, but toward universal good, consequently has the faculty of choosing among diverse goods, and therefore is free.

d) From the testimony of conscience. alpha) Any man of sound mind is intimately and most certainly conscious to himself that he is able to do this or that and has liberty of choice. But such a testimony, so universal and so certain, cannot be false, because otherwise that error would have to be imputed to the Creator Himself, who so created human nature. beta) Any man voluntarily committing sin suffers remorse of conscience. But remorse of conscience would be inexplicable if the sinner were not intimately convinced that he could and should have acted otherwise. For no one has remorse of conscience about a necessary and inevitable thing, although he can grieve over it. Thus, for example, a son grieves vehemently over the unexpected death of his father, but he does not have remorse of conscience unless he has in some way voluntarily caused the death of his father. Remorse of conscience has been acknowledged not only by Christians, but even by pagans themselves, who fashioned it under the name of the Furies or Erinyes.

For fuller arguments for free choice, as also objections against it, see Billuart³⁶ and other authors who defend man's free choice expressly.

³¹ For the opinions of moderns see Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, 6th ed., vol. 1, book 1, chap. 2, § 2.

³² Ecclus. 15:17 sqq.

³³ Jos. 24:15. Cf. also Ps. 94:8; Prov. 8:10; Is. 66:3-4; Matt. 19:17; 1 Cor. 7:37; 1 Thess. 5:21.

³⁴ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 4 on justification (Denz. 814).

³⁵ Ibid. can. 5 (Denz. 815). Cf. also several condemned propositions of Baius, Quesnel, and Jansenius, for example, prop. 66 of Baius: "Violence alone is repugnant to the natural liberty of man" (Denz. 1066); prop. 67: "Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily" (Denz. 1067).

³⁶ De act. hum. diss. 2, a. 1, or in Cathrein, l. c.

52. 2. Perfect and imperfect. Perfect is that which proceeds from perfect and formal cognition of the end; imperfect, on the contrary, is that which arises from imperfect cognition of the end. Therefore this division is taken from the part of cognition and advertence. Perfect and formal cognition of the end is had when not only the thing which is the end is apprehended, but also the account of the end and the proportion of the means to the end are known intellectually.³⁷ Such cognition is found only in rational creatures, which act with full advertence and cognition. If such advertence and perfect cognition is lacking, the voluntary is imperfect, or, as it is customarily said, the act is imperfect; for example, all second-first acts, such as the acts of one half-asleep, acts produced under the influx of vehement passion, etc. - The imperfect voluntary also belongs to brutes; for they act from an intrinsic principle with some material perception of the end and of the means to the end.³⁸

³⁷ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 2.

³⁸ Cf. ibid. and Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 1.

53. 3. The voluntary simply and in a certain respect. Just as the preceding division was taken from the part of cognition, so the present division is attended to from the part of volition. The voluntary simply, or pure voluntary, is customarily called that toward which the will is borne without any repugnance whatever; for example, toward an honest and altogether fitting delectation. But the voluntary in a certain respect is that toward which the will is indeed borne, but with a certain reluctance; for some evil is mixed with the good willed, for example, a sick man, in order to recover health, wills medicine, which nevertheless, because it is very bitter, he takes with some reluctance.³⁹ This voluntary in a certain respect is also customarily called the mixed voluntary, because it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary; and therefore some authors prefer to speak of the involuntary in a certain respect. It is a dispute about words.

Note. Even the voluntary in a certain respect is truly voluntary in a particular case, and therefore a perfect human and moral act. Wherefore if such a voluntary is compared with the adjoining involuntary, it is customarily called voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect. For example, for a sick man to take bitter medicine is voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect; to merit hell is for the sinner voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect. For although to go into hell is altogether involuntary, nevertheless the sinner does not wish to desist from sin, with which the punishment of hell is joined; and thus by accident it comes about that to go into hell is voluntary simply.

³⁹ St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. c. 5, preliminary tract IX) and several modern writers explain this distinction thus. Others, for example, Lehmkuhl (Theol. mor. I, 57; Frins, De act. hum. I, 282), give another explanation.

54. 4. Direct voluntary and indirect voluntary. The first (which by some is called the voluntary in itself)⁴⁰ is that which is intended in itself and is the immediate intended object; for example, theft by a thief. The other (which sometimes is called the voluntary in the cause) is that which is not intended immediately and by reason of itself, but for this reason, that it is inseparably (as an effect or accessory or otherwise) joined with some other thing which is efficaciously sought; for example, in danger of shipwreck sailors cast goods into the sea in order to save life. The casting of the goods is an indirect voluntary; for it is not intended, but rather would be avoided, if it were possible. But because the saving of life, which is intended before all other things, cannot be had without the casting of the goods in this case, hence the casting of the goods into the sea is also indirectly intended by those sailing. Since cases of the indirect voluntary occur very often, indeed pervade almost all Moral Theology, and not rarely are of difficult solution, in the following paragraph this matter will be treated more specially.

⁴⁰ Several theologians rightly, with St. Thomas, distinguish the direct and indirect voluntary from the voluntary in itself and in the cause. These are the words of the Angelic Doctor: "Something can be voluntary either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it; or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause and not into the effect, as is plain in him who voluntarily becomes drunk; for from this, what he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as if voluntary.... Something is called voluntary directly or indirectly: directly indeed that into which the will is borne; but indirectly that which the will could have prohibited, but did not prohibit" (S. theol. I-II, q. 77, a. 7). But because this distinction does not seem to be of great moment for practice, we omit it. For the same things in practice are valid concerning the morality of the indirect voluntary and of the voluntary in the cause.

55. 5. Positive and negative voluntary. The first proceeds from the will through a positive and directly elicited act; for example, someone takes away another's property. The other consists in the voluntary omission of a due act; for example, some administrator of goods sees goods committed to him being taken away, but omits to prevent such theft. That which follows from such an omission is called by St. Thomas the indirect voluntary.⁴¹

There are still other divisions of the voluntary; for example, expressed, tacit, explicit, implicit, actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative voluntary, etc. All these indeed will be explained in their proper places, when they occur, and especially when there will be discussion of the intention necessary in contracts, vows, sacraments, etc.

⁴¹ S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 3.

56. Scholion. On the involuntary. The involuntary must be distinguished from the non-voluntary. The involuntary is an act or effect which happens against the will; but the non-voluntary happens without the will of the agent. Wherefore the Angelic Doctor says: "The non-voluntary is said by the mere removal of the act of the will, but the involuntary is said by this, that the will is contrary to that which happens; whence sadness follows upon the involuntary, which nevertheless does not always follow upon the non-voluntary. For it sometimes happens that someone approaches one not his own, whom he believes to be his own (wife), although he does not actually will to approach one not his own, because he does not know that she is not his own; yet he wills habitually, and would will actually if he knew; whence when afterward he perceives that she was not his own, he is not saddened, but rejoices, unless he has changed his will."⁴² Theologians are accustomed to say: Concomitant ignorance does not cause the involuntary, but the non-voluntary.⁴³

Since the involuntary is contrarily opposed to the voluntary, and since for the voluntary the consent of the will and the cognition of the intellect are essentially required, hence whatever takes away either consent or cognition causes the involuntary. Because of defect of consent, all things which occur coercively are involuntary; but because of defect of cognition, those things are involuntary which occur from antecedent ignorance, as was already said above.

The involuntary is divided into perfect (which others call involuntary simply) and imperfect (which also is customarily called in a certain respect). The first is that which in no way is sought by the will and to which the will resists with every effort; for example, a martyr who by external violence is compelled to sacrifice to an idol exercises a perfectly involuntary action. The other is that to which the will resists not with every effort, but languidly; indeed because of some other good to be had it admits it. For example, the casting of goods done by a merchant because of danger of shipwreck in order to save life is involuntary in a certain respect or in an imperfect manner.

⁴² St. Thomas, Quaest. disp. de malo q. 3, a. 8.

⁴³ S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 1 and 2.

53. The voluntary, from Aristotle, Ethics III, chapter 1, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. It is said:

1. That which, that is, anything whatever, whether an act, or the omission of the act itself, or an effect proceeding from either;

2. Which proceeds, namely, in any way whatever, whether immediately or mediately, whether directly or indirectly: for he who places the cause, or omits it when he ought to place it, wills and causes the effect which he foresees will follow from it;

3. From an intrinsic principle, that is, from the proper power and inclination of that which operates;

4. With knowledge of the end or good: since the principle of acting is twofold, efficient and final, that properly proceeds from within which has an intrinsic efficient and final principle, so that it is not only moved but moves itself into the end. Hence for the voluntary it is required not only that it be from its own efficient principle by natural inclination, but also from some previous knowledge of the end by intentional inclination, by which the being acts for the sake of a known good. Hence for something to be totally voluntary, it must be known according to all circumstances; but if one is unknown, according to this it will not be voluntary, as if someone kills a man, not knowing that he is a cleric, he is guilty of homicide, not sacrilege.

Therefore the voluntary differs:

a) from the natural, whose efficient principle is within, but not the final, such as the motion of the heart, of vegetative life, which are done without knowledge of the end;

b) from the violent, whose principle is from without, with the subject resisting, as if someone is dragged by external force against his will;

c) from the simply willed: for this is an intentional object, but not a real effect of the will proceeding from it as from a cause, that into which the will tends affectively, but which does not proceed from it effectively, that which it wills but does not cause; thus rain is willed by the farmer but not voluntary, likewise the natural death of an enemy at which someone rejoices: indeed every voluntary is in some way willed, but not conversely;

1. Although the simply willed does not proceed from the will, the very volition proceeds from it and consequently is voluntary and sufficient for the notion of sin; but since that volition is not the cause of the willed thing, it does not suffice on this part to induce an obligation, for example, of restitution.

d) from the permissive, which is neither voluntary, or proceeding from the will, nor willed as its object, but only is not impeded by him who can but ought not: thus for just reasons and for a greater good, God or a governor do not impede sins which nevertheless displease them and are not done by them.

54. Division of the Voluntary According to Knowledge of the End. - Since the voluntary proceeds from knowledge of the end, hence according to the diverse knowledge of the end, the voluntary is diverse:

1. Knowledge of the end is material, or improperly so called, when that which is the end is known but not as end; but knowledge is formal, or properly so called, when the thing which is the end is known as end, that is, the very reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end, or the proportion of means to end. Hence the voluntary is divided into the properly so called or perfect, which proceeds from formal knowledge of the end and is found only in the higher appetite of man; and the improperly so called or imperfect, which proceeds from material knowledge of the end and is also found in the sensitive appetite alone, and even in beasts: this is also called spontaneous.

2. Formal knowledge can be deliberate and indeliberate; hence the necessary voluntary is distinguished, which proceeds from judgment and will determined to one thing; and the free, which comes about from indifferent judgment with the power of the will to the opposite. The free is not always more voluntary, for the intentional inclination of the will toward beatitude is greater than toward other things, and yet it is necessary.

3. Deliberate knowledge can be more or less perfect; hence the perfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with full deliberation, such as prudent persons are accustomed to use in matters of some importance, and with full consent; this is required for mortal sin. And the imperfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with some deliberation and some consent, as is found in the half-asleep, the half-drunk, the distracted, and those laboring under vehement passion; this suffices for venial sin. Hence theologians are accustomed to distinguish: first-first movements, which precede all deliberation (and are not properly voluntary or human acts); second-first movements, which come about after some deliberation and before perfect deliberation; and second movements, or deliberate movements, which proceed from perfect deliberation.

55. Division of the Voluntary According to the Intention of the Will. - The voluntary is from the proper intentional inclination of the appetite; hence according to the diverse intention of the will from which it proceeds, the voluntary is diverse. For something can proceed:

1. From an actual intention had here and now, whether explicit, as when a priest baptizing says, I will to baptize, or implicit, contained actually in another, as when he wills to go to the baptistery and perform all things according to custom;

2. From a virtual intention, had previously but here and now still influencing and persevering in force, as when a distracted priest baptizes from the intention had at the beginning;

3. From a habitual intention, had previously and not retracted, but in no way remaining in force and influencing the present act: as when a catechumen desiring to be baptized, deprived of the senses, is voluntarily baptized.

1. Namely, the effect of the will once had endures, which is the condition or necessary disposition of the present effect caused by another.

The first is actually willed, the second virtually, the third only habitually.

2. We say: willed. There is no virtual or habitual voluntary; every voluntary proceeds and therefore is actual, but it proceeds from a virtual or habitual intention.

For a human act, habitual intention is not sufficient (nor, a fortiori, interpretative intention): for this does not flow into the act, nor therefore make it proceed from deliberation of reason and the influence of freedom and be done in a human mode; but at least virtual intention is necessary. For this three things are required: a) that the agent act in a human mode, for otherwise he would not act from intention; b) that the first intention has not been retracted; and c) that it remain active in some effect of itself, so that one effect flows from another and all from the first.

In the case in which contrary or incompossible intentions are present, the predominant remains and influences or obtains the effect. Of simultaneous intentions, the predominant is that which, according to the present disposition, would be chosen if the incompossibility were known; but if they are equal, none persists, because they destroy one another. Of two successive intentions, the later will prevail if someone formed it remembering the prior, because then the prior was knowingly revoked; also for the most part if he was forgetful of the prior, unless the prior was made in such a way that he wills at least virtually to exclude the subsequent one.

56. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Principle. - The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, and therefore by reason of the diverse principle it is distinguished into elicited, which proceeds immediately from the will itself and is consummated in it (to will, to consent, to choose), and commanded, which from the motion and command of the will proceeds immediately from another power, whether internal (for example, voluntarily to think or to be angry), or external (for example, voluntarily to walk).

Therefore by reason of terminus it is internal or external, according as it is consummated in an interior rational or sensitive power, or in the senses or members, or even in exterior effects. Hence the elicited and internal voluntary, and the commanded and external voluntary, are not one and the same.

57. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Manifestation. - Both the voluntary and the willed are manifested in diverse ways, and thus it is divided into 1) expressed, which is manifested by words or signs; 2) tacit, which is manifested by silence, or rather is known certainly from the circumstances of silence according to rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent; 3) presumed, which from certain reasons, as from the inclination or disposition of mind, is prudently conjectured to be present now, or is gathered conjecturally by reasonable indications: for presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing. Examples are: a religious who buys a book with consent received from the superior; or with the superior present and silent; or with the superior absent, whom he cannot approach, when he wholly needs the book.

Not everyone who is silent consents, for in rule 44 it is said: He who is silent does not confess, but neither indeed does he seem to deny. Therefore silence not per se but only according to various circumstances prudently to be considered signifies consent or dissent. Hence the one silent is judged to consent a) in favorable matters when there is question of a benefit or favor, such as a donation or gratuitous promise, but not if there is question of a burden, inconvenience, or prejudice; b) also in prejudicial matters, if someone can without great inconvenience and at the same time ought to contradict, e.g., if he is questioned by a judge, or a superior if he observes a transgressed rule and is silent, or if several come together to deliberate about a common opinion: for then the silent are judged per se to support those consenting; c) in comparison: if several things have been proposed and someone denies all and is silent about one, he is judged to affirm it; if he affirms all and is silent about one, he is judged to deny it; d) if it has been so determined in law, which nevertheless has force only in the external forum, provided the contrary is not proved.

58. Observation. - From all the aforesaid things there is distinguished both the merely interpretative voluntary and the merely interpretative willed: so called from an intention in no way had, but which only would be had. But this in no way is, but only would be, willed or voluntary; namely, in fact it is not intended by the will nor does it proceed from it, but it would be intended or would proceed if something were known, for example, a priest would will to celebrate Mass for his father if he knew him to be dead, and a bishop, if it were requested from him, would grant jurisdiction. It differs from the presumed willed, because this indicates that which, according to prudent estimation, exists or existed; but the former indicates that which, the condition being supposed, would exist.

It is said: merely interpretative. For even the presumed voluntary is called by others, and can also be called under some respect, interpretative. And many scholastics call the voluntary in cause interpretative: for he who wills the cause is judged to will the effect; and others so call the voluntary from virtual (or habitual) intention: he who voluntarily begins is judged to will to persevere.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 71, a. 5; q. 77, a. 7.

59. Notions. - Man is master not only of his willing and acting, but also of his not acting and not willing, insofar as "by willing and acting he can impede this, namely, not willing and not acting." Hence:

1. Therefore the negative and indirect voluntary always coincides with the free.

1. According to the diverse things which proceed from the will, the voluntary is rightly called positive if the placing of an act proceeds; negative if the omission of an act proceeds. For voluntary omission is not to be confused with the will of omitting; for the omission of fornication or of Mass is not voluntary to him who is held in prison, and yet he can have the will of omitting fornication or Mass, while saying within himself: I would not do it, or I would not hear it, if I could. On the contrary, omission can be voluntary even if someone does not say: I will not to hear, provided that, at the time when he can hear Mass, he voluntarily does something else. In the first case there is the placing of an act or commission, namely, of desire, which is positively voluntary (I do not will to act, that is, I will not to act); in the second case there is the omission of an act, and this is negatively voluntary (I do not will to act). Yet both can exist at the same time, when from the will of omitting someone omits a work.

The positive voluntary essentially includes an act, because it proceeds from the will through a real influx. The negative voluntary essentially does not include an act: for in its essence it is not constituted by an act but by a negation, because it is not an act but the omission of one; nevertheless this, so that it can proceed from the will, supposes a preceding or concomitant act of the will as cause or occasion of itself: for either man intends the omission itself in itself, or at least voluntarily places another act incompossible with the omitted act, such as playing, sleeping, remaining at home, when the celebration of Mass is imminent. St. Thomas says aptly, q. 71, a. 5: "If in a sin of omission there is understood only that which per se pertains to the notion of sin, then sometimes the sin of omission is... without every act, either interior or exterior... But if in a sin of omission there are also understood the causes or occasions of omitting, then it is necessary that there be some act in the sin of omission."

1. St. Thomas adds: "Judgment about things must be given according to that which is per se, and not according to that which is per accidens. Whence it can more truly be said that some sin (or voluntary thing) can be without every act."

2. By the same name of positive and negative voluntary, more recent authors call either that which proceeds from the will as from a positive cause, namely, from a voluntary act through a true and positive influence; or that which proceeds from it as from a negative cause, namely, from a voluntary omission, or that which is judged to proceed from the will not operating and omitting to act when it can and ought to act. These proceed from the will according to a diverse mode, and therefore by St. Thomas they are respectively called: the direct voluntary, that which directly proceeds from it insofar as it is acting (as heating from heat) and toward which the will is borne; and the indirect, that toward which it is not borne but which proceeds from it indirectly insofar as it could have prevented but does not prevent, or does not act when it ought to act, as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the helmsman to whom the steering was entrusted, insofar as he ceases from steering.

2. It is called indirect because the will causes it by way of removing what prevents, namely, by removing that which can impede another thing.

Therefore the direct voluntary is from the acting will; the indirect from the will not acting when it ought to act.

Since no special difficulty occurs in the other species of the voluntary, we shall speak only:

6. The direct and indirect voluntary comes among theologians in a twofold sense. In one sense, indeed, according as something proceeds from the will directly, as from one acting (as to sink a ship by a war-cannon), or indirectly, as from one not acting, as the sinking of a ship from the helmsman, insofar as he ceases from steering.¹ The direct voluntary taken in this sense others call positive; the indirect, negative, according as acting denotes something positive, not acting something negative. Yet from this do not conclude that the voluntary consists in negation; for, as St. Thomas says,² "something is called voluntary not only because it falls under the act of the will, but because it falls under the power of the will. For thus even not willing itself is called voluntary, because to will and not to will are in the power of the will, and similarly to do and not to do."

But in another and more common sense, the direct voluntary (or, as others say, express³) is called that "which is willed in itself" (therefore it is also called voluntary in itself) "and immediately, as when someone steals something, because he has in himself the will of stealing";⁴ indirect is that "which is willed not in itself, but in another thing which is apprehended, at least confusedly,⁵ as the cause"

"of some effect." Hence it is also called voluntary in cause.¹ By others, for the same reason, it is also called implicit or virtual voluntary.²

Hence you will gather: a) An effect not only foreseen, but also intended, is directly voluntary.

b) What is intended in itself is directly voluntary, even in the case in which it is intended not for its own sake, or as an end, but only as a means; and therefore the killing of a fetus is directly voluntary, although it is intended only as a means of saving the life or reputation of the mother. "For voluntary is not only what we will for its own sake, as an end, but also what we will for another thing, as for an end."³

c) Sins voluntary in cause are imputed at that time at which their cause is voluntarily placed. Yet from this do not conclude that the evil effect itself, when in fact it follows (for example pollution in sleep arising from a voluntary cause), is not sinful, and therefore that it is sufficient to disclose in Confession the guilt of the cause itself. For, as the exterior act is the substantial complement of the interior act and each is morally one and the same act (n. 25), so, in the case, the effect is the substantial complement of the cause, and with it morally one and the same act. Wherefore, just as it is not sufficient to confess the interior act, so neither is it sufficient to confess the placing of the cause. Thus, as the truer opinion, St. Alph., L. V, n. 149, against others.

d) For the imputation of a sinful effect foreseen from a voluntary cause, it makes no difference whether the effect in fact follows or not; for, as was said under c), the effect is imputed when its cause is placed.

That the things to be said concerning the voluntary in cause may be rightly understood, it is useful to premise these things concerning cause. - The efficient cause, concerning which there is speech here, is that by which something is done. But this is:

1° Physical or moral. The former is that which, by acting physically, produces the effect, as fire produces a conflagration, the sun light. The latter is that which effectively moves another free cause to acting. Thus one commanding homicide is the moral cause of the killing.

2° Immediate or mediate. The former is that which produces the effect, no other cause intervening, for example, if someone pierces the breast of another, he will be the immediate cause of his death. The latter is that which does not produce the effect except another cause being interposed. Hence a moral cause is always a mediate cause.

3° Proximate or remote (in moral matters). A proximate cause has a necessary or ordinary connection with the effect; but a remote cause, although it is able to produce the effect, nevertheless does not have great force upon it, nor does it notably influence it; or it is that from which the effect does not frequently arise. Thus the drinking of wine for a drunkard will be a proximate cause, for a sober man a remote cause, of drunkenness.

4° A cause per se or per accidens. The former is that which from its own nature tends, or is ordered, to producing the effect. Thus excessive drink is a cause per se of drunkenness. But the latter is that which, although from its own nature it is not ordered to some effect, nevertheless sometimes, some circumstance being added, can produce it. Thus homicide can follow from drunkenness. For the most part this last division falls back into the preceding one.

7. - An evil effect following from the indirect voluntary, that is, from the direct volition of a cause, is imputed to the agent for fault, if he could and ought to have avoided the cause on account of such an effect. Hence these things flow:

Corollaries. - I. A threefold condition is required that an effect can be imputed to the agent, or to the one placing the cause, namely:

1° That the agent foresaw the effect, at least confusedly. The reason is that an effect in no way foreseen can in no way be voluntary; for nothing is willed unless it has first been known. Hence drunkenness is not voluntary, nor to be imputed to him who becomes drunk from a little wine, whose force he did not know. Therefore, as some have contended, it is not sufficient for fault that the evil effect could have been foreseen or ought to have been foreseen; for the supposition must be denied, namely that an effect can be foreseen if in fact it is not foreseen, at least confusedly; for the first idea of some thing is not in man's power. Hence also, not even indirectly, is the omission of acts voluntary concerning which a man in no way thinks, as, for example, the omission of Vespers in him who, wholly immersed in studies, does not notice the twelfth hour of the night approaching, before which he had determined to finish them. Nevertheless, voluntary in cause and imputable to sin are the blasphemies, impurities, quarrels, which are wont to be done by someone in drunkenness. For such things are sufficiently foreseen from the custom of doing such things in this state.

2° That the agent could have not placed the cause; for otherwise, liberty being lacking, the voluntary would necessarily be lacking. Besides, an obligation cannot be given when it cannot be fulfilled. Hence the axiom: No one is held to the impossible. Thus a priest who gives Communion to a hidden sinner publicly asking for it is not guilty of sacrilege; for he could not, in those circumstances, not place the cause of the sacrilege which this man will commit.

3° That there be present a law by force of which the agent is held not to place the cause, or to remove it once placed; for where there is no law, neither is there transgression. But no one is held not to place the cause, or to remove it once placed, if he has a right of placing it, founded in necessity, utility, or honesty; for from the rule of law: to one pursuing his own right an effect following beyond intention is not imputed. Hence inordinate motions are not voluntary, nor therefore imputable, to a physician or surgeon in the exercise of his art, or to a theologian in the study of Moral Theology, provided, namely, that the proximate danger of consent is absent or remote; because the former are not held to omit their art, nor the latter his study, in order to forestall this effect, but on the contrary they have a just reason for giving work to them. Thus also evil desires of the curious are in no way imputed to a woman honestly adorning herself.

8. II. - It is lawful to place a good or indifferent cause from which there immediately follows a twofold effect, one good, the other evil, if there is present a proportionately grave reason and the end of the agent is honest, namely if he does not intend the depraved effect.¹

The reason of this principle is that, if this were not lawful, the agent would sin either from the intention of the depraved effect, or from the placing of the cause, or from the foresight of the evil effect. But none of these can be said. Not the first; for the end is supposed honest. Not the second; for the cause is supposed good, or at least indifferent. Finally not the third; for in the hypothesis the depraved effect is not intended, but merely not avoided; and there is present a proportionately grave and just reason for not avoiding it.

Moreover, five conditions which are directly or indirectly enunciated in this principle are altogether required, namely: 1° that the end of the agent be honest, that is, not disordered; 2° that the cause which is placed, or once placed is not removed, be good or at least indifferent; 3° that the good effect be immediate; 4° that there be present a grave reason for placing the cause, or not removing it once placed, nor is the agent held by justice, or by office, or by charity to omit it, or to remove it once placed; and 5° that practically there be no prudent judgment that the agent will consent to the illicit effect.

Therefore, 1° a good end is required; that is, one placing the cause or not removing it once placed must not intend the evil effect,² because otherwise he would intend something disordered, and therefore would sin. Thus in the example just adduced of the physician, surgeon, student of theology, woman honestly adorning herself, it would be a sin if besides the honest end a dishonest one were sought by them. 2° It is required that the cause which is placed, or once placed is not removed, be good or at least indifferent; namely that the act not be opposed to some law from which here and now he is excused by no legitimate cause. The reason is evident. For if the cause were not of this kind, it would induce guilt per se. Hence a girl gravely sins who, pregnant from a crime, procures abortion in order to avoid infamy; for the cause is not indifferent, and besides the 3rd and 4th condition fail. 3° It is required that the good effect follow equally immediately from the cause. The reason is that, if the cause directly and immediately has a depraved effect, and only by means of that depraved effect the good effect exists, then good is sought from evil; but it is never lawful to perpetrate evil, however slight, for procuring any good whatever; for according to the commonly known axiom, drawn from the Apostle,³ evils are never to be done that goods may come. Thus it is not lawful for you to lie, even for saving the life of a man. 4° It is required that there be present a proportionately grave reason for placing the cause, nor is the agent held from another obligation to omit it; because the natural law obliges us to avoid evils and to forestall harms to the neighbor, when we can do this without proportionately grave harm.

When a reason is proportionately grave will be explained in n. 307, 308. 5° It is required that practically there be no prudent judgment that the agent will consent to the illicit effect when it is produced. For consent into sin is never not to be avoided. Suppose, for example, that from riding there is wont to follow pollution for someone, and that the one riding does not intend this (the evil effect), but honest recreation (the good effect). Nevertheless he knows by experience that, notwithstanding the purpose of not consenting and of employing the means for forestalling consent, frequently, because the means have not in fact been employed, or have not been employed seriously enough, he consents; on this man certainly the obligation rests of abstaining from riding.¹

Note. - a) That it may rightly be decided whether the cause of permissively bearing oneself toward an evil effect is proportioned, the advantages and disadvantages which will follow from the action are to be compared with one another; but not only those which will arise in this or that particular case, but also those which would exist for society considered universally, or for the human race, if either it were necessary to abstain from the action, or it were lawful to place it. Wherefore, if I offer a just wage to a worker, and he demands more than the just amount, I am by no means held to consent to it, although I foresee that he will therefore blaspheme; for from this there would exist for society, or for timorous men, this grave harm: that whatever they asked would have to be furnished to those scoundrels, in order to forestall their blasphemies, which otherwise would not only not be forestalled, but to which a more frequent occasion would also thereby be given. On the contrary fornication will never be lawful, because permission for it, if it were given in any event, would yield to the harm of the human race (n. 493, I, under 2°).²

b) If the effect is lightly evil, it can never be imputed unto grave fault; but if it is gravely evil, it will not therefore always be imputed unto grave fault. For, as I said in n. 7 under 3°, in order that an effect can be imputed to one placing a cause, it is required that there be present a law by force of which the agent is held to avoid the cause on account of such an effect, or insofar as it is the cause of such an effect. But the obligation of this law, and likewise the degree or quantity of the obligation, depends both on the causality which intervenes between the action and the effect - namely whether the action influences the effect per se, or only per accidens, and, if per se, whether proximately or remotely - and on the reason which one has for placing the cause of such an effect. - Therefore under grave fault a gravely sinful effect will be imputed if it follows per se and proximately from the action (pollution from an immodest touch); but the killing of an unjust aggressor will in no way be imputed to you if this is necessary for the defense of your life, since you have a just reason for placing a cause producing even per se and proximately the death of the aggressor. - Under grave fault also will be imputed an evil effect which tends to grave harm of the neighbor if either no reason for placing the cause is present (no good effect follows for you from the cause), or a reason is indeed present, but not proportioned to the harmful effect (the good effect to follow from the placing of the cause is so little that, considering the gravity of the harm that will occur to the neighbor, it is to be esteemed as nothing). A case, for example, would be if, by not placing some action from the placing of which you can abstain without any inconvenience, or at least without proportioned inconvenience, you would avoid a cause, although only remote, of so grave a harm (suppose the killing of a neighbor), that you are held under grave fault by charity to avoid that harm, even with this inconvenience. Besides this case, there is not given a grave obligation of avoiding an effect, although gravely evil, if that effect follows from an act as from a cause per se, but only remote. Wherefore, by force precisely of this principle, inordinate motions following from honest conversation (a remote cause), although useless, are excused from grave fault; but if the conversation is truly useful, those motions by themselves are free from every fault. Notice, however, that a cause remote of itself can, for someone, considering his special disposition, be proximate. Examples are had in n. 502, I, under 2°.

*« Since through certain acts it is necessary to arrive at beatitude, human acts must consequently be considered, that we may know by what acts one arrives at beatitude, or impedes the way to beatitude. But, because operations and acts are concerned with singulars, therefore every practical science is perfected in particular consideration. Moral consideration therefore, since it treats of human acts, must first indeed be treated in the universal, secondly however in the particular.

» Concerning the universal consideration of human acts, the first thing occurring to be considered is about the human acts themselves, secondly about their principles. Now some human acts are proper to man, others are common to man and other animals. And since beatitude is the proper good of man, those acts stand more closely related to beatitude which are properly human, than acts which are common to man and other animals. First therefore must be considered the acts which are proper to man, secondly the acts which are common to man and animals, which are called the passions of the soul ¹ » ¹ The passions will be treated in the following treatise.

» Concerning the first two things occur to be considered: first, the condition of human acts; secondly, the distinction of those acts. But since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is rational appetite, which is proper to man, we must consider acts insofar as they are voluntary. First therefore must be considered the voluntary and the involuntary in common; secondly, the acts which are voluntary as elicited by the will itself, as existing immediately of the will itself; thirdly, the acts which are voluntary as imperated by the will, which are of the will itself through mediating other powers. And because the acts of the will have certain circumstances by which they are judged, first must be considered the voluntary and involuntary, and consequently the circumstances of those acts in which the voluntary and involuntary are found ¹ »] ¹ Hic q. 6.

PRAENOTANDA

[That it may be clearly known of what acts there is question in the present treatise, certain distinctions must be established. Since man is rightly defined « a rational animal, » those acts alone which proceed from his nature perfectly, that is rationally, are to be imputed to him, as human and subject to the rules of morality. Hence

Acts done in man necessarily, such as respiration, are indeed natural; but, as pertaining only to animality, they are imperfect and not properly acts in the sense we understand here, that is, human.

There are acts which would of themselves be human if they were referred to a deliberated and free end, but which sometimes arise unforeseen without any deliberation and intention, such as laughter, which proceeds from a power proper to a rational being, but often not rationally. Such acts are not yet human, but are called acts of a man, as proceeding from a man in a mode not perfectly human.

A human act, in the theological sense, is therefore an operation proceeding from a man in a human manner, that is rationally or from deliberated will, consequently with knowledge of the end and freely. It truly pertains to man as defined above.

A human act proceeds from the will either immediately, without the aid of another faculty, and is elicited, because it is considered only in the will itself, by which immanent operation it elicits it: such are love and hate. If that act of the will does not rest in itself but commands another act, for this reason it is said to be imperating. But the act which proceeds from the will only mediately, that is determined by the command of the will and distinguished from its own act, such as meditation and walking, is imperated.

A human act is not to be considered only physically; but, since it tends to a known and chosen end, it is subject to rules which render the prosecution of the end legitimate or illegitimate, and from this heading it is constituted in moral being. Therefore a human act becomes moral from its relation to the rule of honesty or morals: if it is conformable to it, it is good, because « good is from an integral cause; » if it discord from it, it is evil, because « evil is from any defect whatsoever; » but if it is neither against nor alongside such a rule, the act is indifferent.]

DISSERTATION I

ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY

St. Thomas, q. 6.

I say 1°: The voluntary is rightly defined commonly thus: « That which proceeds from an intrinsic principle, with cognition of the end. »

The definition is explained. By intrinsic principle is understood any elicited appetite, rational as well as sensitive; but, because among elicited appetites the will is the more principal, from the principal appetite the voluntary is denominated. Therefore by the first particles the voluntary is distinguished from the violent, whose principle is outside; likewise from what is willed simply, which does not proceed from any influx of will, but is its object and term extrinsically denominated from volition; thus rain is willed by the farmer, but not voluntary to him. By the last particles it is distinguished from natural motion; because, although natural motion is from an intrinsic efficient principle, yet it is not from an intrinsic final principle, or it is not with cognition of the end, as appears in the motions of vegetative things and in the motion of heavy and light bodies toward the center: whence such things are not said to move themselves toward the end, but to be moved by another knowing, by whom there is impressed on them the principle of their motion toward the end. Likewise by these particles are excluded from the reason of voluntary the acts of intellect anticipating the act of will and not commanded by it; because, although they are from an intrinsic efficient principle, they do not suppose cognition of the end from which they are caused.

I say 2°: The voluntary is divided 1° into perfect and imperfect ¹. Perfect is that which proceeds from perfect cognition of the end; imperfect that which proceeds from imperfect cognition of the end. For since two things concur to the voluntary, namely the intrinsic principle and cognition of the end, the proper perfection of the voluntary by which it is distinguished from the natural cannot be sought from the intrinsic principle in which it agrees with the natural. Therefore from cognition of the end alone, by which it is distinguished from the natural. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 2, c. — 2. Ibid.

Hence it follows that the perfect voluntary belongs to rational nature alone, the imperfect to brutes ²; because perfect cognition is had when not only is apprehended the thing which is the end, but also is known the reason of the end and the proportion of means to end; and such cognition, since it is collative and discursive, belongs to intellectual nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the mere apprehension of the thing which is the end, without the knowledge of the reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of means to end. And such cognition of the end is found in brutes through sense and natural estimation. Therefore the imperfect voluntary agrees with brutes, the perfect with rational nature alone; yet not with all its acts, but only those which proceed with full cognition and advertence; whence sudden motions, motions of children, of the insane, of the half-asleep, are only imperfectly voluntary. ² Ibid.

2° The voluntary is divided into necessary and free. Free is that which proceeds from appetite with an indifferent judgment and power toward the opposite, as in man acting with full advertence concerning created goods. Necessary, that which proceeds from appetite with a judgment determined to one without power toward the opposite, as in brutes and human motions preceding the deliberation of reason.

3° The voluntary is divided into the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause. Voluntary in itself is whatever proceeds per se from the will expressly willing it, or every act which per se is intended, elicited, commanded, or positively admitted by the will; as, if you deliberately hate an enemy, you wish to kill, you command killing, you positively consent to one willing to kill. It is called also direct, express, and explicit voluntary.

Voluntary in cause is that which in itself is not immediately intended, elicited, or commanded by the will, but follows nevertheless from something willed per se and in itself, and therefore is reckoned willed in another as in its cause: thus quarrels are voluntary in cause for him who deliberately makes himself drunk, knowing that in drunkenness he quarrels freely everywhere, although elsewhere he detests quarrels. It is called also indirect, imperfect, and interpretative voluntary.

For this voluntary, the indirect one or that in cause, theologians commonly require three conditions. The first is that the effect was foreseen, or ought and could have been foreseen in a human way to follow from such cause; failing this, drunkenness is not indirectly voluntary for him who, ignorant of the force of wine and drinking to satiety, becomes drunk, as happened to Noë. Second, that it can. Third, that he ought to remove this cause and impede this effect; for if by no law am I bound to remove this cause, but on the contrary have just reason for positing it, there is no reason why what follows from it against my intention should be imputed to me, at least morally. Hence disordered motions are not imputed as voluntary to the confessor or surgeon, since these are not bound on that account to omit their ministry, but on the contrary have just cause for exercising it.

But when is anyone bound to omit or remove the cause from which an evil effect follows? A question difficult of solution on account of the diversity of cases occurring; for which are to be seen the things I say in the treatise de Jure et Justitia, dissert. VI, a. 12, in the premises, from which I repeat these few things.

That it may be discerned when the cause ought, or ought not, to be omitted or removed on account of the evil effect to follow from it, whether per se or per accidens, the evil effect must be compared with the good, and at the same time weighed how great is the influx of the cause into the evil effect: so that if the cause influences per se and proximately into the evil effect, and this outweighs the good effect, there is grave obligation of omitting or removing the cause; but none if the good effect outweighs, or at least equals, the evil. By what reason we said that just defense need not be omitted, from which proximately follows the death of the unjust invader, because the life of the innocent outweighs or at least equals the life of the noxious man; nor ought the damnation which the unjust invader incurs be attended to, because this does not follow from the just defense of invasion, but from the malice of the invader, to lay aside which lies in his own hand.

But if the cause influences remotely and lightly into the evil effect, and from it some good effect also follows, although it does not outweigh or equal the evil, there is no obligation of removing the cause, because less reason is required for positing a cause influencing only lightly and remotely into evil, than if it influenced gravely and proximately.

Hence you are not bound to abstain from honest and useful conversation on account of the motions arising from it. But if the cause influencing lightly and remotely be venially evil in itself, or from it no good effect follows, then there will be obligation of removing it, but light and only under venial sin, unless in this and the preceding case there be question of grave damage to a neighbor: because that obligation must be estimated according to the quantity of the influx of the cause; for since the effect is voluntary only in the cause, and is contained lightly and remotely in the cause, it is lightly voluntary in it, and consequently imputable to light fault, and further there is light obligation of removing the cause on account of that effect. Hence you are bound under venial sin to abstain from honest but useless conversation, or from curious reading from which you foresee disordered motions will follow, and this not only by reason of the cause itself, which already is venial in itself, but also by reason of the effect itself. I said, for these last two assertions, « unless the evil effect be grave damage to a neighbor; » for then there would be grave obligation of removing the cause, because charity commands us not only not to cause evil to our neighbor, but also, insofar as we conveniently can, to prevent it.

4° The voluntary is divided into positive and negative ¹. The author calls it direct and indirect. The positive or direct voluntary is that which proceeds from the will by real influx, as are all acts elicited or commanded by the will. The negative or indirect voluntary indeed does not proceed from the will by real influx, yet depends upon it, whence it is said to proceed from it negatively, as the omission of Mass in one who, adverting to its approaching celebration, applies himself to study, without saying actually and positively: « I do not will to hear it. » ¹ Ibid., a. 3, c.

[5° The voluntary is divided into express and tacit. The express voluntary is that which is declared distinctly by word or sign. The tacit voluntary is that which is not distinctly declared, but is gathered from some fact or omission, according to rule 43 of Law: « Who is silent seems to consent. » Truly in interpreting that voluntary one must proceed cautiously and discreetly, on account of this other rule of Law, which is 44: « He who is silent does not confess, but certainly neither does he seem to deny. » There must be added, therefore, that the former rule be rightly understood: « When he is bound to speak, and can. »]

These are the more common divisions of the voluntary; certain others will occur in what follows.

You will ask whether the perfect voluntary is the same as free.

I answer. negatively. For there is given a voluntary necessary from the perfection of cognition, which is perfectly, and more perfectly, voluntary than free, namely beatific love. For this proceeds from a maximally intrinsic principle, namely from the will loving God with whole heart, whole affection, and endeavor, and is accompanied by most perfect cognition, namely the clear vision of God most perfectly flowing into that love and equaling the whole universality of intellect and will.

You will say. The same argument can be made of that necessary love by which God loves himself and produces the Holy Spirit. For it would be absurd to imagine God loving himself with lesser inclination and more imperfect cognition than creatures, whom he loves freely.

Note 1°. The question is not of omission directly voluntary, namely when the one omitting in act wills positively to omit; for all confess that then, for the omission to be voluntary, no precept or obligation of positing the act omitted is required, because then the will is terminated directly and positively to it. But the question is of omission indirectly voluntary, namely when someone, being advertent, posits some act incompossible with the act omitted; e.g., someone, while the practical judgment dictates that Mass is presently to be celebrated and can be heard, chooses to remain at home, or to play, or to study, yet without saying: « I will to omit Mass. »

Note 2° that distinction must be made between culpable and voluntary omission; for it is certain that omission is not culpable without a precept of positing the act omitted.

I say 1°: For omission to be voluntary, there is not required a precept or obligation of positing the act omitted.

It is proved 1° by the fundamental reason. The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. But, the precept of positing the act omitted being set aside, its omission is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. Therefore. — Proof of the minor: 1° We suppose the intellect to advert to what is omitted, otherwise it would be mere forgetfulness or negative omission. 2° This omission hangs upon the will, whether it be posited or not posited. 3° The will elicits advertently some act incompossible with the omitted act, whereby liberty is exercised in act, and from which the omission follows. Therefore, the precept being set aside, omission is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end, and the omission is indirectly voluntary and thus elicited. What the adversaries oppose against this fundamental reason we shall say in the solution of the objections.

It is confirmed. He who omits freely omits voluntarily. But he who, intent upon study, omits Mass on a feria omits no less freely than on a feast day. Therefore.

It is proved 2° a posteriori. Many are the indirect voluntary omissions of acts not precepted; thus, e.g., he who, given to study or prayer, omits warming himself, or recreation, or some other convenience licit indeed but not precepted — not by direct volition of those omissions, but out of voluntary choice of study or prayer at that time, or on that occasion when he could licitly enjoy these conveniences; these, I say, are indirectly voluntary omissions, as no one, I think, will deny, since they are meritorious. Therefore it is plain that an indirect voluntary omission can exist without precept.

I say 2°: The effect consequent upon or concomitant with the omission is not voluntary without obligation of impeding it, unless perchance the omission be ordered as a means toward this effect.

It is proved 1° a priori. The effect following or accompanying the omission, the obligation of impeding it being set aside, proceeds neither physically nor morally from the will: not physically, because the will precisely omitting has no physical influx upon the existence of this effect, nor can omission, since it is a non-being, cause it physically; not morally, because there is no reason why an effect upon which the will has in no wise physical influx should be referred back to it as cause, unless because it could and ought to have impeded it. But by the very fact that it can and ought to impede such an effect, the effect begins to belong to it, and there is due to it the care of impeding it; whence omission of impeding is reckoned as volition of the effect, because no one is presumed unwilling to fulfill his debt, unless he wills the opposite the more. Therefore, the obligation of impeding the effect consequent upon the omission being set aside, that effect is not voluntary.

It is confirmed from the difference which exists between the omission itself and the effect following or accompanying it respectively with respect to the will. Omission per se immediately, no other cause intervening, depends upon the will; for the will can equally immediately nill as will. Whence, that the nolition, or omission of willing, be indirectly voluntary, it needs no other cause than only advertence and the suspension of influx after the vital manner, which is furnished by eliciting another act incompossible with the act omitted; for then the omission proceeds indirectly from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. But the effect following, or accompanying, the omission is not per se immediately from the will, but mediately, through another cause intervening: thus, e.g., while I omit to part two quarrelers, the killing ensuing thence is caused neither by my will nor by my omission, but by the sword of the slayer; likewise, when a sailor omits to steer the ship, neither his will nor his omission submerges the ship, but the tempest. That therefore such an effect be referred back to the will as to its cause, and be called interpretatively voluntary, something must be assigned whereby it comes about that it belongs in some way to the will and has some connection with it; and nothing else can be assigned except a precept of impeding that effect, as I said in the first proof.

The voluntary, according to St. Thomas, is that "whose principle is in the one operating . . . yet in such a way that the one operating himself knows the individual circumstances which concur for the operation": or, it is an act proceeding from the will illumined by intellectual knowledge of the individual things, namely of the object, end, and circumstances. Cf. St. Thomas, 3 Ethic., lect. 4.

The voluntary is distinguished in many ways, namely:

1st. Perfect or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full knowledge and full consent of the will; but the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure knowledge, or from imperfect consent.

2nd. Voluntary simply or in a certain respect. The former is sometimes defined as that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will; the latter, as that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite. But more often the Doctors understand and explain this division in a different way. For they call voluntary simply that which proceeds from the absolute and efficacious will of man, even if there is given, to the contrary, a certain conditioned nolleity, so that apart from this case it would not be done, as happens in a sailor who, when a storm is pressing, casts merchandise into the sea; then they call that voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect, or more briefly a mixed voluntary simply. But if there is present no mixture of the involuntary, because no actual conditioned nolleity is given, as happens in a sinner seriously penitent from fear of hell, then it is called a pure voluntary simply. But voluntary in a certain respect is called by the same Doctors that which is according to the conditioned and inefficacious will of man, although here and now a prevailing unwillingness is present; for example, a player would gladly prolong the game, unless the time of Mass were pressing. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 9 and 21. - Voit, n. 4.

3rd. Direct or indirect. The former is that which is intended in itself, or through itself, that is, which in the order of intention is the immediate object of the will, although perhaps it is very remote in the order of execution; but the latter is called that which is not willed in itself but in another, or rather is foreseen as about to follow from another thing directly willed, as an effect from a cause, or as something connected with it; for example, drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone. Hence the Doctors often express the same division by the name voluntary in itself and voluntary in cause; but they use the name direct and indirect voluntary with St. Thomas to designate the positive and negative voluntary. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 9.

4th. Positive or negative. The former is called that which is from the will really acting, or which requires a positive action, for instance reading; but the latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will; not insofar as no act is posited by the will which is the cause or occasion of the negative voluntary, but insofar as no positive act is required which is of its essential nature. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 71, art. 5; and q. 6, art. 3.

5th. Express or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if from some fact, or omission, it is apprehended to be present.

6th. Actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. That is called actual which proceeds from the will actually acting, as for example contrition in one who here and now elicits an act of penance. Virtual is an act of the will already posited, which nevertheless still so perseveres that here and now it exercises its power upon that which is being done, of which therefore it exists as the true cause. Such is the intention of a priest who, from an actual will of consecrating or absolving, begins Mass or enters the confessional, but a little afterward is so distracted that he no longer adverts to the words which he utters; nevertheless he truly consecrates and absolves by virtue of the intention which he had, and which morally perseveres and acts. Habitual is called that which indeed was actually emitted by the will, has not yet been revoked, but does not flow into the present action, because it has been interrupted either by sleep, or drunkenness, or a notable delay of time; whence it bespeaks pure concomitance, but not causality in relation to the action now to be posited. It is named interpretative if in no way it has been had, but can prudently be presumed, and would be had if it were thought about, or could be thought about. Thus a sick man deprived of his senses, if he has lived as a Christian, is judged to will to receive Extreme Unction.