Article I: On the Essence of Morality

21. - As was said above in n. 1, for theologians a human act is the same as a moral or imputable act. Yet theoretically each must be distinguished; for a twofold being is found in any human act, namely physical and moral. A human act considered according to physical being, or in the genus of nature, is an act which proceeds from the free will of man. But a human act according to its moral being, or in the genus of morals, is that same act insofar as it agrees with or is opposed to the rule of morals; and therefore the morality of human acts in general is their agreement with the rule of morals, or their discrepancy from the same. With certain more obscure formulas of speaking from the schools being set aside, the essence of morality can be said to consist in the bearing or relation of a human act to the rule of morals.

22. - But the one rule of morals is right reason; if the human act has been conformed to it, it will be called morally good; but if deformed from it, morally evil. Now since right reason is distinguished as twofold, one uncreated, which exists in the divine mind and is called the eternal law; the other created, which is the light impressed by God upon the rational creature, by which the eternal law itself is known; therefore:

I. The essence of morality consists primarily in the bearing or relation of a human act to the eternal law, which is the divine reason, or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed. The reason is that the eternal law alone can be the primary rule of morals. And indeed a rule of this sort must be infallible, indefectible, and capable of obliging in conscience; but such is the eternal law alone, from which alone other laws receive the force of obliging; therefore. Thus from St. Thomas.²

II. The essence of morality consists secondarily in the bearing of a human act to right reason. The reason is that right reason alone can manifest to man the eternal law, or the primary rule of morals. Therefore it belongs to right reason to direct the act of the will to God as to the ultimate end. Therefore right reason is the subjective rule manifesting the primary rule. Therefore the essence of morality consists secondarily in the conformity or deformity of the human act with right reason.¹

23. Resolutions. - 1° Therefore a moral being is all and only that which lies under the rule of morals, or under the law of God commanding, forbidding, or permitting. For through this alone we are ordered to our ultimate end, or disordered from it. Therefore, that our acts may be good, they must be in some way conformed to the divine will, since this is the supreme and primary rule of morals.

2° Liberty is pre-required for the foundation of morality; otherwise the act would not be human, and therefore all sins and merits would be removed from the midst.

3° It is false that the essence of morality must be placed in liberty alone. For the morality of a human act embraces its imputability to praise or blame, to reward or punishment; but an act is not worthy of praise or blame only because it is free, but also, and most of all, because it is conformed to or deformed from the rule of morals, or the divine will.

4° It is false, a fortiori, that morality consists in the voluntary alone. For the voluntary can be necessary, as, for example, in the natural appetite for happiness in general (n. 4 under 4°).

5° Moral goodness or malice is twofold, namely objective or material, and subjective or formal. The former is the very conformity or discrepancy of the action with the rules of morals considered in itself and in the object itself, independently of the will of the agent; but the latter is the same conformity or discrepancy, insofar as it is freely willed by the agent.

24. Questions. - It is asked 1° whether there are acts properly indifferent, or lacking morality, whether in species or in the individual.

Resp. 1° It is certain that there are acts indifferent in species, or acts which in their own species are without morality. For there are acts which, considered in themselves, abstracting from end and circumstances, have no agreement or repugnance with law or right reason, and therefore are to be judged neither good nor evil. Thus to walk, to write, and innumerable similar things are acts indifferent in themselves.

Resp. 2° But there is controversy with respect to acts in the individual, or as considered in the agent. The more common and more probable sentence with St. Thomas denies this, and St. Alphonsus proves it in these words: "It cannot happen that some singular act proceeding from deliberate will is done without circumstances: therefore either those circumstances are consonant with reason; namely, so that the act is done when, where, how, and on account of what it ought to be done, and thus it is good; or they are not consonant with right reason, at least not all of them, but some one is lacking, and thus it is evil: therefore no act in the individual, and considered according to all circumstances, can be indifferent."¹

25. - It is asked 2° whether the external act (actually to assist or harm one's neighbor) adds morality to the internal act (to will to assist or harm one's neighbor).

Resp. 1° In itself the external act adds no morality to the internal act, and therefore neither increases nor diminishes the substantial merit or demerit of the internal act. Thus with St. Thomas,² St. Alphonsus³ against certain others. - The reason is that, since the internal act of the will is the cause of the external act, and the effect (the external act) is wholly in the cause (in the internal act), the whole goodness or malice of the former must be placed in the goodness or malice of the latter.⁴

This is also clear from Sacred Scripture, which often regards the will as the deed itself. Thus, with respect to goodness and merit, it is clear from Gen. 22. vv. 16, 17, where God said to Abraham, who only willed to immolate his son: "Because thou hast done this thing, and hast not spared thy son ... I will bless thee." And, with respect to malice, from Matth. 5, 28, where Christ says: "He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." - Nor is the obligation of declaring the external act in Confession an obstacle; for it must be declared because from the internal act of the will and the exterior work there arises one and the same moral act.⁵ Nor again is an aureola an obstacle, which is attributed to martyrs, doctors, and virgins, and is not granted to those who are inwardly prepared to suffer and do the same things which the former have done and suffered; for an aureola is a certain accidental reward or joy corresponding to a special difficulty joined with an exterior act. Nor, moreover, is it an obstacle that the real reception of a Sacrament confers greater effects than the will alone of receiving it; for in the question the matter is not of an equal effect of the internal and external act, but of the equal morality and imputability of them. Add that the real effect of the reception of a Sacrament comes from the privilege of Christ, who willed that it have power ex opere operato, and not by reason of a greater goodness in the recipient. Finally, the matter is also of effect, not of morality, when we say that by an internal act an indulgence is not acquired which the Church has granted to an external act; that a censure or irregularity is not incurred by the mere will of placing the work to which by law they are annexed; and that the burden of restitution does not exist from affective injustice alone.

It must also be noted, if the matter is concerning goodness, that the internal act is supposed to proceed from a will so disposed that, given the opportunity, it would operate, and besides that the case of an internal act is excluded which by its nature would be necessarily inefficacious in order to the execution of the action which it would even sincerely will. Thus an elicited act by which I would will only to please and obey God as much as Christ did could not reach that goodness which the actions of Christ had; for however much I should will this, I would will it inefficaciously, since I am not capable of a theandric action.¹

Resp. 2° Per accidens, the external act generally increases morality, because very often it is the occasion by which the goodness or malice of the internal act is increased, for example so that it is prolonged or multiplied, etc. For the internal act is increased because of the arduousness of the good external work, or because of delight in evil, or because of the longer delay of time necessary in completing the external work. Besides, often in the external work there is scandal or harm to one's neighbor, or, on the contrary,

his edification; from these also the morality of the internal act is increased. Thus commonly the theologians.