Article I: On the Voluntary in Itself

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 1 and 2.

53. The voluntary, from Aristotle, Ethics III, chapter 1, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. It is said:

1. That which, that is, anything whatever, whether an act, or the omission of the act itself, or an effect proceeding from either;

2. Which proceeds, namely, in any way whatever, whether immediately or mediately, whether directly or indirectly: for he who places the cause, or omits it when he ought to place it, wills and causes the effect which he foresees will follow from it;

3. From an intrinsic principle, that is, from the proper power and inclination of that which operates;

4. With knowledge of the end or good: since the principle of acting is twofold, efficient and final, that properly proceeds from within which has an intrinsic efficient and final principle, so that it is not only moved but moves itself into the end. Hence for the voluntary it is required not only that it be from its own efficient principle by natural inclination, but also from some previous knowledge of the end by intentional inclination, by which the being acts for the sake of a known good. Hence for something to be totally voluntary, it must be known according to all circumstances; but if one is unknown, according to this it will not be voluntary, as if someone kills a man, not knowing that he is a cleric, he is guilty of homicide, not sacrilege.

Therefore the voluntary differs:

a) from the natural, whose efficient principle is within, but not the final, such as the motion of the heart, of vegetative life, which are done without knowledge of the end;

b) from the violent, whose principle is from without, with the subject resisting, as if someone is dragged by external force against his will;

c) from the simply willed: for this is an intentional object, but not a real effect of the will proceeding from it as from a cause, that into which the will tends affectively, but which does not proceed from it effectively, that which it wills but does not cause; thus rain is willed by the farmer but not voluntary, likewise the natural death of an enemy at which someone rejoices: indeed every voluntary is in some way willed, but not conversely;

1. Although the simply willed does not proceed from the will, the very volition proceeds from it and consequently is voluntary and sufficient for the notion of sin; but since that volition is not the cause of the willed thing, it does not suffice on this part to induce an obligation, for example, of restitution.

d) from the permissive, which is neither voluntary, or proceeding from the will, nor willed as its object, but only is not impeded by him who can but ought not: thus for just reasons and for a greater good, God or a governor do not impede sins which nevertheless displease them and are not done by them.

54. Division of the Voluntary According to Knowledge of the End. - Since the voluntary proceeds from knowledge of the end, hence according to the diverse knowledge of the end, the voluntary is diverse:

1. Knowledge of the end is material, or improperly so called, when that which is the end is known but not as end; but knowledge is formal, or properly so called, when the thing which is the end is known as end, that is, the very reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end, or the proportion of means to end. Hence the voluntary is divided into the properly so called or perfect, which proceeds from formal knowledge of the end and is found only in the higher appetite of man; and the improperly so called or imperfect, which proceeds from material knowledge of the end and is also found in the sensitive appetite alone, and even in beasts: this is also called spontaneous.

2. Formal knowledge can be deliberate and indeliberate; hence the necessary voluntary is distinguished, which proceeds from judgment and will determined to one thing; and the free, which comes about from indifferent judgment with the power of the will to the opposite. The free is not always more voluntary, for the intentional inclination of the will toward beatitude is greater than toward other things, and yet it is necessary.

3. Deliberate knowledge can be more or less perfect; hence the perfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with full deliberation, such as prudent persons are accustomed to use in matters of some importance, and with full consent; this is required for mortal sin. And the imperfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with some deliberation and some consent, as is found in the half-asleep, the half-drunk, the distracted, and those laboring under vehement passion; this suffices for venial sin. Hence theologians are accustomed to distinguish: first-first movements, which precede all deliberation (and are not properly voluntary or human acts); second-first movements, which come about after some deliberation and before perfect deliberation; and second movements, or deliberate movements, which proceed from perfect deliberation.

55. Division of the Voluntary According to the Intention of the Will. - The voluntary is from the proper intentional inclination of the appetite; hence according to the diverse intention of the will from which it proceeds, the voluntary is diverse. For something can proceed:

1. From an actual intention had here and now, whether explicit, as when a priest baptizing says, I will to baptize, or implicit, contained actually in another, as when he wills to go to the baptistery and perform all things according to custom;

2. From a virtual intention, had previously but here and now still influencing and persevering in force, as when a distracted priest baptizes from the intention had at the beginning;

3. From a habitual intention, had previously and not retracted, but in no way remaining in force and influencing the present act: as when a catechumen desiring to be baptized, deprived of the senses, is voluntarily baptized.

1. Namely, the effect of the will once had endures, which is the condition or necessary disposition of the present effect caused by another.

The first is actually willed, the second virtually, the third only habitually.

2. We say: willed. There is no virtual or habitual voluntary; every voluntary proceeds and therefore is actual, but it proceeds from a virtual or habitual intention.

For a human act, habitual intention is not sufficient (nor, a fortiori, interpretative intention): for this does not flow into the act, nor therefore make it proceed from deliberation of reason and the influence of freedom and be done in a human mode; but at least virtual intention is necessary. For this three things are required: a) that the agent act in a human mode, for otherwise he would not act from intention; b) that the first intention has not been retracted; and c) that it remain active in some effect of itself, so that one effect flows from another and all from the first.

In the case in which contrary or incompossible intentions are present, the predominant remains and influences or obtains the effect. Of simultaneous intentions, the predominant is that which, according to the present disposition, would be chosen if the incompossibility were known; but if they are equal, none persists, because they destroy one another. Of two successive intentions, the later will prevail if someone formed it remembering the prior, because then the prior was knowingly revoked; also for the most part if he was forgetful of the prior, unless the prior was made in such a way that he wills at least virtually to exclude the subsequent one.

56. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Principle. - The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, and therefore by reason of the diverse principle it is distinguished into elicited, which proceeds immediately from the will itself and is consummated in it (to will, to consent, to choose), and commanded, which from the motion and command of the will proceeds immediately from another power, whether internal (for example, voluntarily to think or to be angry), or external (for example, voluntarily to walk).

Therefore by reason of terminus it is internal or external, according as it is consummated in an interior rational or sensitive power, or in the senses or members, or even in exterior effects. Hence the elicited and internal voluntary, and the commanded and external voluntary, are not one and the same.

57. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Manifestation. - Both the voluntary and the willed are manifested in diverse ways, and thus it is divided into 1) expressed, which is manifested by words or signs; 2) tacit, which is manifested by silence, or rather is known certainly from the circumstances of silence according to rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent; 3) presumed, which from certain reasons, as from the inclination or disposition of mind, is prudently conjectured to be present now, or is gathered conjecturally by reasonable indications: for presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing. Examples are: a religious who buys a book with consent received from the superior; or with the superior present and silent; or with the superior absent, whom he cannot approach, when he wholly needs the book.

Not everyone who is silent consents, for in rule 44 it is said: He who is silent does not confess, but neither indeed does he seem to deny. Therefore silence not per se but only according to various circumstances prudently to be considered signifies consent or dissent. Hence the one silent is judged to consent a) in favorable matters when there is question of a benefit or favor, such as a donation or gratuitous promise, but not if there is question of a burden, inconvenience, or prejudice; b) also in prejudicial matters, if someone can without great inconvenience and at the same time ought to contradict, e.g., if he is questioned by a judge, or a superior if he observes a transgressed rule and is silent, or if several come together to deliberate about a common opinion: for then the silent are judged per se to support those consenting; c) in comparison: if several things have been proposed and someone denies all and is silent about one, he is judged to affirm it; if he affirms all and is silent about one, he is judged to deny it; d) if it has been so determined in law, which nevertheless has force only in the external forum, provided the contrary is not proved.

58. Observation. - From all the aforesaid things there is distinguished both the merely interpretative voluntary and the merely interpretative willed: so called from an intention in no way had, but which only would be had. But this in no way is, but only would be, willed or voluntary; namely, in fact it is not intended by the will nor does it proceed from it, but it would be intended or would proceed if something were known, for example, a priest would will to celebrate Mass for his father if he knew him to be dead, and a bishop, if it were requested from him, would grant jurisdiction. It differs from the presumed willed, because this indicates that which, according to prudent estimation, exists or existed; but the former indicates that which, the condition being supposed, would exist.

It is said: merely interpretative. For even the presumed voluntary is called by others, and can also be called under some respect, interpretative. And many scholastics call the voluntary in cause interpretative: for he who wills the cause is judged to will the effect; and others so call the voluntary from virtual (or habitual) intention: he who voluntarily begins is judged to will to persevere.