Mental reservation

639. Declarations. 1. Amphibology is the use of words which of themselves are equivocal and therefore apt for generating a diverse sense. Thus gallus signifies a man sprung from Gaul and a rooster.

If someone uses amphibology, for example, "I killed a gallus," or "We are Germans," it can happen that the words are brought forth according to one signification by the speaker and understood according to another by the hearer, who is thus indeed deceived, yet nevertheless could understand the words also in the signification in which they are brought forth by the speaker: for of themselves they have a double sense.

2. Mental restriction is defined: an act of the mind by which the words of the speaker, through something which is kept silent or retained in the mind, are narrowed to another sense than the natural and obvious one.

It is one thing to lie, another to conceal the truth. Although to lie or to say what is false can never be licit, nevertheless to conceal the truth is often licit, indeed sometimes even necessary. Now mental restriction frequently is the only means of concealing the truth: for often neither is it permitted to decline a response nor to repel the one questioning.

3. A twofold restriction is distinguished: purely mental restriction, if the sense of the speaker can be perceived in no way, as if, when asked whether he has seen Rome, he responds, "Certainly," adding in his mind, "in a picture"; and broadly mental restriction, if the sense of the speaker can in some way be understood from the circumstances.

In mental restriction the words of themselves indeed have only one sense, but in the circumstances of person, place, or time in which they are brought forth, they admit another sense besides the natural one. Thus one asked about a secret which he knows but must conceal, and responding, "I do not know," manifestly denies only communicable knowledge; in this sense Christ denied that he knew the day of judgment.¹

¹ Cf. Mark 13:32; likewise John 7:8.

640. Principles. 1. From a just cause it is permitted to use amphibology or equivocation and to confirm it by oath.

Words brought forth amphibologically contain in themselves and externally in relation to the hearer the sense intended by the speaker; therefore the speech is not against the mind and hence is not a lie. Thus Christ said that he was sleeping who had died.¹ That a just cause is required in order that an amphibological oath be licit is clear from the things to be said below.

2. Purely mental restriction is never licit, because it does not differ from a lie: for in this restriction the words of the speaker, both of themselves and from the circumstances externally, have only one sense, and that discordant from the mind of the speaker.

Wherefore after the propositions (26, 27) condemned by Innocent XI, there is no theologian who says that purely mental restriction is licit, even if before this several had not judged it illicit.²

3. From a just cause we can licitly use broadly mental restriction, unless the one questioning has the right of knowing the truth; indeed sometimes we must use it.

a. This restriction is not a lie: for the words of the speaker are equivocal not of themselves but from the circumstances. Therefore they are conformed to the mind of the speaker, since they truly contain the sense which the speaker has in mind, even if only obscurely or incompletely. Moreover, for the good of society it is required that there be a means of licitly concealing the truth and preserving a secret; but, St. Alphonsus concludes (n. 152), "if it were not permitted to use broadly mental restriction, there would exist no mode of licitly concealing a secret, which would be harmful to human commerce no less than a lie." Finally, one's neighbor is not directly and necessarily deceived, but his deception is only permitted: for if the words of the speaker with restriction are taken by the hearer according to a false sense, the hearer is in reality deceived; but since the words of the speaker can be understood according to a true sense, the deception must be imputed not to the speaker but to the hearer himself.

alpha. A manifest sign of this necessity is detected in those affirmations of many by which they assert that they had to lie either for preventing discord or blasphemies or other inconveniences. In circumstances of this kind there is a just cause of using mental restriction; and since the faithful rarely grasp the theory concerning mental restriction, they must simply be told that the responses which they bring forth in circumstances of this kind for avoiding grave inconveniences are not lies but licit responses.

beta. From the end of restriction it is clear that the speaker can not only deliberately conceal the full truth through restriction, but can also desire and intend that the hearer not perceive the full truth; but it is permitted only to allow his deception. Yet in order that mental restriction be licit, it is required that the sense retained in the mind be able to be known morally or prudently from the circumstances. Therefore it is not necessary that the speaker use a restriction which the hearer easily supplies; yet this is required, that the restriction be able to be understood prudently and reasonably from the circumstances.

b. From a just cause: for it is not permitted without reason to furnish another an occasion of deception. Moreover, if this were always and without any cause permitted, no one could any longer believe another, because in any saying whatsoever he could and would have to suspect ambiguity, which would turn to manifest detriment of human society.

A just cause of using mental restriction is a true utility which follows from the concealed truth, or a true inconvenience, whether one's own or another's, which would follow from the truth manifested. But it is never permitted to use mental restriction where the one questioning has the right of knowing the truth: for to this right there corresponds in the other an obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity, as if children are asked by parents, or those to be promoted to some office, order, or marriage, by superiors concerning a defect or crime committed, because they can and must withdraw from the office which they seek if they do not wish to declare the crime.³

c. We must use broadly mental restriction when neither can the truth about which inquiry is made be manifested without sin, nor can the one questioning be dismissed without a response.

An example by which this may be clear, if we prescind from the secret of confession and of office, is presented by Lehmkuhl, Casus conscientiae I, n. 455 ss.

4. From a just cause it is licit to confirm broadly mental restriction by oath: for since words brought forth with broadly mental restriction are true, God is not invoked in testimony of falsity.

a. A just cause of swearing with mental restriction is a great good to be preserved or grave damage to be avoided. Yet because many do not grasp the theory of mental restriction and others calumniate it, it is rarely expedient that oaths with mental restriction be recommended, unless they are necessary.

b. There are those who affirm that an oath emitted with mental restriction is repugnant both to the essence and to the end of an oath, and is therefore illicit. But they are plainly mistaken. For the essence of an oath requires that that which is confirmed by oath be true; but speech with broadly mental restriction is true. The end for which an oath was instituted does not require that this end be in reality obtained in individual cases, but that it can be obtained; or it requires only this, that the one swearing not impede the attainment of the end by a positive action, but only permit its frustration from a grave cause. But this obtains in oaths of this kind.

Note. All understand that for human intercourse a means of concealing the truth is necessary in those circumstances in which a response cannot be declined. According to the opinion of Catholics, this means is broadly mental restriction; but according to the doctrine of Protestants, it is a lie, or false-speech, which they say is licit when it harms no one but profits the speaker or another. Although practically in most circumstances broadly mental restriction and false-speech return to the same thing as to the matter, nevertheless the doctrine of Catholics must absolutely be held, both because it says that every lie is illicit and therefore more easily forestalls abuses, and because mental restriction, as speech true in itself, can be confirmed by oath, which sometimes is necessary; but a lie, even if it is called licit, cannot be confirmed by oath.

¹ John 11:11.

² Cf. Viva, Damnatae theses, on the cited propositions.

³ Cf. proposition 28 condemned by Innocent XI.

641. Applications. The difficulty of this matter is not in the liceity of mental restriction, which all must concede who understand what is signified by it; but the difficulty is in discerning purely mental restriction from broadly mental. Concerning this matter it must be noted that he who questions, from the usage received among men, does not expect, or cannot expect, any response except one conforming to the circumstances; and therefore the one responding does not lie if he restricts the response to the circumstances of the one questioning and of the one responding, provided he observes the condition proposed above (n. 640, 3, beta).

This is confirmed by common usage, from which it is established that circumstances bring it about that the words of the speaker can and must be understood in another sense than the natural and obvious one. Indeed, there are innumerable cases of human life in which the words of the speaker or of the one questioning are not accepted according to the sense which they have of themselves, but which they have from determined circumstances. Thus, to prescind from ironic sayings, one asked by him who seeks his father through the house whether he has seen his father rightly responds, "No," understanding well from the circumstances that the matter is whether he has seen the father here and now.

a. To one asking those things which cannot be manifested, it is licitly answered, "I do not know," namely, so as to tell you, or by communicable knowledge. Therefore a confessor asked whether Titius confessed homicide can and must respond: "I do not know," because he does not know it by communicable knowledge. Yet if the words or circumstances of the questioner are of such a kind that the word "I do not know" signifies every ignorance, it is not permitted to use it, but one must tell the questioner that he questions in vain. But the confessor, if the questioner were to insist whether he did not know this by communicable knowledge, can still answer, "I do not know": for since the questioner ought to know that the confessor cannot speak about this matter, he cannot prudently expect any other response unless he wishes to bear a refusal.

b. In those circumstances in which there is present a grave reason for concealing the truth, the denial of the thing, "No," from the common judgment of men, does not signify that the thing is denied, but that manifestation of the thing neither ought nor can be made. Therefore a penitent asked by a confessor about a sin which he is not bound to confess can respond with restriction that he did not commit it, namely, in such a way that he is bound to confess it, unless the confessor justly asks in order to know the state of the penitent: for the penitent rightly supposes that the confessor does not wish to question indiscreetly, and therefore expects a response only to those things which he prudently asks. But a prudent confessor ought to suspect that the response can be taken in this way.

c. If public persons are asked about matters committed to their trust, such as secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever have an office and reason for concealing the truth, they can use restriction, rightly supposing that the one questioning does not wish to provoke them to an illicit or imprudent thing.

d. To one asking whether I can lend him money, it is permitted to respond, "I do not have it," subunderstanding: which I can easily or securely lend. For it can prudently be supposed that the one asking does not wish to be troublesome by his petition and therefore seeks only that money which can be lent without difficulty.

e. Servants from the will of their master can deny that he is at home, although he is present, because such speech from received usage signifies that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Yet attention must be given to the custom of places.

f. He who is asked by a tax collector whether he has anything about which a tax must be paid can of himself respond that he has nothing, namely about which he must pay or which he must declare; for since of himself he is not bound to pay or declare, the collector by the highest right cannot prudently expect any response except one corresponding to the obligation of the speaker. Yet tax collectors questioning thus generally intend to free travelers from troublesome inspection; wherefore the words of the one questioning, from the circumstances, rather contain this sense: whether they have anything about which they would have to pay if it were detected by the inspector. Therefore tax collectors, especially from clerics and priests, deservedly expect a response without restriction.

g. Some restrictions which are called broadly mental by authors most certainly must be referred to the purely mental, because the conditions explained above are not observed. Thus if an adulterous woman, asked by her husband whether she committed adultery, denies this while subunderstanding idolatry, because idolatry in Sacred Scripture is sometimes called adultery, she uses purely mental restriction. By these things it is not denied that an adulteress can employ restriction and deny the crime committed, namely that she is bound to manifest it to her husband; for on the one side the husband does not have the right of knowing the hidden crimes of his wife, and on the other side the wife cannot manifest the truth without very grave inconvenience. Therefore the husband ought prudently to judge that the response can be conformable to the circumstances, and therefore inadequate.

If it is never lawful to tell a lie, if the lie of necessity cannot be allowed, what means have we of safeguarding a secret ?

Catholic theologians answer this question by propounding their doctrine of mental reservation. Mental reservations are either strictly or widely so called. The former is the restriction of one’s meaning in making an assertion to the proposition as modified by some addition made to it within the mind of the speaker. As if on being asked “ Are you going to town ?” one were to answer “ Yes,” meaning “‘ in imagination.” In wide mental reservations the words used are capable of being understood in different senses, either because they are ambiguous in themselves, or because they have a special sense derived from the circumstances of time, place, or person in which they are spoken. Thus, when a servant says that her master is not in, the words may mean either that he is absent, or that he does not wish to see the visitor. The servant’s real meaning is restricted to one of these senses. In the same way a defendant on his trial in an English court .of justice pleads not guilty—i.e., until the charge be proved. A lawyer or a doctor questioned about professional secrets replies, “ I don’t know ”—i.e., I have no knowledge which I can communicate.

Although strict mental reservations are lies, and therefore sinful, yet wide mental reservations are in common use; they are necessary, and they are not lies. They are necessary because justice and charity require that secrets should be kept, and frequently there is no other way of keeping them. They are not lies because, as we saw above, words take their meaning not only from their grammatical signification, but from the circumstances in which they are used. When a priest is asked about a sin which a penitent has confessed to him, and he answers, ‘‘I never heard of it,” he speaks as a man, not as a confessor who holds the place of God in the tribunal of Penance. All are aware that he is a priest, and to all his words mean, “‘ I never heard of it outside of the confessional.” He never speaks of what he has heard inside the confessional, and nothing can, or should, be gathered about what he has heard there from the words which he uses. Although these wide mental reservations are not lies, yet they must not be employed without just cause, for the good of society requires that we should speak our mind with frankness and sincerity in the sense in which we are understood by our hearers, unless there be a good reason for permitting their self-deception when they take our words in a sense that we do not mean.

Truth requires not only that we should say nothing that we know to be false, but also that we should weigh our statements and not make rash and unconsidered assertions. There are some people whose talk runs babbling along like a stream in a fresh, and with as little meaning. A man with a love for truth will be more sparing of his words, and will weigh them before giving them currency.

Concealment of the Truth.—Truthfulness is offended not only by the declaration of falsity (i.e., of what is not in the mind), but also by the unlawful concealment of the truth (i.e., of what is in the mind). The truth is concealed either negatively or positively.

(a) There is negative concealment of the truth, when one has recourse to silence or evasion. Everyone admits that this kind of concealment is lawful when there is no obligation to give information, or when there is an obligation not to give it. Thus, a person who is besieged by newspaper reporters does not feel obligated to answer all their questions; a person who is interrogated by curious individuals about his business or financial affairs, does not feel guilty if he evades their questions by changing the subject, or by asking them similar questions, or by putting them off till a more convenient time, etc.

(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental reservation.

Mental Reservation.—Mental reservation is an act of the mind by which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.

(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them) nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from their context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was the club which hit Balbus directly.

(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different meanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius accidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck Sempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows nothing about the matter.

Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.—(a) Strict mental reservation is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn. 1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess; secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).

(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications, when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused. Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37). Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.

(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets. Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared (John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV Kings, vi. 19).

When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?—There is general agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following cases:

(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the facts. The answer, “I do not know” or “No,” in these cases simply means: “I have no personal or communicable knowledge.” In war time a government has the right to censor the news in order to keep information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);

(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).

Ambiguous Answers.—Are ambiguous answers which are not given according to the questioner’s mind, and for which there are no reasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?

(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the speaker’s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying. The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.

(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express the speaker’s mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is good, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or other Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the question propounded referred to moral goodness.

Whether broadly mental restriction is licit? It is sometimes licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, i.e., improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that by this very fact that the truth can be prudently gathered from some circumstance of the thing, place, time, or person speaking, the aforesaid restriction is not evil in itself, since neighbor is not properly deceived, but from a just cause only his deception is permitted. Moreover, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly concealing a secret and of avoiding damage from its manifestation; and sometimes no other means is at hand besides broadly or improperly mental restriction. And so in a case of this kind it is licit to use restriction not purely mental, by answering according to the mind of the questioner, or according to those things which appear and are commonly believed, or according to the ordinary non-authoritative mode of speaking, or finally according to received custom; e.g., if someone denies that he entered such a house, namely in which he himself committed no theft, as is believed, although truly he entered it; if those joined in civil marriage and commonly judged to be joined in legitimate marriage are mutually called husband and wife; if someone, asked by a friend about another's crime injuring reputation, answers that he does not know it; if a servant answers importunate visitors that the master is not at home. Struggl tr. 5, q. 3, n. 17.; Ithur. Cas. 37, n. 11 seqq.

1. Magdalena, a wife, is accused by her own husband concerning adultery altogether hidden, so that he can institute divorce before a judge and enter another marriage. Hence Magdalena asks her confessor whether she is held to confess her sin in court. The confessor responds that she can deny that she committed adultery.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. “It must be said that concerning this a distinction must be made. For if the adultery is altogether hidden, she ought not to confess her sin in court, nor ought an oath concerning speaking the truth to be demanded from her, because hidden things are reserved to the divine judgment alone; according to that saying, 1 Cor. 4:5: Do not judge before the time, until the Lord comes, who will illuminate the hidden things of darkness. But when infamy proceeds from adultery, or some evident signs appear which can cause vehement suspicion, or when it has been half-proved, then an oath concerning speaking the truth ought to be demanded from her, and she herself is held to confess the truth.” S. Th. Quodl. 5. a. 16. Therefore, since in the Case there is question of adultery altogether hidden, Magdalena can, by mental restriction, deny it, saying, I did not commit adultery, and understanding, which I am held to confess in court. For the response is of itself to be understood according to the question made. But a question made by a judge concerning adultery is evidently a question concerning adultery about which he himself can ask and render sentence, and which consequently the guilty woman is held to confess in court. I. M. 1530, 1535; G. 418, 419.

2. Galenus, a most skilled physician, knew a most powerful herb for checking the flow of blood. He communicated the secret only to Laelius, his dearest friend, under the latter’s promise of keeping the same secret. Galenus having died, Laelius, who alone knows the secret, would like to manifest the secret for public utility; and he proposes the doubt to his confessor.

Q. Can Laelius, in the Case, manifest the secret?

R. It seems that Laelius can manifest the aforesaid secret. The reason is that from that manifestation no damage at all can come to Galenus, indeed good can come, namely praise and honor for him. Nor truly can damage of this sort come to any other, since Laelius alone knows the secret. Whence, communication of that secret having been made to him by Galenus, he himself is now the absolute owner of this secret. Besides, the secret is altogether useful to the common good of others. Wherefore it would rather seem to be against charity not to communicate a salutary remedy to all. This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. For the Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 12. a. 21, raises the question: “Whether one receiving the teaching of some experiment under an oath not to communicate it is held to observe the oath”; and he responds: “One thing must be said here simply, and another in the Case. Speaking simply, he is not held, but he acted badly by swearing. An oath loses force not only when the oath is illicit, but also when he swears to worse things; because an obligating oath ought to have judgment, justice, and truth. But even if I sometimes swear something which it is lawful for me not to do, say, not to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful to swear (forever), because although it is lawful for me for some time to do or omit this good, which is to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful for me to interpose an oath and to harden my soul toward not doing some good, because this is to act against the Holy Spirit. And therefore an oath against everything which is of the genus of good things is illicit and not to be observed. Nevertheless, in the Case, he is held to observe it, say if that man or another sufficient physician were present and were prepared to cure and to use that experiment for the bodily health of others.” Scavini, ed. 12, Milan 1874, l. 2. n. 229, speaking of an oath of keeping a secret concerning the art of making some medicine, of healing some infirmities, says: “Notwithstanding the oath, you are held from charity to reveal it, if otherwise someone would undergo grave danger of death, or if the art would therefore die with him, with harm to the commonwealth, and the sick cannot otherwise be healed, since an oath is not for damage.”

3. Eustachius, under the strictest promise of secrecy, manifested to Hilarius that Amalia, his daughter, was spurious. Moreover Hilarius in his own mind had proposed to marry Amalia; but, her condition having been learned, he altogether changed his mind and married another.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Hilarius used his own right, nor did he act illicitly in any way. A secret is, as it were, another’s thing, and consequently of itself it is not lawful to explore or extort it. For that would be, as it were, to snatch his own thing from the owner, although someone proposes to himself not to reveal the secret to others. But after someone has in whatever way naturally learned a secret, that knowledge has now been made his own, and he is not prohibited from using it without any unjust damage to another. Hence, if the secret is some invention of art or science, I can use it, if utility follows for me and no damage follows for another; indeed also, according to Lessius, if some damage to another follows, because that knowledge is mine. If the secret regards some fact, someone can then use it, namely by doing those things to which he already had a right before the knowledge was accepted; for after the knowledge has been accepted, he does not lose the right, as, e.g., if someone seeks a benefice or office which he has learned to be vacant, or buys a field in which he has learned that a treasure lies hidden. Less. l. 2. c. 12. n. 131.

4. Sempronius had written his wife as heir in usufruct, with the burden added that she furnish support to Caius and to Titia, his mother; but in ownership he had named Caius himself as heir, and if he should die without offspring, he had substituted the sons of his niece Bertha, from his sister, who, the testament excluded, by law would have succeeded to the inheritance of her maternal uncle. After the death of the testator, Bertha pressed in civil judgment for the nullity of the testament, since he had called an adulterine son to the inheritance, namely Caius himself, as she said, born from Titia at a time when marriage with his wife was standing. But truly, since the arguments deduced for proving this did not exceed the limit of mere conjecture, and Bertha had declared that in the episcopal Chancery and in the baptismal parish archive documents existed by which the true status of Caius, as she contended, would be placed in clear light, the presiding judge asked the bishop that he exhibit the mentioned documents.

Q. Could the bishop manifest and hand over the commemorated documents?

R. Negatively, as is evident from the Response of the S. C. EE. et RR. 25 Feb. 1842, Bizzarri Collectan. ed. 1855, p. 101. But the reason is that it is especially of the public good that the things which are committed to some person established in some ministry by reason of office, it be unlawful to publish and manifest; for otherwise it would be done with the faith owed to public authority, especially of the Church; for no one would any longer be found who would entrust himself to the same. And thus the Civil Laws themselves exempt Advocates, Physicians, Surgeons, and other professionals from giving testimony concerning those things which become known to them by reason of profession. Nor truly could the bishop or pastor have exhibited the aforesaid documents, entrusted to his faith, from the fact that Bertha already knew the tenor of the documents from the rumor of the crowd. For if truth is obligated to guarding a secret, it cannot confirm public report and rumor, often doubtful and uncertain, by its assent and its affirmation, and render it undoubted and certain. For then it would already be done against the law of secrecy. And although perhaps Bertha knew the matter certainly from the corrupted faith of officials, and so from a shameful and unjust fact, nevertheless to continue and confirm baseness and injustice is altogether illicit. Nor truly is he to be heard in court who alleges his own baseness. Whence Bertha could acquire no right from this to the exhibition of the aforesaid documents.

5. Lucianus, by a fortuitous event, received letters directed to Lucius. Recognizing the handwriting of Rufinus, by whom many damages had already been inflicted on him, and fearing lest those letters contain something against him, whence Lucius, his friend and a powerful man, could be turned away from his friendship, he at once opens and reads the letters, and in them he in fact finds several calumnies asserted against him. Hence, saying nothing about the letters received, by opportune means he forestalls the mind of Lucius, and easily frees himself from every evil machination of Rufinus.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Lucianus licitly read the letters in the Case. For he did this not with the intention of prejudicing the right of another, but with the intention of averting from himself an unjust burden threatening him, judging probably, indeed morally certainly, that the aforesaid letters had been written to his prejudice. But it is lawful to read another’s letters, just as it is lawful to manifest a natural secret, for forestalling unjust damage to be inflicted on oneself or on another. Elbel 616; I. M. 1545.

But what if Lucianus had deceitfully stolen the letters beforehand: could he still use them for removing from himself the grave danger of damage which he first learned from the letters themselves was threatening him, or which he otherwise knows to threaten him? Generally it is not lawful to use another’s letters deceitfully stolen, especially if damage to that other follows from it. The reason is that no one can continue in sin and in injustice. But if someone uses that knowledge, unjustly acquired, for driving away from himself grave and unjust damage, that is not illicit. It is lawful in those very circumstances in which someone licitly reveals another’s sin and reads another’s letters. For just as someone would now licitly acquire that knowledge and licitly use it, so now he can licitly use knowledge already acquired, although its acquisition was unjust in the beginning. I. M. 1494, 1495, 1545; G. 429, 430, 440-442.

441. • Mental restriction is an act of the mind twisting or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one.

Mental restriction is, 1. purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is called properly mental; 2. broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from the adjuncts.

To mental restriction are called back equivocations or amphibologies, which are locutions having a double sense, but one more obvious and the other literal.

442. Principles. - I. It is never lawful to use a purely or properly mental restriction, nor an amphibology not perceptible in a human way; a fortiori it is not lawful to swear with the same, because it is simply a lie. This is also clear from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI. - St. Lig., on the second precept, n. 152.

443. • II. It is sometimes lawful from a just cause to use a broadly, that is, improperly, mental restriction, and equivocal words, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but from a just cause his deception is only permitted; on the other hand, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly hiding a secret; but sometimes no other means is at hand besides equivocation or a broadly or improperly mental restriction. - I said, from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; but this would fall to the greatest damage of human society. - Thus most commonly the theologians. - St. Lig., on the second precept, n. 151-152. - Lacroix, lib. 3, n. 287. - Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Sporer, Elbel, and innumerable others, as St. Lig. testifies, ibid.

But it is lawful to use a broad restriction of this sort even with an oath; although then a greater cause is required, since divine testimony must not be used without judgment. - St. Lig., n. 151.

444. Resolves. - 1. He is not free from fault who uses a restriction, even not purely mental, or an equivocation in some way perceptible, 1. if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2. if the one asking has a right of inquiring or of commanding confession of the truth, because to that right there regularly corresponds in the subject the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity. - St. Lig., n. 154. Add, 3. if damage to the neighbor would emerge from it against the precept of charity; 4. when mutual contracts are celebrated; in which case justice demands that words be put forth nakedly according to the mind of the contracting party. - Scav., de Actib. relig. extern., c. 2, art. 2.

2. A Confessor asked by a tyrant whether Titius confessed homicide can and must respond: I do not know; because the Confessor does not know this by communicable knowledge. Indeed, even if the tyrant insisted and said: Do you not know this by communicable knowledge? he could still respond: I do not know. The reason is that the tyrant well knows that he has no right to ask about this, nor does the Confessor as a man understand himself to know it, but as the vicar of God and therefore by incommunicable knowledge.

3. An accused person questioned by a judge not juridically or not legitimately can respond that he did not commit the crime, understanding under it, that concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is bound to confess. - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 154.

4. All public persons questioned about matters committed to their trust can use a restriction of this sort, such as secretaries, legates of princes, commanders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has an office and reason for concealing some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, very grave inconveniences would follow from this in society.

5. A servant can by order of his master deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by usage to signify that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Yet attend to the custom of places. - St. Lig., n. 165. - See Cases, n. 114 and following.

171. Declarations. Strictly speaking, equivocation, amphibology, ambiguity, and mental restriction are distinguished:

For equivocation is a word which signifies two diverse things, e.g., volo (from willing or flying), Gallus (a rooster or a man sprung from Gaul). Christ Himself used such equivocation when He said: "Lazarus our friend sleeps";³³⁸ for sleeping is said of sleep or of death.

Amphibology is a proposition or phrase having several senses, e.g., Peter is at home (Petrus est domi): Peter is present at home, and Peter eats at home.

But ambiguity is said not only of words and propositions, but also of other signs or things. Thus, e.g., to weep can be a sign either of great sadness or of great joy.

Mental restriction is an act of the mind by which, while we speak, we restrict words to another sense than the obvious one. If this sense, with attention paid to all the circumstances of the speaker and hearer, in no way appears nor can be understood, it is called a purely mental restriction; e.g., someone asked whether he has seen Peter responds affirmatively, understanding within himself, in a picture. But if the sense of the words can be understood by a prudent man because of the accompanying circumstances, it is called a broadly mental restriction; e.g., if a maidservant responds to one wishing to visit the master: the master is not at home; any prudent person immediately understands that by this phrase it is not certainly expressed that the master truly is not at home, but that the master cannot receive the visitor. By not a few authors this restriction is, not undeservedly, called rather a restriction of diction than of mind, because the diction is restricted to one of two or several senses.

³³⁸ Jn. 11, 11.

172. Principle. A purely mental restriction is never lawful; but if necessity or a reasonable cause is present, it is lawful to use a broadly mental restriction (or restriction of diction), or amphibologies and equivocations.

Thus now all Catholic theologians teach; thus in daily life all prudent men act, even those Protestants who indeed accuse the so-called "lax Catholic Morality" with such calumnies, but nevertheless admit a psychological lie or false-speaking, as was said above.

The first part is proved. A purely mental restriction is a pure lie. But a pure lie is never lawful. Therefore neither is a purely mental restriction lawful. For in a purely mental restriction the external speech has a sense so diverse from the interior concept that no hearer could suspect the truth. Therefore it is a pure lie. Hence Billuart³³⁹ deservedly says: 1. If the use of purely mental restrictions were lawful, no one except a dull and leaden man would lie, since nothing is easier than mentally to twist the sense of words to anything else. 2. The use of mental restrictions harms human society no less than lies, since hearers are equally deceived by it. - Innocent XI condemned the following propositions:³⁴⁰ "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned or spontaneously, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end, swears that he did not do something which in truth he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way (day) than that on which he did it, or any other true addition, in truth he neither lies nor is perjured"; and: "A just cause of using these amphibologies is whenever this is necessary or useful for preserving the safety of the body, honor, family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then considered expedient and studious."

The second part is proved. The end of broadly mental restriction is the concealment of truth. But in necessity or from a reasonable cause it is lawful to conceal the truth by means not intrinsically evil. Therefore broadly mental restriction, which does not employ means intrinsically evil, is lawful in necessity or from a reasonable cause. St. Augustine³⁴¹ says: "Although everyone who lies wishes to conceal what is true, nevertheless not everyone who wishes to conceal what is true lies"; and St. Thomas³⁴² teaches: "It is not lawful to tell a lie; ... nevertheless it is lawful to conceal the truth prudently under some dissimulation." - Indeed concealment of truth is not only lawful, but sometimes gravely commanded, e.g., an entrusted secret is commanded. But broadly mental restriction employs means not intrinsically evil for concealing the truth. For the words uttered can have the intended sense; indeed the hearer, with all the circumstances seen, ought to suspect this sense. Hence the hearer is not directly and necessarily deceived, but his deception is rather only indirectly permitted. But deception of this kind can be permitted if a reasonable cause or necessity is present. For the good of human society and the legitimate defense of oneself require that there be a means of lawfully concealing truth and preserving a secret. But sometimes no other means is present except equivocation or broadly mental restriction. For such is the disposition of men that, if you keep silent or if you refuse a response to one questioning, they immediately conclude that the matter is as they think or ask. - Christ Himself seems sometimes to have used mental restriction. For when the disciples asked Him to go up to the feast day, He responded: "You go up to this feast day, but I do not go up,"³⁴³ and nevertheless afterward He went up. Yet He neither changed His purpose, nor still more strongly lied, because in truth He did not go up solemnly and publicly, as the Apostles asked, saying: "Pass hence and go into Judea, that Your disciples also may see Your works; manifest Yourself to the world";³⁴⁴ but He went up "not manifestly, but as it were in secret," as the Evangelist notes. Likewise with mental restriction Christ seems to have responded to the Apostles asking concerning the day of judgment: "But of that day or hour no one knows, neither the Angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father."³⁴⁵ For certainly the Son of God knows the day of judgment, but He does not know it so as to manifest it to the Apostles.

Although, therefore, broadly mental restriction is lawful, nevertheless in its use some necessity is always required; hence he sins who rather often employs an equivocation or restrictions of this kind in lighter matters. For if this were lawful, the hearer in almost any saying would have to suspect ambiguity and could almost never safely believe the speaker; and this indeed certainly would tend toward the detriment of peaceful living together. But for discerning when there is a sufficient cause for employing amphibologies of this kind, let this be the rule: When the one questioning has a strict right of knowing the truth (e.g., in essential matters of an onerous contract), it is not lawful to conceal the truth by broadly mental restriction; but when someone asks importunately and unjustly, and a response cannot be refused without offense of the one questioning and without danger of violating a secret, then it is lawful to use these amphibologies.³⁴⁶

³³⁹ De relig. diss. 9, a. 2.

³⁴⁰ Prop. 26 and 27 (Denz. n. 1176 sq.). These errors are taken from T. Sanchez, In Decal. l. 3, c. 6, n. 15. Cf. also prop. 24, 25, 28 (Denz. n. 1174 sq., 1178).

³⁴¹ Contra mendacium c. 10.

³⁴² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3 ad 4.

³⁴³ Jn. 7, 8.

³⁴⁴ Jn. 7, 3 sq.

³⁴⁵ Mk. 13, 32.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Billuart, De mendacio a. 2.

173. Applications. Although the principle enunciated is admitted by all modern authors (with certain ancient authors contradicting it), nevertheless its application in practice is not without difficulty, because sometimes it is difficult to discern between a purely and broadly mental restriction. Hence we give the following practical resolutions:

1. A confessor asked about any matter known from confession can always, indeed sometimes must, say: I do not know. For every interrogation thus posed to a confessor is unjust, and truly the confessor as a man does not know those things which he heard in confession as a minister of God. But I say, sometimes he must say: I do not know, namely, if otherwise the seal of confession would come into danger. For cases can happen in which, from a refused response, the questioner easily suspects an affirmative response to his question. - A confessor can say even under oath: I do not know. - A penitent also can use amphibologies when the confessor puts a certainly undue question concerning sins already confessed; for he then lawfully responds: I did not commit this sin (understanding, which I am held to reveal to you, because I have already confessed it).

2. All who are held to preserve the so-called professional secret, e.g., secretaries, advocates, physicians, pharmacists, midwives, etc., can use broadly mental restriction for preserving that secret, if no other means is available. The reason is that each hearer easily understands that these persons neither can nor wish unduly to violate professional secret.

3. He who, invited to a meal, is asked whether the food pleases him, can respond affirmatively, although in reality the food is tasteless. Thus at least if otherwise inconveniences would be prepared both for himself and for the host of the meal. The reason is that words of politeness of this kind (commonly compliments), just as also subscriptions: most devoted, most obedient, most attached servant, etc., are taken by no prudent person in the strict and obvious sense.

4. A servant, by order of the master, can say to a visitor: The master is not at home; and this locution indeed, at least in our regions, signifies nothing other than: the master cannot be seen, or the master is not at home so as to receive visitors. - Likewise to one asking for a loan or for a loan for use, it can often (but not always) be answered: I do not have it, namely, what I can easily give to you.

5. Some restrictions which by certain older authors were held lawful nevertheless seem to be rejected. Thus, e.g., to affirm something in a loud voice, adding in a low voice the restriction, as if someone says in a loud voice: I did not do it, and mutters softly: today. For he who acts thus is deservedly regarded as a deceitful and lying man. Likewise in our times it seems illicit that a cleric, even if not obliged from canon law to pay tax, should declare that he carries or has nothing (understanding, that is subject to taxes). For if goods subject to tax are discovered with the cleric, he is regarded by all as a defrauder and causes grave scandal.

174. Warning. Generally speaking, all mental restrictions are to be avoided as far as possible, and they can be employed only if true necessity exists which cannot be avoided in another way. But these restrictions are especially to be avoided in an oath. For if someone were found to have made an oath with mental restriction, according to the modern practice of tribunals he would immediately be condemned as a perjurer. Therefore he who is required to give testimony or to confess the truth should use the right conceded to him of refusing testimony.

On account of the use of mental restriction no small odium has been caused for moral theology, but undeservedly! For although certain authors exceeded too far in this matter and therefore were also condemned by Innocent XI, nevertheless true Catholic moral theology has always restrained mental restriction within just limits.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁷ Cf. Billuart, De mendacio diss. 9, a. 2, who excellently discusses this matter and also explains well 14 places from Sacred Scripture in which lies or mental restrictions seem to be present. Even Caramuel himself, who was called by St. Alphonsus "the prince of the laxists," writes most beautifully: "An aversion against mental restrictions is innate in me. For if they are contained within the bounds of piety and sincerity, they are not necessary. For all things which they can furnish, the co-signifying circumstances will furnish. But if such are said that they are to be admitted even where signifying circumstances are lacking (let their authors and defenders forgive me), they take away human society and security and have been condemned as pestiferous. For once admitted they open the way to every lie, to every perjury. And the whole difference will be in this: that what yesterday was called a lie changes not its nature and malice but its name, so that today it is ordered to be named mental restriction; which is to season poison with sugar and to color wickedness with the appearance of virtue" (Theol. fund. II, n. 1805 [p. 182]).

512. • Mental restriction is an act of the mind diverting or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one.

Mental restriction is 1° purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is properly called mental; 2° broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from the adjuncts, for example from the mode of responding, from received usage, etc.

To mental restriction are reduced equivocations or amphibologies, which are expressions having a twofold sense, but one more obvious and the other literal.

513. Principles. - I. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, nor amphibology not perceptible in a human manner; a fortiori it is not licit to swear with the same, because it is simply a lie. This is clear also from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI, pp. XV and XVI.¹

514. • II. Sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use broad restriction, that is, improperly mental restriction, and equivocal words, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; on the other hand, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly concealing a secret; but sometimes no other means is supplied besides equivocation or broad or improperly mental restriction. - I said: from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would yield to the greatest damage of human society. - Thus the theologians most commonly. St. Alphonsus.¹ - Lacroix.² - Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Sporer, Elbel, and innumerable others.

But it is licit to use a broad restriction of this sort even with an oath; although then a greater cause is required, since the divine testimony is not to be usurped without judgment, and indeed the greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring. But outside judgment, or unless there is question of entering an onerous contract, it is only venial to swear in this way without just cause.³

515. You will resolve. - 1° He is not free from fault who uses a restriction even not purely mental, or an equivocation perceptible in some way, 1) if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2) if the one questioning has the right of inquiring or commanding confession of the truth and uses that right legitimately, because regularly in a subject there corresponds to that right the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity.⁴ Add 3) if from this some damage of a neighbor would emerge which from the precept of charity we are bound to avert; 4) while onerous contracts are celebrated; in which case justice demands that naked words be uttered according to the mind of the contracting party.⁵

2° A confessor, questioned by a tyrant whether Titius confessed homicide, can and ought to respond: I do not know; because the confessor does not know this by communicable knowledge. Indeed even if the tyrant insisted and said: Do you not know this by communicable knowledge? He could still respond: I do not know. The reason is that the tyrant well knows that he does not have the right of questioning concerning this, nor does the confessor understand himself to know as a man, but as the vicar of God, and consequently by incommunicable knowledge.

3° A guilty man questioned by a judge not juridically, or not legitimately, can respond that he has not committed the crime, by understanding: one concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is bound to confess.¹

4° All public persons questioned concerning things committed to their trust can use a restriction of this sort, as are secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has office and reason of concealing some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow from this in society.

5° A servant by command of his master can deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such speech is generally received by usage for signifying that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Yet attend to the custom of places.²

1179. DEFINITION. Mental restriction is an act of the mind twisting or restricting the words of some proposition to a sense other than the natural and obvious one.

DIVISION. Mental restriction is one kind purely mental, which can in no way be perceived by others; another is not purely mental, which can become known from the adjacent circumstances (III, 152).

To mental restriction are recalled EQUIVOCATIONS or amphibologies, which are ambiguous locutions, having a double sense: either one less obvious, the other more common; or one literal, the other spiritual or mystical. Some are determinable, whose sense intended by the one uttering can be known from circumstances; others are indeterminable, whose sense intended by the one uttering can by no means be detected (III, 151; H. Ap., V). Cf. Berardi, II, n. 973.

To this likewise is recalled dissimulation, by which someone neither by word nor deed signifies that which he has in mind, but as it were cuts himself off or abstracts from it: as if someone, asked whether he has money, begins to speak about another matter.

1180. PRINCIPLES. I. It is never licit to use purely mental restriction or indeterminable equivocation. The reason is: 1. because they per se tend to the deception of neighbor, and therefore are true lies; 2. the use of them would be pernicious to human society, and from it human commerce would collapse; 3. it is established from Sacred Scripture (Eccli., 37, 23): He who speaks sophistically is hateful; and from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI. Hence, a fortiori, it is never licit to swear with the same (cf. n. 608, q. 2).

1181. II. It is licit, from a just cause, to use a restriction not purely mental or a determinable equivocation. It is proved: 1. From the nature of the matter: for to use a restriction of this kind is not to lie, because then we do not deceive our neighbor, but from a just cause permit that he deceive himself; and moreover the sense of the speaker can be sufficiently perceived from the adjuncts; whence it is only a prudent concealment of truth. 2. From the example of Christ the Lord, who, when asked whether he would ascend to the feast day, responded: I will not ascend (John, 7, 8), and yet afterward he ascended. But he had said: "I will not ascend," namely manifestly, because the disciples wished that he ascend to manifest his divinity.

To the matter the Angelic Doctor speaks thus (2. 2, q. 110, a. 3, ad 4): "It is not licit to tell a lie for this, that someone may free another from any danger whatever; nevertheless it is licit to conceal the truth prudently, under some dissimulation." And this same thing, almost unanimously, all theologians teach, St. Alphonsus being witness (III, 152). Cf. Panzuti, II, n. 134; Junglas, Der rechtsgeschichtliche Hintergrund fur Liguori's Lehre vom Gerichtseid.

1182. Corollaries. 1. A just cause, so that we may licitly use restriction, is, in general, the necessity of preserving a secret; for this is required for the good of society, and sometimes by no other means can the secret be preserved.

Yet for permitting the use of restrictions not purely mental, sometimes a reasonable cause suffices, say for freeing oneself from the importunate and unjust interrogation of another, and any other honorable end. But it must be noted: a) that the greater cause is required, the more the words furnish an occasion of erring. Whence, if they furnish almost none, as are words equivocal per se, which have a double sense per se, the slightest cause excuses. b) A greater cause is required for equivocating with an oath than without it (III, l. c.).

2. But a just cause is not given when a SPECIAL LAW requires manifestation of the truth. Then it is not licit to use equivocation, but the truth is sincerely to be made manifest. The reason is plain of itself. But such a law is present in the following cases: a) When the precept of professing the faith externally urges. b) When the judge legitimately interrogates; because then the just precept of the Superior obliges, to which one must submit. c) The same obtains when a Superior legitimately interrogates concerning those things which regard the government of subjects; or a confessor concerning those things which he ought to know for rightly judging the penitent. d) Finally in onerous contracts, where strict justice requires that no injury be brought upon the other (H. Ap., V, 15).

1183. For practice, you conclude: 1. All public persons, interrogated concerning matters committed to their faith, can use mental restriction: such as ministers and legates of princes, secretaries, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, etc. For if secrets committed to persons of this kind were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow, as no one fails to know.

2. As often as someone is held to conceal the infamy of another, he licitly says: I do not know, namely with communicable knowledge. A fortiori, the confessor can do this, indeed is held to this, as is plain (III, 153).

3. The accused or a witness, not legitimately interrogated by the judge, can respond that he did not commit or does not know the crime, understanding, concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is held to confess. Otherwise, if the interrogation is legitimate and juridical, as will be explained in the treatise on the Lay State (cf. n. 2315).

4. An adulteress interrogated by her husband can equivocally assert that she has not broken the marriage, which truly persists. And if she has confessed the adultery sacramentally, she can respond: "I am innocent of this crime"; because through confession it has now been taken away (III, 162).

5. He who has promised marriage, to which from some excusing cause he is not held, can deny the promise, namely that by which he is obligated. Likewise, he who was compelled to marriage can assert to the judge, even with an oath, that he did not contract, namely freely, as was proper (III, 159).

6. One asked to lend money can licitly say: Would that I had it! or: I do not have it, although he has it, understanding that he does not have it for lending, if the matter is thus (III, 163).

7. He who must cede his goods, needing hidden goods for support, can respond to the judge that he has nothing, namely which he is held to cede. Likewise an heir who without an inventory has hidden goods, if he is not held to satisfy creditors from those goods, can respond to the judge that he has hidden nothing, understanding: from the goods from which he is held to satisfy (III, 158).

8. A servant can, by command of the master, deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by use for signifying that he is not at home, insofar as he can be seen. Likewise he can respond: He has gone out, understanding: at a past time. Attend, in these matters, to the custom of places.

9. A seller before a notary can assert that he has accepted money which he has not yet received, but which he will receive shortly. For common use concedes this (III, 167).

10. A debtor who has satisfied the creditor, although nevertheless he cannot legally prove the satisfaction, can deny that he contracted any debt, understanding: so that I ought to pay (III, 159).

11. One coming from a place which is falsely thought to be infected by disease can deny that he comes from it, namely as infected by pestilence; because this is the mind of the guards. Likewise, he who is not held to taxes can say that he carries nothing, that is, from which he is held to pay.

12. One invited to a table, and asked whether the food is good, can respond that it is good, although in reality it is tasteless, understanding, for mortification and penance, etc., etc. (III, 160).

Since there are many occasions in which one must speak, and accordingly say what is true, and yet at the same time a secret must be kept and lying avoided, it will be useful to apply the principles set forth above to various practical cases.

869. As regards usual locutions. - He does not lie: 1) who from jest says what he knows appears openly false to the hearers, because the words in these circumstances are not deceptive of the neighbor; likewise 2) he who uses tropic or hyperbolic locutions, or customary polite formulas of speaking or writing, because from common estimation they are only signs of politeness, or modes of speaking to which no one gives credence; 3) similarly, not a few locutions in certain circumstances from common usage itself now do not signify that which they sound, but have become ambiguous or less determinate, for example, he is not at home, he is not here, he has gone out of the house, he is outside, I do not know, I do not have it, c'est le prix de facture, etc. Thus one asked to lend money or to give alms, from a just cause of abuse or of an importunate petition, can respond: I do not have it, I wish I had it! that is, how easily and safely I could lend it.

870. As regards declarations or oaths unjustly extorted. - 1. One who promises under oath what is extorted by force, fear, or an unjust means can promise with restriction: insofar as the other has a right.

2. One who is not liable to a tax can deny that he has merchandise liable to such a tax.

3. To an incompetent judge interrogating, or one inquiring about a matter concerning which he cannot inquire, the person interrogated can keep silent about or deny the secret.

4. Likewise one bound to a secret can swear that he has manifested nothing, if he has manifested nothing of those things which he was bound to conceal.

871. As regards secrets to be kept. - All public persons interrogated about things committed to them can use restriction, such as ministers and legates of princes, secretaries, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, midwives, and whoever has an office or reason for hiding the truth. Hence it is licit to affirm, even under oath:

1. for a confessor, that he does not know a sin heard in confession, that he did not hear it, nor know it, namely, as a man and by communicable knowledge;

2. for anyone, that he does not know a natural, promised, or committed secret, to the knowing of which the questioner does not have a right;

3. for him who committed a delict, that he did not commit it, if he is interrogated by one to whom he is not bound to confess, because there is not simple proof or because he is innocent;

4. which also probably holds of a woman who has committed adultery and is interrogated by her husband.

872. As regards judgments. - When a witness is interrogated under oath: if he lies even lightly, he commits perjury strictly so called; but if he speaks equivocally or is silent, he violates the oath insofar as promissory of saying the whole truth (Belgian Code of Criminal Instruction, a. 75; 155; 317; Code of Civil Procedure, a. 262), which is a grave sin, unless the matter is light. Yet if that witness is interrogated illegitimately or without right, he can use amphibology and real restriction (in the sense of the one requiring, insofar as he has a right). Hence:

1. to a judge interrogating whether he has spoken with the accused, whether he has come to such a place, whether he has seen him, etc., if a just cause of concealing is present, he can respond according to the mind of the judge: by denying, that is, I did not hear or see things which pertain to instructing the cause; yet let him beware of scandal;

2. if from the testimony notable harm threatens the witness himself or his own, he will be able to conceal, unless public or another's harm prevails: for the law of responding does not ordinarily oblige with grave inconvenience. Thus one interrogated whether he comes from a place which is believed to be infected with plague can deny it if he does not suffer from plague: according to the mind of the one interrogating, who intends to know whether there is danger of infection (at least if common usage understands it thus);

3. a witness interrogated about fault, who knows that the accused committed the deed but certainly without fault (for example, by hidden compensation), can rightly deny that he knows the deed, that is, the culpable deed, unless he is interrogated about the material deed alone or about merely juridical fault, for example in civil causes;

4. one who is bound by a secret which is not to be revealed to the judge must respond that he does not know the matter.

873. As regards contracts. - It is licit to affirm, even under oath, from a grave cause:

1. for him who from substantial error entered an invalid contract, that it was not entered, for example, if an oath is deferred to someone concerning a lease entered verbally (Civil Code, a. 1715);

2. for him who is free from the obligation of a contracted debt for any reason whatever, whether because he has already satisfied it but cannot prove it, or because he needs hidden goods for sustenance, or because the other remitted it, that he did not contract the debt, namely, which is still to be paid, or that he has already paid: thus one who is compelled to swear that he paid the price of merchandise received (Civil Code, a. 2275), if the seller secretly remitted the debt which he then unjustly exacts in judgment;

3. for him who from the succession of another has withdrawn what was his own, or has hidden goods from which he is not bound to satisfy creditors, that he did not withdraw them, understanding, what is another's, or from which he is bound to satisfy. Thus for the oath in the placing of a seal (Code of Civil Procedure, a. 914) and to be furnished before a notary in the making of an inventory (ibid. a. 943), the matter concerns things of the deceased taken away from the succession, but not those of which he either did not have ownership, or had already transferred ownership to others.

874. As regards political oaths. - It is illicit: 1. to swear positive recognition, adherence, or assistance to an illegitimate superior, but not passive submission and obedience; 2. to swear the execution of an iniquitous law, indeed not even obedience if it is contrary to God or the laws of the Church, but only insofar as it is not repugnant to these; 3. to add a private restriction in political oaths: for these are to be furnished in the sense of the one requiring them; hence if a limitation is necessary, it must be expressly inserted, or at least be able to be understood from the declaration of authority or common estimation. A private person, namely, does not have the right of limiting the sense of authority, because law can define the sense of the act to be placed.

Thus in the year 1821 it was expressly declared by William I for the Holland-Belgian kingdom that the oath was not required except in a civil sense and as regards civil ordinances, and that it did not oblige to anything contrary to the laws of God and the Church; nor can this be judged to have been revoked by subsequent governments.

A lie is speech against the mind, or, as St. Augustine says, it is "to say something knowingly otherwise than we think." If it is done by nods or by some deed, it is called simulation, which again is called hypocrisy when someone simulates the person of another, e.g., when a sinner simulates the person of a just man. - For a true lie it is not required that there be expressly the intention of deceiving, for as the same holy Doctor says: "Everyone who lies speaks against that which he thinks in his soul, with the will of deceiving." - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 110, art. 1. - St. Augustine, Enchir., chap. 18 and 22.

A threefold kind of lie is distinguished: 1st. harmful, by which unjust harm is inflicted upon someone; 2nd. officious, which is put forth for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3rd. jocose, which is said from jest and for the sole sake of trifling.

But mental restriction differs greatly from a lie; it is an act of the mind turning or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one; whence it happens that they are not true unless they are taken according to the sense which they have in the mind of the speaker. - But a twofold restriction is distinguished, namely purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is called properly mental; and broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from adjuncts.

I say 1st. A lie properly so called is certainly something intrinsically evil, but does not exceed venial sin if it is jocose, or even officious; but if it is harmful, it will be a light or grave sin according to the quantity of harm inflicted. The reason for the first is both because it is repugnant to right reason to use signs of speech against their natural end and institution, and to wish, as it were, to destroy the unity of man; and because, the liceity of lying having been admitted, the order of society, which rests upon mutual commerce and trust, would be altogether subverted. But the reason for the second is taken from the common consent of theologians, from the persuasion of the faithful, and from the very nature of that repugnance with right reason, which certainly does not appear grave. Finally, the reason for the third is that in a harmful lie, besides the virtue of truthfulness, justice is injured, which obliges under grave or light matter according to the harm that is inflicted. - Cf. St. Augustine, books On Lying and Against Lying. - St. Thomas, loc. cit., art. 3 and 4.

I say 2nd. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, because, as is clear from its definition, this would be simply to lie. But sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, that is improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; besides, for the good of society it is required that there be a licit means of hiding a secret; but sometimes no other means is available besides broad or improperly mental restriction. I said, from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would redound to the greatest harm of human society. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de secund. praec. Decal., nn. 151 and 152. - Lacroix, lib. 3, n. 287.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. They certainly err who place the malice of a lie either solely or primarily in this, that the right of the hearers is injured. For from this it would be deduced that God, against whom properly we have no right, could sometimes lie, which would plainly destroy our faith. Cf. Mazella, de Virt. inf., n. 698.

2nd. Figurative, ironic, and hyperbolic expressions are not lies, which as such can easily be, and usually are, taken by hearers. Much less parables, which Christ himself so frequently used.

3rd. They do not lie who write fables, or from jest openly say false things, because then words are put forth and understood with another superadded signification, but one easily admitted by those conversing.

4th. He who uses broad mental restriction is not without fault: 1st. if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2nd. if the one asking has the right of inquiring or commanding confession of the truth, because regularly in a subject there corresponds to that right the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 154.

5th. Yet all public persons questioned concerning things committed to their trust can use restriction of this kind, such as secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has the office and reason of hiding some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow from it in society.

6th. Likewise a servant, by order of the master, can deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by usage to signify that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Attend nevertheless to the custom of places. Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 165.

7th. It is licit to add an oath to a broad and not strictly mental restriction, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 151.

I undertake to handle the most difficult question that exists in all of theology, one which I feel unequal to my own strength to treat. For, having often trodden similar paths, and, indeed, the more turbulent the water always becomes for one who stirs it. Having this intention in mind, of following in similar footsteps, and, in fact, having prescribed for myself this method, to explain only those things which theologians commonly hand down concerning the deceitful, equivocal, amphibological oath, and mental restrictions... , I had brought the treatment nearly to the halfway point. But, when I came to the explanation of amphibologies, mental restrictions, and equivocations, I found myself at once surrounded on every side, as it were, by Scylla and Charybdis, and by rocks and shoals. For that locution which some theologians call a purely mental restriction, others call a not purely mental restriction; and that speech which is, to me, a lie, is, to a good many more recent writers, merely amphibological. All this, however, I judge to be the origin of all the reefs, and of the difficulties: for, since there can be no room for right disputation, unless certain and clear notions of equivocations, amphibologies, and mental restrictions are established beforehand, and this cannot be done, given the distinctions, evasions, and technicalities of more recent writers, which render this matter exceedingly entangled, I resolved, in order to avoid these circuitous paths, to break off the course I had begun, and to unravel the web; and I took this counsel: that I should first of all begin a discourse concerning lying, and take up the whole controversy afresh. For it has proved of no small advantage to me, in the treatment of this controversy already conducted, that I have discovered nothing put forward by more recent theologians in favor of the licit use of amphibologies which had not already, before them, been employed by certain ancient Philosophers, and even by some of the Fathers, in patronage of lies. Nor does any other difference occur to me, weighing the foundations of each, than that the ancients, with candid sincerity, called those locutions "lies" which not a few more recent theologians call "equivocal," and "material," and "amphibological."

To prove this, and to open for myself an approach to resolving the questions concerning the deceitful oath, I have judged it worthwhile to preface a historical narration of the disputes concerning lying among the ancients, both Philosophers and Fathers. Indeed, an occasion for demonstrating this is furnished by the war which, twelve years ago, several literary men of our own Italy waged over the controversies concerning lies and amphibologies. Occasion for this fierce contest was given by Fr. Carlo Ambrogio Cattaneo, who, in Vol. I of his own Lectures, which he delivered from the pulpit to the people at Milan, and published in print, in Lecture 44, devised a new method of concealing the truth, whenever its manifestation would inflict some grave harm. For he says that Christians ought not to be at all anxious, nor ought they to rack their brains, so as to construct an amphibological, or equivocal, speech by an artful arrangement and disposition of words; but he encourages them to deny outright, with open brow and unblushing countenance, all pretense set aside, that they know the matter, or that they know the truth, which, if they revealed it, would subject them to grave harm. For, he says, that word "know" loses its own signification in such circumstances, and signifies nothing more than that name "know."

This most false doctrine Fr. Giuseppe Agostino Orsi undertook to attack — a man, moreover, of the human commonwealth, and of profound genius, endowed with exquisite erudition, and to whom, in writing, I have seen no equal, even in the most difficult questions, for facility and elegance. At present Secretary of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, after many published volumes distinguished for doctrine and erudition, he is writing a universal Ecclesiastical History, received with the applause of the learned. This most learned man, then, published a DOGMATIC-MORAL DISSERTATION, which was the beginning of a long war. For it produced for itself several adversaries, and also several comrades in arms, who all, joining battle with one another, sharpened their pens, wearied the presses, and, with several published volumes, filled all Italy. How well the die was cast in this literary conflict, with what abundance of arguments, with what erudition of every kind, with what elegance of style, and with what eloquence each pleaded his own cause, it is not my concern to make manifest — since their books speak for themselves, and report the sum of their doctrine. This one thing I confess: that I have profited not a little in this rugged controversy from his most learned works, and have borrowed from him certain things which contribute to a historical knowledge of lies. But, lest I detain the reader too long at the threshold, I proceed to the matter.

I. After Augustine attacked lies as professedly wicked in his own Books, and censured the census of all Fathers and Doctors of every age, both the Fathers after Augustine, and all Catholic theologians, condemn lies as sin, and, in whatever event of Christian profession, they are detested. It is superfluous, I judge, to weave this together, since no one now doubts that all Doctors have acceded to Augustine, so as to reject lies, however useful, as illicit remedies for concealing truth. But, since the concealment of truth is most frequently necessary, both for guarding secrets, and for protecting innocence, chastity, and bodily life, and other domestic goods — Doctors have therefore all exercised the powers of their genius, so as to provide suitable remedies for this necessity. Augustine, with his nearly divine genius, left us no other means, by which we might guard the truth hidden in our mind, necessary for attaining this end, except these: silence, and "I will neither betray, nor will I lie." The Fathers who followed devised nothing else. St. Thomas, as in other matters, so in this one, adopted the Augustinian teaching. Writers closer to our own time — St. Raymond, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Sylvester, Sotus, Navarrus, Angles, and others — introduced the use of equivocal words, though only of those which by their own nature have a double external sense; which use, however, some had already indicated before them. At length, as the sixteenth century was drawing to a close, and the seventeenth beginning, when moral theology began to be treated more sharply and broadly in the schools and academies, the invention of mental restrictions, within a short interval of time, so prevailed, that not only Casuists who filled the front benches, but even Theologians, defended these same mental restrictions as licit for guarding truth. So that readers may have an exquisite knowledge of the doctrine which such theologians handed down, I will here transcribe it, expressed in the very words of the authors themselves. For, just as I set before the eyes, in compendium, Augustine's teaching against lying, so that the controversy of that time might be known, so it is fitting that we should likewise bring forth the sentiments of these theologians too. Among the more recent theologians who treated this controversy most broadly, and at the same time most laxly, are Sánchez, and Tamburini. Let me touch briefly, then, on the synopsis of their teaching.

II. Sánchez (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 6, n. 15): "Words may be used without lying, although by their own signification they are not ambiguous, nor admit a true sense either of themselves, or from the surrounding circumstances, but nonetheless yield a true sense from something retained in the mind of the speaker, whatever that may be — as" (here begins the proposition condemned by Innocent XI) "if someone, whether alone, or in the presence of others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other purpose, swears that he did not do something which he really did, understanding within himself some other thing which he did not do, or some other day" (Sánchez has "another day": and this is the true reading, since an error has crept into the condemned proposition) "or whatever else true is added, he does not really lie, nor is he a perjurer." (Thus far the condemned proposition.) "But," Sánchez continues, "he only does not state the determinate truth which the hearers conceive, and which the words in themselves signify, but another, disparate truth." He lists several patrons of his own opinion, namely Navarrus, Valentia, Salón, Toledo, Manuel, Filiarco, Suárez, Leonardo. He proves his opinion, moreover, by the authority of Christ the Lord, who, in John 7, said: "I go not up to this festival day"; and yet" (says Sánchez) "he went up immediately afterward: which speech was nonetheless true, manifestly, from an added retained mental clause — namely, 'I will not go up,' with the sense which those words did not themselves make." He proffers many other arguments, drawn both from Scripture and from reason, which I omit, so as to proceed to describe the other rules of his teaching.

III. In the same chapter, n. 19, he has this: "The cause, moreover, of using these amphibologies is, whenever it is necessary, or useful, for the safety of body, of honor, of protecting family property, or for any other act of virtue, such that the concealment of the truth is then judged expedient, and worthy of pursuit." This is proposition 27 condemned by Innocent XI. He adds, moreover, n. 12, near the end, that the cause of using these amphibologies can also be jest, or recreation. But, he says, if there were fault, it would only be venial, if it were manifest.

IV. The same, n. 34: "A witness can use the aforesaid equivocations, even if otherwise legitimately summoned, whenever he is bound, for some cause, to bear testimony, as, for instance, because notable harm would follow to himself, etc."

V. The same, n. 25, writes this: "When the assessed price of some thing is unjust, if one selling for more, or defrauding in weight and measure, so that he satisfies himself for the injustice of the price, and gives corresponding goods for the price given — can this man, questioned by a judge, if he is not bound, that excusing cause standing, to say he did not see, did not hear, understanding that he is not obligated to answer, so that he must say he does not know whether he sold for more, or fell short in weight and measure, deny this, and assert that he sold at the taxed price, and delivered the full weight and measure, understanding this: 'insofar as one who sells for more, or falls short in weight and measure, is held to make it up.' For without any defect he has done both. And so he truly says that he delivered in full, namely, insofar as he was bound, that price having been received, nor did he exceed by his wrongdoing. And for this it suffices that the opinion be probable, that that tax does not oblige." Not only are mental restrictions, or lies, taught here; but the very governance of the commonwealth is entirely subverted. For it is manifestly about the state, if subjects can despise the sanctions of the Principate, and substitute for them, at their own arbitrary whim, whatever probable opinion they judge more just.

VI. The same, n. 21, writes this: "Fifth, it is deduced that, when someone needs to hide his goods, for his own sustenance, lest he be forced by his creditors to beg — he can lawfully have such goods hidden" (and the same is quite obviously true of the commonwealth) "and, asked by a judge whether he has any such hidden goods, can knowingly swear that he has none, so long as it satisfies him — understanding within himself: 'I do not have hidden goods which I am bound to disclose to the judge.'" The discourse here is not of extreme, or grave, necessity. For he holds that a debtor can retain the creditor's goods, so as not to be forced to beg, and, moreover, can swear that he has not retained them. What could be more effective for introducing every kind of fraud, and for evading the payment of debts?

VII. The same, n. 21: "Sixth, it is deduced that, whenever someone is free from the obligation of any debt whatsoever, he can, being asked by a judge about it, deny it, understanding within himself: 'so that I am bound' — since he answers according to the judge's due intent. For which reason Covarrubias, Cepola, and Azor most excellently teach that one who has paid back money received on loan can, being asked by a judge about the loan, swear that he did not receive it, understanding: 'so that he is bound to pay it.' Suárez, Paraldus teach the same. And the same must be said, if for any other cause he is freed from paying back the loan. And I believe the same, if he is then not bound to pay, because the term to which the loan was given has not yet been fulfilled, or the debtor is excused from paying then on account of poverty."

VIII. The same, n. 16: "Ninth, it is deduced that a creditor, by virtue of a public instrument, exacting a debt before a judge, commonly 'executing for the debt,' can affirm under oath that the sum contained in that instrument is owed him, exactly as it is owed by right — even if part of that debt has been paid to him — if an equal amount of money, as much as has been paid, is owed him by some other way, of which nothing..." concerns the other creditor's prejudice."*

IX. The same, n. 39: "Tenth, it is deduced that, if by injury a sworn promise of giving some money is extorted, it is lawful for the swearer to use this equivocation: 'I swear to you' — understanding, 'that I will pay you money' — with the word 'you' understood ambiguously, such that the sense is: 'I swear to you that I will pay money, whether to you, or to another' — since that speech admits both senses."

X. The same: "But is it lawful then to swear, retaining in mind this condition: 'I swear that I will give, if I am indebted to you by no oath'? Some deny it, on the grounds that these words do not admit this amphibology in the common sense of men — Cajetan, Aragón, Sotus. But, holding to our own opinion, given in number fifteen, it must be said that this is lawful. For it matters not that the words do not admit this amphibology, provided the intent, and necessity, compel their use." Moreover, in the fifteenth number cited, he teaches: "Why, then, would it be a lie to use words not ambiguous in themselves, if from a retained mental condition they produce a true sense? ... This is most useful for concealing many things which need to be concealed, and could not be concealed without a lie, unless this method were certain. For words ambiguous in themselves are not everywhere to be found."

XI. The same, n. 39: "Eleventh, it is deduced that one compelled to accept some woman in betrothal, whom he is not bound to marry, can swear that he will accept her, understanding within himself: 'if I am bound,' or 'if it should afterward please me.'"

XII. The same, n. 41: "Thirteenth, an adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed adultery, can swear that she has not broken the marriage. Likewise she can swear that she did not do it, understanding within herself: 'so that I would reveal it to you.'"

XIII. The same, n. 43: "Fifteenth, it is deduced that, when someone from whom a loan of money is sought, which he really has, can affirm under oath that he does not have it, understanding within himself: 'so as to be bound to lend it,' when he is not bound to lend it. So Navarrus, Filiarco, Sayr... But Córdoba, López, Henríquez hold the contrary. But I believe the former opinion to be truer, as to this — that he is not thereby a perjurer: because in his own sense he speaks truly, since the sense is: 'I do not have it so that I would wish to lend it to you.' Wherefore, for the truth of this oath, it matters not at all whether he is bound to lend or not. And so it is not necessary to add that limitation which the aforesaid Doctors add, 'when he is not bound to lend.'"

XIV. The same, n. 44: "Lastly, it is deduced that a penitent, rashly asked whether he has confessed this or that sin, can swear that he has not confessed it, understanding: 'so that he is bound to explain it to you.'"

XV. So that a fuller knowledge of more recent theology may be had, it is worth adding a few things from Tamburini, who, above the others, tempered the rules of the ancient doctrine, and accommodated them to human weakness. In Bk. II of his exposition of the Decalogue, ch. 2, §2, n. 1, he teaches this: "The question is, whether it is lawful for the swearer to take words in another sense than that which they present. For example: I swear by God that I have not slept this night, understanding, clothed; that I do not have money, understanding, which I would wish to bestow on you; that my wife, or husband, has not broken the laws of marriage, understanding manifestly; that a hundred is not owed by me to you, understanding, so that I cannot compensate it against the other hundred which you owe me, etc. Response: it is lawful, as the same authors teach" (namely Lessius, Castropalao, Rebello, Bonacina) "and it is taught elsewhere, prescinding, however, from the harm which I would unjustly cause by this deceitful oath — even if I am not asked to swear, but offer to do so of my own accord."

XVI. The same, ibid., n. 4: "When the words in no way admit such an equivocation, or restriction of mind, is it lawful to understand something else, from one's own mere will? For example: I swear that I have not slept, understanding that I have not slept together. By this manner of speaking, I only, in a material fashion, say that I did not sleep — this signifying only affirmatively." Response: Sánchez denies that it is lawful, because it is not within anyone's discretion to impose a signification on words. But this reasoning cannot draw me away from the probability that it is lawful.

XVII. Martín Bonacina copied out almost all the propositions which we have reported from Sánchez, and taught the laxity more clearly still. I will transcribe one or two here. In disp. 4, q. 1, punct. 5, n. 5, he has this: "Fifth, one who has a just cause of concealing some goods, lest they be seized by creditors, which are necessary to him for the sustenance of life, without which he would be forced to beg — can deny that he has concealed them, understanding those which he could not conceal, or which he is not bound to disclose. Witnesses who knowingly conceal him could answer the same, both because this response is not contrary to the intention of the questioner, but rather conforms to his mind, and because there is a just cause of using this restriction, or amphibology."

XVIII. The same Bonacina, ibid.: "Sixth, an adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed adultery, can answer negatively, understanding, 'so that she is bound to reveal it to him.'"

XIX. The same Bonacina, ibid., n. 8: "From this it is gathered that sellers, who, since they could obtain a just price by no other way from the buyer, swear that a thing so priced cost them so much, in another sense than that the buyer shares — not only are not, precisely by reason of the oath, held to anything, as is clear from the first question; but they do not even seem to sin mortally, if they inflict no notable harm on the party, nor intend by this means to deceive, or to obtain something beyond the just, or to extort a rigorous price, at which the buyer would not have wished to buy."

I. Before I proceed further, it is fitting to declare this: that the propositions which I described in the preceding chapter, from Sánchez, Tamburini, and Bonacina, were not the offspring only of these theologians; indeed, as may be gathered from Lumbier, in Cárdenas, dissert. 19, on the condemned propositions, ch. 1, n. 5, more than fifty Doctors are found to have upheld this same opinion condemned concerning mental restrictions, so that I might content myself with saying, lest I be too prolix — not only Casuists and Summists, but even distinguished Theologians of nearly every order and standing, taught the same, as one may gather from their Books. Suárez, Valentia, Castropalao, Diana, Vincenzo Ferre, Candido, Leander, Moya, Trullench, Conrado, Hurtado, Filiarco, Filliucci, Dicastillo; and, consequently, the recounted propositions all proceed, as from a fountain, from the condemned doctrine of mental restrictions.

This I especially wish to say, both lest ill-will attach to the three aforesaid authors alone, and so that the historical narration may be more exact. But as for what Gabriel Daniel asserts, in his Colloquies of Cleander and Eudoxus, near the end of his dissertation on mental restrictions — namely, that the recounted propositions, and others, which Innocent XI condemned, he condemned just as they lie, that is, as their words sound, and not as they are in the Books of the Authors from which they were excerpted — this is altogether the same as what the Jansenists say concerning the five propositions: that he condemns them as they lie, but that these propositions, condemned in that sense, are not to be found in Jansenius, and, falsely and contumaciously, they contend this.

II. The doctrine of mental restrictions, condemned by the most holy Pontiff Innocent XI, in the year 1679, then, men bent their minds toward finding other remedies for the concealment of truth. For the use of mental restrictions had so far prevailed, that already, from the time when the censure of the Roman Church came forth against the aforesaid doctrine, the faithful were disturbed, some were tormented with scruples and doubts, confessors approached theologians, seeking counsel over secrets to be guarded; theologians, reduced to a loss, did not know which way to turn. No other refuge for evading a lie, and for concealing a secret, was known, except mental restrictions; these having been condemned, minds despaired of guarding a secret. Augustine's teaching, and that of the other Fathers, which bids us neither betray the truth, nor lie, but guard it either by silence, or, by the virtue of fortitude, with open brow, seemed to them too harsh, and exceeding the yoke of human strength. Besides which, several theologians of that time, neglecting the study of the Fathers, and human reasoning, held their own authority of little account, and held the Theologians and Casuists, and Summists, of their own age, as the rule of morals.

III. Hence they began to soften the condemned doctrine of mental restrictions with various interpretations, and to purge it from censure with various distinctions. First of all, indeed, they distinguished a twofold kind of mental restriction: one, of purely mental restriction; the other, of restriction not purely mental. The former, they affirmed, was condemned by the Pontiff; the latter, licit. This distinction, moreover, was itself the occasion of disagreement among them. For that locution which seems to one a wholly internal, and purely mental, restriction, seems to another an external, and not purely mental, restriction. For example: if, having several sums of money, you are asked by Peter to lend him some of it, and you respond that you do not have money to give him — this locution, say the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 1, punct. 8, n. 106), is not to be called amphibological, but is to be called a mental restriction — joining mentally to it, "in excess of what I need myself." Other theologians, however, wish this same locution to be called not an internal, but an external, or not-purely-mental, restriction, when the borrower is not accustomed to repay the loan, prolongs the payment beyond the fixed time, and the lender suffers loss; for then, they say, from the exterior circumstance, the aforesaid restriction is not purely mental, but external, and therefore licit — of which more in its own place.

IV. Besides mental restrictions, new theologians devised other remedies as well, by which they might conceal, at least from men of dull perception, the truth. These are amphibological, and equivocal, words. These, likewise, are of a twofold kind. Some, according to common understanding, have a double sense, and acceptance, both of which they equally betray — as appears in this saying: "I say that you, the Aeacid, can conquer the Romans," which locution admits a double sense: namely, that the Aeacid can conquer the Romans (and here, in the aforesaid arrangement of words, this seems the obvious sense), or that the Romans can conquer the Aeacid. Others likewise have a double sense: one common, and proper; the other less proper — as if you should say, "Sebastian is a good man," which, in common acceptance, signifies that he is endowed with virtue, but, in a less proper sense, signifies that he is simple, or of dull mind. By these equivocal and amphibological locutions, more recent theologians commonly hand down, truth can be concealed, a just cause pressing; nor do the ancients altogether dissent, as we shall explain below. Such amphibological locutions, however, are not undeservedly called not-wholly-mental restrictions, but constituted external by some external sign, or by a somewhat obscure, yet intelligible, word.

V. At length, not a few theologians, setting aside mental restrictions of both kinds, and amphibological and equivocal locutions, entered upon another path. For they learned by experience that ambiguous words are not always at hand in every circumstance, and are not frequently sufficient for concealing truth; nor are all men equally endowed with perspicacity and acumen, so as to be able, especially in sudden events, to arrange words by such artifice as to constitute an amphibological sense. Hence they devised another manner of concealing secrets. They say, first, that some truths are communicable, others incommunicable; and that it is to be gathered from the circumstances whether words are to be taken with respect to communicable, or incommunicable, knowledge. As, when a Confessor is asked whether he knows anything of a penitent's sin, and he himself answers that he knows nothing, it is denoted from the circumstances that he knows nothing by communicable, or extra-sacramental, knowledge; and when he is asked by a tyrant whether he knows anything as a Confessor, likewise, they say, he can answer that he knows nothing — since even in this circumstance the words appear to be uttered with reference to extra-sacramental knowledge, with respect to which he really knows nothing. Those, however, who proceed by this path have not altogether renounced mental restrictions; but they admit a restriction of mind, made intelligible by an external circumstance. They differ only in this: that they do not wish some word to be necessarily required in the speech itself, which retains the obscure sense which the speaker holds in mind, and reveals and conceals it; but they wish only the obscure, and internal, sense to be gathered from the circumstance either of time, or of the speaker.

VI. At the very last, other theologians entirely removed from the midst mental restrictions, both internal and external, both amphibologies, and equivocations, for the reasons indicated — namely, that ambiguous words do not always occur, or are not sufficient, whenever we address sharp-witted men, or that simple folk are not capable of constructing an amphibological and equivocal speech. Wherefore they forged an invention more effective, they say, than all those recounted, for concealing truth. They teach, then, that we can use words materially, or, as they say, in our own power, so as to utter words materially, without their signifying anything, whenever truth must be concealed for a just cause. Wherefore Peter, asked whether he committed a crime, or knows it to have been perpetrated by someone, can, absolutely, and without any equivocation of words, respond, "I did not do it," "I do not know anyone to have done it" — even though he did do it, or knows by whom it was done: because such words, "I do not know," "I did not do it," signify nothing, just as if they had been uttered by a parrot. Tamburini (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 2, §2, n. 6) opposes to himself the authority of Cardinal Pallavicino, in these words: "But in this way you speak against the pact which was tacitly entered into among men in the constitution of language, that words be uttered significatively, and not only materially. Read Sforza Pallavicino in his Theology, Bk. II, disp. 2, n. 15." I respond: such a pact was too speculatively devised by that most ingenious man. I add: granted that there was an agreement, that by those sounds men could open their own conceptions — yet I contend there was never a pact that they could never, whenever they wished, utter those sounds materially. Certainly, thus do infants utter them, when they begin to learn foreign languages; thus do typesetters, when they set type, and writers and printers, when they write or print words of another language. Why not, when it profits a man to do so? That words can be used materially, or as signifying nothing, in human and serious speech, for concealing truth, Caramuel also taught, in his Haplotes, art. 1, concl. 1, n. 14, p. 15, in Cárdenas, dissert. 19, ch. 4, n. 51; which opinion, however, he himself does not approve, since he saw it was not approved by the Roman Censors.

VII. Other more recent writers hand down this doctrine of words, or sounds, signifying nothing, more clearly. Fr. Claude La Croix (Bk. VI, part 2, ch. 3, dub. 2, n. 158, at the end) attributes this opinion to Tanner, and Stoz, in these words: "Tanner and Stoz suggested another method: that a Confessor, if he cannot otherwise guard the seal, should use words purely materially, as sounds not signifying, wishing to signify nothing by them. The reason, moreover, why words in these circumstances are not significative, is this: that the significative force of words is the will of those who instituted them for signifying this or that. Now those instituting them neither willed, nor could will, that such words should be significative in the case where the seal would be revealed through them: for to will this would be impious, and neither God's, nor the commonwealth's, approval can accede to it — which, however, ought to accede, for there to be an obligation of using words as they were instituted. Therefore words, in these circumstances, are not significative. But as for the fact that the questioner takes them as significative, and is deceived — let him blame himself, for he questions unjustly." Fr. La Croix neither approves nor disapproves this manner of speaking; but, according to the custom of other Doctors, gathers various opinions, so that readers may select whichever pleases them.

VIII. Of his own, however, he offers a rule to all those bound by a seal, by which they might more easily know how to guard it. He says, then, n. 1587: "When a Confessor is thus unjustly asked about a matter closed by the seal, and cannot otherwise conceal it than by lying, it is not necessary that he seek out, of the many ways of answering without a lie, that which is more consonant with the reasons already related; but it suffices, simply saying that he knows nothing, that he not have the intention of lying, and wish to respond in that sense in which, according to the mind of the Church and the Doctors, he can thus speak with truth: for it is certain that there must be here some licit way of saving the seal, nor does any more fitting one occur than one of these. And what has been said of a Confessor holds for every other person bound to a seal." But for these, and similar most grave cases, it would be a mortal sin to lie; it is licit to use such words.

IX. This doctrine, whose use Fr. La Croix concedes as licit only for the guarding of the seal, and for similar most grave cases, to protect either life, or chastity, which are called the most grave cases — Fr. Carlo Ambrogio Cattaneo extended to cases not only grave, but to the avoidance of any notable inconvenience whatsoever. The cases to which he extends this described doctrine I will transcribe here, rendered from the vernacular tongue into Latin. He says, then, Vol. I, Lecture 44: "To your shop, for example, comes a wicked debtor, whom you cannot at all subject to the laws of justice; he asks whether you have such-and-such cloth. This question, the circumstances being inspected, betrays this sense: 'Would you have such cloth to sell me?' You respond..." : "and it must be understood that I do not have that which I do not have to sell to a wicked debtor; you can freely say: I do not have it." He proposes another case in these words: "Another comes, who does not possess a hand's-breadth of land, and asks whether you have a hundred scudi. You abound in many. You respond: I do not have them. Is this not a lie? Not at all. From the circumstances, this response is true. For the question signifies: do you have a hundred scudi to lend? But you, to one who could repay only at great risk, and would not have the solid means to repay, are not bound to lend."

X. With these, and other similar cases resolved, and various examples adduced, he expounds this doctrine at greater length than the aforesaid Fr. La Croix indicates; and he beforehand warns his readers that this doctrine of his is sufficient to overturn all difficulties. He says, then, that ambiguous and equivocal words of double meaning are not always at hand, especially in sudden events. What, he says, if an assassin, having entered your courtyard, about to kill your father, asks whether he is at home? Are you, as if bewitched, bound to strain your mind to search out ambiguous words, or to fit an equivocal locution; or to bring under scrutiny whether the restriction is purely mental, or not; or to recite a formula of words committed to memory from some book, as described, when you may thus escape free from this snare? In these, and similar cases, no other way is open, nor does the word "I do not know" suffice; you must hurl back into the face of the impudent questioner a round and bold "no" — since this conforms to the mind of all men whatsoever: for men are masters of words. They by no means instituted them to the harm of the commonwealth, and in favor of thieves and assassins. Not to say more: whatever lacks signification, by the consent of the whole human commonwealth, which established that, in similar events, words signify nothing — in just the manner in which a coin, its value having been removed by the Prince's command, becomes worthless. When, then, you hear that an officious lie cannot licitly be told, neither to save an entire city from a fire, nor for the same end to steal one solidus, or one silk thread — you must know, however, that just as, in such an event, theft would not be theft (since this has been so agreed among men for the public good), by the same reasoning a lie would not be a lie: since the human commonwealth possesses dominion no less over words than over things.* Thus far Cattaneo, who confirms his doctrine with other examples.

I. Of the ancient writers who patronized lying, I will single out Cassian, above all others, who defended the cause of lying more fully than all the rest, and treated it at greater length. But the whole doctrine of Cassian, and of the other Fathers, is concluded within these limits: namely, that in extreme necessity — for instance, to protect one's own life, or a neighbor's — the use of a lie is lawful, just as the use of hellebore is lawful in the most extreme illnesses. He proposes the case of the woman Rahab, and says that her lie was worthy of pardon. Here are his words, from Collation XVII, ch. 17: "Lying is to be so felt, and so used, as though it had the nature of hellebore... For thus we read that even holy and most approved men of God made pardonable use of a lie, as did Rahab." Cassian manifestly does not assert that this lie was absolutely licit, but that it was pardonably uttered; or that the lie was worthy of pardon, since it was told for the good end of protecting the lives of three men. Wherefore Cassian did not absolutely teach that, even in these most extreme events, a lie is entirely innocent, and loses the nature and guilt of a lie; but that, of two evils, the lesser is to be chosen, and that one who employs an officious lie is worthy of pardon, so as to compensate for, or avoid, the greater harm which would follow from the manifestation of truth. Thus Cassian declares his own mind, in express words, ch. 20: "For then, necessarily, and pardonably, is acquiescence given to the detriment of a lie, when, as we have said, a greater loss from the confession of truth is imminent, and the utility conferred upon us by truth does not prevail to compensate for the harm that must be generated by it." This teaching of Cassian's moved even Augustine himself, who calls it a doctrine of compensatory sins.

II. The same case, among several others, of the woman Rahab, and the Hebrew midwives, Augustine proposes (Book Against Lying, ch. 15); he turns it over in every direction, and disapproves Cassian's teaching, and resolves that Rahab, and the Hebrew midwives, did not lie, but Rahab teaches, in these words: "He knows where I am; I will not betray him." Then he resolves and turns back upon his adversaries everything that can be objected against this response — namely, that the woman would have been slain, and that her fellow-citizens, given this answer, would have finally searched the whole house, and that innocent men would have been delivered to death. What, then, ought she to have answered, you will say — that they should search the house? "But would it necessarily have followed that, by telling the truth, they would have found even those whom she had so carefully hidden? For that most cautious woman had foreseen, and had placed them where they could be hidden, even if she had not been believed when she lied. And even she, if nonetheless she had been killed by her own fellow-citizens, for a work of mercy, would have ended that life by a death precious in the sight of the Lord, and her kindness toward them would not have been in vain. But you will say: what if, having come even to that place where she had hidden them, by searching everything, they had found them? It can be said in this way: what, if they had refused to believe that most vile and most shameful woman, whether lying or perjuring herself? Surely, then, too, those things would have come to pass which she, by lying, feared. And where do we place the will, and the power, of God? Could he not, perchance, have kept both her from lying to her fellow-citizens, and from betraying the men of God, and have kept those men of his safe from every peril?"

III. A wholly similar case more recent theologians also propose to themselves. Older theologians, among whom St. Thomas holds the chief place, respond, with Augustine, that the woman lied, and that all lie who, in a similar event, with Rahab, deny that guests, sought even unto death, are present in their own house, when in fact they are dwelling there. Most more recent writers, however, agree with Cassian on this, which is the head of the whole controversy. For Cassian teaches that Rahab was worthy of pardon for denying that guests were in her house; more recent writers likewise affirm that we can, and ought, to deny to an assassin seeking, for death, a guest present in our house, that such a guest is dwelling, or to be found, with us. They differ from Cassian, however, in that he calls Rahab's lie one pardonably uttered, or worthy of pardon; more recent writers, however, do not wish this aforesaid denial of the truth to be a lie, and assign various reasons. For some distinguish a twofold truth, and a twofold knowledge: one revealable, the other not revealable — or one communicable, the other incommunicable. They wish, accordingly, that truth, from whose manifestation the death of an innocent person follows, to be incommunicable, or not revealable; and therefore that the negation answering to it be true. Others teach that, in a similar case, words signify nothing, by the tacit consent of the commonwealth — so that a lie is not a lie, just as theft in extreme necessity is not theft.

IV. Another case Augustine proposes to himself (ch. 18, Against Lying) concerning a sick father, who, if he understood that his only and most beloved son had died, would himself also succumb to fate. "If he asks whether he lives — whose death you know — what will you answer, when, whatever else you say besides one of three things — that he is dead, or that he lives, or that you do not know — he understands nothing else than that you are unwilling to say that he is dead? It will avail just as much, even if in every way you keep silent. But of those three, two are false — that he lives, and that you do not know — and these cannot be said by you except by lying. But the one true thing, that is, that he is dead, if you say it, and the death of the troubled man follows, it will be cried out that he was killed by you." We have described Augustine's complete response above, ch. 2, n. 6, which, lest I repeat the same thing, I refer readers to consult there. Only this I add: that Augustine restricts this case so that no room is left either for equivocation, or for silence, or for evading with words. Whatever you say, besides one of these three things — that he lives, that you do not know, that he is dead — the sick father concludes his son's death. If you confess the truth, saying he is dead, the father, too, dies. If you say, "he lives," or "I do not know," you lie. Manifestly, however, to attest death — or rather, truth — Augustine concludes, and proves by many arguments, even though the father's death should follow.

V. Most more recent writers think altogether the contrary. For they wish that you can say, "he lives," or "I do not know," so that the sick man's death does not follow — since, in these extreme cases, in which the manifestation of truth produces most grave harm, when it cannot be concealed by an equivocal speech, they teach that it is to be concealed by a manifest denial, which either signifies nothing, or denies incommunicable truth, as we have indicated, and shall explain more fully below.

VI. Augustine, near the end of the Book Against Lying, namely ch. 21, which is the last, presents a case which both occurred then, and now not infrequently occurs, of an adulterous wife, provoked, and compelled by her husband, to remove suspicion of adultery by an oath... . So firm and constant was it, in the persuasion of the faithful of that time, that a husband could exact an oath from his wife, whereby she might deny adultery without perjury, that this was really committed, as an evident argument of innocence. For if they had believed, or suspected, that wives could lawfully deny it, and confirm by oath the denial of adultery committed, husbands would never have been accustomed to induce their wives to swear, believing that they could also perjure themselves. For it must be considered that men very often provoke to an oath their wives, of whose adultery they are suspicious — which they certainly would not do, unless they believed that even those who had not feared to commit adultery would fear to commit perjury. For indeed some unchaste women, who did not fear to deceive their husbands by illicit intercourse, feared to employ God deceitfully as a false witness to those same husbands whom they had deceived.

VII. This same case more recent writers propose to themselves, and very many respond that an adulteress can lawfully deny that she committed adultery, which she really did commit, and confirm her denial by a sacred oath. Sánchez (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 6, n. 40): "Thirteenth, an adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed adultery, can swear that she has not broken the marriage... Similarly, she can swear that she did not do it, understanding within herself: 'so that I would reveal it to you.'" Castropalao (tract. 14, disp. 1, punct. 5): "Thirteenth, a woman who has committed adultery can, under oath, deny that she committed it, understanding that she is not bound to disclose it." Sayr, Bonacina, and all defenders of purely mental restriction teach the same. If, then, those men who lived in Augustine's time were alive in our own age, they would falsely persuade themselves that their wives would not perjure themselves — since the theologians themselves teach that perjury, in these circumstances, is not only, but merely material, and consequently licit. Is such a doctrine consonant with Augustine's mind, and teaching, who, in express words, teaches the opposite of the adulteress! Let Francolino gather from this on what foundation he could so intrepidly break out into these words (Bk. II, Preface, Church, Benignity, disp. 7, n. 33): "You understand now, I think, that the example you have adduced favors me, and rather confirms what I have tried to show: that our more recent Casuists do not write from their own genius, but respond according to the teaching of the Fathers, where the Fathers went before, and according to a teaching not contrary to the Fathers, where the Fathers did not go before; but according to what the Fathers themselves would hand down, if they taught in this age — that is, if they acted as Casuists in the schools, and not as sacred Preachers in the pulpits of temples, as they mostly did, when they treated of morals: for they spoke less distinctly than when they wrote of faith." Without doubt, if the Fathers were Casuists, and taught in the schools of most Casuists, they would then teach less strictly, and would transform their minds and spirits to teach the laxities of many. Francolino adds that he praises only the most approved of more recent writers, not those whose luxuriant license in opining Alexander VII and Innocent XI most wisely condemned in their decrees. But, as we shall show elsewhere, among the most approved, and most worthy of every praise, he professes to hold those whose propositions the aforesaid Pontiffs disapproved. And indeed, not only to Francolino, but to me too, several are most approved who taught in the schools that purely mental restrictions were licit. But the distinction which this author places between the Fathers teaching in the schools, and the Fathers composing in the temples from the pulpit, the most wise Father Elizalde says is the origin, chiefly, not of a benignity inseparable from the charity of Christ, but of laxity. Indeed, Elizalde adds that this distinction is that of the Pharisees, who preached true doctrine from the pulpit in the temples, but in private schools disseminated false and erroneous opinions; and therefore Christ said, "Whatsoever they say, do"; but, in private schools, he says false things: and therefore this same Christ said: "Beware of the doctrines of the Pharisees." But of this most erudite, and most opportune, interpretation of Father Elizalde, we shall speak more fully in its own place. What we wish, only in passing, to indicate to Francolino by our own dissertation, is this only: that all this that he said tends solely to diminish the authority of the Fathers; for this very distinction of Fr. Francolino's the Lutherans and Calvinists devised, so as to reduce the authority of the Fathers to nothing. I would wish that Fr. Francolino had brought forward some document by which he might prove that the Fathers spoke more cautiously, or more distinctly, when they wrote of faith than when they wrote of morals. Does not one equally err who corrupts the doctrine of morals, as one who corrupts that of faith? Are those who fight against sins that conflict with morals invaded with any lesser zeal than those who fight against sins that conflict with faith? This praised distinction of Fr. Francolino's, then, is false, and — to speak as gently as possible — most injurious to the Fathers of the Church. For if they spoke less distinctly of morals than of faith, from this universal rule it is inferred that scarcely anything certain can be gathered from the Fathers in the matter of morals, since they spoke less distinctly, according to Francolino. But we shall show, in its own place, that the holy Fathers of the Church spoke both in matters of morals, and in controversies of faith, distinctly and clearly enough — although neither all the opinions which more recent Casuists have devised in the matter of morals, nor all the errors which heretics have forged against the dogmas of faith, are found expressly refuted in the Fathers. But the general doctrine is found in their works, by which we reject both the dogmas of faith, and the rules of morals, contrary to the Gospel. But, as I said, of this more fully elsewhere.

VIII. I could adduce many other cases, which are resolved by Augustine in this matter, altogether opposite to the doctrine by which more recent theologians resolve these same cases — several of whom do not seem to recede far from the ancient defenders of lying. Indeed, as it seems to me — saving their better judgment — some of them defend that lies, which they call material, can be confirmed by oath, and can be employed in those events in which those who defended lies scarcely at all used them. For Cassian, and the rest, said that the use of a lie was pardonably licit only for the protection of life, chastity, or something similar; not so for protecting domestic goods, wares, or honor — for the preservation of which our own Casuists teach that material lies, which to the ancients were formal, are licit. From these few things it appears that the fourth and sixth propositions described above, ch. 5, are true.

I. Thus far we have played the part of the Historian; now, however, we must demonstrate clearly and distinctly what is to be disapproved from what we have described. But before I establish anything, in this most difficult question, of what seems to me more probable, let us first assail those things which are certainly false to us, or appear so; then let us set forth our own views. We begin, then, from a refutation of purely mental restrictions.

II. A purely mental restriction, as has been said, is then present, when the words, considered absolutely, and all circumstances inspected, constitute an external speech of the speaker false; but in the mind of the speaker something is understood which would make it true, no external sign, however, being given by which the hearer could detect what he restricts in his civil mind. As if someone should say, "Peter is dead," understanding within...

1. There are natural secrets, secrets of promise, and secrets of trust. A natural secret is all a man's own private history, which he would not have made public, as also all that he discovers by his own observation of the similar private history of his neighbours. If a man finds out something about his neighbour, and, after he has found it out for himself, the neighbour gets him to promise not to publish it, that is a secret of promise. Lastly, if one man comes to another, as to a lawyer, or a surgeon, for professional advice, or simply to a friend for moral counsel, and in order thereto imparts to him some of his natural secrets, those secrets, as they are received and held by the person consulted, are called secrets of trust. This latter kind of secret is privileged above the other two. A natural secret, and also a secret of promise, must be delivered up on the demand of an authority competent to inquire in the department where the secret lies. But a secret of trust is to be given up to no inquirer, but to be kept against all who endeavour to come by it, except where the matter bodes mischief and wrong to a third party, or to the community, and where at the same time the owner of the secret cannot be persuaded to desist from the wrong. This proviso does not hold for the seal of confession, which is absolutely inviolable.

2. The main art of keeping a secret is, not to talk about it. If a man is asked an awkward question, and sees no alternative but to let out or lie, it is usually his own fault for having introduced the subject, or encouraged the questioner up to that point. A wise man lets drop in time topics which he is unwilling to have pressed. But there are unconscionable people who will not be put off, and who, either out of malice or out of stupidity, ply you with questions against all rules of good breeding. This direct assault may sometimes be retaliated, and a rude question met by a curt answer. But such a reply is not always prudent or charitable, and would not unfrequently convey the very information required. Silence would serve no better, for silence gives consent, and is eloquent at times. There is nothing left for it in such cases but to lock your secret up, as it were, in a separate compartment of your breast, and answer according to the remainder of your information, which is not secret, private, and confidential. This looks very much like lying, but it is not lying, it is speaking the truth under a broad mental reservation.

3. Mental reservation is an act of the mind, limiting the spoken phrase so that it may not bear the full sense which at first hearing it seems to bear. The reservation, or limitation of the spoken sense, is said to be broad or pure, according as it is, or is not, indicated externally. A pure mental reservation, where the speaker uses words in a limited meaning, without giving any outward clue to the limitation, is in nothing different from a lie, and is wrong as a lie is always wrong. A good instance is Archbishop Cranmer's oath of fealty to the Pope, he having previously protested—of course out of hearing of the Pope or the Pope's representative—that he meant that oath in no way to preclude him from labouring at the reformation of the Church in England, that is, doing all the evil work which Henry VIII. had marked out for him in the teeth of the Roman Bishop.¹⁸ Even broad mental reservation is permissible only as a last resource, when no other means are available for the preservation of some secret which one has a duty to others, or grave reason of one's own, to keep.

¹⁸ Strype's Cranmer, i., pp 27, 28; ib., ii.,
Appendices 5, 6; ed. Oxon., 1812.

4. The point to make out is that no lie is told. To speak under a reservation is a lie, if it is speech against the mind of the speaker. But how can it be aught else than speech against the mind, when the heart thinks yea, and the tongue says nay? We answer that, in the case contemplated, the thought of the heart is, secrets apart, nay; and though the word on the lips is nay simply, yet we must not take that word as the whole locution, but as a mere text, to which the situation of the speaker and the matter spoken of form a commentary, legible to any observant eye. The word is an annotated text; nay in the body of the page, with secrets apart inscribed in the margin. The adequate utterance is the whole page, text and gloss together; that speech answers to the thought in the speaker's mind; therefore it is no lie.

5. The essential requisite is that the gloss, secrets apart, be not written in the speaker's private mind, but be outwardly and publicly manifest in the matter spoken of, which must be one that clearly admits of secrets, and in the circumstances of the speaker, who is driven into a corner, and obliged to answer something, and yet cannot by any prudent man be expected to answer out of the fulness of all the knowledge that he may possibly possess.

6. Nor let it be said that all confidence in the replies given to our questions is hereby destroyed. For most questions are in matters that do not admit of a secret. There the qualification, secrets apart, which may be said to attach to all answers, has no value and meaning: it is mathematically equal to zero; and we may take the answer in full assurance just as it reaches our ear. Again, when a person volunteers a statement unasked, he cannot be supposed to be reserving secrets. But when delicate subjects are touched on, and inquiry is pushed to extremity by an unauthorized questioner, secrets apart is the handwriting on the wall.

7. But why is not this qualification spoken out with the tongue? Sometimes it safely may be, and then it should be so added. But, as the addition is unusual, our taking the trouble to express it would often certify to the inquirer that his suspicions were correct, though we ought not to tell him so. Our aim then must be to give such an oral answer as we should return, were the suspicion quite unfounded. Our questioner, if he is a prudent man, will piece out our phrase with the addition, secrets apart; and he will understand that he can get nothing out of us either way, which is exactly what we wish him to understand. His unauthorized interrogatory has been met by speech that amounts to silence, arguing indeed our prudence, but leaving him as wise as before on the forbidden topic. If he is a thoughtless man, he is deceived, not by any intention or election of ours, but indirectly so far as we are concerned, an incidental deception which he has brought on himself.

8. This then is a convention that obtains, not of positive institution, but dictated by nature herself, that on a matter which admits of being secret, any answer elicited under stress of necessity must be so construed, as that any grave secret that may be touched, not being morally in the power of the respondent to reveal, shall be taken to remain reserved.

9. We may therefore sometimes avoid seeming to know what we know, or to be what we are. But we may never of our own proper motion step forward and court observation as being what we are not, or knowing what is against or beyond our knowledge. We may dissemble occasionally, but not simulate. The dissembler of a secret wishes for obscurity and silence: he wants to have the eyes of men turned away from him and their curiosity unroused. Whatever he says or does is to divest the idea of there being anything particularly interesting about him. But he who simulates—call him pretender, impostor, or quack—is nothing, if not taken notice of. The public gaze is his sunshine: obscurity gives him a deadly chill. His ambition is to appear out of the ordinary, being really quite within common lines: the dissembler is in some respect beyond the ordinary, but wishes not to show himself otherwise than as an ordinary mortal with ordinary knowledge. The pretender is on the offensive, challenging attention: the dissembler is on his defence against notice. "Simulation," says Bolingbroke, "is a stiletto, not only an offensive but an unlawful weapon, and the use of it may be rarely, very rarely, excused, but never justified. Dissimulation is a shield, as secrecy is armour: and it is no more possible to preserve secrecy in the administration of public affairs without dissimulation than it is to succeed in it without secrecy." (Idea of a Patriot King.)

Readings.—De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, 14, nn. 135, 141, 142; The Month for March, 1883; Lockhart's Life of Scott, v., 26.

154. Equivocation consists in using an expression readily susceptible of two meanings, one false, the other true, which the listener or reader can, and often will, understand wrongly. Thus we read (Gen. xii. 13), that, on entering Egypt, Abraham instructed Sarai to call herself his sister, the Hebrew word for sister being often used to denote a near female relative. He did this because his life would not have been safe if she were known to be his wife. In the matter of liceity, equivocation is generally classed with mental reservation which is not purely mental.

155. "Mental reservation is the unexpressed qualification of a statement affecting or entirely altering its meaning as understood by the person addressed, generally so that the uttered statement is untrue, though with the qualification it is true." (Standard Dictionary, 1894.)

It consists, therefore, in withholding a circumstance by which a statement is qualified in such a manner that the statement is false as it stands, although it is true if joined to the qualifying circumstance. When it is strictly mental, i. e., when there is nothing either in the words or in the circumstances that can prevent the hearer from being deceived, it is equivalent to a lie and therefore essentially wrong. But when the reservation is not strictly mental, it may be allowed at times; yet not without weighty reasons, else speech would become unreliable and social confidence would be impaired. If, however, reservation were never lawful, the common good or great private good would often have to be sacrificed without sufficient reason, for it may often happen that important secrets cannot be protected without mental reservation. One example will suffice: a man to whom an official secret has been intrusted may answer, if interrogated on the subject, that he does not know, meaning thereby that he does not know the matter in such a way as to be able to communicate it.

The objection may be raised that mental reservation is always wrong because it leads others into error, and, consequently, inflicts an injury upon them. We answer that he who uses a mental reservation, as an unavoidable means, intends directly to save a private person or the public from injury; and that, in so doing, he is not the cause but the justifiable occasion of error in the mind of the rash questioner.