Article II. On Mental Restriction

441. • Mental restriction is an act of the mind twisting or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one.

Mental restriction is, 1. purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is called properly mental; 2. broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from the adjuncts.

To mental restriction are called back equivocations or amphibologies, which are locutions having a double sense, but one more obvious and the other literal.

442. Principles. - I. It is never lawful to use a purely or properly mental restriction, nor an amphibology not perceptible in a human way; a fortiori it is not lawful to swear with the same, because it is simply a lie. This is also clear from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI. - St. Lig., on the second precept, n. 152.

443. • II. It is sometimes lawful from a just cause to use a broadly, that is, improperly, mental restriction, and equivocal words, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but from a just cause his deception is only permitted; on the other hand, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly hiding a secret; but sometimes no other means is at hand besides equivocation or a broadly or improperly mental restriction. - I said, from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; but this would fall to the greatest damage of human society. - Thus most commonly the theologians. - St. Lig., on the second precept, n. 151-152. - Lacroix, lib. 3, n. 287. - Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Sporer, Elbel, and innumerable others, as St. Lig. testifies, ibid.

But it is lawful to use a broad restriction of this sort even with an oath; although then a greater cause is required, since divine testimony must not be used without judgment. - St. Lig., n. 151.

444. Resolves. - 1. He is not free from fault who uses a restriction, even not purely mental, or an equivocation in some way perceptible, 1. if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2. if the one asking has a right of inquiring or of commanding confession of the truth, because to that right there regularly corresponds in the subject the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity. - St. Lig., n. 154. Add, 3. if damage to the neighbor would emerge from it against the precept of charity; 4. when mutual contracts are celebrated; in which case justice demands that words be put forth nakedly according to the mind of the contracting party. - Scav., de Actib. relig. extern., c. 2, art. 2.

2. A Confessor asked by a tyrant whether Titius confessed homicide can and must respond: I do not know; because the Confessor does not know this by communicable knowledge. Indeed, even if the tyrant insisted and said: Do you not know this by communicable knowledge? he could still respond: I do not know. The reason is that the tyrant well knows that he has no right to ask about this, nor does the Confessor as a man understand himself to know it, but as the vicar of God and therefore by incommunicable knowledge.

3. An accused person questioned by a judge not juridically or not legitimately can respond that he did not commit the crime, understanding under it, that concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is bound to confess. - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 154.

4. All public persons questioned about matters committed to their trust can use a restriction of this sort, such as secretaries, legates of princes, commanders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has an office and reason for concealing some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, very grave inconveniences would follow from this in society.

5. A servant can by order of his master deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by usage to signify that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Yet attend to the custom of places. - St. Lig., n. 165. - See Cases, n. 114 and following.