Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article II: On Mental Restriction
- DEFINITION. Mental restriction is an act of the mind twisting or restricting the words of some proposition to a sense other than the natural and obvious one.
DIVISION. Mental restriction is one kind purely mental, which can in no way be perceived by others; another is not purely mental, which can become known from the adjacent circumstances (III, 152).
To mental restriction are recalled EQUIVOCATIONS or amphibologies, which are ambiguous locutions, having a double sense: either one less obvious, the other more common; or one literal, the other spiritual or mystical. Some are determinable, whose sense intended by the one uttering can be known from circumstances; others are indeterminable, whose sense intended by the one uttering can by no means be detected (III, 151; H. Ap., V). Cf. Berardi, II, n. 973.
To this likewise is recalled dissimulation, by which someone neither by word nor deed signifies that which he has in mind, but as it were cuts himself off or abstracts from it: as if someone, asked whether he has money, begins to speak about another matter.
- PRINCIPLES. I. It is never licit to use purely mental restriction or indeterminable equivocation. The reason is: 1. because they per se tend to the deception of neighbor, and therefore are true lies; 2. the use of them would be pernicious to human society, and from it human commerce would collapse; 3. it is established from Sacred Scripture (Eccli., 37, 23): He who speaks sophistically is hateful; and from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI. Hence, a fortiori, it is never licit to swear with the same (cf. n. 608, q. 2).
- II. It is licit, from a just cause, to use a restriction not purely mental or a determinable equivocation. It is proved: 1. From the nature of the matter: for to use a restriction of this kind is not to lie, because then we do not deceive our neighbor, but from a just cause permit that he deceive himself; and moreover the sense of the speaker can be sufficiently perceived from the adjuncts; whence it is only a prudent concealment of truth. 2. From the example of Christ the Lord, who, when asked whether he would ascend to the feast day, responded: I will not ascend (John, 7, 8), and yet afterward he ascended. But he had said: "I will not ascend," namely manifestly, because the disciples wished that he ascend to manifest his divinity.
To the matter the Angelic Doctor speaks thus (2. 2, q. 110, a. 3, ad 4): "It is not licit to tell a lie for this, that someone may free another from any danger whatever; nevertheless it is licit to conceal the truth prudently, under some dissimulation." And this same thing, almost unanimously, all theologians teach, St. Alphonsus being witness (III, 152). Cf. Panzuti, II, n. 134; Junglas, Der rechtsgeschichtliche Hintergrund fur Liguori's Lehre vom Gerichtseid.
- Corollaries. 1. A just cause, so that we may licitly use restriction, is, in general, the necessity of preserving a secret; for this is required for the good of society, and sometimes by no other means can the secret be preserved.
Yet for permitting the use of restrictions not purely mental, sometimes a reasonable cause suffices, say for freeing oneself from the importunate and unjust interrogation of another, and any other honorable end. But it must be noted: a) that the greater cause is required, the more the words furnish an occasion of erring. Whence, if they furnish almost none, as are words equivocal per se, which have a double sense per se, the slightest cause excuses. b) A greater cause is required for equivocating with an oath than without it (III, l. c.).
- But a just cause is not given when a SPECIAL LAW requires manifestation of the truth. Then it is not licit to use equivocation, but the truth is sincerely to be made manifest. The reason is plain of itself. But such a law is present in the following cases: a) When the precept of professing the faith externally urges. b) When the judge legitimately interrogates; because then the just precept of the Superior obliges, to which one must submit. c) The same obtains when a Superior legitimately interrogates concerning those things which regard the government of subjects; or a confessor concerning those things which he ought to know for rightly judging the penitent. d) Finally in onerous contracts, where strict justice requires that no injury be brought upon the other (H. Ap., V, 15).
- For practice, you conclude: 1. All public persons, interrogated concerning matters committed to their faith, can use mental restriction: such as ministers and legates of princes, secretaries, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, etc. For if secrets committed to persons of this kind were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow, as no one fails to know.
As often as someone is held to conceal the infamy of another, he licitly says: I do not know, namely with communicable knowledge. A fortiori, the confessor can do this, indeed is held to this, as is plain (III, 153).
The accused or a witness, not legitimately interrogated by the judge, can respond that he did not commit or does not know the crime, understanding, concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is held to confess. Otherwise, if the interrogation is legitimate and juridical, as will be explained in the treatise on the Lay State (cf. n. 2315).
An adulteress interrogated by her husband can equivocally assert that she has not broken the marriage, which truly persists. And if she has confessed the adultery sacramentally, she can respond: "I am innocent of this crime"; because through confession it has now been taken away (III, 162).
He who has promised marriage, to which from some excusing cause he is not held, can deny the promise, namely that by which he is obligated. Likewise, he who was compelled to marriage can assert to the judge, even with an oath, that he did not contract, namely freely, as was proper (III, 159).
One asked to lend money can licitly say: Would that I had it! or: I do not have it, although he has it, understanding that he does not have it for lending, if the matter is thus (III, 163).
He who must cede his goods, needing hidden goods for support, can respond to the judge that he has nothing, namely which he is held to cede. Likewise an heir who without an inventory has hidden goods, if he is not held to satisfy creditors from those goods, can respond to the judge that he has hidden nothing, understanding: from the goods from which he is held to satisfy (III, 158).
A servant can, by command of the master, deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by use for signifying that he is not at home, insofar as he can be seen. Likewise he can respond: He has gone out, understanding: at a past time. Attend, in these matters, to the custom of places.
A seller before a notary can assert that he has accepted money which he has not yet received, but which he will receive shortly. For common use concedes this (III, 167).
A debtor who has satisfied the creditor, although nevertheless he cannot legally prove the satisfaction, can deny that he contracted any debt, understanding: so that I ought to pay (III, 159).
One coming from a place which is falsely thought to be infected by disease can deny that he comes from it, namely as infected by pestilence; because this is the mind of the guards. Likewise, he who is not held to taxes can say that he carries nothing, that is, from which he is held to pay.
One invited to a table, and asked whether the food is good, can respond that it is good, although in reality it is tasteless, understanding, for mortification and penance, etc., etc. (III, 160).