§ 3. On Mental Restriction And Amphibology

171. Declarations. Strictly speaking, equivocation, amphibology, ambiguity, and mental restriction are distinguished:

For equivocation is a word which signifies two diverse things, e.g., volo (from willing or flying), Gallus (a rooster or a man sprung from Gaul). Christ Himself used such equivocation when He said: "Lazarus our friend sleeps";³³⁸ for sleeping is said of sleep or of death.

Amphibology is a proposition or phrase having several senses, e.g., Peter is at home (Petrus est domi): Peter is present at home, and Peter eats at home.

But ambiguity is said not only of words and propositions, but also of other signs or things. Thus, e.g., to weep can be a sign either of great sadness or of great joy.

Mental restriction is an act of the mind by which, while we speak, we restrict words to another sense than the obvious one. If this sense, with attention paid to all the circumstances of the speaker and hearer, in no way appears nor can be understood, it is called a purely mental restriction; e.g., someone asked whether he has seen Peter responds affirmatively, understanding within himself, in a picture. But if the sense of the words can be understood by a prudent man because of the accompanying circumstances, it is called a broadly mental restriction; e.g., if a maidservant responds to one wishing to visit the master: the master is not at home; any prudent person immediately understands that by this phrase it is not certainly expressed that the master truly is not at home, but that the master cannot receive the visitor. By not a few authors this restriction is, not undeservedly, called rather a restriction of diction than of mind, because the diction is restricted to one of two or several senses.

³³⁸ Jn. 11, 11.

172. Principle. A purely mental restriction is never lawful; but if necessity or a reasonable cause is present, it is lawful to use a broadly mental restriction (or restriction of diction), or amphibologies and equivocations.

Thus now all Catholic theologians teach; thus in daily life all prudent men act, even those Protestants who indeed accuse the so-called "lax Catholic Morality" with such calumnies, but nevertheless admit a psychological lie or false-speaking, as was said above.

The first part is proved. A purely mental restriction is a pure lie. But a pure lie is never lawful. Therefore neither is a purely mental restriction lawful. For in a purely mental restriction the external speech has a sense so diverse from the interior concept that no hearer could suspect the truth. Therefore it is a pure lie. Hence Billuart³³⁹ deservedly says: 1. If the use of purely mental restrictions were lawful, no one except a dull and leaden man would lie, since nothing is easier than mentally to twist the sense of words to anything else. 2. The use of mental restrictions harms human society no less than lies, since hearers are equally deceived by it. - Innocent XI condemned the following propositions:³⁴⁰ "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned or spontaneously, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end, swears that he did not do something which in truth he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way (day) than that on which he did it, or any other true addition, in truth he neither lies nor is perjured"; and: "A just cause of using these amphibologies is whenever this is necessary or useful for preserving the safety of the body, honor, family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then considered expedient and studious."

The second part is proved. The end of broadly mental restriction is the concealment of truth. But in necessity or from a reasonable cause it is lawful to conceal the truth by means not intrinsically evil. Therefore broadly mental restriction, which does not employ means intrinsically evil, is lawful in necessity or from a reasonable cause. St. Augustine³⁴¹ says: "Although everyone who lies wishes to conceal what is true, nevertheless not everyone who wishes to conceal what is true lies"; and St. Thomas³⁴² teaches: "It is not lawful to tell a lie; ... nevertheless it is lawful to conceal the truth prudently under some dissimulation." - Indeed concealment of truth is not only lawful, but sometimes gravely commanded, e.g., an entrusted secret is commanded. But broadly mental restriction employs means not intrinsically evil for concealing the truth. For the words uttered can have the intended sense; indeed the hearer, with all the circumstances seen, ought to suspect this sense. Hence the hearer is not directly and necessarily deceived, but his deception is rather only indirectly permitted. But deception of this kind can be permitted if a reasonable cause or necessity is present. For the good of human society and the legitimate defense of oneself require that there be a means of lawfully concealing truth and preserving a secret. But sometimes no other means is present except equivocation or broadly mental restriction. For such is the disposition of men that, if you keep silent or if you refuse a response to one questioning, they immediately conclude that the matter is as they think or ask. - Christ Himself seems sometimes to have used mental restriction. For when the disciples asked Him to go up to the feast day, He responded: "You go up to this feast day, but I do not go up,"³⁴³ and nevertheless afterward He went up. Yet He neither changed His purpose, nor still more strongly lied, because in truth He did not go up solemnly and publicly, as the Apostles asked, saying: "Pass hence and go into Judea, that Your disciples also may see Your works; manifest Yourself to the world";³⁴⁴ but He went up "not manifestly, but as it were in secret," as the Evangelist notes. Likewise with mental restriction Christ seems to have responded to the Apostles asking concerning the day of judgment: "But of that day or hour no one knows, neither the Angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father."³⁴⁵ For certainly the Son of God knows the day of judgment, but He does not know it so as to manifest it to the Apostles.

Although, therefore, broadly mental restriction is lawful, nevertheless in its use some necessity is always required; hence he sins who rather often employs an equivocation or restrictions of this kind in lighter matters. For if this were lawful, the hearer in almost any saying would have to suspect ambiguity and could almost never safely believe the speaker; and this indeed certainly would tend toward the detriment of peaceful living together. But for discerning when there is a sufficient cause for employing amphibologies of this kind, let this be the rule: When the one questioning has a strict right of knowing the truth (e.g., in essential matters of an onerous contract), it is not lawful to conceal the truth by broadly mental restriction; but when someone asks importunately and unjustly, and a response cannot be refused without offense of the one questioning and without danger of violating a secret, then it is lawful to use these amphibologies.³⁴⁶

³³⁹ De relig. diss. 9, a. 2.

³⁴⁰ Prop. 26 and 27 (Denz. n. 1176 sq.). These errors are taken from T. Sanchez, In Decal. l. 3, c. 6, n. 15. Cf. also prop. 24, 25, 28 (Denz. n. 1174 sq., 1178).

³⁴¹ Contra mendacium c. 10.

³⁴² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3 ad 4.

³⁴³ Jn. 7, 8.

³⁴⁴ Jn. 7, 3 sq.

³⁴⁵ Mk. 13, 32.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Billuart, De mendacio a. 2.

173. Applications. Although the principle enunciated is admitted by all modern authors (with certain ancient authors contradicting it), nevertheless its application in practice is not without difficulty, because sometimes it is difficult to discern between a purely and broadly mental restriction. Hence we give the following practical resolutions:

1. A confessor asked about any matter known from confession can always, indeed sometimes must, say: I do not know. For every interrogation thus posed to a confessor is unjust, and truly the confessor as a man does not know those things which he heard in confession as a minister of God. But I say, sometimes he must say: I do not know, namely, if otherwise the seal of confession would come into danger. For cases can happen in which, from a refused response, the questioner easily suspects an affirmative response to his question. - A confessor can say even under oath: I do not know. - A penitent also can use amphibologies when the confessor puts a certainly undue question concerning sins already confessed; for he then lawfully responds: I did not commit this sin (understanding, which I am held to reveal to you, because I have already confessed it).

2. All who are held to preserve the so-called professional secret, e.g., secretaries, advocates, physicians, pharmacists, midwives, etc., can use broadly mental restriction for preserving that secret, if no other means is available. The reason is that each hearer easily understands that these persons neither can nor wish unduly to violate professional secret.

3. He who, invited to a meal, is asked whether the food pleases him, can respond affirmatively, although in reality the food is tasteless. Thus at least if otherwise inconveniences would be prepared both for himself and for the host of the meal. The reason is that words of politeness of this kind (commonly compliments), just as also subscriptions: most devoted, most obedient, most attached servant, etc., are taken by no prudent person in the strict and obvious sense.

4. A servant, by order of the master, can say to a visitor: The master is not at home; and this locution indeed, at least in our regions, signifies nothing other than: the master cannot be seen, or the master is not at home so as to receive visitors. - Likewise to one asking for a loan or for a loan for use, it can often (but not always) be answered: I do not have it, namely, what I can easily give to you.

5. Some restrictions which by certain older authors were held lawful nevertheless seem to be rejected. Thus, e.g., to affirm something in a loud voice, adding in a low voice the restriction, as if someone says in a loud voice: I did not do it, and mutters softly: today. For he who acts thus is deservedly regarded as a deceitful and lying man. Likewise in our times it seems illicit that a cleric, even if not obliged from canon law to pay tax, should declare that he carries or has nothing (understanding, that is subject to taxes). For if goods subject to tax are discovered with the cleric, he is regarded by all as a defrauder and causes grave scandal.

174. Warning. Generally speaking, all mental restrictions are to be avoided as far as possible, and they can be employed only if true necessity exists which cannot be avoided in another way. But these restrictions are especially to be avoided in an oath. For if someone were found to have made an oath with mental restriction, according to the modern practice of tribunals he would immediately be condemned as a perjurer. Therefore he who is required to give testimony or to confess the truth should use the right conceded to him of refusing testimony.

On account of the use of mental restriction no small odium has been caused for moral theology, but undeservedly! For although certain authors exceeded too far in this matter and therefore were also condemned by Innocent XI, nevertheless true Catholic moral theology has always restrained mental restriction within just limits.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁷ Cf. Billuart, De mendacio diss. 9, a. 2, who excellently discusses this matter and also explains well 14 places from Sacred Scripture in which lies or mental restrictions seem to be present. Even Caramuel himself, who was called by St. Alphonsus "the prince of the laxists," writes most beautifully: "An aversion against mental restrictions is innate in me. For if they are contained within the bounds of piety and sincerity, they are not necessary. For all things which they can furnish, the co-signifying circumstances will furnish. But if such are said that they are to be admitted even where signifying circumstances are lacking (let their authors and defenders forgive me), they take away human society and security and have been condemned as pestiferous. For once admitted they open the way to every lie, to every perjury. And the whole difference will be in this: that what yesterday was called a lie changes not its nature and malice but its name, so that today it is ordered to be named mental restriction; which is to season poison with sugar and to color wickedness with the appearance of virtue" (Theol. fund. II, n. 1805 [p. 182]).