Question Four: On Various Cases

Since there are many occasions in which one must speak, and accordingly say what is true, and yet at the same time a secret must be kept and lying avoided, it will be useful to apply the principles set forth above to various practical cases.

869. As regards usual locutions. - He does not lie: 1) who from jest says what he knows appears openly false to the hearers, because the words in these circumstances are not deceptive of the neighbor; likewise 2) he who uses tropic or hyperbolic locutions, or customary polite formulas of speaking or writing, because from common estimation they are only signs of politeness, or modes of speaking to which no one gives credence; 3) similarly, not a few locutions in certain circumstances from common usage itself now do not signify that which they sound, but have become ambiguous or less determinate, for example, he is not at home, he is not here, he has gone out of the house, he is outside, I do not know, I do not have it, c'est le prix de facture, etc. Thus one asked to lend money or to give alms, from a just cause of abuse or of an importunate petition, can respond: I do not have it, I wish I had it! that is, how easily and safely I could lend it.

870. As regards declarations or oaths unjustly extorted. - 1. One who promises under oath what is extorted by force, fear, or an unjust means can promise with restriction: insofar as the other has a right.

2. One who is not liable to a tax can deny that he has merchandise liable to such a tax.

3. To an incompetent judge interrogating, or one inquiring about a matter concerning which he cannot inquire, the person interrogated can keep silent about or deny the secret.

4. Likewise one bound to a secret can swear that he has manifested nothing, if he has manifested nothing of those things which he was bound to conceal.

871. As regards secrets to be kept. - All public persons interrogated about things committed to them can use restriction, such as ministers and legates of princes, secretaries, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, midwives, and whoever has an office or reason for hiding the truth. Hence it is licit to affirm, even under oath:

1. for a confessor, that he does not know a sin heard in confession, that he did not hear it, nor know it, namely, as a man and by communicable knowledge;

2. for anyone, that he does not know a natural, promised, or committed secret, to the knowing of which the questioner does not have a right;

3. for him who committed a delict, that he did not commit it, if he is interrogated by one to whom he is not bound to confess, because there is not simple proof or because he is innocent;

4. which also probably holds of a woman who has committed adultery and is interrogated by her husband.

872. As regards judgments. - When a witness is interrogated under oath: if he lies even lightly, he commits perjury strictly so called; but if he speaks equivocally or is silent, he violates the oath insofar as promissory of saying the whole truth (Belgian Code of Criminal Instruction, a. 75; 155; 317; Code of Civil Procedure, a. 262), which is a grave sin, unless the matter is light. Yet if that witness is interrogated illegitimately or without right, he can use amphibology and real restriction (in the sense of the one requiring, insofar as he has a right). Hence:

1. to a judge interrogating whether he has spoken with the accused, whether he has come to such a place, whether he has seen him, etc., if a just cause of concealing is present, he can respond according to the mind of the judge: by denying, that is, I did not hear or see things which pertain to instructing the cause; yet let him beware of scandal;

2. if from the testimony notable harm threatens the witness himself or his own, he will be able to conceal, unless public or another's harm prevails: for the law of responding does not ordinarily oblige with grave inconvenience. Thus one interrogated whether he comes from a place which is believed to be infected with plague can deny it if he does not suffer from plague: according to the mind of the one interrogating, who intends to know whether there is danger of infection (at least if common usage understands it thus);

3. a witness interrogated about fault, who knows that the accused committed the deed but certainly without fault (for example, by hidden compensation), can rightly deny that he knows the deed, that is, the culpable deed, unless he is interrogated about the material deed alone or about merely juridical fault, for example in civil causes;

4. one who is bound by a secret which is not to be revealed to the judge must respond that he does not know the matter.

873. As regards contracts. - It is licit to affirm, even under oath, from a grave cause:

1. for him who from substantial error entered an invalid contract, that it was not entered, for example, if an oath is deferred to someone concerning a lease entered verbally (Civil Code, a. 1715);

2. for him who is free from the obligation of a contracted debt for any reason whatever, whether because he has already satisfied it but cannot prove it, or because he needs hidden goods for sustenance, or because the other remitted it, that he did not contract the debt, namely, which is still to be paid, or that he has already paid: thus one who is compelled to swear that he paid the price of merchandise received (Civil Code, a. 2275), if the seller secretly remitted the debt which he then unjustly exacts in judgment;

3. for him who from the succession of another has withdrawn what was his own, or has hidden goods from which he is not bound to satisfy creditors, that he did not withdraw them, understanding, what is another's, or from which he is bound to satisfy. Thus for the oath in the placing of a seal (Code of Civil Procedure, a. 914) and to be furnished before a notary in the making of an inventory (ibid. a. 943), the matter concerns things of the deceased taken away from the succession, but not those of which he either did not have ownership, or had already transferred ownership to others.

874. As regards political oaths. - It is illicit: 1. to swear positive recognition, adherence, or assistance to an illegitimate superior, but not passive submission and obedience; 2. to swear the execution of an iniquitous law, indeed not even obedience if it is contrary to God or the laws of the Church, but only insofar as it is not repugnant to these; 3. to add a private restriction in political oaths: for these are to be furnished in the sense of the one requiring them; hence if a limitation is necessary, it must be expressly inserted, or at least be able to be understood from the declaration of authority or common estimation. A private person, namely, does not have the right of limiting the sense of authority, because law can define the sense of the act to be placed.

Thus in the year 1821 it was expressly declared by William I for the Holland-Belgian kingdom that the oath was not required except in a civil sense and as regards civil ordinances, and that it did not oblige to anything contrary to the laws of God and the Church; nor can this be judged to have been revoked by subsequent governments.