Probabiliorism

231. Probabiliorism teaches: it is lawful to follow the opinion for liberty if it is more probable than the opposite for the law.

As regards the degree of greater probability which the more probable opinion must carry before itself in order that it be lawful to follow it, probabiliorists do not agree: for some require that it be notably more probable and therefore almost morally certain; others require that it be more probable to such an extent that the mind can assent to it. Besides, some assume a reflex principle for informing conscience; others admit none, contending that in order to operate honestly conscience need not be practically certain.

1. This doctrine was little known among moralists until the middle of the 17th century. From that time theologians of the Order of Preachers defended probabiliorism with such agreement that up to the beginning of the last century hardly a Dominican theologian could be found who was not a probabiliorist. To these several other theologians, both secular priests and regulars of other orders, joined themselves.

Among the Dominicans are eminent: Mercorus, Gonet, J. Martinez, Vincent Baronius, Contenson, Natalis Alexander, Concina, Billuart, and Patuzzi, whom St. Alphonsus had as a most keen adversary. At this same time other theologians also of every order, both seculars and regulars, acceded to this doctrine, from whom these are to be named: Prosper Fagnanus, Collet, Cabassutius. Of the theologians of the Society of Jesus, those devoted to probabiliorism are: Blancus, Thyrsus Gonzalez, Camargo, Estrix, Gibert, Elizalde, Malatra, and Antoine. At the present time, especially after the ecclesiastical approval which the moral books of St. Alphonsus obtained, there will scarcely be a theologian who defends probabiliorism.

2. Their argument is: just as in doubt concerning truth we are bound to embrace that sentence which approaches more to the truth and excludes more the danger of erring, so in doubt concerning honesty we are bound to follow the sentence which approaches more to the truth and excludes more the danger of sinning; but the more probable opinion approaches more to the truth and removes more from sin.

3. Refutation. a. Either they admit reflex principles for forming a certain conscience or they do not admit them; if the first, by logical necessity they arrive at probabilism; if the second, they necessarily at last fall into absolute tutiorism, since it is not lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience.

Those who admit a reflex principle form a practically certain conscience in this way: he who does what he prudently judges to be licit does not sin; but he who follows the more probable opinion does what he prudently judges to be licit; therefore he who follows the more probable does not sin. - Now they cannot effectively prove the minor in another way except by an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law; but this argument consequently leads to probabilism: for the law is invincibly unknown whether the opinion against the law is more probable or probable.

b. A moral system cannot be true which not only imposes an intolerable burden on the faithful, but besides brings this inconvenience, that its use is impossible both for confessors and for the faithful; but probabiliorism is of this kind. For for the licit use of some opinion it would be necessary to inquire which opinion is more probable; but this is impossible for most. Besides, it casts all who are of timorous conscience into innumerable scruples and perplexities, especially because that which to one is certainly more probable seems to another at most probable, and that which to the same man today appears probable, tomorrow seems to be more probable.

c. Their argument, which has deceived many, contains two things which are false. a. It is false that the more probable opinion approaches nearer to the truth: for in order that this could be affirmed, the truth would have to be known. It must be said: the more probable opinion has a greater appearance and likeness of truth and is more often joined with truth than with falsity, but nevertheless it can be just as false as the opposite probable opinion. Therefore neither of contradictory sentences, of which one must be true, approaches truth more or less than the other: for each either coincides with truth or is contradictorily opposed to it. b. The order of knowledge is confused with the order of operation: if in doubt concerning truth there is question of consent to be given to one opinion or the other, we must assent to that which appears more probable on account of graver reasons; nevertheless at the same time we know that the law is uncertain; but now we are not bound to follow an uncertain law.

On a similar confusion rests the example sung again and again by probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. If two ways offer themselves to one seeking Rome, of which one more probably leads to Rome, only this one can prudently be chosen. - Indeed he would be mad who chose the other, which less probably leads to Rome. But cases of this kind, in which there is question of a means necessary for attaining an end and of damage necessarily to be avoided, are solved not by the probabilistic principle but by the tutioristic principle. But where there is question of a doubtful law, he who follows the less probable certainly avoids the only damage to be feared from the fact that he perhaps does not observe an existing law, namely formal sin.

III. Diverse systems. Seven are enumerated, namely: absolute Tutiorism, mitigated Tutiorism, Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, Laxism, and the System of Compensation.

Absolute Tutiorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is certain to me; or: The law obliges me unless I am certain that it does not exist.

Mitigated Tutiorism teaches: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is most probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as most probable that the law does not exist.

Probabiliorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is more probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as more probable that the law does not exist.

Equiprobabilism professes: In doubt about the making of a law, it is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is equally or almost equally probable to me as the opposite opinion favoring the law. But in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the law is to be observed.

Probabilism contends: It is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is truly probable to me, and this even if the contrary opinion is certainly more probable to me; or: The law does not oblige me provided I hold it as truly probable that it does not exist, and this even if I hold it as more probable that it does exist. And these things hold even if the law certainly existed, provided it has probably ceased or has been fulfilled.

Laxism admits the use even of a thinly probable opinion.

The System of Compensation teaches that in doubts the safer thing is to be followed unless a relatively grave inconvenience excuses.¹

Absolute Tutiorism,² mitigated Tutiorism, and Laxism³ are commonly rejected; Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, and the System of Compensation are sustained. We admit Equiprobabilism, which system indeed we now undertake to prove and to vindicate from objections.

¹ Thus Laloux, De actibus humanis; Potton, De theoria probabilitatis; Boisdron, Theorie et systemes des probabilites; Prummer, Manuale Theol. Mor., t. I, n. 351; McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, p. 254. The system of Cardinal d'Annibale deserves special mention; in his Summula Theologiae moralis (I, nn. 262 and 264), relying only on the principle of possession, he gives his vote, with respect to doubt about the existence of a law, rather to Probabilism; and with respect to doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, to Equiprobabilism. That system could be called the System of Possession, or Possessionism.

² Alexander VIII struck down the thesis: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, or among probable opinions the most probable one."

³ Innocent XI condemned this proposition, the third: "Generally, while, relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently."

One who strictly doubts about the making of a law, in other words, one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable that the law has not been made and that it has been made, is not held to observe it. It is proved:

I. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. For this authority is such that it seems to create a grave presumption in favor of the system which he himself defended. But the holy Doctor defended the proposed thesis.

The major is confirmed by these things: first, the Church recognized St. Alphonsus as an outstanding master of Moral Theology, and repeatedly declared that he was a most safe and divinely given guide of directors of souls (n. 215). Moreover, these things ought especially to hold for the principal question of Moral Theology, that is, for the moral system; indeed the aforesaid praises and commendations seem scarcely capable of being honorably explained if St. Alphonsus had erred in choosing the moral system which extends most widely throughout the whole of moral science and, as it were, pervades it, and by force of which the innumerable doubts that occur in the said science are solved for practice. These points are confirmed by what the Vindiciae Alfonsianae report from the Acts of the Cause of Beatification:¹ "Already a decree had been issued concerning 'Nothing worthy of censure,' and already the heroic virtues of Alphonsus had been discussed. But nevertheless, by command of the Pontiff, a new Positio on the Virtues was instituted, and indeed on Prudence, not with respect to the exercise of that virtue, but because of some rules of morals contained in his works. Hence besides other particular questions, the moral system in particular and the doctrine on habitual sinners and recidivists were called back to a more severe weighing." Once these things had been carried out, Pius VII solemnly declared that the heroic degree of the virtues was established. In addition, the Sacred Penitentiary on 19 Dec. 1855 wrote back to a certain professor of Moral Theology that he, notwithstanding his oath to defend Probabiliorism, could follow and publicly hand on the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (n. 215). Hence several, and those distinguished, theologians confess that the system which St. Alphonsus embraced seems worthy of commendation.²

The minor is admitted by all.

Objection. When it was asked of the Holy See whether by the words of the Decree of 11 March 1871, by which St. Alphonsus is said to have "paved a safe way amid the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter...," whether, I say, by those words Equiprobabilism had been designated and commended before Probabilism, the response was that by those words the Sacred Congregation "had wished to condemn no opinion or prefer one to another, but only to designate a fact admitted by all, namely, that St. Alphonsus by his system took care to avoid both laxer and stricter opinions."

Response. This response did not proceed from legitimate authority, as was learned after diligent examination instituted at Rome. It is also absent from the authentic edition of the Decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites. It was given by the substitute of the Secretariat of the Sacred Congregation of Rites alone, in the name of the Secretary alone.³

II. From the authority of theologians. Theologians today almost commonly defend the thesis stated. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, there will be discussion later.

III. From reason. Preceptive and prohibitive laws are in the likeness of a spiritual bond, and therefore, in order that they obtain their effect, they must reach a human being positively; this cannot happen except through at least some knowledge properly so called of the making of the law. "Just as a rope," says St. Alphonsus, "does not bind unless it is applied to the thing to be bound by contact, so a precept does not bind except through knowledge of it" (I, 76). But in strict doubt, all knowledge properly so called of the making of the law is lacking. "Then," says St. Alphonsus, "...we do not have knowledge of the law, but only knowledge of the doubt or question whether the law exists or not" (I, 74). It is indeed known that each part, namely both the making and the non-making of the law, is equally probable; but no knowledge is had about the conclusion or term of the inquiry.⁴

Then, in strict doubt about the making of a law, that is, in strict doubt whether a law prohibits or permits some act, all knowledge properly so called about the ordinance of the law concerning the said act, or about the objective morality of that act, is lacking. Once this has been posited, that act in second act, as it is said, is situated with respect to me outside the order of morality, or is regarded as a merely physical act. But nothing prevents an act of this sort from being placed, provided a good end is added. Therefore in strict doubt whether some act is objectively permitted or prohibited, it is right to place that act for a good end.

So that the argument just brought forward may be more fully clarified, I note these things: by force of our rational nature we are, as regards being, in the moral order, that is, in first act we are bound by law; but as regards acting, by force of our rational cognition, we are constituted in the moral order, that is, in second act we are bound by law. Hence, since in strict doubt there is no knowledge properly so called about the morality of an act, as regards acting we are not in the moral order except insofar as by a higher law the obligation of always acting for an honorable end is imposed on us.

Nor should you object that perhaps that act is prohibited by the legislator. This is true; but that prohibition, if it has place, binds only my rational being; in other words, it binds me because I have a rational nature, but my acting is bound only by rational cognition.

Hence in strict doubt the act, as regards my acting, is not in the moral order; but it is merely physical, and must receive morality from the end.

Finally, if the discussion concerns positive law, the principle proved in n. 229 has force: in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior is better than the condition of that which is posterior. But moral liberty is prior to a positive preceptive or prohibitive law.

¹ Dissertatio, Proemium, n. 46.

² Thus, for example, Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., I, 165; Noldin, De Principiis theol. mor., n. 239; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund., n. 700 sq.; Beauduin-Gardeil, cited work, p. 79.

³ Cf. Ter Haar, Ven. Innoc. P. P. XI de Probabilismo Decreti Historia et Vindiciae, p. 107.

⁴ Therefore neither do we deny that contradictory parts considered in themselves, or even compared, can retain the probability which they have from good reasons. But this is not the matter at issue. The matter concerns the parts insofar as they are contradictorily opposed, or insofar as they are simultaneous affirmation and negation with respect to one question of truth.

Probabiliorism.—The arguments in favor of Probabiliorism are as follows:

(a) extrinsic or from authority. This system is more ancient, and, when the controversy over systems began in the seventeenth century, this was the one that was most favored by the Church and theologians;

(b) intrinsic and direct. An essential note of certitude is that it should exclude all doubt, for as long as doubt remains there is only opinion. But one who is undecided cannot exclude all doubt, unless the arguments against the doubts not only balance, but outweigh the latter (i.e., unless one has greater probability on one’s side). Hence, he who acts against the safer, which is always certain enough, when his own opinion is not more probable, acts with an uncertain conscience;

(c) intrinsic and indirect. In all other matters a man is not prudent if he assents to that which is less safe and less probable. Thus, in things speculative no scholar would think of accepting a theory which to his knowledge was further removed from the truth; in things practical no man of common sense would prefer a road that seemed less likely to lead to his destination. But we should not be less prudent about the good than we are about the true and the useful. Hence, in doubt we should always decide in favor of the law, unless the arguments for liberty are more convincing.

The answers given to the above arguments are:

(a) Probabiliorism is not more ancient as a system, since none of the moral systems were formulated before the sixteenth century; if Patristic and medieval authorities can be quoted who decided cases probabilioristically, others who were contemporary can be named who decided according to milder principles. Moreover, the passages cited are frequently obscure, and do not necessarily bear a Probabilioristic sense. That Probabiliorism enjoyed more favor at the beginning of the controversy is not wonderful, since other systems were more or less identified with Laxism, and the question at issue had not been studied thoroughly. Today Probabiliorism has few defenders.

(b) That which is more probable by far, or most probable, does overcome all doubt, and is even speculatively certain; but he who would require the more probable in this sense does not differ from the Tutiorists spoken of above. That which is more probable, but not to a notable extent, does not exclude all doubt, for the very definition of the more probable is “that judgment which appears more likely to be true than another, but which does not exclude all fear that the other may be true.” Hence, if Probabiliorism calls for the notably more probable, it does not differ from Tutiorism; if it calls for the moderately more probable, it wrongly claims that there is no probability on the opposite side.

(c) The true is that which is in harmony with facts, the useful that which conduces to the obtaining of an end, the good that which is in conformity with law. Certainly, a man is not a prudent seeker of truth if he arbitrarily prefers the less to the more true-seeming, nor a prudent seeker of the useful if he chooses the less safe way of obtaining what is a necessary end; but a man can be a prudent seeker of the good, even though he prefers the less safe and less probable, when the law itself, the norm of good, does not demand more from him. Hence, one who makes a judgment according to the anti-Probabiliorist systems does not feel that he is yielding assent to what is speculatively less probable; but that he is making a decision that is practically certain; not that he is choosing a perilous way, but one that is absolutely safe.

Arguments against Probabiliorism.—(a) Theoretical Objection.—The principle of Probabiliorism that it is lawful to act against the safer side when the less safe side is more probable, cannot be justified except on the ground that invincible ignorance of obligation exists, and hence that the law does not oblige. But the same argument can be used in favor of milder systems; for even if the less safe side is only probable, it makes one invincibly ignorant that one is obliged. Hence, the basis of Probabiliorism is fatal to its own claims.

(b) Practical Objection.—A system for the direction of conscience should be so simple that it can be easily applied in the everyday affairs of life. Abstract questions may receive attention from moralists for days and months, but concrete cases have to be decided as a rule without delay. But Probabiliorism is such a complicated system that it is unsuited to everyday life. St. Alphonsus declares that he found by the experience of many years that this system cannot be profitably used in the guidance of souls, for it imposes an intolerable burden on both confessors and penitents. And how few are so skilled as to be able to decide quickly, without scruples, and correctly about the relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions!

Answers of the Probabiliorists.—(a) A probable opinion against the existence of obligation does not create invincible ignorance, but only doubt; nor does a more probable opinion against obligation create invincible ignorance, since it excludes the less probable opinion for obligation, and makes one assent unwaveringly and in good faith, even though erroneously, to the judgment that one is not bound.

(b) It is no more difficult to decide what is more probable than to decide what is equally probable, or truly and solidly probable; nor is the same skill and attention expected in all persons and cases, but each person must judge according to the best light he has, and each case must receive the measure of attention its importance calls for. If Probabiliorists may become scrupulous, may not Probabilists become lax?

The debate between Probabiliorism and its adversaries is not often heard today, as most modern moralists give their allegiance either to Equiprobabilism (a modified Probabiliorism) or to Probabilism.

Note: 1. "That diverse species of probabilities are given.... A tenuously probable opinion is one which rests on some foundation, but not such as avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.... Probable is that which rests on a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority, which avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also judged probable. Most probable is that which rests on a most grave foundation, and for this reason the opposite is judged either tenuously or doubtfully probable.... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning; but the safer is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest on stronger reasons." L. l. c. But S. D. speaks more exactly about a most probable opinion, H. A. tr. 1. n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not tenuously probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But tenuous probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with it a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not altogether certain and stable." Cf. also Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 85. But lest there be quibbling about words, as far as concerns us, we recognize no opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability except the probable opinion, the more probable, and the most probable. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; but mediately to the most probable; and likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable, unless someone wishes really to confuse the most probable with the certain.

2. Various moral systems: Tutiorism: A moral system which establishes that in doubt the safer part is to be followed practically. One kind is absolute, and is Rigorism, which establishes that the safer part must always be followed. Another is mitigated, which establishes that the safer part must be followed unless the other part favoring liberty is most probable. Probabiliorism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty only when it is more probable than the opposite favoring the law. Therefore according to this system a doubtful law obliges, against the most common opinion and against reason. Equiprobabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is equally or almost equally probable as the opposite. It is indeed a right norm of acting, but not to the exclusion of probabilism, which is a moral system containing an altogether right norm of acting, embracing all the cases of a true probable opinion favoring liberty, when the question concerns merely the subjective honorableness of an action. Probabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty, although the opposite in favor of the law is more probable, whether a little or much more probable, where nevertheless the question concerns only the liceity of a human action. The reason is that when there is a truly probable opinion against a law, the law is doubtful, and a doubtful law does not oblige. Laxism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion even doubtfully and tenuously probable against the law. It was condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

55. • The efficacy of probability is situated in its force for forming the ultimate dictate of conscience, practically certain. But from those things which we asserted in no. 39, certain conscience alone is the right rule of morals. In what way, then, can it happen that from even greater probability it is sometimes licit to act? Certainly this is not licit by force of probability alone. Therefore recourse must be had to some morally certain principle, so that certitude may be had. Therefore one must now discuss what probability avails for this end; namely, whether sometimes, with solid reasons favoring both the law and liberty, we can consider ourselves free from the very bond of the law.

That we may discuss and resolve these questions, we establish the following theses.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, nor a more probable one, with the safer one left aside, as often as there is an absolute obligation of obtaining some determinate end, which the use of a means probably unfit would bring into danger; then therefore the safer part must be followed.

56. • It is proved. Whoever is compelled to obtain an end absolutely and more certainly, is held to choose those means by which he is certainly going to attain the end. But the end can be obtained certainly only through the safer part: for by hypothesis the means, only probably apt, brings into danger the end which I am held absolutely to attain. Therefore it is not licit to use a means only probably apt, but more apt and the same safer means must be chosen ¹. Therefore the safer part must be followed.

¹ It must be denied that in these circumstances any probability remains for the opinion. For from what has been said above, no probability remains for liberty where a certain law militates against it. But thus the matter stands in the case. It is certainly a law that I cannot inflict injury on another; and therefore it is certainly a law that I am held to guard against a probable danger of another's harm, since it is injurious to bring a probable danger of harm to another. Therefore as often as from my action a probable danger threatens another, the action is manifestly illicit, as being opposed to a certain law.

52.^† Hence You Will Resolve. - 1. In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are held to follow the safer; for a most grave obligation urges everyone certainly to care for the eternal salvation of his own soul; therefore means absolutely safe and certain must be applied ². Therefore in matters pertaining to the Faith or to the true Religion, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed, opposite probability being set aside ³. Hence the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 4: An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 43.

² Hence if you are uncertain whether you were baptized, or if you prudently doubt whether your grave sins were duly expiated through confession, you are held to seek the grace of justification by suitable means.

³ This most grave obligation of natural law is violated by all those who, perhaps thinking themselves unfit for another examination, nevertheless confess that salvation can be obtained in the Catholic Church; but in the meantime neglect to embrace it, because they think they can be saved also in their own sect. For at least this can and ought to cast grave doubt upon them, that against the opinion of their own salvation they have the opinion of all Catholics; and therefore the obligation either of inquiring more diligently into the matter, or certainly of choosing the safer part, cannot be hidden from them.

⁴ Beware, nevertheless, lest you conclude from this that anyone, when faith is at issue, is obliged to adhere to an opinion, even a more probable one. For by the same Innocent XI the sentence was proscribed (prop. 21) that supernatural assent of faith, useful for salvation, stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, and with fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Therefore from that fourth condemned proposition you will conclude this one thing: that that unbeliever is not excused if, led by a probable opinion, he remains tranquilly in his sect; for he would fail in a grave obligation of solicitously applying those means by which he may reach the truth.

2. A hunter fearing lest by discharging shot at a wild animal he perhaps injure some man cannot fire, even if he judged more probably that the danger is absent; for this danger, if perhaps it is present, cannot be removed by a contrary probability, even a greater one.

3. A physician and surgeon are held to apply the safer medicines and remedies which can be had here and now; because by a tacit contract they have obliged themselves to obtaining the end more securely, insofar as it can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted some obligation of this kind toward the neighbor ⁵. - St. Lig., no. 44.

⁵ Thus a judge is held to render a sentence according to the more probable reasons. On this matter you have proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI: I think probably that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable.

4. The minister of a Sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless the defect is supplied by the Church, or a case of necessity urges, is held, insofar as he can, to follow the safer part, with the less safe probable, or even more probable, one left aside; the reason is that otherwise he would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and his neighbor to danger of spiritual harm. Hence deservedly the proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: It is not illicit in conferring Sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the Sacrament, with the safer one left aside. - St. Lig., no. 48.

I said 1. unless the defect is supplied by the Church; for sometimes the Church can and is considered to supply that which is lacking for the validity of a Sacrament: and this indeed can happen in two sacraments, namely in the sacrament of Penance, if for a grave reason it is conferred with doubtful jurisdiction, or with probable jurisdiction, and in the sacrament of Matrimony, when it is celebrated with a doubtful impediment of ecclesiastical law, or even if the delegation of the assisting Priest is doubtful, as will be said in its own place. - St. Lig., no. 50.

I said 2. unless a case of necessity urges: because since the Sacraments are for men, they must be ministered to a man constituted in grave danger of life in the best way in which it can be done, even with mere probability, indeed with slight and very slight probability concerning their value. - St. Lig., no. 49, and others commonly.

It is not licit to follow an opinion slightly probable, with the safer one left aside ⁶.

⁶ ** However manifestly Father Gury opens his mind in this thesis; however Father Ballerini in the attached note said that the opposite doctrine is condemnable; indeed however the same Father Ballerini in the little Dissertation already reprinted several times On the Moral System of St. Alphonsus clearly professed that no one of sound mind could have adhered to this condemnable doctrine, namely with these words (final proposition): Certainly no one of sound mind, to speak with Dominicus Viva, taught or could teach that men act prudently and licitly if they rest on an opinion in no way probable, of which sort the adversaries whom the thesis of St. Alphonsus attacks are...; nevertheless both VV. (page 38) and their French Confrere (see Univers, May 8, 1873) do not hesitate to accuse both Gury and Ballerini, as though they profess this condemnable and foolish doctrine, on which account (ibid.) they furthermore traduce them as supporters of laxism, liberalism, and rationalism. Perhaps you will wonder, friendly reader, at these monstrosities; but you will be more stupefied that, although in the preceding words Father Ballerini proclaims that that condemnable doctrine which St. Alphonsus attacks could not have been defended except by those who lacked a sound mind, VV. accuse Ballerini not once, but again and again (see Additional Summary, cols. 499 and 507; and V., page 112), because he made a blasphemous jest against St. Alphonsus and in the alleged words traduced him as a man not of sound mind. And in these few things you have some specimen, candid reader, of what sort is the method by which VV. undertook to attack both Gury's Compendium and the added notes.

58. • It is proved. For a slightly probable opinion, as has been said, rests on light motives, which cannot attract the assent of a prudent man; whence from them it cannot be persuaded that the existence of the law is uncertain. But it is illicit to follow some opinion, with the safer one left aside, unless the law can be said to be invincibly unknown; but the law cannot be considered unknown unless by solid reasons it is proved to be uncertain. Therefore....

It is also clear from the third proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Generally, when trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided that one does not depart from the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently ⁷.

⁷ Another vice is present in the preceding proposition, on account of which it could be condemned, because namely while it always, and thus in every case, affirms the use of probability to be licit, it comprehends also those cases in which a certain law forbids it, as was said at the preceding thesis, no. 56, 57. Nevertheless if with most more recent authors by the name slight probability you understand that which is not equal to eliciting a prudent assent, and therefore cannot even cast prudent doubt on the existence of the law, the proposition will be condemnable also on account of the reason brought in the text. Dominicus Viva (On Proposition III Condemned by Innocent XI, no. 1) attributed this false opinion to Tamburini, Bresserus, and Amicus; but from mere lack of diligence. For 1. Tamburini (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 3, § III, no. 11) expressly cautions lest the probability of the other proposition be so great that it cast the opposite down from probability, and thus the intellect can prudently assent. 2. Bresserus (On Conscience, book 3, ch. 6, no. 77) discusses an opinion for which a reason of great moment militates. 3. Finally Amicus (Scholastic Theology, vol. 3, disp. 15, sect. 3, no. 49) speaks not of slight probability, but of slight assent, which he ascribes to a probable opinion having a more probable one against itself.

It is licit to follow the most probable opinion, and even the more probable one, with the safer one left aside, where there is question only of the honesty of the action.

59. • It is proved 1. As to the most probable. It is clear 1. from the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius, which is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII and is of this sort: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. Therefore it is licit to follow at least the most probable opinion. Besides, in this condemned proposition there is question of a less safe most probable opinion, since no one ever denied that it is licit to follow the safer most probable one. Therefore. - It is clear 2. from the fact that according to St. Ligorius and others, where a most probable opinion is given, the opposite proposition becomes slightly probable, as was said above (no. 52) in the definition of the most probable opinion. For it is not conceived how a solid reason can stand on one side, if on the other side a most grave foundation of thinking otherwise appears. Therefore with the most probable opinion standing, a very slight fear of erring remains, and therefore, if not absolute certitude, at least some broad moral certitude of the law's non-existence is had. Therefore, etc.

It is proved 2. As to the more probable. That must be admitted as true in which all theologians agree; for it cannot be supposed that all theologians have fallen into error by unanimous consent. Moreover, if you except the very few rigorists, all agree in crowds in admitting this doctrine, at least if there is question of an opinion truly more probable.

Moreover, if you wish to inquire into the intrinsic reason of this sentence, no other solid reason seems able to be brought except that by which the following proposition concerning the liceity of the use of moderate probabilism is accustomed to be proved, namely that the law, if perhaps it is present, is altogether unknown, and therefore that it cannot oblige.

It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, with the safer one, equally probable or even truly more probable, left aside, where there is question only of the licit or illicit ⁸.

⁸ ** Thus also St. Alphonsus, who (Dissertation according to the Naples edition, year 1755), after, as he says (no. 1), to avoid ambiguities and equivocations, he set forth beforehand this definition of a more probable opinion: More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but also with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also truly probable, or gravely verisimilar, although less so; then (ibid., no. 3) writes: We undertake to prove the last, more benign and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one for the law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. Concerning this thesis then (ibid., no. 52) he puts forward this judgment: Our sentence, namely that it is licit to follow a probable opinion for liberty, with the more probable one left aside, is far more probable, or most probable, indeed morally or in a broad way certain. This is clear from the arguments set forth above..... These arguments indeed are each strong enough to show the moral certitude of our sentence; much more when joined together. Moreover even the Authors of the Alphonsian Vindications concede, indeed contend, that St. Doctor never changed his sentence.

This proposition can be demonstrated by a threefold genus of arguments, namely 1. from reason; 2. from authority; 3. from the consequences which flow from the opposite sentence.

60. • From reason one can argue thus: There is no obligation unless it is certain concerning it; but it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law against which true and solid probability militates. Therefore there is no obligation of following the safer part, with the truly probable opinion left aside; therefore it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, with the safer, even more probable, one left aside.

I. THE MAJOR IS PROVED from the necessity of cognition for obligation. For he is not obligated who invincibly does not know that he is obligated. But in the hypothesis I invincibly do not know that I am obligated. Therefore I cannot truly and properly judge myself bound by obligation; therefore in reality I am not obligated.

61. • The proposition is confirmed from the doctrine of St. Thomas. For thus he himself says in the Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 17, art. 3: No one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept... The same virtue is that by which a precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except by virtue of knowledge. Whence thus: no one is bound except by virtue of knowledge; but, from St. Thomas, to be bound by virtue of knowledge is the same as to have a certain obligation. Therefore no one is bound unless his obligation is certain to him. - And indeed St. Ligorius chiefly uses this argument in Moral System, § II.

62. • II. THE MINOR IS PROVED, namely it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law probably not existing. For by hypothesis the law is uncertain, since true and solid probability is supposed against it; therefore also the obligation following from it is uncertain. For a greater degree of certitude cannot be given in the obligation than in the law from which it proceeds; otherwise the certain would arise from the uncertain. Therefore.

It is confirmed. A certain obligation, as effect of law, supposes a certain cause or law. For if the effect could be certain without the cause being certain, the effect could exist without a cause; which is repugnant. Therefore there is not a certain obligation where the law is uncertain, or probably not existing. Therefore.

63. Nor say that, the directly certain law being deficient, there exists another indirectly certain law producing a certain obligation. For if such a law could be feigned, either it would be a law of avoiding the danger of sinning, or a law of following the safer; moreover neither can be feigned.

1. Not a law of avoiding the danger of sinning. For 1. the objection can be turned back against the probabiliorists themselves; since, such a law being supposed, it would no longer be licit to follow even the solidly more probable, with the safer one rejected, because even then such a danger would be present. - 2. That law could not certainly exist, and therefore certainly oblige me, except insofar as there truly was a danger of sinning formally in the violation of the direct law which probably does not exist; moreover there is no danger of sinning formally, since that direct law, as uncertain, produces no certain obligation, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore if perhaps that wholly uncertain law exists, there will be only a material violation of the law: therefore no sin will be present.

2. Nor a law of following the safer. For 1. if such a law were feigned, it would be strong also against the adversaries, and would lead us into tutiorism, proscribed in the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. 2. That law of following the safer would suppose that it is not simply safe to disregard a law probably not existing: moreover this is false where there is question only of the licit or illicit. For it is safe enough to avoid sin and the danger of sin. Moreover sin and the danger of sin are avoided by not fulfilling a direct law probably not existing, as was said above. Therefore.

64. • It is clear from various heads, namely:

1. From the more common consent of authors through several centuries. For from the time when the dispute concerning probabilism arose, namely from the middle of the sixteenth century, innumerable authors at once from every nation, state, condition, and from all Religious Orders undertook its patronage, among whom not a few shine forth illustrious by the fame of doctrine, such as Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, Lessius, Eusebius Amort, Bonacina, etc., and in more recent times St. Alphonsus de Ligorio. But if some among so great a multitude of Doctors perhaps seem to have extended the limits of probabilism too much ⁹, let us surely guard against a danger of this kind, yet retaining the limits of true probabilism, namely by not admitting an opinion as probable unless it rests on a solid foundation, or unless solid reasons militate for it, according as nearly all, even before St. Ligorius, understood probabilism ¹⁰. moral questions, which is sought from the principles of probabilism, was also very familiar to the most ancient Fathers of the Church, and indeed in matters of the gravest moment.

⁹ Beware, nevertheless, lest you think that the lax opinions which had to be rejected are generally due to probabilism (as certain persons have either imprudently or even fraudulently suggested) as their proper source. And indeed with slight trouble from those Authors who are accustomed to be sold as probabiliorists, a lengthy catalogue could be brought forth of those laxities, of which no one has yet been able to bring forth an example from the books of the probabilists.

¹⁰ And thus concerning an opinion which rests on a grave foundation, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, must be understood certain sayings of the old Doctors which St. Antoninus reports (Summa, part I, title 3, ch. 10, § 10). For after he set forth beforehand that sometimes there are contrary opinions among Doctors greatest in sanctity and knowledge in moral matter even necessary for salvation, and proved this by the example of St. Thomas, who holds that after a fall into mortal sin it is not necessary that someone immediately confess under precept when a supply of a confessor has been had, while nevertheless Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure are of the contrary opinion in this: but neither of their opinions is reproved, although the opinion of Blessed Thomas is more commonly held, which nevertheless seems less safe; then to confirm that which he had established, namely that with good conscience someone can hold one part of some opinion and operate according to it,... especially when someone applies diligence in inquiring and does not find something which sufficiently moves him to this, that it is illicit, he subjoins these things: Likewise Ulricus in the Summa says that if someone concerning some doubtful thing to be done consults those more skilled, about which he has no express authority, whether it is so or not: provided that he forms for himself a good conscience, even if the matter holds itself otherwise than that which he thinks and which was advised to him, he is excused, because he did what he could, and God requires no more. Likewise from the responses which seem to have been given by Albert the Great, it is had that a simple brother or any man can with salvation follow in counsels whichever opinion he wishes, provided that he follows the opinion of some great Doctor. Hostiensis also says...: Where there are diverse opinions and diverse judgments, the more humane and more equitable is always to be preferred.... William also in the gloss of Raymond says that in the niceties of law, where even the wise doubt, ignorance is excusable. Nevertheless if someone in good faith chooses that part or that, he ought not on this account to have a conscience too scrupulous. Likewise Peter de Palude says... that if a confessor doubted whether that, concerning which the one confessing neither repents nor confesses, were mortal, and the one confessing says that he did this by counsel of skilled men, concerning whom from life and knowledge it is probable that they would not advise except well, he can conform himself to that judgment. Geoffrey of Fontibus seems to think the same in these contrary opinions which are tolerated by the Church. Thus St. Antoninus; from which it is sufficiently clear how much those are deluded who ascribe the beginnings of this doctrine and practice to Bartholomaeus Medina, otherwise an excellent theologian from the Order of Preachers, as though he first introduced it. For from the things adduced above it manifestly shines forth that, as to substance, it preceded even the age of scholastic theology. And worthy indeed to be read is the Dissertation which Christian Lupus published on this argument (Works, vol. XI, diss. I), in which it is splendidly shown that the method of solving questions

65. • 2. From the doctrine commonly handed down in this time. For if the schools spread through the whole world are inspected, in very many of them the doctrine of moderate Probabilism will be found handed down and defended, especially at Rome, which rightly must be considered as the center of theological sciences, and where false doctrine, and indeed publicly, while the Church is silent, certainly cannot be taught. So likewise in all Italy, Spain, Germany, etc. - In France itself also the doctrine of St. Ligorius, which certainly altogether recoils from probabiliorism, is now received daily with almost unanimous applause.

3. From the approval of the Church, at least implicit, in the approval of the works of St. Ligorius. For the sacred Congregation of Rites solemnly declared that there is nothing worthy of censure in the works of the holy Doctor. Again in the decree of the Sacred Penitentiary (5 July 1831), approved by the Supreme Pontiff Gregory XVI, any professor of theology can follow and teach all the opinions which St. Ligorius professes in his Moral Theology, nor is the Confessor to be disturbed who follows the same opinions in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance ¹¹.

¹¹ To this pertain the words of our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX in the letter given to Peter Scavini on 7 April 1847: We vehemently congratulate you, because in composing these theological Institutions you had nothing more ancient than to propagate more and more the salutary doctrines of Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, a most holy and learned man, and to imbue with them especially the minds of ecclesiastical youth.

66. • I. In the system of the probabiliorists there would follow a difficulty too grave for Confessors. For the Confessor would expose himself to the danger of sinning because of a defect of sufficient diligence in weighing the various degrees of probability, especially in the matter of restitution, when from two equally probable opinions he would follow one. For if he assumed the more benign sentence, he would sin by permitting that in which he apprehended a deformity probably existing. If he acted according to the stricter sentence, he would sin by imposing an uncertain yoke on the penitent ¹². Besides, although the stricter sentence appears more probable to him, when will he be certain that it is truly such, and that the opposite one does not seem more probable to another Confessor? Nor could anyone undertake the office of Confessor, unless perhaps he had been so versed in moral theology that he could certainly distinguish between more probable and less probable opinions: for the burden of doing includes the burden of knowing; but very few are able to furnish this ¹³. Hence there follows also that contradiction of Confessors who, though professing probabiliorism, nevertheless not rarely keep saying that they cannot apply the principles of probabiliorism rigorously ¹⁴ in the administration of the sacrament of Penance; and so they hold one thing in theory, but the wholly opposite in practice. Being constituted in anxieties, there are not lacking those who easily judge that to be more probable which at other times they would have held less probable. Would it not be better to establish and admit milder principles with so many most wise Doctors, and to lead them into practice more exactly?

¹² Hence one must repeat that Confessors imbued with the principles of probabiliorism, and otherwise of a timorous conscience, for the most part flee the sacred ministry of hearing confessions, harassed, of course, by dreadful anxieties, or certainly devote all their labor to cultivating in spirit certain little devout persons.

¹³ ** Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus thus says (Dissertation, edition of the year 1755, no. 17): Such appearance (namely of greater probability) cannot constitute a certain rule of acting, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion, which appears more probable to one person, will appear less probable to another; indeed to oneself an opinion which yesterday was less probable will appear more probable today.

And again (ibid., no. 42), giving the reason why a more probable opinion cannot oblige, he brings forward the same reason: For some opinion, which is more probable to me, will often be less probable to others; and therefore the law would be particular only for those to whom that opinion appeared more probable. But this certainly would be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal, and proposed universally, lest the people, who are held to observe it, be more often divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions, would often instruct the faithful according to his own sense.

Then the holy Doctor solves the objection, showing that these inconveniences press only those who wish some obligation to arise from a more probable opinion. Thus he says (ibid., no. 43): Nor is it valid to say that, by following the benign sentence (what the benign sentence may be, see above, Note to thesis IV), deformity also can intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one person, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that when some opinion possesses solid probability, and rests on a certain grave foundation, it will be judged probable among the greatest part of the wise: and this will already be enough for conserving the universal uniformity of the observance of law, notwithstanding that among some particular person it is not probable; for that which rarely happens does not take away universal conformity. Yet this certainly does not occur concerning the estimation of more probable opinions; because, since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely, but commonly, that what is stronger to one appears weaker to another.

Besides, the holy Doctor intimates the difficulties and inconveniences which would follow the necessity, if there were any, of determining certainly which opinion is truly more probable in preference to the opposite. Thus he says (ibid., no. 48): BUT THAT WE BECOME CERTAIN THAT SOME OPINION... IS TRULY MORE PROBABLE, OR HAS THE REQUIRED PREPONDERANCE, THIS IS MORALLY IMPOSSIBLE. For either that preponderance is small; and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is modest, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great; and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the safer opinion (in the present matter let us say, the opposite, or less safe one) is judged false or at least slightly probable? And so we would always have to act with a practical doubt.

Hence concerning the anxieties which the obligation both of knowing and of following the more probable things would bring, the holy Doctor brings forward these things (ibid.) from Ven. Father Segneri: Either I am held to follow the more probable things in themselves, and then when shall I know what opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on this side and on that? Or the more probable things for me, and the anxieties would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be more probable against another sentence of several wise men; and then who will render me safe, that my opinion is certainly more probable, and more notable with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How will I be certain that I myself have understood well and solved well the opposite reasons? That the dictate of conscience, which I formed for myself, is sufficiently certain and safe? That I have not been hallucinated by my own sense, so that, if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?

But that the common sentence lacks these inconveniences, the holy Doctor thus continues (ibid., no. 50): But they do not expose themselves to that danger who follow an opinion certainly probable, although less so. Because after they have been made certain concerning the probability of the opinion, they are not held to apply greater diligence. For when some opinion rests on a grave and certain foundation, there is no longer a moral or prudent hope of finding certain truth; and therefore if they are mistaken, they are mistaken invincibly.

¹⁴ The principles of probabiliorism rigorously admitted, as they were defended by the older authors, for example Gonzalez, Antoine, Gennett, Sinnichius, etc., labor under another inconvenience, and one not slight, which also did not escape the eyes of St. Alphonsus (cf. Index of Authors, which Father Michael Haringer prefixed to St. Alphonsus' Theology, see Gonzalez, page LXV, Ratisbon edition 1846). For they do not deny, nor can they deny, that which is confessed among all and ought to be, namely (see above no. 39 with note), that for an act to be honest, a certain conscience concerning the honesty of it is altogether required. But on the other hand, to acquire this certitude concerning the honesty of the action, they neither wish nor are able to invoke for themselves any support from reflex principles, just as they attack it in adversaries. Therefore it is necessary that they borrow a certitude of this kind altogether from direct principles, or from the innermost and proper reasons of each matter. Hence that saying of Antoine (On Conscience, ch. 4, q. 1): It is not licit (to follow probable conscience), unless the probability is so great that it excludes every reasonable fear of falsity, and produces certitude at least relative: because, as I said in ch. 2, for not sinning there is required a certain judgment, at least by moral certitude, by which doubt and the fear of sin, at least reasonable fear, is prudently excluded. And again (q. 3, no. 4) he gives the reason, because an opinion only equally probable standing for liberty cannot bring moral certitude, which is at least required for not sinning. Nor otherwise does Gonzalez, at the very front of his work, assume for himself the task of proving that, for someone licitly to be able to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty..., it is altogether necessary that that opinion... be judged by him to be true by an absolute, firm, and non-fluctuating judgment: which certainly are the marks of certitude. Hence after he contends (disp. IV, § XII, in the title) that a certain and evident practical judgment is necessary for acting rightly, he adds (see Index, under Reflection) that the one acting must make the opinion his own by direct assent. But now, from the sentence of all (see St. Alph., Apostolic Man, tr. 3, no. 2, and Viva on proposition 3 of Alexander VIII, no. 2), a sentence at least morally certain differs from a most probable opinion in this, that the former excludes every prudent fear of the opposite, but the latter does not. Therefore from their sentence, not only by their words expressly, but also from the intrinsic force and nature of the system itself, it follows that not even the most probable opinion suffices for acting rightly. Hence that saying of St. Alphonsus (l.c.): I do not know how the aforesaid authors, by asserting that it is not licit to use in acting any but morally certain sentences, since thus in reality they utterly reprobate the use of probable opinions, although in words they seem to admit it; I do not know, I say, how they can be excused from the condemned proposition, which said (it is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII): It is not licit to follow the most probable opinion among probable ones.

67. • II. A most troublesome difficulty for the faithful would follow. For in doubts there would be imposed on them an obligation of inquiring what opinion is more probable; since the obligation of operating according to the more probable includes the necessary duty of inquiring into it. But for the most part there is a moral impossibility of distinguishing between the more probable and the less probable; for even to the learned this is often very difficult. And indeed I ask, whether I am held to the more probable in itself or absolutely, or as to me or relatively? If the former, whence shall I know it? If the latter, again either there is question of intrinsic probability, or extrinsic. If of the latter, what school must be followed?... what Doctors must be consulted?... If of the former, the difficulty increases: whence shall I know whether I am sufficiently fit for this judgment? whether I am in invincible ignorance or not? Therefore being uncertain, and pressed by doubts, what shall I do? Shall I have recourse to Masters? But by hypothesis it belongs to me to judge. Therefore it becomes manifest how many and how great anxieties threaten the faithful from that necessity of following the more probable or the safer. - Segneri, little work on probability.

68. • III. There would follow a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine. For from probabiliorism there follows a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine among the probabiliorists themselves, as daily experience proves. But this discrepancy arises also from the very nature of probabiliorism. For it is impossible that they agree in fact; for, with the obligation of following the opinion which appears more probable to each one being posited, necessarily some will resolve for the affirmative part, others for the negative. One will bind, another will loose; and what appears more probable to you will very easily seem equally or less probable to another. Hence there will follow confusion of decisions, perplexity of the faithful, and anxieties of the Confessors themselves, who from some supposed excess of probability will impose most grave obligations. But probabilism rightly understood lacks inconveniences of this sort, at least for the most part. For only two things are to be weighed by probabilists, namely certain obligations, and merely probable obligations. But although the true probability is not always clear, nevertheless no one does not see that, ordinarily speaking, it is much easier to discern whether a solid reason or authority is had against the law, than to pronounce a judgment concerning some excess of probability. Therefore... etc....

69. Objections. - 1. It is objected from Sacred Scripture, Eccli. 3. 27: He that loves danger shall perish in it. But probabilists love danger by following an equally or less probable opinion. Therefore... - Eccli. 37. 20: Before all thy works let the true word go before thee. But in probabilism there is not a true word. Therefore... - 1 Thess. 5. 22: Abstain from every appearance of evil. But probabilists permit one to follow an appearance of evil. Therefore...

I answer 1. What is this to the matter? An empty and vacuous application!

I answer 2. I retort. For these objected places of Scripture, understood thus, would not permit even the use of probabiliorism. For in a more probable opinion against the law there is a danger of sin ¹⁵, a word not true..., an appearance of evil....

¹⁵ ** Indeed St. Alphonsus (On the Moral System), by an argument to the man, observes that not even those are immune from danger of this sort who otherwise hold that the use of an opinion against the law is licit only when it is most probable. For he reasons thus: As the most probable opinion does not lack every prudent fear that it is false, so the opinion opposite to the most probable does not lack every prudent motive that it is true.... Now I ask.... in what way will he who judges it illicit to expose himself to the danger of transgressing the law, wishing to follow the most probable, ever be able in practice with tranquil conscience to be induced to believe firmly that the opinion standing for the law is not truly probable? Where will he find a balance so exact that it renders him secure that the opinion standing for the law lacks so much weight of probability as would make it probable?

I answer 3. Directly. To the first: there the question is of final impenitence, as is clear from the context: A hard heart shall fare ill at the last; and he that loves danger shall perish in it. Besides, no danger is present where no sin is detected.

To the second: among us the true word is the reflex principle itself, which produces practical certitude, and therefore the act placed from it is conformable to truth.

To the third: he abstains from an appearance of evil who does that in which he sees no sin; for then he does not discern even the appearance of sin.

340. 3. Probabiliorism teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe opinion favoring liberty, provided that it is manifestly more probable than the opinion favoring law. This system was very commonly admitted before Medina (cf. above), and was not obscurely commended by the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Clement XI, Benedict XIV, as will be clear below in n. 345.

345. Reasons for Probabiliorism. a) From authority. There is no other system which is supported so strongly from authority as Probabiliorism. For before the controversies about Probabilism arose, several Supreme Pontiffs seem to have given decisions according to the principles of Probabiliorism. Thus, for example, Innocent III,¹²⁰ treating of a violated censure, says: "Although in this he does not seem to have been altogether culpable, nevertheless, because in doubts the safer way is to be chosen, he ought rather to have abstained than to handle the ecclesiastical sacraments." Therefore the Pontiff does not say: a doubtful law does not oblige, but rather the contrary. Eugenius I,¹²¹ Clement III,¹²² and Clement V have similar things, the last of whom says: "We, attending to the fact that in those things which regard the salvation of the soul, in order to avoid grave remorse of conscience, the safer part is to be held."¹²³ After Bartholomaeus Medina introduced the system of Probabilism and obtained very many followers, the Supreme Pontiffs did not cease to put forward salutary warnings against it. Alexander VII in the Decrees of 24 Sept. 1665 and 18 March 1666 proscribed 45 propositions excerpted from books of the Probabilists.¹²⁴ But Innocent XI manifestly favored Probabiliorism, who in the celebrated Decree of 26 June 1680 commanded Thyrsus Gonzalez, Praepositus General of the Society of Jesus, "that he himself freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also vigorously attack the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable, and let him be made certain that whatever he does and writes in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and attack the opinion of those asserting that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, as it shall please him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary one; and let him command them that they submit themselves altogether to the mandate of His Holiness."¹²⁵ And when Matthaeus Moya, under the pseudonym "Amadeus Guimenius," had written a little work for defending the opinions of the Probabilists, this little work, already previously placed on the Index, was again condemned, and indeed by a special Brief of Innocent XI on 16 Sept. 1680.¹²⁶ - Clement XI in the year 1702 wrote to Thyrsus Gonzalez: "The Superiors of the Society will do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they see to it that the Jesuits abstain from teaching and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of an opinion less probable and less safe is licit, since it has been ascertained by His Holiness that this is altogether expedient for the safety and honor of the Society."¹²⁷ Likewise Benedict XIV favored Probabiliorism, who warned the confessor "that he embrace that opinion which he shall have known to be more supported by reason and favored by authority."¹²⁸ Besides, the same Pontiff ordered that the theology of Fr. Antoine, S.J., a vigorous Probabiliorist, be expounded in the Seminary of Propaganda Fide. Clement XIII on 26 Feb. 1761, through a Decree of the Holy Office, condemned a sheet containing several theses favoring the system of Probabilism; indeed, the proposition, "Probabilism was supremely familiar to Christ the Lord," he specially condemned as erroneous and proximate to heresy.¹²⁹ - From all these things it clearly appears how rightly Thyrsus Gonzalez wrote in the supplicatory little book offered to Clement XI in the year 1702: "It is certain that the Apostolic See has always inclined more toward the opinion contrary to Probabilism." The same is thought by Mausbach, Sawicki, Koch, Schmuckenschlager, Liese, Vinati, and very many others among the moderns.¹³⁰ Hence it is also manifestly evident - which I would wish to be noted in passing - how undeservedly and calumniously Dollinger-Reusch,¹³¹ Harnack,¹³² Hoensbroech,¹³³ and several others reproach the Catholic Church with having fostered lax moral doctrines. - Bartholomaeus Medina himself candidly confessed that his doctrine concerning Probabilism differed from the doctrine of the old authors; and in reality, up to this point no author could be adduced who clearly taught Probabilism before the sixteenth century. For the old authors, who are sometimes alleged as favorers of Probabilism, such as Lactantius, Basil, Gregory Naz., Augustine, Antoninus, Ioannes Nider, etc., when inspected more diligently rather favor Probabiliorism.¹³⁴ This is especially true of St. Antoninus and of Ioannes Nider.¹³⁵ - The first who seems to have expounded the principle of Probabiliorism clearly enough is Guilielmus Antisiodorensis, who flourished around the year 1230. He writes in the treatise on pollution: "That masterly rule, that one doubting about something whether it is illicit, and doing it while the doubt stands, sins because he commits himself to danger, must be understood of such a doubt as is vehement, and leads the mind more, or at least equally, to believe that it is mortally illicit, as that it is licit. It is otherwise where the mind inclines more and judges that it is licit than that it is illicit, although it does not have evident or fixed certitude in every way, because even this itself is not required." - For Probabiliorism among the old authors are cited: Alexander Halensis, Petrus de Tarantasia, Durandus, Petrus de Palude, Silvester Prierias, Cajetan, Franciscus de Victoria, and almost all theologians from the Order of Preachers, to which, assembled in General Chapter, Alexander VII in the year 1656 very much commended that its members fight for Probabiliorism.¹³⁶

b) From reason. 1. In doubts the safer part must be chosen, at least if this is morally possible. For so teach not only great authors, but also many texts of the Decretals.¹³⁷ But Probabiliorism is much safer and always chooses the safer part insofar as this is morally possible and necessary. Therefore Probabiliorism is the system to be preferred. The minor is proved: it is safer to follow the law than, the equally and truly probable law having been set aside, to follow liberty, as all admit. But Probabiliorism teaches that the law must always be followed, unless the opinion favoring liberty is certainly more probable; for if the opinion favoring liberty is certainly more probable, there exists a very small danger of violating the law. But a little is accounted as nothing, as the common adage says. - Nor should anyone say that Tutiorism is still safer than Probabiliorism and therefore that it must be followed; for, granted that Tutiorism is safer, it is impossible in practice, all admitting it. But no one is bound to the impossible.

2. Where the truth cannot clearly be found, we are bound at least to embrace that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth. Hence Rule of Law 45 in VI says: "In obscure matters we look at what is more like the truth." But Probabiliorism approaches nearer to the truth, since it follows either the safe opinion or the manifestly more probable opinion. Therefore Probabiliorism is to be preferred among the diverse systems. See several other arguments apud Billuart.¹³⁸

¹²⁰ c. 5, X 5, 27.

¹²¹ c. 3, X 4, 1.

¹²² c. 12, X 5, 12.

¹²³ c. 1, V 11 in Clem.

¹²⁴ Denz. n. 1101-1145.

¹²⁵ On the history of that Decree see Mandonnet, O. Pr., Le Decret d'Innocent XI contre le Probabilisme; Wouters, C.SS.R., De Minusprobabilismo 2, 41; Brucker, S.J., in Etudes t. 86, 778 and t. 91, 831.

¹²⁶ Cf. Index libr. proh., word "Guimenius," and Hurter, S.J., Nomencl. lit. Theol. cath. IV 611.

¹²⁷ Apud Wouters l. c. 36.

¹²⁸ Lettera circolare a tutti i Patriarchi ... sopra la preparazione all' anno santo, d. 26 June 1749, n. 20.

¹²⁹ This whole Decree is alleged by St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 84, ed. Gaude. It is strange that it is not found in Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion.

¹³⁰ See the individual testimonies apud Wouters l. c. 41. Thus, for example, the Tubingen Professor Ant. Koch writes: "Rome did not condemn Probabilism, but visibly favored the doctrine of the more probable opinion" (Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 3 Sept. 1904).

¹³¹ Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Nordlingen 1889.

¹³² Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte.

¹³³ Die ultramontane Moral.

¹³⁴ Cf. Billuart, De consc. diss. 6, a. 1.

¹³⁵ Ioannes Nider, O. Pr., in his excellent book, whose title is Consolatorium timoratae conscientiae (P. 3, c. 1), expressly adopts the opinion of Blessed Albert and relies on almost the same words as St. Antoninus, who certainly favors Probabiliorism. Behold his words: "When, therefore, in some moral matter there are various and contrary opinions, he who would adhere to the opinion of the broader way seems to expose himself to the danger of mortal sin, because in doubt, since that opinion can be false and the contrary true." Then St. Antoninus responds that he who acts in strict doubt really sins. "But by acting against such a [slight] doubt one does not sin, while he adheres to the opinion of some doctor and has more probable reasons for it than for the opposite opinion" (S. theol. P. 1, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10). - What can be said more clearly?

¹³⁶ Acta capitulorum Gen. O. P. ed. Reichert vol. VII, p. 403. For the testimonies of individual authors see Concina, De Probabilismo diss. 1 and 2.

¹³⁷ Cf. above. - The Decretals have it thus at least seven times: c. 3 X 3, 43; c. 3 X 4, 1; c. 12 X 5, 12; ib. c. 18 and c. 24; c. 5 X 5, 27; Clem. l. 5, tit. 11, c. 2.

¹³⁸ L. c.

346. Difficulties. 1. The fundamental rule itself of Probabiliorism is not so certain. For this rule establishes: In doubt it is licit to follow the more probable opinion, the less probable opinion for the law having been set aside. But this rule cannot be proved certainly except by an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law. Yet this same argument seems almost equally to prove the principle of Probabilism: a doubtful law does not oblige; which nevertheless the Probabiliorists reject.

2. Probabiliorism is almost impossible in practice. For a) it can cause conflicts between the confessor and the penitent; because, if the penitent wishes to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, the confessor is bound to absolve him. Thus the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls common and to be followed, citing more than thirty authors for it.¹³⁹ But the reason is that the confessor is not the competent judge of opinions, but only of the disposition of his penitent. But the disposition of the penitent consists in true contrition for sins committed and in the sincere purpose of not sinning in the future. Therefore a Probabiliorist confessor is sometimes compelled to act against his own system. - b) Sometimes a benign probable opinion is much more useful for the spiritual salvation of the penitent than a rigid more probable opinion. For not rarely, on account of a rigid opinion imposed on him by the confessor, a penitent is altogether deterred from receiving the sacraments and thus grows foul in sins. Hence today perhaps there is no confessor who applies all the logical consequences of Probabiliorism in the practice of the penitential tribunal, or who follows the opinion of Billuart saying: "If the opinion of the penitent is certainly less probable and the penitent recognizes it as such and wishes to follow it, the confessor ought to deny him absolution as indisposed, even if he says that he is a probabilist."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 604. The Holy Doctor leads the opposite opinion to absurdity in this way: "Two confessors have two contrary opinions, each of which appears more probable to itself; if one wished to confess to the other, this one would have to lay aside his opinion, taking his intellect captive, so that he might obey his confessor constituted as his judge. Conversely, however, if afterward the other were to confess to this one, this second confessor would have to resume his opinion, which appears to him more probable; for then he would have to judge according to his own proper judgment and would have to oblige him to lay aside the opinion which he had previously imposed on him as to be followed. And behold a comedy worthy of laughter, which would occur daily among confessors. Who has thought that Christ the Lord wished to oblige confessors and penitents to these burdens in the sacrament of Penance?" Cf. nevertheless Lugo, Respons. mor. l. 1, dub. 26 (Paris edition 1869, tom. 8, p. 40).

¹⁴⁰ De consc. diss. 6, a. 4.

61. • Since in practical doubt concerning the honesty of an action we cannot act honestly, and since that doubt very often cannot be directly overcome by reasons proper to individual cases, there must certainly be given from elsewhere some means of laying aside the doubt, so that, resting upon a certain conscience, we can act rightly. Now it is manifest that this means cannot consist except in some certain principle.² Therefore the state of the question here is:

In the concurrence of two opinions concerning the honesty of an action, of which one, the less safe, favors liberty, while the other, the safer, favors the law, what in this doubt is the certain universal rule to be followed for acting rightly?

This question is of such great moment that upon its solution depends the whole system of Moral Theology, whatever system may be chosen. For doubts of this kind occur many times in the individual matters of Moral Theology, since in it especially the application of laws to particular cases is treated, which is often uncertain.

But now, to solve this celebrated question, theologians have entered upon various ways. Some, namely, of excessive rigor in favor of the law; others, of excessive benignity in favor of liberty; and others finally have held the middle way between each extreme. Hence several systems have come forth, which we here briefly review:

62. Systems. - I. Rigorism or strict Tutiorism, according to which it is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be followed. This is a condemned system.

II. Mitigated Tutiorism, according to which it is not lawful to follow the less safe sentence unless it is most probable.

III. Probabiliorism (another mitigated Tutiorism), according to which it is prohibited to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless it is more probable than the opposite one for the law.

IV. Equi-probabilism, according to which, in the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable, while doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed. This is the system of St. Alphonsus.

Since the followers also of simple Probabilism in our age are accustomed to distinguish their system by the title of Moderate Probabilism, and thus, by the celebrated name of Alphonsus, cover a doctrine altogether diverse from the doctrine of the Holy Doctor, for the sake of greater clarity we have preferred in this edition to call the Alphonsian system by the name Equi-probabilism; the more so because authors today commonly use that term, and the Saint himself (for example, H. A. Tr. I. 75) calls his system "my system of the equally probable opinion."

V. Simple Probabilism, according to which it is right to follow an opinion less probable and favoring liberty in the concurrence even of a notably more probable one for the law; and it is lawful promiscuously to follow a probable opinion that is less safe, even in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law.

The followers of simple Probabilism are divided into two classes; for some, although they favor liberty, nevertheless say that in doubt both concerning the cessation and concerning the existence of a law, the law must be followed when the opinion favoring liberty is certainly less probable. Thus Martinet and certain more recent authors. Others teach that it is lawful to follow an opinion less probable and favoring liberty, even if it is evident that the opposite one is more probable. Thus Lacroix and other Probabilist authors of the eighteenth century almost commonly, and also Gury in the later editions of his Compendium, and Ballerini.

VI. Laxism, according to which it is lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty, even if it is only doubtfully or slightly probable. This system also is condemned.

Therefore, excepting I and VI, the remaining systems can be maintained without the Church's condemnation. Yet among them we judge that only Equi-probabilism, which claims St. Alphonsus for itself as its principal author and as a second quasi-parent (Vind. P. I, p. 74. - Ed. 2a, T. I, p. 509), holds the middle way and for this reason is true.

85. • IV. Probabiliorism. This System adds uncertain obligations to certain obligations, and thus, with the number of obligations increased, it increases the number of sins. But from the principles of Equi-probabilism it has been demonstrated that uncertain obligations are repugnant to the natural right of liberty. Therefore Probabiliorism denies to liberty the justice owed to it.

Since the right formation of conscience is made by varied application of principles, it is not strange if the doctrine on this matter did not exist from the beginning perfect and complete, but was slowly elaborated.

I. Among the Fathers no definite system is found; nevertheless there are traces of principles which can serve for forming conscience.

Frequently they rather favored the safer part. Namely the safer is to be taken in choosing religion (Lact., De Div. Inst. III, 13), in avoiding danger of nullity in the administration of the sacraments (Aug., De B. c. Don. I, c. 3, n. 5), in admitting the whole truth of faith without regard to the empty opinions of heterodox persons (Greg. Naz., or. XXXVI, 7; Chrys., In II Cor., hom. XIII, 4; Aug., De util. cred. XI), in conforming oneself through all things to the divine law (Tertul., De spect. XX-XXI), in striving to inquire into truth (Aug., De Civ. Dei, l. XXII, 23), in certainly establishing necessary penance for sins and avoiding the uncertainty of penance at the end: "hold the certain and dismiss the uncertain," Augustine cries, serm. 393. He also inveighs against the Academics (l. III, n. 35-36) who say: "when each one does what seems probable to him, he neither sins nor errs," who understood probability as merely subjective and empty, which each one fashioned for himself.

Even outside these cases, they quite generally favored the safer part, both because of the rigorous penitential discipline of those times and because ignorance of law was regularly held by many as culpable (cf. Aug., ep. 194).

On the opposite side, however, certain more benign solutions are found, for sometimes they did not urge an uncertain obligation in practice.

Lactantius says that one must not care about the precepts of the philosophers, as being mere conjectures without solid foundation; on which occasion he writes: "It belongs to a most foolish man to wish to obey their precepts, concerning which it is doubted whether they are true or false; and therefore no one obeys, because no one wishes to labor toward what is uncertain" (De Div. Inst. III, 27).

Gregory Nazianzen, or. XXXIX, 19, replies to the rigorists who did not wish the baptized to be admitted to penance: "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity prevail."

Thus Jerome, in the question concerning bigamists to be ordained, permits an uncertain and less safe opinion to be embraced, "prejudging no one from following what he wishes" (Adv. Ruf. I, 32). And Theodoret repeats the same (P. G. LXXXIII, 136 B C).

Indeed Augustine in various questions: 1. whether it is licit on the Lord's Supper to receive the Eucharist after food, says: "we compel no one to eat before that Lord's supper, but neither do we dare to contradict anyone" (ep. 54); 2. whether it is licit to enter marriage with an infidel: "since," he says, "truly in the New Testament nothing is prescribed concerning this, and therefore either it has been believed to be licit, or it has been left as doubtful" (De fide et op. XIX, 35); 3. whether it is licit to eat food which has been found in an idol's temple, he replies: "Either it is certain to be idol-offering, or it is certain not to be, or it is unknown; if therefore it is certain to be, it is better rejected by Christian truth; but if it is known either not to be or is unknown, it is taken up for the use of necessity without any scruple of conscience" (ep. 47); 4. whether it is licit for a soldier to fight in a perhaps unjust war: "A just man," he says, "...can rightly fight,... for whom it is certain either that what is commanded is not against God's precept, or it is not certain whether it is, so that perhaps the injustice of commanding makes the king guilty, but the order of serving shows the soldier innocent" (c. Faust. man., l. 22, c. 75).

II. Among the Scholastics the question of the formation of conscience is explicitly proposed; and they especially insist on this, that conscience ought to be certain, so that to act in doubt is sin, for he who acts while remaining in doubt commits himself to risk and to danger of sinning. Thus St. Thomas, Quodl. VIII, 13; IV Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3; III, q. 83, a. 6, ad 2; before or after him, William of Auxerre (Sum. l. II, tr. 29, c. 1, q. 3), William of Paris (De coll. benef. a. 8; De legibus, c. 21), Alexander of Hales (Sum. II, q. 112, cas. 8; q. 121, m. 3, a. 1, ad 2), David Augustine (De hom. compositione, l. III, pr. 5, c. 19; pr. 6, c. 43), Henry of Ghent (Quodl. IV, 33), Scotus (in Sent., prol., q. 2, n. 15; l. III, d. 25, q. 1).

They generally did not know the use of a reflex principle in forming conscience, except in cases of epikeia and a few others: for it is admitted that one must also do that which seems rather illicit, both for a soldier in a war not certainly unjust, and for a religious when the superior commands what is not certainly illicit: this last is noted in the decree of Gratian and is handed down by St. Bernard, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, William Peraldus, Paludanus.

Hence in practice they rather often give safer solutions, as St. Thomas in Quodl. VIII, 13. There he asks "whether he who has several prebends sins," concerning which there were then contrary opinions; he replies that he who "is brought into a certain doubt from the contrariety of opinions,... if while such doubt remains he has several prebends, commits himself to danger, and thus without doubt sins." Thus he simply declares that a certain conscience is required and that it is not safe to act in practical doubt; without inquiring or seeming to suspect whether in the case the doubt perhaps could be solved by some indirect principle. Nevertheless they have several things which favor the more benign part. Thus the principle proposed by St. Thomas in Q. D. De Ver. 17, a. 3: "no one is bound by a precept except through knowledge of the precept"; for although there it is adduced to prove that an unknown law does not bind, nevertheless logically the same holds concerning an uncertain law. Besides this, sometimes he holds more benign opinions: thus he denies the necessity either of confessing merely aggravating circumstances (IV Sent. d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5), or of confessing at once after a fall (d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 4), or of repeating an unformed confession (ibid. a. 4); without concluding, on account of the opposite opinions, that to act thus is to commit oneself to danger.

To the safer practice in the thirteenth century a certain corrective was added from the principle of probabiliorism. William of Auxerre seems to have explained this first rather clearly, says Prummer, Th. M. I, n. 345, when he wrote in the treatise on pollution: "That magisterial rule, that one doubting about something, whether it is illicit, and doing that thing while the doubt stands, sins, because he commits himself to danger, is to be understood of such doubt which is vehement, and more, or at least equally, induces the mind to believe that it is mortally illicit, as that it is licit. It is otherwise where the mind inclines more and judges that it is licit than that it is illicit, although it does not have in every way evident or fixed certitude, because not even this itself is required."

St. Albert the Great accepts the principle of probabiliorism (Sum. de creaturis, p. II, q. 70, a. 2), and his disciple Ulrich of Strasbourg; likewise Monaldus; but in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries several do so, as Gerson (De consol. theol., l. IV, pr. 2 and 3), John of Dambach (De consol. theol., l. XIV, c. 8), Nider (Consol. tim. consc., p. 3, c. 11-16), Conradus (De contr.), Gabriel Biel (in IV, d. 15, q. 8, a. 3, dub. 2; and a. 16, q. 3, a. 3, dub. 6); likewise various summae: Tabiena, Trovamala, Angelica. Yet several continued to adhere to the safer part, as Dionysius the Carthusian, Bartholomaeus Fumus, and Adrian VI.

Another corrective is noted among others, when they prescribe to the confessor as a rule: to respect the opinions of the penitent, unless they are openly false. Thus Godfrey of Fontaines (Quodl. IX, a. 16), and Paludanus (in IV, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, n. 5).

III. In canon law various principles are stated which can serve for forming conscience.

1. In doubt the safer part is to be chosen. Thus Eugenius III, decr. l. IV, t. 1, c. 3; Clement III, l. V, t. 12, c. 12; Innocent III, l. III, t. 43, c. 3; l. V, t. 12, c. 18; Honorius III, l. V, t. 12, c. 24. Moreover, it is invoked not as a universal principle, but in certain cases, when namely there is present danger of salvation, or irreverence, or scandal, in one word, of a greater evil; or also by way of an equitable principle in solving certain peculiar difficulties. But sometimes in the law solutions opposed to this saying are found, as was the license of attempting conjugal copulation for three years in doubt of impotence; and it is to be reconciled with other principles admitted in law, such as: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, or Laws are to be interpreted more benignly.

2. In obscure matters we look at what is more like the truth. This was borrowed from Roman law, in which it is a rule for judges for establishing presumptions in certain doubts of fact. In canon law it is invoked as a rule in authentic interpretation of law (l. II, t. 9, c. 4), or as a norm prescribed to judges in interpreting facts, contracts, testaments (l. VI, reg. 45), or it also holds concerning some speculatively more probable opinion to be held; but it is not invoked in questions concerning a law to be observed or concerning uncertain obligation. St. Antoninus is recounted as the first who applied this to these matters (Sum. p. I, t. 20), and indeed for positive laws.

3. In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. Thus l. II, t. 23. The principle holds in many doubts of fact, and is stated under various forms; in doubts regarding the existence of a fact: a fact is not presumed but must be proved; one must stand for that for which presumption stands; one must judge from things ordinarily occurring; in doubt concerning the conditions of a fact: no one is presumed evil unless it is proved; one must stand for the validity of the act; that is judged to have been rightly done which by law had to be done.

Yet it cannot validly be applied in doubts of law: for how can it be solved from presumption whether a contract entered under such a form is just or unjust, whether interest is licitly received from money loaned or not, whether abortion or embryology or vasectomy are ever licit, etc.? Hence we do not understand how some could write that this is the universal principle to which all the others are reduced.

4. A doubtful law does not bind. This is handed down under various forms, for example, in doubt of promulgation: "Unless you have been certain concerning the mandate of the Apostolic See, you will not be compelled to execute it," says Innocent III, decr. l. I, t. 29, c. 31; in doubt concerning the intention of a human legislator: "interpretation is to be made against him who could have stated the law more openly"; in doubt concerning the sense of the law: "laws are to be interpreted more benignly, so that their will may be preserved," and "in obscure matters the minimum is to be followed" (reg. 30). But since the body of law contains positive laws, it is not strange if the principle does not regard the natural law.

5. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Thus l. II, t. 19, c. 3; t. 26, c. 6; l. III, t. 4, c. 31; l. VI, reg. 65 and 11. It is invoked in doubts of fact for the matter of justice, when possession of the thing or of right or power is present, but not where possession is lacking; sometimes in speculative doubts of law, if from use a presumption can be taken for the force or extinction of a law; besides this in practical doubts whether the accused is to be condemned on account of a crime committed or to paying a debt: his condition is better until the crime or the obligation of paying is certainly demonstrated.

As we noted in n. 84, under the form of the principle of possession can be stated the faculty of neglecting slight reasons and negative doubt.

IV. From the sixteenth century there are well-defined systems. At the beginning several profess probabiliorism, especially from the Dominican school, as Sylvester Prierias and Cajetan; also outside this school, as John Major.

Cajetan explicitly posited the distinction between speculative and practical doubt (op. 31, resp. 13, dub. 7), from which distinction the question received notable progress, so that from this there came to be a broader use of the reflex principle for rendering practical judgment certain.

The Dominican school of Salamanca, with the masters Fr. de Victoria, Melchior Cano, and Dominic Soto as leaders, also stood generally, and with certain cases of the safer part excepted, for the more probable opinion; but at the same time it affirmed that he does not sin who, among truly probable opinions (equal ones), follows whichever he wishes; so that they approached equiprobabilism.

These things were the occasion of a certain longer and diverse evolution.

1. Probabilism arose from this. For Bartholomew de Medina was the first who in the year 1577 formally taught at Salamanca: "if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable." This position was soon accepted not only in Spain, but also in other regions. Thus the Preachers generally held it: Did. Alvarez, Lopez, Bannez, P. de Ledesma, V. Candidus, Gr. Martinez, John of St. Thomas, Arauxo, Barth. de Ledesma, etc., yet with a few excepted, as I. Martinez de Prado; likewise generally the theologians of the Society of Jesus, as is known to all; several Franciscans such as Reiffenstuel, Mastrius, and Herincx; also several Sorbonists and Louvain theologians, as Malderus, Wiggers, Sylvius; likewise the Carmelite theologians of Salamanca.

Yet certain persons continued to think otherwise, as Dr. Navarrus Azpicuelta, Ant. Corduba and Fabri from the Order of Friars Minor, Palacios, also P. Comitoli and A. Bianchi from the Society of Jesus, all probabiliorists; Perez, O.S.B., and Rebello, S.J., equiprobabilists; and Merenda, a tutiorist.

There was not one tendency of probabilists. Some, the moderate, said it was licit to follow a less probable opinion, provided the opposite was not notably more probable. Others, more benign, who are called pure or absolute probabilists, held licit every less probable opinion, provided it was probable in itself, even if the opposite was notably more probable. Hence probabilism gradually became more lax.

2. Laxism followed from this. For certain persons held it licit to act according to thin probabilities, or applied probabilism to cases in which, on account of danger of bringing in harm or frustrating an effect, one must act more safely. Thus, for example, John Sanchez, Bauny, Escobar, Tamburini, Moya, and others from the Society of Jesus; Leander, O.S.Tr.; Diana the Theatine; Caramuel, O.Cist.; etc.

Against those excesses of laxer probabilism a reaction arose, especially at Paris (in the year 1640) and at Louvain (in the year 1649), first in the universities, afterward among bishops and clergy, and among the Jansenists, whose leader was Pascal in the so-called Provincial Letters (1656-1657).

Hence Alexander VII condemned 45 laxer propositions, in the years 1665-66. But in the year 1677 four Louvain professors, M. Steyaert, Chr. Wolf or Lupus, Fr. van Viaene, and P. L. Ledrou, go to Rome so that they might obtain from Innocent XI the condemnation of lax propositions; and in fact he condemned 65 in the year 1679.

3. From this tutiorism was born. The safer practice which had mostly flourished in the middle age was now erected into a general system. Sinnich, a Louvain professor, in the book Saul Ex Rex is said to have defended this opinion: "it is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable," which was condemned by Alexander VIII (in the year 1690).

Wherefore others taught a certain mitigated tutiorism, as Steyaert, van Opstraet, Henricus a S. Ignatio, Dens, Perin, Neesen; to whom there closely approached in France Habert, in Italy Fagnanus and Card. Gerdil.

4. Revived probabiliorism is also taught by many. Alexander VII had commended to the general chapter of the Order of Preachers held at Rome in 1656 that they fight against laxer opinions. This was done. Advancing further, the Preachers from this moment rather generally taught probabiliorism, as Mercorus, Gonet, Natalis Alexander, Contenson, Billuart, Cuniliati, Concina, Patuzzi, etc.; yet not all: thus Bancel, Ferre, and Larraga are probabilists.

But not only among the Dominicans; also in the French clergy many probabiliorists are found, with Bossuet as leader; and in Italy Berti, O.S.A., P. Ballerini, and Benedict XIV hold it. Indeed in the Society of Jesus itself it has defenders. Thyrsus Gonzalez had written the book The Foundation of Moral Theology concerning the Right Use of Probable Opinions, in which he strenuously defended probabiliorism. Since he could not easily publish it, Innocent XI ordered that the general Father of the Society command that he permit Gonzalez himself and other Fathers to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the view that it is licit to follow the less probable. But when Father Gonzalez himself was elected General of the Society, and since Innocent XI and afterward Clement XI favored the more probable opinion, several from the Society now taught probabiliorism, as Antoine, Elizalde, Estrix, Gisbert, Taberna, and others. In the year 1694 the book of Thyrsus Gonzalez was at last published, but it was attacked by the Jesuits Segneri and Rassler.

5. Equiprobabilism, which already before was held by several, was now proposed systematically by Rassler, De Ruvere, Mayr, Biner from the Society of Jesus; by Eusebius Amort, canon regular; by B. Schmier, O.S.B.; and by others.

St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who had been instructed in probabiliorism, when he had learned by experience that that system could not be applied in practice, first (in the year 1755) taught moderate probabilism, although nevertheless he did not specially defend that a less probable opinion could be chosen in practice when a certainly more probable one occurred; afterward (in the year 1762) he perfected and corrected his system with a twofold restriction, namely equality of probabilities and the principle of possession, so that, in order that a law bind, it must be more probable; in order that it cease to bind, it must be more probable that it has been removed or fulfilled. He was vehemently attacked by probabiliorists, especially by Patuzzi, O.P.

And so St. Alphonsus truly was an equiprobabilist, and those err who contend that he never abandoned pure probabilism. But they would err more who tried to bring him into the party of probabiliorism, or who held equiprobabilism as a logical evolution of probabiliorism, forgetful that the holy Doctor chiefly attacked probabiliorism and was sharply attacked by probabiliorists, and that he firmly and broadly defended that principle so hateful to all tutiorists and probabiliorists: A doubtful law does not bind.

That for any action to be honest a certain conscience concerning its honesty is required, all theologians admit; but by what manner such certainty can or ought to be had, when only probable reasons appear on this side and on that, this is what troubles them not a little. Namely, theologians ask to what side he can or ought to turn himself who, a doubt having arisen concerning the liceity of the action which he is about to place, and diligent inquiry having been made, has found it not certainly but only probably licit. Moreover, for solving this question they enter upon a twofold way; for some teach that certainty in this case can be had only directly; but others hold that it can, and therefore ought, to be obtained indirectly, namely by force of another principle; and therefore the former drive the agent to embrace the safer part, while the latter permit that indulgence be granted to liberty. The first are called either anti-probabilists, because they say probabilities in moral matters are of no use, or tutiorists, because they always incline to the safer part, or finally rigorists, because they impose more burden than is necessary or even accommodated to human shoulders. But the others are called by a certain generic name probabilists, because they hold that practical utility can be derived from probabilities.

But the patrons of each opinion, agreeing as to their substantial principle, admit various degrees: the former indeed in relation to the certainty which they will to have directly, and the latter in relation to the probability upon which they remotely rely; and therefore the first are split into absolute and mitigated tutiorists, and the second into probabiliorists, equiprobabilists, and probabilists simply. Wherefore there have properly been five systems: absolute tutiorism, mitigated tutiorism, probabiliorism, equiprobabilism, and probabilism. There is added laxism, which can scarcely be called a system, and scarcely merits the attention of a prudent man. Concerning each there will briefly be said something.

Absolute tutiorism requires certainty in every way, or absolute certainty, that the law either never existed, or has already fully ceased, before it permits anything to liberty; and therefore, even if you bring forward in favor of liberty a most probable opinion, you are bound to follow the law. For thus the patrons of this system argue: "Just as an opinion, whether less probable, or even less than probable, can be true, so on the other side, an opinion more probable, or even most probable, can be false. Therefore, as long as one remains within the limits of probability, the danger of erring is not fully obviated." Moreover, that this system is altogether to be rejected is clear both from the fact that it surpasses human strength, and from the condemnation made by Alexander VIII of the following proposition: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, even the most probable among the probable." Cf. Viva, on prop. 3, among the 31 condemned by Alexander VIII.

Mitigated tutiorism differs from the preceding system in this, that in place of absolute certainty it demands the greatest probability, and therefore only then permits the part favoring liberty to be followed when a most probable opinion stands for it. But although this system has not been positively condemned, nevertheless it is easily overthrown; for that most probable opinion which is required either makes the conscience certain or it does not: if the first, the aforesaid condemned proposition and the reason of the condemnation are urged; if the other, it would now become licit to act from a conscience not certain, which cannot be admitted.

Probabiliorism, as at least it is defended by those who wish to distinguish themselves from tutiorists and seek protection from reflex principles, teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe part, namely the part favoring liberty, provided you bring forward for it an opinion manifestly and solidly more probable; and therefore you are bound to follow the law not only when a lesser, even if solid, probability stands for liberty, but also when the opinion which favors it is equally probable as that which favors the law. The chief reason of this system is taken from this, that by following the more probable opinion, we much less incur the danger of sinning. But if reflex principles are admitted, the simple probabilist will avoid the danger of formally sinning as well as the probabiliorist; but if they are not admitted, one must finally come to absolute tutiorism.

Equiprobabilism holds that only then is it licit to follow the less safe part, namely the opinion favoring liberty, when the opinion which stands for the law is only equally or almost equally probable; but if this is certainly more probable, adherence must be given to it. The patrons of this system add that this is valid if that equal or almost equal probability regards the existence of the law; but if the doubt is concerned with the cessation of a certain law, then you are bound to follow the law, however much the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as that which favors the law. But this addition pertains rather to the application of the system than to its substance, and there are many among simple probabilists who either suppose or explicitly admit this limitation. The principal foundation of equiprobabilism is taken from the authority of St. Alphonsus, which indeed is very grave; but by what right this opinion is attributed to him will be said below.

Probabilism indeed teaches that the safer part must always be followed when there is question of attaining some determinate end; but when there is question only of the licit and the illicit, it holds that someone can follow an opinion less safe and also less probable, provided it enjoys true and solid probability. Wherefore the probabilist seeks not two judgments, but only one; namely he asks whether the opinion which favors liberty is solidly probable, every comparison with that which favors the law having been left aside, and as soon as he knows that there is present in favor of liberty a solid probability, he is exempted from the law by force of a reflex principle. It must be noted that this system is called by some simple, and by others moderate probabilism, so that they may distinguish it both from equiprobabilism and from laxism; but since from the things said confusion of this sort is not possible, we shall abstain in this book from any added term.

Laxism, no distinction having been made between solid and slight probability, always exempts from the law as often as any opinion whatever is brought forward against it, even if it is only slightly probable. This system was condemned, as is clear from prop. 3, proscribed by Innocent XI, which reads thus: "Generally, when trusting in probability whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the boundaries of probability, we do something, we always act prudently." But the reason of the condemnation is open; for since slight probability is that which does not merit the assent of a prudent man, by force of it the law cannot be said to be uncertain. Cf. Bouquillon, n. 287 and seq.

VI. Very many of the unskilled confound the safer opinion with the more probable, and the safe with the less probable. Hence the Probabiliorists are called by the unskilled crowd Tutiorists and Rigorists. But this is a putrid calumny, born of ignorance — and that a supine ignorance. An opinion standing for the law is safer, but not on that account more probable. For that opinion is called safer which more removes a man from the danger of sinning. If, however, it be sometimes asserted that such an opinion binds a man to its execution, it will be false and improbable. More safely, surely, will a man keep chastity if he never look upon or address women; and more safely will he abstain from usury if he enter into no contracts. But if you would absolutely bind men to abstain from converse with all women, and from every contract, the opinion is utterly improbable and false. For the safer opinion and the more probable opinion flow from diverse principles: the latter from a greater approach to the truth, and from graver weights of reasons; the former from a greater withdrawal from the danger of sinning.

I. It is an article of faith that the Gospel of Christ contains the sole and pure truth, with the exclusion of any falsity whatsoever; and that this Gospel is the certain and safe rule which God has assigned to us for the directing of our conscience.

This first proposition is an article of faith, and is placed beyond the hazard of any disputation or cavil whatsoever.

II. The Probabilists teach the licit use of both of two contradictory propositions, of which, if one is true, the other must of necessity be false. For both cannot be true, as all confess.

This second proposition is the very state of the question. It is a most luminous truth of fact, which can be called into controversy by no one, unless the state of the question be destroyed.

III. Therefore the doctrine of Probabilism is antievangelical, since it teaches the licit use of the falsity which is contained in one or the other of the opinions, and which wars as an enemy against the Gospel. This consequence is legitimate, and flows necessarily from the two first propositions.

IV. Assuredly the evangelical law is the extrinsic and remote rule of moral operations; and the intimate and proximate rule is the reason of the mind, by which the evangelical law itself is proposed. But since that law is a law of truth, as is of faith, those who lay down that the rule of conscience is a falsity, and a falsity known as such, teach an antievangelical error. Who will deny this? This the Probabilists teach by the force of their system; which I prove by explaining the second proposition.

V. I confess that it is not certainly established for us which of the two opinions is true. For it can happen, though very rarely, that the opinion which seems to us more probable is false, and the less probable true. What follows from this? This surely: that if, after mature diligence, the Antiprobabilist errs in choosing falsity in the place of truth, the error is worthy of excuse. For the Antiprobabilist venerates and champions truth as the certain and evangelical rule — that truth alone is the norm of our conscience. And he does not contradict this principle if, through his own weakness, he is deceived in selecting the opinion which he certainly judges nearer to the truth.

VI. The Probabilist, on the contrary, knowingly and willingly lays down, in the place of a system and principle, that the use of contradictory opinions is licit — of which, if one is true, the other must be false. The Probabilist knows certainly and evidently, as all know, that one or the other of the contradictories is false. Therefore, when the Probabilist lays down as a principle the licit use of contradictory opinions, he errs dogmatically; because he establishes as the rule of conscience a known falsity — one, that is, which he certainly knows to be contained in one or the other of the contradictory opinions. For although he does not know which of the two is true, he nevertheless evidently knows that in one or the other falsity is contained. Therefore, in the place of a system, by establishing the licit use of both contradictory opinions, he systematically teaches the licit use of falsity, even of known falsity. But nothing wars more hostilely against evangelical truth than falsity. The Probabilist therefore errs in two ways. First, dogmatically, as has been shown, because he lays down as his system the licit use of a known falsity contained in one or the other of contradictory propositions; secondly, morally, against prudence and against the duty of finding the truth, when he selects the less probable opinion — that is, the one less near to truth and more neighboring to falsity — in view of the more verisimilar, as the rule of his conscience. But of this second point below. For now the discourse is of the error alone, which can be called dogmatic.

VII. The Probabilists can twist their wits and stuff in patchworks of distinctions; but they will never give a simple and perspicuous answer to the aforesaid demonstration. The first proposition is an article of faith, repeated a thousand times in the Scriptures. Thy law is truth. The law of truth was in his mouth. Psalm 118: All thy commandments are truth. Thou hast commanded justice thy testimonies, and thy truth exceedingly. Zacharias adds, chapter 8: Love ye only truth and peace. God delivered the truth to his people to be guarded. A just nation, keeping the truth, says Isaias, chapter 26. The people of God manifests this truth; Isaias repeats it in chapter 38: He shall make thy truth known. And along this path of truth the sons of God walk. 3 Kings 3: Walking in truth. This David chose, Psalm 118: I have chosen the way of truth — by no means the way of probability. By this truth we become holy: Sanctified in truth. These men are prepared to champion the truth, says Paul, 2 Corinthians 13: For we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth. This is the rule of sanctity: In the sanctity of truth, adds the same Paul to the Ephesians, chapter 4. Christ came into the world that he might teach us this truth, Paul continues, 1 Timothy 2: Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. His elect he calls sons of truth, James chapter 1: He hath begotten us by the word of truth. For God is truth. It is truth which frees us from sin, as is added in John chapter 8: You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

VIII. The privation of truth is the mark of the reprobate, as is found in the first book of Machabees: There is no truth in them. These are they, says Paul, 1 Timothy 6, who are destitute of the truth; and he adds, 2 Thessalonians chapter 2: They believed not the truth; nay, they will turn away their hearing from the truth: 2 Timothy 4, turning themselves away from the truth; Titus 1; they resist the truth: 2 Timothy 2. They are destitute of the love of this truth: They received not the love of the truth: 2 Thessalonians 2. They do not acquiesce in the truth: Romans chapter 2. They speak not the truth: Jeremias chapter 9. Who detain the truth in injustice [Romans 1]; and by the depravity of their opinions they transform it into a lie: They changed the truth of God into a lie: Romans chapter 1. Forgetfulness of the truth has filled the earth, says Isaias: Truth hath been made into forgetfulness. So it is, cries Osee, chapter 4: There is no truth upon the earth. This truth men attempt to obscure and to whittle down: Truths are decayed from among the children of men: Psalm 11.

II [IX]. And what greater diminution of the truth can there be, than if that be rejected which more approaches the truth, and that be chosen which stands farther from the truth — that is, which is judged less true — while God commands the contrary? Thou hast commanded thy commandments to be kept most diligently: Psalm 118. Finally God, in Ecclesiasticus 37, gives this precept: Before all thy works let the true word go before thee, and before every action a steady counsel — no less true, and no less steady.

IX. Hence, then, the argument is constructed. It is an article of faith that the evangelical law, which Christ Jesus gave us as the certain, safe, and indefectible rule of our conscience, contains pure and sole truth, and rejects and detests all falsity. This, as I have said, is a truth of faith. The Probabilists defend, and that most pugnaciously, the licit use of contradictory opinions, in one or the other of which they know certainly and evidently that an antievangelical falsity is contained. Therefore the Probabilists certainly and evidently teach that a known falsity, by the force of their system, is the rule of a right conscience. Therefore the Probabilists champion an antievangelical doctrine.

X. The second proposition is most evident, since it is the very argument subjected to the disputation. Do the Probabilists deny the licit use of the more probable opinion? Do they deny the licit use of the contrary less probable opinion, concerning the very same action, and in respect of the same person? Would that they denied it — for then they would repudiate Probabilism, and devote it to the Furies. Not only do they by no means deny it; rather they most expressly affirm it; and in the name of them all, Fr. Antonio Casnedi thus addresses Christ, in tome 2, in the very dedication of his work: Since thou art the Master of truth, thou condescendest so far to human ignorance, that in thy tribunal of truth inculpable error equals truth itself. For thou dost not accuse it, but excusest it; thou dost not punish it, but rewardest it — holding thy very law for no law, and thy no-law for law, if the law be invincibly unknown as no law, and the no-law as law.

XI. This doctrine, as we have seen above in chapter 3, all the Probabilists commonly admit and defend. Therefore the second proposition of our demonstration is most evident: namely, that the Probabilists teach that the use of falsity, clothed in the cloak of Probabilism, is licit; and that this falsity, and error itself covered with the cloud of ignorance, enters the gate of Paradise, and is crowned by the Father of truth with the eternal reward of glory. But this doctrine, to my weakness, and saving better judgment, appears evidently false, antievangelical, and full of scandal.

XII. It is my pleasure to confirm what I have said by a sensible example. There are two cups of wine, in one of which poison lies hidden; but I do not know in which one determinately it resides. If I were to hand both cups to two men to drink, I should surely be guilty of homicide: since I know for certain that in one or the other a mortal poison is contained. There are two contradictory opinions, in one of which is contained the transgression of the divine Law, and therefore the guilt of eternal damnation. You do not know, indeed, which is determinately true; but you know most certainly that in one or the other falsity is contained. You propose that both be followed — the one by Peter, the other by Paul. This proposition contains the state of the question which all the Probabilists defend. Let us hear one above all, Fr. Paul Laymann, the most moderate of all the Probabilists, who in book I, treatise I, chapter 5, writes as follows: I judge that it will be nothing alien to reason, if a Doctor who is consulted signify to the one consulting him that an opinion is defended as probable by certain learned men, and that he may accordingly follow it — although the same Doctor certainly persuades himself that such an opinion is speculatively false, so that he himself cannot follow it in practice. For since the one consulting, in a doubtful matter, has the right of conforming himself to an opinion which is defended by certain learned men, notwithstanding that some others contradict it and judge the opinion speculatively improbable, the Doctor is not forbidden to indicate this very right to the one consulting him; and hence it comes about that a learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions, discretion and prudence however being preserved. Here you have, in few words, the whole secret of Probabilism laid open. You judge a proposition which treats of mortal sin to be certainly false speculatively, that is, absolutely, in itself. If you certainly judge it false, you also certainly judge it to be antievangelical, and therefore proscribed by God; since all falsity is disapproved by God. It is not lawful for you to follow it, says Fr. Laymann; yet it is lawful for you to urge it upon others. What? You can urge upon others what is not lawful for you? Where then is the oracle of Christ: What thou wilt not have done to thyself, do not to another? Where is the love of the truth, which you are commanded to follow, and to teach to others?

XIII. I come now to the last proposition set forth by me. A learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions. The learned man evidently knows, as we have said, and absolutely recognizes, that in one or the other of the opinions the poison of falsity is contained; yet he offers and urges both, to diverse men, to be followed. Therefore, knowingly and willingly, he kills one of those consulting him with the poison of falsity. You are deceived, they say. The poison of falsity, smeared over with the varnish of Probabilism, loses its power of killing. Is it so indeed? That falsity covered by invincible ignorance becomes harmless, I myself confess. But that falsity evidently known is vicious, no one can deny. Fr. Laymann, and with him all the Probabilists to a man, teach these two paradoxes — monstrous enough, in truth. The first: that you can urge upon another an opinion which you know to be certainly false in itself. The second: that you can offer opposite counsels to diverse men according to opposite opinions, while you know most certainly that in one or the other opinion the poison of falsity lies hidden. For to one of those men you urge a doctrine antievangelical in itself — as is every false doctrine. But an antievangelical doctrine does not raise to heaven; it thrusts down to hell. Who does not most evidently gather from this, that this Probabilism reduces the Gospel of Christ to pure and unmixed Scepticism, Pyrrhonism, and Academicism?

I. What has been said hitherto would suffice, and more than suffice, for overthrowing and exterminating Probabilism. But the more luminous the truth is, the more cavils, evasions, hiding-places, and sophistical distinctions do they need who strive to obscure and assail it. Wherefore we too are compelled to prolong the discourse, and to confirm what we have said by the authority of the Supreme Pontiffs.

II. Alexander VII, in the year 1665, on the 24th day of September, published this decree: "Our most holy Lord has heard, not without great grief of his soul, that several opinions, relaxative of Christian discipline and bringing destruction upon souls, are partly being revived after having grown obsolete, and partly newly brought forth; and that that extreme license of luxuriant wits grows greater day by day, through which, in matters pertaining to conscience, a manner of opining has crept in which is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers — and which, if the faithful were to follow it in practice as their right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would burst forth. Wherefore, lest at any time the way of salvation, which the supreme truth, God, whose words endure for ever, has defined to be narrow, should be widened — or rather perverted — unto the destruction of souls: the same most holy Lord, that in his pastoral solicitude he might call back the sheep entrusted to him from such a spacious and broad way, along which men go to perdition, into the right path, committed the examination of these same opinions to several ..." and so forth.

III. Let this decree be compared with the preceding demonstration, and it will forthwith appear that Probabilism wars against evangelical doctrine no less than darkness against light. Three things are to be weighed in the Alexandrine decree. First, the condemned propositions, of which there is now no dispute. Second: a manner of opining has crept in into the Theology of morals, that is, in matters pertaining to conscience. This manner was intruded by the extreme license of luxuriant wits. This manner of opining, or of probabilizing, is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity — that is, to the spirit and sincerity of the evangelical law — and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. What follows from this? If the Faithful, if the Pastors and Directors of souls were to follow this manner, an immense corruption would burst forth upon Christian life. The third point is that this manner of opining probabilistically thrusts Christian souls into the broad and spacious way which leads to perdition. Wherefore the most holy Pontiff, that he might call them back into the path of salvation, which God has defined to be narrow, condemned several opinions. He declared the probabilistic plant poisonous — that is, alien to the evangelical law and the doctrine of the Fathers; and he reprobated many of the fruits proceeding from it.

IV. Hence it is plain, clearer than the noonday light, that in this decree the Pontiff discourses, not of particular opinions only (for these opinions he condemns one by one), but of the probabilistic system itself. A manner of opining has crept in, which, if the Faithful followed it as their rule, they would slide down into the way of perdition. Now the rule of forming conscience is Probabilism, as Terillus proves at length in his treatise on the rule of morals. The rule is, as the Probabilists themselves confess, a benign one. But the Pontiff declares that this rule wars against the Gospel and the doctrine of the Fathers. Let the Probabilists explain to us: what other manner, what other rule alien to the Gospel and to the doctrine of the Fathers, has crept into the Theology of morals, besides Probabilism? Let them point out to us another manner, another system, another rule.

V. All this is evident in the obvious sense of the decree. Add to this that, as all the Historians confess, Probabilism had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover Stefano Gradi, Prefect of the Vatican Library, and a near contemporary of Alexander VII, testifies — both in a votum published by order of the sacred Congregation, and in a disputation published at Rome in the year 1670 against Fr. Honoré Fabri — that the Pontiff, by those words a manner of opining, etc., branded Probabilism. For the Pontiff, having received so many letters against Probabilism from the Bishops of France and of Belgium, had conceived (says Gradi), as an excellent reporter of the things of God, an impulse toward measures altogether grave and severe in this whole matter (of Probabilism), and toward cutting off the evil, as he said, utterly at its fountain and root, by publishing an express constitution ... Nor was anything nearer than that he should do it; and he would without doubt have done it, had not Cardinal Pallavicino intervened in his counsel, to whom that matter seemed to demand a more careful deliberation than could be dispatched quickly, as it appeared it would be; and that it would be much wiser if, the fuller censure being deferred for a while, the opinions themselves should in the meantime be struck down by name, as was done ... and a preface was added, which, though under a veil of words, makes truly manifest the mind of the one decreeing, as alien from this way of philosophizing about morals — which for that reason, as you see, he called a manner of opining contrary to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers.

VI. That Alexander VII by these words (a manner of opining, etc.) branded Probabilism, is attested also by the whole Gallican Church congregated in general Assembly in the year 1700, in these words: "Now, that we may come to another head of the faith — namely, to moral Theology, corrupted in these latest times by the depraved license and subtlety of wits — we think the words of Alexander VII of happy memory should be set first ... a manner of opining has crept in, etc.; in which sentence he not only complains that errors have increased, but also — and this is the chief point — he willed it to be noted that the very method of treating the matter had been introduced, whence we might see that a corruption of morals would not only follow, but would even, as it were with a charge made, burst in upon us — one which we could scarcely restrain. Nor was it enough for the most holy Pontiff (let the Probabilists weigh these words) to have uncovered this new method of making sport of conscience and of wrapping up the truth — that is, the very fountain of the evil — but he pursued also the rivulets of the deadly doctrine," and so forth.

VII. Finally, after many things, that Assembly published this solemn edict against Probabilism, the fountain of all laxities:

"Far be it from us to approve the error of those who deny that it is lawful to follow, even among probable opinions, the most probable. But for the right use of probable opinions we recognize these rules prescribed by the Law.

"The first is that in doubts concerning the business of salvation, where equal weights of reasons offer themselves to the mind on both sides, we should follow that which is safer — or that which is in that case (mark it well) solely safe; and that we should hold this not in the place of a counsel (as the Probabilists say), but of a precept, Scripture saying: He that loveth danger shall perish in it. This is the first rule.

"The second: that concerning probable opinions about Christian doctrine we should follow what the ecumenical Council of Vienne decreed concerning the virtues infused in baptism both in infants and in adults, in these words: We have judged that this opinion, as more probable, and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology, is to be chosen. And it is evident that this judgment of the Council pertains the more to the direction of morals, the more the sanctity and salvation of the Faithful depend upon these very things, etc.

"That therefore in practice it should be lawful for us to follow an opinion which not even they themselves would judge should be chosen as the more probable — this is new, unheard of; this was brought forth by certain known authors only in this last (mark it well) century, and set up by them as the rule of morals; it is repugnant to that saying of Vincent of Lérins, etc. This is the beginning of the evils, and the head of all the aforesaid corruptions. This was censoriously branded, in the censures of the Apology of the Casuists, by our predecessors, men strong and religious." See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 2.

I. Two decrees this supreme Pontiff published, by which Probabilism is overthrown: the one in 1679, directed to the universal Church; the other in 1680, given to the General of the Society of Jesus, in which he perspicuously declares that he detests Probabilism. See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 3, chapter 2.

II. In the former decree four propositions are condemned, which are as it were the four hinges of Probabilism. I shall weigh them in few words. The third is this: In general, when we do anything relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently.

III. The Probabilists answer that the thesis was condemned on account of those two words, in general and always: because, they say, Judges and Confessors cannot use a less probable opinion. A futile response. For the Pontiff condemned separately the use of the less probable opinion in Judges and in the administration of the Sacraments. Others cavil that a slight probability is not true probability. A vain evasion. For in the proscribed thesis it is said: provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability. Therefore the use of true probability stands condemned.

IV. The other condemned proposition is this: I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. Before the birth of Probabilism no theologian, so far as I know, taught this thesis. It is a legitimate offspring of Probabilism. Before the Pontiff's decree the Probabilists commonly defended it, as the Salmanticenses testify, treatise 29, chapter 1, point 4; and Fr. Camargo attests that about seventy Probabilists maintained, before the decree, both that a judge can use the less probable opinion, and all the rest. Therefore, by the testimony of seventy Probabilists, the use of the less probable opinion is condemned absolutely no less in respect of all men than in respect of judges. And with good reason did they assert it. For this is the single foundation of Probabilism: He who acts probably, acts prudently; therefore he acts licitly. Hence this principle either stands everywhere, or nowhere. They rejoin that he acts prudently who follows an opinion practically probable, not he who follows an opinion speculatively probable; and that the less probable opinion in the tribunal is only speculatively, not practically, probable. Why? Because practical probability regards the licit or the illicit; speculative probability meditates rights and laws. An opinion which decides to whom estates, fiefs, and fields are owed is not practical. A most amusing fiction! The judge, then, adjudging the estate to Peter according to the more probable opinion, judges according to an opinion speculatively, not practically, probable?

V. Terillus — easily the prince of reflex Probabilism — answers that the judge is bound to pronounce sentence according to what appears to him truer, every human affection being excluded. But why are not the judges of souls also bound to do the same? By no means, replies Fr. Terillus, On conscience, question 24, number 26, page 476, in these words: I answer that there is a disparity, because the Confessor forms the dictate of his own conscience dependently upon the dictate of the conscience of the penitent. For the penitent does not sin, nor is he excused from sin, through the judgments of the Confessor, but only through his own judgments. Therefore the Confessor, who must judge concerning the sin of the penitent, must look to the opinion which the penitent has followed in good faith; which opinion, even if directly less probable, excuses the penitent from sin, and therefore determines the Confessor to say that that opinion, though directly less probable, frees from sin the man who follows it in good faith. But the judge does not regulate his own judgment by the judgment of the litigants: otherwise he would have to pronounce sentence in favor of both. And so the judge regulates his own judgment and his own sentence by those things which seem more probable to himself, not to others; and therefore he must follow those things which he himself, all things weighed, judges to be more probable.

VI. Many of the Probabilists complain when we cry out with raised voice that these are unheard-of and portentous paradoxes. But I most humbly beseech them, and earnestly beg, that, prejudices laid aside, they be willing seriously to weigh whether this doctrine can be joined — I do not say with the Gospel, but with common sense. The Confessor forms the dictate of his conscience dependently upon the dictate of the penitent? Who can bear to hear this? The Confessor sitting in the tribunal either is, or is not, a judge. Who will deny that he acts the person of a judge? Therefore, as judge, he cannot depend upon the judgment of the penitent. If Confessors depended upon the judgment of their penitents, and not upon the laws of the Church and the divine law, penitents would always have to be absolved, and never bound. For no Catholic approaches the tribunal who does not have a dictate by which he judges that he ought to be absolved. For if they judged themselves unworthy of absolution, they would assuredly not approach it.

VII. Another disparity between the Judge and the Confessor the Probabilists commonly assign. The judge, they say, cannot follow the less probable opinion, because, if it be false, the evil is not avoided which thence befalls Caius, who loses his cause. On the contrary, if the less probable opinion which the Theologian follows be false, no evil follows: for the violation of the law is then material; and, on the other hand, God suffers no harm. So teaches Terillus, On conscience, question 24, number 53: God is incapable of all harm; he can only be dishonored through offense. But every offense is manifestly avoided through the good faith of the agent, reasonably established. And a man, in the case of the objection, is not bound to judge in favor of God; though the judge is bound to pronounce sentence for the more probable part. Terillus is followed by La-Croix, Viva, Segneri in his epistles, and the other Probabilists.

VIII. I am compelled, against the end of brevity that I set before myself, to transcribe the principal words of the Probabilists themselves: because readers would in no way believe that these paradoxes could have been devised by Theologians. God is incapable of all harm. True enough. Therefore so much diligence is not to be applied that his offense may be avoided, as must be applied that the temporal losses of a single man may be averted? What, I ask, is more unworthy of Christian ears? This response, the more common it is among the Probabilists, the more inept it is, and the fuller of scandal. For, this being granted, iniquity might be drunk like water, since God suffers no harm from it. How horrendous this is, everyone sees. That response is refuted on two heads. 1. The violation of the law, however material, is a grave evil in itself. That it is not imputed to you as fault, as the Probabilists contend, is per accidens, on account of invincible ignorance — if indeed it be present; but in reality it is a real transgression of the divine law. And this is a far graver harm than the evil inflicted upon Caius by the loss of his estate. Therefore, if the Judge sins, more gravely sins the Theologian using the lesser probability. 2. The Probabilists are evidently deceived when they say that this transgression is material in the Theologian, but not in the Judge. Tell me: why is the transgression of the law formal in the Judge? Because the Judge does not apply all diligence and industry to avoid the transgression of the law. Well and rightly said. But is not all diligence and industry morally possible perhaps necessary, absolutely and apart from any circumstance whatever, that the offense of God may be avoided? If you use the lesser probability, you do not apply the aforesaid diligence: because you not only neglect, but positively repudiate, all the probability that lies before you. Therefore you sin, just as, by the definition of the apostolic See, the judge sins. Therefore the use of the less probable opinion makes criminal in equal measure every Theologian who neglects to avoid the danger of the divine offense, as it makes criminal the judge who neglects to decline the danger of injuring the right of Caius. What do you mutter? Is greater diligence in finding the truth required in the judge of temporal things than in the judge of eternal salvation? Is this the prudence of Probabilism — to make more of temporal detriment than of the loss of eternal salvation? Is it not a monstrous prudence which in the least things, such as earthly things are, demands the utmost diligence, and in the greatest things, such as eternal things are, a lesser solicitude? Would God be too severe if, in the settling of controversies over his law, he commanded his judges the use of the greater probability — while those Princes are not severe, nor Rigorists, but benign, who command their judges that in controversies about eaves-drippings, about a beam, about an estate, they embrace the more probable doctrine? The whole of holy Scripture commands that we search the divine law, and love it above gold and topaz. The Probabilists, on the contrary, will have us love the civil law, which declares the rights of contracts, of estates, of sales, more than the law of God, and embrace the greater probability in these causes. This is the benign probabilistic Theology. Although it be more verisimilar to you that your action violates the law of God and offends God himself, provided it be probable that you will not violate the law, you act prudently and holily in performing the action which you more probably judge to violate the Law and to contemn God. On the contrary, a civil judge would be unjust and criminal if he applied this rule.

IX. The last disparity, finally, devised by the Probabilists is this. A pact intervenes between judges and the Commonwealth, that judgments be pronounced according to the more probable opinion. But by this pact Theologians and Confessors are not bound. But whence do the Probabilists prove this pact? Their prince answers, question 24 On conscience, number 15, Terillus: For this presumed will, from the very constitution of nature, is equivalent to a pact, and has the force of a pact. This pact the other Probabilists obtrude, especially Fr. Paolo Segneri: they obtrude this pact, I say, as the last anchor to which they tie their shipwrecked Probabilism.

X. This anchor is of straw, and chimerical. That pact, limited to civil judges alone, is fictitious. Nay, I say that this pact has been implanted by the author of nature in all men. This pact is a fruit of the divine light signed upon the countenance of all souls. The civil Commonwealth elects its judges. The ecclesiastical Commonwealth elects its judges — Bishops, Parish priests, Confessors, Theologians. Whence, I ask, do the Probabilists have it that the civil Commonwealth, but not the sacred, enters into a pact that judgments be pronounced according to the more probable opinion? Whence does the knowledge of so great a secret shine upon them? What foundation urges that this pact be instituted in the lay Commonwealth, but not in the sacred? Does the Commonwealth, insofar as it is sacred and ecclesiastical, make less of truth and justice than the lay and civil Commonwealth? In the first centuries of the Church, Bishops and Parish priests were chosen as judges of civil causes among Christians. The same often happens even today. Do those judges, outside of confession, judge according to the more probable opinions, but in the sacred tribunal according to the less probable? Will they free, in the sacred forum of penance, from restitution, from usury, from simony, the litigant whom in the lay tribunal they judged liable to restitution, or guilty of usury, according to the more probable opinion? If civil Principalities and Commonwealths impose on their chosen judges the burden of embracing, in controversies of temporal things, the greater probability, does the Catholic Church absolve her judges of eternal things from that burden? If the civil Commonwealth chooses judges more learned and more skilled, does the Church choose men less learned, less skilled, less upright? Holy Scripture, Exodus chapter 18, cries out: Provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, in whom is truth — it does not say, probability. Likewise Ecclesiasticus [recte Osee] chapter 7 [recte 4]: Woe to you for ever and beyond, because there is no truth in you.

I. The first and universal extrinsic rule of morals is the eternal law of God. The second rule, proximate and formal, intrinsic, is the reason, or practical dictate, of our conscience, as has been shown above. About this first proposition there is no dispute. That an action may be honorable, it must be consonant with both laws, as St. Thomas perspicuously teaches, I-II, q. 21, art. 1: In those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law. Whenever, therefore, a human act proceeds to its end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is bent aside from this rectitude, then it is called sin. Now it is manifest from the premisses that every voluntary act is evil by this, that it recedes from the order of reason and of the eternal law; and every good act accords with reason and the eternal law.

II. The eternal law of God is a law of truth: Thy law is truth; all thy commandments are truth. Truth alone is the single rule of an honorable conscience — truth alone, I say, known either evidently and certainly, or probably and obscurely. When falsity appears to us under the aspect of truth, the rule is false, and the operation is not honorable, but vicious. If the falsity be invincible, the vicious action is not imputed to fault; but it never becomes good and meritorious, as has been shown above.

III. The third ineluctable principle is expressed in the holy Scriptures themselves — namely, the most grave commandment of inquiring after and investigating the truth. Nothing is more frequent in Scripture than this most grave precept, by which all are bound to learn and to meditate the law. It is said in Deuteronomy 6: And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart; and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey. David continually prays, and promises that he will investigate the law: Set before me for a law, O Lord, the way of thy justifications, and I will always seek after it. Give me understanding, and I will search thy law. Matthew 28: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. St. Paul, Ephesians 4 [recte 5]: Become not unwise, but understanding what is the will of God. Not to be long: a thousand times this most grave precept of learning, meditating, searching, and not forgetting the law of truth is repeated to us. These things being laid down as certain, I press the Probabilists thus.

IV. If you hold the truth of the Law evidently, are you not bound to fulfill it? They say yes. Then you must say the same when you judge it more probable that the law exists. A clear knowledge of the law imposes the duty of fulfilling the law, as all confess. Therefore, according to the degree of knowledge, such will be the degree of obligation. Therefore, when the law more probably obliges, the burden of keeping the Law presses.

V. He who acts according to the lesser probability, the greater being repulsed, evidently violates the most grave precept of investigating, learning, and meditating the law. For he who acts according to the less probable opinion knows and reckons that his operation is more contrary than conformed to the law; he knows that he is receding from the law more than approaching it. Therefore he does not inquire after the law with sincerity of soul. Would you sincerely and with deliberate mind search for a treasure, if you abandoned the way which would more probably lead you to the finding of it, and selected the opposite way, which would less lead you to, and more lead you away from, the finding?

VI. If a sick man chose a medicine which he knows to be more probably poisonous than wholesome, would he be free from sin? They answer that these examples are inept: since, if the medicine be poisonous, it brings death, no good intention of the mind availing; but an opinion about the honesty of an action, even if false, excuses from mortal sin, by the benefit of invincible ignorance. Below I shall show that this probabilistic invincible ignorance is a portent monstrous in the extreme. Dismissing, then, the chimerical disparity which the Casuists are wont to assign between the recounted examples and the less probable opinion, I press the Probabilists thus.

VII. Let the Probabilists explain to us. Do they dare themselves to affirm that this sick man desires and loves his health with a sincere and efficacious mind? They would show themselves fools if they affirmed it. But why does that sick man not love or desire health with a sincere mind? Because he repudiates the medicine which he more probably judges to be more suited to the acquiring of health. Therefore, by the same reasoning, the Probabilists do not seek with a sincere mind the observance of the law of God, if, the greater probability being repudiated, they select the lesser. Whatever, then, be the case with the distinction between a medicine and an opinion, we now press the Probabilists to answer whether he studies to fulfill, with a sincere and efficacious mind, the most grave precept of finding and learning the truth, who in obscure matters rejects what is more verisimilar and embraces what is less verisimilar. From another side I press them.

VIII. He who conforms his operation to a rule which he judges more distorted, and opposed to the first rule, sins. So do the Probabilists conduct themselves. By their direct judgment they judge the less probable opinion to be more opposed than conformed to the first rule. Therefore they judge it more distorted than right. What they add about the reflex judgment is a childish cavil. For the direct judgment is the object of the reflex judgment; if that be distorted, so also is this. Again: he who contemns the eternal law, sins. The Probabilists, by the use of the less probable opinion, contemn the eternal law. Therefore, etc. I prove it. He who does not investigate the eternal law according to his powers, neglects it, and in very deed contemns it. The Probabilists, following the lesser probability, do not inquire after the eternal law according to their powers, since they repudiate the greater probability, that is, the greater nearness to the law. Therefore they neglect and contemn it. With what boldness can the Probabilists affirm that they apply sufficient diligence in inquiring after the law of truth, if they reject what they judge nearer to the truth of the Law, and of set purpose select what they think approaches the truth less — nay, what they know to recede from the truth more? Finally, the object of the intellect is the true. But the intellect cannot apprehend an object as true, when probable reasons prove that it is rather false.