Article II. On the Efficacy of Probability for Forming Conscience

55. • The efficacy of probability is situated in its force for forming the ultimate dictate of conscience, practically certain. But from those things which we asserted in no. 39, certain conscience alone is the right rule of morals. In what way, then, can it happen that from even greater probability it is sometimes licit to act? Certainly this is not licit by force of probability alone. Therefore recourse must be had to some morally certain principle, so that certitude may be had. Therefore one must now discuss what probability avails for this end; namely, whether sometimes, with solid reasons favoring both the law and liberty, we can consider ourselves free from the very bond of the law.

That we may discuss and resolve these questions, we establish the following theses.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, nor a more probable one, with the safer one left aside, as often as there is an absolute obligation of obtaining some determinate end, which the use of a means probably unfit would bring into danger; then therefore the safer part must be followed.

56. • It is proved. Whoever is compelled to obtain an end absolutely and more certainly, is held to choose those means by which he is certainly going to attain the end. But the end can be obtained certainly only through the safer part: for by hypothesis the means, only probably apt, brings into danger the end which I am held absolutely to attain. Therefore it is not licit to use a means only probably apt, but more apt and the same safer means must be chosen ¹. Therefore the safer part must be followed.

¹ It must be denied that in these circumstances any probability remains for the opinion. For from what has been said above, no probability remains for liberty where a certain law militates against it. But thus the matter stands in the case. It is certainly a law that I cannot inflict injury on another; and therefore it is certainly a law that I am held to guard against a probable danger of another's harm, since it is injurious to bring a probable danger of harm to another. Therefore as often as from my action a probable danger threatens another, the action is manifestly illicit, as being opposed to a certain law.

52.^† Hence You Will Resolve. - 1. In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are held to follow the safer; for a most grave obligation urges everyone certainly to care for the eternal salvation of his own soul; therefore means absolutely safe and certain must be applied ². Therefore in matters pertaining to the Faith or to the true Religion, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed, opposite probability being set aside ³. Hence the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 4: An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 43.

² Hence if you are uncertain whether you were baptized, or if you prudently doubt whether your grave sins were duly expiated through confession, you are held to seek the grace of justification by suitable means.

³ This most grave obligation of natural law is violated by all those who, perhaps thinking themselves unfit for another examination, nevertheless confess that salvation can be obtained in the Catholic Church; but in the meantime neglect to embrace it, because they think they can be saved also in their own sect. For at least this can and ought to cast grave doubt upon them, that against the opinion of their own salvation they have the opinion of all Catholics; and therefore the obligation either of inquiring more diligently into the matter, or certainly of choosing the safer part, cannot be hidden from them.

⁴ Beware, nevertheless, lest you conclude from this that anyone, when faith is at issue, is obliged to adhere to an opinion, even a more probable one. For by the same Innocent XI the sentence was proscribed (prop. 21) that supernatural assent of faith, useful for salvation, stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, and with fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Therefore from that fourth condemned proposition you will conclude this one thing: that that unbeliever is not excused if, led by a probable opinion, he remains tranquilly in his sect; for he would fail in a grave obligation of solicitously applying those means by which he may reach the truth.

2. A hunter fearing lest by discharging shot at a wild animal he perhaps injure some man cannot fire, even if he judged more probably that the danger is absent; for this danger, if perhaps it is present, cannot be removed by a contrary probability, even a greater one.

3. A physician and surgeon are held to apply the safer medicines and remedies which can be had here and now; because by a tacit contract they have obliged themselves to obtaining the end more securely, insofar as it can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted some obligation of this kind toward the neighbor ⁵. - St. Lig., no. 44.

⁵ Thus a judge is held to render a sentence according to the more probable reasons. On this matter you have proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI: I think probably that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable.

4. The minister of a Sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless the defect is supplied by the Church, or a case of necessity urges, is held, insofar as he can, to follow the safer part, with the less safe probable, or even more probable, one left aside; the reason is that otherwise he would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and his neighbor to danger of spiritual harm. Hence deservedly the proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: It is not illicit in conferring Sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the Sacrament, with the safer one left aside. - St. Lig., no. 48.

I said 1. unless the defect is supplied by the Church; for sometimes the Church can and is considered to supply that which is lacking for the validity of a Sacrament: and this indeed can happen in two sacraments, namely in the sacrament of Penance, if for a grave reason it is conferred with doubtful jurisdiction, or with probable jurisdiction, and in the sacrament of Matrimony, when it is celebrated with a doubtful impediment of ecclesiastical law, or even if the delegation of the assisting Priest is doubtful, as will be said in its own place. - St. Lig., no. 50.

I said 2. unless a case of necessity urges: because since the Sacraments are for men, they must be ministered to a man constituted in grave danger of life in the best way in which it can be done, even with mere probability, indeed with slight and very slight probability concerning their value. - St. Lig., no. 49, and others commonly.

It is not licit to follow an opinion slightly probable, with the safer one left aside ⁶.

⁶ ** However manifestly Father Gury opens his mind in this thesis; however Father Ballerini in the attached note said that the opposite doctrine is condemnable; indeed however the same Father Ballerini in the little Dissertation already reprinted several times On the Moral System of St. Alphonsus clearly professed that no one of sound mind could have adhered to this condemnable doctrine, namely with these words (final proposition): Certainly no one of sound mind, to speak with Dominicus Viva, taught or could teach that men act prudently and licitly if they rest on an opinion in no way probable, of which sort the adversaries whom the thesis of St. Alphonsus attacks are...; nevertheless both VV. (page 38) and their French Confrere (see Univers, May 8, 1873) do not hesitate to accuse both Gury and Ballerini, as though they profess this condemnable and foolish doctrine, on which account (ibid.) they furthermore traduce them as supporters of laxism, liberalism, and rationalism. Perhaps you will wonder, friendly reader, at these monstrosities; but you will be more stupefied that, although in the preceding words Father Ballerini proclaims that that condemnable doctrine which St. Alphonsus attacks could not have been defended except by those who lacked a sound mind, VV. accuse Ballerini not once, but again and again (see Additional Summary, cols. 499 and 507; and V., page 112), because he made a blasphemous jest against St. Alphonsus and in the alleged words traduced him as a man not of sound mind. And in these few things you have some specimen, candid reader, of what sort is the method by which VV. undertook to attack both Gury's Compendium and the added notes.

58. • It is proved. For a slightly probable opinion, as has been said, rests on light motives, which cannot attract the assent of a prudent man; whence from them it cannot be persuaded that the existence of the law is uncertain. But it is illicit to follow some opinion, with the safer one left aside, unless the law can be said to be invincibly unknown; but the law cannot be considered unknown unless by solid reasons it is proved to be uncertain. Therefore....

It is also clear from the third proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Generally, when trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided that one does not depart from the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently ⁷.

⁷ Another vice is present in the preceding proposition, on account of which it could be condemned, because namely while it always, and thus in every case, affirms the use of probability to be licit, it comprehends also those cases in which a certain law forbids it, as was said at the preceding thesis, no. 56, 57. Nevertheless if with most more recent authors by the name slight probability you understand that which is not equal to eliciting a prudent assent, and therefore cannot even cast prudent doubt on the existence of the law, the proposition will be condemnable also on account of the reason brought in the text. Dominicus Viva (On Proposition III Condemned by Innocent XI, no. 1) attributed this false opinion to Tamburini, Bresserus, and Amicus; but from mere lack of diligence. For 1. Tamburini (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 3, § III, no. 11) expressly cautions lest the probability of the other proposition be so great that it cast the opposite down from probability, and thus the intellect can prudently assent. 2. Bresserus (On Conscience, book 3, ch. 6, no. 77) discusses an opinion for which a reason of great moment militates. 3. Finally Amicus (Scholastic Theology, vol. 3, disp. 15, sect. 3, no. 49) speaks not of slight probability, but of slight assent, which he ascribes to a probable opinion having a more probable one against itself.

It is licit to follow the most probable opinion, and even the more probable one, with the safer one left aside, where there is question only of the honesty of the action.

59. • It is proved 1. As to the most probable. It is clear 1. from the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius, which is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII and is of this sort: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. Therefore it is licit to follow at least the most probable opinion. Besides, in this condemned proposition there is question of a less safe most probable opinion, since no one ever denied that it is licit to follow the safer most probable one. Therefore. - It is clear 2. from the fact that according to St. Ligorius and others, where a most probable opinion is given, the opposite proposition becomes slightly probable, as was said above (no. 52) in the definition of the most probable opinion. For it is not conceived how a solid reason can stand on one side, if on the other side a most grave foundation of thinking otherwise appears. Therefore with the most probable opinion standing, a very slight fear of erring remains, and therefore, if not absolute certitude, at least some broad moral certitude of the law's non-existence is had. Therefore, etc.

It is proved 2. As to the more probable. That must be admitted as true in which all theologians agree; for it cannot be supposed that all theologians have fallen into error by unanimous consent. Moreover, if you except the very few rigorists, all agree in crowds in admitting this doctrine, at least if there is question of an opinion truly more probable.

Moreover, if you wish to inquire into the intrinsic reason of this sentence, no other solid reason seems able to be brought except that by which the following proposition concerning the liceity of the use of moderate probabilism is accustomed to be proved, namely that the law, if perhaps it is present, is altogether unknown, and therefore that it cannot oblige.

It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, with the safer one, equally probable or even truly more probable, left aside, where there is question only of the licit or illicit ⁸.

⁸ ** Thus also St. Alphonsus, who (Dissertation according to the Naples edition, year 1755), after, as he says (no. 1), to avoid ambiguities and equivocations, he set forth beforehand this definition of a more probable opinion: More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but also with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also truly probable, or gravely verisimilar, although less so; then (ibid., no. 3) writes: We undertake to prove the last, more benign and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one for the law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. Concerning this thesis then (ibid., no. 52) he puts forward this judgment: Our sentence, namely that it is licit to follow a probable opinion for liberty, with the more probable one left aside, is far more probable, or most probable, indeed morally or in a broad way certain. This is clear from the arguments set forth above..... These arguments indeed are each strong enough to show the moral certitude of our sentence; much more when joined together. Moreover even the Authors of the Alphonsian Vindications concede, indeed contend, that St. Doctor never changed his sentence.

This proposition can be demonstrated by a threefold genus of arguments, namely 1. from reason; 2. from authority; 3. from the consequences which flow from the opposite sentence.

60. • From reason one can argue thus: There is no obligation unless it is certain concerning it; but it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law against which true and solid probability militates. Therefore there is no obligation of following the safer part, with the truly probable opinion left aside; therefore it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, with the safer, even more probable, one left aside.

I. THE MAJOR IS PROVED from the necessity of cognition for obligation. For he is not obligated who invincibly does not know that he is obligated. But in the hypothesis I invincibly do not know that I am obligated. Therefore I cannot truly and properly judge myself bound by obligation; therefore in reality I am not obligated.

61. • The proposition is confirmed from the doctrine of St. Thomas. For thus he himself says in the Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 17, art. 3: No one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept... The same virtue is that by which a precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except by virtue of knowledge. Whence thus: no one is bound except by virtue of knowledge; but, from St. Thomas, to be bound by virtue of knowledge is the same as to have a certain obligation. Therefore no one is bound unless his obligation is certain to him. - And indeed St. Ligorius chiefly uses this argument in Moral System, § II.

62. • II. THE MINOR IS PROVED, namely it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law probably not existing. For by hypothesis the law is uncertain, since true and solid probability is supposed against it; therefore also the obligation following from it is uncertain. For a greater degree of certitude cannot be given in the obligation than in the law from which it proceeds; otherwise the certain would arise from the uncertain. Therefore.

It is confirmed. A certain obligation, as effect of law, supposes a certain cause or law. For if the effect could be certain without the cause being certain, the effect could exist without a cause; which is repugnant. Therefore there is not a certain obligation where the law is uncertain, or probably not existing. Therefore.

63. Nor say that, the directly certain law being deficient, there exists another indirectly certain law producing a certain obligation. For if such a law could be feigned, either it would be a law of avoiding the danger of sinning, or a law of following the safer; moreover neither can be feigned.

1. Not a law of avoiding the danger of sinning. For 1. the objection can be turned back against the probabiliorists themselves; since, such a law being supposed, it would no longer be licit to follow even the solidly more probable, with the safer one rejected, because even then such a danger would be present. - 2. That law could not certainly exist, and therefore certainly oblige me, except insofar as there truly was a danger of sinning formally in the violation of the direct law which probably does not exist; moreover there is no danger of sinning formally, since that direct law, as uncertain, produces no certain obligation, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore if perhaps that wholly uncertain law exists, there will be only a material violation of the law: therefore no sin will be present.

2. Nor a law of following the safer. For 1. if such a law were feigned, it would be strong also against the adversaries, and would lead us into tutiorism, proscribed in the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. 2. That law of following the safer would suppose that it is not simply safe to disregard a law probably not existing: moreover this is false where there is question only of the licit or illicit. For it is safe enough to avoid sin and the danger of sin. Moreover sin and the danger of sin are avoided by not fulfilling a direct law probably not existing, as was said above. Therefore.

64. • It is clear from various heads, namely:

1. From the more common consent of authors through several centuries. For from the time when the dispute concerning probabilism arose, namely from the middle of the sixteenth century, innumerable authors at once from every nation, state, condition, and from all Religious Orders undertook its patronage, among whom not a few shine forth illustrious by the fame of doctrine, such as Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, Lessius, Eusebius Amort, Bonacina, etc., and in more recent times St. Alphonsus de Ligorio. But if some among so great a multitude of Doctors perhaps seem to have extended the limits of probabilism too much ⁹, let us surely guard against a danger of this kind, yet retaining the limits of true probabilism, namely by not admitting an opinion as probable unless it rests on a solid foundation, or unless solid reasons militate for it, according as nearly all, even before St. Ligorius, understood probabilism ¹⁰. moral questions, which is sought from the principles of probabilism, was also very familiar to the most ancient Fathers of the Church, and indeed in matters of the gravest moment.

⁹ Beware, nevertheless, lest you think that the lax opinions which had to be rejected are generally due to probabilism (as certain persons have either imprudently or even fraudulently suggested) as their proper source. And indeed with slight trouble from those Authors who are accustomed to be sold as probabiliorists, a lengthy catalogue could be brought forth of those laxities, of which no one has yet been able to bring forth an example from the books of the probabilists.

¹⁰ And thus concerning an opinion which rests on a grave foundation, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, must be understood certain sayings of the old Doctors which St. Antoninus reports (Summa, part I, title 3, ch. 10, § 10). For after he set forth beforehand that sometimes there are contrary opinions among Doctors greatest in sanctity and knowledge in moral matter even necessary for salvation, and proved this by the example of St. Thomas, who holds that after a fall into mortal sin it is not necessary that someone immediately confess under precept when a supply of a confessor has been had, while nevertheless Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure are of the contrary opinion in this: but neither of their opinions is reproved, although the opinion of Blessed Thomas is more commonly held, which nevertheless seems less safe; then to confirm that which he had established, namely that with good conscience someone can hold one part of some opinion and operate according to it,... especially when someone applies diligence in inquiring and does not find something which sufficiently moves him to this, that it is illicit, he subjoins these things: Likewise Ulricus in the Summa says that if someone concerning some doubtful thing to be done consults those more skilled, about which he has no express authority, whether it is so or not: provided that he forms for himself a good conscience, even if the matter holds itself otherwise than that which he thinks and which was advised to him, he is excused, because he did what he could, and God requires no more. Likewise from the responses which seem to have been given by Albert the Great, it is had that a simple brother or any man can with salvation follow in counsels whichever opinion he wishes, provided that he follows the opinion of some great Doctor. Hostiensis also says...: Where there are diverse opinions and diverse judgments, the more humane and more equitable is always to be preferred.... William also in the gloss of Raymond says that in the niceties of law, where even the wise doubt, ignorance is excusable. Nevertheless if someone in good faith chooses that part or that, he ought not on this account to have a conscience too scrupulous. Likewise Peter de Palude says... that if a confessor doubted whether that, concerning which the one confessing neither repents nor confesses, were mortal, and the one confessing says that he did this by counsel of skilled men, concerning whom from life and knowledge it is probable that they would not advise except well, he can conform himself to that judgment. Geoffrey of Fontibus seems to think the same in these contrary opinions which are tolerated by the Church. Thus St. Antoninus; from which it is sufficiently clear how much those are deluded who ascribe the beginnings of this doctrine and practice to Bartholomaeus Medina, otherwise an excellent theologian from the Order of Preachers, as though he first introduced it. For from the things adduced above it manifestly shines forth that, as to substance, it preceded even the age of scholastic theology. And worthy indeed to be read is the Dissertation which Christian Lupus published on this argument (Works, vol. XI, diss. I), in which it is splendidly shown that the method of solving questions

65. • 2. From the doctrine commonly handed down in this time. For if the schools spread through the whole world are inspected, in very many of them the doctrine of moderate Probabilism will be found handed down and defended, especially at Rome, which rightly must be considered as the center of theological sciences, and where false doctrine, and indeed publicly, while the Church is silent, certainly cannot be taught. So likewise in all Italy, Spain, Germany, etc. - In France itself also the doctrine of St. Ligorius, which certainly altogether recoils from probabiliorism, is now received daily with almost unanimous applause.

3. From the approval of the Church, at least implicit, in the approval of the works of St. Ligorius. For the sacred Congregation of Rites solemnly declared that there is nothing worthy of censure in the works of the holy Doctor. Again in the decree of the Sacred Penitentiary (5 July 1831), approved by the Supreme Pontiff Gregory XVI, any professor of theology can follow and teach all the opinions which St. Ligorius professes in his Moral Theology, nor is the Confessor to be disturbed who follows the same opinions in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance ¹¹.

¹¹ To this pertain the words of our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX in the letter given to Peter Scavini on 7 April 1847: We vehemently congratulate you, because in composing these theological Institutions you had nothing more ancient than to propagate more and more the salutary doctrines of Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, a most holy and learned man, and to imbue with them especially the minds of ecclesiastical youth.

66. • I. In the system of the probabiliorists there would follow a difficulty too grave for Confessors. For the Confessor would expose himself to the danger of sinning because of a defect of sufficient diligence in weighing the various degrees of probability, especially in the matter of restitution, when from two equally probable opinions he would follow one. For if he assumed the more benign sentence, he would sin by permitting that in which he apprehended a deformity probably existing. If he acted according to the stricter sentence, he would sin by imposing an uncertain yoke on the penitent ¹². Besides, although the stricter sentence appears more probable to him, when will he be certain that it is truly such, and that the opposite one does not seem more probable to another Confessor? Nor could anyone undertake the office of Confessor, unless perhaps he had been so versed in moral theology that he could certainly distinguish between more probable and less probable opinions: for the burden of doing includes the burden of knowing; but very few are able to furnish this ¹³. Hence there follows also that contradiction of Confessors who, though professing probabiliorism, nevertheless not rarely keep saying that they cannot apply the principles of probabiliorism rigorously ¹⁴ in the administration of the sacrament of Penance; and so they hold one thing in theory, but the wholly opposite in practice. Being constituted in anxieties, there are not lacking those who easily judge that to be more probable which at other times they would have held less probable. Would it not be better to establish and admit milder principles with so many most wise Doctors, and to lead them into practice more exactly?

¹² Hence one must repeat that Confessors imbued with the principles of probabiliorism, and otherwise of a timorous conscience, for the most part flee the sacred ministry of hearing confessions, harassed, of course, by dreadful anxieties, or certainly devote all their labor to cultivating in spirit certain little devout persons.

¹³ ** Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus thus says (Dissertation, edition of the year 1755, no. 17): Such appearance (namely of greater probability) cannot constitute a certain rule of acting, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion, which appears more probable to one person, will appear less probable to another; indeed to oneself an opinion which yesterday was less probable will appear more probable today.

And again (ibid., no. 42), giving the reason why a more probable opinion cannot oblige, he brings forward the same reason: For some opinion, which is more probable to me, will often be less probable to others; and therefore the law would be particular only for those to whom that opinion appeared more probable. But this certainly would be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal, and proposed universally, lest the people, who are held to observe it, be more often divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions, would often instruct the faithful according to his own sense.

Then the holy Doctor solves the objection, showing that these inconveniences press only those who wish some obligation to arise from a more probable opinion. Thus he says (ibid., no. 43): Nor is it valid to say that, by following the benign sentence (what the benign sentence may be, see above, Note to thesis IV), deformity also can intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one person, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that when some opinion possesses solid probability, and rests on a certain grave foundation, it will be judged probable among the greatest part of the wise: and this will already be enough for conserving the universal uniformity of the observance of law, notwithstanding that among some particular person it is not probable; for that which rarely happens does not take away universal conformity. Yet this certainly does not occur concerning the estimation of more probable opinions; because, since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely, but commonly, that what is stronger to one appears weaker to another.

Besides, the holy Doctor intimates the difficulties and inconveniences which would follow the necessity, if there were any, of determining certainly which opinion is truly more probable in preference to the opposite. Thus he says (ibid., no. 48): BUT THAT WE BECOME CERTAIN THAT SOME OPINION... IS TRULY MORE PROBABLE, OR HAS THE REQUIRED PREPONDERANCE, THIS IS MORALLY IMPOSSIBLE. For either that preponderance is small; and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is modest, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great; and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the safer opinion (in the present matter let us say, the opposite, or less safe one) is judged false or at least slightly probable? And so we would always have to act with a practical doubt.

Hence concerning the anxieties which the obligation both of knowing and of following the more probable things would bring, the holy Doctor brings forward these things (ibid.) from Ven. Father Segneri: Either I am held to follow the more probable things in themselves, and then when shall I know what opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on this side and on that? Or the more probable things for me, and the anxieties would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be more probable against another sentence of several wise men; and then who will render me safe, that my opinion is certainly more probable, and more notable with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How will I be certain that I myself have understood well and solved well the opposite reasons? That the dictate of conscience, which I formed for myself, is sufficiently certain and safe? That I have not been hallucinated by my own sense, so that, if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?

But that the common sentence lacks these inconveniences, the holy Doctor thus continues (ibid., no. 50): But they do not expose themselves to that danger who follow an opinion certainly probable, although less so. Because after they have been made certain concerning the probability of the opinion, they are not held to apply greater diligence. For when some opinion rests on a grave and certain foundation, there is no longer a moral or prudent hope of finding certain truth; and therefore if they are mistaken, they are mistaken invincibly.

¹⁴ The principles of probabiliorism rigorously admitted, as they were defended by the older authors, for example Gonzalez, Antoine, Gennett, Sinnichius, etc., labor under another inconvenience, and one not slight, which also did not escape the eyes of St. Alphonsus (cf. Index of Authors, which Father Michael Haringer prefixed to St. Alphonsus' Theology, see Gonzalez, page LXV, Ratisbon edition 1846). For they do not deny, nor can they deny, that which is confessed among all and ought to be, namely (see above no. 39 with note), that for an act to be honest, a certain conscience concerning the honesty of it is altogether required. But on the other hand, to acquire this certitude concerning the honesty of the action, they neither wish nor are able to invoke for themselves any support from reflex principles, just as they attack it in adversaries. Therefore it is necessary that they borrow a certitude of this kind altogether from direct principles, or from the innermost and proper reasons of each matter. Hence that saying of Antoine (On Conscience, ch. 4, q. 1): It is not licit (to follow probable conscience), unless the probability is so great that it excludes every reasonable fear of falsity, and produces certitude at least relative: because, as I said in ch. 2, for not sinning there is required a certain judgment, at least by moral certitude, by which doubt and the fear of sin, at least reasonable fear, is prudently excluded. And again (q. 3, no. 4) he gives the reason, because an opinion only equally probable standing for liberty cannot bring moral certitude, which is at least required for not sinning. Nor otherwise does Gonzalez, at the very front of his work, assume for himself the task of proving that, for someone licitly to be able to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty..., it is altogether necessary that that opinion... be judged by him to be true by an absolute, firm, and non-fluctuating judgment: which certainly are the marks of certitude. Hence after he contends (disp. IV, § XII, in the title) that a certain and evident practical judgment is necessary for acting rightly, he adds (see Index, under Reflection) that the one acting must make the opinion his own by direct assent. But now, from the sentence of all (see St. Alph., Apostolic Man, tr. 3, no. 2, and Viva on proposition 3 of Alexander VIII, no. 2), a sentence at least morally certain differs from a most probable opinion in this, that the former excludes every prudent fear of the opposite, but the latter does not. Therefore from their sentence, not only by their words expressly, but also from the intrinsic force and nature of the system itself, it follows that not even the most probable opinion suffices for acting rightly. Hence that saying of St. Alphonsus (l.c.): I do not know how the aforesaid authors, by asserting that it is not licit to use in acting any but morally certain sentences, since thus in reality they utterly reprobate the use of probable opinions, although in words they seem to admit it; I do not know, I say, how they can be excused from the condemned proposition, which said (it is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII): It is not licit to follow the most probable opinion among probable ones.

67. • II. A most troublesome difficulty for the faithful would follow. For in doubts there would be imposed on them an obligation of inquiring what opinion is more probable; since the obligation of operating according to the more probable includes the necessary duty of inquiring into it. But for the most part there is a moral impossibility of distinguishing between the more probable and the less probable; for even to the learned this is often very difficult. And indeed I ask, whether I am held to the more probable in itself or absolutely, or as to me or relatively? If the former, whence shall I know it? If the latter, again either there is question of intrinsic probability, or extrinsic. If of the latter, what school must be followed?... what Doctors must be consulted?... If of the former, the difficulty increases: whence shall I know whether I am sufficiently fit for this judgment? whether I am in invincible ignorance or not? Therefore being uncertain, and pressed by doubts, what shall I do? Shall I have recourse to Masters? But by hypothesis it belongs to me to judge. Therefore it becomes manifest how many and how great anxieties threaten the faithful from that necessity of following the more probable or the safer. - Segneri, little work on probability.

68. • III. There would follow a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine. For from probabiliorism there follows a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine among the probabiliorists themselves, as daily experience proves. But this discrepancy arises also from the very nature of probabiliorism. For it is impossible that they agree in fact; for, with the obligation of following the opinion which appears more probable to each one being posited, necessarily some will resolve for the affirmative part, others for the negative. One will bind, another will loose; and what appears more probable to you will very easily seem equally or less probable to another. Hence there will follow confusion of decisions, perplexity of the faithful, and anxieties of the Confessors themselves, who from some supposed excess of probability will impose most grave obligations. But probabilism rightly understood lacks inconveniences of this sort, at least for the most part. For only two things are to be weighed by probabilists, namely certain obligations, and merely probable obligations. But although the true probability is not always clear, nevertheless no one does not see that, ordinarily speaking, it is much easier to discern whether a solid reason or authority is had against the law, than to pronounce a judgment concerning some excess of probability. Therefore... etc....

69. Objections. - 1. It is objected from Sacred Scripture, Eccli. 3. 27: He that loves danger shall perish in it. But probabilists love danger by following an equally or less probable opinion. Therefore... - Eccli. 37. 20: Before all thy works let the true word go before thee. But in probabilism there is not a true word. Therefore... - 1 Thess. 5. 22: Abstain from every appearance of evil. But probabilists permit one to follow an appearance of evil. Therefore...

I answer 1. What is this to the matter? An empty and vacuous application!

I answer 2. I retort. For these objected places of Scripture, understood thus, would not permit even the use of probabiliorism. For in a more probable opinion against the law there is a danger of sin ¹⁵, a word not true..., an appearance of evil....

¹⁵ ** Indeed St. Alphonsus (On the Moral System), by an argument to the man, observes that not even those are immune from danger of this sort who otherwise hold that the use of an opinion against the law is licit only when it is most probable. For he reasons thus: As the most probable opinion does not lack every prudent fear that it is false, so the opinion opposite to the most probable does not lack every prudent motive that it is true.... Now I ask.... in what way will he who judges it illicit to expose himself to the danger of transgressing the law, wishing to follow the most probable, ever be able in practice with tranquil conscience to be induced to believe firmly that the opinion standing for the law is not truly probable? Where will he find a balance so exact that it renders him secure that the opinion standing for the law lacks so much weight of probability as would make it probable?

I answer 3. Directly. To the first: there the question is of final impenitence, as is clear from the context: A hard heart shall fare ill at the last; and he that loves danger shall perish in it. Besides, no danger is present where no sin is detected.

To the second: among us the true word is the reflex principle itself, which produces practical certitude, and therefore the act placed from it is conformable to truth.

To the third: he abstains from an appearance of evil who does that in which he sees no sin; for then he does not discern even the appearance of sin.

70. • It is objected 2. from Canon Law. In Canon Law this rule is handed down everywhere: In doubts the safer part must be chosen. Thus in the chapter Illud Dominus, on an excommunicated cleric.

I answer 1. I retort. If the matter is thus, then it is not licit even for you to follow an opinion, however more probable, against the law, because it is not the safer way. Consequently you will have to flee to tutiorism. But that system has been condemned. What then will you do? You shall see to it.

I answer 2. Directly. In the aforesaid rule there is question of practical doubt, not however of speculative doubt, in which conscience can be formed by the help of a solid motive; or even there is question of cases in which an end is necessarily to be obtained. Thus St. Lig., obj. IV ¹⁶.

¹⁶ St. Alphonsus (Moral System, no. 79) answers that, from the almost common sense of the Doctors, the aforesaid rule of the canons, as to speculative doubts, is of counsel, not of precept. And St. Alphonsus teaches that this must be understood not only of the saying objected to, but also of other sayings of this sort which are usually drawn from the sacred Canons.

It is objected 3. from the Fathers. Many testimonies of the Fathers are brought forward which seem to favor probabiliorism, in Collet, Concina, Billuart, etc.

I answer 1. Let the same general answer be given as in the preceding objection. For the Fathers for the most part speak of particular cases of practical doubt, or where the end is necessarily to be obtained.

I answer 2. Other testimonies of the Fathers are not lacking which evidently favor probabilism. Let it suffice to report a few. - St. Augustine, epistle 54 (otherwise 118), ch. 2, says: What is not convicted to be contrary either to Faith or to morals is to be held indifferently. - St. Gregory Nazianzen, oration 39, says: But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and frailty prevail.

71. • It is objected 4. A probable opinion does not remain probable in concurrence with a more probable one; for the lesser probability is annulled and destroyed by the greater. Therefore...

I answer. I deny. For if the lesser probability were annulled, the greater probability would now become certitude, or would exclude prudent doubt. But this is manifestly false ¹⁷. Besides, reasons sought from disparate and non-subordinated principles cannot annul one another. For my reasons, notwithstanding the opposite probability, will stand in all their strength, until you have proved them to be false.

¹⁷ ** To those objecting that greater probability annuls the lesser; whence it happens that, when the opinion for liberty is less probable, it becomes improbable with respect to the more probable opinion for the law, which then alone is able to draw the assent of the mind to itself, just as a greater weight alone inclines the scale to itself, although in the other scale there is another weight but less heavy, St. Alphonsus replies (Dissertation, edition of the year 1755, no. 13): But our authors rightly answer that it is false that greater probability annuls the lesser, except when that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable or no longer gravely and certainly probable. Yet one must say otherwise if the excess is not notable, and the opposite probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means destitute of its grave probability.... This response certainly is right, and altogether proves that the greater probability of some opinion by no means renders the opposite one improbable.

It is objected 5. Probabilists do not act from moral certitude, not even from a reflex principle, since they cannot call the opinion opposite to their own improbable. Thus Billuart, art. 2, and Gerdil, ch. 6.

I answer 1. I retort from parity of reason. Behold then a difficulty to be solved by you first.

I answer 2. Directly. This is our reflex principle: An obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, or an uncertain law cannot impose a certain obligation. Moreover this principle is unshaken, since it cannot be denied without those denying it contradicting themselves. Indeed the adversaries can prudently rest on no other reflex principle ¹⁸.

¹⁸ ** Genuine probabiliorists, namely those who follow the proper principles of that theory, do not admit and cannot admit any use of reflex principles; otherwise they would necessarily be compelled to surrender their conquered hands to the adversaries. See above, note to § 66.

72. • It is objected 6. The probabilist acts imprudently by not following the more verisimilar opinion, and acts against conscience by doing that which is probably, or even more probably, a sin ¹⁹.

¹⁹ ** Concerning an objection of this sort St. Alphonsus thus says (Dissertation, edition of the year 1755, no. 35): They object that known truth must without doubt be followed. Therefore just as when certain truth appears for the law, we are held to follow it, so also when the matter appears more verisimilar. And he answers: But the parity is denied: when truth appears for the law, certainly we are held to follow it, because then the law manifestly appears, whence no one can form for himself a right conscience (namely concerning the non-existence or doubtfulness of the law). It is otherwise if the matter only appears more verisimilar; for then, since truth verisimilarly stands also for the other part, the law is doubtful; and therefore in that case either the law is not present, or it does not oblige. And again (ibid., no. 54): And thus response is made to the objection of those saying that, since there is an obligation of pursuing truth, we are held to follow what appears more verisimilar to us. For, as we said above, two truths must be altogether distinguished, the truth of the opinion, and the truth of honesty as to the use of the opinion. Certainly we are held to pursue what appears more verisimilar concerning the truth of the honesty of the use, but not always what appears more verisimilar concerning the truth of the opinion: whence there can well be fear concerning the truth of the thing, and certitude concerning the honesty of the action; because more often, even if the law may seem more probably to be present, nevertheless it will be more probable that it does not oblige; and from this we form a practical judgment morally certain concerning the licit: wherefore to act against conscience and to act against that which appears more probable are not the same.

And again (ibid., no. 31): Nor is it valid to say that when some more probable opinion appears for the law, then that greater probability declares the law, and now exhibits knowledge of the law. For knowledge, as is clear, imports certain notice of the existence of the law; but opinion, even the more probable, since it does not remove the opposite prudent fear, is DIVERSE FROM KNOWLEDGE BY THE WHOLE HEAVEN, which, every prudent fear having been excluded, carries certitude before itself. Therefore when in some question there is no knowledge of the law, then the law either is not present, or does not oblige.

And again (ibid., no. 34): If the adversaries understand by the more probable opinion that which appears more verisimilar, although the contrary also retains its own foundation; then I say that if we can follow this more probable opinion for liberty, we can also follow the less probable. The reason is that, once it is conceded that it is licit to operate with the more probable, it must be conceded that the law does not possess in doubt.

And again (ibid., no. 17): A more probable opinion cannot be called a true opinion: otherwise a more probable opinion would be manifest truth, which is repugnant, since manifest truth is properly knowledge, not opinion; but it must always be called probably or fallibly true. For since it has its origin from a fallible motive, and does not exceed the limits of probability, it is inferred that the contrary opinion is also probably true. From this it happens that great Authors, although they judge some sentence to be more probable, nevertheless do not hesitate to call the contrary sufficiently or very probable, as de Lugo, On Penance, disp. 17, no. 107.

And again (ibid.): When there are two opinions, one more, the other less probable, then a comparison is not made between truth and falsity; and therefore if the less probable is chosen, falsity is not on that account preferred to truth; but a comparison is made between two appearances of truth, of which, although one seems greater than the other, nevertheless each seems great, so that each probably is true; wherefore at the same time at which the more probable opinion appears more verisimilarly true, it also appears verisimilarly false, and the opposite opinion appears verisimilarly true.

And again (ibid., no. 17) he asks: To what purpose, therefore, does that lesser probability serve, when, speaking per se, we cannot follow it (because, namely, per se it does not produce a certain judgment concerning the honesty of the act)? And he answers:

It will serve to show that truth can verisimilarly stand for it, and consequently that the law in that case, since it is doubtful, does not oblige. Whence then the less probable opinion indeed will not be said to be true; but by reasonably believing that it is verisimilar, it will be judged true that a man is not held to abstain from the use of it, notwithstanding that the opinion for the law appears more verisimilar. For such appearance cannot constitute a certain rule of acting, since it can deceive in many ways.

And again (ibid., no. 32): When, they say (the adversaries), the more probable opinion or reason stands for the law, it elucidates the law enough, and binds to the law. And he answers: But first it is denied altogether that a declaration of the law of this sort, doubtful as it is since it has arisen from a fallible opinion, although a more probable one, can oblige to the law. For in doubtful things the declaration of law holds itself as a new law; and therefore just as a law, in order to oblige, must be certain, so also the declaration.... The reason is that when doubt turns on whether a law comprehends some case or not, the law itself becomes doubtful as to whether it is present with respect to that case or not. Therefore the declaration that then the law has place must likewise, as law, be certain and infallible, so that it can oblige; for otherwise we would be bound to a doubtful law. Response is made secondly, and it is asked: who made this declaration of the law apt of itself to oblige? God did not; the Pontiff did not; indeed that greater probability appearing for the law did not. For some opinion which is more probable to me will often be less probable to others.

And again (ibid., no. 38): Therefore it is clear from the aforesaid text of St. Thomas that the law cannot be said to have been sufficiently intimated by the sole more probable opinion; for since opinion necessarily includes fear toward the opposite, as we showed above, it can never be called knowledge. Therefore even if to someone it appears more probable that a prohibiting law is present, nevertheless it cannot be said that he knows the law, when he still probably thinks that it does not exist, and perhaps in reality it will not exist.

I answer 2. Directly. What is this to the matter? A notable cavil! Who does not

I answer 1. I retort. Do you not likewise, by doing that which is probably against the law, conduct yourself imprudently?

I answer 2. Directly. He does not act imprudently who sees no obligation to the opposite, nor therefore does he act against conscience, since he detects no deformity or transgression of any law in his action. It is objected 7. The probabilist wills an object which he knows more probably to be materially evil: therefore he also wills formal evil, which cannot be separated from the material evil known.

I answer 1. I retort. But do you not labor under a similar inconvenience? For even by following the more probable opinion against the law, do you not will a material deformity at least probable, and consequently a formal one? Can the probability which appears a little greater to you take away the danger of violating the law materially?

I answer 2. Directly. I deny the antecedent. The probabilist does not will any deformity, not even a material one. For since the objective deformity is doubtful, the act can be good. Therefore if it can be good, it can fail to be intended and in reality is not intended as evil: since it is simply unknown as evil; and an unknown deformity cannot be the object of the will.

73. • It is objected 8. Greater care must be applied to the soul than to the body. But what sick person chooses a less efficacious remedy and leaves behind a more probably efficacious one, unless he is insane? Thus Collet with not a few others.

I answer 1. I retort. What sick person of sound mind takes a remedy probably harmful, with a certain remedy left aside? Is not the safer to be preferred? see, unless he is altogether blind, that the use of probability in this matter is entirely illicit? Can greater or lesser probability in physical causes avert the danger of the harmful effect which is feared? Therefore the supposition with the parity must be denied.

74. • It is objected 9. A judge in rendering sentence must follow the more probable opinion, as is clear from the following proposition condemned by Innocent XI: I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. Therefore it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion.

I answer. The example does nothing to the matter, and I deny the consequence. The reason for the condemnation of this proposition is that a judge is constituted by authority so that he may give to each one his own right; moreover he has the greater right for whom the greater probability, or the stronger reason, favors. - St. Lig., book 4, no. 210. In order for the example to be to the matter, a case would have to be brought forward where there is question only of the licit or illicit.