§ 3. On Probabiliorism.

231. Probabiliorism teaches: it is lawful to follow the opinion for liberty if it is more probable than the opposite for the law.

As regards the degree of greater probability which the more probable opinion must carry before itself in order that it be lawful to follow it, probabiliorists do not agree: for some require that it be notably more probable and therefore almost morally certain; others require that it be more probable to such an extent that the mind can assent to it. Besides, some assume a reflex principle for informing conscience; others admit none, contending that in order to operate honestly conscience need not be practically certain.

1. This doctrine was little known among moralists until the middle of the 17th century. From that time theologians of the Order of Preachers defended probabiliorism with such agreement that up to the beginning of the last century hardly a Dominican theologian could be found who was not a probabiliorist. To these several other theologians, both secular priests and regulars of other orders, joined themselves.

Among the Dominicans are eminent: Mercorus, Gonet, J. Martinez, Vincent Baronius, Contenson, Natalis Alexander, Concina, Billuart, and Patuzzi, whom St. Alphonsus had as a most keen adversary. At this same time other theologians also of every order, both seculars and regulars, acceded to this doctrine, from whom these are to be named: Prosper Fagnanus, Collet, Cabassutius. Of the theologians of the Society of Jesus, those devoted to probabiliorism are: Blancus, Thyrsus Gonzalez, Camargo, Estrix, Gibert, Elizalde, Malatra, and Antoine. At the present time, especially after the ecclesiastical approval which the moral books of St. Alphonsus obtained, there will scarcely be a theologian who defends probabiliorism.

2. Their argument is: just as in doubt concerning truth we are bound to embrace that sentence which approaches more to the truth and excludes more the danger of erring, so in doubt concerning honesty we are bound to follow the sentence which approaches more to the truth and excludes more the danger of sinning; but the more probable opinion approaches more to the truth and removes more from sin.

3. Refutation. a. Either they admit reflex principles for forming a certain conscience or they do not admit them; if the first, by logical necessity they arrive at probabilism; if the second, they necessarily at last fall into absolute tutiorism, since it is not lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience.

Those who admit a reflex principle form a practically certain conscience in this way: he who does what he prudently judges to be licit does not sin; but he who follows the more probable opinion does what he prudently judges to be licit; therefore he who follows the more probable does not sin. - Now they cannot effectively prove the minor in another way except by an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law; but this argument consequently leads to probabilism: for the law is invincibly unknown whether the opinion against the law is more probable or probable.

b. A moral system cannot be true which not only imposes an intolerable burden on the faithful, but besides brings this inconvenience, that its use is impossible both for confessors and for the faithful; but probabiliorism is of this kind. For for the licit use of some opinion it would be necessary to inquire which opinion is more probable; but this is impossible for most. Besides, it casts all who are of timorous conscience into innumerable scruples and perplexities, especially because that which to one is certainly more probable seems to another at most probable, and that which to the same man today appears probable, tomorrow seems to be more probable.

c. Their argument, which has deceived many, contains two things which are false. a. It is false that the more probable opinion approaches nearer to the truth: for in order that this could be affirmed, the truth would have to be known. It must be said: the more probable opinion has a greater appearance and likeness of truth and is more often joined with truth than with falsity, but nevertheless it can be just as false as the opposite probable opinion. Therefore neither of contradictory sentences, of which one must be true, approaches truth more or less than the other: for each either coincides with truth or is contradictorily opposed to it. b. The order of knowledge is confused with the order of operation: if in doubt concerning truth there is question of consent to be given to one opinion or the other, we must assent to that which appears more probable on account of graver reasons; nevertheless at the same time we know that the law is uncertain; but now we are not bound to follow an uncertain law.

On a similar confusion rests the example sung again and again by probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. If two ways offer themselves to one seeking Rome, of which one more probably leads to Rome, only this one can prudently be chosen. - Indeed he would be mad who chose the other, which less probably leads to Rome. But cases of this kind, in which there is question of a means necessary for attaining an end and of damage necessarily to be avoided, are solved not by the probabilistic principle but by the tutioristic principle. But where there is question of a doubtful law, he who follows the less probable certainly avoids the only damage to be feared from the fact that he perhaps does not observe an existing law, namely formal sin.