Sins Against Charity Toward Neighbor

99. What these sins are. Sins against charity of neighbor are, on the one hand, sins of omission, namely the omission of love, whether internal or external, when this is prescribed, as the omission of due alms and fraternal correction; on the other hand, they are sins of commission, which are committed by positive acts contrary to charity of neighbor. These are opposed either to internal charity: hatred; or to external charity: scandal, induction, cooperation.

External sins against charity toward neighbor - besides omission of due external acts - are especially scandal and cooperation in evil. These, if they are taken strictly, differ according to authors to this extent: scandal in some way determines another to sin; cooperation, however, concurs in the sin of another already determined to sin. Yet rather often it happens that both concur in one action, so that, for judging the morality of the action, attention must be paid to the character both of scandal and of cooperation.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 34-36.)

The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be reduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b) sloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord and schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal, which is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 37-42.)

The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 43.)

Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to the internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to treat of scandal and cooperation which are opposed to the external acts of charity—beneficence and brotherly correction.

The principal ones are hatred, envy, quarrels, scandal, and cooperation with the sins of others.

We shall speak only about the two latter, since concerning the others it has already been treated in another place, or it must be spoken of in the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

497. The sins which are specially opposed to charity toward neighbor are the following: hatred, envy, malediction, schism, discord, contention, brawl, sedition, war, duel, scandal, and cooperation in the sins of others.

Of duel and war there will be discourse in the treatise on the fifth precept. Of the rest we shall treat here, in a threefold article, namely: 1. of hatred, to which we shall attach a scholium on kindred sins; 2. of scandal; 3. of cooperation in the sins of others.

498. NOTIONS. Hatred is an act of the will by which someone is borne toward something with malevolence. It is twofold: 1. hatred of enmity (or of the person), by which we are averse to someone, and will evil to him insofar as it is evil to him; 2. hatred of abomination (or of the quality), by which we are averse to neighbor not according to himself, but according to some quality of his disagreeing with us. Cf. n. 475, note 2.

Hatred ordinarily arises from an offense, and manifests itself externally by denial of signs of love.

But some SIGNS of love are common, others special. Those are called common which are usually shown to others of the same state; for example, by a Christian to a Christian, by a fellow citizen to a fellow citizen, by a kinsman to a kinsman. Special signs are those which are shown on account of a special title, for example of friendship, which is not the same toward all of the same condition (II, 28). See what is to be said below, n. 501.

499. PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept of loving enemies, by which hatred of enmity is prohibited as a sin grave of its kind. It is established from the words of the Lord (Matt. 5:44): Love your enemies..., and in the same place (6:15): But if you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins. Whence (1 John 3:15): Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.

We said, 1. Enemies, by which name are signified those who persecute us with hatred, or have affected us with offense or injury.

2. Hatred of enmity, for hatred of abomination, or of aversion, is of itself indifferent, and takes its moral species from the nature of the quality which we abhor. Thus, for example, if in neighbor you pursue with hatred his bad qualities, pride, etc., the hatred is good and can pertain to charity, according to that saying (Ps. 138:22): I hated them with perfect hatred (sinners). But one must watch lest hatred of the quality pass into hatred of the person. If you hate in him qualities simply good and honorable, justice, piety, etc., the hatred is so evil that by its nature it is a mortal sin, as we said concerning envy (n. 368).

3. As a sin grave of its kind; for hatred admits smallness of matter: in an internal act, for example if you wish a light evil to an enemy, or rejoice concerning it after it has happened; in an external act, if it betrays a hatred lightly offensive, or induces light scandal; as often happens among those who live together (Kon., n. 282).

500. II. The precept of loving enemies does not impose a special obligation, that is, one diverse from that by which we are held toward all men. It requires only this, "that one loving God and neighbor not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor." Thus all with St. Thomas (2.2, q. 25, a. 8; cf. St. Alph., II, 28, 1). Therefore special love is not of the necessity of charity, except according to the preparation of soul, by which, namely, a man is prepared for this, that in particular he would love his enemies and, when necessity requires it, would furnish special benefits to them.

Hence: 1. Those sin who wish evil to neighbor insofar as it is evil to him, whether this is done from vengeance or from aversion toward his person. But sometimes it is licit to wish a temporal evil to neighbor, insofar as it is good for him, as we said n. 349.

2. Those sin, of themselves gravely, who refuse pardon to an enemy; or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand greater than is fair; who bring the guilty person into judgment from hatred and vengeance, or rejoice concerning an enemy's evil. But you are not bound to forgive the satisfaction which is owed to you for injury and harm: for this you can demand, not indeed as an evil of the enemy, but as a good owed to you, all hatred being removed and charity preserved. Nor ought a feeling of indignation or the memory of injury be confused with hatred (II, 29).

3. "A private person, who, being averse to another, flees from him, if he does this in order to deprive him of his conversation and solace, and thus to sadden him and make it be ill with him, is hatred of enmity and a sin. But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is unlike your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion, and a sin if it is without reason: such it will not be if the person is very harsh, provided contempt, scandal, and the desire of vengeance are absent" (II, 30, 3).

501. III. Common signs of love and benefits are owed, of themselves, to enemies; but not special ones. The reason for the first is that to deny to an enemy those things which are owed to all would be a manifest sign of hatred and vengeance. Such denial will be a grave or light sin, according as, from the circumstances, contempt is present or is reputed grave or light. The reason for the second is that special signs, which are indications of restored former friendship or of perfect reconciliation, proceed not from debt, but from liberality (Ami du Cl., 1913, p. 203).

From these things you will deduce: 1. We are bound, speaking of itself, to return the greeting of an enemy greeting us,¹ to respond to one asking or writing, to sell exposed merchandise to one wishing to buy, not to exclude him from common prayers and alms, to furnish common services to him, to avert his harm if we easily can, etc. - For all these things are numbered among common signs.

2. Per accidens we are not bound to these things when charity or justice demands something else, or a reasonable cause excuses. And indeed a) Charity, as if, from signs or benefits denied, the enemy is hoped to be amended; if he is believed to become worse from the same signs being granted, or to interpret them badly; if, from speaking with him, it is feared that quarrels, contempt, etc., may be repeated. b) Justice, as if parents or Superiors, for the just punishment and correction of a son or subject (for example, on account of an infamous delict, an unworthy marriage), deny him sight, speech, entrance into the house, even after petition of pardon; yet provided that such a punishment does not exceed the gravity of the delict, and lasts only for a time, namely as long as it will seem expedient for amendment. c) A reasonable cause, for instance, if they are omitted for a short time, not from hatred, but as a signification of just pain or sadness on account of a recently received injury; if the enemy does not respond to signs of charity. Yet one must always beware both the danger of hatred and the scandal of others (II, 28, 2).

3. We are not bound of ourselves to receive an enemy with hospitality or at a banquet, to console him when sad, to visit him when sick, to admit him to familiar conversation, to greet him when met on the way, not to exact from him reparation of the harm inflicted, to leave him immune from the public vindication of the delict by not citing him before a judge on account of the common good.² For these are special signs, which fall under counsel alone.

4. Per accidens those special signs are sometimes owed: namely, when either by reason of circumstances they become common, as if someone must, as physician, visit the sick, or as innkeeper receive travelers at table and lodging, etc.; or when from elsewhere an obliging reason is added, for example, for avoiding scandal. Wherefore it is wicked to omit special signs of this kind: a) If the omission would be scandalous to others, or would confirm the hatred of the enemy. b) If by some sign of love you could, without grave inconvenience to yourself, reconcile the enemy to you and to God. c) If the enemy's grave necessity, bodily or spiritual, demands a special benefit, etc. d) If the enemy asks pardon, or offers suitable satisfaction; for then remission of the offense must be externally signified, for which, ordinarily, common signs do not suffice, but some special sign is required. e) If previously you had been accustomed to show peculiar signs to an enemy: then total omission of any special sign whatsoever seems to carry before itself an appearance of contempt or hatred, and therefore is not licit, unless you signify that it is not done from hatred, and thus remove scandal.

502. IT IS ASKED. What are the RULES to be observed in the reconciliation of enemies?

Resp. 1. If injuries intervened on one side only, the offender is bound, as far as can be done by him, to seek pardon and reconciliation by himself or by another, and to repair the harms following from the injury; for in whatever way charity was destroyed, in the same way it must also be restored.

Except, unless a legitimate reason excuses, for example if the offense was not grave, or the offended person is absent, or does not care for a petition of pardon, does not accept it, or on account of another reason is judged already to have been satisfied. Likewise, if between two offenders one offended the other more gravely or first, that one is first bound to show signs of reconciliation.

2. If the injuries on each side were morally equal and simultaneous, each enemy is bound, when the occasion is given, to begin reconciliation by greeting, conversation, invitation, benefit, etc. Moreover, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and address who passes while the other is standing or sitting before him, or who unexpectedly arrives.

3. A suitable time is to be sought; for although the offended person is bound from the beginning to forgive the offense, nevertheless he is not bound (at least under grave sin) so to forget it or to bear it with an even mind that he is immediately ready for reconciliation. For this seems violent and above human frailty, as they commonly teach. - "Ordinarily," Gousset observes (Theol. mor., I, 365), "the matter does not succeed except through the mediation of friends and prudent men." But if it is a question of restitution of a temporal good, the real right must rightly be distinguished from the injury to the person; otherwise reconciliation will be able to succeed but little prosperously.

503. Note. 1. For judging hatred itself, the confessor should believe the deeds rather than the words of the penitent; and, as regards the gravity of hatred, let him attend to three things: whether grave contempt was present, great sadness was inflicted, notable harm followed.

2. Ordinarily those cast suspicion of hatred who, although they say that they forgive, nevertheless refuse to address an enemy or to respond to him; a fortiori, those who assert that they will never speak even a word to him: unless this can be forgiven to the disturbance and horror of a recent injury. Wherefore let the confessor proceed cautiously, lest he absolve penitents of this kind too hastily.

3. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not immediately to be accused of sin, especially grave sin: for often they confuse hatred properly so called, or of enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of quality or defect, or even with some natural and invincible aversion of soul. Here the question will help: Why do you have hatred for your neighbor? and what have you done from it?

504. Seven sins kindred to hatred are numbered: envy, malediction, schism, discord, contention, brawl, and sedition.

1. ENVY is a capital vice, concerning which we treated n. 368 seqq.

2. MALEDICTION is the imprecation of evil, insofar as it is evil. It proceeds from anger or hatred. Three things are required for malediction to be mortal, namely: a) that the evil uttered is truly desired; b) that it is desired with perfect deliberation; c) that the evil desired is grave (V, 83). Cf. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 76, a. 3.

3. SCHISM is the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the unity of the Catholic Church. The Angelic says (2.2, q. 39, a. 1): "Those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him (in doctrine, worship, sacraments, etc.)": from which it is clear that schism is a most grave sin, whether it is pure, or joined with heresy. - See n. 1317.

4. DISCORD is a disagreement of wills concerning the good of God and neighbor, in which we are bound from charity to consent. It is mortal or venial, according to the measure of the matter (V, 66). It differs much from disagreement of intellect; which is not a sin, if it obtains concerning opinions whose use is licit: as was the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas (Acts 15:36-40).

5. CONTENTION is an inordinate fight of words, which obtains when truth is either attacked, or defended in an undue mode. "It is mortal when, with the spirit of contradicting, you altercate concerning truth pertaining to faith, or to the salvation of soul or body" (ibid., at the end).

6. BRAWL is a fight of hands and words, among private persons; namely, when from anger one unjustly attacks another. "Brawls, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise if they progress to seditions, wounds, slaughters. And these are commonly sins on the part of the one beginning the brawl; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense" (V, 83, end). Cf. n. 734.

7. SEDITION is an aggressive war by which one part of the republic unjustly rises up against another. If it is against the legitimate prince, it is called rebellion. Concerning these, recall the things said n. 148 and n. 150, q. 2.

505. NOTIONS. Scandalum in Greek is the same as offendiculum in Latin, a stumbling-block placed in the way, against which a traveler incautiously stumbling falls. Whence the name scandal, transferred from physical things to morals, signifies everything which can furnish to neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin, and also the spiritual ruin itself arising thence.

Therefore the essence of scandal is not to be sought in the admiration caused, nor in the knowledge stimulated, nor in the irritation produced; but in this, that it can furnish, or is capable of furnishing, an occasion, or an occasional cause, of sinning, for example if at the least rash judgment, unjust suspicion, or rumor would follow.

It differs from positive induction or seduction, which is rather cooperation in sin or an external action by which another is explicitly and directly provoked to sin (II, 58). Cf. Noldin, II, n. 110.

DIVISION. Scandal is twofold: namely, active and passive.

I. Active scandal is: "A less right word or deed, furnishing another an occasion of spiritual ruin" (2.2, q. 43, a. 1).

It is said: 1. word or deed, under which name also comes an external omission, for example the omission of Mass on a day on which the precept urges; 2. less right, that is, what either is evil in itself (as if you speak filthy things before a youth), or has the appearance of evil in the eyes of others (although in itself it is good), as if from a just cause, before others ignorant of it, you omit Mass on a feast day, leave parents in order to follow the evangelical counsels, eat flesh on a forbidden day; 3. furnishing another an occasion of spiritual ruin: for, for the notion of scandal, it is not required that spiritual ruin actually be brought upon neighbor; but it suffices to furnish to him an occasion of fall or an occasion of sinning in such a way that, the circumstances being attended to, his fall is probably to be feared.

Active scandal is subdivided into direct and indirect. 1. It is DIRECT if the ruin or sin of another is intended. But it can be intended either formally, namely if something is therefore done so that neighbor may fall into sin, and then the scandal is called diabolical; or materially, namely if neighbor is therefore exposed to sin so that his sin may serve the usefulness or pleasure of the one intending it, and then the scandal is called simply direct. 2. It is INDIRECT if the sin of neighbor is not indeed intended, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited (without just cause) (II, 43).

II. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of neighbor, or the sin for which an occasion is furnished to neighbor. It is similarly divided into two parts: 1. Scandal is GIVEN if it arises from active scandal, namely from a deed which is evil in itself or at least has the appearance of evil. 2. Scandal is ACCEPTED if it does not arise from active scandal. And this latter can happen in two ways, namely: a) if it arises from weakness alone or ignorance. Then it is called scandal of the little ones, because, from a deed which contains neither evil nor the appearance of evil, an occasion of sinning is taken solely on account of weakness or ignorance; for example, if a young man from the modest adornment of a girl takes occasion of desiring her basely; b) if it arises from malice alone, and then it is called pharisaical. Thus the Pharisees conceived hatred against Christ on the occasion of his words or deeds; so also one who sees a priest walking, and from this maliciously takes an occasion of saying that the ministers of the Church labor under sloth.¹

506. From these things you will gather: 1. Sometimes active and passive scandal are found together, namely when someone, from an occasion of sinning which neighbor furnished to himself, actually falls into sin. Sometimes there is active scandal without passive, namely when someone induces another by word or deed to sin, but the effect does not follow. Sometimes there is passive scandal without active, as happens, for example, in pharisaical scandal.

2. "It is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done being attended to, it can probably be feared that by this act those who otherwise would not sin are drawn to sin" (II, 43, 3). Wherefore those are not guilty of scandal who, living with a man prone to blasphemies, posit actions lightly evil, for example words of impatience, or even indifferent actions, from which new blasphemies can be foreseen; all the more because it is morally impossible to abstain from all these things (Aertnys, l. 2, tr. 3, n. 62).

3. "He is not judged to give scandal who, although he sins publicly, nevertheless does it before those who are either so vile, or infamous or wicked, or who are so upright, that no one is moved to sin: for example, if someone fornicates before others who are prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example; or if before the meek someone contends, brawls, or strikes another" (II, 44, 6; VI, 257).

These things having been posited, let us consider: 1. the malice; 2. the permission; 3. the reparation; 4. the frequency of scandal.

Passive scandal does not have a special malice; for it is nothing other than the sin itself of the one scandalized. Here only ACTIVE scandal is treated, and it is asked what kind and how great its malice is.

507. PRINCIPLES. I. Every scandal has at least a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the virtue to the wounding of which neighbor is exposed. As regards direct scandal, theologians generally agree. As regards indirect scandal, some say that through it one sins only against the virtue wounded; others think that one sins only against charity. Yet the opinion affirming that by each scandal one sins both against charity and against the virtue is to be preferred, with St. Alphonsus. Against charity indeed, because if from charity we are bound, when we can, to impede the sin of neighbor, much more are we bound not to be the occasion for neighbor of committing it. Against the virtue, because each virtue prohibits someone from being the cause or occasion to others of wounding it. And a very urgent reason against the first opinion is this: because where it is a question of consent in sin, the direct and indirect voluntary belong to the same species.²

We said at least twofold; because direct diabolical scandal sometimes also wounds charity toward God. Besides, every scandal can contain several malices: either on account of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example if a father scandalizes children, a Superior subjects, a teacher pupils; for these are held, not only from charity but also from office, to forestall the ruin of their subjects; or on account of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone induces a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, to filthy things. All these malices, diverse in species, can also be several in number: for there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized (cf. n. 331). See St. Alph., V, 46; Selva, P. I, c. 8; P. II, c. 2.

508. II. Scandal is a mortal sin of its kind. The reason is that it is opposed to the precept of charity toward neighbor, since the greatest of harms is inflicted upon him. Whence Christ said in Matt. 18:7: Woe to that man by whom scandal cometh.

But the gravity of scandal is measured: 1. from the more or less explicit intention of the ruin of neighbor; whence direct scandal is graver than indirect; 2. from the greater influence upon the ruin of neighbor; wherefore the scandal of a priest or religious is regularly graver than the scandal of a layman; 3. from the gravity of the sin of which it is the occasion. The reason is that it participates in the malice of this sin, as is established from the things said (n. 507). Hence it can happen that a sin grave according to itself is venial by reason of scandal, for example if your grave theft is the occasion to another of committing a light theft. Conversely, a sin light according to itself can be grave by reason of scandal, for example if a religious utters a less honorable word before women, or those who can thence take occasion of mortal sin (II, 44).

509. Corollaries. 1. To ask from another something which he himself will not furnish without sin, if he is already PREPARED to sin, is a sin of scandal, if the thing which is asked is intrinsically evil, so that in no way can it be furnished without sin; for example, fornication with a prostitute is certainly a sin of scandal, even if the other is already prepared to sin. The reason is that thus an occasion is given of greater ruin (II, 47; l. El. qq. ref., n. 8 and 16).

Yet he will not be guilty of scandal who, from a just cause, asks for a thing good or indifferent in itself, although the other, in furnishing it, commits sin. Thus, for example, it is lawful, for the sake of necessity or usefulness, to ask a loan from a usurer, the sacraments from a sacrilegious priest, the conjugal act from an abusing spouse. Cf. n. 315. But if a just and proportionate cause is lacking, it is not licit, without guilt of scandal, to do these things (II, 47, 77, 79).

2. To advise a LESSER EVIL, so that a greater may be avoided, to the execution of which another is already determined, is licit of itself, according to the more probable opinion (whether this lesser evil which is advised is of the same species or of a diverse species); namely, when the one acting is so firmly determined to execute the evil that in no other way can he be turned away from the execution. The reason is that then the one advising does not seek evil, but good, namely the choice of the lesser evil. Hence, to one prepared to kill an enemy, it is licit to advise that he rather strike him, or steal something from him (II, 57). Cf. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1911, p. 380.

Yet per accidens, by reason of justice, this is not licit: namely, if he is advised that a lesser evil be inflicted upon some other determinate person, which that person here and now is not bound to suffer (III, 565). Cf. n. 980.

3. To PERMIT an occasion of sinning (not evil of itself) is licit; even if the fall of another is thence foreseen, or probably feared; namely, if a cause is present, for example, that the delinquent may be corrected. For permission of itself is not induction; it is a merely indirect volition.

In this way, a father and a master can refrain from removing an occasion of stealing from sons or servants whom they have known to be prone to theft, so that, being caught, they may be punished and come to their senses; for one theft is reasonably permitted so that several may be avoided. Thus also it is licit for custodians of fields, vineyards, and forests to hide themselves, so that those causing damage may be caught, and, being punished, may be turned away from inflicting further damage.

Thus finally a man having a suspect wife can lay snares for her and catch her in the crime, in order that he may provide. Thus St. Thomas and others rather commonly. Cf. II, 58; H. Ap., IV, 30.

4. Probably it is also licit to PLACE an occasion, if a just cause is present; for only an indifferent act is posited, and the evil is permitted with sufficient reason.

Hence, probably the master does not sin who deliberately leaves open the chest in which money is kept, for the end that he may test the doubtful fidelity of a servant. St. Thomas (2.2, q. 78, a. 4) gives this general rule: "To induce a man to sin is in no way licit: yet to use the sin of another for good is licit."

5. In sins which necessarily have an ACCOMPLICE, the circumstance of induction is not to be explained in confession, according to a sufficiently probable opinion. For since in sins of this kind a mutual wounding of charity is found, the circumstance of induction is only an aggravating circumstance, within the same species, against charity, and therefore is not necessarily to be disclosed in confession. But he sufficiently accuses the sin of scandal who confesses the species of the sin, for example fornication, adultery, incest, etc. (II, 46; H. Ap., IV, 26; l. El. qq. ref., n. 7). Except, unless the one inducing to evil had used threats, or prayers so importunate that they could be equated with force.

510. From these things you will resolve: 1. A penitent does not satisfy in confession when he says: I gave scandal; but besides his own sin by which he gave scandal, he must express the species of mortal sin to which, by his evil example, praise, blame, etc., he gave occasion; besides, the number of persons to whom he furnished, or probably could furnish, an occasion to such sin; likewise, the quality of himself and of the person scandalized, whenever from this a new species is had; similarly, the unjust mode, if he used force or threats. But as regards those penitents who, in relation to indirect scandal, adhere to the opinion of modern authors (cf. n. 507), let the confessor act according to the principles to be established n. 1789.

2. Let the confessor and preacher gravely rebuke those giving scandal, after the example of Christ saying: Woe to that man by whom scandal cometh (Matt. 18:7). For by their work the world is filled with sins, and hell with souls (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 46).

The state of the question is whether it is licit to posit a good act having the appearance of evil, or an act wholly good or indifferent, from which passive scandal is foreseen as going to arise. That this is licit when the due conditions intervene is already established from the things said about the indirect voluntary (n. 315). Therefore it remains that we show when the due conditions are found, and since, in relation to the first three, there is no difficulty, there remains to be weighed when the fourth condition is verified, namely, WHEN A SUFFICIENT REASON IS GIVEN for permitting the scandal of neighbor. Yet we forewarn that here it is chiefly a question of grave scandal; although the things which we are about to say also hold, in due proportion, concerning scandal in light matter.

511. PRINCIPLES. I. Grave inconvenience is a sufficient reason for permitting scandal given or scandal of the little ones. This is established from the fact that charity does not oblige one to undergo grave inconvenience lest neighbor suffer harm which depends upon his free will, since then he is not constituted in strict necessity (cf. n. 480 and 519). But we are bound with light inconvenience, because from charity we ought to impede the sins of neighbor when we easily can (cf. n. 493). But a greater cause is required if a graver sin is feared, if there are several to be scandalized, if it is more certainly foreseen that scandal will follow (II, 48, 49).

Moreover, in practice, we can avoid scandal either by concealing the action, or by deferring it to another time, or by omitting it altogether; and specifically, as regards scandal given, or when the work from which scandal is foreseen bears before itself the appearance of evil, the occasion of ruin is to be removed, as far as it is in the power of the agent (yet not with grave inconvenience), by admonition made to neighbor concerning the rectitude of the action, for example on account of a dispensation, an excusing cause, etc. But if, after the admonition has been given, the scandal persists, it can now be equated with pharisaical scandal (II, 52).

II. Any reasonable cause whatsoever is a sufficient reason for permitting pharisaical scandal. The reason is that this scandal arises from the malice alone of neighbor. It is clear besides from the example of Christ, who despised the scandal of the Pharisees: Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind (Matt. 15:14). Wherefore if some reason of utility is present, whether one's own or another's, no further care is to be had concerning this scandal. Yet some reason is required, because charity demands that without any cause we should not offer even a remote occasion of sin to one who is about to sin from malice alone (II, 52).

512. Corollaries. 1. Precepts which here and now oblige are never to be omitted for avoiding any scandal whatsoever. The reason is that then to pass them over is sin, and consequently illicit. In that case the rule of Law is consonant: "More usefully is scandal permitted to arise than truth abandoned" (Reg. 3, l. 5, tit. 41).

Of this kind are: a) Precepts which are concerning things necessary for salvation, as the precept of receiving faith and baptism, and consequently also the precept of ministering a Sacrament necessary for salvation.

b) Precepts of natural law urging here and now, and not ceasing on account of changed circumstances. Thus on account of no scandal to be avoided is it licit to lie (II, 50).

c) Precepts of positive law, when pharisaical scandal is foreseen; because if they did not oblige and were omitted, an occasion would be given to depraved men of maliciously impeding the goods of others. But whether they oblige, and therefore are to be observed, when scandal of the little ones is foreseen, is controverted. Some probably affirm, because even positive and human precepts do not cease to oblige when scandal is not given but accepted. Others more probably deny, because there is present a conflict of laws, in which the natural precept (namely of impeding the sin of another) removes the obligation of the positive precept, which therefore is to be omitted, yet not with great inconvenience. This opinion is to be recommended only for one time or another, since frequent omission would induce grave inconvenience (II, 51, 53; cf. H. Ap., IV, 28; Conf. dir., IV, 14). Whence, in practice, since each opinion is probable, a woman, in order to avoid the sin of her husband, who would take from it an occasion of blaspheming, can well omit the precept of hearing Mass, or of observing fast, once or again, but is not bound to do so. Similarly, a girl, lest she offer herself to the sight of a young man by whom she knows she is basely loved, rightly omits Mass once and again, so that thus the other can notice that he is avoided by her.

2. Works of counsel or indifferent works are sometimes to be omitted for avoiding scandal of the little ones. Thus, for example, a woman who would foresee that she would be to some determinate person the cause of ruin would be bound once or another time, provided it can be done conveniently, to flee his sight, by going, for example, to another church, walking by another road, not approaching the window, and similar things.

But she would by no means be bound to do this for a long time, since this would be very burdensome. "For, ordinarily speaking, a cause suffices to excuse her at least from mortal sin, lest she be deprived of her liberty...; since it would be a very inconvenient thing for a woman, and liable to scruples, if she always had to weigh whether she has a just cause of going out or not." Nor is she bound to abstain from public walking on account of the scandal of others; for this must be judged too grave for her. Yet a girl could not be excused from mortal sin if, led by vanity, even if she does not intend the scandal of that man, she deliberately offers herself to his sight. Likewise if she seeks some place which she would not approach unless she knew her lover was present there (II, 58).

3. Temporal goods, if they are one's own, can indeed licitly be given up for avoiding the scandal of others; but they do not necessarily have to be given up.

Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to some workman, although you foresee that he will blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often and among many; whence, in the whole complex, it becomes grave. Similarly, a parish priest, of himself, is not bound to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks out into various detractions, etc.; for thence grave inconvenience would come both to the parish priest himself and to his successors (II, 52; St. Thom., 2.2, q. 78, a. 4).

Note. We said if they are one's own; for if the goods are another's, they cannot even licitly be given up, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed.

REPARATION OF SCANDAL generally demands two things for itself: one, sometimes under grave sin, that the further influence of scandal be removed as far as can be done; the other, which ordinarily does not seem to urge under mortal sin, that the amendment of him who suffered scandal be efficaciously consulted.

513. PRINCIPLES. I. He who from scandal has induced neighbor into sin, or into a harmful error, is bound from charity to repair this evil according to his powers. And indeed, if anyone whatsoever is bound from charity to correct one sinning or about to sin, a fortiori he who, by giving scandal, was the author why neighbor fell into sin or into danger of sinning, is bound by this obligation, even with greater inconvenience than all the rest. The same is to be said a fortiori concerning him who, through induction properly so called, persuasion, or counsel, made another sin or err.

Hence: 1. He who gave scandal to others by wicked counsels which are still efficacious must render them inefficacious through diligent revocation to be made known to the same persons, either by himself or by another. Thus an author who, through heretical or obscene writings, was to others a cause of sinning, is bound to impede the diffusion of his books, publicly retract his writings, and compose and publish new ones, if he can, for the edification of the Christian faithful.

2. He who induced neighbor into a stable perversion, for example of concubinage or irreligiosity, is bound under grave sin to labor for his conversion, so that he may lead him back, either by himself or by others, into the path of virtue. We say either by others; for sometimes it is better to use the work of others, especially when it is a question of the conversion of an accomplice in filthy matter: in which case the occasion of sinning could easily be brought back.

3. As regards ordinary scandals, which bring forth not full perversion but only passing sins, these regularly cannot be repaired except by that general reparation which is contained in the cessation itself from scandal, in good example, in prayer for the one scandalized, and similar things.

514. II. Public scandal obliges the guilty person to public reparation. Otherwise the further influence of scandal is not sufficiently removed, nor are all the scandalized admonished concerning the evil which they suffered.

Wherefore a concubinary, a usurer, or another sinner of this kind is to be constrained, if it can be done, to public reparation of scandal: suppose that, his commerce or wicked business having first been abandoned, he publicly approach the sacraments with devotion.

III. The scandal of a Superior, given to subjects, must be repaired by him from office. Thus, for example, a father of a family who scandalized domestics is ordinarily to be constrained to repair the scandal, if this is still judged efficacious, so that he may manifest to the same domestics his displeasure concerning his evil example, and paternally exhort them not to follow it in the future.

IV. Scandal unjustly inflicted must be repaired from justice. It is said: unjustly inflicted, that is, by fraud, force, deceit, unjust fear. It must be repaired by restraining the influence of the action. The reason is that each one has a right not to be injured unjustly in spiritual goods.

But after the unjust means have been removed, the one scandalizing is probably bound only from charity to repair the scandal. For when force or fraud has now ceased, and the other knows that he was deceived, he can, if he wishes, extricate himself from sin by himself, and therefore, if he does not amend himself, this is imputed to him (III, 661).

515. Those are to be held guilty of much pernicious scandal:

1. Those retaining the custom of blaspheming, especially before younger persons, most of all if before children.

2. Reporters of grave detraction, relating the matter to others; for thence arise hatreds and quarrels.

3. Messengers of love to some woman, whether married or unmarried, apart from the end of marriage. Thus especially servants and maidservants sin who furnish help to sons of families for fostering base loves (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 45).

4. Those spreading books of harmful reading, namely who scatter them, sell them, or hand them over to be read by others. Likewise, those who make, spread, or publicly sing filthy little songs or poems.

5. Those introducing into schools a pernicious manner of teaching, or dangerous books. Without scandal anatomical and surgical books, or even books of pagan authors not sufficiently expurgated, cannot be handed into the hands of boys (cf. Const. Officiorum ac munerum, n. 10).

6. Those uttering lascivious speeches, whether in clear words or equivocal ones (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers). This is, says St. Alphonsus (l. c.), "ordinary scandal: men speak dishonorably before women, youths, and sometimes even before innocent children. And alas, what ruin they cause!..."

7. Those given to alluring performances. Thus the authors, actors, and actresses of comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances in which, by reason of the dress of the dancing-women, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, filthiness appears (III, 428). Cf. n. 835. Likewise the authors of a cinematographic exhibition which infects especially the mind of youths, excites the imagination, indeed provokes the will to crimes to which a man would certainly be less prone unless he saw them remain unpunished, and their authors praised on account of their cunning and dexterity. But whether and how far the spectators of such exhibitions (who ordinarily defile themselves with many internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles later to be established concerning cooperation (III, 427). Cf. below n. 519, 525, 836.

8. Painters, sculptors, photographers, and others who at home or in gardens or museums, etc., exhibit to the sight of all obscene statues or images, namely those in which those parts of the body (we do not say of an infant, but of a more grown person), which modesty teaches among all peoples are to be veiled, appear naked or covered only by a thin veil. "Otherwise if, with other parts uncovered, the shameful parts are covered" (II, 56). Yet there is no one who does not know that images and statues truly can be obscene when, although all things are covered, from the gesture and manner of holding oneself a mind addicted to lust appears.

9. Persons who by a special title ought to remove others from sin; thus sin: a) Parents and masters who permit their daughters or maidservants conversations in hidden places with spouses and lovers. b) Wives who, by admitting their graceful lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and others, as experience teaches. And the same must be said of a husband who keeps a maidservant suspected by his wife not without reason. c) Clerics who, keeping at home a person suspect to the people, furnish an occasion to sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state, etc. etc. (Council of Trent, Sess. 25, c. 14, de Ref.).

516. You will ask. What is to be thought concerning THE ADORNMENT OF WOMEN?

1. Moderate adornment, according to the decency of state, is licit of itself, because it does not give occasion of sinning. Hence there is no sin if a woman decently adorns herself in order to please her husband, or to find a spouse. But if she acts from levity or vanity, she sins venially (II, 54).

2. Excessive adornment, namely that which exceeds the condition of one's own state, is of itself venial, because of itself it does not gravely move others to equal luxury. But it becomes mortal: a) if it is indulged in for provoking the lasciviousness of men; b) if the fall of some man in particular is foreseen. Women who use rouge and pigments, scandal being prescinded from, sin only venially; but not at all, if they intend thus only to conceal defects of the body (II, 54, 55; III, 425).

3. Immodest adornment, such as is not rarely accustomed to be displayed at solemn dinners and evening gatherings, is illicit according to the degree of immodesty.¹

Hence: a) if the uncovering is so immoderate that the breasts are shown almost entirely or are covered with a very thin veil, it is of itself grave scandal, because such immodesty of itself incites to lust; b) but if it is not so immoderate, so that only the arms, or the breasts in part, are uncovered, those women indeed are not excused from mortal sin who introduce the use of such dress where it does not prevail; but others who follow what has already been introduced, although they are to be severely rebuked, nevertheless are not, of themselves, to be condemned for mortal sin; because custom causes concupiscence to blaze up much less. For the rest, by denudation of the breast women not rarely seek to be dishonorably desired by men, in which case direct scandal will be present. Wherefore this worst custom is to be restrained and extirpated by preachers and confessors as far as can be done; c) what has been said concerning denudation of the breast seems also to be said concerning garments so studiously made, tight and thin, that the whole conformation of the body appears.

We shall treat: 1. of cooperation in general; 2. of the various modes of cooperating, or of the cases which are accustomed to occur more frequently.

517. DEFINITION. To cooperate, in general and by force of the word, is the same as to work with another.

But someone can work with another both by inducing him to act, and by furnishing help to him, already determined to act, by which he may be able to accomplish his work.

Concerning the first mode of cooperating, which is done by induction and which is compared to SCANDAL, we treated in the preceding disputation. Therefore it remains that we discuss also the second mode, which is done by furnished help.

Therefore, properly COOPERATION is named and can be defined: concurrence with the depraved action of another principally acting.

DIVISION. Cooperation is distinguished as manifold, according to the various modes by which the cooperator concurs with the depraved action of another:

I. By reason of the evil act, it is formal or material: 1. FORMAL cooperation is that which concurs even with the evil will of the one principally acting, or is the concurrence which someone furnishes with that intention (whether explicit or implicit) that it may be a help to the one principally acting in executing the evil work.

This can be done in two ways, namely: a) through work which, taken concretely, by its very nature, that is, from the end of the work, is ordered to the depraved action, for example, in a scenic work by which religion is derided, to act the parts of an actor; b) or through indifferent work, which indeed not from itself, but from the special intention of the cooperator, that is, from the end of the one acting, is directed to a depraved action of this kind: for example, if someone furnishes money to another, collected for spreading errors; or if someone accompanies another to a place of filthiness, so as thereby to render him more bold for sin.

2. MATERIAL cooperation is that which furnishes the material of sin; which therefore, apart from the intention and with the mere permission of the cooperator, concurs with the evil action of another. It is furnished through work which neither of itself nor from the determination of the cooperator is ordered to this evil action, and which the one principally acting can use without sin; although, on account of his malice, he abuses it for sinning. Cooperation of this kind would be, for example, the furnishing of wine to one who wishes to make himself drunk; the handing over of keys to one who enters in order to steal (II, 63; H. Ap., IV, 31; cf. III, 571; Conf. dir., IV, 16).

II. Material cooperation can be subdivided:

1. By reason of the help furnished, it is immediate or mediate. - It is called immediate when the cooperator acts with the one principally acting in the evil act itself, for example by helping a thief carrying off another's thing; but mediate when the cooperator furnishes something which serves the one principally acting for executing the depraved work, for example by handing over a ladder to a thief about to invade a house.

2. By reason of connection with the depraved act, it is proximate or remote: namely, according as, from its nature or from the circumstances, it is judged to have or not to have a moral connection with the sin of the one principally acting. Thus, for example, proximate cooperation is to give a sword to one about to kill; but remote cooperation is to furnish the material from which the sword is to be made (cf. n. 313, 2).

Note. 1. Concerning cooperation which becomes formal from the intention of the cooperator, there can scarcely ever be difficulty; because one cooperating in such a way directly intends the sinful action and evidently becomes a participant in the malice of the one principally acting. But whether and when this depraved intention must be MANIFESTED to the one principally acting, in order that the cooperator may also be held to reparation of harm, is a question which will be weighed in the treatise on the seventh Precept (cf. n. 976 seqq.).

2. But concerning cooperation which is formal from its nature, and objectively can never be reputed material, dispute frequently occurs; because, in order to define whether some work is ordered of itself and from the intrinsic end of the work to the depraved action of another or not, there is often need of most attentive consideration and much sagacity.

To elucidate this matter, it helps to add the following:

a) An action ordered of itself to a depraved end is to be considered in such a way that it neither has nor can have a good end. This can be verified either concerning an action taken speculatively, or concerning an action apprehended concretely, that is, clothed with such circumstances. Thus to paint, in a temple of heretics, an image of the founder of the sect with an aureole; to discharge a gun with another against someone, are actions of themselves ordered only to an evil end.

b) An action which, for the one principally acting, is a condition without which he could not act does not by that very fact become an action ordered solely to an evil end; for example, to place one's shoulders under, says St. Alphonsus (III, 571), to furnish a ladder to a master wishing to ascend for fulfilling lust, is not cooperation of itself ordered to sin.

c) From the fact that the one principally acting becomes more bold for the attainment of the intended end, it cannot always by that very fact be said that the cooperation of another is formal; for example, in the example of one placing his shoulders under, these things are verified; and nevertheless he who places his shoulders under furnishes merely material cooperation. But if the cooperator who renders the one principally acting more bold, by his action, as it were acts his person and receives in himself a part of the evil work, he becomes guilty of formal cooperation: for example, one who for his master writes truly amorous letters containing filthy things; one who to a thief prepared for sinning indicates, at his request, the time and mode so that he can commit his crime more securely; one who, while someone indulges lust in a bedroom, acts as watchman, formally cooperate in the sin.

d) Formal cooperation is not synonymous with illicit cooperation: for every formal cooperation is illicit, but not vice versa; for example, he who, on account of a reason not proportioned to the evil, furnishes material cooperation certainly sins, but does not become guilty of formal cooperation. The number of actions which of themselves, from the end of the work, are formal cooperations is not so great.

518. PRINCIPLES. I. Formal cooperation is never licit. For formal cooperation, since it includes some consent of the will in another's sin as sin, is intrinsically evil, and cannot be without fault. Therefore it can be excused by no reason, not even fear of death (H. Ap., IV, 31).

Indeed, no otherwise than scandal, it has at least a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the virtue which is wounded (cf. n. 507).

Hence it is never licit to furnish work which, from its nature, can be ordered only to sin as such: as would be, for example, to make instruments suited only to impeding generation, to prepare remedies destined only to procuring abortion, to seek a concubine for a master, to write amorous and filthy letters to a concubine for a concubinary, to invite a woman to commit crime with the master, etc. (II, 67). Likewise, according to St. Alphonsus (II, 64, 65, 68; l. El. qq. ref., 11), it is never licit for a servant to carry amorous letters to the concubine of his master, or to carry little gifts and dainties to a prostitute; because this service also, from its nature, as regards this act taken concretely, fosters base love, and by its nature is born to produce no other effect of itself.² And the same must be said of a girl if she willingly accepts gifts of a lover basely desiring her. For thus she fosters his base love, in which she at least implicitly consents (II, 76).

But if, on account of peculiar circumstances, the action of the cooperator does not involve consent of this kind, it can be without sin; for example, if a girl accepting gifts offered before others cannot refuse without stirring up suspicions and incurring danger of infamy. Then her acceptance becomes morally another action, insofar as she simply consults her reputation. Thus also postal officials who carry letters which, from certain indications, they know to be amorous, simply fulfill a public function, in the name of the State.

519. II. Material cooperation is sometimes licit. It is licit, namely, if three conditions are present, from the indirect voluntary, that is: 1. if the action of the cooperator is good of itself, or at least indifferent; 2. if his intention is right; 3. if there is present a just cause, and proportioned both to the gravity of the sin of another, and to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished for the execution of the sin.³

"The reason is that when you furnish an indifferent action without a depraved intention, if the other should wish to abuse it for executing his sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it; and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, positing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin: for then that man's sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him who abuses your action. Nor does it avail to say that your action, although indifferent, nevertheless, joined with the circumstance of the depraved intention of another, becomes evil; for in reality, your action is not conjoined of itself with his evil will, but he conjoins his evil will with your action; whence your action will not then be a cause influencing the sin of itself, but only an occasion which he abuses for sinning" (II, 63).

Moreover, for judging when the CAUSE is just and proportionate, above all let it be observed as a rule what the Doctors say; because, since this depends upon the estimation of prudent men, the more common opinion in this matter will also be the more probable. - Therefore generally it can be said that "a cause is required so much the graver: 1. the graver the sin is whose occasion is given; 2. the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin, or the more certain the effect of the sin is; 3. the more closely your cooperation touches the sin; 4. the less right you have to such a work; 5. finally, the more the sin conflicts with justice, and this on account of harm to a third party" (II, 59; H. Ap., IV, 32). Cf. above n. 314.

520. Hence the following SPECIAL RULES are drawn out:

1. It is always licit to cooperate materially with the sin of another in order to avoid a greater evil; for the axiom holds: "Of two evils the lesser is to be chosen." Thus, for example, you licitly furnish wine to one about to make himself drunk, lest he break out into blasphemies (II, 69; V, 77).

2. It is licit to cooperate materially in the lesser harm of neighbor, so that HE may be freed from a greater one, if another means is lacking; for since the owner can dispose of his own thing, he is judged reasonably to will this. Thus it is licit to help an enemy to lay waste a house, to steal, etc., lest the owner be killed (II, 74).

3. It is licit to cooperate materially, even IMMEDIATELY, with harm to a third party, for example by breaking doors, so that one's OWN harm of a superior order may be avoided. Thus it is lawful to burn a house in order to avoid death. For one constituted in such necessity can suppose the consent of the owner, who would be unwilling irrationally. But MEDIATELY it is licit to cooperate if it is a question of avoiding equal harm to oneself. Thus it is licit to give back a sword to one about to kill, so that one's own life may thereby be consulted. The reason is that, from the order of charity, we are not bound to impede the harm of another (even if this one is in extreme necessity) with equal detriment to ourselves (II, 76; III, 571; Istr., X, 56).

4. The cause which suffices for excusing a private cooperator does not suffice for excusing a Superior, magistrate, or anyone else who, not only from charity, but by force of his function, is held to ward off evil or to impede others' sins; for where there is a twofold obligation, there the excusing cause must necessarily be morally twofold. Thus, for example, parents must impede the sins of children, parish priests the sins of parishioners, magistrates the delicts of citizens, etc. Thus also merchants sometimes, from a special law, are bound not to sell certain dangerous weapons, poisonous drinks, etc. (H. Ap., IV, 32).

5. The cause which would excuse you if the one principally acting would attain his end equally easily does not suffice for excusing you if, your concurrence being denied, the other would not have sinned.

Since an enumeration of all the cases in which cooperation intervenes is plainly impossible, it will be enough to have enumerated those which are accustomed to occur more frequently, and from which the rest can be judged.⁴ But the prudent

confessor should ADVERT: 1. that good faith often excuses in this matter; 2. that for various places and times, much attention must be given to common estimation; 3. that in doubt, favor is not to be given to liberty where the reason of scandal, danger of perversion, of formal sin, etc., stands in the way; and if it is a question of a public matter, recourse to Superiors and to the more prudent is not to be omitted (cf. Konings, 312; Aertnys, l. II, n. 79).

521. 1. To the violation of the law of abstinence. a) If the sin of the master violating the law is established, it is not licit for a servant to prepare or serve forbidden food from the sole reason of service, because it is a question of proximate cooperation; it is licit only on account of notable detriment. b) In doubt, the master is presumed to be excused by a just cause. - But in practice, rarely will either doubt or notable detriment be lacking (II, 68).

2. To usury. a) He who helps a usurer only in counting monies, writing accounts, or carrying a pledge, can be excused by the reason of service alone. b) Otherwise, if he exacts usuries: because exaction is a more proximate cooperation with the sin of the usurer, even if he exacts amicably. c) But if he exacted by force or threats, he would not only sin, but besides would be held to restitution, the master failing.

3. To lust. Three kinds of services must here be distinguished: a) services which from their nature are determined to filthiness; b) services indifferent of themselves which concur proximately with the filthiness of the master; c) services which concur with the same only remotely. Now:

Services of the FIRST kind are excused by no reason, since they constitute true formal cooperation (cf. n. 518).

Services of the SECOND kind, because they are proximate cooperations, cannot be excused from the sole reason of service, but only from another cause, whether grave or most grave, according to the diversity of the case. Thus, for example, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus (II, 64), the sole reason of service does not suffice, but besides there is required at least fear of grave harm, in order that a servant may licitly accompany his master to a place of filthiness; or saddle the horse for him departing there (even if the master is not rendered more bold by these things); or bring the concubine in a carriage to the house of the concubinary master, if it had already been agreed between him and the concubine; to offer a shoulder to one ascending to a woman not unwilling, etc., even if in these matters the servant furnishes merely material work. But a most grave cause, indeed fear of death, would be required in order that he could licitly help the master by carrying a ladder, or placing his shoulders under, or opening a door by force, when the master wishes to ascend to deflower a virgin.

Services of the THIRD kind, since the cooperation is remote, can be excused from the sole reason of service. Hence, for example, it will be licit for a servant, in the usual manner, to open the door to a concubine or prostitute, if, if he himself does not open, there is another who will open. But if the servant were many times compelled to such services, he would have to be earnestly admonished to leave the service (II, 66).

It is asked. What concerning public carriage-drivers conveying others to a brothel?

Resp. 1. It is proximate cooperation; therefore they are not excused by reason of wages, but only on account of grave harm to be avoided; for example, if a public carriage-driver feared lest he be dismissed, not easily about to find another master (II, 75; l. El. qq. ref., n. 15). Likewise, if carriage-drivers are held by civil law to convey travelers wherever they wish.

2. They can never offer their work for leading someone more safely or more secretly, or indicate to one ignorant where the brothel is. For it is formal cooperation (II, 64, 75; Kon., n. 311).

522. 1. To violation of the law of abstinence. a) Of themselves it is not licit for innkeepers, on a forbidden day, to serve meats of their own accord: because it would be a true and at least remote cooperation with another's sin, without a just cause (II, 80; l. El. qq. ref., n. 17). But it seems licit (at least where the usage prevails) universally to serve meats to guests asking for it, provided their request is not made in contempt of religion (III, 1030, q. 3).

b) Those innkeepers who establish a common table (table d'hote), at which guests sit jointly, or who await travelers arriving by public carriages or railway at a determined hour, taught by experience that many will ask for meat or broth from meat, can licitly have these things ready, so that they may then set them before those asking; or even spread the table with licit and illicit foods, offer them, mark them on a card, so that each may choose what has pleased him.

The reason is both that among so many, many are presumed to be legitimately excused or to be in good faith, whom to question individually would be grave or dangerous; and that such cooperation does not seem to be except remote, and if sometimes it were proximate, it must be said that in the present state of affairs it is impossible, at least in many places, to exercise the office of innkeeper otherwise (Kon., 310).

c) Those who have received some Catholics into board for an agreed price (pension) ought not so easily to furnish meats on forbidden days; because it is proximate cooperation, and in a private house the laws of the Church are more easily observed, nor does there generally occur so grave a reason for cooperating (ibid.). Yet those are more easily excused who, on fast days, in morning and evening, furnish foods not prohibited by reason of quality. For more are excused from fasting than from abstinence, on account of grave labor or not firm health. Therefore the cooperation is rather remote, and the matter is safely remitted to the conscience of individual boarders.

2. To drunkenness. It is not licit for innkeepers to give wine to those concerning whom they foresee that they will become drunk, unless on account of fear of grave evil, for example to forestall blasphemies or brawls, or also if from refusal they fear lest they be notably injured on account of diminution of guests: for it is proximate cooperation. Other evils also are to be weighed which often follow from drunkenness, as dissipation of goods, the misfortune of the wife, scandal of the children, etc. (II, 69).

3. To lust. a) Innkeepers are guilty of most grave sin and unworthy of absolution who, formally cooperating, furnish secret rooms for lust; or who conduct wholly filthy and lascivious dances at their place, unless the filthiness or lasciviousness would happen accidentally, for example in wedding dances. b) Universally, innkeepers are to be deterred as much as possible from instituting dances, because dances are generally done less honorably and furnish occasion to innumerable sins. Moreover, for judging whether absolution is to be denied to those wishing to institute them, the circumstances are to be inspected, and the mode in which the dances are accustomed to be done (Kon., n. 310). Cf. n. 829.

4. To harmful reading. a) Innkeepers cannot expose for reading those public papers which evidently and ordinarily are adverse to religion or morals, or positively prohibited by the Bishop, even if guests on that account cease to flow together to them; for in the latter case it is a question of proximate cooperation in a public evil. The same is to be said of those papers which generally and evidently are adverse to the clergy, and are the cause why the faithful detract from the veneration owed to them. A sufficient reason for exposing papers of this kind could be only a particular necessity, for guests, of knowing something from them, for example news pertaining to commerce, which would be sought elsewhere in vain. But in this case the master of the inn, in the best way which can be done, ought to signify that he exposes such papers only on account of the aforesaid reason, and does not approve their arguments. He must also watch lest they be exposed without necessity, and that they be destroyed as soon as possible. b) Commonly a sufficient reason is present for admitting those papers which treat of merely political matters. Nor do innkeepers seem to be bound to reject a newspaper which now and then contains something less right by reason of faith or morals, provided it is not generally opposed to religion or good morals (Kon., n. 310, d). Cf. n. 453.

523. To abuse of the things which they hand over. 1. If the thing of itself is determined to evil, and has no good use, as, for example, an idol for pagans in a region of unbelievers; a theatrical garment manifestly filthy; a woman's adornment obscene of itself; a scenic mask which has no other end than to turn religion and its rites and ministers into mockery; the distinctive insignia of a Masonic sect or of another of the same kind; a drug destined solely to procuring abortion, etc.; it is clear that the making and sale of this thing are generally altogether illicit.¹ - Whence St. Alphonsus (II, 72): "The sale of poison," he says, "which does not serve except for the killing of a man, is simply evil." But poisons which can be useful may not be sold except to those who are thought to be going to use them well, for example for making colors, or for medicine.

2. If the thing is indifferent of itself, but from the circumstances it is established that the buyer is led by an evil intention, it will not be licit to make, rent, or sell it, except from a grave or proportionate cause, even if it would equally be bought from others. Thus it is not licit to sell ornaments to a girl about to abuse them, unless otherwise the seller would suffer notable inconvenience (II, 71; l. El. qq. ref., 14; cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 8). It is said: even if it would equally be bought from others; because we are bound, at least short of grave inconvenience, to admonish one sinning, and especially one giving scandal, when opportunity is given. Now, "the denial of my cooperation," says Sanchez (Decal., l. 1, c. 7, n. 16), "is a certain kind of admonition, by which neighbor could have been recalled, if not from the present sin, at least from a future one, from the memory of this denial."

3. Catholics are not to be disquieted who, in order to avoid grave harm, build or restore synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, provided scandal is not present and it is not in contempt of religion. On account of defect of this condition, they are bound to abstain from the work: a) where a work of this kind is commonly held as a protestative sign of false religion; b) or something is contained in it which of itself directly and solely expresses reprobation of Catholic worship and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; c) or it is established that Catholic artisans are driven or called to the work by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion (from the declaration of the Holy Office, Aug. 17, 1613; Jan. 14, 1818; July 7, 1864).² The Holy Office declared the same on July 27, 1892,³ concerning cooperation with cremation of corpses (cf. n. 1388bis). With the same cause existing, it is licit for Catholics, for the use of heretics, to make and sell organs, a pulpit, a supper-table, altars, a chalice, priestly vestments, etc. A fortiori, it is licit to build and adorn theaters, etc., provided the ornaments are not impious or dishonorable in themselves. A sufficient cause for excusing workmen is more easily given than one which would be sufficient to excuse architects, contractors, and masters of workers, since they are not placed in the same necessity as the workers.⁴

4. A graver cause is required in order that it be licit to sell land to heretics for building a temple, to rent or sell to those enrolled in a Masonic sect a house destined for their meetings, etc.⁵

5. But a most grave cause is required, suppose danger of death, of most harsh exile, or an equivalent danger, in order that it be licit to furnish work for building or restoring temples of false gods, etc. Others say that this is in no way licit, from decrees of the Holy Inquisition of the years 1629 and 1699. But the mentioned decrees seem to have been issued on account of peculiar circumstances, from which the concurrence of Catholics would have been formal cooperation and, from the concrete nature of the thing, a protestative sign of false religion (Coll. Miss. Ext., n. 1070 and 1089; Gallo, l. c., p. 251).

6. If the depraved end of the one asking is not established, it is licit for workers, merchants, renters, etc., by the sole title of commerce, to hand over indifferent things to anyone asking; because in doubt no one is presumed evil. Thus, for example, strong liquors, dice, playing-cards, pigments, etc., are licitly sold, although many generally abuse them (II, 71).

604. Preliminary Note. The precept of charity toward neighbor is at the same time positive and negative. Insofar as it is positive, it enjoins acts of charity, by omitting which a man sins. Let the things said in the preceding article suffice for judging these sins of omission. But insofar as the precept of charity is negative, it prohibits several acts: hatred, enmities, envy, discord, contentions, war, quarrels, scandal, cooperation in evil, etc. Already above enough has been said concerning hatred, enmity, and also envy.¹⁰² War will be treated below, t. II, because by war not only charity but also justice is usually violated.

Discord (Zwietracht) is opposed to concord, which is union of hearts. Discord is a disagreement of wills concerning the good of God and neighbor; but not a disagreement of opinions, which sometimes is licit and existed, e.g., between St. Peter and St. Paul. Discord arises from excessive love of self and notably from vain glory.¹⁰³ Sacred Scripture bearing witness (Prov. 6, 19 and 17, 19), he who meditates discords loves quarrels, and him who sows discords among brothers God detests.

Contention (Wortstreit) is a disordered fight of words, or, as Cicero (Rhet. lib. 3) says, "it is sharp speech fitted for confirming and refuting." This disordered fight of words is accustomed to arise from vain glory, just as discord.¹⁰⁴

A quarrel (tatlicher Streit) between private persons is a certain private war, which is waged not only with words, but also by exterior deed. A quarrel is accustomed to arise from anger and is more or less sinful, unless it happens from just defense.¹⁰⁵

It remains only that here scandal and cooperation be treated more fully. Those two sins are not specifically distinct, but differ only in degree. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity we shall treat separately 1. of scandal and 2. of cooperation in evil.

¹⁰² Cf. n. 421 sqq.

¹⁰³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 37, a. 2.

¹⁰⁴ Ib. q. 38, a. 2.

¹⁰⁵ Ib. q. 41, a. 2.

The discussion must be: 1° on the precept of love of the neighbor in itself; 2° on works of charity to be fulfilled from it; 3° on vices opposed to charity toward the neighbor.

§ I. On The Precept Of Love Of The Neighbor In Itself.

1° Toward all in general; 2° toward enemies in particular.

278. Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is established 1° from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, created to His image and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; therefore, just as we must love God, so also we must love the neighbor on account of God. - 2° It is established from Sacred Scripture:¹ "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." - 3° It is also established from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI (see p. XV).

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, as to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts, he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

II. Some order of charity must be preserved in love of the neighbor; for the objects which charity embraces are not equal; therefore neither are they to be loved equally. But this whole order is placed in this, that we assign to each lovable subject its own fitting place, with regard namely both to goods, to necessity, and to persons.

1. Account must be had of goods, for all goods are not of the same excellence. For this is their order, that the first place be held, and therefore before all things procured, by spiritual goods; the second by intrinsic natural goods, as life, health, integrity of members; the third by extrinsic natural goods, as reputation and honor; to which riches are to be added in the last place as being of an inferior order. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to the private good.

2. Account must be had of necessity, which can be diverse, whether it is spiritual or temporal. A threefold necessity is distinguished: - extreme, as when someone without the help of another cannot free himself from danger of damnation, or from death or another evil almost equal; - grave, as when someone, unless he is helped by another, can escape the danger of the soul or of the life of the body, or of another grave evil, only with very great difficulty; - common or mediocre, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this necessity, in the spiritual order, ordinary sinners are situated, who, if they wished to employ some effort, could rise again from the depraved state. But in the temporal order, beggars are generally in this necessity; for them, according to their condition, life is not held as too burdensome.

3. Account must be had of persons; for the love of diverse persons must be measured according to the diverse reason of excellence and conjunction of the person to be loved.

279. • Special rules of the order of effective charity, or of succor, from the common doctrine of Theologians, are these:

First Rule. Each one is held, absolutely speaking and in equal necessity, to love himself more than the neighbor, as to goods of the same order, according to that: well-ordered charity begins from oneself; for "no one is nearer than each one is to himself"; and this moreover is clear from the natural and invincible inclination of all. And therefore: 1) we are held to love our own soul more than the soul of the neighbor; and for this reason it will never be licit to sin either gravely or lightly in order to consult the salvation of another. Yet it will be licit for a just cause to expose oneself to a probable, not certain, danger of sinning. Thus, for example, it is licit for physicians and priests to read and handle dangerous matters; and in the extreme spiritual necessity of the neighbor, for example if otherwise an infant is certainly about to die without baptism, it will be necessary to expose oneself to it. - 2) We are regularly held to prefer our life to the life of the neighbor. I said: regularly; for a private person a) is held to expose life to certain danger for the republic, or for preserving the life of a person altogether necessary for the public good (n. 278, II, 1); b) can from the motive of virtue expose life for the life of another private person. For the order of charity in this case is not injured, since not precisely the life of the neighbor, but the good of virtue, is then preferred to our life.

Second Rule. 1° If the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity, he must be succored even with danger to our life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a more excellent good than our temporal life. Hence you are bound, with danger to your life, to baptize a dying infant. Likewise if you know that someone, existing in mortal sin, is to be killed while asleep or thinking of nothing. Make exception if either a) there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor, whence a mother is not held to undergo danger of life so that the offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether the latter will come through to baptism; or b) another is present who can and wills to succor him; or c) a graver evil is feared from it, as if he who exposes life for a brother is necessary for the common good. The reason for these exceptions is clear of itself.

2° If the necessity of the neighbor is temporal, you are not held to very difficult or almost morally impossible means, for example to spending on him an extraordinary sum of money, although you are rich; because although in a necessity of this sort charity obliges even with great inconvenience, nevertheless not with the greatest, even toward yourself.

Third Rule. If the neighbor is in grave necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, no one is held of himself to succor him with grave inconvenience; for when another absolutely can free himself from danger, charity does not seem to oblige us to come to his aid with such great difficulty, since then the neighbor cannot truly be said to be in a case of necessity, as being not ineluctable. I said: 1) of himself; for he would be held even with danger to life who was obliged to this either by reason of office, as Pastors of souls are; - or by reason of a delict, as if someone had taught heresy; - or if that grave necessity is public, because a public grave necessity is accustomed always to be joined with the extreme necessity of certain private persons. Hence if someone spreads heresy somewhere, you are held to impede him with danger to life, if you can do this efficaciously and no one else impedes him. Likewise if in persecution or hostile incursion some people lacked a priest, and otherwise were exposed to grave dangers of sinning, you are likewise held to assist them with danger to life. I said: 2) with grave inconvenience; for each one is held to assist the neighbor constituted in grave necessity with mediocre inconvenience, as the matter itself says.

Fourth Rule. If the neighbor is situated in common necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, he will indeed have to be helped, because love of neighbor demands this; but speaking of itself there cannot be present except a light obligation, for the neighbor himself can rather easily free himself from such necessity, nor is it so burdensome to him.

Fifth Rule. Finally, if a comparison is instituted among diverse persons, in equal necessity we ought to prefer blood relatives, or those joined in some other way, to strangers; because charity does not change the order of nature, but perfects it. - I said: in equal necessity; for since the obligation of succoring the neighbor does not exist except by reason of the necessity in which he is situated, it is clear that the obligation is greater where the necessity is greater. - But among those joined to us, those more closely joined are always to be preferred according to their various degrees, with regard to the necessity and the goods which are owed to such conjunction and in which it is founded. Hence in grave necessity: 1) the wife is to be preferred, because she is one flesh with the man and the principle of children; 2) children, because they are more closely joined, since they proceed from the substance of the parents; 3) parents, who after those named concur toward the fellowship of life and the increase of the republic; 4) brothers, sisters, relatives, domestics, fellow citizens, and fellow soldiers. I said: in grave necessity; for if the necessity is extreme, more probably not the good of families, but of life, must be attended to. Hence then parents are to be preferred to all because of the eminence of the principle; and indeed the father is to be preferred to the mother, as being the more noble principle; then come children, spouse, etc., as above.⁴

Note. - By accident it can happen that one is to be preferred who naturally would have to be placed after another. Thus a good mother, useful to the offspring, can be preferred to a bad father who is harmful to the offspring. Likewise a son necessary to domestic affairs can be preferred to a useless and clamorous wife. This is clear from n. 280, q. 3°, Resp. 1°.

280. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Are penitents to be interrogated about due care of the soul or body neglected?

Resp. Negatively, generally speaking. For either there is question of damage of the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must no more be expressed than in a sin, for example of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or there is question of the omission of means by which faults are guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins. Lugo.² - But if there is question of damage inflicted on life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself would seem to have to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body, nevertheless since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost never infer grave guilt, unless nevertheless the illnesses have been certainly foreseen from causes, even remote ones.

Quaer. 2° Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself because of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet those do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is estimated harsher than death itself. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever. Yet little women desiring death for themselves because of the smallest troubles are, for the most part, not improbably excused from mortal sin because of defect of advertence and deliberation.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it against Charity to desire temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the due order of Charity is preserved, that is, if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1° because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2° because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3° because of a good even of several persons, of much greater moment, for example of a family, or even of an innocent person.² - Besides, such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor the death of her daughter because she cannot marry because of deformity or poverty. This is established from the condemnation of propositions 13, 14, and 15 by Innocent XI.³ - See p. XV; cf. Vind.⁴

281. Preliminary notes. - 1) By this precept hatred is forbidden. Hatred generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward another: and this can happen in a twofold way; namely, so that he wills evil to him, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him (hatred of malevolence or of enmity); or so that he turns away from him as from an evil to himself or to a loved person (hatred of abomination). But the object of abomination is someone either by reason of himself or as simply evil (for example, as a man), and this is called hatred of abomination of nature; - or only under some respect (for example, as a sinner), while under another respect he remains lovable, and this is called hatred of abomination of quality. Bouq. de Virt. th. n. 507-509.

2. Signs of love are either common or special. Those are called common which are customarily given to others of the same state; yet they are diverse according as certain persons are bound together among themselves by a diverse reason of conjunction. Hence some are common signs, for example among brothers or among pupils of the same monastery or college; others among fellow servants or fellow students; others among fellow citizens or fellow soldiers; others finally, which man owes to any man from charity.

Special signs are those which are shown particularly to certain persons by reason of some conjunction or friendship or familiarity, which is not toward all others otherwise of the same condition. Thus not only among men bound by no other bond besides, but also among fellow members of any community or society or college, it almost happens that someone is more friendly or familiar with one than with another.

282. Principles. - I. Hatred of abomination is not absolutely evil, but can be good. The reason is that it arises from love of oneself or of another, and therefore it is evil only when that love is not ordered. Hence hatred of abomination of nature is gravely evil, and of itself also hatred of abomination of quality, if this quality is good, as if you have someone in hatred because he is pious, just, etc.; but in no way is it evil, but rather praiseworthy, if the quality is evil. This is clear also from Scripture, Ps. 118. 113 and 138. 21; Wis. 14. 9. Yet one must beware lest abomination of the quality degenerate into hatred of the person.

II. Hatred of enmity is absolutely and from its genus mortally evil; for it cannot fail to be a sin to will evil to the neighbor, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him; nor can it be a light sin if the evil thus willed is grave. This is clear also from 1 John II. 11; III. 14, 15; IV. 20. Bouq. ib., n. 515, 516.

Resolutions. - I. Common signs are owed, of themselves, to enemies, because their denial would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity, which is owed also to enemies. Hence:

1. It is not licit to exclude enemies from prayers, for example from the Lord's Prayer; indeed one would have to pray specifically for them if this one means alone were available to the offended person for extinguishing hatred.

2. It is not licit to exclude enemies from common alms, from return greeting, from response, from the sale of exposed goods, because these are common signs of love. - Thus commonly.

3. Those sin who do not assist an enemy in necessity, or who do not prevent his grave damage, when they can do so easily.

II. Special signs of love are not owed of themselves to enemies, for example to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to visit the sick, to console the sorrowful. For these proceed not from debt, but from liberality. Yet I said: of themselves; for by accident sometimes they are owed, namely 1) if their omission would be scandalous, as if the enemies were Superiors, or had already previously shown such signs to oneself; 2) if grave necessity of the enemy, whether temporal or spiritual, precisely demands them and they can be shown without grave inconvenience; 3) if signs which are customarily enumerated as special, by reason of state or condition or office, are in reality common; as if someone as a physician ought to visit the sick and serve them, or as an innkeeper ought to receive travelers with table and lodging, etc.

III. Not only is an offense to be forgiven to an enemy in such a way that the desire of unjust vengeance is cast away, and common signs of love are not denied; but to one seeking pardon, and furnishing fitting satisfaction for the injury, if any intervened, certain particular signs also of special love, if any were previously accustomed to be given, generally speaking are not altogether to be refused.

Hence those sin who avoid an enemy wishing to be reconciled, especially when he notices this and is gravely affected by it, or who, when invited, refuse to go with him, unless nevertheless they are excused by fear of quarrels, or of new rancor, or by another just cause. Likewise those who refuse pardon, or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand a greater one than is fitting, or who bring the matter into court from hatred and vengeance.

283. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and even to seek it?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if every affection of vengeance is absent; but in practice this is dangerous, and easily exposed to delusion, and ordinarily illicit.¹

Quaer. 2° What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Resp. 1° He who has offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. I said: of himself; for otherwise one must speak if someone is excused by a legitimate reason, as if the offense was light, or the offended person absent, or he does not care about the deprecation of fault or is not going to accept it, or satisfaction is considered to have been made to him in some other way.

2° If the offense is mutual and equal, he who first offended should first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him precede who offended more gravely. Besides, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered. Thus, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and speak who passes in the presence of another standing or sitting, or who arrives after others. Add that a more opportune time must sometimes be awaited, and ordinarily reconciliation scarcely turns out well except by means of a friend and prudent man, as Gousset aptly observes.

Quaer. 3° Is there given an obligation of greeting an enemy met on the way?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, because greeting and conversation are not common signs owed to the neighbor. Yet one must speak otherwise if adjuncts of state, condition, or other similar things require that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if there is question of a subject toward his superior.²

Quaer. 4° Ought the offender to ask pardon from the injured person?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, unless another means or mode of reconciliation more suitable is available, for example by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless the asking of pardon seems likely to avail nothing for placating the offended person. They make exception also if the offender is far superior to the offended person, or if the offended person is prudently judged to forgive it. But other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. - Thus commonly. - Lacroix,³ Tambur., etc.

Quaer. 5° Do parents sin who refuse to a son or daughter, although asking pardon, both conversation and sight, because of a marriage contracted by them against their reasonable will?

Resp. Distinguish. Either they refuse for a long time, and intend to refuse in perpetuity, or for a short time only. - If the former, they sin gravely, as is clear of itself. - If the latter, they do not sin in the case in which they act thus for the amendment of the son or daughter, or as a punishment of the fault, or as an example for the other children. Thus Laymann, Diana, and others apud Varceno.¹

§ II. On Works Of Mercy.

Works of mercy are some corporal, as to furnish food to the poor, to clothe the naked, etc.; - others spiritual, as to correct those sinning, to teach the ignorant, to console the sorrowful, etc. We shall speak specifically only of two: 1° of almsgiving; 2° of fraternal correction, insofar as they are referred to the precept of Charity.

284. • Principles. I. There is truly given a precept of giving alms to the needy. This is established 1° from the natural law, that is, from the general law of Charity, by which we are obliged to love the neighbor, and consequently to bring help to him in necessity (n. 278). - It is established 2° from Sacred Scripture: "Defraud not the poor man of alms";² and "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire ... for I was hungry and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me not to drink."³

II. Generally, from St. Thomas,⁴ something must be considered on the part of the giver, namely that what is to be spent in alms is superfluous to him; and something on the part of the recipient, namely that he suffers necessity.

III. The superfluous on the part of the giver is distinguished as twofold, namely superfluous to life and to state. Superfluous to life is called that which is not necessary for preserving your life, and the life of others whose care has been entrusted to you. Superfluous to state is that which is not necessary either so that someone, with those whose care has been entrusted to him, may live decently according to the condition of the state in which he here and now is situated, or so that he may render this condition moderately better.

IV. Necessity on the part of the recipient can be threefold, namely extreme, grave, common.

285. Rules. - I. In extreme necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to life; but from those alone. - From things superfluous to life: since the right order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor prevail over a good of ours far inferior. - From those alone: since it does not demand that we prefer another's life to our life and that of our own, as would happen if we were to succor him from things necessary to life.

II. In grave and common necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to state.

I say: 1° He must be succored; for the precept of almsgiving regards not only extreme necessity - which is very rare - and grave necessity - which is rarer - but also, and indeed especially, common necessity, which is frequent. Thus all.

I say: 2° from goods superfluous to state; for besides things superfluous to life there are no others from which the neighbor may be succored.

III. The quantity of alms: - a) sufficient is that by which the neighbor is sufficiently succored according to the degree of present necessity; - b) strictly prescribed in necessity, 1) whether grave or extreme, cannot be called a great sum of money (n. 279, second Rule under 2°); 2) in common necessity, according to St. Alph., a fiftieth part, or 2%, of surplus revenues. For if individual rich persons spent that quantity on the poor, it would already be sufficient for meeting common necessities.

Therefore rich persons sin who, where the poor are not supported by public stipends, always repel them harshly from themselves, and reserve all surplus things for acquiring a higher state. For otherwise so moderate an alms, which was recounted above, cannot impede an honest ascent to a higher state. - Likewise physicians, advocates, etc., sin who refuse to expend their service freely on the poor, for whom provision is not made by public authority.

286. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of almsgiving oblige under grave sin?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, according to St. Alph.,¹ also in grave necessity, and if there is question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor man, also in common necessity. The reason is that since in Scripture men are frequently condemned because works of mercy were neglected, the grave obligation of these works is not to be restricted to extreme necessity, or a very rare one, nor to grave necessity, or a rare one. - Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man harshly repelling from himself all who are situated in common necessity, since rich persons almost always bring forward excusing reasons, which in practice the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty.¹

Quaer. 2° To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. To the truly poor - yet to those asking - and without excluding strangers or non-Catholics. I say: 1) to the truly poor, but not to those unwilling to labor; for these cannot be said to be pressed by any true necessity. - I say: 2) yet to those asking; namely when they can easily ask. - I say: 3) without excluding strangers or non-Catholics, while preserving, nevertheless, the right order of Charity, and unless in some place there has obtained, for a just cause, a custom or statute of excluding poor strangers from cities, namely so that they may be fed by their own citizens.

Quaer. 3° From which goods ought or can alms be given?

Resp. 1° From one's own goods, of which someone has free administration. I say: 1) from one's own goods. Therefore not from goods liable to restitution; - not with damage to creditors; - not by children from the proper goods of parents; - not by servants from the goods of masters. - Yet tutors and curators can give from goods committed to them those moderate alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person. - I say: 2) of which someone has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of the husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which namely she has both dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods according to the custom of wives of her condition.

Resp. 2° From another's goods, when either 1) the poor person is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own;² or 2) the owner consents or is reasonably presumed to consent. Hence children can bestow very small things, and servants bread and similar things.

287. Definition. - Fraternal correction is an admonition by which someone, from charity, endeavors to recall another from sin. It is said: by which someone, from charity; therefore it differs from that which is made from office, which is distinguished as twofold, namely judicial, which is made by public authority and for the common good; the other paternal, which is made by a superior for the private and at the same time public good. That which is made from office obliges only those who discharge that office, namely Bishops, Pastors, Prelates of regulars, Magistrates, Parents, and those who are in their place, and it is to be made only to subjects; - but fraternal correction, like charity from which it proceeds, obliges all and toward all.

288. Principles. - I. There is given a true precept of fraternal correction. This is established 1° from the natural law of Charity, by which we are obliged to remove the evils of the neighbor. - 2° From Sacred Scripture: "Reprove thy neighbor ... lest perhaps he repeat it";¹ and "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother."²

II. For the strict obligation of this precept there is required: 1° that the sin of the neighbor, or the proximate danger of sinning, be certainly established. - 2° That the amendment of the neighbor be more probable than his non-amendment. - 3° That there not be another equally suitable person who is believed to be about to correct him. - 4° That the correction can be made without grave inconvenience of the one correcting. - 5° That it be judged necessary for the amendment of the delinquent, and that there is not at least probable hope that he will amend himself of his own accord. Thus commonly.³

The first is required, lest you act rashly and inflict injury on the neighbor, for example by lending your ears too easily to some rumor. - But in doubt you are not held to inquire about the sin, since this pertains only to those who are held to correction from office.⁴

The second; for the doubtful man only imprudently puts his hand to a moral action.⁵ Hence prudence for the most part counsels that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with a hostile spirit, they become worse. Make exception, nevertheless, if either 1) the one to be corrected, who is not in good faith, is situated in danger of death; or 2) there is question of a danger of perversion in faith or morals to be averted from others.

The third; for then there is not present true and absolute necessity.

The fourth; for charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience unless either the neighbor is situated in extreme spiritual necessity, or, supposing that to the obligation of charity in the one correcting there is also added an obligation of justice, as in a Prelate, Pastor, Magistrate toward subjects, in grave necessity. But parents, confessors, masters, husbands, teachers, tutors, curators, although from office (of piety, etc.), nevertheless not from justice, and therefore not with their grave detriment, are held as Prelates, Pastors, Magistrates are. L. II. 40.

The fifth; for since many bear correction with difficulty, it is to be employed only in necessity.

From these things it follows that private persons among themselves are rarely held to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are joined familiarly among themselves; because rarely are all the required conditions found to be present; more rarely still toward Superiors because of unsuitability. - Likewise often you will not be held to correct detractors, at least under grave sin; for in this matter it is most difficult to establish that correction will be profitable; detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; there is danger lest they increase or confirm the detraction; the hearer for the most part does not know whether what is said is notorious, and in doubt there is no reason why he should condemn the detractor (unless he is a lost man); once detraction has begun, often the neighbor is better consulted if this is allowed to be completed; for if it is explained distinctly, often it is not apprehended as so grave as had been conceived at the beginning. L. IV. 979. 981. Cf. what is to be said n. 524. - I suppose that silence is not equivalent to approbation. - Scrupulous persons likewise are ordinarily excused from the office of fraternal correction.

289. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of fraternal correction oblige under grave sin?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if the required conditions are present, and there is question of grave matter. Hence he can sin gravely who from vain fear lest the neighbor be offended somewhat, or lest he himself suffer light detriment from it, omits correction in a grave matter, where he thinks it will more probably be profitable. - Yet he sins lightly who from faintheartedness and bashfulness considers himself less suitable for correcting. - St. Thom.,¹ - St. Alph.²

But matter in this, as in the other precepts, can be grave either from itself or because of circumstances. Thus, if in some religious Order through venial sins the vigor of discipline seems either to be dissolved or even greatly diminished, the obligation of correction can be grave. Likewise if a son or subject often steals small things, or little by little habituates himself to drinking, to dangerous play, although he does not yet sin gravely.

Quaer. 2° Does the precept of correction have place where someone sins from ignorance?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if there is question of vincible ignorance, because this does not excuse from sin.

Resp. 2° But if the ignorance is invincible, there is not so much question of fraternal correction as of warning, by which the neighbor is taught about the truth; since correction is an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults. But that warning must be made if the sins are against divine law, whether natural or positive; but if against human law, it is disputed on both sides probably whether private persons are obliged to it under grave sin. Yet the affirmative opinion is the more probable and more common according to St. Alphonsus;³ for that transgression, although material and not intrinsically evil, with the certain law posited, is always evil, and therefore to be impeded through correction. But certainly it must be made by those who from office are held to teach subjects, as prelates, parents, confessors, teachers.

They generally add that, although no fruit is hoped for and the ignorance is invincible, nevertheless admonition must still be made if there is question of things necessary by necessity of means, or of those things which furnish public scandal, lest namely others think that to be licit which is not corrected.

Quaer. 3° What order must be observed in fraternal correction?

Resp. The order assigned by Christ Himself must be observed, unless circumstances suggest otherwise. - Hence 1° Correct secretly: "Rebuke him between thee and him alone." - 2° Before witnesses, if the first admonition does not suffice: "If he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two." - 3° Refer the matter to the Superior: "Tell the Church."

Sometimes that order can and must be inverted, namely: - 1° if the sin is public or soon to be made public; - 2° if it is gravely harmful to another; - 3° if secret admonition is not judged to be profitable; - 4° if it is better to manifest the matter immediately to the Superior, as it is generally better in communities living under a rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc. Nor can members or fellow residents be absolved who do not consent to a denunciation of this sort where there is question of grave damage to the community. Likewise by natural law corrupting priests, who inflict great spiritual damage on the faithful or seem likely to inflict it, must be denounced to ecclesiastical Superiors; - 5° if the delinquent has yielded his right, as happens in various religious Orders.

Quaer. 4° In what manner must fraternal correction be made?

Resp. Fraternal correction must be made with true charity also as to the manner; therefore it ought to be paternal toward inferiors, kindly among equals, and reverential toward Superiors. - Moreover, it is required that time, place, and other adjuncts be suitably chosen. Therefore he does not sin who puts the matter off to another time, when he can correct either more conveniently or equally conveniently, unless perhaps grave danger threatens from delay.

You will resolve: 1° A Superior, by force of knowledge obtained through a simple denunciation made to him as to a father, cannot proceed judicially, because the delict was not manifested to him as to a judge. L. V. 246. Not. III.

2° Those sin who refer to a superior a defect of a subject perfectly amended.¹

3° Likewise those who refer a delict to mediate superiors while passing over the immediate superior, who can correct by himself and concerning whom there is not probable suspicion that he will not discharge his office, or will not discharge it duly; for the reputation of the neighbor must be consulted.

4° Superiors are held to inquire into the sins of subjects, yet not of some certain subject, unless some peculiar reason moves them to this. - Nor ought they easily to admit spontaneous accusers, and much less immediately to give faith to them. - A grave obligation likewise falls upon them of not manifesting those by whom they were made more certain about someone's fault, if namely the fault is grave, - or, although it is light, if that manifestation, from another cause, ought to be regarded as a grave delict. - They also sin gravely if, when the common good does not demand it, they manifest to those whose counsel or help in correcting the subject they do not need a grave and occult delict of a subject brought to them.¹ But if the manifestation of the delict alone suffices for asking counsel, they sin if they also manifest the delinquent.

§ III. On Vices Opposed To Charity Toward The Neighbor.

The principal ones are hatred, envy, quarrels, scandal, and cooperation in others' sins.

We shall speak only of the two latter, since the matter has already been treated concerning the others in another place, or is to be discussed under the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

290. • By the name scandal, Greek rather than Latin, which from its primary signification denotes an obstacle or impediment placed in the way, by which occasion of stumbling and ruin is furnished to one walking ("stumbling-block or stone"), the Sacred Writers, the holy Fathers, and Theologians are accustomed to designate a spiritual obstacle placed before the neighbor in the course of the way of salvation. Hence scandal, accepted in this sense, is rightly defined with St. Thomas² as "a word or deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin." From this definition it is clear that for scandal there is required:

a) That it be a word or deed, that is, an external speech or action and known to another; for those things which are merely internal or occult cannot furnish occasion of ruin to another, since in no way are they perceived by him. But under the terms word or deed there must also be comprehended an external omission, that is, a not-said where one ought to speak, a not-done where one ought to do; for, as the Angelic Doctor notes,³ "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act."

b) That it be a word or deed less right, that is, having some defect of rectitude; which can happen in two ways: 1° when the word or deed according to itself is evil, for example a blasphemous word, a lustful deed; and 2° when it carries before itself the appearance of evil, for example if from dispensation you eat meats on a fast day before persons ignorant of the dispensation. Hence for the notion of scandal it is not necessary that the word or deed be of itself a sin; but it suffices that it have the likeness of sin; "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor,¹ "it is fittingly called less right, so that both those things which are sins according to themselves and those things which have the appearance of evil may be comprehended." But as to words or deeds which bear no appearance of evil, as being wholly right, it seems one must say: - they never constitute scandal strictly so called, although perhaps another may take occasion of sinning from them; - yet sometimes even such words or deeds can put on in some way the malice of scandal, and therefore are not undeservedly called scandal broadly so called, or scandal by accident, namely in a case in which, by command of the law of charity, even those words or deeds must be omitted precisely so that the sin of the neighbor may be guarded against.

c) That it furnish to another occasion of spiritual ruin, that is, that it expose another to probable danger of sinning, although nevertheless it is not necessary that the sin of the other actually follow; for scandal of itself is not, nor can be, an efficient cause, but only an occasion of ruin, or, as St. Thomas again says,² "nothing can be for man a sufficient cause of sin ... except his own will; and therefore the words or deeds of another man can only be an imperfect cause" (occasion) "inducing in some way to sin." - Therefore it suffices, but also is necessarily required for the essence of scandal, that it be in some way inductive to sin; and hence Busembaum rightly resolves apud St. Alph.:³ "it is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, with attention to the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that through this act those will be drawn to sin who otherwise would not have sinned." Thus, for example, it is not scandal if someone blasphemes or curses the neighbor in the presence of persons, for whom he notices that no probable danger of sinning will arise from it, as can often happen (provided there is not question of matter of the Sixth), and especially then when the person sinning himself is a man of the lowest condition and of bad reputation, or when the persons present are very upright or very depraved. - From these things also you will understand that Dens rightly warns¹ that the opinion of the common people is false, namely that someone is scandalized when, on occasion of an improper word or deed, he is justly indignant; but then he is not scandalized when he applauds or delights in the impropriety of another; since, on the contrary, in the second case he is scandalized, not in the first. And for this reason, as Suarez notes,² scandals are often said to be committed which properly are not scandals.

291. Division Of Scandal. - Theologians commonly distinguish:

I. Active scandal and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the definition handed down and explained above (n. 290) belongs. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of the scandalized person, or, as it pleases certain Moralists to say, it is the very sin of the neighbor occasioned. But it is established from what was said above that active scandal can exist without passive scandal, just as, on the contrary, it will be established from what is to be said later that passive scandal can sometimes exist without active scandal, for example if there is question of Pharisaic scandal.

II. Division of active scandal. Active scandal is divided into direct (which by another name is called seduction) and indirect.

Direct scandal is when the ruin or sin of the neighbor is intended by the scandalizer. But the sin of the neighbor can be intended in two ways, namely a) precisely so that the neighbor may sin and lose his soul (which is proper to the devil, and occurs more rarely among men, unless perhaps among those given to magical arts or openly impious); or b) so that the sin of the neighbor may serve the proper pleasure of the scandalizer, as happens in the lustful, - or his proper utility, as happens in the avaricious, thieves, etc. In the first hypothesis direct scandal is called diabolical; in the other it is simply called direct.

Indirect scandal is scandal when the sin of the neighbor is not indeed intended by the scandalizer, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited by him without just cause, and therefore to be omitted lest the sin of the neighbor follow. - But when a word or deed of this sort, even if of itself right, must be considered as posited without just cause and to be omitted under the aforesaid title, will be more accurately explained below. Here you will usefully recall the doctrine on the indirect voluntary, n. 6-8.

III. Division of passive scandal. - Passive scandal is divided by St. Alph.¹ into given and accepted. Given, in the sense of the holy Author, is the sin to the committing of which someone is induced from active scandal; but accepted is the sin which is committed under the pretext of active scandal from pure malice of one's own. - Whatever given scandal is called by the holy Doctor scandal of the little ones, by reason of the weakness or infirmity by which those are considered to labor who allow themselves to be induced to sin through the word or deed of another; for scandal can scarcely fall upon the perfect and constant, according to that:² "Much peace have they that love thy law, and to them there is no scandal." Then any accepted scandal is called by St. Alph.² Pharisaic scandal, from the Pharisees, who, according to the testimony of Sacred Scripture, in order to destroy Christ feigned that they suffered scandal from His holy words; just as today false Liberals or Revolutionaries, in order to destroy the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, feign themselves to be scandalized by his most celebrated Syllabus.

292. Malice Of Scandal. - There is not here to be raised a question about the malice of passive scandal, which is nothing other than the very sin of the scandalized person. For it is clear of itself that such a sin has the same malice which it would have if it were committed by one not scandalized; so that the fact of having been scandalized adds to it no new species, indeed not even an aggravating circumstance; unless perhaps there is question of Pharisaic scandal, which can have a new specific malice joined to itself, for example from the fact that the words or deeds of Christ the Lord Himself are sacrilegiously employed as a pretext for sinning with impunity. - Hence in the following there will be discussion only of the malice of active scandal, concerning which let there be a twofold question.

Quaer. 1° How great a sin is active scandal?

Resp. 1° Active scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, since it is gravely opposed to the negative precept of charity: namely, do not harm your neighbor, and much more, do not induce him into sin, which is the gravest of all the damages that can be inflicted on the neighbor. But the guilt of active scandal is the graver:

a) The more the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is intended; and thus, for example, direct scandal is graver than indirect.

b) The more efficaciously active scandal flows into the ruin of the neighbor; and thus, for example, bad example given by clerics and priests regularly tends more efficaciously into the ruin of others than bad example given by laymen.

c) The graver the spiritual damage of the neighbor which is caused through scandal; and under this reason no scandals are more detestable than those by which innocent souls of tender children are corrupted.

Resp. 2° Yet from a threefold head active scandal can be only a venial sin, namely:

a) From defect of sufficient deliberation, as if someone from negligence lightly culpable does not notice the occasion of mortal sin which is furnished to another by his word or deed.

b) From the lightness of the influence which the scandal exercises upon the grave ruin of the neighbor, as if in speaking or acting you commit some light indiscretion, which regularly, unless a special circumstance intervenes, indeed is accustomed to move the neighbor somewhat, but not so much that it could reasonably have been feared that he would fall from it into mortal sin, into which by accident he has fallen.

c) From smallness of matter, namely if to another there is furnished an occasion of committing only venial sin (which nevertheless is not to him a likely occasion of further grave ruin). And this is true even if that occasion of venial sin is furnished through a word or deed according to itself mortally evil; for the malice of active scandal is not to be measured from the malice of the word or deed which furnishes occasion of sin to another, but from the malice of the sin itself for which occasion is furnished; and hence it can happen that some word or deed according to itself is mortal sin and only venial in the reason of scandal; or the contrary, that some word or deed according to itself is venial and mortal in the reason of scandal. Thus, for example, he who inflicts a grave wound on a neighbor whom he knows will only become lightly angry sins mortally by reason of the injury and venially by reason of scandal; on the contrary, he who strikes a light slap on a neighbor whom he knows is to be moved from it to blasphemies sins venially by reason of the injury and mortally by reason of scandal.

293. • Quaer. 2° What kind of sin (that is, of what species) is active scandal?

Resp. Active scandal has at least a twofold specific malice, one against charity and another against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced. And this is generally admitted by theologians concerning direct scandal; but concerning indirect scandal they dissent somewhat. Cardinal de Lugo and others fewer in number think that through indirect scandal one indeed sins against charity, but not against another virtue; so that he who indirectly scandalized another would of himself satisfy by saying in Confession: I gave grave scandal to the neighbor, without declaring in what matter. Yet much more common is the opposite opinion, to which St. Alph.¹ wholly subscribes: namely, that through scandal, even indirect, one sins not only against charity but besides against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced, so that he who scandalized another either directly or indirectly must declare in Confession in what matter, for example of chastity, justice, etc. The solid reasons of this opinion are:

1° Because the case of indirect scandal seems to be one of the cases to which the axiom must be applied: the evil effect (the sin of the neighbor) foreseen from the cause (in scandal) communicates its malice to the cause itself (the scandal itself).

2° Because any virtue of precept seems to demand from us both that we not injure it ourselves and that we not be either directly or indirectly the cause or occasion why it is injured by others.

We have said: Scandal has at least a twofold malice; for often still more malices, whether in species or in number, it can contain, namely because of the proper sin which is committed by the scandalizer whenever he scandalizes another through a word or deed according to itself already evil, for example through blasphemy, detraction, theft, etc.; - or because of the quality of the person scandalizing, as if scandal is furnished to children by parents, or to parishioners by their pastors; for these are held not only from charity, but also from office, to guard against the ruin of their subjects; - or because of the quality of the scandalized person, as if someone induces a married person or a person bound by a vow of chastity to shameful acts; - or even because of the number of those scandalized, for more probably there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized.

Note. - The resolution just given concerning the at least twofold malice of active scandal, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ also obtains in the case in which someone furnishes to another the occasion of executing by work a sin for which the other was already prepared and determined, so that for example one seeking fornication from a prostitute prepared for fornicating sins not only against the virtue of chastity, but also against charity. The reason, very powerful to him, is this: that although such a prostitute is in the actual will of sinning, nevertheless by completing that particular sin of fornication in work she certainly brings upon herself a gravely greater ruin; and therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating this sin in work thereby cooperates toward her gravely greater ruin. But to cooperate toward another's gravely greater ruin is without doubt gravely opposed to charity.

294. Conclusions. - A penitent who is guilty of the mortal sin of scandal must explain in Confession:

1° The very word or deed by which he scandalized another, if namely that word or deed according to itself already is a mortal sin, as blasphemy, grave detraction, perfect drunkenness, etc.

2° The species of grave sin for which he furnished occasion to the neighbor, for example that he furnished to the neighbor an occasion of committing a mortal sin of drunkenness, blasphemy, luxury, theft, etc. And this not only if the scandal was direct, but also, from the much more common opinion proved above n. 293, if it was only indirect; so that this simple accusation never suffices of itself: I gave grave scandal to another, but it must always be added in what species of grave sin.

3° The number of persons whom he induced to grave sin, or foresaw could probably have been induced. "He who sows scandals before others," says Dionysius Carth.,¹ "is worthy of so many and such condemnations as from how many and what sort he is seen." But if a certain number cannot be morally determined, as generally happens, then it suffices to assign a probable number.

4° The quality of himself (for example, that he is a father of a family, teacher, pastor, etc.), and the quality of the scandalized person (for example, that the person is married, related by blood, bound by a vow of chastity, etc.), whenever a quality of this sort is a circumstance changing the species in a grave matter.

But it is asked: In sins against chastity which have an accomplice, for example in the sin of fornication, must it be expressed who first solicited? Or, as others propose this question: must the circumstance of induction to fornication and similar things be explained in Confession?

Resp. Sufficiently probably it is not of itself necessary that in Confession of sins of this sort it be explained who first solicited; because one consenting to the solicitation, by this consent itself, is also guilty of grave scandal, and consequently contracts malices specifically the same as those which the one first soliciting contracts, namely grave malice against chastity and against charity. Therefore it can only be said that the first one soliciting sins more gravely, or that the circumstance of solicitation is only a circumstance aggravating in the same species, which does not pertain to the necessary matter of confession. Cf. St. Alph.²

295. • Confessors regularly ought of themselves to judge especially the following to be guilty of mortal fault of scandal:

1° Those who have a detestable habit of blaspheming, in the presence of persons of any kind, especially younger persons.

2° Those who compose, spread, or publicly sing impure songs or poems.

3° Those who institute and prolong, whether in clear words or in equivocal words (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers), lascivious conversations. See n. 492, II.

4° Those who write or publish depraved books or other perverse writings.

5° Those who sell the aforesaid irreligious or immoral publications indiscriminately to any person, or rent them for reading; or those who in libraries established for lending books expose to the use of all works which commonly ought to be considered as poisoned cups to be removed from the lips of the faithful.

6° Those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books.

7° Those who hand over to boys or girls books perhaps good in themselves, but treating matter the knowledge of which is reputed of itself an occasion of offense to them, according to their natural innocence and sensibility. Who, for example, would doubt that anatomical and surgical books cannot be handed into the hands of children without scandal!

8° Authors, Actors, and Actresses of Comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances (ballet-dances), in which, by reason of the dress of the dancers, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, the greatest foulness appears, as often happens in those which are made under the name gallop, polka, waltz. - It is certain, says St. Alphonsus,¹ speaking of immodest spectacles, that those representing or composing notably impure comedies are in no way free from grave sin of scandal; nor can gain, however great, excuse them. - But whether and to what extent the spectators of such comedies (who ordinarily stain themselves with several internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles to be established later concerning cooperation. Authors of dances which are called "round dances" are commonly guilty of grave scandal, as manifestly follows from that grave admonition which is contained in the Pastoral Letters which the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore² gave in the vernacular tongue to the clergy and people committed to them: "We consider it to be our duty to warn our people against ... those fashionable dances, which, as at present carried on, are revolting to every feeling of delicacy and propriety, and are fraught with the greatest danger to morals." Cooperation in these dances is treated below. - As to the modern gatherings of boys and girls which are held under the name children's balls, I indeed would not wish to precipitate a judgment, although, relying on testimonies not to be despised, I would almost dare sometimes to compare them to a whirlwind destroying the rising roses of innocence.¹ Therefore let parents see to it that they do not cause one of these little ones to be scandalized! - But concerning those gatherings of diverse sex which are called masked balls, there is scarcely need to say a word; since no one fails to understand that by their character they are for the most part full of danger and scandalous. Those festivities also are often to be called scandalous which are commonly called "Pic-Nics," "Excursions," "Fairs," "in which" (these are the words of the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore in the same pastoral letters²), "as too often conducted, the name of charity is made to cover up a multitude of sins." Wherefore the Fathers proceed: "We forbid all Catholics from having anything to do with them, except when managed in accordance with the regulations of the Ordinary, and under the immediate supervision of their respective Pastors."

9° Painters, Sculptors, and Photographers who, eagerly seizing upon the thesis too much sung today: le chaste c'est le nu ("nakedness is chastity"), exhibit statues or images truly obscene and commonly incentive to lust, for example images in which those parts of the body appear naked (I do not say of an infant, but of an older person), which modesty everywhere among peoples demands to be veiled, and which therefore are called shameful parts. Indeed, generally speaking, we concede that artificial things often move less than natural ones, and therefore that grave scandal can more easily be given through natural nakedness than through artificial; but with the common body of Theologians we altogether deny that the nakedness, although artificial, of the aforesaid parts moves so little that it can be excused from grave scandal. What we have said here about painters, etc., "I think the same," says St. Alph.,¹ "must be said about those who retain such images at home" (Gousset² adds: in museums or gardens) "exposed to the sight of all." And at this time we affirm the same especially of those who circulate wholly immodest photographic cards, especially those which are to be viewed by means of a stereoscope. - Note, however, that in the preceding there is not question of the case in which something obscene must be painted, for example for the assistance of anatomical and obstetrical science.

10° Fabricators of female adornment or dress (milliners, hair-dressers), who in their shops show to the eyes of passers-by samples so adorned and dressed that they are gravely offensive, by which namely women are represented in a manner wholly immodest and greatly provocative to lasciviousness.

11° Women or girls adorning themselves in such a way, as often happens in solemn dinners and evening gatherings (soirées). But here one must distinguish between adornment that of itself greatly excites to lasciviousness - such as enormous uncovering of the breasts or their translucent covering is judged to be - and adornment indeed immodest, but not of itself so lascivious, as perhaps is, for example, the uncovering of those parts more modest. Those assuming adornment of the first kind are not to be excused from grave sin of scandal. But those assuming adornment of the second kind are also not excused from mortal scandal if they introduce the use of such clothing where it is not in force; but if they follow a custom already introduced, certainly not in the least to be praised, indeed severely to be rebuked, yet they are not of themselves to be condemned of mortal sin, provided they intend nothing evil. For customary things, provided they are not altogether lascivious of themselves, are not accustomed to move passion so notably.

To be noted. - What we have observed in the last place about custom once introduced as to clothing not altogether lascivious, seems in some measure to have to be said also as to other matters, not simply obscene, for example as to comedies or equestrian games (circus), not notably impure. Hence I would indeed strive to dissuade from those comedies, etc., and, if it could be done, to root them out; but I would not dare in these provinces, where there is in force no special prohibition or Ecclesiastical censure concerning this matter, as elsewhere there is, to teach publicly that actors and actresses in those equestrian games also or comedies, which are made in a manner not to be praised, yet usual and not irreligious or gravely impure, are of themselves guilty of mortal scandal, and therefore unworthy of the Sacraments unless they abandon their office. Therefore let the pastor and confessor judge concerning individual cases, with account taken of the nature of the representations, of the usage of the places where they are made, and of the persons commonly attending; and regularly let him disapprove their office, but not condemn it as mortal unless this is sufficiently established. - We say the same a fortiori of simple lay spectators of such representations. Meanwhile we carefully warn here that in the preceding we have treated only of grave scandal to others; for if a question is instituted about the proximate occasion in which perhaps the actors themselves, etc., or spectators are situated, it will often happen that abstinence from their office or their attendance, which cannot be imposed upon the same under grave fault by title of grave scandal, nevertheless must be imposed under grave fault by title of their own proximate occasion; concerning which n. 1444, Resp. 2°, 3), will speak more broadly.

12° Finally, we still generally assign as guilty of scandal of themselves: a) clerics who, by retaining at home a person suspected by the people, furnish occasion for sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state; cf. Counc. Trent;¹ and the same must be said of a husband as to a maid-servant suspected by his wife not without reason; b) married women who, by admitting their handsome lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; c) parents who permit to their daughters conversations in the evening and in hidden places with betrothed men and lovers; and the same must be said of superiors as to servants and other domestics.

296. Preliminary note. - 1° We are not treating here of omitting direct active scandal, the malice of which is of itself manifest to anyone; but only of those things which are to be omitted under the fault of indirect active scandal, the description of which see above n. 291.

2° Mindful of the Apostolic word:¹ "giving no offense to any man," and at the same time of the exhortation of the divine Master Himself:² "Let them alone; they are blind"; Moralists commonly resolve: it is never licit to give the neighbor scandal, even indirect; but sometimes it can be licit simply to permit that the neighbor, beyond our intention, take scandal. But when someone morally must be judged, whether in a strict or in a certain broader sense, to give scandal; and when he can be judged licitly to permit the taking of scandal: this depends totally on this: whether by the law of charity he is held or not held to omit some word or deed precisely so that the ruin of the neighbor may be avoided. In the first hypothesis namely, he must be judged, in whatever sense finally, to give scandal; in the second hypothesis he can be judged licitly to permit the scandal of the neighbor. Hence of itself there arises the general question proposed in the title of this Section, the solution of which we now approach by parts, by positing four special questions, of which the first will regard things less right, the second indifferent things, the third spiritual goods, the fourth temporal goods.

297. First Question. - Must things less right always be omitted by the law of charity because of passive scandal of the neighbor foreseen from them?

Resp. Affirmatively, without any exception, if the things less right are already evil of themselves; indeed, speaking of itself, affirmatively also if they carry before themselves only the appearance of evil, as is established from the words of the Apostle:³ "from all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Cf. 1 Corinthians,⁴ where the Apostle thus addresses those who reclined in an idol's temple (which was not evil of itself, yet had the appearance of evil for the weak): "Take heed lest perhaps this liberty of yours become an offense to the weak." To this also pertains the very well-known heroic example of the venerable old man Eleazar.⁵

We have said: speaking of itself; for by accident it can be licit to do before others what bears the appearance of evil, namely if you have a legitimate reason of necessity or great utility, and at the same time you take care that, as far as lies in you, you remove the occasion of ruin by teaching, for example, those present (unless from circumstances they already sufficiently recognize it) that you can act licitly, that you can licitly eat meats on a fast day because you are excused from the precept of fasting because of a dispensation, etc. For where after these things scandal still arises or persists, it is generally rightly considered as purely accepted scandal, which from the law of charity (apart from the gravest or extreme necessity of the neighbor) we are not held to avoid with grave inconvenience of our own; unless perhaps at the same time there was question of such damage, for example of a community, of faith, or of religion, that it would have to be guarded against before one's own private damage.

298. Second Question. - From the law of charity must indifferent things be omitted from which the neighbor is thought to be about to accept scandal?

Resp. Affirmatively, as often as they can be omitted without notable inconvenience; because from charity we are held to impede the ruin of the neighbor when we easily can, for example by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc. But on the contrary, negatively, as often as they cannot be omitted without such inconvenience; because then charity ceases to oblige. Here, however, one ought to notice with St. Alph.¹ that, other things being equal, a greater inconvenience is required the graver or the more certain the sin of the neighbor which is feared, or the more numerous are those to be scandalized; likewise a greater one is required so that scandal of the little ones may licitly be permitted than Pharisaic scandal, which for the most part, when a reasonable cause stands, is to be cared about little, unless perhaps fruit is hoped for from some easy delay, or unless the evil to be feared from it is far more notable than the good which will be obtained through our indifferent works. Besides, this still deserves to be noted: scandal of the little ones, persisting after admonition made to the little ones, can easily be equated to Pharisaic scandal.

From the given response, by way of example, it will be licit to resolve: Therefore a woman is not held to put aside decent adornment (which she assumes because it is fitting to her state, or to please her husband, or that she may find a spouse) because of the scandal of some indeterminate man; for this is to be reputed too grave for her. But if a woman foresees that some determinate man will fall from it into mortal sin, then for one or another time, if it could be done conveniently, she ought to lessen her adornment or abstain from the sight of such a man, but not for a long time, since this again would be too difficult. But if a woman of this sort, although she does not intend the ruin of such a man, nevertheless led by mere vanity, presents herself to his sight on purpose, she could not be excused from grave sin of scandal, just as she also would not be excused if she were to seek some place which she would not approach unless she knew that a shameful lover was there. Cf. St. Alph.¹ The following resolution, which occurs apud several Authors, can also be referred to this place: A woman or girl is held, when she knows certainly that some man sins gravely when she sits in his sight in church, to choose another place, if she conveniently can. - But from these resolutions, proposed by way of example, it will be licit to judge prudently about other similar cases, with account taken of the response given above.

299. Third Question. - To avoid the scandal of the neighbor, must spiritual goods sometimes be omitted by the law of charity?

Resp. Works good of themselves (under which are understood also omissions good of themselves) are either of counsel or of precept:

a) As to good works which are of mere counsel, the same thing must be established, preserving proportion, which we established in the preceding question about omitting indifferent works.

b) As to good works of precept one must say: they are never to be omitted because of scandal, whether Pharisaic or of the little ones, as often as they are absolutely necessary to salvation, as reception of Baptism before death, - or as often as they are prescribed from the law of nature, here and now urging, and not ceasing because of changed circumstances; for evils are not to be done, even venial ones, that good things may come. But where there is question of works prescribed from positive law alone, especially human law, for example of hearing Mass on Sunday, this distinction must be made: such works generally must not be omitted because of Pharisaic scandal; but whether they sometimes must be omitted because of scandal of the little ones is a question controverted among Authors, concerning which see St. Alph.² The opinion which seems practically able to be safely counseled holds: such works can more advisably and licitly be omitted because of scandal of the little ones, at least sometimes, but regularly they need not necessarily be omitted. - Therefore the confessor in the cases here supposed should proceed by persuading. See L. IV. 331.

300. Fourth Question. - Are temporal goods to be abandoned to avoid scandal?

Resp. Either there is question of temporal goods proper to us, or of another's goods committed to our care:

a) If the former: indeed they can licitly be abandoned, but ordinarily speaking they need not necessarily be abandoned to avoid scandal; for the law of charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not held, for example, to pay more than is equitable to some laborer, even if you foresee that he, notwithstanding your admonition about the justice of the payment, is going to blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often, and thus in the whole complex becomes grave. Similarly also a Pastor of himself is not held to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks forth into various slanders, etc.; for from this a grave inconvenience would happen not only to the pastor himself, but also to his successors.

b) If the latter: they cannot even licitly be abandoned, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed. Cf. St. Alph.,¹ where special warnings are also given to Prelates about ecclesiastical goods committed to their administration.

301. • From the same law of charity by which we are prohibited from giving scandal to another, we are also commanded to remove or repair scandal once given, in the best way in which it can be done. But for this it is required that the scandalizer, having henceforth omitted the active scandal once given, should besides, as far as he morally can, try to remove its further evil influence, if namely such influence is still reasonably to be feared, as often happens where there is question, for example, of the scandal of a Superior toward subjects, or of scandal given to another through an evil command, an unjust counsel, the spread of a perverse book, and similar things. But by what ways a further effect of this sort can and must be removed, and therefore scandal repaired, must altogether be judged from the circumstances of the diverse cases, and generally it is established rather easily, provided especially that attention is paid to the special character of the scandal given and its publicity, and to the quality of the person scandalizing and the person scandalized.

Thus, for example, he who gave scandal to others through unjust counsels still efficacious will have to render them inefficacious, as far as he can, through diligent revocation, to be made known to the same persons either by himself or by another. A father of a family who scandalized the domestics ordinarily, for repairing the scandal (if it is still judged efficacious), will have to be obliged to manifest to those same domestics his displeasure over his bad example, and to exhort them paternally not to follow it in the future. A bad Author who through heretical, immoral, or defamatory writings incited others to sinning will be held, as far as he can, to retract these through new writings. A concubinarian, usurer, or other sinner of this kind who gave public scandal will also have to be constrained to its public reparation, for example that publicly, having first abandoned his wicked commerce or business, he approach the Sacraments with devotion.

As to other ordinary scandals, we think one must say: more commonly, for such scandals a special reparation, at least under grave sin, cannot be imposed; both because often they scarcely have any persisting efficacy, and also because, although they remain efficacious, often nevertheless morally they cannot be repaired otherwise with fruit (and no one is held to what is useless) except by that general reparation which is contained in the very cessation from scandal, in the furnishing of good example, in prayer for the scandalized person, and similar things. With prudence as guide, judge in this matter, and impose an obligation on no one unless it is sufficiently established.

Note. - To the reparation of scandal there also pertains the obligation of procuring that the scandalized person be recalled to penance or true conversion. Nevertheless this obligation generally of itself does not seem to urge under mortal sin, except in the case in which the scandalized person, because of ignorance or some other cause, does not have in his power the means of penance; for if he has them and does not wish to use them, then he must impute his impenitence to his own malice and not to another. Thus Scavini.¹

302. • Cooperation differs from scandal, as it is an influence into the will of another, in that it is a concurrence toward the evil action of another principally acting. It is said: principally acting. For the cooperation about which the discussion is here is not to be confounded with immediate participation; because those thus participating in the evil action of another, for example of theft, homicide, etc., are equally principal authors of the same guilt, and for this reason are called by Theologians concurring causes. But such concurrence, or cooperation, can be furnished in nine ways, contained in the following little verse, and to be explained more broadly in the Treatise on Justice:

Command, counsel, consent, flatterer, recourse,
Participant, silent one, one not preventing, one not manifesting.

In the first six ways concurrence is furnished positively, that is, by positing an action influencing the sin of another; in the last three ways concurrence is made negatively, that is, by omitting an act by which another's sin can and must be impeded (or, to use an expression too celebrated today, by not intervening). - Yet do not wonder if in the following there seems to be discussion almost exclusively of the positive ways of cooperating; for the negative ways, morally and with proportion preserved, are reduced to the positive according to that saying of the Angelic Doctor, already related before: "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act." - Besides, concerning negative cooperation, as much as is needed, there will be special discussion in the Treatise on Justice, n. 773 sqq.

303. • In the present treatment a twofold cooperation must be carefully distinguished: namely formal and material.

Formal cooperation is that which truly concurs toward the very evil will of another, namely by consenting to it, or by intending the sin; and this happens a) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which from its own nature is determined to evil; and b) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which at least from the intention of the cooperator is determined to evil, that is, is posited for this end, that another may be helped in sinning. - Hence formal cooperation always supposes in the cooperator some consent into the sin of another, if not by reason of the end which the cooperator expressly intends (the end of the agent), then at least by reason of the work furnished, which from its character tends into evil (the end of the work).

Material cooperation is that which concurs only toward the evil action of another; and this through assistance at least indifferent of itself, which namely neither from its character (from the end of the work), nor from the intention of the cooperator (from the end of the agent), is determined to evil; but is determined to evil only by the principal agent. Practically, cooperation of this sort for the most part consists in the furnishing of some matter, occasion, or means indifferent of itself, which another can use without sin, although, from his own malice, beyond the intention of the cooperator, he is in reality going to abuse them for sinning. Hence material cooperation does not of itself flow into the very evil will of another, nor does it include of itself any consent in his sin, as formal cooperation does; and therefore I would have thought that generally it can rightly be said: cooperation in the sins of others is formal or material according as, with attention to the end of the agent who concurs, and to the end of the work by which he concurs, the cooperation does, or does not, of itself involve some consent in the sin of the one principally acting. Cf. Vind.¹

Sins against neighbor are opposed to charity or justice with their annexed virtues. But they can harm the neighbor in his various goods: in the internal goods of his own person, whether of body or of soul; in the goods of marriage, as regards the person joined to him; in the external goods of fortune; in the goods of reputation and honor, and of friendship and peace. To these various goods diverse sins are opposed.

I. Innocent XI condemned the following theses:

13. If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened over someone's life, or rejoice over his death; seek it and desire it with an inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal advantage.

14. It is licit, with an absolute desire, to wish for the death of one's father — not indeed as an evil to the father, but as a good to the one wishing it — because, namely, a rich inheritance will fall to him.

15. A servant who, with bowed shoulders, knowingly helps his master climb through windows to ravish a virgin, and many times abets him in this, carrying the ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally, if he does this from fear of notable detriment — for instance, lest he be ill-treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with fierce eyes, lest he be expelled from the house.

II. "Coninck believes that no fear whatever makes it licit to paint an idol, or to make a priestly vestment at the request of an Infidel ... But I believe that it can be excused by a most grave fear, if these things are not demanded of you in contempt of Religion, and there is no scandal in your not scorning them. For the fabrication of an idol, and the painting of a concubine, are not intrinsically evil, but can often be rendered honest." Castropalao, treatise 6, disputation 6, point 12, number 7, page 434.

III. "Of the sculpture or painting of an idol there is a doubt: and indeed it is licit, when idolatry is neither sought nor feared; but when it is feared, I say that he sins against Religion who furnishes it without a most urgent loss. This is proved both from the law of charity, and because every virtue obliges that all occasions of violating it be avoided. But if I cannot myself refuse to furnish the idol without grave and proportionate loss, I do not sin in giving it." Hurtado de Mendoza, on the second part of the Second Part, disputation 66, section 6, § 181, in Diana, coordinated edition, Tome 7, treatise 5, resolution 64.

IV. Fr. Antonino Diana, Tome 7, coordinated edition, resolution 9, number 6, frees from the sin of scandal women using superfluous and excessive adornment. "But I" (he says) "think that there is no sin, even if the adornment were superfluous and excessive, provided it be according to the custom of the country." Does the custom of the country, then, prevail over the Gospel which prohibits such superfluity?

V. That women's cosmetics, and the exquisite adornments of face and head, hold a middle nature, removed both from honesty and from malice, Lessius writes, book 4 On justice, chapter 4, doubt 14, number 114. "Finally, to paint the face, and to apply various colors to it, is not evil of itself, but indifferent." But the divine Scriptures cry out against ornaments and allurements of this kind. He answers: "Those Scriptures either contain an exhortation, since they have no word of precept ... or certainly it was expedient at that time, for the edification of the Heathen, that this be commanded." Place cited, number 114.

VI. Caramuel, in his Theologia Praeterintentionalis, Tome II, precept 6, question 8, chapter 2, case 2, writes the following conclusions: "First. Servants can, with the knowledge that she is a prostitute or a concubine, minister foods at table — not only common foods, but also warm ones, and season food that provokes to Venus, and make ready a private bed." At number 297 he praises for his opinion Azor and Diana, and adds: "I have advisedly spoken not only of common foods, because I know that there is altogether greater difficulty if there were such foods as would excite Venus — for then, according to certain Theologians, servants would have to desist from such service, lest they cooperate indirectly toward illicit Venus. But we, the more prudent, believe that even such foods can be seasoned without fault." Is it licit, then, to incite Venus? To cook foods that kindle it? And is Caramuel to be held the more prudent for teaching these things? But hear the reason he brings forward. Such foods can be eaten without fault even by one who foresees the future pollution, provided he is prepared not to give consent: therefore the foods can be seasoned and ministered. Let this suffice to have pointed out, that it may be detested.

"Second. They can make the bed for their master and his mistress without venial fault," consonant with Azor, whom Diana cites.

"Third. It is not a mortal sin to procure for one's master and his concubine, about to have intercourse, a lodging, or to prepare a bed better than usual, or to strew it with flowers."

"Fourth. It is not a sin to hire a mistress into one's master's house, even though you foresee that she will sin in it."

VII. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, book V on the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 4: "If my friend wishes me to carry little gifts and the like — namely incitements of shameful love — which he himself sends to his concubine, can I carry them without sin? The answer was absolutely negative: because on the one hand this action, though otherwise indifferent, is conjoined with the sin of the friend and of his concubine; and on the other hand there is no excusing cause, drawn from servitude (for this he grants to servants) or from another detriment, as we suppose. Nor indeed, if there is some modest blush of shame, does this seem regularly to be of such moment as sufficiently to excuse. I confess, however, that if such a friendship were of great value to you, and you truly feared to lose it, you could be excused: because then a just fear of notable detriment is added."

The same, number 30: "Can those who by office carry litters on their shoulders, or drive carriages, licitly, hired for a price, bring a girl to a lascivious young man? Answer: I say they cannot. Nor does the reason of servitude excuse this: for these are not servants or subjects; nor does the loss of gain excuse it, because this is quite small. I have, however, one point from Navarrus, from which something more benign can probably be gathered. From these things," he says, "there seems to be gathered a reason for defending many from sin, at least deadly sin — provided, as in the case proposed, the sin does not please them, and they perform the aforesaid services for some good end — for instance, because they render what belongs to their office, or for a just wage. For although these offices and services are very much conjoined with sin, they are not, nevertheless, in themselves and by their own nature sins; and therefore they can be separated from the sin by a different and separate end. Thus he." Note that phrase: of their office, or for a wage.

VIII. Fr. Antonino Diana, Tome 7, coordinated edition, treatise 5, resolution 48: "Is it licit, for some just cause, to lend a bedchamber to someone asking it for fornication; or to let a house to a prostitute, even if, on account of the circumstance of the place, someone should commit a sin; or if the prostitute, hiring that house, should do great harm to honest women neighbors? On this case I was once asked; for a certain most noble man was insistently seeking his friend's house for the purpose of fornicating. But if he had denied him this, he would have fallen into most grave harm. He asked whether he would sin by doing this. And I answered in the negative: because without a proportionate loss to himself he could by no means deny this; and to lend a bedchamber is not, from its object, intrinsically evil, but indifferent, and is ordered to evil only from the depraved intention of the one abusing it. Therefore, etc. And thus Merolla teaches this same opinion most recently, in specific terms."

"Hence it is inferred, a fortiori, against Navarrus, chapter 17, that it is licit, for a just cause, to let a house to a prostitute — even if, on account of the circumstance of the place, someone should commit a sin, which he would by no means perpetrate if that place were not granted to him, by reason of its situation, etc. — or if the prostitute, hiring that house, should do great harm to honest women neighbors."

The same Diana, resolution 50: "Is it licit to give a gift to a judge's mistress, that she may intercede with him, since she herself would go to speak with the judge, and it is mortal by reason of scandal, since she exposes herself to a most vehement danger of sinning? Sanchez, most recently, answers in the negative ... But I judge the affirming opinion no less probable, if the business is grave, and you see that the judge is not favorable to you, but you hope that through the mistress's intercession he will become well-disposed, and no other way appears by which you could bend him to preserve your right: because you are not asking for something which she herself could not licitly furnish. For although by that intercession the judge and the mistress foster a shameful love, this you do not intend, nor are you the cause of any harm. All these things Castropalao teaches, Tome I, treatise 6, point 15, number 2."

The same, resolution 42: "I have adduced Francesco Merolla in his moral-theological disputations, Tome I, disputation 2, where he speaks thus. From these things it is gathered what must be said of coachmen who carry a prostitute from one place to another, when they know that she seeks that place in order to sin. For these are regularly excused from sin: because there is a cause of not losing the gain which they procure from that ministry. So he, and I."

IX. Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 5 on the fifth precept of the Decalogue, chapter 1, section 3, number 92: "Without doubt painters sin mortally, regularly speaking, who paint very filthy and obscene things; and much more actors representing such very filthy things ... But I say 'regularly speaking': for in a rare case, if the necessity of the painter or actor were so great that he needed such gain for food, clothing, or some other necessary thing, certain Doctors, with Tamburini, permit it once or twice, until another means of livelihood should occur — provided there be absent the mortal danger of impure venereal delight." This opinion is more than lax, as will be said in its place. For according to these Theologians, regularly speaking, very filthy and obscene scandal is not licit. But if food, or clothing, or something of the kind presses, then a very filthy scandal will be honest, until another means of livelihood occurs.

THESE perversions of the soul agree only in this, that they tear asunder the seamless Tunic of the Lord, which the soldiers themselves did not rend — Charity, that is: the one indeed attacks the truth, which it cannot by arguments, with clamors; the other breaks cords of hearts formerly united by the bond of peace, whence it took the name of Discord.

In CHARITY is contained eminently FRIENDSHIP (which, according to the Philosopher, is perfected only between two persons); likewise also political peace, which makes many fellow-citizens of one will and one tongue, for repelling the assaults of outsiders; against the former, Quarreling fights from the opposite side; against the latter, Sedition; against Charity, however, both; therefore both must be briefly considered here.