§ 2. On Scandal

505. NOTIONS. Scandalum in Greek is the same as offendiculum in Latin, a stumbling-block placed in the way, against which a traveler incautiously stumbling falls. Whence the name scandal, transferred from physical things to morals, signifies everything which can furnish to neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin, and also the spiritual ruin itself arising thence.

Therefore the essence of scandal is not to be sought in the admiration caused, nor in the knowledge stimulated, nor in the irritation produced; but in this, that it can furnish, or is capable of furnishing, an occasion, or an occasional cause, of sinning, for example if at the least rash judgment, unjust suspicion, or rumor would follow.

It differs from positive induction or seduction, which is rather cooperation in sin or an external action by which another is explicitly and directly provoked to sin (II, 58). Cf. Noldin, II, n. 110.

DIVISION. Scandal is twofold: namely, active and passive.

I. Active scandal is: "A less right word or deed, furnishing another an occasion of spiritual ruin" (2.2, q. 43, a. 1).

It is said: 1. word or deed, under which name also comes an external omission, for example the omission of Mass on a day on which the precept urges; 2. less right, that is, what either is evil in itself (as if you speak filthy things before a youth), or has the appearance of evil in the eyes of others (although in itself it is good), as if from a just cause, before others ignorant of it, you omit Mass on a feast day, leave parents in order to follow the evangelical counsels, eat flesh on a forbidden day; 3. furnishing another an occasion of spiritual ruin: for, for the notion of scandal, it is not required that spiritual ruin actually be brought upon neighbor; but it suffices to furnish to him an occasion of fall or an occasion of sinning in such a way that, the circumstances being attended to, his fall is probably to be feared.

Active scandal is subdivided into direct and indirect. 1. It is DIRECT if the ruin or sin of another is intended. But it can be intended either formally, namely if something is therefore done so that neighbor may fall into sin, and then the scandal is called diabolical; or materially, namely if neighbor is therefore exposed to sin so that his sin may serve the usefulness or pleasure of the one intending it, and then the scandal is called simply direct. 2. It is INDIRECT if the sin of neighbor is not indeed intended, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited (without just cause) (II, 43).

II. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of neighbor, or the sin for which an occasion is furnished to neighbor. It is similarly divided into two parts: 1. Scandal is GIVEN if it arises from active scandal, namely from a deed which is evil in itself or at least has the appearance of evil. 2. Scandal is ACCEPTED if it does not arise from active scandal. And this latter can happen in two ways, namely: a) if it arises from weakness alone or ignorance. Then it is called scandal of the little ones, because, from a deed which contains neither evil nor the appearance of evil, an occasion of sinning is taken solely on account of weakness or ignorance; for example, if a young man from the modest adornment of a girl takes occasion of desiring her basely; b) if it arises from malice alone, and then it is called pharisaical. Thus the Pharisees conceived hatred against Christ on the occasion of his words or deeds; so also one who sees a priest walking, and from this maliciously takes an occasion of saying that the ministers of the Church labor under sloth.¹

506. From these things you will gather: 1. Sometimes active and passive scandal are found together, namely when someone, from an occasion of sinning which neighbor furnished to himself, actually falls into sin. Sometimes there is active scandal without passive, namely when someone induces another by word or deed to sin, but the effect does not follow. Sometimes there is passive scandal without active, as happens, for example, in pharisaical scandal.

2. "It is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done being attended to, it can probably be feared that by this act those who otherwise would not sin are drawn to sin" (II, 43, 3). Wherefore those are not guilty of scandal who, living with a man prone to blasphemies, posit actions lightly evil, for example words of impatience, or even indifferent actions, from which new blasphemies can be foreseen; all the more because it is morally impossible to abstain from all these things (Aertnys, l. 2, tr. 3, n. 62).

3. "He is not judged to give scandal who, although he sins publicly, nevertheless does it before those who are either so vile, or infamous or wicked, or who are so upright, that no one is moved to sin: for example, if someone fornicates before others who are prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example; or if before the meek someone contends, brawls, or strikes another" (II, 44, 6; VI, 257).

These things having been posited, let us consider: 1. the malice; 2. the permission; 3. the reparation; 4. the frequency of scandal.

Passive scandal does not have a special malice; for it is nothing other than the sin itself of the one scandalized. Here only ACTIVE scandal is treated, and it is asked what kind and how great its malice is.

507. PRINCIPLES. I. Every scandal has at least a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the virtue to the wounding of which neighbor is exposed. As regards direct scandal, theologians generally agree. As regards indirect scandal, some say that through it one sins only against the virtue wounded; others think that one sins only against charity. Yet the opinion affirming that by each scandal one sins both against charity and against the virtue is to be preferred, with St. Alphonsus. Against charity indeed, because if from charity we are bound, when we can, to impede the sin of neighbor, much more are we bound not to be the occasion for neighbor of committing it. Against the virtue, because each virtue prohibits someone from being the cause or occasion to others of wounding it. And a very urgent reason against the first opinion is this: because where it is a question of consent in sin, the direct and indirect voluntary belong to the same species.²

We said at least twofold; because direct diabolical scandal sometimes also wounds charity toward God. Besides, every scandal can contain several malices: either on account of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example if a father scandalizes children, a Superior subjects, a teacher pupils; for these are held, not only from charity but also from office, to forestall the ruin of their subjects; or on account of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone induces a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, to filthy things. All these malices, diverse in species, can also be several in number: for there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized (cf. n. 331). See St. Alph., V, 46; Selva, P. I, c. 8; P. II, c. 2.

508. II. Scandal is a mortal sin of its kind. The reason is that it is opposed to the precept of charity toward neighbor, since the greatest of harms is inflicted upon him. Whence Christ said in Matt. 18:7: Woe to that man by whom scandal cometh.

But the gravity of scandal is measured: 1. from the more or less explicit intention of the ruin of neighbor; whence direct scandal is graver than indirect; 2. from the greater influence upon the ruin of neighbor; wherefore the scandal of a priest or religious is regularly graver than the scandal of a layman; 3. from the gravity of the sin of which it is the occasion. The reason is that it participates in the malice of this sin, as is established from the things said (n. 507). Hence it can happen that a sin grave according to itself is venial by reason of scandal, for example if your grave theft is the occasion to another of committing a light theft. Conversely, a sin light according to itself can be grave by reason of scandal, for example if a religious utters a less honorable word before women, or those who can thence take occasion of mortal sin (II, 44).

509. Corollaries. 1. To ask from another something which he himself will not furnish without sin, if he is already PREPARED to sin, is a sin of scandal, if the thing which is asked is intrinsically evil, so that in no way can it be furnished without sin; for example, fornication with a prostitute is certainly a sin of scandal, even if the other is already prepared to sin. The reason is that thus an occasion is given of greater ruin (II, 47; l. El. qq. ref., n. 8 and 16).

Yet he will not be guilty of scandal who, from a just cause, asks for a thing good or indifferent in itself, although the other, in furnishing it, commits sin. Thus, for example, it is lawful, for the sake of necessity or usefulness, to ask a loan from a usurer, the sacraments from a sacrilegious priest, the conjugal act from an abusing spouse. Cf. n. 315. But if a just and proportionate cause is lacking, it is not licit, without guilt of scandal, to do these things (II, 47, 77, 79).

2. To advise a LESSER EVIL, so that a greater may be avoided, to the execution of which another is already determined, is licit of itself, according to the more probable opinion (whether this lesser evil which is advised is of the same species or of a diverse species); namely, when the one acting is so firmly determined to execute the evil that in no other way can he be turned away from the execution. The reason is that then the one advising does not seek evil, but good, namely the choice of the lesser evil. Hence, to one prepared to kill an enemy, it is licit to advise that he rather strike him, or steal something from him (II, 57). Cf. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1911, p. 380.

Yet per accidens, by reason of justice, this is not licit: namely, if he is advised that a lesser evil be inflicted upon some other determinate person, which that person here and now is not bound to suffer (III, 565). Cf. n. 980.

3. To PERMIT an occasion of sinning (not evil of itself) is licit; even if the fall of another is thence foreseen, or probably feared; namely, if a cause is present, for example, that the delinquent may be corrected. For permission of itself is not induction; it is a merely indirect volition.

In this way, a father and a master can refrain from removing an occasion of stealing from sons or servants whom they have known to be prone to theft, so that, being caught, they may be punished and come to their senses; for one theft is reasonably permitted so that several may be avoided. Thus also it is licit for custodians of fields, vineyards, and forests to hide themselves, so that those causing damage may be caught, and, being punished, may be turned away from inflicting further damage.

Thus finally a man having a suspect wife can lay snares for her and catch her in the crime, in order that he may provide. Thus St. Thomas and others rather commonly. Cf. II, 58; H. Ap., IV, 30.

4. Probably it is also licit to PLACE an occasion, if a just cause is present; for only an indifferent act is posited, and the evil is permitted with sufficient reason.

Hence, probably the master does not sin who deliberately leaves open the chest in which money is kept, for the end that he may test the doubtful fidelity of a servant. St. Thomas (2.2, q. 78, a. 4) gives this general rule: "To induce a man to sin is in no way licit: yet to use the sin of another for good is licit."

5. In sins which necessarily have an ACCOMPLICE, the circumstance of induction is not to be explained in confession, according to a sufficiently probable opinion. For since in sins of this kind a mutual wounding of charity is found, the circumstance of induction is only an aggravating circumstance, within the same species, against charity, and therefore is not necessarily to be disclosed in confession. But he sufficiently accuses the sin of scandal who confesses the species of the sin, for example fornication, adultery, incest, etc. (II, 46; H. Ap., IV, 26; l. El. qq. ref., n. 7). Except, unless the one inducing to evil had used threats, or prayers so importunate that they could be equated with force.

510. From these things you will resolve: 1. A penitent does not satisfy in confession when he says: I gave scandal; but besides his own sin by which he gave scandal, he must express the species of mortal sin to which, by his evil example, praise, blame, etc., he gave occasion; besides, the number of persons to whom he furnished, or probably could furnish, an occasion to such sin; likewise, the quality of himself and of the person scandalized, whenever from this a new species is had; similarly, the unjust mode, if he used force or threats. But as regards those penitents who, in relation to indirect scandal, adhere to the opinion of modern authors (cf. n. 507), let the confessor act according to the principles to be established n. 1789.

2. Let the confessor and preacher gravely rebuke those giving scandal, after the example of Christ saying: Woe to that man by whom scandal cometh (Matt. 18:7). For by their work the world is filled with sins, and hell with souls (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 46).

The state of the question is whether it is licit to posit a good act having the appearance of evil, or an act wholly good or indifferent, from which passive scandal is foreseen as going to arise. That this is licit when the due conditions intervene is already established from the things said about the indirect voluntary (n. 315). Therefore it remains that we show when the due conditions are found, and since, in relation to the first three, there is no difficulty, there remains to be weighed when the fourth condition is verified, namely, WHEN A SUFFICIENT REASON IS GIVEN for permitting the scandal of neighbor. Yet we forewarn that here it is chiefly a question of grave scandal; although the things which we are about to say also hold, in due proportion, concerning scandal in light matter.

511. PRINCIPLES. I. Grave inconvenience is a sufficient reason for permitting scandal given or scandal of the little ones. This is established from the fact that charity does not oblige one to undergo grave inconvenience lest neighbor suffer harm which depends upon his free will, since then he is not constituted in strict necessity (cf. n. 480 and 519). But we are bound with light inconvenience, because from charity we ought to impede the sins of neighbor when we easily can (cf. n. 493). But a greater cause is required if a graver sin is feared, if there are several to be scandalized, if it is more certainly foreseen that scandal will follow (II, 48, 49).

Moreover, in practice, we can avoid scandal either by concealing the action, or by deferring it to another time, or by omitting it altogether; and specifically, as regards scandal given, or when the work from which scandal is foreseen bears before itself the appearance of evil, the occasion of ruin is to be removed, as far as it is in the power of the agent (yet not with grave inconvenience), by admonition made to neighbor concerning the rectitude of the action, for example on account of a dispensation, an excusing cause, etc. But if, after the admonition has been given, the scandal persists, it can now be equated with pharisaical scandal (II, 52).

II. Any reasonable cause whatsoever is a sufficient reason for permitting pharisaical scandal. The reason is that this scandal arises from the malice alone of neighbor. It is clear besides from the example of Christ, who despised the scandal of the Pharisees: Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind (Matt. 15:14). Wherefore if some reason of utility is present, whether one's own or another's, no further care is to be had concerning this scandal. Yet some reason is required, because charity demands that without any cause we should not offer even a remote occasion of sin to one who is about to sin from malice alone (II, 52).

512. Corollaries. 1. Precepts which here and now oblige are never to be omitted for avoiding any scandal whatsoever. The reason is that then to pass them over is sin, and consequently illicit. In that case the rule of Law is consonant: "More usefully is scandal permitted to arise than truth abandoned" (Reg. 3, l. 5, tit. 41).

Of this kind are: a) Precepts which are concerning things necessary for salvation, as the precept of receiving faith and baptism, and consequently also the precept of ministering a Sacrament necessary for salvation.

b) Precepts of natural law urging here and now, and not ceasing on account of changed circumstances. Thus on account of no scandal to be avoided is it licit to lie (II, 50).

c) Precepts of positive law, when pharisaical scandal is foreseen; because if they did not oblige and were omitted, an occasion would be given to depraved men of maliciously impeding the goods of others. But whether they oblige, and therefore are to be observed, when scandal of the little ones is foreseen, is controverted. Some probably affirm, because even positive and human precepts do not cease to oblige when scandal is not given but accepted. Others more probably deny, because there is present a conflict of laws, in which the natural precept (namely of impeding the sin of another) removes the obligation of the positive precept, which therefore is to be omitted, yet not with great inconvenience. This opinion is to be recommended only for one time or another, since frequent omission would induce grave inconvenience (II, 51, 53; cf. H. Ap., IV, 28; Conf. dir., IV, 14). Whence, in practice, since each opinion is probable, a woman, in order to avoid the sin of her husband, who would take from it an occasion of blaspheming, can well omit the precept of hearing Mass, or of observing fast, once or again, but is not bound to do so. Similarly, a girl, lest she offer herself to the sight of a young man by whom she knows she is basely loved, rightly omits Mass once and again, so that thus the other can notice that he is avoided by her.

2. Works of counsel or indifferent works are sometimes to be omitted for avoiding scandal of the little ones. Thus, for example, a woman who would foresee that she would be to some determinate person the cause of ruin would be bound once or another time, provided it can be done conveniently, to flee his sight, by going, for example, to another church, walking by another road, not approaching the window, and similar things.

But she would by no means be bound to do this for a long time, since this would be very burdensome. "For, ordinarily speaking, a cause suffices to excuse her at least from mortal sin, lest she be deprived of her liberty...; since it would be a very inconvenient thing for a woman, and liable to scruples, if she always had to weigh whether she has a just cause of going out or not." Nor is she bound to abstain from public walking on account of the scandal of others; for this must be judged too grave for her. Yet a girl could not be excused from mortal sin if, led by vanity, even if she does not intend the scandal of that man, she deliberately offers herself to his sight. Likewise if she seeks some place which she would not approach unless she knew her lover was present there (II, 58).

3. Temporal goods, if they are one's own, can indeed licitly be given up for avoiding the scandal of others; but they do not necessarily have to be given up.

Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to some workman, although you foresee that he will blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often and among many; whence, in the whole complex, it becomes grave. Similarly, a parish priest, of himself, is not bound to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks out into various detractions, etc.; for thence grave inconvenience would come both to the parish priest himself and to his successors (II, 52; St. Thom., 2.2, q. 78, a. 4).

Note. We said if they are one's own; for if the goods are another's, they cannot even licitly be given up, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed.

REPARATION OF SCANDAL generally demands two things for itself: one, sometimes under grave sin, that the further influence of scandal be removed as far as can be done; the other, which ordinarily does not seem to urge under mortal sin, that the amendment of him who suffered scandal be efficaciously consulted.

513. PRINCIPLES. I. He who from scandal has induced neighbor into sin, or into a harmful error, is bound from charity to repair this evil according to his powers. And indeed, if anyone whatsoever is bound from charity to correct one sinning or about to sin, a fortiori he who, by giving scandal, was the author why neighbor fell into sin or into danger of sinning, is bound by this obligation, even with greater inconvenience than all the rest. The same is to be said a fortiori concerning him who, through induction properly so called, persuasion, or counsel, made another sin or err.

Hence: 1. He who gave scandal to others by wicked counsels which are still efficacious must render them inefficacious through diligent revocation to be made known to the same persons, either by himself or by another. Thus an author who, through heretical or obscene writings, was to others a cause of sinning, is bound to impede the diffusion of his books, publicly retract his writings, and compose and publish new ones, if he can, for the edification of the Christian faithful.

2. He who induced neighbor into a stable perversion, for example of concubinage or irreligiosity, is bound under grave sin to labor for his conversion, so that he may lead him back, either by himself or by others, into the path of virtue. We say either by others; for sometimes it is better to use the work of others, especially when it is a question of the conversion of an accomplice in filthy matter: in which case the occasion of sinning could easily be brought back.

3. As regards ordinary scandals, which bring forth not full perversion but only passing sins, these regularly cannot be repaired except by that general reparation which is contained in the cessation itself from scandal, in good example, in prayer for the one scandalized, and similar things.

514. II. Public scandal obliges the guilty person to public reparation. Otherwise the further influence of scandal is not sufficiently removed, nor are all the scandalized admonished concerning the evil which they suffered.

Wherefore a concubinary, a usurer, or another sinner of this kind is to be constrained, if it can be done, to public reparation of scandal: suppose that, his commerce or wicked business having first been abandoned, he publicly approach the sacraments with devotion.

III. The scandal of a Superior, given to subjects, must be repaired by him from office. Thus, for example, a father of a family who scandalized domestics is ordinarily to be constrained to repair the scandal, if this is still judged efficacious, so that he may manifest to the same domestics his displeasure concerning his evil example, and paternally exhort them not to follow it in the future.

IV. Scandal unjustly inflicted must be repaired from justice. It is said: unjustly inflicted, that is, by fraud, force, deceit, unjust fear. It must be repaired by restraining the influence of the action. The reason is that each one has a right not to be injured unjustly in spiritual goods.

But after the unjust means have been removed, the one scandalizing is probably bound only from charity to repair the scandal. For when force or fraud has now ceased, and the other knows that he was deceived, he can, if he wishes, extricate himself from sin by himself, and therefore, if he does not amend himself, this is imputed to him (III, 661).

515. Those are to be held guilty of much pernicious scandal:

1. Those retaining the custom of blaspheming, especially before younger persons, most of all if before children.

2. Reporters of grave detraction, relating the matter to others; for thence arise hatreds and quarrels.

3. Messengers of love to some woman, whether married or unmarried, apart from the end of marriage. Thus especially servants and maidservants sin who furnish help to sons of families for fostering base loves (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 45).

4. Those spreading books of harmful reading, namely who scatter them, sell them, or hand them over to be read by others. Likewise, those who make, spread, or publicly sing filthy little songs or poems.

5. Those introducing into schools a pernicious manner of teaching, or dangerous books. Without scandal anatomical and surgical books, or even books of pagan authors not sufficiently expurgated, cannot be handed into the hands of boys (cf. Const. Officiorum ac munerum, n. 10).

6. Those uttering lascivious speeches, whether in clear words or equivocal ones (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers). This is, says St. Alphonsus (l. c.), "ordinary scandal: men speak dishonorably before women, youths, and sometimes even before innocent children. And alas, what ruin they cause!..."

7. Those given to alluring performances. Thus the authors, actors, and actresses of comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances in which, by reason of the dress of the dancing-women, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, filthiness appears (III, 428). Cf. n. 835. Likewise the authors of a cinematographic exhibition which infects especially the mind of youths, excites the imagination, indeed provokes the will to crimes to which a man would certainly be less prone unless he saw them remain unpunished, and their authors praised on account of their cunning and dexterity. But whether and how far the spectators of such exhibitions (who ordinarily defile themselves with many internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles later to be established concerning cooperation (III, 427). Cf. below n. 519, 525, 836.

8. Painters, sculptors, photographers, and others who at home or in gardens or museums, etc., exhibit to the sight of all obscene statues or images, namely those in which those parts of the body (we do not say of an infant, but of a more grown person), which modesty teaches among all peoples are to be veiled, appear naked or covered only by a thin veil. "Otherwise if, with other parts uncovered, the shameful parts are covered" (II, 56). Yet there is no one who does not know that images and statues truly can be obscene when, although all things are covered, from the gesture and manner of holding oneself a mind addicted to lust appears.

9. Persons who by a special title ought to remove others from sin; thus sin: a) Parents and masters who permit their daughters or maidservants conversations in hidden places with spouses and lovers. b) Wives who, by admitting their graceful lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and others, as experience teaches. And the same must be said of a husband who keeps a maidservant suspected by his wife not without reason. c) Clerics who, keeping at home a person suspect to the people, furnish an occasion to sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state, etc. etc. (Council of Trent, Sess. 25, c. 14, de Ref.).

516. You will ask. What is to be thought concerning THE ADORNMENT OF WOMEN?

1. Moderate adornment, according to the decency of state, is licit of itself, because it does not give occasion of sinning. Hence there is no sin if a woman decently adorns herself in order to please her husband, or to find a spouse. But if she acts from levity or vanity, she sins venially (II, 54).

2. Excessive adornment, namely that which exceeds the condition of one's own state, is of itself venial, because of itself it does not gravely move others to equal luxury. But it becomes mortal: a) if it is indulged in for provoking the lasciviousness of men; b) if the fall of some man in particular is foreseen. Women who use rouge and pigments, scandal being prescinded from, sin only venially; but not at all, if they intend thus only to conceal defects of the body (II, 54, 55; III, 425).

3. Immodest adornment, such as is not rarely accustomed to be displayed at solemn dinners and evening gatherings, is illicit according to the degree of immodesty.¹

Hence: a) if the uncovering is so immoderate that the breasts are shown almost entirely or are covered with a very thin veil, it is of itself grave scandal, because such immodesty of itself incites to lust; b) but if it is not so immoderate, so that only the arms, or the breasts in part, are uncovered, those women indeed are not excused from mortal sin who introduce the use of such dress where it does not prevail; but others who follow what has already been introduced, although they are to be severely rebuked, nevertheless are not, of themselves, to be condemned for mortal sin; because custom causes concupiscence to blaze up much less. For the rest, by denudation of the breast women not rarely seek to be dishonorably desired by men, in which case direct scandal will be present. Wherefore this worst custom is to be restrained and extirpated by preachers and confessors as far as can be done; c) what has been said concerning denudation of the breast seems also to be said concerning garments so studiously made, tight and thin, that the whole conformation of the body appears.