§ 3. On Cooperation in the Sins of Others

We shall treat: 1. of cooperation in general; 2. of the various modes of cooperating, or of the cases which are accustomed to occur more frequently.

517. DEFINITION. To cooperate, in general and by force of the word, is the same as to work with another.

But someone can work with another both by inducing him to act, and by furnishing help to him, already determined to act, by which he may be able to accomplish his work.

Concerning the first mode of cooperating, which is done by induction and which is compared to SCANDAL, we treated in the preceding disputation. Therefore it remains that we discuss also the second mode, which is done by furnished help.

Therefore, properly COOPERATION is named and can be defined: concurrence with the depraved action of another principally acting.

DIVISION. Cooperation is distinguished as manifold, according to the various modes by which the cooperator concurs with the depraved action of another:

I. By reason of the evil act, it is formal or material: 1. FORMAL cooperation is that which concurs even with the evil will of the one principally acting, or is the concurrence which someone furnishes with that intention (whether explicit or implicit) that it may be a help to the one principally acting in executing the evil work.

This can be done in two ways, namely: a) through work which, taken concretely, by its very nature, that is, from the end of the work, is ordered to the depraved action, for example, in a scenic work by which religion is derided, to act the parts of an actor; b) or through indifferent work, which indeed not from itself, but from the special intention of the cooperator, that is, from the end of the one acting, is directed to a depraved action of this kind: for example, if someone furnishes money to another, collected for spreading errors; or if someone accompanies another to a place of filthiness, so as thereby to render him more bold for sin.

2. MATERIAL cooperation is that which furnishes the material of sin; which therefore, apart from the intention and with the mere permission of the cooperator, concurs with the evil action of another. It is furnished through work which neither of itself nor from the determination of the cooperator is ordered to this evil action, and which the one principally acting can use without sin; although, on account of his malice, he abuses it for sinning. Cooperation of this kind would be, for example, the furnishing of wine to one who wishes to make himself drunk; the handing over of keys to one who enters in order to steal (II, 63; H. Ap., IV, 31; cf. III, 571; Conf. dir., IV, 16).

II. Material cooperation can be subdivided:

1. By reason of the help furnished, it is immediate or mediate. - It is called immediate when the cooperator acts with the one principally acting in the evil act itself, for example by helping a thief carrying off another's thing; but mediate when the cooperator furnishes something which serves the one principally acting for executing the depraved work, for example by handing over a ladder to a thief about to invade a house.

2. By reason of connection with the depraved act, it is proximate or remote: namely, according as, from its nature or from the circumstances, it is judged to have or not to have a moral connection with the sin of the one principally acting. Thus, for example, proximate cooperation is to give a sword to one about to kill; but remote cooperation is to furnish the material from which the sword is to be made (cf. n. 313, 2).

Note. 1. Concerning cooperation which becomes formal from the intention of the cooperator, there can scarcely ever be difficulty; because one cooperating in such a way directly intends the sinful action and evidently becomes a participant in the malice of the one principally acting. But whether and when this depraved intention must be MANIFESTED to the one principally acting, in order that the cooperator may also be held to reparation of harm, is a question which will be weighed in the treatise on the seventh Precept (cf. n. 976 seqq.).

2. But concerning cooperation which is formal from its nature, and objectively can never be reputed material, dispute frequently occurs; because, in order to define whether some work is ordered of itself and from the intrinsic end of the work to the depraved action of another or not, there is often need of most attentive consideration and much sagacity.

To elucidate this matter, it helps to add the following:

a) An action ordered of itself to a depraved end is to be considered in such a way that it neither has nor can have a good end. This can be verified either concerning an action taken speculatively, or concerning an action apprehended concretely, that is, clothed with such circumstances. Thus to paint, in a temple of heretics, an image of the founder of the sect with an aureole; to discharge a gun with another against someone, are actions of themselves ordered only to an evil end.

b) An action which, for the one principally acting, is a condition without which he could not act does not by that very fact become an action ordered solely to an evil end; for example, to place one's shoulders under, says St. Alphonsus (III, 571), to furnish a ladder to a master wishing to ascend for fulfilling lust, is not cooperation of itself ordered to sin.

c) From the fact that the one principally acting becomes more bold for the attainment of the intended end, it cannot always by that very fact be said that the cooperation of another is formal; for example, in the example of one placing his shoulders under, these things are verified; and nevertheless he who places his shoulders under furnishes merely material cooperation. But if the cooperator who renders the one principally acting more bold, by his action, as it were acts his person and receives in himself a part of the evil work, he becomes guilty of formal cooperation: for example, one who for his master writes truly amorous letters containing filthy things; one who to a thief prepared for sinning indicates, at his request, the time and mode so that he can commit his crime more securely; one who, while someone indulges lust in a bedroom, acts as watchman, formally cooperate in the sin.

d) Formal cooperation is not synonymous with illicit cooperation: for every formal cooperation is illicit, but not vice versa; for example, he who, on account of a reason not proportioned to the evil, furnishes material cooperation certainly sins, but does not become guilty of formal cooperation. The number of actions which of themselves, from the end of the work, are formal cooperations is not so great.

518. PRINCIPLES. I. Formal cooperation is never licit. For formal cooperation, since it includes some consent of the will in another's sin as sin, is intrinsically evil, and cannot be without fault. Therefore it can be excused by no reason, not even fear of death (H. Ap., IV, 31).

Indeed, no otherwise than scandal, it has at least a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the virtue which is wounded (cf. n. 507).

Hence it is never licit to furnish work which, from its nature, can be ordered only to sin as such: as would be, for example, to make instruments suited only to impeding generation, to prepare remedies destined only to procuring abortion, to seek a concubine for a master, to write amorous and filthy letters to a concubine for a concubinary, to invite a woman to commit crime with the master, etc. (II, 67). Likewise, according to St. Alphonsus (II, 64, 65, 68; l. El. qq. ref., 11), it is never licit for a servant to carry amorous letters to the concubine of his master, or to carry little gifts and dainties to a prostitute; because this service also, from its nature, as regards this act taken concretely, fosters base love, and by its nature is born to produce no other effect of itself.² And the same must be said of a girl if she willingly accepts gifts of a lover basely desiring her. For thus she fosters his base love, in which she at least implicitly consents (II, 76).

But if, on account of peculiar circumstances, the action of the cooperator does not involve consent of this kind, it can be without sin; for example, if a girl accepting gifts offered before others cannot refuse without stirring up suspicions and incurring danger of infamy. Then her acceptance becomes morally another action, insofar as she simply consults her reputation. Thus also postal officials who carry letters which, from certain indications, they know to be amorous, simply fulfill a public function, in the name of the State.

519. II. Material cooperation is sometimes licit. It is licit, namely, if three conditions are present, from the indirect voluntary, that is: 1. if the action of the cooperator is good of itself, or at least indifferent; 2. if his intention is right; 3. if there is present a just cause, and proportioned both to the gravity of the sin of another, and to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished for the execution of the sin.³

"The reason is that when you furnish an indifferent action without a depraved intention, if the other should wish to abuse it for executing his sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it; and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, positing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin: for then that man's sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him who abuses your action. Nor does it avail to say that your action, although indifferent, nevertheless, joined with the circumstance of the depraved intention of another, becomes evil; for in reality, your action is not conjoined of itself with his evil will, but he conjoins his evil will with your action; whence your action will not then be a cause influencing the sin of itself, but only an occasion which he abuses for sinning" (II, 63).

Moreover, for judging when the CAUSE is just and proportionate, above all let it be observed as a rule what the Doctors say; because, since this depends upon the estimation of prudent men, the more common opinion in this matter will also be the more probable. - Therefore generally it can be said that "a cause is required so much the graver: 1. the graver the sin is whose occasion is given; 2. the more probable it is that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin, or the more certain the effect of the sin is; 3. the more closely your cooperation touches the sin; 4. the less right you have to such a work; 5. finally, the more the sin conflicts with justice, and this on account of harm to a third party" (II, 59; H. Ap., IV, 32). Cf. above n. 314.

520. Hence the following SPECIAL RULES are drawn out:

1. It is always licit to cooperate materially with the sin of another in order to avoid a greater evil; for the axiom holds: "Of two evils the lesser is to be chosen." Thus, for example, you licitly furnish wine to one about to make himself drunk, lest he break out into blasphemies (II, 69; V, 77).

2. It is licit to cooperate materially in the lesser harm of neighbor, so that HE may be freed from a greater one, if another means is lacking; for since the owner can dispose of his own thing, he is judged reasonably to will this. Thus it is licit to help an enemy to lay waste a house, to steal, etc., lest the owner be killed (II, 74).

3. It is licit to cooperate materially, even IMMEDIATELY, with harm to a third party, for example by breaking doors, so that one's OWN harm of a superior order may be avoided. Thus it is lawful to burn a house in order to avoid death. For one constituted in such necessity can suppose the consent of the owner, who would be unwilling irrationally. But MEDIATELY it is licit to cooperate if it is a question of avoiding equal harm to oneself. Thus it is licit to give back a sword to one about to kill, so that one's own life may thereby be consulted. The reason is that, from the order of charity, we are not bound to impede the harm of another (even if this one is in extreme necessity) with equal detriment to ourselves (II, 76; III, 571; Istr., X, 56).

4. The cause which suffices for excusing a private cooperator does not suffice for excusing a Superior, magistrate, or anyone else who, not only from charity, but by force of his function, is held to ward off evil or to impede others' sins; for where there is a twofold obligation, there the excusing cause must necessarily be morally twofold. Thus, for example, parents must impede the sins of children, parish priests the sins of parishioners, magistrates the delicts of citizens, etc. Thus also merchants sometimes, from a special law, are bound not to sell certain dangerous weapons, poisonous drinks, etc. (H. Ap., IV, 32).

5. The cause which would excuse you if the one principally acting would attain his end equally easily does not suffice for excusing you if, your concurrence being denied, the other would not have sinned.

Since an enumeration of all the cases in which cooperation intervenes is plainly impossible, it will be enough to have enumerated those which are accustomed to occur more frequently, and from which the rest can be judged.⁴ But the prudent

confessor should ADVERT: 1. that good faith often excuses in this matter; 2. that for various places and times, much attention must be given to common estimation; 3. that in doubt, favor is not to be given to liberty where the reason of scandal, danger of perversion, of formal sin, etc., stands in the way; and if it is a question of a public matter, recourse to Superiors and to the more prudent is not to be omitted (cf. Konings, 312; Aertnys, l. II, n. 79).

521. 1. To the violation of the law of abstinence. a) If the sin of the master violating the law is established, it is not licit for a servant to prepare or serve forbidden food from the sole reason of service, because it is a question of proximate cooperation; it is licit only on account of notable detriment. b) In doubt, the master is presumed to be excused by a just cause. - But in practice, rarely will either doubt or notable detriment be lacking (II, 68).

2. To usury. a) He who helps a usurer only in counting monies, writing accounts, or carrying a pledge, can be excused by the reason of service alone. b) Otherwise, if he exacts usuries: because exaction is a more proximate cooperation with the sin of the usurer, even if he exacts amicably. c) But if he exacted by force or threats, he would not only sin, but besides would be held to restitution, the master failing.

3. To lust. Three kinds of services must here be distinguished: a) services which from their nature are determined to filthiness; b) services indifferent of themselves which concur proximately with the filthiness of the master; c) services which concur with the same only remotely. Now:

Services of the FIRST kind are excused by no reason, since they constitute true formal cooperation (cf. n. 518).

Services of the SECOND kind, because they are proximate cooperations, cannot be excused from the sole reason of service, but only from another cause, whether grave or most grave, according to the diversity of the case. Thus, for example, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus (II, 64), the sole reason of service does not suffice, but besides there is required at least fear of grave harm, in order that a servant may licitly accompany his master to a place of filthiness; or saddle the horse for him departing there (even if the master is not rendered more bold by these things); or bring the concubine in a carriage to the house of the concubinary master, if it had already been agreed between him and the concubine; to offer a shoulder to one ascending to a woman not unwilling, etc., even if in these matters the servant furnishes merely material work. But a most grave cause, indeed fear of death, would be required in order that he could licitly help the master by carrying a ladder, or placing his shoulders under, or opening a door by force, when the master wishes to ascend to deflower a virgin.

Services of the THIRD kind, since the cooperation is remote, can be excused from the sole reason of service. Hence, for example, it will be licit for a servant, in the usual manner, to open the door to a concubine or prostitute, if, if he himself does not open, there is another who will open. But if the servant were many times compelled to such services, he would have to be earnestly admonished to leave the service (II, 66).

It is asked. What concerning public carriage-drivers conveying others to a brothel?

Resp. 1. It is proximate cooperation; therefore they are not excused by reason of wages, but only on account of grave harm to be avoided; for example, if a public carriage-driver feared lest he be dismissed, not easily about to find another master (II, 75; l. El. qq. ref., n. 15). Likewise, if carriage-drivers are held by civil law to convey travelers wherever they wish.

2. They can never offer their work for leading someone more safely or more secretly, or indicate to one ignorant where the brothel is. For it is formal cooperation (II, 64, 75; Kon., n. 311).

522. 1. To violation of the law of abstinence. a) Of themselves it is not licit for innkeepers, on a forbidden day, to serve meats of their own accord: because it would be a true and at least remote cooperation with another's sin, without a just cause (II, 80; l. El. qq. ref., n. 17). But it seems licit (at least where the usage prevails) universally to serve meats to guests asking for it, provided their request is not made in contempt of religion (III, 1030, q. 3).

b) Those innkeepers who establish a common table (table d'hote), at which guests sit jointly, or who await travelers arriving by public carriages or railway at a determined hour, taught by experience that many will ask for meat or broth from meat, can licitly have these things ready, so that they may then set them before those asking; or even spread the table with licit and illicit foods, offer them, mark them on a card, so that each may choose what has pleased him.

The reason is both that among so many, many are presumed to be legitimately excused or to be in good faith, whom to question individually would be grave or dangerous; and that such cooperation does not seem to be except remote, and if sometimes it were proximate, it must be said that in the present state of affairs it is impossible, at least in many places, to exercise the office of innkeeper otherwise (Kon., 310).

c) Those who have received some Catholics into board for an agreed price (pension) ought not so easily to furnish meats on forbidden days; because it is proximate cooperation, and in a private house the laws of the Church are more easily observed, nor does there generally occur so grave a reason for cooperating (ibid.). Yet those are more easily excused who, on fast days, in morning and evening, furnish foods not prohibited by reason of quality. For more are excused from fasting than from abstinence, on account of grave labor or not firm health. Therefore the cooperation is rather remote, and the matter is safely remitted to the conscience of individual boarders.

2. To drunkenness. It is not licit for innkeepers to give wine to those concerning whom they foresee that they will become drunk, unless on account of fear of grave evil, for example to forestall blasphemies or brawls, or also if from refusal they fear lest they be notably injured on account of diminution of guests: for it is proximate cooperation. Other evils also are to be weighed which often follow from drunkenness, as dissipation of goods, the misfortune of the wife, scandal of the children, etc. (II, 69).

3. To lust. a) Innkeepers are guilty of most grave sin and unworthy of absolution who, formally cooperating, furnish secret rooms for lust; or who conduct wholly filthy and lascivious dances at their place, unless the filthiness or lasciviousness would happen accidentally, for example in wedding dances. b) Universally, innkeepers are to be deterred as much as possible from instituting dances, because dances are generally done less honorably and furnish occasion to innumerable sins. Moreover, for judging whether absolution is to be denied to those wishing to institute them, the circumstances are to be inspected, and the mode in which the dances are accustomed to be done (Kon., n. 310). Cf. n. 829.

4. To harmful reading. a) Innkeepers cannot expose for reading those public papers which evidently and ordinarily are adverse to religion or morals, or positively prohibited by the Bishop, even if guests on that account cease to flow together to them; for in the latter case it is a question of proximate cooperation in a public evil. The same is to be said of those papers which generally and evidently are adverse to the clergy, and are the cause why the faithful detract from the veneration owed to them. A sufficient reason for exposing papers of this kind could be only a particular necessity, for guests, of knowing something from them, for example news pertaining to commerce, which would be sought elsewhere in vain. But in this case the master of the inn, in the best way which can be done, ought to signify that he exposes such papers only on account of the aforesaid reason, and does not approve their arguments. He must also watch lest they be exposed without necessity, and that they be destroyed as soon as possible. b) Commonly a sufficient reason is present for admitting those papers which treat of merely political matters. Nor do innkeepers seem to be bound to reject a newspaper which now and then contains something less right by reason of faith or morals, provided it is not generally opposed to religion or good morals (Kon., n. 310, d). Cf. n. 453.

523. To abuse of the things which they hand over. 1. If the thing of itself is determined to evil, and has no good use, as, for example, an idol for pagans in a region of unbelievers; a theatrical garment manifestly filthy; a woman's adornment obscene of itself; a scenic mask which has no other end than to turn religion and its rites and ministers into mockery; the distinctive insignia of a Masonic sect or of another of the same kind; a drug destined solely to procuring abortion, etc.; it is clear that the making and sale of this thing are generally altogether illicit.¹ - Whence St. Alphonsus (II, 72): "The sale of poison," he says, "which does not serve except for the killing of a man, is simply evil." But poisons which can be useful may not be sold except to those who are thought to be going to use them well, for example for making colors, or for medicine.

2. If the thing is indifferent of itself, but from the circumstances it is established that the buyer is led by an evil intention, it will not be licit to make, rent, or sell it, except from a grave or proportionate cause, even if it would equally be bought from others. Thus it is not licit to sell ornaments to a girl about to abuse them, unless otherwise the seller would suffer notable inconvenience (II, 71; l. El. qq. ref., 14; cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 8). It is said: even if it would equally be bought from others; because we are bound, at least short of grave inconvenience, to admonish one sinning, and especially one giving scandal, when opportunity is given. Now, "the denial of my cooperation," says Sanchez (Decal., l. 1, c. 7, n. 16), "is a certain kind of admonition, by which neighbor could have been recalled, if not from the present sin, at least from a future one, from the memory of this denial."

3. Catholics are not to be disquieted who, in order to avoid grave harm, build or restore synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, provided scandal is not present and it is not in contempt of religion. On account of defect of this condition, they are bound to abstain from the work: a) where a work of this kind is commonly held as a protestative sign of false religion; b) or something is contained in it which of itself directly and solely expresses reprobation of Catholic worship and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; c) or it is established that Catholic artisans are driven or called to the work by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion (from the declaration of the Holy Office, Aug. 17, 1613; Jan. 14, 1818; July 7, 1864).² The Holy Office declared the same on July 27, 1892,³ concerning cooperation with cremation of corpses (cf. n. 1388bis). With the same cause existing, it is licit for Catholics, for the use of heretics, to make and sell organs, a pulpit, a supper-table, altars, a chalice, priestly vestments, etc. A fortiori, it is licit to build and adorn theaters, etc., provided the ornaments are not impious or dishonorable in themselves. A sufficient cause for excusing workmen is more easily given than one which would be sufficient to excuse architects, contractors, and masters of workers, since they are not placed in the same necessity as the workers.⁴

4. A graver cause is required in order that it be licit to sell land to heretics for building a temple, to rent or sell to those enrolled in a Masonic sect a house destined for their meetings, etc.⁵

5. But a most grave cause is required, suppose danger of death, of most harsh exile, or an equivalent danger, in order that it be licit to furnish work for building or restoring temples of false gods, etc. Others say that this is in no way licit, from decrees of the Holy Inquisition of the years 1629 and 1699. But the mentioned decrees seem to have been issued on account of peculiar circumstances, from which the concurrence of Catholics would have been formal cooperation and, from the concrete nature of the thing, a protestative sign of false religion (Coll. Miss. Ext., n. 1070 and 1089; Gallo, l. c., p. 251).

6. If the depraved end of the one asking is not established, it is licit for workers, merchants, renters, etc., by the sole title of commerce, to hand over indifferent things to anyone asking; because in doubt no one is presumed evil. Thus, for example, strong liquors, dice, playing-cards, pigments, etc., are licitly sold, although many generally abuse them (II, 71).

524. 1. To the printing of depraved books or papers. Cooperation is either proximate, namely in those who are masters of the printing office, publishers of books; in those who arrange the types, place the paper upon the types, turn the press, direct the printing; or remote, for example in those who prepare ink or paper, correct or arrange books already printed, apply fire to the machine in more recent printing shops, or exercise other ministries pertaining only remotely to the printing.

These things having been premised: a) In a printing shop erected solely or principally for an evil end, it is licit for no cause, not even mediately, to cooperate. Thus, for example, Catholics can in no way be occupied around Protestant printing shops which by profession oppose the Catholic religion. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 825. b) In a common printing shop, if rarely and as it were per accidens a depraved book comes forth, or in a newspaper certain things are sometimes published against faith or good morals, mediate cooperators can be excused from a grave cause. Indeed Kenrick notes: "Those who are occupied in turning the press, and do not set the types, are not judged to know the things which are printed, and therefore in a common printing shop, where books of every kind are published, they are not bound to make a distinction. But those who have the right of direction ought to put far away the things which are opposed to faith and good morals" (tr. XIII, n. 157).

2. To the propagation or publication of the same. a) To expose, sell, give, lend, procure for a master asking, etc., books altogether obscene or filthy is proximate cooperation, from which only very grave necessity excuses (Lehmkuhl, ib. 4). Those buying depraved newspapers for a year or for months of themselves sin gravely, because by their money they efficaciously concur in publishing them. b) It is not licit indiscriminately to sell to all, or to procure, heretical books, for example Protestant bibles; or other harmful books, for example those which defend errors fixed in the Syllabus; or books of non-Catholics which professedly treat of religion. Yet those do not seem to be condemned who procure books of this kind, or others prohibited by the law of the Index, for someone who specially seeks them, and who is not certainly known to lack the due license for reading them: concerning which the bookseller at least is not bound to inquire. See CONST. Officiorum, n. 3 and 46. c) Those who, in depraved newspapers or in sheets to be posted publicly, carry advertisements of those things which by their nature tend to the detriment of faith or morals, as, for example, a heretical sermon to be held, books professedly harmful, dishonorable dances, filthy spectacles, etc., if they do this knowingly, do not seem able to be excused from formal cooperation. For they indicate the opportunity of sin. But it is licit to announce harmful books in scientific papers, so that they may be known by those whose interest it is (Kon., 315, 317). d) But those who in depraved newspapers only announce things to be sold or rented; or who only write scientific articles, are to be blamed for merely remote material cooperation. The case is excepted in which the cooperation of the writer would furnish notable favor to these newspapers (Genicot, I, 240). If the Bishop, on account of the common good, entirely prohibits insertion, one must stand by his decision.

525. 1. To cooperate in dishonorable dances, whether by music or by rental of a place, is proximate cooperation. Yet the reason of grave harm will excuse a musician not producing sounds of that sort which pertain solely to the dishonorable manner of dancing; for in this case the dances become dishonorable from the malice alone of those dancing. Thus Suarez, Palaus, Giribaldus. Yet there are some who permit this in no way, because sound influences too much and more intimately inflames toward dishonorable dances (Scavini, II, 957). Cf. n. 829.

2. To concur in the same way with lascivious dances, for example with prostitutes, is formal cooperation where those are instituted as such. But where lasciviousness occurs only by chance, by reason of private malice, there will be merely material cooperation.

3. All are guilty of mortal sin who, without just cause, concur by applause or money in notably filthy spectacles, even if they would be performed without them: for proximate cooperation is present. Likewise, those who from office are held to impede them and can do so without grave and notable harm; or who otherwise can conveniently impede them and do not impede them; a fortiori the actors representing them (III, 427, 428). Cf. n. 834.

4. In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, prostitutes are permitted to dwell, it is licit from a reasonable cause to rent a house to them, because this cooperation is remote material: unless, however, the prostitutes would gravely harm honorable neighbors, or by reason of the location would give greater occasion to sins (II, 70).

5. To paint or make for a lover an image of a person basely loved by him is proximate cooperation, which only very grave necessity excuses. Indeed to paint obscene things is not always formal cooperation, provided those things can have a good end, that is, the study of anatomical art (Lehmkuhl, I, 827).

526. To this matter pertain very many responses of the Most Holy Roman Congregations, given on the occasion of the sacrilegious invasion of the Pontifical State, and also of the separation of State and Church carried out in France.

I. On the occasion of the invasion of the Pontifical State.

1. It can be tolerated that votes be given for councils and municipal representative persons, provided the municipal persons are not driven to those things which are opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws, and abstain from an oath according to the form proposed by the invading government.

2. It is licit to compete for teaching offices, to accept those offered, scandal being removed, no adhesion nor approbation being given as regards the intruded government.

3. It can be tolerated that, under the intruded government, offices are retained and accepted, provided they do not directly and proximately influence the spoliation, the maintenance and exercise of the plunder, and danger of wounding divine and ecclesiastical laws is absent. In practice it is better that in individual cases the Ordinary be consulted.

4. Administrators of ecclesiastical goods can hand over to the government an inventory of the revenues of the Church, if it is demanded under grave penalties, yet a protest in writing having been issued, before or after the handover (S. Poenit., Dec. 10, 1860).

5. To cast votes in political elections is not expedient, that is, according to the interpretation of the Holy See, is prohibited (S. Off., July 30, 1866).

6. The sin of him who shall have taken part in political elections is to be judged in particular cases, according to conscience and prudence, all adjuncts having been weighed, so that censure is incurred or not incurred according to the adjuncts of the fact and the dispositions of the subject, according to the norms handed down by the authors (S. Poenit., 1883).

7. Place can be given to dispensation of the law in particular cases - from reason of the supreme good of society - the necessity having been acknowledged by the Bishops and the dispensation having been sought by them. Encyclical Letter to the Bishops of Italy, June 17, 1905 (A. S. S., 37, p. 741).

II. On the occasion of the separation of State and Church in France and elsewhere.

1. Deputies and Senators who established the law of separation are excommunicated by the fact itself and are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial if they die in sin (S. Poenit., May 30, 1908).

2. It is not licit for clerics, whether secular or regular, in France, in present circumstances, to present themselves as candidates in elections to assemblies of deputies, without the consent of their proper Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place where they wish to present themselves as candidates (S. Congr. a neg. eccl. extr., Apr. 2, 1906). Similarly, it is not licit for priests in Italy to undertake the function of counselor in administrative affairs, whether of municipalities or of civil provinces, and for this end to accept that they be proposed as candidates in elections, unless with the previous consent both of their proper Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place in which the administrative mandate is to be exercised. S. C. Cons., June 8, 1914 (A. A. S., VI, p. 313). Likewise it is not licit for them to give their name to syndicalist associations (A. A. S., VI, 349).

3. Associations of Worship, to be constituted from the French law, can be established by no pact, because by them the most holy rights which pertain to the life of the Church itself are violated. Encyclical Gravissimo, Aug. 10, 1906 (A. S. S., 39, p. 385).

4. The so-called approved mutual societies (mutualites approuvees), to which Mass foundations are attributed, but without the intervention of ecclesiastical authority, are to be disapproved (Letter, May 7, 1908).

5. Renters occupying ecclesiastical goods (otherwise, however, concerning the liquidator, acting in the name of the government but retaining no part of the goods for himself; otherwise also concerning a notary of the tribunal), incur excommunication and are held to restitution. - Buyers of natural fruits publicly sold are held only to almsgiving toward the despoiled Congregation and for the price by which they bought for less than the just price (S. Poenit., Aug. 5 and Sept. 7, 1907).

6. Counselors and the Mayor of a city, who acquired despoiled goods for the common uses of the city, do not incur excommunication. In a case of necessity or usefulness, faculty is to be sought from the Holy See or from the Religious Order (S. Poenit., Jan. 3, Mar. 8, May 9, 1906).

7. Those giving work to the sale of religious goods in France (secondary cooperators) do not incur excommunication; yet in a particular case they can be deprived of ecclesiastical burial. - As regards them, as also regards liquidators, the obligation of restoring is not established (S. Poenit., Sept. 17, 1906).¹

527. St. Alphonsus notes (II, 74, from Busenbaum): "Inhabitants of a city or province which a tyrant has occupied licitly remain among the unjust possessors, and, the command compelling, help them by watches, digging, contribution; and this from the presumed consent of the legitimate prince; from which also they promise such services with an oath, in order to avoid greater evils of themselves and of the legitimate prince." - See other things in PART IV, n. 2287 and 2292. Cf. Rev. des sciences eccl., t. II, p. 256; likewise Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1882, p. 582, where various cooperations are treated.