413. Declarations. 1. Another's thing can be taken away in a twofold way, either secretly and without force brought upon the owner, or openly and by force brought upon the owner. If the first, theft is committed; if the second, robbery.

Therefore two things are required for robbery: a. that the thing be taken away with the owner present; b. that it be taken away with violence brought upon him, which is judged to be employed also by any fear unjustly instilled, as when someone threatens another with death or a grave evil and thus compels him to hand over the thing. Hence a thief who breaks open doors but takes away the thing while the owner does not notice does not commit robbery; nor he who takes away the thing while the owner is indeed present, but without force brought upon him.

2. Theft and robbery are sins specifically distinct: theft is against commutative justice through real injury concerning goods of fortune; robbery is against commutative justice through injury concerning goods of fortune and through personal injury against the owner.

414. Notion and malice. 1. Theft is defined as the hidden taking away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

a. Taking away is understood as done with the mind of retaining the thing for oneself and receiving profit. Therefore he who takes another's thing to destroy it is not called a thief. Hidden, so that theft may be distinguished from robbery.

b. Unwilling: for committing theft it is required that the owner be unwilling, and indeed as to the substance or as to the taking itself, not only as to the mode of taking away, namely that the thing be taken away secretly while the owner is ignorant. He who takes something away while the owner is unwilling only as to the mode sins venially, because in the mode of taking he acted against the will of the owner, but he does not commit theft.

c. Reasonably unwilling: he is reasonably unwilling about the taking away of a thing who is not bound to leave his own thing; but he who is bound to yield his thing is unreasonably unwilling about its taking away. But he is unreasonably unwilling only if he is bound to give or leave it from justice or from piety, not however if he is bound from mere charity. Hence he who takes away a thing in extreme necessity or to compensate himself does not commit theft; nor a son who secretly takes from the goods of the parents what is necessary to himself for honest sustenance. But a poor man who takes away the goods of a rich man in grave necessity commits theft.¹ - Likewise he who abuses his own thing (for example, a wicked book) for sinning is reasonably unwilling if the book is taken away from him lest he commit sin, because he is not bound to deprive himself of the book either from justice or from piety.

2. Theft is a sin grave from its genus: a. For by theft commutative justice is injured, which of itself obliges under grave obligation. b. By the Apostle theft is reckoned among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Neither thieves ... nor robbers shall possess the kingdom of God."² That theft can become a light sin from smallness of matter will be conceded the more easily because here the matter is divisible, which can be diminished so much that it is no longer capable of grave fault.

¹ Cf. Vermeersch, n. 150 ss.; Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 274 ss.

² 1 Cor. 6:10.

415. Grave matter of theft (and damaging) must be determined both relatively and absolutely.

Matter absolutely grave is taken from the value alone of the thing taken away, with no account had of the condition of the person from whom it is taken away, and therefore it is always and with respect to all considered grave. Matter relatively grave is derived from the value of the thing and from the condition of the owner, and therefore is grave with respect to some, but light with respect to others. Wherefore matter absolutely grave is called that which, when taken away (in this place and time), inflicts grave damage, not always indeed on him from whom it is taken, but at least on society. Matter relatively grave is called that which inflicts grave damage on him from whom it is taken.

1. Matter relatively grave must be determined: for the gravity of theft depends on the gravity of the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor. But damage is of diverse gravity according as the condition of the person who suffers the damage is diverse: for what is light to one can be grave to another. Besides, if no account were had of the condition of the owner, and the same grave matter were established for all, this greatest inconvenience would follow: that a florin taken from a rich man would be grave sin, or ten florins taken from a poor man would be light sin, according as great or small matter is assigned for constituting grave sin.

That matter is considered relatively grave which, for the one from whom it is taken, would suffice according to his condition for the suitable sustenance of himself and his own for a day: for since external goods have been granted to man for the sustenance of life, and to be deprived of daily sustenance is a great harm, the quantity equaling daily sustenance (food, clothing, habitation) is deservedly considered grave.

To determine this rule more accurately for practice, from the nearly common consensus of more recent theologians and with account had of the value which money now has in most provinces of Europe, it seems possible to establish that grave matter is:

a. relative to poor beggars, about 1/2 florin = 1 mark = 1 lira = 1 crown, or even less according to greater poverty;

b. relative to workers who acquire sustenance for themselves by daily labor, about 1 florin = 2 marks = 2 lire = 2 crowns;

c. relative to craftsmen, artisans, merchants who labor in their own workshop, about 3 florins = 6 marks = 6 lire = 6 crowns;

d. relative to those moderately rich, about 5 florins = 10 marks = 10 lire = 10 crowns;

e. relative to the truly rich, about 10 florins = 20 marks = 20 lire = 20 crowns;

f. relative to the very rich or extraordinarily rich, about 50 florins = 100 marks = 100 lire = 100 crowns and more, but when the matter concerns these, attention must be given to absolute matter.

Note 1. These quantities are to be taken not mathematically, but morally; besides, attention must be given to the circumstances of places. For the wealth of inhabitants is not the same everywhere, nor is the value of money the same everywhere. 2. When it is unknown to whom the damage has been inflicted, according to the common opinion of doctors it is presumed to have been inflicted on one moderately rich, because this is usually what happens more frequently.

416. 2. Matter absolutely grave must also be determined, because, if matter absolutely grave were not determined, great damage would threaten the common good. For since men on the one hand are not accustomed to avoid light sins so diligently, and on the other hand most wish to become rich, unless a certain matter were prohibited always under grave sin, thefts would become very frequent with great damage and disturbance of peace and security.

Matter absolutely grave, which is such relative to anyone very rich and even to the fisc itself, is about 15 florins = 30 marks = 30 lire = 30 crowns. For on account of the taking away of this sum even the very rich man is gravely unwilling, even if not on account of the damage which he himself suffers, certainly on account of the damage which society would suffer if such matter were not prohibited under grave obligation.

For determining the gravity of matter relative to sacred things, one must distinguish: if the sacred thing can be estimated by price, such as a chalice, the gravity of matter must be measured as in a profane thing; but if it cannot be estimated by price, such as sacred relics, its dignity and rarity must be considered. Therefore it would be mortal to steal the smallest particle of the Holy Cross, but outside the territory of the City it would not be mortal to take away the smallest thing from the body of some saint.¹

Article Second. On Causes Diminishing Theft

The rules concerning the gravity of matter in theft set forth above admit various modifications in the concrete: for various causes can bring it about that the owner is less unwilling about the taking away of his thing; therefore the same causes can also bring it about that a greater quantity is required for constituting grave sin. Now, that the owner may be less unwilling can happen: a. by reason of the persons who steal; b. by reason of the things which are taken away; c. by reason of the mode of taking away. Therefore in order there must be treated: domestic thefts, theft of exposed things, petty thefts of things pertaining either to one or to several.

¹ Reuter, Theologia moralis, III, n. 438. Outside the territory of the City: for from the constitution Apostolicae sedis (II, 15) they incur censure who extract relics from the sacred cemeteries or catacombs of the City of Rome and its territory without legitimate permission, with no account had of quantity of matter.

417. On domestic thefts. The persons toward whom the father of a family, if they take something away at home, is judged to be less unwilling are sons under family power, wives, and servants.

1. With respect to thefts of sons, ordinarily a quantity twice greater is required for constituting grave sin than in thefts of strangers; but wives generally can be judged still more liberally, especially if they spend the things taken away for the uses of the family or relatives.

a. Yet attention must be given whether the father is rich, liberal, friendly, or on the contrary poor, avaricious, little loving; whether household members steal for their own uses or for giving to others; whether they steal money or other precious things, or other things; whether there is one son or several.

b. Not rarely, although the father of a family, once the theft is known, seems very unwilling and is vehemently angry, he is unwilling not so much about the thing taken away as about the mode, namely that it is secretly stolen, or about the end, namely that it is consumed by gambling and drinking. Therefore frequently sons taking a thing at home do not sin except venially.

c. With respect to the obligation of restitution which is to be imposed on sons (wives), these things are to be noted: alpha. If things taken away by them are consumable by first use and have already been consumed, restitution is scarcely ever to be imposed. beta. If things taken away (for example, money) are still extant, they must be restored. gamma. If things taken away in greater quantity are no longer extant, they are earnestly to be exhorted that by caring for the domestic estate more diligently they repair the damage in some way. Moreover, condonation by the father can for the most part be presumed, unless the things taken away are very notable and were spent for the uses of outsiders. Yet it is scarcely ever expedient to advise, and much less to command, that wives or sons ask condonation of the debt.

2. With respect to thefts of servants. a. If servants steal money or other things which are usually carefully guarded, such as precious things, garments, etc., a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because masters are not less unwilling toward them than toward others; and rightly indeed, because of the continual danger which threatens them from the unfaithfulness of servants.

b. If the thefts of servants happen in things which they administer or which are not usually cautiously guarded, such as food and drink, ordinarily servants do not arrive at grave sin, provided the things taken away are consumed by the servants themselves, are not sold, and are not taken away in extraordinary quantity: for in these things masters are usually less unwilling. Moreover, in estimating the gravity of the fault attention must also be given whether the master is liberal or close, and whether the person serving is disliked or dear, useful and diligent or of slight industry.¹

¹ Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 12, n. 48.

418. On theft of exposed things. The things in whose taking away a greater quantity is required for constituting grave sin are those which grow spontaneously with almost no labor of men, especially if they are exposed, such as fruits (grapes, apples) beside roads and wood in forests.

1. Concerning fruits plucked from another's vineyard or another's orchard, the old authors are very benign and indulgent. For they say that travelers who pluck one or another apple or cluster of grapes to quench thirst or refresh strength do not sin. Indeed they universally permit grapes and apples to be eaten up to satiety, provided they are not rare and of great price and nothing is carried away.¹

But today, on account of the circumstances of things altogether changed, which cause most fruits to be valued more highly and carefully guarded, this doctrine seems to be restricted to those fruits which are not much valued.

a. Yet these things seem able to be conceded: that it is not a sin to pluck one or another apple or cluster of grapes here and there; that workers, from the presumed consent of the owner, do not sin if they eat of the fruits for whose gathering they have been hired; that he who more often takes away that quantity of fruits which he himself can eat sins only lightly, unless the fruits are of great price.

b. But thefts of these things are to be gravely reprehended where rather grave damages are caused to the owners from them, because not only are fields trampled down, but owners are compelled to gather immature fruits lest all be carried away.

2. Wild fruits (mushrooms, strawberries, bilberries [Heidelbeeren], etc.) indeed of themselves pertain to the owner; but he is presumed to grant permission that they be gathered by passers-by and the poor and also sold. But if, using his right, he prohibits their collection, those gathering them sin against justice. Yet in forests of the government or of one's own community, a prohibition of gathering fruits of this kind is judged merely penal, unless a manifest reason (for example, of forestalling damages in a growing forest) dictates otherwise.

3. With respect to wood which is cut in forests, these things should be noted:

a. If wood is cut in forests which pertain to private ownership or to another community, sin is committed against justice, unless the matter concerns brushwood and dry fragments of wood; for with respect to these the owner is not judged unwilling.

b. If wood is cut in a forest which pertains to one's own community, no sin is committed if the poor take away only those things which are required for domestic use, and no great destruction is made. For the law prohibiting the cutting of wood is judged penal, which obliges only to paying the penalty after the sentence of the judge.²

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 529.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 529.

419. On petty thefts. The third cause on account of which a greater quantity is required for constituting grave sin is the mode of stealing, namely through thefts in light matter, which are usually called petty thefts. Therefore it is asked when thefts in light matter become grave sin and what quantity is required for constituting grave matter.

Generally, theft of light matter becomes grave sin when the matter taken away in individual thefts coalesces into grave matter. But this can happen in a threefold way: a. by intention of arriving at grave matter; b. by conspiracy; c. by multiplication alone.

420. By intention. 1. The intention of arriving at grave matter causes individual thefts to coalesce, even when a rather long interval is placed between the individual thefts, whether the thefts are committed against the same owner or against various owners.

This intention, by which individual thefts are committed, causes two things: first, that the matter of the individual thefts coalesces into one, even if a rather long interval intervenes between them; and then also that even thefts in light matter are grave sin: for what happens from an intention gravely evil is grave sin. In this case we have a sin indeed light with respect to the external act, but grave on account of the internal affection. The sin, even insofar as it is external, becomes grave when grave damage is completed.

2. For constituting grave matter, a greater quantity is not required than in thefts which are done at once and together, if they are committed relative to the same owner; but if the thefts are done to diverse owners, an absolute quantity is required.

Therefore he commits grave sin in each instance: a. a merchant who, by moderately falsifying measures and weights in individual instances, intends to gather notable profit or foresees that in this way he will arrive at great profit; b. an innkeeper who, by mixing a little water with wine several times, wishes to become rich: "A deceitful balance is an abomination before the Lord";¹ c. he who, having the intention of harming the neighbor in a grave matter, inflicts light damage in individual instances. Yet because all these sins proceed from the same intention of becoming rich (of harming) virtually enduring, morally they constitute one sin.²

¹ Prov. 11:1.

² Cf. De principiis^9, n. 308.

421. By conspiracy. 1. If several, by common plan and consent, either together or successively, commit small thefts against the same owner or against various owners, their matter coalesces into one, because the individual conspirators intend the whole taking. Therefore when small thefts taken together constitute grave matter, the individual conspirators sin mortally: for conspiracy causes the individuals to will the whole damage and cooperate toward the whole.

2. If petty thefts are done to the same owner, a greater quantity is not required for constituting grave sin; but if they are done to diverse owners, an absolute quantity is required.¹

a. If individuals act independently from each other, even if they know the damage inflicted by others, they do not sin gravely, because none of them inflicts grave damage, nor intends the damage inflicted by others, nor cooperates in it.

b. If several, stirred up by the example of another, commit light thefts which together inflict grave damage, he gravely sins whose example provoked others to inflicting damage, not indeed against justice, but against charity, provided he foresaw the damage to be inflicted.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 311.

422. By multiplication. He who by petty thefts committed either against the same owner or against various owners arrives at grave matter sins gravely, provided he retains the things taken away, a great interval is not present between the individual thefts, and the thing taken away is of some price. For in this case the individual thefts coalesce.

1. That petty thefts which happen successively coalesce into grave matter, a twofold condition is required: a. That the thief retain the things taken away.

If he restores the prior thefts, the subsequent little thefts are not united with the preceding ones. But if he only had the intention of restoring, this does not impede thefts from coalescing; for by a new theft the intention is judged revoked.

b. That a great interval not intervene between the individual thefts.

If a notable space intervenes between individual thefts, the things taken away are no longer judged to be united. This interval must be determined from common sense, with the quantity of the thing taken away considered. If the thing taken away nearly reaches grave matter, an interval of two months causes it no longer to coalesce; if the thing taken away is far distant from grave matter, an interval of one month causes the same; finally, if the thing taken away is very slight, either it does not coalesce at all, or certainly an interval of one week impedes it from coalescing.¹

alpha. In this case of coalescence, that theft by which grave matter is knowingly completed is grave sin; but the individual preceding thefts are venial. beta. Petty thefts which afterward happen after grave matter has been completed are grave sins, provided the will of retaining the things taken away endures and they happen with advertence to the grave damage inflicted, because they coalesce with the prior ones into grave thefts and continue the prior grave sin, but they constitute one sin in number with the prior one.² gamma. He who does not advert that by a light theft grave matter is completed does not indeed commit grave sin by stealing; but when afterward, adverting to grave matter, he does not propose restitution of the thing taken away, he sins gravely on account of the wicked will of retaining another's thing in great quantity.

2. For constituting grave sin in these petty thefts which happen successively, a greater quantity is required, and indeed, if the thefts happen to the same owner, matter is required which is greater by half: for the owner ordinarily does not suffer so grave a damage if the thing is taken away at intervals. But if the thefts happen to diverse owners, an absolute quantity is required.

a. Therefore tailors sin gravely when they reach grave matter by retaining fragments of cloth which remain and are still useful to the owners, unless either this custom is in force somewhere and therefore less is paid for the labor, or it is established that rich persons do not wish fragments to be restored to them, or these are of lesser importance and are not cared about by the owners. Something similar must be said of millers who retain a moderate part of the grain or flour for themselves.

beta. Servants or maidservants, especially in the families of the rich, who continually take away or consume certain small things and never restore, are not easily to be accused of grave sin nor obligated to making restitution, both because in this case from a twofold reason a greater quantity is required for constituting grave sin, and because they do not advert to grave damage, and because owners are not gravely unwilling nor demand restitution, and finally because ordinarily the things consumed are of the kind that do not coalesce into grave matter.

Note. Those accustomed to thefts are to be asked concerning the number and quantity of thefts, and where the matter concerns petty thefts, concerning the interval placed between individual thefts, so that judgment can be made concerning the coalescence of matter. Yet because they ordinarily do not know how to indicate these things, since they steal on any occasion, it suffices that in general they indicate the frequency of the thefts, the quality of the things taken away, and the time elapsed from the last confession. From these the confessor will form for himself a judgment concerning the state of the soul of his penitent. Then he will warn him concerning his obligations: of restoring, of laboring, and of abstaining from thefts in the future.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 312.

² Lugo, disp. 16, n. 43 s.

423. On thefts of things pertaining to several.

a. He who in grave matter takes away a thing pertaining to several sins gravely: for although grave damage is not inflicted on individuals, nevertheless individuals are gravely unwilling, because, if thefts of this kind were multiplied, the security of human commerce would suffer grave damage unless they were prohibited under grave obligation.

b. For constituting grave sin in thefts of things pertaining to several, whether these several constitute a moral person (as a commercial, industrial, insurance society, or religious community), or do not constitute a moral person, matter absolutely grave is required, because grave damage is not inflicted either on individuals or on a particular community, unless the community is small or the associates are few.

Article Third. On Causes Excusing from Theft

There is a twofold cause which excuses altogether from theft and renders the taking away of another's thing licit: extreme necessity and hidden compensation.

Real sacrilege is also committed in three ways:

(a) By treating with irreverence sacred things, such as the sacraments, Holy Scripture, relics, sacred images.

It is a sacrilege to administer or to receive the sacraments in a state of mortal sin, to quote the words of Scripture for the purpose of making an obscene joke, to treat sacred images and relics with contempt.

(b) By theft of sacred objects. Sacrilegious theft is committed by stealing a sacred object from a sacred place, or a profane object from a sacred place, or a sacred object from a place that is not sacred, according to an old decree of canon law.¹ In the first of these cases a double sacrilege is committed, local and real, as when a chalice is stolen from the tabernacle; in the last case real sacrilege only is committed, as when a chalice is stolen from a priest’s room. Local sacrilege only is committed in the second case, and, indeed, according to a probable opinion, then only when the object stolen belongs to the sacred place, or has been entrusted specially to the sacred place for safe keeping. If a thief picks a pocket in church, his sin probably has not the malice of a grievous sin of sacrilege, although it may be grievous as against justice.

(c) By committing the sin of simony, the treatment of which is reserved for the next chapter.

¹ c. 21, C. 17, q. 4.

THEFT, as we have seen, is the secret taking away of what belongs to another against his reasonable wish.

Not only the taking away, but also the keeping of what belongs to another against his reasonable wish is theft, as when a borrower fails to return what has been lent him on the day appointed, to the disappointment of the lender. Moreover, the use of, or any unlawful dealing with, the property of another against his wish is theft, as when a tramp makes himself at home for the night on another’s premises, or when a passenger travels on the railway or tram without paying his fare.

In order that a sin of theft may be committed, the owner of the property must be unwilling that it should be thus dealt with by the thief; there is no theft committed by using another’s property if the user knows that the owner would not object. Moreover, he must be reasonably unwilling, and so a man who is in danger of dying from starvation, or who is in extreme necessity of any other kind, may take or use what is necessary to save life, even if the owner be unwilling that he should do so. The reason of this is that, by the primary intention of our Creator and Lord, material things were created for the preservation of human life, and no rights of ownership can prevail against the higher claim of one who is in extreme necessity.

The sin of theft is of itself grievous, as is clear from the fact that it is against justice and charity; and St Paul classes it among the sins which shut the kingdom of heaven to the sinner. However, like other sins of injustice, it is sometimes venial on account of light matter, and a practical question here arises as to when theft is a mortal sin, and when it is only venial. The same question is put in other words when we ask, What amount must be taken to constitute a mortal sin of theft? .

Theologians are agreed that we must distinguish between the absolute sum, the taking of which is as a general rule 1 x Cor. vi 10. necessary and sufficient in all cases to constitute grave matter, and the relative sum, which will be sufficient for grave matter, regard being had to the loss of the owner. The general principle on which the quantity required for grave sins depends is the damage caused by the theft. For it is a grave sin to cause grave damage without a just reason; but in the case of very rich persons or companies we must consider not only the personal and particular damage done to them by theft of what belongs to them, but also the harm done to society. It may well be that a rich millionaire would not be appreciably worse off for the loss of a hundred pounds or of ten times that sum. The damage done to him by a thief taking a hundred pounds would be relatively less than if sixpence were taken from a day labourer. However, we must also consider the harm done by theft to the community and to the security of property. The malice of sin is not measured merely by the harm done to the individual; the harm done to society and other considerations also enter into the estimate. We must, then, besides considering the damage done to the owner of stolen money, weigh also the harm which theft does to society, And if grave harm is caused to society by stealing a certain sum of money, if the security of property would be seriously imperilled unless the theft of a certain sum were forbidden under pain of mortal sin, that sum will be the absolute quantity required for a mortal sin of theft, What the precise sum is must be left to the judgement of experts, who will consider all the circumstances of time and place, for, as values are perpetually changing, the sum required for a mortal sin of theft will also change. Under present circumstances, in civilized countries where similar conditions of commerce prevail, the common opinion of theologians fixes one pound sterling as the absolute sum required for a grave sin of theft. This will serve, therefore, as a measure of the gravity of theft from very rich people, or from companies with large resources.

However, a mortal sin of theft may be committed by stealing a much less sum than one pound if the theft cause great harm to the owner of what is stolen. The loss of a day’s wage or of a sum which is sufficient for the support of a labourer and his family for a day, is a serious loss for a workman, and so, as the common opinion holds, the theft of such a sum from a labouring man is a grave sin. Something between this and the absolute sum will be grave matter if stolen from persons whose wealth is between the two extremes.

Matter which in itself is grave may become light on account of special circumstances. Thus although grave necessity does not excuse theft, yet it may lessen the sin and cause to be venial what would otherwise be mortal. In the same way, less unwillingness on the part of the owner may lessen the sin. A father is less unwilling as a rule that a little of his money should be taken by a member of his family, especially if it is for a good purpose, than by a common thief. On this ground some divines say that in thefts from parents a double quantity is required for grave matter. Also when a number of small thefts are committed, which in the aggregate amount to grave matter, a larger sum is required for a mortal sin than when it is all taken at once. For the loss is not felt so keenly, and so the owner is not so unwilling.

That small thefts may coalesce and constitute grave matter is certain, for by a number of small thefts grave harm may be done, and the opposite opinion is implicitly condemned by the 38th proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Small thefts coalesce if the intention of the thief is to take a considerable sum, but for some special reason he takes it in small quantities at different times. Similarly, if a number conspire together to steal from another, they will all commit grave sin if grave damage be inflicted, even though each one only obtains a small sum. Also, when the proceeds of pilferings are hoarded, grave sin will be committed when grave matter is reached, or even if the proceeds be spent and do not coalesce by accession as in the preceding case, the different pilferings will coalesce and constitute one moral act of injustice if the interval be not notable—not over two months—as some theologians say. On the other hand, small thefts committed at wide intervals of time, and which do not coalesce on account of any of the reasons given above, do not constitute one moral act, and remain so many venial sins of theft.

The theft of something of small money value, but whose loss is very keenly felt for reasons of affection or association, will be a venial sin against justice, but a mortal sin against charity, if it was foreseen that its loss would cause very serious pain to the owner.

I. Notion. Theft, taken in the broader sense, is taken for every unjust injury in goods of fortune. Taken in the stricter sense it is defined: the occupation of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling. It is said:

1. Occupation, that is, taking away with the intention of making the thing one's own, or at least of treating it as one's own. Hence he is not guilty of theft who takes wine away from someone so that he may not become drunk, or a sword so that he may not kill someone.

2. While the owner is unwilling, namely with respect to the occupation. Therefore I note that, morally speaking, he is now not unwilling if, being asked, he would consent, provided he would not do this on account of the petition alone, but on account of, or also on account of, a good affection toward the person taking it away. If, however, the owner is unwilling with respect to the mode, that is, with respect to occupation without express permission, you are not excused from venial sin (St. Alphonsus, III, 700, question 1).

3. While reasonably unwilling, again with respect to the occupation. Moreover, in general the owner is irrationally unwilling if he refuses to yield a thing which is owed either from justice or from piety (n. 779); otherwise, if it is owed from charity alone. Hence a poor man is guilty of theft who, placed in necessity that is simply grave, occupies the owner's thing; but not a wife who, placed in a similar necessity, against her husband's will takes goods necessary for herself (St. Alphonsus, III, 519).

II. Division. Theft is distinguished into simple theft and robbery. Simple theft is when a thing is taken away while the owner is ignorant of it, or at least without physical or moral force. Robbery is when theft is committed while the owner is present and positively resisting, with force being employed, whether physical or moral, for example unjust fear. Each is called sacrilegious if a sacred thing is taken away.

III. Morality. 1. Theft is a grave sin from its genus, or grave or light according as it regards grave or light matter. Theft which regards grave matter is a grave sin, as is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the reason alleged where injustice in general was discussed (n. 978; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 59, a. 4; q. 66, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 518). Nevertheless:

a) "It is not mortal, speaking per se, to steal any sum whatever with the intention of restoring immediately, for example within a quarter of an hour" (St. Alphonsus, III, 531). But

b) "It is grave, although not in the species of theft, if the thief knows that from the loss of a small thing a very great annoyance will follow for the owner; for example, because he was greatly attached to it, and a similar thing cannot be recovered: unless, however, the thing is of no importance at all" (St. Alphonsus, III, 526).

2. Simple theft and robbery differ in species, since robbery adds to theft the species of personal injury. Sacrilegious theft adds to both the species of sacrilege² (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, III, 518).

3. It remains to determine what matter is grave. Now:

a) Matter both relatively grave and absolutely grave must be established. It is said:

α) Matter relatively grave, that is, matter which is grave considering the condition of him from whom it is taken away. For the gravity of theft also depends on the gravity of the damage which is inflicted on someone. But the gravity of damage is different according as the condition of him on whom it is inflicted is different (St. Alphonsus, III, 527). Here, however, it can be asked whether, in establishing matter relatively grave, account must also be taken of the owner's special and reasonable affection toward some thing which in itself is of lesser value, for example toward a collection of letters from a dear person. Now it seems this must be affirmed, because on account of the special affection the thing is of greater value to the owner, so that for this reason it could be sold for more, and therefore greater damage is inflicted on him.

β) Matter absolutely grave regards the quantity by which the thief is enriched, rather than the damage inflicted on the neighbor. It is called absolutely grave because it is always held as grave, even with respect to the very rich. And it must be admitted, because the act of occupying and having another's thing as such, according to its proper concept, that is, with abstraction made from the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor, involves disorder; in a word: justice forbids inflicting damage on someone and occupying and having another's thing, or, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "the precept of not stealing obligates not only that grave damage not be inflicted on the neighbor, but also that no one be enriched from another's thing" (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 28). Moreover, if the aforesaid act involves disorder, with abstraction made from the damage inflicted, one must finally arrive at grave matter, even if the individuals from whose goods someone is enriched do not suffer grave damage.³

b) For matter grave, whether relatively or absolutely grave, a greater sum is required the smaller the value of money is; hence for grave sin a greater quantity is required now than formerly, and a greater quantity, for example, in North America than in Europe. Finally a greater quantity is required the less unwilling the owners are judged to be.

c) Considering the things we have just noted, the matter can be more determinately stated for our regions in this way:

α) With respect to a poor person: 1 florin; with respect to workers: 3 florins; with respect to citizens of middle fortune: 5 florins; with respect to the rich: 10 florins. The reason is that the assigned sums, with respect to the assigned persons, are judged to inflict grave harm. With respect to the very rich, absolutely grave matter holds; but the sum of 25 florins can be held as absolutely grave matter.

If there is question of a sacred thing, the gravity of the matter must be judged from the dignity and rarity of the thing. Hence, as regards relics, grave matter is lacking "if someone steals some very small thing, not deforming the relic itself, nor diminishing its esteem: unless it is some notable or rare relic, as for example of the Holy Cross" (St. Alphonsus, III, 532).

β) For spouses and children of the family, a sum twice as great can be established, so that, for example, the child of rich parents would sin gravely if he stole 20 florins from his parents. Indeed, if there is question of spouses, a latitude somewhat greater than for children is admitted. The reason for these things is "that the parent (and spouse) is less unwilling, and the child is something of the father" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 32), and spouses constitute one thing. Moreover, sometimes they are in no way unwilling, or are unwilling only about the mode, so that there can be no question of theft. Finally spouses and parents easily condone thefts committed by the spouse and by children if they have been consumed, so that there is no obligation of restoring (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). If there is an obligation, compare what was said about the mode of restoring in n. 1016.

Note moreover that a wife and children of the family do not steal by taking secretly what is necessary for food and clothing, if the father refuses to grant these things. But as regards those things which are judged to be required by children for recreations fitting to their condition, great prudence is needed if these are denied by the parents. For children are usually more inclined to squander money, whereas parents often have excellent reasons for denying what is desired.

γ) As regards servants, if there is question of money or of a thing carefully guarded, the same quantity as for outsiders suffices. But it is commonly admitted that, by stealing eatables and drinkables, they do not easily arrive at grave sin, provided they themselves consume them, and do not sell them or carry them out of the house, and there is no question of a thing diligently guarded (St. Alphonsus, III, 545; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 34).

δ) As regards religious, in eatables and drinkables what was said about servants holds; in other thefts from the goods of the monastery, a greater quantity is required for grave matter than in thefts by outsiders, but a lesser quantity than in thefts by children (St. Alphonsus, IV, 24).

Here, however, note that the diverse opinions of theologians about the quantity required for grave sin are not to be explained to the people or to penitents.

Corollary I. Considering the notion of theft, sometimes very small things can be secretly taken without sin, for example one apple or another from an orchard by someone passing by, etc.; as regards very small things, owners for the most part are not judged to be unwilling. If, however, the orchard, etc., is fenced in, the owner is reasonably unwilling with respect to entrance into his territory.

Corollary II. He who cuts wood in another's forest or pastures animals in another's pastures:

1. Does not sin if the forests or pastures belong to some commune, and there is question of inhabitants of that commune, unless, as regards forests, great devastation is done. Otherwise the prohibition can be held as merely penal, and even as such it is not judged to extend to dry branches.

2. Sins if the forests or pastures belong to some private person, or at least have been leased by a private person. Nevertheless, commonly owners are judged to grant that dry branches may be collected (St. Alphonsus, III, 529). For the rest, in these matters custom must also be attended to.

Corollary III. He who, from money entrusted to him by a society, steals a sum with the intention of returning it, sins, because the owners, on account of the danger of damage, are reasonably gravely unwilling. But what quantity is required for grave sin depends in great part on the gravity of the danger.

¹ Zech. 5:3; Hab. 2:16; Exod. 20:15; 1 Cor. 6:10.

² According to others, both robbery and sacrilege constitute one species of sin, as if coalescing from two, yet distinct from simple theft.

³ Others argue from the grave damage which, according to the contrary opinion, would threaten society or even individual persons; but an intrinsic reason of strict injustice is lacking. Others judge that in the case posited the right of the republic is gravely injured. But the private owner alone, and not the republic as such, enjoys a strict right in the goods of others.

I. One sins gravely by minor thefts:

1. When someone commits a light theft with the intention of committing a grave one if the occasion were present (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 7, ad 3).

2. When someone steals light things with the intention of arriving gradually at grave matter. In the case the thief already sins gravely by the first theft; namely, although the execution of the individual thefts is externally light, nevertheless insofar as it is subject to a gravely evil intention, it is gravely evil. Nonetheless, those several little thefts seem to be morally united from that intention and therefore to coalesce into only one sin in number (St. Alphonsus, III, 533).

3. When someone, after minor thefts retained either in themselves or in equivalent, finally and advertently completes grave matter; and it is all the same whether the retained thefts were committed against the same owner or against diverse owners. The reason is that the act of retaining another's thing in itself contains disorder, and therefore, if there is question of grave matter, grave disorder (n. 1028). In this hypothesis the thief sins gravely by that very theft which completes grave matter, unless he has the intention of restoring at least the last little theft quickly. But if, after grave matter has been completed, he again commits a minor theft, according to some he increases and continues the prior mortal sin and therefore sins gravely; according to St. Alphonsus and others, he does not sin gravely unless he reaches another new grave quantity (III, 538). In the case, however, it is posited that the new little theft was not intended from the beginning; but if this had happened, there would indeed be an increase and continuation of the prior mortal sin.

4. When someone, after minor thefts not indeed retained, but following at a brief interval and committed against the same owner, completes grave matter. I have said at a brief interval, because then they are apt to inflict grave damage and therefore the owner is gravely unwilling; not so if they are separated by a longer interval. For the rest, the greater the quantity taken away on individual occasions is, the greater the interval required so that they do not coalesce (St. Alphonsus, III, 530).

If there is question of a quantity which is near to grave matter, St. Alphonsus requires an interval of at least two months (III, 530).

5. When several, by conspiracy, each take light things from someone, which together constitute grave matter. The reason is that the total damage is imputed to each one (St. Alphonsus, III, 535, 536). But "if several, either simultaneously or successively, commit several small thefts against someone, which taken together gravely harm him, then, if one does not know about the other, no one sins gravely" (St. Alphonsus, III, 535). If each one is moved by the example of another, by reason of scandal they sin against charity, and indeed gravely if the matter is grave. Moreover, more probably they also sin against justice, insofar as they cooperate in injustice by giving an example that will be followed, as was said about indirect scandal (n. 548). But by reason of this injustice one is not held to restitution, because for this it is required that someone have been an efficacious cause, not merely an occasional cause, of the damage.

6. Finally, as is clear, theft light in itself can become grave by reason of damaging, as if someone steals an instrument of lesser value, for example a tailor's needle, which someone needs in order to be able to support himself.

I. Necessity excuses, as follows:

1. Extreme necessity excuses to this extent, that it is licit to take away what is necessary for succoring the necessity, even a thing of great or extraordinary value. For the division of things proceeding from a human fact can have force only to the extent that it does not prejudice the primary end of things, which is to provide for the life of men. But it would prejudice that end if it were illicit, in extreme necessity, to consume another's thing, or, if only use is necessary, to use it (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 7; St. Alphonsus, III, 520).

2. Quasi-extreme necessity excuses to this extent, that it is licit to take away ordinary things, but not extraordinary and choice things. The reason is that such necessity differs little from extreme necessity. Many exclude extraordinary and choice things, because otherwise the character of private ownership seems to be too much restricted, and public order to be exposed to danger more than is fitting (St. Alphonsus, III, 520; cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 2).

Corollary I. He who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity is per se held to ask for another's thing before he occupies it. For the rights of private ownership ought to be judged restricted only to the extent that the primary end of things demands it. But that end does not demand that the owner lack the faculty of assigning the thing by which the necessity of the neighbor may be relieved; but given that faculty, the petition of the neighbor must precede. There is added that otherwise all beggars who lack necessary things could steal what belongs to another, without acquiring it for themselves by begging; and this would necessarily harm order (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 2). Make exception: 1° if a determinate thing is absolutely necessary for someone, either because another cannot be obtained, or because another would not suffice; for then there can be no question of assigning the thing, since it has already been assigned. Make exception 2° if the owner is foreseen as about to refuse the petition, because no one is held to what is useless (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. What is licit for relieving one's own necessity is also licit for succoring another's necessity. Yet if someone can succor the needy person from his own goods, he is held to that from charity, rather than to steal another's goods (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 15).

Corollary III. If it is asked from what virtue someone is held to succor one who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, I respond: he is held from charity to succor him spontaneously; if he does not succor him spontaneously, he is held from justice not to impede the needy person from providing for himself (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 3).

3. Grave necessity (a fortiori common necessity) does not excuse. This is clear first from proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI: It is permitted to steal, not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity. The reason, moreover, is that the primary end of things, which is that life be provided for, does not demand such a restriction of private ownership. There is added that the contrary doctrine would give occasion to innumerable takings away of another's things. Nevertheless, it is licit for a poor man, for relieving grave necessity, to steal some light thing, "judging probably that the wealthy owner, from mercy, is not unwilling, at least with respect to the substance. But the use of this epikeia ought not to be easy, nor in grave matter; because then the rich would also be reasonably unwilling with respect to the substance" (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, at the end).

4. An obligation of restoring after the necessity has passed is present as follows:

a) If the occupied thing still exists, it must be restored, because only the use, not ownership, was necessary (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 5).

b) If the thing has been consumed, the one taking it away is held to restitution if he was not absolutely poor, that is, if he had goods of his own or hope of obtaining them; for it sufficed to receive the thing as a loan. The contrary must be said, for the contrary reason, if he was poor both in thing and in hope. And this holds sufficiently probably even if someone had unjustly stolen the thing before the necessity. The reason is that the obligation of restoring contracted from unjust acceptance is extinguished by the very fact that the thief makes the stolen thing simply his own and consumes it (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, questions 4 and 5).

II. Hidden compensation consists in this: that the creditor, without the debtor's knowledge, procures for himself from the debtor's goods that to which he has a right. It is just and licit, provided the due conditions are observed. It is required:

1. That there be a strict right, and that it be liquid or exigible.

2. That there be a certain right. If it is doubtful, the condition of the possessor is better. Yet some judge that compensation has place when the doubt regards not the fact, for example injury to reputation, which is supposed to be certain, but the right, namely, in the hypothesis posited, the right to compensation through goods of fortune, so that, for example, someone certainly defamed could compensate himself with money for reputation not repaired (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 544, with the editor's note).

He who has secretly compensated himself with a doubtful right is held to restore the thing if he began to possess in doubtful faith; otherwise, if he proceeded in good faith and cannot overcome the doubt (n. 992).

3. That the debt cannot conveniently be obtained by another way. Namely, one secretly compensating himself per se, although only venially, "sins against common justice, while he usurps for himself judgment of his own thing, with the order of law passed over" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 3). He sins only venially because, provided the thing is owed, public order is not gravely disturbed.

Moreover, insofar as it can be done, a thing of the same species as the thing owed is to be taken; likewise, insofar as it can be done, care should be taken that another, for example a servant, not come under suspicion of theft; finally one must beware lest the debtor pay again, for example by remitting the debt, as it were (St. Alphonsus, III, 521; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 21).

Corollary. Hidden compensation is often illicit, namely because the required conditions are lacking. Hence the confessor should be very prudent in permitting it; wherefore proposition 37 condemned by Innocent XI is to be noted: "Male and female domestic servants can secretly steal from their masters to compensate their labor, which they judge greater than the wage which they receive."¹ This proposition was deservedly condemned, both because sometimes they so judge too lightly, and because a wage per se less than the work rendered can per accidens be just (n. 917), and because, even if the wage is less than just, there is not always a just cause for obtaining what is owed to oneself by this reason, but per se a greater wage ought first to be asked (St. Alphonsus, III, 522-524).

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1187.

Condonation of the domestic thefts of wives and children of the family cannot be presumed in all cases (see 1903).

(a) Thus, if the things stolen are articles of food and drink (or tobacco), and were consumed by the members of the family, there is no duty of restitution, since the father or husband is then unwilling, not so much that these things should be taken, as that they should be taken furtively.

(b) If the things taken do not fall under the class of eatables and are still in the possession of the thief, they should be restored. Hence, if a son steals money from his father in order to have the means for debauchery, he must give back that money.

(c) If the things taken were not eatables, but were of great value and have been consumed or alienated, it will depend on circumstances whether restitution is obligatory or not. Thus, if the father thinks much of the son who took the money and the family does not miss it much, condonation may perhaps be taken for granted; but if the son is not on good terms with his father, or if the theft is very harmful to the family, restitution may be due.

Theft and Robbery.—Having considered the injuries to person committed by homicide, mutilation, imprisonment, etc., we shall now take up the injuries to property committed by theft and robbery. Private ownership of property is allowed by natural and divine law, and it is necessary when, as at present, human affairs cannot be well managed under another system. It has its limits, however, since it is subordinate to the public good, and charity requires that those who have the goods of this world share them with those who are in need (see 1210 sqq.). The chief titles to private ownership are the following:

(a) original titles, which are those by which one takes possession and dominion of goods that have never had or have not now an owner, and these are reduced to two, namely, occupation (i.e., the taking possession of a material thing) and accession (i.e., the union of a material thing with one’s property);

(b) derivative titles, which are those by which one obtains dominion, through transfer of right, of the goods that belong to another. These titles are produced by the law itself (as in prescription), or by the law and the free will of man (as in inheritance from testament or from intestate), or by the free will of man (as in contracts).

Theft.—Theft is the secret taking of what belongs to another, with the intention of appropriating it to oneself, against the reasonable wishes of the owner.

(a) It is a taking, that is, a carrying away of goods. But theft also includes the receiving or keeping of property, since the harm done is the same as when the goods are carried away. Hence, he who does not restore borrowed or deposited or found objects, or who does not pay back a loan, when he could and should, is a thief.

(b) It is a secret taking, that is, the property is taken away without the knowledge of the owner or lawful possessor, even though he be present. In this respect theft differs from robbery.

(c) It is the taking of property. This includes not only corporeal things (e.g., books, money, jewelry, clothing), but also incorporeal things (e.g., patents, trademarks, copyrights), and even persons if they are looked on as possessions. Hence, plagiarism or infringement of copyright or man-stealing or kidnapping (i.e., the carrying off of another’s slave or child) are forms of theft.

(d) It is the taking of property that belongs to another, that is, of goods of which another person is the owner, or lawful possessor as usufructuary, guardian, depositary, etc. Hence, one can steal from oneself by taking one’s goods by stealth from the bailee with the design of charging him for their value or of depriving him of their use to which he has a right.

(e) It is the taking away of goods with the intention of appropriating them to one’s own possession, use or enjoyment to the exclusion of the rightful owner. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not theft to carry away property with the intention of borrowing it for a time or of destroying it; but these are acts of unlawful possession or of unlawful damage. It is obligatory to take an object from another, if this is necessary to prevent the commission of a crime (e.g., to take away and hide the gun with which another intends to kill).

(f) It is against the wishes of the owner. This refers to the substance (that is, the conversion of the property to one’s use), not to the mode (that is, secrecy with which it is done). Hence, if the owner is unwilling that the property be taken, he who takes it is guilty of theft; if the owner is not unwilling that it be taken, but is unwilling that it be taken without his knowledge, he who takes it in this way sins at least venially, but is not guilty of theft in the strict sense.

(g) It is against the reasonable wishes of the owner or possessor; for no injury is done if he does or should consent to the loss. The owner does consent if the person who takes the goods is acting according to a general and recognized custom (e.g., when a servant takes things left over from her employer’s table, which it is certain the latter does not wish to keep); the owner should consent, if justice forbids that he prevent the taking (e.g., when a starving man is taking food from one who has plenty), or if domestic duty commands that he should give the thing taken (e.g., when a wife takes from her husband’s pockets the needed money he denies his family, for a wife and family have the right to receive from the head of the house support according to their station and means). But the owner is not bound to consent to the loss of his goods from the mere fact that he misuses them to his own spiritual disadvantage, or owes them in charity to the taker. Hence, it is theft to take a flask from the pocket of one who drinks too much, or to steal a book from one who is harmed by reading it, or to filch money from a rich man because one is poor and he will not give an alms.

Comparison of Theft and Robbery.—(a) They differ in species, for theft contains injustice to an owner in his property, but robbery, which is an unjust and violent taking of what belongs to another, contains injustice both to property and to person. The unwillingness of the owner in the case of theft is due to his ignorance of his loss; in the case of robbery it is due to intimidation or force. (b) They differ in gravity, robbery being according to its nature the more serious kind of stealing; for the robber does a twofold injury, and the owner’s unwillingness to be robbed is greater.

Kinds of Theft and Robbery.—(a) There are many varieties of theft, the differences arising from the circumstances in which the stealing is done. Thus, he who steals from the Church is guilty of sacrilegious theft; he who uses the public goods for his private ends commits peculation; he who takes from his parents practises domestic thievery.

(b) There are also many ways in which robbery or rapine is committed. The following persons are guilty of robbery: pirates, bandits, highwaymen, burglars, usurers, profiteers, venal judges, unmerciful creditors who deprive debtors of necessaries, debtors who escape payment by fraudulent bankruptcy, profiteers, laborers who extort unjust wages, those who force subordinates to contribute graft, and blackmailers. Two forms of robbery are described in Scripture as sins that cry to heaven for justice, namely, defrauding laborers of their wages (James, v. 4) and oppression of the poor, which happens especially when one denies their rights to those who are unable to defend them. The following persons are also classed as thieves: pickpockets, spongers, smugglers, forgers, counterfeiters, embezzlers, and those who misappropriate funds entrusted to them.

In the civil law theft is also known as larceny, and is defined as the unlawful severance of personal property from the possession of its owner. The following kinds of larceny are distinguished:

(a) in respect to the manner of perpetration, a theft is larceny when the property is taken from the possession of the owner by one who had no possession, whether the latter be a stranger or a custodian; it is embezzlement when committed by one upon whom the owner had conferred temporary possession on account of a fiduciary relationship between them; it is false pretence when committed by one who procures permanent possession or ownership through fraudulent representations;

(b) In respect to the matter or quantity stolen, theft is called petit larceny when it falls below a certain sum fixed by the law, grand larceny when it exceeds that sum.

The Sinfulness of Theft.—(a) From its nature theft—and, much more, robbery—is a grave sin; for it is opposed to the virtues of charity and justice, it is expressly forbidden in the Seventh Commandment (“Thou shalt not steal,” Exod., xx. 15), and it excludes from eternal life (“Neither thieves nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10). The thief attacks the sacred right of the individual to his property, and imperils the peace and stability of society itself. Theft is a grave sin, even when it is committed by little and little, as happens when a merchant gives underweight habitually: “A deceitful balance is an abomination to the Lord” (Prov., xi. 1). The proposition that restitution for a large sum taken in parts at different times is not a grave duty was condemned by Innocent XI (Denzinger, 1188). Canonical penalties for theft include exclusion from acts and offices, censures, and deposition (Canon 2354).

(b) From the imperfection of the act theft may be only a venial sin, for example, when the thief is a kleptomaniac and steals without advertence, or when he is invincibly ignorant that the thing taken is not his own or is of great value, or from the smallness of the matter involved (e.g., when the thing taken has little value, or the owner is opposed rather to the stealthy manner of taking than to the taking, or is only slightly unwilling to lose the goods).

What is grave matter in theft of sacred objects? (a) If these objects have a value that may be measured by money (e.g., the gold or jewels that enter into a reliquary), grave matter is estimated by the material value, just as in profane objects. (b) If these objects have no monetary value (e.g., sacred relics), grave matter is judged from the dignity or rarity of the object. Thus, it would be a serious sin to steal even the smallest splinter from the True Cross.

The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter.—(a) In theft from one’s parents about double the usual quantity is required. But in an individual case the parents may be just as unwilling, and with good reason, to be despoiled by members of the family as by outsiders, and in such a case the rule would not apply. Hence, in considering thefts by children one must bear in mind the ability of the family to suffer the loss, the number of the children, the uses to which the stolen goods are put, the liberality or thrift of the parents, the affection or dislike which the parents have for the child who steals, etc. Thus, if poor parents are denying themselves in every way in order to rear and educate a large family, thefts from them are a serious matter.

(b) In theft from one’s husband even a greater amount is required. But there are exceptions, as when the husband is especially unwilling to have his property stolen by his wife, for example, when the money she takes is devoted, not to the benefit of the family or other useful purposes, but to vanity or sin, or to the great detriment of the husband or family (see 1799).

Theft from One’s Wife or Minor Child.—(a) According to the law in the United States, a wife cannot steal from her husband nor the husband from the wife, but this principle has reference to the common property of which husband and wife are joint tenants (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 563). Both husband and wife may have also their own separate property, and in that case either of them is guilty of injustice if he or she damages or takes without leave the goods of the other.

(b) According to American law, the father has the right to the earnings of his minor children who live with him and receive their maintenance from him; but the law gives the father no right over the separate real or personal estate of these children. Hence, a parent would be guilty of theft if he unlawfully took or used the individual property of his child.

The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees.—(a) If the things stolen are small articles which the employer customarily supplies for his help (e.g., food and drink for domestic servants, pencils and paper for his clerks), the theft is not serious as a rule. But there are exceptions, as when the employee gives or sells to others these articles, or when he uses or wastes them to such a degree that the employer suffers a considerable loss. And one should also consider such circumstances as the great or small value of the services given by the employee, his good or bad standing with the employer, etc.

(b) If the thing stolen is not meant for consumption (e.g., furnishings of the home or office, merchandise of the store, tools or machinery of the factory) or is of a very precious kind (e.g., rare wines or expensive brands of tobacco), grave matter is of the same amount as when an outside person does the stealing. In fact, the guilt of the employee is more serious on account of his abuse of confidence or violation of contract. The property of employers would be subject to constant risk, if employees were permitted greater liberties than outsiders.

Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less Concerned.—(a) Vegetation that Belongs to the Public and Is Left Unprotected.—If these things are of minor importance (e.g., wild fruits or berries, broken twigs, branches, etc., in public lands), it seems that it is not theft to take them, at least when one is poor and a member of the community; for laws against such acts are generally regarded as penal. But one sins, and may even sin gravely, when extensive damage is done to public property (e.g., by cutting down trees, carrying away flowers and plants, injuring shrubs, etc.).

(b) Vegetation that Belongs to Private Parties and Is Left Unprotected.—If only a small quantity is taken (e.g., an apple or a bunch of grapes hanging over a public highway taken by a passerby), it seems no theft is done, unless the owner or law expressly forbids. But it seems to be a venial sin to take more (e.g., as much as a hungry person can eat), and a mortal sin to take a quantity whose market value is equal to grave matter.

Travelling Without Paying Fare.—Is it theft to ride in public conveyances without paying the fare?

(a) If one rides without payment or ticket, it seems that theft is committed, unless the company is willing to give a free ride. It may be said that the company suffers no loss on account of one passenger who has not paid for his transportation, since the same number of cars and the same expenses would be required even without that passenger. But since the owners are unwilling to furnish their service gratis, he who takes it without pay is guilty of theft.

(b) If one rides without payment, but uses the ticket of another, there is no injustice if the rules of the company permit this (e.g., A buys a round-trip ticket, but gives the return ticket to B), but there is fraud if the rules of the company and the agreement of the purchaser make the ticket non-transferable (e.g., B uses the half-rate ticket which A had received as a personal privilege from the railroad company).

Small Thefts Which Amount to a Large Sum.—Small amounts stolen may accumulate into a large amount. This happens in the following ways: (a) the thief takes small sums on different occasions from the same person or from different persons, and continues at this until he has stolen a considerable amount; (b) the thief conspires with other thieves to steal on the same occasion from one person or several persons, and, though the sum he steals is small, the sum taken by the whole group is considerable. Similarly, petty damages or vexations may accumulate into a mortal injustice. Thus, if Claudius, aiming to break down the health, sanity, success, reputation, business, etc., of Balbus, plans and carries out a systematic campaign of small injuries daily repeated for years, Claudius is guilty at least in purpose of serious damage.

Moral Connection between Repeated Acts of Theft.—The moral connection between repeated acts of theft by one person is necessary, as was said, in order that these acts unite into one grave sin. This moral connection does not exist, however, if the series is broken by interruption or revocation.

(a) Thus, the connection is broken by interruption when there is a long interval between small thefts, because thefts that are small and infrequent do not inflict severe loss on individuals or society. This supposes, of course, that there is no intention to practise small thievery habitually in order to become enriched by it, but that one steals now and then as opportunity or necessity occurs, or (according to some) that one intends to steal only small amounts and at long intervals.

(b) The connection is also broken by restitution or revocation. It is clear that, if the thief has given back his former thefts, they should not be computed with later thefts; and it seems also—though some do not admit this—that, if he has sincerely resolved to give back things taken before (e.g., things which are useless for him), there is no moral connection between the past thefts and a theft he is committing now.

Interval of Time between Acts of Theft.—The interval of time that breaks the connection between small thefts cannot be determined with mathematical exactness, but the following rule seems to be accurate enough: thefts combine to form a great theft only when considerable property is taken by degrees, but within such a brief period of time as to be of notable advantage to the thief and of notable disadvantage to the loser. Some moralists think that six months is a long space, sufficient to prevent union between thefts, but that two months is too short a space to prevent the union; others, on the contrary, believe that the amounts stolen should be taken into consideration; and hence that the following intervals between thefts separate them into distinct venial sins without coalescence:

(a) a period of one year between thefts, each of which almost amounts to grave matter, when the property is kept (e.g., when a dressmaker who has kept not a little of her patron’s material of a twelvemonth ago does the same thing again this year);

(b) a period of two months, when the matters are almost grave, but the property is not kept (e.g., when a thief who beat a restaurant out of the price of a very elaborate meal at the beginning of January does the same thing at the beginning of March). But it is hard to see how one could have the habit of stealing in this way and not have the intention of stealing a large amount, for a person who steals what is almost grave matter every two months or so must realize that he will shortly be enriched to a considerable extent by his dishonesty. Moreover, the interval of two months might be needed by the thief for avoiding suspicion;

(c) a period of one month, when the thing stolen falls far short of grave matter (e.g., a meal of simple fare plainly cooked and served);

(d) a period of about two weeks, when the matters are very small (e.g., when a thief takes a few secret sips from a wine bottle on each of his fortnightly visits to a certain house, or carries away some trifling object as a souvenir). These thefts would not surpass five or ten cents a month;

(e) some authors think that one week or perhaps even one day will prevent coalescence between extremely small thefts; and surely there are some paltry objects (e.g., a pin or needle, a match, a small lump of coal, a piece of string) which would not total a large value even after many years have passed.

Theft from Joint Owners.—Is it a grave sin to steal a considerable amount of property that belongs to joint owners? (a) If the amount taken is absolutely grave, the sin is serious for the reasons given in 1898 sqq.; (b) if the amount taken is relatively grave (e.g., because a community is very poor, or because the owners are only two or three and the individual loss is heavy), the sin is serious; (c) if the amount taken is not relatively grave, as happens when an organization is not poor and has many members or when the loss will be so distributed among the joint owners as to be little felt by them individually, the sin is not serious.

Restitution in Cases of Theft.—(a) Restitution is owed for the property stolen. He who stole a serious amount but gave back part, retaining only what is light matter, is bound under venial sin to restore the rest. Confessors should urge restitution even of small amounts, when possible, in order to deter men from theft, and it may sometimes be useful to require children to seek a condonation from their parents for a similar reason. (b) Restitution is owed also for damage caused by the theft (see 1895). Thus, if one steals the tool of a poor farmer, which is of little value in itself but which brings on him a serious loss, one is responsible for the loss as well as for the tool.

Cases of Doubt.—(a) Doubts of Law.—The rules given by moralists on grave matter in thefts are not to be regarded as certain and authentic, since they are only the opinions of theologians, and have no obligatory sanction from the Church. They are reasonable and well founded, indeed, but in spite of them there will occur cases wherein it is doubtful whether a theft is mortal or venial (see 1896). It is no disgrace to be ignorant in such difficult cases, for St. Augustine himself admitted that he did not always know where to draw the line. Hence, confessors should not feel obliged to decide with finality in every instance whether the sin committed was in itself grave or light; on the contrary, it will sometimes be necessary to avoid a definite answer, while calling attention to the sinfulness of all theft and the duty of restitution. But the obligation of restitution should not be imposed as certain, where the doctors disagree.

(b) Doubts of Fact.—The application of the rules for grave matter will also be at times very difficult on account of uncertainties about circumstances of time, person, etc. In such cases one must have recourse to the systems for decision in the presence of a doubtful conscience. If a thief does not know from whom he stole, it may be doubtful whether the matter is relatively grave or only light; but the presumption then will be that the loser was a person of average means. Again, when there is a strong likelihood that an owner was not greatly unwilling, one must insist that the thefts cease for the future, but one cannot always impose restitution. If a petty thief does not know how much he stole, or whether all the thefts were from the same person, or whether the intervals between the thefts were great or small, or whether he had the intention from the outset to take a large sum, the confessor will have to form an opinion by questioning the penitent on the time of his last confession, the amounts he generally took, the general frequency of the thefts, etc.

Conversion of Others’ Property.—The conversion of property owned by others or held by them may be permitted, or at least tolerated, when the owner or possessor would be unreasonable if he objected as in the following cases:

(a) in extreme necessity, for according to natural law each one has the right to preserve his life by using the temporal things of the earth (see 1571). In danger of death things necessary for escaping the danger become common property, and no injury is done by the person in danger if he uses the goods of another person to save his own life;

(b) in certain cases when occult compensation is the only way in which one can defend or secure one’s right to property, for it is not wrong to take what is one’s due, if this is done without harm to the rights of others.

Conditions for Lawful Occupation of the Goods of Others in Extreme Need.—(a) The occupation must be necessary for securing one’s own or another’s natural right to some supreme good, such as life or what is almost the equivalent of life (e.g., freedom from cruel restraint, escape from fearful disease). A supreme good is at stake, then, when one is in extreme, quasi-extreme, or most grave need (see 1236), that is, exposed to the certain or very probable peril of losing life, limbs, liberty, sight, chastity, etc.; occupation is necessary when there is no other way (e.g., by begging) to avert the danger.

(b) The occupation must be made without detriment to the rights of others. Hence, one may not occupy more than is really necessary to escape the danger; one may not occupy at all if the owner is situated in an equal danger (e.g., one may not take the plank from a man in danger of drowning in order to save oneself); one may not retain the thing taken, if the danger has passed (e.g., one who commandeered his neighbor’s car in order to escape from a thug must return the car). The neglect to ask permission, however, does not exceed a venial sin and does not impose the duty of restitution, if there is a real reason for occupation. One may not take the goods without permission, if this can be obtained without too much difficulty; nor forcibly, if possession can be had peaceably.

Restitution for Occupied Goods.—Is the occupier bound to restitution for occupied goods that were consumed (e.g., food and drink), if he afterwards becomes able to pay for them?

(a) If the occupier had no prospect at the time of ever being able to pay for what he took, he is not bound to restitution—not because of possession, since the thing has perished, nor because of the taking, since there was no onerous contract, nor because of injury, since he acted within his rights. The owner cannot complain at this, since charity obliges him to give of his own free will to one who is in supreme need and not to expect that the alms be paid back, while justice forbids that he impede the appropriation of what is needed by the person in distress. It seems, however, that a case of this character would rarely happen, and, if it did happen, the more decent thing would be to pay for what was used. Some moralists think that more probably there would be an obligation of justice to do this, since occupation is lawful only in so far as it is necessary.

(b) If the occupier had the prospect at the time of being able to pay for what he took, he is bound to restitution; for one should not occupy more than is necessary, and, if a loan suffices to tide one over a difficulty, it is not right to expect a gift. Hence, men who raid bakery shops in times of food shortage, are bound to make restitution to the bakers when able.

Occupation in the Case of Merely Grave Necessity.—Is it lawful to occupy in merely grave or ordinary necessity?

(a) This is not lawful, for otherwise the doors would be opened to thefts without number, and both the security of property and the peace of the public would be at an end. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is permissible to steal in great need (Denzinger, n. 1186). (b) Such occupation is less sinful than to occupy without necessity, and indeed the theft may be only venial if one is in grave need and has vainly sought work or charity to relieve the difficulty, as when a poor man who is not able to give his children all the food they need steals provisions now and then.

Occupation of a Large Sum by One in Dire Need.—(a) One opinion holds that even for the sake of avoiding death this is not permissible, for one has no right to extraordinary means for the protection of one’s life.

(b) A second opinion maintains that this occupation is lawful, under the conditions given in 1921; for life is more precious than even a large sum of money, and in such extreme need property right yields to the right to life.

(c) A third opinion distinguishes between the case in which extreme necessity is proximate or urgent (e.g., an unarmed Watchman is threatened with instant death if he does not hand over at once the money he has in charge) and the case in which it is only remote (e.g., the doctor tells a poor man that he will die shortly from tuberculosis unless he goes to a more healthy altitude, but the patient is too poor to follow these instructions). In the former case the person in need may take what is necessary (on account of the reasons for the second opinion and also because the civil laws allow this), but he is not bound to do so (on account of the reasons for the first opinion); in the latter case, more probably he has no right to occupation, for this would be prejudicial to the public welfare and is moreover strictly forbidden by civil laws (see 1571, 1253).

Lawfulness of Receiving Support from a Thief.—Is it lawful for the wife and family to receive support from the head of the family, when he is a thief?

(a) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are not thus deprived of their goods or of the prospect of restitution. This happens when the actual support does not come from the stolen property, and the thief is able to make restitution from other property that belongs to him, or the wife and children earn as much for the family by their work as they receive in support. In this case the family may take from the thief even things that are not necessary for their support.

(b) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of restitution, but the obligation of restitution has ceased on account of grave necessity (see 1797). This happens when the support does not actually come from the stolen property, but the thief is unable to make restitution from his own property without depriving his own family who are in grave need. In this case the family may take from the thief only such things as are necessary for them according to their station in life.

(c) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of their goods, but the right to occupy these goods has arisen on account of the extreme necessity of the family (see 1920 sqq.). This happens when the support comes from the stolen property itself. But the family may use only what is really necessary for the relief of their dire distress.

How many kinds of injury are there in the goods of fortune? There is chiefly a threefold kind, namely theft, robbery, and simple damaging. Theft properly is the hidden taking away of another's thing, when the owner is reasonably unwilling. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3. Taking away: so that he may have it for himself; not so that he may burn it, throw it away, or destroy it. Those participate in the malice of theft, and therefore are reduced to theft, who accept even another's thing taken away by another, or simply detain another's thing, or usurp another's thing; for that acceptance is a certain continuation of theft, and "to detain that which is owed to another has the same character of harm as unjust taking." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 3. And the same harm is had if someone occupies or usurps another's thing as though his own. When he is reasonably unwilling; otherwise the right of another is by no means violated. - But robbery is the taking away of another's thing by force or violence brought upon the person. L. 1, Cod. de Vi bonorum raptorum. Hence robbery adds to theft a distinct species of the sin of injustice, because to the owner who is reasonably unwilling and wishes to preserve his own thing force and personal injury are brought. Finally, simple damaging is when, while the owner is reasonably unwilling, some damage is inflicted without anything being accepted or retained by the one inflicting the damage. - Inst. l. 4, t. 1, 2, 3; L. 1, C. de Usucap. pro empto; L. 2, C. de usucap. pro donato; L. 518; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 3, 4, 9. "If some private thing is taken away from a private person, it is called theft; if it is secretly taken from the public by him to whom a public office has been entrusted, it is called peculation; they call it kidnapping if a free man or another's slave is led away into servitude; but if a sacred thing is taken away, it is named sacrilege." Roman Catechism, 5. The unjust taking away of animals is cattle-theft. "Labeo says that theft is said from furvus, that is, black, because it is done secretly and in darkness, and generally at night; or from fraud, as Sabinus says; or from carrying and taking away; or from the Greek speech, which calls thieves phores; indeed the Greeks also said phores from pherein, that is, from carrying. § 1. Hence the mere thought of committing theft does not make a thief. § 2. Thus he who denies a deposit is not immediately also held for theft, but so if he has concealed it for the cause of intercepting it. § 3. Theft is fraudulent handling of a thing for the sake of making profit, either of the thing itself, or even of its use or possession; this is prohibited by natural law to admit." L. 1, de Furtis ff.

"Cattle-thieves are properly held to be those who withdraw cattle from pastures or from herds, and in some way plunder them, and practice the pursuit of driving away as though an art, leading horses from droves or oxen from herds. Certainly, if someone has led away a wandering ox, or horses left in solitude, he is not a cattle-thief, but rather a thief." L. 1, 3, de Abigeis Dig.

What is the malice of theft? - Theft is a sin mortal from its kind. It is proved, because theft from its generic concept, and apart from another malice, is gravely opposed to justice, indeed to common peace and tranquility; therefore it is a sin mortal from its kind. For "through theft a man brings harm to his neighbor in his goods; and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 6. Meanwhile, nevertheless, it is certain among all that theft admits smallness of matter, and because of this it is often a sin only venial in the individual; as, e.g., if a poor person steals something small. St. Thomas, Quodl. 6, a. 6; 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 3, 5, 6; L. 700; E. M. "Those also are to be placed in the number of thieves who, when they have been hired for some private or public office, furnishing no or little work, neglect the duty and enjoy only the wage and price." Roman Catechism, 9. To theft is reduced any fraud or defrauding, which is the lesion and diminution of another's goods or rights, accomplished by deceitful circumvention. Robbery differs in species from theft, because theft includes in its nature the ignorance of him to whom injury is done, but robbery includes violence. In theft the thing is accepted by cunning, deceit, fraud. In robbery the thing is accepted by one's own power, coercion or violence having been made to the person. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 4, 5, 8, 9. Cf. here 1289.

What is grave matter in theft? - The matter of theft is one kind absolutely grave, another relatively grave. Matter of theft absolutely grave is that which according to itself, and apart from the state, or wealth or poverty, of him from whom it is taken, gravely conflicts with justice, by inflicting grave damage on society. But matter of theft relatively grave is that which is grave not precisely according to itself, but by relation to the person from whom it is taken, and inflicts on him a relatively grave detriment. - L. 526.

What is matter of theft absolutely grave? Two or three gold pieces do not seem to suffice for absolutely grave matter, namely about ten or fifteen lire; but thirty or forty lire. For old theologians established two or three gold pieces as absolutely grave matter. But in our time the value of money has greatly decreased, and the abundance of money certainly has doubled and more than doubled. Therefore, if in the former time absolutely grave matter was established at ten or fifteen lire, in the present it seems to be established at thirty or forty lire. - Indeed the rule for discerning absolutely grave matter is one kind extrinsic, another intrinsic. The extrinsic rule is contained in the common judgment of theologians and prudent men, since this matter, as it depends on many circumstances, depends especially on common sense and estimation.

Moreover in the present doctors and God-fearing and sensible men commonly hold this as absolutely grave matter. - But the intrinsic rule must be taken from this: that that matter of theft is absolutely and universally grave, on account of whose taking away any owner, even a very rich one, would reasonably be gravely unwilling, because it is such a quantity as can serve several uses and necessities of life, and, if it were stolen often and by many and through light thefts, which are frequent, there would be danger of enormous damage to society; for the security of society would no longer stand. But the quantity designated as absolutely grave, with attention also to the changed circumstances of present times, certainly appears to be such. - L. 527, 528; Gennari, Consultazioni Mor. Can. Liturg., P. I, Cons. 64.

What is matter of theft relatively grave? Matter of theft relatively grave, speaking of itself, is the price which is required for the competent sustenance of one day of that person from whom it is taken.

It is proved, because against the taking away of the price which is necessary for procuring the sustenance of one day competent to himself, anyone can reasonably be gravely unwilling; therefore such a price is suitably established as relatively grave matter of theft. Speaking of itself; for if a Prince, or another, lived very sumptuously, for relatively grave matter of theft a lesser price would suffice than would be required for his daily food. For would he reasonably be unwilling if that Prince on that day, e.g., had to abstain altogether from his magnificence? For competent sustenance, etc.; for if a very rich man from economy lived sparingly, for relatively grave matter of theft the price which he is accustomed from economy to spend for daily food would not suffice. For sustenance, in which not only food is computed, but also clothing and dwelling, as well as honest recreations, and even distributions to be made according to one's proper condition. For sustenance, that is, either for the whole sustenance, or even for a notable part of it; since even then someone would still be reasonably gravely unwilling. L. 527.

Resolutions: For grave matter considered relatively, with attention to the principal places of Europe and the circumstances of our times, there seem to be required: 1. About the value of one lira relatively to the poor, and sometimes less or more according to the greater or lesser degree of necessity. 2. About two or three lire relatively to workers who procure food for themselves by daily labor. 3. About five or six or seven lire relatively to men exercising a liberal profession and living honorably from it. 4. About ten or eleven or twelve lire relatively to ordinary rich persons; but fifteen or twenty relatively to the more opulent rich, but not the very richest, for whom absolutely grave matter is to be attended to. L. 527, 528.

What if in theft the necessity of the one secretly taking is grave? The matter of theft, though more grave, can become relatively light because of the grave necessity of the one taking, in which without the secret taking of another's thing he would have to lead a most miserable life, as La-Croix, l. 3, p. n. 955, and Struggl, de 7 Praec. Dec. 13, teach with Laymann and Sporer. The reason is that the owner cannot reasonably be gravely unwilling if a miserable man in such a case takes as much as is necessary to relieve such grave necessity in some way.

What if the person secretly taking is domestic?

The matter can likewise become relatively light because of the condition of the person, e.g., if the one taking is a son, a wife, or a servant very useful to the owner; for against the thefts of such persons the owner is not so gravely unwilling. - L. 539.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of sons of the family? - Several theologians require for grave theft by sons a sum twice greater than for strangers, and others extend this quantity of matter even much more. But since a universal and absolute rule concerning the gravity and lightness of similar thefts cannot be given, it must be taken 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and greater or lesser affection of the parent toward the son; 2. from the plurality, age, and other circumstances of the children; 3. from the end and use of the thing taken. The reason is that from these heads it is ordinarily accustomed to happen that the father is more or less unwilling against the theft of the son. Prov. 28:24; L. 528, 543, 544.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of wives? For grave theft by wives, several theologians also require a greater quantity, and indeed twice as much as for theft by sons. The reason is that between husband and wife there is a greater conjunction and moral identity, especially in order to common goods, than between father and son; therefore against the theft of a wife the husband is ordinarily judged to be less unwilling. Nor are several and grave theologians lacking who extend this quantity of matter even more broadly, and assert that the wife does not sin mortally, even if annually she secretly takes a twentieth part of the revenues for honest uses; which sum St. Alphonsus, 540, H. A. tr. 10, n. 33, judges excessive, at least speaking universally. Therefore, since here also a universal and absolute rule cannot be established concerning the gravity or lightness of similar thefts, this must be taken 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and greater or lesser affection of the husband toward the wife; 2. from the greater or lesser dowry, from the wife in order to household economy, and from other circumstances. The reason is that from these heads it is ordinarily accustomed to happen that the husband is more or less, or at least can be, unwilling against the theft of the wife. L. 539, 542.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of servants? "Concerning thefts of servants, doctors commonly say that small thefts which are made by servants from foods which are not customarily guarded carefully never reach grave fault, provided they do not sell them or carry them outside, and provided they do not take them in extraordinary quantity, or, it must be added, if they were not things of extraordinary price." L. H. A. tr. 10, n. 34; l. 3, n. 545. And this holds especially if the owner does not furnish them due sustenance. But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, no greater quantity is required for grave sin, because owners are then not less unwilling toward them than toward others. Indeed thefts of this kind are punished more severely by civil law because of the defect of fidelity which intervenes in them. But if these things are by no means guarded, indeed if the servants themselves have the administration of things, several and grave theologians require still a greater quantity than for strangers; this must be judged 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and affection of the owner toward the servant; 2. from the labor, utility, and necessity of the servant himself, and from the greater or lesser liberty which is given to him in administering the things committed to him. Tambur., Exp. Dec., l. 8, tr. 2, c. 3, par. 4, n. 1; L. 539, 545, 546.

What if several small thefts are made? More grave matter can also become relatively light when it is done through several small thefts and performed successively. The reason is that in these thefts less damage is effected; hence owners also are not accustomed to be so gravely unwilling against these thefts.

Hence, if small thefts are made from the same person at different times, the matter will be grave when it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - If small thefts are made from different persons, matter will be judged grave of itself when it is twice greater than the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Wherefore a still greater quantity is required if these thefts are made against several persons and several times, and then the excess seems to be required threefold greater. But these things hold when those small thefts coalesce among themselves. L. 530; D'Annibale, p. 2, n. 254, ed. 4.

Whether small thefts made several times can coalesce together? - Small thefts can coalesce into grave matter. It is proved 1. from the similar case in meals on a fast day, in servile works on a feast day. 2. From proposition 38 condemned by Innocent XI. 3. Because from multiplied light thefts there can be grave damage, or danger of grave damage. And this holds even if the little thefts are made from several persons. For although grave damage is not done to individuals as individuals, nevertheless grave damage is done to the community and society itself, or to one moral body in its members. Moreover, the matter concerns a thing which, unless it were gravely prohibited by justice, would give rise to a most grave evil against the common good; for it would be easy for sellers, e.g., to defraud measures, etc. Ithur., Cas. 1; L. 533, 534; E. M.

When do small thefts coalesce together? Small thefts coalesce into grave matter in four cases: 1. Through the intention of reaching grave matter, unless that prior will is retracted. The moral effect of this intention is to give moral unity to the various little thefts, and thus they reach grave matter. 2. If there is not a great interval of time between theft and theft. Otherwise, morally speaking, theft is not united with theft; nor therefore do they constitute one object in the moral genus. But more probably, and commonly speaking, thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months, even if they would approach quasi-grave matter. Yet others assign a longer interval, others a shorter one. The variety of these opinions shows that judgment in this matter must be taken not from the space of time alone, but also from other circumstances of things. Moreover, small thefts, even with whatever interval posited, coalesce according to the opinion of all whenever they were committed with the intention of reaching a notable sum; because by this intention they are truly united among themselves. But this intention being excluded, if the thefts are altogether modest, even with a lesser space of time, say fifteen days or even less, they do not coalesce. For who would say that the drink of coffee which a maid takes today coalesces with that which she will take after fifteen or ten days; or that the draught of wine taken today coalesces with the draught of wine taken tomorrow? 3.

Through conspiracy, where several conspire among themselves, and the little thefts of individuals, collected together, constitute grave matter. Since then each is the cause of the whole damage, in which he cooperates together with the others. - 4. Through the accession of a stolen thing to a stolen thing, if both are preserved; and then not only moral but also material union is had. Ithur., Cas. 27, n. 16; L. 530, 533, 535, 536, 537.

Note: 1. He who often steals a little from the same person, even if he has not had the will of becoming rich or of taking away a notable quantity, nevertheless if in the last small theft he notices that he has now reached a great quantity, by the last small theft, regularly speaking, he sins mortally. The reason is that such a thief by the last theft wills to continue and complete the grave damage of another; therefore by force of this volition he sins mortally, although the external theft according to itself precisely is light. L. 533. The same must be said if after grave matter has been completed, he steals something light; for the grave sin is continued. L. 538. - 2.

"It is not mortal, speaking of itself, to take secretly any sum whatever with the intention of restoring immediately, e.g., within a quarter-hour. The same is the case if within that brief time someone wishes to restore only that last part completing grave matter, or if he delays restitution for a brief time." L. 531, 533, 653. - 3. "If little thefts which together reach a great quantity have been made from different certain owners..., it seems more probably to be said that a thief of this kind does not sin gravely if he does not restore to the certain owners, when he can conveniently do so, and that he satisfies his grave obligation if he distributes the things owed to the poor... and he will also be excused from venial sin if some reasonable cause is present." L. 534.

Whether in extreme necessity it is licit to take secretly another's things. In extreme necessity, namely when no other way appears for preserving oneself, it is licit to take secretly another's things which are simply necessary for preserving life. The reason is 1. because against a taking of this kind the owner of the thing cannot be reasonably unwilling. 2. Because the division of goods, in whatever way it occurred, cannot derogate from natural or divine right. But according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, lower things are ordered to this, that from them relief be given to the necessity of men. Wherefore a right belongs to each one to provide for himself when he labors under extreme necessity. Therefore in such a case all things become common; and thus one accepting another's thing for relieving himself accepts a thing truly common, which he makes his own, just as happened before the division of goods. Therefore he does not commit theft. Nor indeed is he bound to ask or accept the thing as a loan; otherwise now nothing would ever become common. But because he has a right to that thing from justice, he can, if he is prevented, even take it by force. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 32, a. 7, ad 3; q. 66, a. 7; L. 520, 623, 624.

Resolutions: A poor person in extreme need can accept a thing even of great value, if it is absolutely necessary to him for preserving life; and unless it is an altogether extraordinary means for preserving life, although another is not bound to give. For the obligation of giving is from charity, which does not urge with great inconvenience; but the faculty of accepting is from the very right of nature, which all have of using goods destined by nature itself for the sustenance and conservation of man. But nature itself does not wish goods, especially very precious ones, to be common to all; whence no one is obliged to employ even those extraordinary goods to preserve life for himself. Yet someone can well preserve life even by extraordinary means, from the very faculty which he has of preserving life by created means. Lugo d. 16, n. 159; L. 520.

Note: Since the reason for taking another's things secretly is necessity, hence if one in extreme need has elsewhere, in fact or in probable hope, from which he can pay, he cannot take another's thing except with the burden of restitution, because necessity does not require that the ownership of the thing be acquired when it can sufficiently be relieved by a thing accepted as mutuum or commodatum. A rich man hiding his own things, or using another industry so as not to help the poor man, when the necessity of the poor man ceases, is not bound to restitution, because necessity, even extreme necessity, confers on the poor man a right to the use of another's thing only as long as the necessity itself urges. In addition, even while that extreme necessity of the poor man stands, the thing of the rich man does not cease to be his own as long as the poor man has not occupied it.

If a rich man prevents a poor man by force from accepting his goods, he sins against justice and is held concerning the damages arising from it; for since in that case the poor man has a right of using those things, he also has a right not to be impeded from them. L. 520, 701; H. A. 19, 20; St. Thomas, Quodl. 5, a. 17.

Whether also in merely grave necessity it is licit to take secretly another's things, by private right? - Resp. Negatively. 1. From proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI.

2. Because in these circumstances owners are reasonably unwilling, since things do not become common. For in this grave necessity, either the matter does not concern common goods of life, to the sustaining and conserving of which nature destined exterior common goods; or, if the matter concerns those goods, there is not absolute impossibility of providing for oneself from elsewhere, although not without inconvenience and labor. 3. Hallucination in this matter would be easy, and an entrance to plunderings would be more easily opened. Moreover, it does not seem illicit to take some small thing to avert grave damage of life, both from the intention of nature, which destined these lesser exterior goods for those lesser common goods of life, and from the presumed will of the owner. Lugo d. 16, n. 156. In merely grave necessity. For if someone suffers necessity, not indeed actually extreme, but very urgent, which more probably or certainly will soon verge into extreme necessity, he could take secretly from another's property for avoiding extreme necessity and danger of life. By private right, because since the common good prevails over the particular good, on account of public necessity and good the Prince can by high right at least dispose that the rich, e.g., open their granaries and sell at a just fixed price, etc. L. 520; Lugo d. 16, n. 154, 156, 160; E. M.

Whether, if a thief threatens to take your thing unless you accept and hand over to him another's thing, you can take this secretly so as not to lose your own? "This is not licit to do, because I do not have the right of inflicting damage on another in order to preserve my own goods; and therefore if I do this, I do an illicit and unjust action." L. 569.

"Whether those cutting wood in a forbidden forest sin and are bound to restitution? Doctors commonly teach that if the grove belongs to the whole community, its inhabitants who cut wood against the prohibition do not sin at least gravely, indeed not even venially according to Sanchez, etc., and are bound to restore nothing unless they make great destruction, but are bound only to the penalty after sentence; for such a prohibition is judged purely penal." L. 529, 614; l. 1, n. 145. The same holds concerning fields of the whole community as regards pasturing animals. L. ib. "Consequently those are free from all, or certainly from grave, fault who cut single bundles on single days for the use of the family, and the poor who cut besides two bundles each week for selling." D'Annibale, p. 2, n. 253, ed. 4. One must stand by the usages of places in this matter, Gousset 983. "In private forests, the poor are free from all, or at least from grave, fault who gather from them, indeed even cut down shrubs and brushwood necessary for fire; for not undeservedly you would say these are owed to them from charity, especially if the owners know and are silent, provided they do not devastate by cutting down, nor cut small trees or branches of trees, unless perhaps dead ones, nor carry away their poles or those of vineyards, nor tear down hedges." D'Annibale, l.c.

"Whether it is licit to eat grapes in another's vineyard? - Covarruvias, Valerius, Ripa, etc., apud Lugo d. 16, n. 33, affirm, provided one does not carry away the grapes, and they adduce Deut. 23:24, 25. And the same thing that is said concerning grapes and ears of grain, says Abulensis apud Cornelius a Lapide, understand concerning apples and other fruits." L. 529. St. Alphonsus in the same place says this opinion is sufficiently probable, and adds: "Moreover, probably," says Lugo, "by the law of nature it is licit to eat one or another cluster of grapes, that is, one or another grape; and in like manner he concedes eating from another's orchard one or another apple. For to prohibit this seems very harsh and contrary to humanity." Nor indeed would someone sin gravely if he ate up to satiety, provided he carried nothing away. - L. H. A. tr. 10, n. 24; D'Annibale, l.c.

What is to be judged concerning remnants of tailors? - If the remnant is a notable part, they are bound to restore it to the owner, if he pays the due price of labor. The reason is that the owner would be reasonably unwilling. If the remnant is of lesser moment, and is expressly reclaimed by the owner, they are also bound to restore, if he pays the due price of labor, for the same reason. If the remnant is of lesser moment and is not expressly reclaimed by the owner, then it can be retained, because owners commonly know that tailors retain similar moderate remnants, and therefore also often pay a lower price for the labor. L. 568.

How does he sin who takes away from another a small thing very dear to him, or a thing of greater moment which he does not care about? - Resp. To the 1st: He sins mortally against charity, yet not in the genus of theft against justice. The reason is that such a person unjustly gravely saddens another, yet in the goods of fortune he does not inflict grave damage. Hence, if such a thing perishes, the thief is not bound to restore to the owner as much as that owner valued the thing, but only the value and common estimation of the thing in itself. Resp. To the 2nd: He sins only venially if the owner cares little about it, as if it were of small moment; but if the owner does not care about it at all, and holds it as neglected and abandoned, he does not sin even venially. The reason is that injury is inflicted on the owner in the goods of fortune insofar as he himself is unwilling; therefore, since in the former case he is lightly unwilling, and in the latter in no way unwilling, in the former a light injury is inflicted on him, and in the latter none.

Whether there is an obligation of restitution from unjust taking; what in a case of doubt? It is undoubted that from the unjust taking of another's thing an obligation of restitution arises. For if another's thing has been unjustly accepted, it is possessed either by no title or by an invalid title; and therefore that thing cries out for its owner.

Inst. l. 4, t. 1, 2; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 6; L. 548. But one thing can be asked here: Whether someone unjustly accepts another's thing when he begins possession with doubt concerning his right. Now in truth, he could begin possession here in two ways: 1. By despoiling another, without any title of itself able to transfer ownership; and in this case, since the peaceful possession of another gives a morally certain right, the despoiler is bound to restitution. 2.

By accepting a thing under another title, e.g., of purchase, donation, etc., from another concerning whom it is doubted whether he is its owner; and then one is bound to inquire into the truth of the matter, and, if doubt perseveres, "he must restore," says Father Gury, 652, "according to the proportion of the doubt, to the probable owner, or to the poor, if the owner is unknown. The reason is that possession begun with doubtful faith does not favor him, and therefore he cannot retain the whole; nor from another source does he seem bound to restore the whole, since he doubts whether the thing is another's and not his." But even if that doubt is not merely negative, but positive, he seems to be held to nothing; for he can then form conscience from reflex principles: no one is evil unless proved, etc.; nor from another source can a certain obligation be imposed which certainly is not established. Moreover, he can use the right of him to whom he succeeds by title of purchase, donation, etc. Wherefore, if that one possessed the thing in good faith and therefore could retain it, the one who succeeds him will also be able to retain the same thing for himself. Lugo d. 17, n. 83. Finally, he can retain the thing by title of occupation or possession until the owner appears; and if he does not appear, it can rightly be presumed that no owner is present, if, e.g., someone found a gem on the shore of the sea and doubts whether the thing belongs to no one, or was lost by some traveler. Cf. here 1334. But to what one retaining and continuing possession with doubt concerning his right is bound, cf. 1352-1354. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 6; L. 547, 625; Gousset 939, 1028; d'Annibale, ed. 4, p. 2, n. 121.

Whether he who in good faith bought a stolen thing can return it to the thief in order to recover his own price? Resp. Negatively, if the owner appears, reclaiming his own thing from him; for then he must render it to him, even with the loss of his own price, because by natural law the owner can seize his own thing wherever he finds it. Nevertheless an action is given to the buyer against the thief. C. A. 333. Except according to C. I. and C. G. if the thing was bought in a public market, or from one who is accustomed to sell things of this kind; for then the buyer is not bound to render the thing to the owner unless the price is paid. But this disposition of law, according to several, has force also in the forum of conscience, because it is very useful to the public good, to the tranquility of possessions, and greatly favors commerce. Cf. 1333; Bouvier, de Possessore bonae fid.; Carrière 1041; Gousset 1027.

If the owner is indeed known, but unaware of the thing, the first opinion, "very probable," denies, "because the thing snatched from the hand of the thief has now obtained a better state; and therefore if he were to return it to the thief, he would throw it into a worse state, and thus would inflict injury on the owner." The second opinion, "perhaps more probable," affirms, "because you are not bound to preserve the thing for the owner with your own damage." But since each one has a right to guard against his own damage, there certainly "is not forbidden to him that action which of itself is necessary and direct for repairing his own damage, although indirectly and accidentally damage comes to another.... Yet it must be noted that this opinion can have place only when no other way of recovering his own price is available to the buyer except by restoring the thing to the robber." L. 569.

If the thief, or another seller, does not appear, or does not wish to render the money, the buyer, once the owner is known, cannot sell the thing to others, nor turn it to his own uses in order to keep himself indemnified, because he is not the owner of the thing; but he must render it to the owner, notwithstanding the loss of the price. He preserves recourse against the seller. But if he cannot find him, the damage must be undergone by him. Cf. 1351; C. A. 333.

What are just causes for dispensing in diriment impediments? Some causes are honorable, others are notorious, for avoiding scandals. Formerly they were taken more strictly, today more broadly, because of changed circumstances of the times. Honorable causes are: 1. the age of the girl, who, having already passed the twenty-fourth year of age, has thus far not found a man of equal condition whom she can marry; 2. defect of dowry, if the girl has none, or not enough, to be able to marry a man of equal condition in her own place where she dwells; 3. narrowness of place, i.e., if the woman therefore cannot find a man of equal condition in the place of origin or domicile, by reason only of the female petitioner; 4. grave enmities to be settled between the parents, blood relatives, or relatives by affinity of the man and woman; 5. lawsuits to be ended concerning matters of great importance arising between the man and woman, or between their parents; 6. poverty of a widow who is burdened with numerous offspring; 7. prerogative of royal dignity; 8. preservation of an illustrious family; 9. preservation of goods in the same family; 10. excellence of merits toward the Church; 11. Christian virtues, which probably would not be found in another man; 12. a more generous alms to be poured into pious works.

Notorious causes are: 1. excessive familiarity, suspicious and dangerous, and also cohabitation under the same roof which cannot easily be impeded; 2. infamy of the woman, arising either from true or false suspicion, whence the woman is compelled either to remain defamed or unmarried, or to marry a man of unequal condition; 3. copulation having followed between those wishing to contract, and legitimation of offspring; 4. danger of civil marriage; 5. danger of mixed marriage, or marriage before a non-Catholic minister; 6. danger of incestuous concubinage; 7. cessation of public concubinage; 8. removal of grave scandals, lest they fornicate again, lest enmities flare up; 9. danger of incontinence for a younger widow; 10. revalidation of marriage. Benedict XIV, Response to the Archbishop of Tours, September 26, 1754; A.S.S., vol. 2, p. 62; Instruction of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, May 9, 1877; L. 1129, 1130; E.M.

Dispensation was said to be without cause when none of these causes was present which are usually alleged as canonical; or when, no proper cause having been alleged, dispensation is usually sought and granted from certain rational causes, namely because of a more abundant Composition in degrees somewhat remote, or in more remote degrees because of a cause of public good moving the mind of the Pontiff, or also because, since the cause is shameful, it is not expedient to reveal it. Those causes are called canonical which, from the style and approved custom of the Curia, are regularly accustomed to be admitted for matrimonial dispensations. By no means, however, is one prohibited from setting forth other causes also, by which either other causes may be strengthened, or even the defect of others supplied, e.g., deformity of the girl, infirmity, etc. Reformed Forms of the Apostolic Datary; E.M.

After the Constitution Sapienti consilio of Pius X, June 29, 1908, matrimonial dispensations are distinguished as of greater degree and of lesser degree. The former are granted from a legitimate cause; the latter from reasonable causes approved by the Holy See. "19. Dispensations of lesser degree are from impediments: "a) of consanguinity and affinity of the third and fourth degree of the collateral line, whether equal or unequal, that is, of the fourth degree mixed with the third, and of the fourth or third mixed with the second; "b) of affinity in the first degree, and in the second simple or mixed with the first, where this impediment proceeds from illicit intercourse; "c) of spiritual kinship of any kind; "d) of public honesty, whether through betrothals or through marriage, concerning which there has already been dispensation and it has been dissolved. "20. Dispensations of greater degree usually granted, when a legitimate cause intervenes, are from impediments: "a) of consanguinity of the second degree of the equal collateral line, and of the second or third degree touching the first; "b) of affinity of the first and second degree of the equal collateral line, and of the second or third degree touching the first; "c) of crime from adultery with promise of future marriage. "21. Dispensations from lesser impediments are all granted from reasonable causes approved by the Holy See. But when granted in this way, they will have force just as if they had been imparted by motu proprio and from certain knowledge; and therefore they will be subject to no challenge either by vice of obreption or of subreption." Order to be observed in the Roman Curia, Particular Norms, chap. 7, a. 3.

As regards simple vows emitted in some Religious Congregation, dispensation is given by the Sacred Congregation of Religious with this formula: "Since he feels himself wholly unequal to sustaining the burdens of common life, etc."

605. • Definition. Theft is the hidden taking away ¹ of another's thing, when the owner is reasonably unwilling.

¹ When it is said taking away, theft is distinguished from mere damaging. Wrongly, therefore, do some find an example of grave theft if someone steals from a tailor a needle without which he cannot work. For it will be grave damaging, but not grave theft.

Division. Theft is thus distinguished:

1. Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2. Robbery, if it is done openly with violence inflicted on the owner ². - 3. Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

² If theft is a hidden taking away, but robbery an open taking away with violence, then robbery ought not to be called a species of theft, but of unjust taking away.

Principles. I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed to the natural law, as is plain both from reason and from Sacred Scripture, in which it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus says the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6:10: Neither thieves..., nor robbers shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of diverse malice: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted on the person. But other modes, or other objects of theft, do not change the species, because by these the nature of damage is not changed.

1. The reason for doubting in this matter is that in the present day it seems necessary to exceed the limits predefined both by the older Theologians and also by St. Alphonsus, book 3, nn. 527, 528, because from their age down to ours no slight difference is perceived concerning the value of money. For all now complain that the prices of things have increased notably in comparison with past times, or, what comes to the same thing, that the value of money has decreased. Whence grave matter in theft must now reach a greater quantity of money. But on the contrary it seems that one must not depart either from the opinion of the old theologians, which is always to be held in the greatest account in a moral matter, or, and much less, from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, which has had special approval from the Holy See. Moreover, although it must be conceded that according to the variety of times a variety has also been introduced in the value of money, nevertheless, if a proportion of this sort had to be observed, since now the prices of things have increased immensely, the grave quantity in theft would also have to be increased immensely, which would cede to evident damage of Society. To resolve this question we inquire into three things: 1st. How many kinds of grave matter are to be distinguished in theft? 2nd. What in our age is to be judged in theft matter both relatively and absolutely grave? 3rd. What must be judged concerning the proposed reasons for doubting?

2. As to the first question it is enough to note that, properly speaking, grave matter in theft is always relative, nor can it be absolute. The reason is that, as the Angelic Doctor says, 2.2, q. 73, a. 3, "sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed in themselves according to the harms which are brought upon the neighbor, because from this they have the nature of fault. But the harm is so much the greater as the good taken away is greater." This notwithstanding, theologians commonly distinguish in theft absolute grave matter and relative grave matter. Relative grave matter is that which is grave, attention having been paid to the conditions of the person in particular, to whom in fact grave harm is brought. This is altogether consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas just set forth, l.c., and q. 66, a. 6, ad 3. But as regards absolute grave matter, Scavini, Milan ed. 1874, book 2, n. 697, says: "the theft will be absolutely grave when, independently of the damage which the owner suffers, in the judgment of men it is considered of itself to suffice for constituting mortal sin." This definition is either inexact, as being incomplete, or in reality says and explains nothing; because, if precision and abstraction are made from the neighbor's damage, no judgment of grave matter can be formed. And if the common sense of men judges this or that matter grave, it judges so because in this or that matter it considers grave harm to the neighbor. Otherwise that judgment of common sense would be a judgment without foundation and sense. Absolute grave matter, according to the common doctrine of Theologians, ians, is matter which is grave with respect to all, of whatever condition they themselves may be, whether they are poor or rich; whether they are individual or moral persons, as that which in any conditions of status always brings grave harm to the neighbor, for such a place or time. It is said, for such a place or time, because the same thing in this place or time, on account of abundance, is valued little, and consequently its taking away inflicts slight damage; but in another place or time, on account of rarity and necessity, it is valued more highly, and consequently the taking away of the same thing brings grave damage. Hence that also is inexact which the same Scavini adds, l.c.: "But it is plain that the determination of matter absolute and in itself, for judging concerning the gravity of sin, ought then only to have place when the state and condition of the damaged person is unknown." And he asserts this absolutely grave matter to be about five or six libellae.

3. Lugo aptly says, De Iust. et Iur., D. 16, S. 2, n. 23: "And indeed it cannot be denied that the malice of theft is respective, nor has anyone denied this. For although they say that there can be some grave matter of theft that is absolute, and another respective..., nevertheless they do not will that it be grave without any respect to damage to the neighbor; but they only signify that there is some matter of such a sort through which grave damage is inflicted upon all, and therefore, such matter standing, there is no need to examine and weigh the condition of the person suffering the damage, since it is established that every person, of whatever condition he may be, suffers grave damage from a theft of this sort. Nor can it be denied that there is some matter which is not grave with respect to all, but with respect to one person is slight, and with respect to others is grave.... For the gravity of malice is taken from the gravity of the damage inflicted; but the gravity of damage proceeds from the greater need by which the neighbor needs that thing. Wherefore, since not all equally need the thing which is taken away, it follows that they do not suffer an equally grave injury either, and therefore one person will be able to suffer a slight injury, another a grave injury, through the theft of an equal sum."

4. As regards the second question, there is a twofold criterion or rule for judging and determining matter relatively grave. For one criterion is intrinsic, the other extrinsic. Let us speak first of the intrinsic. That which reasonably and, speaking in itself, brings grave displeasure to our neighbor is a grave sin against charity; and if justice enters into it, it is a grave sin against justice, which obliges more strictly than charity. The Angelic Doctor uses nearly this reasoning, 2.2, q. 66, a. 6, to prove that theft in itself is a mortal sin. "Mortal sin," he says, "is that which is opposed to charity, according as it is the spiritual life of the soul. But charity consists principally indeed in the love of God, and secondarily in the love of neighbor, to which it pertains that we will and work good for the neighbor. But through theft a man inflicts harm upon his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish. Whence theft, as contrary to charity, is a mortal sin." Moreover, to deprive some person and his family of daily sustenance, necessary according to his own condition, reasonably brings grave displeasure to our neighbor, who sees himself and his own deprived of the things necessary for life according to his own state. Whence it evidently appears that the harm is grave, counting in sustenance not only food, but also clothing and habitation. "Commonly the Doctors say," says St. Alphonsus, book 3, n. 527, "that in theft that is grave matter which would suffice someone according to his condition in a day for the sustenance of himself and his family; in which, as La-Croix well observes, n. 985, with Sporer, Gomez, and others, not only food is computed, but also clothing and habitation." And here it must be noticed that in sustenance of this sort, speaking in itself, there ought also to be comprehended honorable pleasures and lawful recreations fitting to one's own condition, without which human life neither can be, nor in fact is, and of which also someone would be deprived with altogether reasonable displeasure. For man does not live only on bread and meat, water and wine, in a strict measure, nor does he live solitary; but physically he also lives by other things, and by a measure conveniently good and considered together, if not always superabundant; but morally he lives in his own family and in society; and therefore expenses of pleasure, for the sake of honorable and suitable recreation and also of due honor, must at least sometimes be sustained. Theologians seem implicitly to understand this in that sustenance of the family which they call congruous and suitable to one's state.

5. But as regards grave sin, although deprivation of sustenance in the sense explained is certainly and among all grave, nevertheless a smaller quantity still suffices for grave sin, according to the principle established. For if someone were deprived of daily sustenance necessary only for his own individual life, and not also for the life of his own family, he would certainly experience grave and reasonable displeasure. Indeed, for constituting grave sin from the principle already established it is not necessary that someone be deprived of that whole which is necessary for the daily sustenance of his own individual life, as this sustenance has just been explained, but it suffices that he be deprived only of a notable part of it. For indeed, would not someone feel grave and rational displeasure if even for one day he were deprived of necessary food, or clothing, or habitation, or for that reason could not fulfill the offices of his own status and condition?

6. Wherefore considering, 1st, what at present and as regards Italy is spent for the sustenance of life by the poor, by workers, by various persons of civil and noble condition, what is spent daily in Colleges and Seminaries, in religious Communities, in families which live decently and suitably, but also with due economy; considering, 2nd, the stipends of workers, doctors, advocates, public officials, and the profits of merchants, the pensions of students in Colleges and Seminaries, the dowries of Nuns, the incomes of ordinarily rich persons; it seems possible to establish at present and as regards Italy, and perhaps also, at least more or less, for other regions of Europe, the following matter relatively grave: 1st, for the poor, 1 libella, and less, according to the degree of their poverty. 2nd, for workers and artisans, 1 libella, 2, 3, according to the various crafts and arts, more or less lucrative. 3rd, for persons of civil and ordinary condition, who live from incomes, or from the exercise of merchandising and commerce, or of a liberal profession, 4 libellae, 5-6, 7, according to the various degree of convenience of life. 4th, for ordinary rich persons, 8, 9-11, 12 libellae, and for ordinary moral Bodies, 10-20 libellae, according to the degree of riches. 5th, finally, for extraordinarily rich persons, such as reigning and non-reigning Princes, Nobles and Merchants and very rich Businessmen, moral Bodies and Societies possessing exorbitant Capitals, relatively grave matter cannot be designated; recourse must be had to absolutely grave matter. And indeed, when a private Prince, for example, possesses 50 and 100 millions, and daily spends 30 libellae and more for letters and telegrams alone, it is an evident thing that the theft of 10, 20, 30 libellae certainly will not deprive him in any way of suitable sustenance. Therefore to assert that matter of this sort is relatively grave for them is merely arbitrary, and in no way confirmed by the enunciated intrinsic criterion and rule for judging concerning relative gravity.

7. But let us make a step to the extrinsic criterion and rule. Since here there is question of a moral judgment in a moral matter, such criterion and rule is contained in the authority of Theologians. "Moreover," says St. Alphonsus, l.c., "for making a just measurement of this gravity, the Salmanticenses rightly say, De Rest., c. 5, n. 12, that the judgments of the wise contribute greatly, whose greater authority in this point seems to me to constitute greater probability. Wherefore I have taken care diligently to gather here the diverse opinions of Doctors," etc. But recent theologians, with few exceptions and a slight difference of which account cannot be taken in moral matters, agree altogether in the matter assigned. For in this they agree, that for the regions of Europe, matter relatively grave at present is almost twice greater than that which St. Alphonsus established for his own time. Moreover, the Holy Doctor, book 3, n. 528, no distinction having been made between the lowest, middle, and highest degree of riches, assigns: 1st, for the poor, 1 iulius, 54 centesimi; 2nd, for workers, 2 iulii, 1 libella, 8 centesimi; 3rd, for artisans, 2 1/2 iulii, 1 libella, 35 centesimi; 4th, for those moderately rich, 4 iulii, 2 libellae, 16 centesimi; 5th, for those absolutely rich and for very wealthy merchants, 6 iulii, 3 libellae, 24 centesimi; 6th, for the very richest magnates, 1 aureus, 5 libellae, 38 centesimi; 7th, for a very wealthy Community, 1 1/2 aurei, 8 libellae, 17 centesimi; 8th, for Kings, 2 aurei, 10 libellae, 76 centesimi. But the Holy Doctor adds, l.c., n. 527, that very many doctors extend this quantity up to 3 aurei, 16 libellae, 14 centesimi. And this quantity, as is plain, is, as it were, half the quantity assigned. For a iulius is worth 54 centesimi of a libella. But an aureus is worth 5 libellae, 58 centesimi. Cf. Finardi, Prontuario del Commerciante, etc., Rome 1862. That we may pass over others, for the sake of brevity, the most learned Joseph D'Annibale has these things in Summula Theolog. Moral., Part 2, n. 201, 2nd ed., Milan 1882: "Let me have St. Alphonsus before my eyes, the price of things having almost doubled from that time in which he lived. And so, for the present value of coins, I would say that the damage which does not reach about one libella is always slight in itself, even if to a beggar; on the contrary I would say that damage which exceeds about 30 libellae is grave in itself, even if inflicted upon the very richest person, or upon a King. Between these the damage must be measured relatively, that is, from the persons: therefore I judge it grave, 1st, for the poor, that is, for a beggar, or worker, or artisan, damage of 1 libella or 2 1/2; 2nd, for merchants, according to each one's fortune, whether lowest, middle, or highest, 2 1/2, or 4, or 8; 3rd, for the rich, according as nothing, or little, or much, or very much remains to them from their own revenue, expenses deducted, 3 and perhaps less, or 4, or 7, or 10. Finally as regards moral persons which have the body of a College, damage is grave which is reckoned at 10, or, if they shall have been wealthy, at 20." This question was debated in the present year 1887, on the day 24 Jan., in the Conference of Cases of Conscience at S. Apollinaris before the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar of the City, and the same opinion was defended by the Resolver and approved by the Censors present; and the Censor who at the end, according to custom, made the recapitulation, set forth the whole doctrine which is explained in this Commentary.

8. Let us come to absolute matter. As for relative matter the damage of individuals is attended to, with all particular circumstances considered, so for absolute matter the damage of Society itself ought especially to be considered. And, this once admitted, then it is easily understood how absolutely grave matter is always grave, namely grave for all, without distinction, although there is question of extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich persons. This principle being established, absolutely grave matter seems to be that which exceeds thirty libellae, the quantity designated by the praised Joseph D'Annibale. But someone will object: how can thirty libellae more or less bring grave damage to Society, if they do not bring grave damage even to an extraordinarily rich individual, such as are great bankers or merchants of monies in Europe, to whom the loss of 30 and even 300 libellae and more in their commercial operations is scarcely perceptible and is immediately compensated by so many and so great other profits? It is responded that it is common doctrine with relation to fornication that it is prohibited in all cases by natural law itself on account of the uncertain education of offspring. Although in some particular case, which is not very difficult to be verified, both the father and the mother, otherwise very rich, agree between themselves that the offspring be educated in due manner; indeed even that they themselves immediately undertake the care of a suitable education, and therefore with sincere and efficacious will promise a marriage to be entered at once, fornication would always remain prohibited by natural law; because if it were lawful and permitted in some particular case, the gravest danger would always be present of disordered license with immense damage to the offspring. In like manner, although a determined quantity, already sufficiently great in itself, does not bring grave harm to some individual in particular, nor even for the same individual is there at least danger of further grave harm, nevertheless it is itself sufficient for constituting a grave and most grave danger for Society itself, and, speaking in itself, also for individuals themselves. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, it will always be grave matter in any case. For if the grave damage of the individual and of society is considered, there is need to take account not only of expenses necessary for the sustenance and decorum of one's own state, but also of slight thefts, which are sufficiently frequent not only in thieves by profession, but also in the very persons of one's own family, community, society; but especially in persons to whom the administration of others' goods has been entrusted, especially of public dominion and utility. "Namely," says the most distinguished D'Annibale, l.c., n. 257, note 20, "it is very difficult for the things of owners to be administered by others so faithfully that something does not adhere to the hands of those handling them." Therefore, such danger being posited, not only is it evident that the designated quantity is sufficient for constituting absolutely grave matter; but also perhaps that quantity can, not without reason, seem excessive and to be restricted to narrower limits. For where the gravity of sin does not deter, and the hope of a greater, sufficiently notable profit invites and incites to a new theft, many men, and commonly by far more, would commit it, and our fortunes would be most gravely injured, unless they were deterred by fear of graver sin. Hence it is plain why, although the excess of the faculty of the most wealthy King over the faculties of an ordinary rich man, or even of a Marquis or Count, is far greater, beyond any proportion, than the excess of the rich man over the faculties of a citizen or common man, nevertheless there is not required so great a proportionate excess in a grave theft made against a King over a theft made against a rich man as in this latter with respect to a theft made against a common man. And this doctrine seems conformable to the doctrine just related of the Angelic Doctor concerning the gravity of theft, which he declares absolutely, saying: "But through theft a man inflicts harm upon his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish." But cf. also Lugo, l.c., n. 29 ff.

9. Nor indeed should the authority of Cardinal de Lugo be objected, as asserting, l.c., n. 21, that a quantity absolutely grave cannot be constituted in theft. For Lugo, l.c., does not assert this, but a very different thing, namely "that it cannot be defined what are the borders of each matter, namely slight and grave, so that short of such a sum it is slight, and beyond that it is grave." It is surely one thing that this quantity cannot be mathematically defined, another that absolutely grave matter cannot even be determined morally, with a certain moral latitude, namely a little more or a little less; and this is what Cardinal de Lugo himself attempts to effect in the following paragraphs. Cf. n. 29 ff., where he designates the universal reason of the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave. Cf. also n. 35.

10. Nor likewise should it be objected that from the discourse made it would follow that any theft whatever is grave, since from any slight theft whatever a most grave detriment of Society and of individuals could be feared. For men are not so allured to these smaller thefts, from which they take little profit, as they are allured to those other greater ones, in which profit appears not contemptible, if they could be done without grave sin, as the same Lugo has, l.c., n. 33. But the assigned quantity of thirty libellae, more or less, surely brings profit not contemptible, more than enough alluring to steal.

11. Finally, the authority of Lugo is still objected against the assigned quantity of 30 libellae as absolutely grave. For Lugo asserts this quantity to be 100 aurei, l.c., n. 21. If therefore in the time of Lugo this was the absolutely grave quantity, in our time certainly it ought to be greater still. It is responded that the assertion is altogether false. For Lugo does not say that for his own time that was the absolutely grave quantity, but that that was a quantity evidently and certainly grave, which is very different; and he asserts this indeed by a kind of near exaggeration. For in that same number he does not speak of matter to be determined absolutely, so that he determines it, but he speaks only of the difficulty of determining that grave matter and much more of defining the limits of that grave and slight matter, on account of the difficulty itself of finding in this matter some rational principle and some fixed rule. Hence in the following numbers 22-29 he relates various opinions of Theologians, and various rules assigned by them, which he weighs, and shows to be insufficient. But before he brings forth in n. 29 his own rule and rational principle, so that the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave, may be understood, he openly declares that in reality he does not depart from the opinion of others, attention also having been paid to the decrease of money at that time; and he says at the end of n. 28: "Wherefore I shall not reluctantly agree with the aforesaid in the matter itself, that in order with respect to Kings and wealthy Magnates a theft of one aureus be required; with respect to the rich, six or seven argentei; with respect to artisans, four; with respect to the poor, the value of daily food, or the average wage which in a time midway between winter and summer is given to a digger." An argenteus is the same for Lugo as a iulius or regalis, nn. 22-26; but an ordinary regalis is worth 26 centesimi of a libella. But since he takes an argenteus for a iulius or regalis, and says in n. 26 that one Ducat contains eleven reales or iulii, by regalis he understands not the ordinary regalis, of bronze, real de vellon, but the silver regalis, real de plata, of about twice greater value and about equivalent to a iulius. And in n. 31 he establishes still more definitively that the theft of one aureus is absolutely grave, on account of the danger of grave detriment which is in it: "for," he says, "from several thefts of one aureus made to you by diverse persons, your family affairs would truly suffer most grave detriment." Likewise in n. 32 he affirms the same thing altogether clearly, extending that absolutely grave matter not to 100 aurei, but to one or two aurei. Finally, in n. 35, discoursing again concerning the difficulty of defining precisely the limits of grave and slight matter, although he speaks hypothetically and only for the sake of example, he certainly brings into the midst not 90 or 80 aurei but 6 iulii. This can also be confirmed by the authority of St. Alphonsus, who in n. 527 counts Lugo among authors who "with respect to the very richest Magnates... say that one aureus suffices for grave matter." But from the opinion of Lugo, n. 29, with respect to these very rich persons, relatively grave matter is not to be required, but absolutely grave, which he then establishes according to this rule and principle; namely, "some things are prohibited not on account of precisely the damage which they bring when they are done once, but on account of the damage which they would bring if, being repeated more often, they were lawful.... Thus therefore in the present matter it seems to be said that although the theft of one aureus or half made only once would not bring great detriment, especially to a rich man, and therefore considered according to itself would not seem sufficient for inducing eternal damnation; nevertheless consequently it would bring great detriment, because if such theft were slight and could be done without grave sin, thefts of this sort would be multiplied, from the frequency of which the greatest detriment would follow even for the rich and princes." And from these things it is more than sufficiently plain how false it is to assert that matter absolutely grave from Lugo is the sum of 100 aurei, namely greater than 500 libellae, since an aureus is equivalent to 5 libellae, 38 centesimi.

12. Let us come to the third question. The reason adduced, that one depart from the limits designated by ancient Theologians and by St. Alphonsus, is excellent. For since the value of money has changed, and has been diminished, and notably diminished, the damage at present brought upon the neighbor in equal circumstances is much less than that which it was before. And in the matter of theft it is precisely this damage, grave or slight, which renders the matter grave or slight. St. Alphonsus himself, l.c., n. 527, says that the gravity of the matter of theft "is to be measured respectively according to the circumstances of person, thing, place, and time." Lugo has the same, l.c., nn. 24, 25. But what is asserted against this, that it is not lawful to depart from the doctrine of the ancient theologians and of St. Alphonsus, whose works received special approval from the Apostolic See, truly has no place in our case. For we do not depart from their doctrine and principles even by the breadth of a nail, although the conclusion is different, because the circumstances are different, as the same St. Alphonsus and Lugo teach that they ought to be. Finally, what is added, namely that grave matter in theft would assume nearly enormous proportions if attention had to be paid to the changed value of money and the price of things, is most false. A certain recent theologian, indeed, relying upon a certain catalogue of prices which is found in a certain Ordinance of the Police of the City of Bourges in France, in the year 1598, from a comparison of the aforesaid prices with the prices of the same city in the year 1883, found the proportion to be one to thirteen. And hence he deduced that grave matter for a king is at least 150 libellae. This assertion is a very true exaggeration, and without any solid foundation. It does not suffice to compare the price of a few wares and the stipend of some workers which are found in that Ordinance of the City of Bourges. But in order that we may come to a seriously deduced and founded conclusion, it is necessary to examine and weigh the whole present State of Society in relation to public and private riches, in relation to the value of money and all necessities of life. And first indeed, the poor, who live from the goods of the rich, are in the present day as many as before and perhaps more and much more than before. If money is more abundant, taxes also and revenues are greater, at least in an equal if not greater proportion. The stipend of public officials has increased, but certainly it has not increased thirteen times nor ten times, nor much less relatively to the stipend of the time immediately past. But the necessities of life in the present day have increased; and money, if, attention being paid to commerce and present industry, it is more fruitful than before, certainly the increase is not thirteen times greater, but scarcely by a third or half. Cultivation of fields, on the contrary, in many places is much less fruitful, and in some almost abandoned. But attention being paid to the evolution of Commerce, the loss of Capitals on account of cessions of goods, fires, shipwrecks, etc., is much greater than before. And although there is now greater activity, circulation, and quasi-motion of riches, notwithstanding this, those who now are extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich do not seem truly to be richer than those who were extraordinarily rich in past times, as can easily be deduced from their great works and foundations of beneficence, of most splendid buildings, Monasteries, Hospitals, etc., which they erected and founded. Finally, if according to that Ordinance of the City of Bourges a pound of beef and a hen today is of thirteen times greater price than before, a proportion of this sort is not true for all cities and towns of Europe, indeed not even of the same France, as is established from catalogues of prices which are published in public Journals. And thus, for example, in the City of Bourges the best hen of all is bought for 3 libellae and 90 centesimi; at Turin it is bought for 2 libellae and 40 centesimi. Cardinal Lugo himself observed this for his own time; for he says, l.c., n. 24: "I saw at Madrid that the common price of one hen was eight argentei, while nevertheless at Salamanca, while I was studying there, it was commonly bought for two argentei." Besides, how many other things there are which previously were bought at a much dearer price, but today are had at a cheap price, as it is easy to discern in the transmission of letters, in the carriage of goods, in journeys, in things made by machine art, in fuels necessary for illuminating and burning, etc. Therefore the excess of grave matter in theft in the present day can by no means be enormous. All things well weighed, perhaps it scarcely reaches double, as can also be confirmed from the stipend of Masses, which either by custom or by diocesan Statutes has increased about twofold. And thus in the time of St. Alphonsus and Benedict XIV, the stipend of manual Masses was 10 solidi; but that of founded Masses was 26 or 27 solidi, cf. Benedict XIV, Instr. 56, n. 19 ff.; but today it is 1 1/2 or 2 libellae for various places. Nearly the same must be said concerning the stipend of soldiers, doctors, etc. In the year 1856 the Sacred Congregation, for the furnishing of support, decreed the sum of 6 ducats monthly, about 30 libellae, etc. Cf. Bizzarri, Collect., etc. Moreover, in the time of Molina, who died in 1600, the variation of money was from 1 to 6. De Iust. et Iure, tr. 2, D. 685, n. 2. In the time of Lugo, who died in 1660, the variation of money was from 1 to 3. De Iust. et Iur., D. 16, n. 25. St. Alphonsus also affirms a variation from 1 to 2, book 3, n. 383. Nor indeed did these Doctors increase grave matter of theft for their own time in this proportion. Therefore that the grave matter of theft must be increased according to the reasoning of the change in the value of money, in the same proportion, is proved neither by reason nor by authority.

445. Since theft is defined as the unjust taking of another's thing, no cause properly excuses from it; but there can be causes excusing from the occupation of another's thing. There are two: necessity and hidden compensation.

446. First principle: He who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity can take from the goods of another as much as is necessary for him to escape this necessity, unless however the owner is in the same necessity.

It is explained. Extreme necessity is that in which the necessities of life are lacking, or a certain danger threatens of losing a good of an order superior to the goods of fortune, e.g., integrity of members, health, liberty, chastity. Quasi-extreme necessity is verified when someone is in very probable danger of losing a superior good, namely life, a principal member, etc.

447. It is proved. According to the order of divine Providence, temporal things were primarily instituted for assisting human necessity, and therefore by the division and appropriation of things it is not impeded that man's necessity should be assisted from things of this kind; now if a man, constituted in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, could not appropriate to himself from the things of another as much as is required to escape this necessity, the order of divine Providence would be frustrated and human law would prevail over natural and divine right; therefore. - Or, in other words, the right of life, members, and liberty is superior to the right of property; moreover in a conflict of rights, the lesser ought to yield to the greater, from what was said above, n. 29.

Yet it is said "unless the owner is in the same necessity," because then the condition of the possessor is better.

448. Corollaries. 1. In extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, it is not licit to take away more than what is necessary; whence, if the sole use of the thing suffices, e.g., of a horse for fleeing, of a gun for the defense of life, etc., the obligation remains of restoring these things when the necessity ceases.

449. 2. If someone, in a case of necessity, takes another's thing, and possesses goods or the hope of possessing them, he is bound to restitution when the necessity ceases, even if the thing was consumed or destroyed; for he could take away nothing in this case except under the burden of restitution, since nothing else is required that he may go out from present necessity. - But if, at the time when the thing was taken away, the one taking away had neither actually nor in hope the means from which he might restore, probably he is bound to nothing afterward, even if he becomes rich, because he made the thing his own without any burden of restitution; yet it is very fitting, according to all, that he return an equivalent sum. But we hold as more probable the opinion which asserts that he is bound to restitution even in this case; for, by force of the general principle, he cannot take away more than what is necessary; moreover, even in this case, he needed only the use of the thing, and therefore he could not take the thing away except on the condition that he return it as soon as he is able.

3. When a poor man is in extreme necessity, another can take away another's thing for relieving the necessity of this poor man, provided he himself cannot assist him from his own goods: for what someone can do by himself, he can also do through another.

450. 4. It is controverted whether, in the case of extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, it is licit to steal a thing of great value. Some affirm, because then all things become common;¹ others deny, because, even in a case of necessity, no one is bound to aid another with so great an inconvenience. - We think that a thing of great price (e.g., a horse for fleeing) can then indeed be taken away, but under this law, that it be returned as soon as this can morally be done: for, on the one hand, life or integrity of members is much more precious than a horse or another thing of this kind, and on the other, the use alone of this thing by hypothesis is necessary.

¹ That principle, which is found among some theologians, can only be accepted with a sufficient grain of salt; for, as we have said, in this case not all things become common, but only that which is required for preserving life or health.

451. 5. A poor man who in these cases needs some thing regularly ought to seek it from the owner, if this can be done, so that contentions may thus be avoided; yet if he takes it away, without any petition, he does not injure justice, since he has a right in the thing, but he sins venially, unless he is excused by some reason, by not preserving the legitimate mode.

452. 6. It is controverted whether a rich man who neglects to assist one in extreme need sins only against charity, or also against justice. But if by force or threats he impedes the poor man from taking that thing, he certainly injures justice, since he obstructs the right which is inherent in one in extreme need of occupying something necessary for himself; and under this head he is bound to repair the damages which followed from this.

453. Second principle: In necessity simply grave or common, it is not licit to take away another's thing.

Grave necessity is that in which the neighbor is very probably going to suffer a notable loss of goods or loss of status, unless he is helped by another's aid. But common necessity is that in which ordinary poor persons are placed, who, unless they are helped, live a troublesome life, although they are able to provide necessities for themselves.

Now if any cause excused from the occupation of another's thing in the aforesaid cases, this would be the good of society; but the common good demands, on the contrary, that it not be licit to take away another's thing for assisting necessity of this kind; for since cases of this kind are altogether frequent, and men easily persuade themselves that they are constituted in such necessity, the security of possessions would be disturbed; and idleness and the squandering of goods would be favored, if it were licit for each person by his own authority to invade another's things in so common a necessity. - Deservedly, therefore, Innocent XI reproved this proposition (36) as scandalous and pernicious: "It is permitted to steal, not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity."¹

¹ In Denzing., n. 1053.

1. When property is destroyed or injured, not appropriated, that act is called damnificatio iniusta sive dolosa. It is qualified as “non lucrosa,” because the wrong-doer gets no benefit from his act.⁸

⁸ Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 791: “Unjust damaging, or damage unjustly done, is said to be the secret or violent destruction or deterioration of another’s property against the owner’s will. Hence it is called unprofitable damaging, because no gain or advantage thereby comes to the one causing the damage.”—Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 380.

a) To this category of sins belong all real injuries done intentionally or through criminal negligence to the property of others against their reasonable will (invito domino); hence α) All injuries done to the movable or immovable goods (bona fortunae) of others, e. g., houses, tools, crops, etc., and β) All damage inflicted on public institutions or utilities, such as streets, sidewalks, railways, bridges, water works, etc.

b) The sinfulness of the acts just enumerated is determined by the extent of the damage done (damnum emergens), by the foreseeable consequences (lucrum cessans), by the malice inspiring the perpetrator, by the personal relationship existing between the parties concerned, and by the degree of carelessness shown.

The intentional damaging or destruction of religious statues or paintings on buildings or along public highways is not only a crime against justice, but a sin against religion, and if the articles are blessed or belong to the Church, it is also a sacrilege.⁹

⁹ See this Handbook, Vol. IV, pp. 231 sqq.

If the owner of a building sets it on fire or causes some one else to do so (crimen incendiarii), in order to obtain the insurance, he not only inflicts damage, but also commits the sin of fraud.

Simple damnificatio, in contradistinction to the unjust appropriation of the property of others, generally consists in an uncharitable act of destruction bringing no advantage to the destroyer. In such cases the moral evaluation of the sin offers no difficulties. There is a more complicated case, however, which arises out of the intricacies of modern business. Not infrequently a mer- chant seeks and obtains advantages for himself at the expense of his competitor, and nothing is more common than the charge of unfair competition raised by the loser against the winner in the mad race for profits. By the introduction of spinning machinery thousands of weavers lost their jobs and suffered serious damage, yet the inventor of the spinning jenny and those who bought and used his patents were entirely within their rights when they employed this product of human ingenuity for their own enrichment. Every new improvement in machinery might be called an injury to him who is compelled to use the unimproved model, but it is no unjust damnificatio in the moral sense.

Injury done to another without a bad intention, and without culpable negligence, must be regarded as accidental; it is for the positive law to determine whether and to what extent one who unintentionally inflicts an injury on another is to be held liable for the damage done.¹⁰

¹⁰ Linsenmann, Lehrb. d. Moraltheol., p. 596; Cronin, The Science of Ethics, II, p. 381.

I. What Injuries Are To Be Considered. An injury inflicted upon goods can be more damnifying or lucratively injurious; it can be committed secretly or with force applied; the thing which is the object of the injury can be sacred or profane. Hence various characters of injury are to be distinguished juridically, for example as regards reserved cases, which nevertheless, as injuries, are of the same moral species.

It is manifest that personal injuries (as in robbery), reasons of sacrilege, or scandal can accede.

Juridically, theft is the hidden taking away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling. Hidden, i. e. without force; of another's thing: taken away at least according to law; unwilling: as regards the substance; reasonably, i. e. with all circumstances weighed, the owner or the one having the right being unwilling.

He does not steal who, in extreme necessity, for himself or for another takes as much as is necessary; or, in quasi-extreme necessity, as much as the other would have to give from charity; or in grave necessity, he who, after a fruitless petition, has taken some modest thing.

Nor does he steal who, using hidden compensation, without the debtor knowing, takes away another's thing, but one owed to himself. The debt must be of commutative justice, sufficiently certain that it would be assigned to the creditor by a judge. There is need of moderate difficulty in obtaining the thing otherwise, lest the invasion of another's thing be condemnable as a light injury; and care must be taken that the compensation not be damaging to the debtor.

Charity moreover commands that the damage be avoided which another, for example a servant who would be accused of theft, would suffer.

II. Gravity. Theft by its genus is grave, as contrary to charity among men. Yet light matter brings it about that the injury is indicated as morally imperfect. Therefore that the injury be light, it is necessary that at the same time: a) it bring no grave privation to the injured owner. Matter is estimated as relatively grave which deprives someone of a seventh part of weekly income, in such a way, however, that for him who has no family to support, the quantity can be doubled. But matter modest in the aspect of theft can, as damnifying, become grave, as if it takes away a necessary instrument of work; - b) nor is the thing taken away in itself, i. e. in such a defined society, of universally notable utility; - c) nor is the injury apt to have a grave repercussion upon common security. By the two latter considerations absolutely grave matter is defined. Before the war, by a perhaps more benign opinion, this was estimated at one hundred lire or coins of similar common use (100 marks, pesetas, shillings, l., dollars, florins). Although now, in regions where paper money alone is already used, this is rather distant from the metallic money to which before the war it was equivalent, nevertheless the third consideration seems to prohibit us from estimating the grave quantity according to the value of gold money. Wherefore we would not think that the absolutely grave quantity can be increased beyond double or triple, even if the prices of most things are more than tripled, and we judge that it must be estimated at about 100 lire, not however reprehending those who think that it should be increased, for example, by half.

Consideration of absolutely grave matter comes into use when there is question of physical or moral persons whose daily income is represented by an absolutely grave quantity, or by half of that sum, where there is no burden of family.

A more benign estimation of matter is permitted: a) on account of personal or real considerations which render the injured person less unwilling; b) on account of the mode of injustice, which, creating difficulty, would lessen the danger of many abuses. Thus, on account of the former considerations, a greater quantity is required in exposed things, in things which the owner wholly neglects, and in thefts of connected persons. Wherefore they admit that for a wife and children of the family the customary matter can be increased at least double, but for a religious, if there is question of the things of the monastery, at least by half. Poor persons who, for their own uses, gather wood in forests, sin more lightly, provided they do not harm the forests; domestic servants also sin more lightly, not as regards money enclosed in a chest, but in other things in which the reason of frailty in part excuses the delict. On account of the other consideration, a greater quantity is required in small thefts which coalesce. Then, according to the cases, they permit that the matter be increased by half, or double, or that absolutely grave matter alone be considered.

III. Coalescence of Small Thefts. Moreover small thefts and modest damnifications coalesce: a) on account of the unity of the injured subject, unless, with the smallness of the thing or the interval (15, 30, 60 days) considered, the former things have almost fallen from memory when the delict is repeated. Rather slight small thefts in consumable foods almost do not coalesce; - b) on account of the moral unity of the action, even if the things pertain to several. Yet it is not established that mere damnifications done to several coalesce; - c) on account of the unity of intention of him who intends to steal a great value through several minute things; - d) on account of the unity of collection, if a great quantity is morally preserved; - e) on account of the unity of conspiracy of several.

Moreover grave sin is committed from the beginning, if the intention of stealing or damnifying gravely was then had; otherwise, when the guilty person notices that grave matter is being completed and does not conceive the proposal of restoring. He who, after grave matter has been completed, steals some light thing, either continues the same sin, or commits a new light one, according to the distinction or unity of the acts.

If a pious work is injured, relatively grave matter will have to be estimated from the detriment of the end.

IV. Restitution on Account of Real Injustice, at Least Material Injustice. 1. What possessors of another's thing must restore.

Principle. Unless they are excused by the privilege of a just law, possessors, as such, must satisfy real rights and execute the promises of agreements. If they have been formally unjust, they must repair damaging injuries. Hence:

a) A possessor in good faith can use the privileges of positive law; unless he has acquired the thing by usucapion, he must restore it in the state in which it is found, when another's right has been established. If he has usefully consumed the thing for himself, he will have to restore the utility received from the thing itself, at least so that the owner recover the value which the thing had when it was consumed. - Say the same about fruits received from the thing; yet often, from positive law, a possessor in good faith can make these his own by perception. - If you attend to opinions, he is compelled to repair no damages. If he sold the thing, since as seller he will have to provide eviction to the buyer; as possessor of the price, he is at least to be persuaded to restore to the owner deprived of his thing the price existing with him.

b) A possessor in bad faith is responsible for a fortuitous event, unless the thing would have perished by the same identical disaster, or at least at the same time, in the owner's possession; - he cannot use the privileges of positive law, except prescription which, independently of good faith, has a public cause; - he must restore the thing with all non-industrial increases; - concerning the thing consumed or alienated, he must make the owner indemnified; - indeed he must restore the value which the thing had when it was consumed; - he must repair all damages foreseen at least in a confused way; - he must provide eviction to the seller [source reads venditori; the legal context seems to require "buyer"].

Observe nevertheless that fruits of consumable things are not properly such.

Since many things often are not established, let the value of the thing be restored as it was when consumed, with compensation of use added, and, if the thing was consumable, with modest interest.

If several have successively possessed the thing: he who has it or destroyed it owes the thing first; the robber succeeds; each one first owes the fruits which he has received; each one owes damages (in solidum or separately) with which he has cooperated.

Necessary or economically useful expenses can be deducted from the quantity to be restored.

c) A possessor in doubtful faith must investigate the truth from justice with that care which agrees with the importance of the thing, the degree of doubt, and the hope of success.

Once inquiry has been made, he must satisfy the certain right of others, according to the rules of a possessor in good or bad faith, according to the case. If the certain right of no one appears, while the doubt remains, he need restore nothing; and if he himself, or his author, began to possess in good faith, he will be able to acquire the thing by usucapion according to the path of positive law. - But he who by his negligence has been the cause why the thing cannot be restored to the owner, which he can occupy only as belonging to no one, will have to destine it to common utility.

He who, doubting concerning his own right, has deprived a possessor who is not in bad faith of his possession, must be charged with certain injustice. And in doubt we are prohibited from making the condition of him who has the right worse. Nor are real fruits or connected gains acquired by a possessor in doubtful faith.

2. What damnifiers must restore. An unjust damnifier must restore as much as the damage which from his action has been unjustly inflicted.

Except damage not foreseen or, at least from presumption, condoned.

Wherefore, if merely a right to a thing or to hope has been injured, the quantity to be restored must be estimated from the value of the hope; in the absence of a better computation, let it be estimated at half the thing.

Fruits are to be restored, with expenses deducted. Yet it will be enough to restore a thing of modest value and for which another is easily substituted.

On account of presumed condonation, a modest alms extorted by fraud is not to be restored. Great liberality must be restored at least to true poor persons.

82. The rules given above for discerning the gravity of theft (or rather the grave obligation of restitution in certain thefts) must be somewhat tempered, either because among the small things taken away there were many intervals, or because the owner is not judged to be so unwilling, or because the thing was not so much another's. Whence some things remain to be said: 1. on petty thefts; 2. on domestic thefts; 3. on thefts in public things.

84. A special difficulty arises for the confessor if he must judge concerning thefts committed to the detriment not of some private man, but of a community or state. For some penitents indeed abhor theft of a private good, but they do not think it gravely illicit, for example, to cut wood in public forests and there to gather grasses and other fruits. Even the old Moralists³⁴ proposed more benign opinions concerning these thefts, because at that time forests abounded and wood was of small price, both on account of abundance and on account of the difficulty of transporting it to distant regions. But in modern times the matter has been entirely changed. Forests have been diminished, wood is precious. When there is question of thefts of those public goods, the confessor can apply the following norms:

1. Civil laws prohibiting dry branches, grass, fungi, clusters, and other wild fruits from being gathered in public forests are commonly only penal laws.³⁵ For these things, unless they are gathered, are accustomed to rot in the forests and to be of almost no utility. Whence commonly inhabitants who, in neighboring public forests, gather those things without other damage inflicted are not to be disturbed, especially if they are poor. Yet if the state or treasury is accustomed to sell even those wild things, it must be said otherwise.

2. Civil laws prohibiting the cutting of the trees themselves oblige directly in conscience and are not merely penal laws. Whence he who steals a notable quantity of trees from a public forest sins gravely and is bound to restitution. But a notable quantity is judged to be matter absolutely grave, namely a value of about 100 francs, because the state or treasury possessing those public goods is thought to be very rich. But in computing this value, the trees must be estimated as they grow in the forests, and not as they stand for sale among merchants. Whence someone is not yet bound under grave sin to restitution if, for example, he has taken away a tree which is worth 20 francs in the forest, but after cutting and transportation all the way to the merchant's emporium is worth 200 francs. Those evildoers are to be judged more severely who, on account of futile reasons, uproot younger trees and plants in public forests. Nevertheless these are rather damagers than thieves.

3. Thefts in those public things are rarely perpetrated one time in a notable quantity, but are customarily done separately. Therefore then the rules given above concerning petty thefts must be applied. If, therefore, someone does not have the intention of stealing grave matter, and between individual petty thefts there is some notable interval, the thefts do not coalesce nor do they induce a grave obligation of restitution.

³⁴ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 529.

³⁵ Thus also Noldin, De praeceptis n. 418.

85. Scholion. On The Defrauded Price Of A Public Vehicle. It can be held as almost a species of theft in public things, if someone having a ticket of third class is conveyed in second or first class on the railway without due permission. He who corrupts officials for acting thus sins and is bound to restitution; but otherwise it will not easily be a grave sin, nor an obligation of restitution. The reason is that the owner of the railway suffers almost no damage through this mode of acting, nor does he seem to be so gravely unwilling; indeed sometimes he connives in this matter. There is indeed cessant gain, but greater expenses do not arise, whether the vehicles of the higher class are empty or occupied. Nevertheless restitution would have to be made if (in an unusual case), on account of the occupied place of the higher class, new vehicles had to be added. For then a damage not so negligible would arise for the railway treasury. - But if someone is conveyed on the railway and other public vehicles without any ticket at all having been bought, he seems to be obliged to restitution. For not only is this judged to be something base according to the common estimation of men, but it is also a damaging and evident theft, because then the legitimate price of transportation is furtively taken away from the proprietors of those public carriages. Nor let anyone say that the vehicles must run whether they are empty or occupied, and consequently no damage arises from furtive occupation. For, although this is true, nevertheless the proprietors are reasonably and gravely unwilling that someone use those vehicles without any price paid; but they are not so gravely unwilling that someone having a ticket of a lower class use a higher class, since they sometimes tacitly or expressly permit this.

Two causes render legitimate the taking away of another's thing, namely 1. the extreme necessity of the one taking it away and 2. right occult compensation. For in these cases the owner is no longer reasonably unwilling.

86. Principle. In extreme necessity it is lawful to take from the goods of another only so much as is enough to free oneself from such necessity. Thus all authors.³⁶

The reason is that in extreme necessity all earthly goods again become common. For God gave the earth to be inhabited and goods to be enjoyed by all men. Therefore each man has the right that he be able to live from earthly goods and, in an extreme case, to take for himself those things which are altogether necessary. This principle, however, needs some explanation:

a) Neither in common necessity, nor in grave necessity, but in extreme necessity alone is it lawful to take away the goods of another.

The reason is that otherwise not only all private ownership but also public security would be greatly endangered, since a wide gate would be opened to innumerable thefts. Hence common poor beggars cannot licitly take another's thing for themselves, when the owner is unwilling. Innocent XI proscribed the proposition: "It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave."³⁷ Certainly the word "to steal" in the condemned proposition is not to be taken in the formal sense (because never, not even in extreme necessity, is it lawful to steal or to take away another's thing unjustly), but in the material sense, i.e., for "physically to take another's thing." Speaking in this material sense, even the Angelic Doctor asks: "Whether it is lawful for someone, on account of necessity, to steal?" And he responds: "If, however, the necessity is so evident and urgent that it is manifest that the present necessity must be relieved from things at hand, for instance when danger threatens a person and otherwise he cannot be helped, then someone can licitly relieve his necessity from the things of others, whether they are taken openly or secretly; nor does this properly have the nature of theft or robbery."³⁸

Authors do not agree what necessity is extreme or quasi-extreme; now, however, there is rather common enumeration under it not only of proximate danger of life, but also danger of losing a principal member or a sense of the body (or chastity). Thus Bannez, cited by Lugo, and St. Alphonsus.³⁹

Theologians rightly teach with St. Thomas⁴⁰ that, in extreme necessity not only one's own but also one's neighbor's, it is lawful to take away what is necessary. Thus, e.g., a mother who does not have nourishment for a child about to perish from hunger can take away another's milk.

b) It is not lawful to take more than is enough to free oneself (or another) from such necessity.

If therefore, e.g., it suffices to borrow another's thing, it is not lawful to take it into ownership. Similarly, when the necessity has passed, the thing taken away must be restored, if it still exists. But what is to be done if, after the extreme necessity has passed and after the thing has been consumed in such necessity, the man unexpectedly becomes capable of restoring the thing taken away? Certainly it is fitting that he compensate the thing taken away, but he is not strictly obliged to this. For a man living in extreme necessity truly makes his own the other person's thing taken away, and therefore is never bound to restore it. Thus also Billuart,⁴¹ Noldin,⁴² and others. For the rest, this case seems to be rather theoretical than practical. For if a man has overcome extreme necessity, almost always he had some hope of afterward compensating the thing taken away. But with such hope existing, the man is truly bound to make compensation from the goods afterward acquired.

c) Even in extreme necessity it is not lawful to take from another a thing, if from the taking away that other person also is going to fall into extreme necessity.

The reason is that, in an equal cause, "the condition of the possessor is better." Hence, e.g., if two fall into the sea, one of whom, and perhaps the weaker, has an air-belt, the other cannot take away this belt to save himself, because with the belt removed the first possessor is thrust into proximate danger of death.

³⁶ Civil codes also are accustomed expressly to concede this license, e.g., German Code 229 and 904; Swiss Code of Obligations, art. 52.

³⁷ Denz. n. 1186. On the sense of this condemned proposition, cf. Dominic Viva and Ballerini-Palmieri, De furto n. 22 sq.

³⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 7; cf. also Cajetan's Commentary on this place.

³⁹ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 520.

⁴⁰ L. c. ad 3.

⁴¹ De iure et iust. diss. 11, a. 6.

⁴² De praeceptis n. 425.

87. Scholion. On Great Goods Of Another To Be Taken Away In Extreme Necessity. We have already said above (I, n. 592) that in extreme necessity a poor person must be aided even with great inconvenience, provided, however, that it is not a question of great and extraordinary expenses to be made. But if someone does not satisfy this obligation, he does not sin against (commutative) justice, but only against charity.⁴³ By parity, it can be asked whether one placed in extreme necessity can take away by stealth from a rich man a great sum of money in order to free himself from such necessity. Theologians do not agree. Lacroix and Concina deny; Sporer and Lugo, cited by St. Alphonsus,⁴⁴ affirm; and St. Alphonsus asserts: "In the case in which a poor man is in extreme necessity of some thing of great value, he can justly accept it, because he has a right to seize it. Not therefore, however, is the rich man bound to give, since he is bound only from charity, which does not bind with so great an inconvenience." Perhaps the response is more rightly given with a distinction:

1. A poor man living in extreme necessity is not bound to take away by stealth a great sum of money even for preserving life. The reason is that no one is bound to employ extraordinary means for saving life.⁴⁵

2. A poor man living in proximate extreme necessity can take away by stealth even a great sum of money for preserving life. Thus, e.g., the guard of some banking institution (commonly, bank), to whom a robber threatens death unless the key of the safe containing a great sum of another's money is handed over, is placed in proximate extreme necessity, and therefore he can hand over the key, and even another's money, to save his life. The reason is that a) he can value his own life more highly than money committed to him; b) the civil laws also are accustomed to permit this.

3. A poor man living in more remote extreme necessity probably cannot take a great sum of another's money. Thus, e.g., a very poor father of a family suffering from pulmonary consumption, to whom a physician has said with moral certainty that he is certainly and shortly going to die unless he immediately sets out for a healthier region, nevertheless does not seem licitly to take away by stealth a sum, e.g., of 1000 francs, from some rich man so that he may be able to set out and thus save his life. The reason is that a) otherwise an occasion would be provided for many illusions and disorders, and social peace would be disturbed not a little; b) the civil laws also gravely prohibit this.

⁴³ Thus at least according to the more probable opinion (cf. St. Alphonsus, l. c. n. 520, quaer. 6; see above I, n. 589). Leo XIII indeed says (Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891), speaking of the obligation of giving alms: "Those offices are not of justice, except in extreme things, but of Christian charity." But the Supreme Pontiff seems to take the word justice not for commutative justice, from the violation of which the obligation of restitution arises, but for general or legal justice. Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 118, a. 4 ad 2. But the owner seems to sin against commutative justice who prevents a poor man laboring in proximate extreme necessity from occupying, or from having occupied, the thing necessary. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. c.

⁴⁴ L. c. quaer. 3.

⁴⁵ Cf. above, concerning the precept of charity toward oneself (I, n. 567).

I. The question to be treated. - Sins against external goods are committed by theft, robbery, fraudulence, usury, and other unjust damaging acts, which are prohibited by the seventh precept of the Decalogue and are customarily explained sufficiently in moral theology. In practice, a special difficulty usually arises in the case of restitution; therefore we judge it opportune that this be inspected, especially as regards compensation in material goods.¹ We do not indeed deny that even from injuries committed against other goods, and from other precepts toward the neighbor besides the seventh, there can arise an obligation of restitution; nevertheless in practice, even then the principal obligation is usually reduced to material compensation in real goods, or at least frequently has that joined to it.

¹ Moralists may be consulted where they treat of restitution, especially St. Alphonsus in Th. M., l. III, tr. 5, c. 2; Marc, Aertnijs, Tanquerey, Genicot, Noldin, Prummer, Vermeersch in their manuals; Waffelaert in his work De Iustitia; Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 232-235; Berardi, Praxis-conf.; Aertnijs, Th. P., n. 84-87.

II. Principles and rules to be regarded in the case of restitution. - The confessor ought especially to have these before his eyes:

1. First of all let him attend to this principle: to dispense in these matters and to concede delay does not belong to the confessor himself, but only to the owner. Hence excuse from restitution or delay is to be defined by sole and true necessity, unless the circumstances were such that the confessor could prudently presume the consent of the creditor to delay, or reasonably interpret the intention of the owner.

2. Let him diligently ask what is the nature, the adjuncts, and the conditions of the case, so that he can define whether, how, and how much must be restored, how long the injustice lasted, whether it has already been declared in confession, why it has not yet been restored, etc.

3. When a more difficult case occurs, let him not resolve it immediately, but ask for delay to examine the matter more deeply or even to consult others, and let him enjoin the penitent afterward to return to him. But if the penitent cannot conveniently do this, let him be ordered to consult another learned and God-fearing man; and if he promises that he will do this and shows himself prepared to execute the decision and to perform those things which would be imposed on him, he will be able to be absolved.

4. If, inquiry having been made, the obligation of restitution remains doubtful or uncertain, it cannot strictly be imposed on the penitent; although sometimes a certain partial compensation to be made from equity can opportunely be advised for the various adjuncts.

5. If the obligation of restoring is certain and no cause excusing from it appears, but the penitent, although able, raises difficulties, let the confessor warn him that the sin is not forgiven unless restitution is made, because it is no less evil to retain another's goods against the will of the owner than to take them away, since it is a continued taking away; and consequently that the penitent must choose between these two: whether he prefers to undergo the eternal punishment of hell, or rather to lack the thing belonging to another.

6. When the debtor asserts that he cannot restore either altogether or at least immediately, let the confessor diligently examine the alleged impossibility, and let the one asserting not be believed unless he efficaciously proves it; nor let him be absolved unless he seriously promises that he will restore as soon as he will be able and will make an effort toward this. Namely only grave and ineluctable difficulty is a sufficient cause. Hence the debtor a) is bound to diminish superfluous expenses, to labor insofar as the decency of his state permits, to employ parsimony in food, clothing, and necessary expenses; b) if he objects that he will suffer gravely in reputation, let there be suggested a manner by which reputation may be cared for; c) if there is no sufficient cause of temporary delay, this cannot be conceded; but if there is a sufficient cause of delay alone, definitive remission cannot be conceded; d) if the whole cannot be restored at once, let it be returned by parts as soon as possible.

7. Therefore let the confessor beware lest he be credulous as to difficulties which penitents of this kind are wont to oppose: for some pretend impotence to restore, but often it is weakness of will rather than incapacity or weakness of powers; others with every effort solicit delay; but let the confessor know that it is not in his power to concede delay, because it is not only illicit to snatch away another's goods but equally illicit to retain them.

8. Namely, as moralists teach, the following are unworthy of absolution: a) those unwilling to restore when they can do this; b) those not able to restore, but neglecting to obtain for themselves the faculty of restoring; c) those delaying restitution much without an excusing reason, or committing to the heir a restitution which they themselves can do by themselves; d) those able to restore in full and restoring only a part.

9. But if the penitent certainly is in good faith, either because he believes that he owes nothing, or because he thinks that he is bound only to a part, not to the whole or in solidum, or because he judges it enough that he restore by several payments, although he could do so by one, if there is no probable hope of fruit to follow from warning, which nevertheless is not easily to be presumed, let the confessor leave him in ignorance; but if the penitent doubts or asks, the confessor cannot be silent.

10. In certain cases he will reasonably be able practically to presume total and absolute condonation, namely as regards children of a family and spouses who have snatched away things not of great value and have now consumed them; likewise for thefts of servants as regards edible and drinkable things, at least ordinary ones, not sold to others but consumed; indeed as regards other things if the master has rebuked or expelled the servant convicted of theft and has said nothing about restitution; likewise concerning small thefts of the poor committed against diverse persons, or against one person but not very frequently.

11. Ordinarily let him not absolve one who holds another's thing with himself unless he first has restored it, namely on account of the danger in which otherwise he lives of delaying restitution, or of consuming the thing and converting it to his own use. But if someone already seems so constituted and firmly disposed that he is deservedly believed soon to satisfy, he will be able to be absolved, but by fixing for him the space of time within which he is to restore and the manner in which he is to accomplish this; for indeterminate promises easily perish.

But one who, previously warned, did not restore, regularly is altogether to be dismissed for a time, absolution being delayed until he has restored, because although he may say that he proposes restitution, nevertheless there will easily be doubt concerning this disposition, and too much danger of relapsing and of changing the purpose.

III. There are various practical modes or means by which restitution can be made more opportunely, namely:

1. Through the public or postal course, so that, whether by means of an inscribed letter or by means of an order or check (mandat, cheque), he sends the sum under a fictitious name. But if the sum is owed to some society, it is better, for sufficient security, to write at the same time to the treasurer and to the president or syndicate.

2. By testament, if the dying person without any infamy can leave a legacy to such and such a person. And if it cannot be done without infamy, it must be seen whether an heir or fiduciary legatee can be constituted.

3. By a fictitious donation, provided that gifts are not compensated by gifts, and that they bring true profit or utility to the creditor, so that he is truly rendered unharmed: for it would not suffice, for example, that he be invited to drink or eat superfluously, or that sweets be given to him.

4. By undue labors useful to the creditor, for example by setting vines for a farmer, making a trip with a wagon for a master, whitening either linens or other things for him, laboring beyond what is owed with the master's profit and without pay. This manner is often practical for servants or workers. Nevertheless let mere favors without true utility not be confused with labor.

5. By alms, whether given to the poor or to priests who will celebrate Masses; nevertheless this is valid only for cases in which either it is impossible to restore into the hands of the creditor, or he must be presumed content with this manner of restoring. Nevertheless let the confessor beware lest he ask alms of this kind for himself or for his own convent. But if the sum is not very great and the debtor is of slender fortune, for restitution he will be able to give alms even of the kind he is otherwise accustomed to give; thus likewise he can remit to some poor debtor of his as much as he is bound to give to the poor: namely it is easier to yield that which one does not yet have than to deprive oneself of that which he now holds.

6. Through a trustworthy third person. It is not opportune that the confessor spontaneously offer himself for exercising this office of mediator; indeed, when asked by the penitent, let him not easily undertake the burden, and let him attend lest the seal be violated. To avoid this, sometimes he will be able to make restitution through another priest, or transmit it from another place. Indeterminate restitutions, for example those to be performed for the poor, he should ordinarily leave to be made by the penitent; restitutions to be made to a determined person he will easily be able to undertake in a case of necessity lest the reputation of the penitent be injured, but let him require the testimony of the creditor concerning the thing or sum restored, which he may transmit to the penitent.

Thus let the confessor himself not incur suspicion.

Especially A. If the injured person is not certainly known, inquiry is to be made diligently concerning him. But doubt remaining after diligent inquiry:

1. if the doubt is among a few, the thing or its price is to be divided among them, nor can it be given to the poor; thus, for example, money lost or taken from one of three or four persons;

2. if the doubt is among several of the same place, restitution is to be made to them, if morally it can be done: thus merchants defrauding in weight, measure, or quality of goods ought to restore by increasing weight and measure, if the same buyers are accustomed to return; otherwise, if it cannot be done in another way, let restitution be made to the poor or to pious works of the same place in which the injustice was committed; thus in war, if unjust requisitions have been made and it is unknown who suffered damage;

3. if the doubt is among many scattered persons or among altogether unknown persons, so that there is no probability that restitution can be made to the true owners, restitution is to be made to the poor or to any pious causes.

B. If the injured person has died, restitution is to be made to heirs or to those having care, nor can the goods be expended for the poor or in Masses for the deceased² (who otherwise is no longer the owner of the goods), unless the heirs consent or there are absolutely none.

² Thus the Sacred Penitentiary, 7 Feb. 1899.

C. If a community or society has been injured, restitution is to be made to this society itself, unless it is essentially evil and pursues only an altogether evil end, so that it cannot have the right of possessing. Excepting this case, therefore, restitution cannot be made to the individual members but to the administrators of the society. Nevertheless it is better to warn several of the administrators or members, lest restitution be defrauded by an unfaithful administrator. This also holds concerning an insurance society, although on account of a contract of reinsurance entered among several societies, it is impossible to know which society in fact suffered damage. In this last case certain theologians have said that restitution is to be made to the poor or to pious causes. But as Vermeersch notes,³ this is not the practice of the Sacred Penitentiary; hence Genicot says:⁴ "Practically it seems to suffice that restitution be made to the administrators when the injured person cannot be better detected, and if this is regularly done, a certain compensation among the various societies exists." Therefore restitution is by no means to be made to the poor, unless it cannot be done otherwise; nevertheless one who in good faith in this case has already restored to the poor would not seem to be disturbed.

³ Th. M., II, n. 494.

⁴ Th. M., I, n. 658, VII.

D. If restitution must be made to the State or municipality, restitution can be made through official administrators or those set over taxes, provided that sufficient care is taken lest they keep it for themselves, for example by warning several. It can also be done by destroying titles of public debt issued by the State or municipality, or postal stamps, provided that they belong to the government; but not by destroying banknotes, because they are only protected by the State. Nor can it be made to those who have been unjustly injured in goods by the civil power, as sometimes religious or Catholic schools are, unless the injustice committed against determinate persons is altogether indubitable and has not been repaired or condoned; nor can restitution be made to the poor under the pretext that civil society ought to assist them, because it satisfies that obligation in another way, nor does it belong to private persons to dispose of public goods by private authority; unless nevertheless no other way lies open by which restitution could securely come to the public treasury.

IV. Corollary. - Therefore confessors err:

1. who never or almost never ask concerning the sin of injustice;

2. who generally say nothing concerning restitution but pass over it in silence;

3. who from those unable to restore do not require a firm and efficacious purpose of restoring, nor impose on them the obligation of seriously striving and employing apt means so that they may restore as soon as possible;

4. who, after hearing the declaration of a sin or of adjuncts which can induce the obligation of restoring, from negligence do not examine whether it must be made;

5. who do not warn concerning restitution to be made, even when the obligation is certain and there is no serious reason for doubting the capacity or probity of the penitent;

6. who too easily and without grave reason either suppose good faith in the penitent, or fear that the warning will not be useful;

7. who too easily either presume condonation, or admit an excusing reason of delay or impossibility, or even exempt from the obligation of restitution;

8. who think that in light matter no obligation of restitution is given, when on the contrary it is owed under venial sin, and must in some measure be urged, if otherwise there would be danger that the penitent would fall into grave injustice or would multiply light matters greatly;

9. who do not care about light matters added to one another and coalescing into one grave matter, although nevertheless they can induce grave fault and a grave obligation of restoring, not only by reason of intention, but also by reason of grave damage inflicted on one person, and by reason of notable detention or accumulation even from things belonging to several;

10. who, when the injured person is unknown, do not care to inquire concerning him or to institute inquiry, and at once pronounce that restitution is to be made to the poor;

302. A possessor of bad faith is one who culpably detains a thing which he knows belongs to another. Hence by a twofold title he is bound to restitution, insofar as he is the unjust possessor of another's thing, by reason of the thing received, and insofar as he has inflicted damage, by reason of unjust taking. Therefore he must not only restore the thing itself with its fruits, but also compensate all damages following from his unjust action.

303. The general principle is: A possessor of bad faith is bound to restore insofar as he has damaged; whence the measure of restitution is the quantity of damage inflicted. In particular:

A. As to the thing itself: 1) As the unjust possessor of another's thing, he must restore to the owner the thing itself, if he has it, or an equivalent thing, and hence everything in which he has been made richer from it, and as soon as morally possible, unless the owner would be unreasonably unwilling to the delay; because no one ought unjustly to be enriched from another's thing.¹

¹ Nor is recourse given against the seller for recovering the price, because the buyer knew the thing belonged to another (a. 1629).

But if another's thing has successively been possessed by several with bad faith, first of all restitution must be made by him who detains, consumed, or lost the thing; failing him, the robber is bound; and when these fail, the rest are bound according to the rules of restitution in solidum, concerning which in the following article.

2. As an unjust damager, he is bound to repair all detriments which he foresaw at least in confusion would follow from the unjust retention, even if he has been made richer in nothing; because he is the cause of all these.

Hence a) if the thing has been consumed or has perished, even without his fault but by fortuitous chance, he must restore its price, at least if the thing would not certainly have perished with the owner at the same time;

b) if the thing was made worse, while with the owner it would have remained whole, he is bound to compensate the damage;

c) if the owner has undergone some emergent damage, because, for example, he had to buy another thing at a higher price, this also must be repaired.

B. As to fruits, he is bound to restore 1) all fruits (natural, industrial, civil), expenses being deducted, perceived from another's thing, even if the owner would not have perceived them, even if they have been consumed, although from them the possessor did not become richer. For the thing bears fruit for its owner;

2. all fruits which the owner would legitimately have perceived, although the possessor did not perceive them, because he was the unjust cause of this damage; nevertheless this is not to be repaired entirely, but according to the proportion of the probability of the ceasing gain, or of the hope of obtaining it, according to the condition of persons and business affairs (q. 62, a. 4);

3. all fruits perceived by others, if they have not restored them, because he is the cause of this damage by cooperation.

But fruits of the person or of industry alone, which were perceived only on the occasion of the thing, are not to be restored, as being fruits not of the thing but of one's own labor. Thus these need not be restored: hens from the eggs of another, trees taken by theft and planted in one's own field, profit from trading or gambling with deposited money, although one acting thus sinned; but generally it suffices to pay the price of the eggs, of the small trees, of the legal increase, unless, however, further damage was caused.

C. As to expenses, he can deduct 1) necessary and useful expenses (a. 1381); but not pleasurable expenses (a. 1635). But ornaments which can be removed with the substance of the thing preserved and without detriment to it, he can retain for himself.

Thus unless civil law determines otherwise, such as the law in England and in the United States of America, according to which the owner need not refund expenses made by a possessor of bad faith.

304. What if the thing would have perished at the same time with the owner? — Resp.:

1. If the thing certainly would have perished at morally the same time and by the same cause as it perished with the thief, for example, by the same fire, earthquake, shipwreck, incursion of enemies, or from an intrinsic defect of the thing, as a horse from old age, the thief is not bound to restitution of the thing, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage, nor was the condition of the owner made worse, although nevertheless other damages following from unjust detention are to be repaired.

2. If the thing certainly would have perished at the same time but not by the same natural cause, for example, if two ships perish at the same time, or if the thing perishes by fire with the thief while it would have perished by water at the same hour with the owner, probably it need not be restored, because the owner suffers no damage from this as to the thing; just as neither is he bound to restore who consumed the thing in the same place and around the same time at which, from a natural cause, it would certainly have perished, as from fire, because neither is he the cause of the damage.

3. If, however, the thing would have perished at the same time with the owner from the injustice of another, the thief is bound to restore its price, because the owner suffers damage from the theft: for if the thing had not been taken away, another would have contracted the burden of restoring, and from this other the owner could have recovered it.

4. If the thing would not have perished at morally the same time, the thief is bound to restitution, even if he rescued the thing from danger: for then the thing was unjustly detained for some time by the thief. Thus if someone saves a thing which otherwise was going to perish by fire or waters, he is bound to restore it; he could have not saved it, but, if he saves it, he saves it not for himself but for the owner.

By French civil law (a. 1302, in force among many nations; Italian, a. 1298; Spanish, a. 457), a possessor of bad faith is bound to restitution of the price of the thing in whatever way the thing has perished in his hands. Nevertheless this disposition, insofar as it adds to natural law, can be regarded as a penal clause, whence it does not obligate before, but only after, the sentence of a judge.

305. What must be restored, if the thing during the time of unjust detention had a varied value?

R. Per se the highest value is to be restored, which certainly must be done if the owner is unjustly deprived of this increase, namely: 1. if he himself, since he is vigilant, would have sold the thing at the highest price; 2. if he had to buy another equivalent thing at the highest price; 3. if the unjust possessor became richer from it, for example, because the thing grew in itself, as if a calf matured, for the thing grows for its owner; or 4. on the contrary, if the thing was made worse and would not have been so with the owner.

In practice, however, it will often be difficult to determine whether it is so. In doubt, restitution is to be urged only according to the price of the thing at the time of theft, or according to the greater price for which the owner had to procure another for himself.

306. A possessor of doubtful faith is one who, from a grave and truly probable reason, doubts whether the thing which he detains is his own or another's; whence a negative or very slight doubt does not render a possessor of doubtful faith. Doubtful faith can be antecedent, if it preceded the very receiving of the thing and the possessor received the thing in doubtful faith; or supervening or subsequent, if the possessor began to possess the thing in good faith, but after the receiving of the thing a doubt arose.

A possessor of doubtful faith must diligently investigate the thing; and according as he acts justly or unjustly, he is reduced to a possessor of good or bad faith.

307. In the case of antecedent doubtful faith:

1. if someone occupies a thing occupied here and now by no one, he is bound to inquire concerning the owner and to act in the same way as was said concerning lost things; but if he neglects to inquire, he becomes a possessor of bad faith, and nothing can be retained, but the whole must be handed over to pious causes;

2. if by a doubtful title he takes away a thing and despoils a possessor who is not of bad faith, for example, probably judging that he has a right to part of an inheritance, he is assimilated to a possessor of bad faith and must restore the whole thing to the possessor; because in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. In the case, he ought to have recurred to the judge;

3. if by a legitimate title (for example, donation or purchase) he acquired a thing from a suspect possessor, doubting whether the latter is truly the owner, he is bound to restore at least according to the proportional part of the doubt (that is, according to the weight of reasons) to the probable owner, and failing him to a pious cause: he cannot retain the whole because he began possession without good faith and exposed himself to the danger of possessing another's thing; nor is he probably bound to render the whole, because it is not certain that the thing belongs to another.

Exception: a) if he acquired the thing from a possessor of good faith and after due inquiry an insoluble doubt remains: for then, although perhaps he sinned because of doubtful faith in acquiring, nevertheless he can consider himself as one possessor with his predecessor, so that the possession can be said to have begun in good faith, and the doubt is considered as supervening;

b) if he bought or received the thing with the intention of inquiring concerning the owner and rendering the thing to him as soon as he can be found: for then he begins to possess with good faith, and he can detain the thing until the owner appears. But if he culpably neglected to inquire concerning the owner, and because of the neglected inquiry it is now impossible to solve the doubt, he is now equated with a possessor of bad faith, and according to the proportion of the doubt, that is, according to the weight of reasons, he must restore to the probable owner or to a pious cause, in the same way as was said above.

308. In the case of subsequent doubtful faith: when a doubt has arisen, he is bound from justice diligently to investigate the truth, with that diligence which is proportioned to the value of the thing and the gravity of the doubt; otherwise he becomes as a possessor of bad faith. But he must:

1. before the inquiry is finished, not alienate nor consume the thing, but preserve it;

2. after diligent inquiry has been made, a) if it is certainly or almost morally certainly established that the thing belongs to another, he must restore it in the same way as a possessor of good faith; b) if the doubt perseveres, he can retain the thing and dispose of it, because in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Therefore he again becomes a possessor of good faith; whence he can use the thing and consume it, as was said concerning a lost thing, indeed sell it, provided that he warn the buyer concerning the doubt, lest the latter be deceived;

3. if he has omitted the inquiry from grave negligence, he becomes a possessor of bad faith and is bound thereafter because of damage perhaps arising, and therefore:

a) if the owner is afterward found, he must repair the whole to him;

b) if because of the neglected investigation it is now impossible to solve the doubt, he is bound to restore according to the proportion of the doubt, when the doubt concerned a right which some determinate man perhaps had in that thing: for then that man is thus deprived of some probable hope of obtaining that thing; but this hope, according to greater or lesser doubt, can be estimated at a price by prudent judgment.

Generally St. Alphonsus thinks that then the quantity to be restored is much less than half the value of the thing, since possession had been begun in good faith. Therefore this restitution must be made to that man (or to his heirs), if he is known; but if he cannot be known, it must be made to the poor or to a pious work.

It is said: if the doubt concerned the right of some determinate man; for if the doubt was not concerning someone determinate, but indeterminately, sin indeed has been committed because of the neglected investigation, and more commonly they judge that even then restitution must be made to the poor; which therefore is to be counseled, for the possessor is in some way in bad faith. Nevertheless the matter is not altogether certain, since some judge that then damage effectively inflicted is not established, since possession was begun in good faith and there is no one who can contend against the possessor concerning the thing possessed.

903. Definition. Theft is: the carrying away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

It is said 1. Carrying away of another's thing, namely with the mind of having it as one's own. Hence he does not commit theft who takes away a thing by jest, or on account of the good or advantage of the owner; for example wine lest he become drunk, a heretical book lest he read it. - 2. Owner, under which name comes he to whom any strict right whatever belongs, for example the right of usufruct, of deposit. - 3. Reasonably unwilling, for if the owner is presumed to consent, or if he cannot, by force of right, dissent (for example when a thing is taken away by title of necessity or compensation), the carrying away of another's thing is not theft.

904. Principles. I. Theft is from its genus a mortal sin. This is certain from 1 Cor., 6, 10: Neither thieves ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God. The reason is that by theft commutative justice is injured, which of itself obliges under grave matter. Add that, if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish, as the Angelic Doctor observes (l.c., a. 6). - Theft nevertheless admits smallness of matter.

905. II. Grave matter of theft must be determined from the gravity of the damage that through it is inflicted upon one's neighbor. Thus commonly, from the Rule of the Angelic Doctor (2. 2, q. 73, a. 3): "Sins that are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed of themselves according to the harms that are inflicted upon one's neighbor; because from this they have the character of fault" (cf. n. 337, II).

Hence: a) The matter must be measured relatively, namely so that attention is given to the various conditions of men, places, and times, and to the varied value of money; for the end of the right of property for a private person (namely that he enjoy life in peace) can be more or less impeded and injured. - b) Some absolutely grave matter must also be determined, that is, matter that never, without grave fault, can be stolen even from the very richest; this is required by the end of the right of property as regards society: otherwise the greed of thieves would grow excessively, and society itself would certainly suffer grave damage. For the crowd scarcely attends to venial sins.

906. On this account the following Rules are established:

Rule 1. Matter is judged relatively grave when it would suffice for the injured person according to his condition for daily sustenance of himself and his family.

Therefore, with consideration given to the present value of money (which is at least twice lower than in the time of St. Alphonsus), and with attention given to the common estimate of more recent theologians (whose opinions here become intrinsically more probable), we judge that the following grades can be established, as a general norm in the principal places of Europe:

a) With respect to beggars, grave matter would be the value of one franc, or 20 asses; and less, if some poor person gains less by his daily begging. - b) With respect to ditch-diggers and similar workers, about 2-5 francs. - c) But with respect to craftsmen and merchants of slender fortune, 4-8 francs. - d) With respect to the moderately rich, or those who live from their own revenues, 8-10 francs. - e) But with respect to the absolutely rich, for example with respect to merchants sufficiently wealthy, 10-20 francs. - f) With respect to magnates, 30 francs and above.

In doubt, for example if you do not know to whom the damage was done, theft of 8-10 francs is reputed grave; because the damage is presumed to have been inflicted on one moderately rich. - Thus today commonly. Cf. Gousset, Theol. mor., I, 980; Crolly, III, n. 272; Konings, n. 695; Aertnys, l. III, n. 285.

Rule 2. Absolutely grave matter is that which, of itself and independently from the damage that the owner suffers, is commonly reputed to have notable utility or value.

Hence St. Alphonsus (III, 528) assigned as grave, with respect to kings, a sum exceeding 2 aurei, or about 10 francs. But today, with circumstances changed, 30-40 francs seem to be assigned, or even more, in places where the value of money is lower. Thus for England 1 1/2-2 golden pounds, in North America 7-10 dollars, can be named absolutely grave matter.

Note. 1. The relatively grave matter indicated above regards of itself theft that is committed by one action against one and the same person. As regards little thefts that inflict damage either upon one person by diverse actions, or upon diverse persons at one time, see n. 908.

2. In sacrilegious theft, if the thing, as regards physical species, is estimable by price, conclude in the same mode as for a profane thing; if otherwise (for example in sacred relics), consider its dignity, rarity, or attend to the special prohibition of the Church (cf. n. 583, 1342).

3. Theft with respect to a community (for example a commercial society), that it may be grave, ordinarily must reach the matter indicated for the absolutely rich. Others require absolutely grave matter. Except if the community is poor or small. - Say the same if a religious community is injured. Cf. St. Alphonsus, III, n. 528; IV, n. 25, with the notes added beneath.

908. Theft light of itself can in many ways become grave (cf. n. 905), but especially: 1. through intention of arriving at grave matter; - 2. through grave damage coming from a light theft; - 3. through conspiracy; - 4. through multiplication.

I. Through intention of arriving at grave matter the thief sins gravely, for example a merchant using false weights, as often as by stealing some very small thing he renews, at least implicitly, his purpose.⁰² The reason is that an external act takes its malice from the internal act, which is gravely sinful. - Say the same concerning him who steals a small quantity with the mind of taking away a notable quantity if he could. But he is held to restitution only under light matter, because the matter is not grave.

II. Through grave damage, which the thief foresaw would come from his light theft, he likewise sins gravely. Thus, for example, to take away a needle from a tailor can be grave matter, if he could not have another by which he would be able to procure a living for himself (H. Ap., X, 22).

He who takes away from an owner a small thing very dear to him, for example a rare and singular flower, first fruits from a tree destined for honoring some distinguished man, and at the same time foresees that the owner will be gravely afflicted from such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage is foreseen as to follow from it.

III. Through conspiracy, little thefts are committed when several persons, by common counsel and consent, at the same time or successively, steal some small thing from one or several. - Now, little thefts of this kind are grave sins if, taken together, they constitute matter either relatively or absolutely grave: for then the individual thieves truly and efficaciously cooperate in the whole damage.

We said: by common counsel, because if individuals act independently of one another, whether they were ignorant of, or knew, the damage inflicted by others, then none of them is the cause of the whole grave damage (III, 535 seqq.).

If several, moved by mutual example, commit light thefts, the individuals sin against charity by reason of scandal (and indeed they sin gravely if the total damage is grave, and they could easily have impeded it); but more probably they are not held to restitution solidarily as regards the whole; because example is not a cause directly influencing another's damage, but only an occasion (cf. n. 949, 2nd Cond., and 989). Nevertheless each one, as is clear, is held as regards his own part (III, 537; II, 45).

IV. Through multiplication, light thefts can coalesce into grave matter and induce a grave obligation of restoring.

Light thefts can coalesce physically or morally. Physically, if the things are preserved, so that the heap becomes grave matter. Morally, if the things are indeed consumed, but the thefts are repeated within a brief interval of time. For small little thefts ordinarily an interval of 15-30 days, for greater little thefts an interpolation of two months, prevents the little thefts from coalescing morally (III, 530).

The assertion is proved. 1. It is certain from the thirty-eighth proposition condemned by Innocent XI. - 2. As regards little thefts physically coalescing (whether they injure one or several), there can be a physical union, one heap, from which the thief is enriched unjustly and beyond measure. - As regards little thefts morally coalescing, there is something one in the genus of morals, from which notable damage can arise for a private person, or, if diverse persons have been injured, notable damage for the community and right order. Lugo, l.c., n. 37.

Note. The matter required in small thefts, that it become grave, is not always the same: 1. If they happen to the same person at diverse times, or to diverse persons (if they are few) at the same time, the matter is grave if it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - 2. If they happen to a few diverse persons by diverse occasions, the matter is judged of itself grave if it is twice greater than the sum commonly required for grave theft. - 3. Finally, if they happen to diverse persons in a great number, absolutely grave matter is required, or twice greater than absolutely grave, according as the thefts were committed once or by diverse occasions (III, 530). Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 1115.

909. It is asked: Whether he sins gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, steals still some other light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. The more probable opinion, however, denies, unless, an interruption having been made, for example by the will of restoring, the thief reaches, or intends to reach, another new grave quantity. The reason is that the little theft with respect to taking is certainly light; but with respect to detention it seems to constitute one sin with the preceding: for sin is not multiplied when the purpose of not restoring is renewed or confirmed, but only when it is morally interrupted, as we said in the treatise on Sins (n. 328, Rule 3). Cf. III, 538.

910. From these things you will resolve: 1. Tailors, and their servants, sin gravely against justice, where they reach grave matter, by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth still useful to the owners, which remain over. - Except if somewhere

a custom flourishes that less is paid, and the fragments remain to the tailors; or if it is certain that wealthy owners do not wish fragments to be restored to themselves, or care little about them.

2. Those who dig coal are prohibited from carrying it away for their own use unless a certain price has been paid. - Nevertheless, those who sometimes carry away coals necessary for their family, although they are to be reproved, do not seem to be compelled to restitution; for in mines there is so great an abundance of coals that owners are scarcely to be judged altogether unwilling, and ordinarily they do not employ solicitude to detect thieves of this kind. - It must be said otherwise concerning those who frequently do this, or take away a great quantity of coals deposited on the banks of rivers or elsewhere (Konings, 703, 8).

3. Those who cut wood in the forests of their own community (or neighboring community) do not sin, nor are they held to restitution, unless they make great destruction with damage to the community; because a law strictly prohibiting every cutting of wood is judged to be penal: hence only the penalty is to be paid, and indeed after the sentence of a judge. - But otherwise in the forests of private persons, unless the matter concerns some rather small tree, or dried woods, for which the owner's consent can be presumed (III, 529, q. 1). - As regards the poor, it is certain that they can gather dried woods not only for burning, but also for selling, if they are in grave necessity. Cf. Gopfert, II, n. 148, where there are many things.

4. Those who eat fruits in the vineyards or orchards of others can easily be excused, provided they carry nothing outside, and the fruits are not rare and of great price. That this is probably licit is gathered from Deut., 23, 24 (likewise Luke, 6, 1), and from the law of charity which among Christians mitigates the rigor of right. - This at least is certain, "that in thefts of exposed things, as are fruits beside roads and woods in forests, that the theft be grave, greater matter is required" (H. Ap., X, 23). Yet we would add this: that the value of fruits, even exposed ones, in the common estimation, has much increased today.

911. Note. The confessor, in small thefts, indeed ought not to urge restitution, yet neither should he easily dissimulate, but according to the condition and capacity of persons should always enjoin some restitution, to be made to the creditors themselves or to the poor. For otherwise, when they are dismissed with impunity, penitents become more prone to little thefts of this kind, and they make a step toward greater ones (Lessius, l. 2, c. 12, n. 50; Ami du Cl., 1903, p. 97).

693. Definition. - Theft, taken generically, is the taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

Division. - Theft is thus distinguished:

1° Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2° Robbery, if it is done while the owner is positively resisting (morally or physically). - 3° Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

694. Principles. - I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed both to charity and to justice, and in Sacred Scripture it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus the Apostle Paul says:¹ Neither thieves, ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of malice diverse from theft: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted upon the person. But the other modes, or the other objects of theft, do not change the species, because through them the nature of the damaging is not changed.

695. Questions. - A. Concerning theft grave of itself. - Query 1° What matter is judged grave in thefts of outsiders?

Resp. 1° According to the common opinion, this matter is not to be looked at absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that a graver matter is required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of the will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one fails to see that the same matter causes sadness now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. - Thus commonly with S. Alph.² against some, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be looked at absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily support of an honorable man or of one moderately rich.

Yet some absolute matter must be determined, which it is never licit to pass beyond without grave fault; otherwise, if complete proportion had to be preserved among all conditions, surely the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter when someone steals from a very rich man. But this would certainly yield to the harm of society. - Hence:

Resp. 2° According to S. Alph.,¹ and with attention to the circumstances of this region and of our times, it will be grave approximately - relatively 1) to beggars, $0.50, and less if some poor man would not collect so much daily; 2) to diggers and similar laborers, $1.00; to artisans and merchants of slender fortune, $1.25; 3) to those moderately rich or living from their own incomes, $2.00, but less if from their own they live wretchedly; but relatively to the absolutely rich, for example merchants sufficiently wealthy, $2.50 or $3.00; 4) to a wealthy community, $5.00, or even, if it is very wealthy, $7.50; 5) to the very rich, $10.00, which sum indeed can be judged absolutely grave.

In practical doubt, generally that which does not reach $2.50 or $3.00 is not to be reputed grave.

Resp. 3° The value of a sacred thing, as to the physical species estimable by price, for example of a chalice, is the same as that of a profane thing; otherwise, as in Relics, its dignity and rarity must be considered,² or the special prohibition of the Church (n. 1730).

696. • Query 2° What matter is required, so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Resp. 1° It is certain that in thefts of a wife and of children more is required than in thefts of outsiders; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance;³ but no general rule can be assigned. For the matter must generally be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. Thus S. Alph.⁴ with others resolves that a son does not sin gravely who steals two or three scuta from a rich father (today and among us, I think, he would say $10 or 15).

Resp. 2° For servants it depends also upon the greater or lesser liberality of the masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example if it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to the common opinion, through small thefts committed by servants in foods and edible things which are not usually kept carefully, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or taken in extraordinary quantity, or are of extraordinary price.¹ But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others.

Query 3° Must the circumstance be explained by a son, that he stole from his father?

Resp. Negatively, because theft regularly is not directly and gravely opposed to piety, as for example hatred is. I say: regularly; for it is otherwise if the father would suffer much from it concerning his state. Scav.²

697. Questions. - B. Concerning theft grave by accident. - Query 4° In how many ways does theft of matter light of itself become grave by accident?

Resp. 1° By the intention of arriving at grave matter (n. 703. 2°); 2° by conspiracy, where many conspire among themselves and the little thefts of individuals gathered together constitute grave matter (n. 701. 702); 3° on account of grave damage coming to the owner from a light theft (n. 703. 3°); 4° by multiplication, concerning which in the questions n. 697-700.

Query 5° Do multiplied small thefts suffice to constitute grave matter?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively - whether it is a question of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage upon the owner; or it is a question of thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons, because, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly they bring grave damage to the community. Cf. prop. 38 condemned by Pius V.

Resp. 2° By multiplication they coalesce into grave matter either physically or morally. Physically, if they are conserved and the heap becomes grave; for then another's property is retained in a notable quantity. Morally, if indeed they are consumed, but between them there intervenes an interval which is morally or proportionately estimated as brief. - S. Alph.,³ Lugo.⁴

698. • Query 6° Do small thefts also coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common opinion. The reason is that, when a great interval has been posited, small thefts are not judged to be morally united by the common estimation of men, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Moreover, then grave damage inflicted upon the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and thus he is not judged gravely unwilling.²

Query 7° When is the interval judged great?

Resp. To S. Alphonsus³ the opinion teaching that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months is more pleasing, even if they were approaching matter as it were grave. But if it is a question of little thefts whose matter each time is very small, he considers a month or even a fortnight as a great interval. - Except, as I said above n. 697. q. 4° and 5°, if an accumulation is made or there is the intention of arriving at a grave sum.⁴

699. • Query 8° When does matter become grave in small thefts?

Resp. 1° If small thefts are made from the same person at diverse times, or by diverse persons at the same time, the matter will be grave when this exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° If small thefts are made from diverse persons, and discontinuously, grave matter of itself will be judged present when it is double the sum commonly required for grave theft.⁴

Query 9° Does retraction of the will prevent following little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if in fact the things previously taken have been restored, because once separated they now no longer exist here and now. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were done from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring. Or even if the thief expressly and seriously proposes again at the same time to restore the things previously stolen; which, nevertheless, can scarcely be admitted in practice, since one who seriously proposes restitution does not here and now repeat thefts. - Negatively, however, where this will seems in some way to be revoked by a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts coalescing into one.

700. • Query 10° Does he sin gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. An opinion, very probable, denies it, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being set aside. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus S. Alph.¹

701. • Query 11° Does he sin gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of grave damage inflicted upon the owner. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that nearly grave damage had been perpetrated by others, nevertheless with the case of conspiracy set aside. The reason is that this man taking a little thing neither is per se the cause of grave harm, nor is he the cause that the others accepted other things. Therefore the grave damage which the owner suffers ought in no way to be imputed to him. - Nor say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer inflicting death by a light blow upon a man already struck by others with innumerable light wounds; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter is otherwise in the case of theft; for by the last little theft no notable calamity or damaging is added. - Lugo,² and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

702. • Query 12° If many, without common counsel but by example, commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, do individuals sin gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a per se cause, but only an occasional cause, of the damage. - Thus S. Alph.³ and others more commonly against some.

703. Resolutions. - 1° "Probably," says S. Alphonsus,¹ "those who would eat fruits in others' vineyards" or orchards, "provided they are not rare and of great price, can be excused at least from grave sin, if they do not carry them out in great quantity; for in this kind of things, which are too exposed, a greater quantity is required for constituting grave matter."

2° If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, as often as he steals he sins gravely. The reason is that the external act derives its malice from the internal act, which is gravely sinful.² Say the same of him who steals a small quantity with the intention of taking a notable quantity. Recall what was said n. 225. 8°. a).

3° He who takes from an owner a trifling thing very dear to him, for example a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined to honor some special man, and foresees at the same time that the owner is to be gravely afflicted by such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems likely to follow from it.

4° Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although each time they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they will arrive at it.

5° Tailors and their servants sin lethally against justice, when by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth which remain over, otherwise still useful to the owners, they have arrived at grave matter. Except unless in some place a custom prevails that less be paid and the fragments remain to the tailors; or unless it is established that wealthy owners do not wish the fragments to be restored to them, or care little about them.

6° They must be accused of theft who by deceitful beggary (not those who truly beg with exaggeration), or by going about with fabricated reasons, draw money from citizens. Yet those are not to be condemned who have a certain modest amount of money placed in a savings bank, in order to provide for old age and infirmity, lest they be forced to withdraw into a public poorhouse, or so that funeral expenses may be paid, meanwhile collecting alms from private persons whoever they may be, or from pious societies.

collecting alms, so that provision may be made for daily necessities. Indeed, that little money which they keep saved would shortly be spent, and they themselves would be a burden either to pious societies or to hospices. It must be said otherwise if they have money which is sufficient for the support of life. These things likewise can be understood of those who deposit a modest sum of money with a friend, when they betake themselves to a hospice, so that, if afterward it happens that they leave it, they may not lack every aid, or, if they die, their bodies may be committed to burial.¹

7° Concerning youths educated gratis in seminaries, or at the expense of private persons, with that hope that they will serve the ecclesiastical ministry, it must be held that they commit fraud if they enter seminaries without the intention of dedicating themselves to sacred duties, and with this purpose only, that they may be imbued with letters or indulge leisure; and therefore that they are bound to repair the damage. It is not necessary, however, that they be altogether certain of their vocation; for holy leisure is conceded to them for this reason, that they may have more mature counsel concerning so great an undertaking. But they ought neither rashly to enter nor to remain in sacred buildings after they have cast off hope and purpose. But if by their own fault they bring it about that they are held unworthy, they do not seem for that reason bound to make restitution, whenever the mind of defrauding was lacking; for donors are not to be judged to have placed the condition of restitution on account of sluggishness or other customary faults.²

8° Those who dig out coals are prohibited from carrying them away for their own use, unless a certain price has been paid; nevertheless, from the convenience of the thing, it easily happens that each one takes the coals necessary for his family. That custom indeed must be reprehended, but restitution does not seem to be exacted, since there is so great an abundance of coals there, and the owners are scarcely to be judged altogether unwilling; for they do not use solicitude to detect thieves. Those who carry away some coals for their own use from the banks of canals and rivers, where coals are deposited from boats, sin, and indeed gravely if they take a great abundance; not so if a few, especially those which lie scattered here and there. Moreover those who have been accustomed through the whole winter, or another long time, thus to take coals for themselves are guilty of grave theft, and ought to make satisfaction according to an equitable estimation of the damage. But often it is very difficult to send the price safely to the owners. The same must be said concerning those collecting wood which another cut for his own use, or carrying away what another procured for himself; for it is a grave fault of theirs to take an abundance for themselves without the owner's permission.¹

Question 2. What matter is required so that the thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Response 1st. As regards wives, a case of grave matter in theft is held with difficulty, both because, as was said elsewhere, among us they make one person with husbands as regards common goods, and because these are not ordinarily considered reasonably unwilling regarding donations and other expenses, even secret ones, which are not altogether prodigal. But if a wife uses common riches prodigally, that quantity is required for the gravity of theft which suffices for inflicting grave damage upon the husband, which must be judged from the circumstances. But then it is more commonly taught that she is held to restitution either from paraphernal goods or by working more diligently or by taking care of the family estate. Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 169.

Response 2nd. It is certain among all that in thefts of children more is required for constituting grave matter than in thefts of strangers; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as regards the manner, namely that it be taken secretly, than as regards the substance. Wherefore many theologians say that for them a sum twice greater than for strangers is required; but no general rule can be assigned, for the matter will generally have to be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 32.

Response 3rd. For servants it also depends upon the greater liberality or stinginess of masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, e.g., whether it is edible or not, guarded or exposed, etc. According to many, by small thefts committed by servants in foods and eatables which are not usually carefully kept, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these are not sold or taken out of the house or are of extraordinary value. But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, no greater quantity is required for grave sin, because the masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 34. - Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 168.

St. Bonaventure, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 4, reduces to the genus of theft the secret taking of a thing, the detention of a thing found, sacrilege, the property of Religious, and bad dispensation.

To rapine likewise he reduces new tariffs, new customs of burdens, iniquitous exactions, extortions, the acceptance of gifts, and the game of dice.

NOW we must treat of theft and rapina in the proper sense.

Scotus, 4. dist. 15. quaest. 3. §. De secundo, teaches that daytime thieves cannot rightly be hanged. His reason is that God commanded: Thou shalt not kill, nor dispensed except for night thieves; but it is not permitted to dispense in the law of a superior.

Alensis, part. 3. quaest. 47. memb. 4. art. 3., teaches that there can indeed be power in the Republic to put thieves to death, yet they are not to be hanged as a rule, because life is preferred to stolen goods. Sotus also, lib. 5. de Iust. quaest. 3. art. 3. ad 3., takes it rather ill that simple thieves are hanged; hence he inveighs against Baldus, in the Law sed novo iure, Cod. de servis fugitivis, who held that thieves ought to be hanged for simple theft thrice repeated, or for one enormous theft equivalent to three.

The common opinion, however, is that a thief can be put to death for one notable theft alone, or for several repeated. So the jurists, the Law cited, where Baldus, and Paulus de Castro, and others, whom Covarruvias reports.

Among Theologians, however, John Maior 4. dist. 15. quaest. 27. quaest. 27. art. 4. Gabriel 4. dist. 15. quaest. 15. art. 3. dub. 1. John Medina Cod. de restit. quaest. 4. John Driedo Lib. 1. de libertate Eccles. cap. 10. Alph. Castro Lib. 1. de Lege poen. cap. 6. Victor relect. de homicid. num. 21. Covarruvias lib. 2. var. cap 9. num. 7. Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. controv. 4. Aragon there, Bannes there, dub. 1. Petrus Navarrus lib. 2. de restit. cap. 3. disput. 1. Valentia Tom. 3. disp. 5 quaest. 8. puncto 1. Sayrus lib. 9. cap. 15. num. 33. The same is intimated by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, salv. tit. 3. cap. 6, proving it from Ecclesiasticus 34, where the Holy Spirit makes the thief almost equal to the homicide, of whom the Holy Doctor said in cap. 4 that hanging is due to him.

This opinion is proved from the disturbance of the Republic induced by thieves.

To the argument of Scotus Sayrus responds, num. 25., from St. Bonaventure cap. 6. in Decalogum, that the same God who commanded: Thou shalt not kill, also commanded in Exodus 22: Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live.

Thus in many provinces thieves were hanged, as Aulus Gellius reports, book 11 of the Attic Nights, last chapter, on the Roman Emperors. And among the Egyptians a thief was put to death. Which some gather from Genesis 44, where Joseph's brothers said: With whomsoever that which you seek shall be found, let him die; he himself more mercifully said: He shall be my servant.

In the Lombard Constitutions, however, approved by the Emperor, it is established that a thief be punished the first time with the cudgel, the second time mutilated, and the third time hanged.

The Holy Doctor brings forward, in the Confessionale, cap. 3. particula 54, the decree against the ravishers of churches, but notes that it is not universally in use. They can also sometimes be excommunicated, as St. Bonaventure notes in 4. dist. 18. part. 2. quaest. 3. fundamento 3.

V. No one is bound under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away by a number of small thefts, however great the total sum may be. This is the 38th of Innocent.

Titius, since he frequently used the railway in making journeys, bought a six-month ticket; after that period of time had elapsed, he made journeys in the same way for a month without renewing the ticket or otherwise paying the price of the journey. When he had disclosed these things in confession, the confessor asked what price was owed to the company; Titius answered him that the sum would be about two pounds sterling. Having heard these things, the confessor considered within himself whether Titius was bound under grave sin to restore two pounds sterling to the railway company. Hence it is asked:

1. What matter is required to constitute a grave sin against justice?

2. In England, on account of the lesser value of money, is a larger sum required for grave matter than among other nations of Europe?

3. Do small thefts coalesce, and how?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What matter is required to constitute a grave sin against justice?

According to St. Thomas (II-II, question 59, article 4) the sin of injustice is mortal because it is against charity, which is the life of the soul. But sins against charity are only venial if the matter be light. Matter against charity will be grave if the act causes another serious sadness, or tends notably to disturb peace and harmony. Justice, it is true, looks rather at objective relations than at subjective dispositions, and so although charity will always serve as a measure of the gravity of sins against justice, yet in estimating the gravity of these sins we must take as our norm an ordinarily constituted person, not such as are specially sensitive. Loss of property in such a quantity as would cause serious trouble to an ordinarily constituted person will be a serious loss, and the theft of it will be a serious sin against justice. The theft of what would suffice to support the owner of the property and his family for a day would ordinarily be a serious loss to him, and would be grave matter. This rule serves for ordinary cases; for a measure of the gravity of theft from very rich persons or from wealthy companies we must have recourse to other considerations besides the foregoing. For theft does injury to the community and to the security of property, as well as to the individual owner. Even if the individual owner does not suffer loss which is serious for him, yet the harm which theft does to the community and to social security may be notable, and if it is notable, the theft will be mortally sinful. What sum is notable on this account will depend on circumstances of time and place. Although the precise sum can not be determined with mathematical exactness, yet, according to the common opinion, a sum of about one pound sterling is at present sufficient to constitute a mortal sin of theft, when it is taken even from the richest.

2. Is a larger sum required to constitute grave matter in England than in other countries on account of the less value of money there?

The affirmative has been maintained by some theologians. However, the conditions of modern commerce tend to equalize the value of money; or, in other words, the whole world is now one big market for money and the chief articles of commerce. If either money or goods are cheaper in one country than in another, trade is attracted thither, and trade soon tends to equalize prices. Hence there is no very notable difference now in the value of money in the different civilized countries of the world. Prices of different articles are, indeed, different in different places, and this fact makes trade profitable; but the general cost of the same standard of living is much the same all the world over.

3. Do small thefts coalesce, and how?

Small thefts certainly coalesce, as is clear from Proposition 38, condemned by Innocent XI. Small thefts coalesce, owing to the intention of the thief finally to steal a large sum, or owing to conspiracy among many, each of whom steals something ; also owing to the hoarding of small sums stolen at short intervals.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 396.

4. The case. Titius traveled on the railway for a month after his season ticket had expired, without paying his fare. He thereby defrauded the railway company of two pounds. He took that value which belonged to somebody else, against that person's reasonable wish. He therefore committed theft, and as the matter is grave, he is bound under grave sin to make restitution of that sum to the company.

The virtue of Justice forbids us to injure our neighbor, and this obligation is of its nature grave, as all theologians admit. Still, if the matter be trivial an offense against justice is no more than a venial sin, as all agree. The well-known lines: —

It is a sin

To steal a pin,

Much more to steal

A greater thing may be as faulty from the strictly theological stand- - point as they are from the poetic; but for all that they express the theological truth that the matter determines whether a sin against justice is grievous or venial.

But when does the matter become sufficient to constitute a mortal sin? Theologians have always considered this a difficult question to answer. And yet it is a question of great practical importance for the confessor, not only that he may know when he must require restitution to be made under pain of refusing absolution, but also for measuring the guilt of violations by religious of their vow of poverty; for this question is settled on the same principles. Nearly all theologians who treat of justice discuss this question; and of late there has been a tendency in certain quarters greatly to increase the sum which others commonly assign as necessary and sufficient for a mortal sin of theft. Unless I am much mistaken, they have increased it unduly, and for reasons which have no validity ; so I propose briefly to examine the question again, and in doing so I will make use of the labors of economists. For although the question belongs to theology, still, as we shall see, its solution partly depends on certain data which belong to economics, and on these it is only right that economists should be heard.

Since about the time of Lugo († 1660) it has been a common opinion among theologians that it is a grave sin of theft to rob a working man of a sum which is sufficient to support him and his family for a day. The reason for this doctrine is obvious and satisfactory. For that quantity will be sufficient for a mortal sin, whose theft causes a notable injury to the owner, an injury which ordinary men of prudence and sense consider serious, and which is sufficient to upset them considerably. This is the test which is applied in other matters where there is question of the grave breach of a moral law which admits of parvity of matter. When theologians settle what omission of the Office by a priest, or of Mass on a Sunday by the faithful, or what quantity of servile work on a holy-day of obligation is mortally sinful, they ask themselves what quantity of the matter prescribed or forbidden, as the case may be, is notable and considerable, having regard to the subject matter, the end of the precept in question, and the intention of the lawgiver. In the same way, when we wish to know what sum is sufficient for a grave sin of theft, we consider how important it is for maintaining peace among men that property should be secure; what quantity of money or commodities is looked upon as considerable with a view to the use that can be made of them; and what quantity will, with reason, cause the owner serious concern and chagrin if he is unjustly deprived of it. Now, to a workman, or indeed to any one who has to earn his living, the loss of what will support him and his family for a day is a serious matter; it practically means that he has worked a whole day for nothing, and such a loss causes most men, with reason, to be seriously put out. So that we may take it as fairly established doctrine that the theft of such a sum will keep the owner and his family for a day is a grave sin.

This rule, however, will only serve in those cases where theft has been committed against one who earns his living, or at any rate, who is not very rich. It cannot be applied to wealthy companies, or governments, or to millionaires, who would hardly feel the loss of a day’s support in however grand a style they live. And so in such cases we must have recourse to other considerations in order to find what quantity will constitute a grave sin of injustice when stolen. Here we consider, not so much the loss caused to the owner of the property, as the wrong done to public order and to the security of property. Public and private interests require that property should be safe; public as well as private interests are seriously jeopardized when notable injuries to property are of frequent occurrence. All this is but saying in other words that the public weal requires that theft of a considerable sum must be forbidden in all cases, as a grave violation of justice, by the natural law. A prohibition, under pain of venial sin, not to steal a considerable sum of money, would not be sufficient to safeguard the rights of property. In other words, theft of what is commonly at a certain time and place considered a notable sum of money, will be sufficient to constitute a mortal sin of theft, even when the owner of the property stolen is not sensibly the worse off.

We have now arrived at a principle for measuring the quantity which will be grave matter in theft, independently of the harm done to the owner who is wronged. But there remains the great difficulty of determining the quantity which public and private interests require should not be stolen under pain of committing grievous sin. The value of money is constantly changing, and differs considerably in different places; the quantity of money, too, in a country varies greatly with the growth or decrease of national wealth, and so, a sum which was considerable at one time would cease to be so at another. This truth is illustrated very well by the change in the opinions of theologians from age to age on this point. Navarrus, in the sixteenth century, taught that a sum equivalent to about twopence-halfpenny of our money was sufficient for a mortal sin of theft. This opinion, however, was commonly rejected as too severe. Sanchez says that the more common and the truer opinion fixed the sum at one shilling and eightpence. Lugo, a generation later, called attention to the change in the value of money which had been caused by the large influx of the precious metals from America. He asserted, that where formerly fifty gold crowns sufficed for support, three times that sum did not suffice in his day. And so, following the example of other recent authors, as he says, he put the sum required for grave theft, in the case of very rich lords and kings, at five shillings. St. Alphonsus thought five shillings sufficient in the case of rich lords, but for kings he put the sum of ten shillings. Modern theologians agree in still further increasing the amount. Haine and Marc increase it to between twenty and twenty-five francs; D’Annibale and Bucceroni to between twenty and thirty francs; Kenrick and Sabetti to five dollars; Lehmkuhl to between twenty and thirty shillings; Berardi to between thirty and forty francs; Génicot and Waffelaert to forty francs. Lehmkuhl thinks that for England and America, on account of the less value of money in those countries, thirty or forty shillings would be required for a grave sin. Father Ojetti¹ goes further than any one else that I have seen, and says that a sum under four pounds would not be grave matter.

¹ Synopsis rerum moralium, s.v. “Furtum.”

All these theologians, as was to be expected, attach great weight to traditional teaching on the point, but on account of the continual depreciation of money, they think the amount required for grave theft continually increases. Génicot, to take one example, says: —

“Nor does this last computation [forty francs] seem to exceed the measure for our region, if account is taken of the great change that has occurred in the value of money since the time when many authors whom St. Alphonsus cites required two or three gold pieces [fifteen francs].”²

² Vol. I., n. 497.

The very great depreciation in the value of money, then, is the reason why he selects a sum eight times as great as that assigned by Lugo and others in the seventeenth century, and three times as much as the most liberal of those who are quoted by St. Alphonsus. This reason is not theological, it rests on a question of fact: has money, in reality, depreciated so much in value during the last two or three centuries? This is a question belonging to economics, a difficult question, as all admit, but one on which great labor has been spent, and with regard to which fairly certain conclusions have been reached, though no pretense can be made to mathematical accuracy.

Professor Bastable, one of our greatest authorities on monetary questions, gives in the Encyclopædia Britannica³ a general history of the changes which have taken place within historical times in the value of money. Concerning the period with which we are dealing, he writes: —

³ S.v. “Money.”

The annual addition to the store of money has been estimated as £2,100,000 for the period from 1545 to 1600. At this date the Brazilian supply began. The course of distribution of these fresh masses of the precious metals is an interesting point, which has been studied by Mr. Cliffe Leslie. The flow of the new supplies was first towards Spain and Portugal, and from thence they passed to the larger commercial centers of the other European countries, the effect being that prices were raised in and about the chief towns, while the value of money in the country districts remained unaltered. The additions to the supply of both gold and silver during the two centuries 1600-1800 continued to be very considerable; but, if Adam Smith’s view be correct, the full effect on prices was produced by 1640, and the increased amount of money was from that time counterbalanced by the wider extension of trade. At the commencement of this century [nineteenth] the annual production of gold has been estimated as being from £2,500,000 to £3,000,000. The year 1809 seems to mark an epoch in the production of these metals, since the outbreak of the revolts of the various Spanish dependencies in South America tended to check the usual supply from those countries, and a marked increase in the value of money was the consequence. During the period 1809-1849 the value of gold and silver rose to about two and a half times their former level, notwithstanding fresh discoveries in Asiatic Russia. The annual yield in 1849 was estimated at £8,- 000,000. The next important date for our present purpose is the year 1848, when the Californian mines were opened, while in 1851 the Australian discoveries took place. By these events an enormous mass of gold was added to the world’s supply. The most careful estimates fix the addition during the years 1851-1871 at £500,000,000, or an amount nearly equal to the former stock in existence. The problems raised by this phenomenon have received the most careful study by several distinguished economists, to whose writings those desiring more extensive information may refer. The main features of interest may be briefly summed up... (2) The contemporaneous development of the Continental railway systems, and the partial adoption of free trade, with the consequent facilities for freer circulation of commodities, led to the course of distribution being different from that of the sixteenth century. The more backward districts were the principal gainers, and a more

general equalization of prices, combined with a slight elevation in the value, was the outcome. .. . (4) The change in the value of money, which may for the period of 1849- 1869 be fixed at twenty per cent., enabled a general increase of wages to be carried out, thus improving the condition of the classes living on manual labor. It may be added that the difficulty of tracing the effects of this great addition to the money stock is a most striking proof of the complexity of modern economic development.

This general sketch is fully borne out by the results obtained by other workers in the same field. The following table was drawn up by the Vicomte d’Avenel, and is borrowed from Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, iii. p. 193: —

TABLE OF THE COMPARATIVE PURCHASING POWER OF EQUAL WEIGHTS OF THE PRECIOUS METALS AT DIFFERENT Periods IN France :—

Period. PERIOD. 1451-1500 about 6 1651-1675 about 2 1501-1525 ”» 5 1676-1700 » 214% 1526-1550 ” 4 1701-1725 7” 2% 1551-1575 ”» 3 1726-1750 ”» 3 1576-1600 7 216 1751-1775 ”» 2% 1601-1625 » 3 1776-1790 ”» 2 1626-1650 ” 2% 1890 ” 1

To show the changes in the value of money during the last century, we can avail ourselves of the Index numbers calculated for this purpose by able economists, such as Jevons and Sauerbeck. They give the prices of a large number of the chief commodities in gold for each year. I subjoin a table composed of the Jevons’ Index numbers for the years 1782-1839, and of Mr. Sauerbeck’s to 1905. These Index numbers show us whether gold increased or decreased in value, and what the increase or decrease was approximately, for each year.

PERIOD. Jevons’ Ind. No. | Period. Sauerbeck Ind. No. 1782-84 .. 97 | 1840-44 (Jevons, 77).. 92 1785-89 -- 87 | 1845-49 .- 85 1790-94 -. 93 | 1850-54 -. 85 1795-99 .. 120 | 1855-59 -- 98 1800-04 -. 126 | 1860-64 -, 101 1805-09 .. 138 | 1865-69 -. 100 1810-14 -. 125 | 1870-74 -. 104 1815-19 .. 111 | 1875-79 -. 91 1820-24 .. 92 | 1880-84 -- 83 1825-29 .- 88 | 1885-89 .- 70 1830-34 .- 79 1890-94 -. 69 1835-39 ..- 85 | 1895-96 -. 62

1896-1905 .. 68

If it were necessary, the results that we have obtained might be corroborated from other sources, but they will, perhaps, suffice for our purpose.

We find then that from the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth gold decreased in value as 6:2; the Vicomte d’Avenel’s figures fully bear out the correctness of Lugo’s estimate quoted above; from that time till the end of the eighteenth century, the value of gold remained fairly constant ; it sank during the revolutionary wars with France; after Waterloo it rose until about 1850, when it began to sink again till about 1870, since which time it has been rising gradually. The Vicomte d’Avenel calculated that the purchasing power of equal weights of the precious metals in France in 1790 and in 1890 was as 2:1, in other words, the net result of the fluctuations in the value of the precious metals during the nineteenth century was that their value decreased by about one-half.

These conclusions agree with what might be expected on general principles. For the value of the precious metals, as of other things, depends on supply and demand. If the supply is increased, other things remaining the same, the value will fall, as was the case with gold when the vast stores from America had been distributed through the commercial centers of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the next century and a half trade developed, population increased, and the greater number of business transactions demanded a larger supply of money. The demand was equal to the supply, and in spite of the constant influx of gold, its value remained much the same for a century and a half. The revolt of the South American colonies from Spain tended to check supplies from that quarter, and gold rose in value till the discovery of the mines in California and Australia. The quantities drawn from thence caused gold to depreciate till about 1870, when the growing expansion of trade, the adoption by Germany and other countries of a gold standard of currency, together with other causes, brought about an appreciation of the precious metal.

The evidence, then, from Political Economy shows that gold has, indeed, depreciated in value since the time of Lugo, but that the amount of the depreciation is not nearly so great as some modern theologians suppose. If we say that the value of gold in Lugo’s time was twice as much as it is now, we shall probably not be far wrong. So that if we take the opinion of Lugo and other great theologians of his time, as an accurate estimate of the quantity required for a grave sin of theft, we shall arrive at the sum required to-day on account of the depreciation in the value of money, by multiplying Lugo’s five shillings by two. If we adopt the more liberal estimate of Laymann and others, we must double this amount, and say that the theft of more than twenty shillings is always a grave sin. However, besides the depreciation of money, other circumstances have to be considered, as we shall presently see.

Father Lehmkuhl⁴ thinks that in England and in the United States, where, he says, the value of money. is less than in other countries, a sum of from thirty to forty shillings is required; whereas in other countries twenty to thirty shillings would be sufficient for the absolute sum necessary for a mortal sin of theft.

⁴ Vol. I., 931 note.

It is, of course, possible that money may have a greater value on the continent of Europe than in England and the United States. But this, again, is not a theological question, it is a question of fact, though a very complex one, and one very difficult to solve satisfactorily. Just as the value of commodities is measured by money, so the value of money is measured by what it will exchange for. If one pound will purchase more commodities of the same quality in Germany than in England, then the value of money is greater in Germany than it is in England. And if this be the case, a mortal sin of theft will be committed by stealing a less sum of money in Germany than in England.

Of course it is perfectly true that a pound will purchase more of some commodities in Germany than in Great Britain. It will purchase more wine in the Rhineland, otherwise Rhenish wine would not be imported to England. On the other hand, it will not purchase more cotton goods, or else we should not export those articles to Germany. But the value of money depends on its general purchasing power, not on its power of purchasing more or less of one or two commodities. The general purchasing power of money is proximately determined by the law of supply and demand. If the supply of money increases relatively to the supply of other commodities for sale, its value decreases; if the supply decreases its value augments. Moreover, whenever an object has a higher value the greater demand attracts supplies until a common level is reached. Money obeys this law like any other commodity, and the vast improvement in means of communication which the last hundred years have witnessed, the facility and cheapness of carriage, the intimate commercial relations which now exist between all the countries of the civilized world, tend to equalize values, if we neglect tariffs and the cost of transit. So that, although we should allow still for some difference in the value of money in the different countries of the civilized world, it is probable that the difference is not great. Professor Bastable says:⁵ “ At present it is quite natural to assume that the materials of money are distributed by means of international trade, and tend to keep at an equal level all the world over,—an assumption which is in general well grounded, though an important exception exists with regard to the East.” Professor Marshall, one of our greatest English economists, is of opinion that money is now of greater value in England than in France. He writes: — 6

⁵ Encycl. Brit., s.v. “ Money.”

Free trade, improvements in transport, the opening of new countries, and other causes have made the general purchasing power of money in terms of commodities rise in England relatively to the Continent. Early in this century [nineteenth] twenty-five francs would buy more, and especially more of the things needed by the working classes, in France than £1 would in England. But now the advantage is the other way: and this causes the recent growth of the wealth of France to appear to be greater relatively to that of England than it really is.

Many facts seem to corroborate Professor Marshall’s opinion. There is undoubtedly less gold in England now than there was twenty-five years ago, 7 and it is estimated that the circulation of gold, silver, and uncovered notes per head of the population is almost as much in Germany and Spain, is considerably more in Belgium and Holland, and more than twice as much in France as it is in England.⁸

⁸ Ibid., p. 605.

Statistics published in 1903 by the Board of Trade in the Blue Book on British and Foreign Trade and Industry [Cd. 1761] tend to prove the same conclusion. By their means we can make a rough estimate of the relative cost of the chief necessities of life in England, in America, and on the Continent. Since 1877 the price of food, which represents one-half of the total expenditure of the working classes, has de creased by about thirty per cent. in Great Britain; very much more than it has decreased in France and Germany. Between 1880 and 1897, the cost of workmen’s food in Paris fell fourteen points, compared with thirteen in Germany, and forty-two in the United Kingdom.⁹ Of the chief articles of food, bread and flour are cheaper in London than in Paris or Berlin; home-produced butcher’s meat is slightly dearer, but the balance is redressed by the cheaper price of foreign and colonial meat. Butter and eggs are slightly dearer in London, but sugar and rice are cheaper. Clothing is cheaper, on the whole, in England than on the Continent or in America; house rent in the large towns is somewhat dearer.

⁹ Loc. cit., p. 226.

6 Principles of Economics, i., p. 817.

1 Dictionary of Political Economy, ii., p. 617.

It would seem, then, that there is no reason for saying that money has less value in England than on the Continent, or that, on this account, a greater sum is required in England for a mortal sin of theft. The contrary is probably more correct.

Not all countries, however, are equally rich; England and America are the richest nations in the world, and it is conceivable that in comparison with the wealth of the population, what is a notable sum in one country is not so in another. I take it that this would be true if the wealth of England and America were more or less equally divided among the population. This is not by any means the case. Wealth, in great measure at any rate, seems to accumulate in comparatively few hands, and the great mass of the people remains little the better off for the greater wealth in the country. The urban population of England is about seventy-seven per cent of the whole, and the recent investigations of Mr. Charles Booth and Mr. Rowntree have shown that some thirty per cent. of these live in a state of poverty, without a sufficiency of the bare necessaries of life. It seems to me that in these circumstances the common estimate of the value of money in England is not likely to be less, but rather more than in other European countries.

It is, indeed, true that wages are higher in England and in America than in France or Germany. According to the rough estimate contained in the Blue Book from which I have already quoted, workmen’s wages in the United States are one-and-a-half times higher than in England; in Germany they are two-thirds, and in France three-fourths of those which prevail in the United Kingdom. We may remark, however, in passing, that this does not prove that the cost of labor of the same amount and quality is greater in the States and in England than abroad; it may be, as many competent judges affirm, that English and American labor is more efficient, and so as cheap or cheaper than labor is on the Continent. So that even though the income of the working-classes is greater in England than it is abroad, this will not cause them to put a less value on money if it costs them correspondingly greater effort. Still the higher wages and cheaper food and clothing enable the working classes in England to spend more and live in greater style, than on the Continent, and this may somewhat lower the common estimate of the value of money. But, even if we allow something for this, it seems to me that Father Lehmkuhl’s estimate of the difference is much too large, amounting, as it does, to fifty per cent.

The general level of wages, not only in England and America, but on the Continent also, is very much higher now than it was sixty or seventy years ago. In 1883, Sir Robert Giffen calculated that in England at that time wages were much more than one hundred per cent. higher than they had been fifty years before.¹⁰ Engel estimated that workmen’s incomes had nearly doubled in Belgium between the years 1853 and 1891. 11 This general rise in wages will have some influence on the estimate to be formed of the quantity required for a grave sin of theft. For the working classes form the great bulk of the population, and their estimate of the value of money will greatly influence the general estimate. It seems clear that a workman who gets thirty shillings a week will put less value on ten shillings than if his weekly wage were only twenty shillings. We must, then, allow not only for the depreciation of money, but also for the higher wages, the higher standard of comfort, and in consequence, the relatively less value attached to money by the working-classes throughout the civilized world, independently of its purchasing power.

¹⁰ Dictionary of Political Economy, ii., p. 617.

All things considered, I see no reason for increasing the quantity which the greater number of modern theologians assign as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft. That quantity is about twenty shillings, and if we attach much importance, as we should do, to the opinions of such classical moralists of the past as Lugo about such a question, the sum will be rather below than above twenty shillings.

11 Ibid., iii., p. 679.

With twenty shillings I can purchase a week’s work of an average workman, who will be able to support himself and his family on it. Such a sum is a notable quantity of money; it is a very respectable subscription even for a rich man to a charity, or any other object that attracts public support. Subscriptions to learned societies are, commonly enough, one pound or one guinea a year. If such a sum could be stolen without grave sin, its amount would prove too great a temptation for the virtue of large numbers of people, who wish to save their souls, but make little of venial sins; who shrink from crime, but, to put the matter in homely language, do not profess to be better than their neighbors. For all these reasons, then, it seems to me that to assign twenty shillings as the absolute sum required for a grave sin of theft, is as near the truth as we can get in so intricate a question.