XIX. On Theft

What is the malice of theft? - Theft is a sin mortal from its kind. It is proved, because theft from its generic concept, and apart from another malice, is gravely opposed to justice, indeed to common peace and tranquility; therefore it is a sin mortal from its kind. For "through theft a man brings harm to his neighbor in his goods; and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 6. Meanwhile, nevertheless, it is certain among all that theft admits smallness of matter, and because of this it is often a sin only venial in the individual; as, e.g., if a poor person steals something small. St. Thomas, Quodl. 6, a. 6; 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 3, 5, 6; L. 700; E. M. "Those also are to be placed in the number of thieves who, when they have been hired for some private or public office, furnishing no or little work, neglect the duty and enjoy only the wage and price." Roman Catechism, 9. To theft is reduced any fraud or defrauding, which is the lesion and diminution of another's goods or rights, accomplished by deceitful circumvention. Robbery differs in species from theft, because theft includes in its nature the ignorance of him to whom injury is done, but robbery includes violence. In theft the thing is accepted by cunning, deceit, fraud. In robbery the thing is accepted by one's own power, coercion or violence having been made to the person. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 4, 5, 8, 9. Cf. here 1289.

What is grave matter in theft? - The matter of theft is one kind absolutely grave, another relatively grave. Matter of theft absolutely grave is that which according to itself, and apart from the state, or wealth or poverty, of him from whom it is taken, gravely conflicts with justice, by inflicting grave damage on society. But matter of theft relatively grave is that which is grave not precisely according to itself, but by relation to the person from whom it is taken, and inflicts on him a relatively grave detriment. - L. 526.

What is matter of theft absolutely grave? Two or three gold pieces do not seem to suffice for absolutely grave matter, namely about ten or fifteen lire; but thirty or forty lire. For old theologians established two or three gold pieces as absolutely grave matter. But in our time the value of money has greatly decreased, and the abundance of money certainly has doubled and more than doubled. Therefore, if in the former time absolutely grave matter was established at ten or fifteen lire, in the present it seems to be established at thirty or forty lire. - Indeed the rule for discerning absolutely grave matter is one kind extrinsic, another intrinsic. The extrinsic rule is contained in the common judgment of theologians and prudent men, since this matter, as it depends on many circumstances, depends especially on common sense and estimation.

Moreover in the present doctors and God-fearing and sensible men commonly hold this as absolutely grave matter. - But the intrinsic rule must be taken from this: that that matter of theft is absolutely and universally grave, on account of whose taking away any owner, even a very rich one, would reasonably be gravely unwilling, because it is such a quantity as can serve several uses and necessities of life, and, if it were stolen often and by many and through light thefts, which are frequent, there would be danger of enormous damage to society; for the security of society would no longer stand. But the quantity designated as absolutely grave, with attention also to the changed circumstances of present times, certainly appears to be such. - L. 527, 528; Gennari, Consultazioni Mor. Can. Liturg., P. I, Cons. 64.

What is matter of theft relatively grave? Matter of theft relatively grave, speaking of itself, is the price which is required for the competent sustenance of one day of that person from whom it is taken.

It is proved, because against the taking away of the price which is necessary for procuring the sustenance of one day competent to himself, anyone can reasonably be gravely unwilling; therefore such a price is suitably established as relatively grave matter of theft. Speaking of itself; for if a Prince, or another, lived very sumptuously, for relatively grave matter of theft a lesser price would suffice than would be required for his daily food. For would he reasonably be unwilling if that Prince on that day, e.g., had to abstain altogether from his magnificence? For competent sustenance, etc.; for if a very rich man from economy lived sparingly, for relatively grave matter of theft the price which he is accustomed from economy to spend for daily food would not suffice. For sustenance, in which not only food is computed, but also clothing and dwelling, as well as honest recreations, and even distributions to be made according to one's proper condition. For sustenance, that is, either for the whole sustenance, or even for a notable part of it; since even then someone would still be reasonably gravely unwilling. L. 527.

Resolutions: For grave matter considered relatively, with attention to the principal places of Europe and the circumstances of our times, there seem to be required: 1. About the value of one lira relatively to the poor, and sometimes less or more according to the greater or lesser degree of necessity. 2. About two or three lire relatively to workers who procure food for themselves by daily labor. 3. About five or six or seven lire relatively to men exercising a liberal profession and living honorably from it. 4. About ten or eleven or twelve lire relatively to ordinary rich persons; but fifteen or twenty relatively to the more opulent rich, but not the very richest, for whom absolutely grave matter is to be attended to. L. 527, 528.

What if in theft the necessity of the one secretly taking is grave? The matter of theft, though more grave, can become relatively light because of the grave necessity of the one taking, in which without the secret taking of another's thing he would have to lead a most miserable life, as La-Croix, l. 3, p. n. 955, and Struggl, de 7 Praec. Dec. 13, teach with Laymann and Sporer. The reason is that the owner cannot reasonably be gravely unwilling if a miserable man in such a case takes as much as is necessary to relieve such grave necessity in some way.

What if the person secretly taking is domestic?

The matter can likewise become relatively light because of the condition of the person, e.g., if the one taking is a son, a wife, or a servant very useful to the owner; for against the thefts of such persons the owner is not so gravely unwilling. - L. 539.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of sons of the family? - Several theologians require for grave theft by sons a sum twice greater than for strangers, and others extend this quantity of matter even much more. But since a universal and absolute rule concerning the gravity and lightness of similar thefts cannot be given, it must be taken 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and greater or lesser affection of the parent toward the son; 2. from the plurality, age, and other circumstances of the children; 3. from the end and use of the thing taken. The reason is that from these heads it is ordinarily accustomed to happen that the father is more or less unwilling against the theft of the son. Prov. 28:24; L. 528, 543, 544.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of wives? For grave theft by wives, several theologians also require a greater quantity, and indeed twice as much as for theft by sons. The reason is that between husband and wife there is a greater conjunction and moral identity, especially in order to common goods, than between father and son; therefore against the theft of a wife the husband is ordinarily judged to be less unwilling. Nor are several and grave theologians lacking who extend this quantity of matter even more broadly, and assert that the wife does not sin mortally, even if annually she secretly takes a twentieth part of the revenues for honest uses; which sum St. Alphonsus, 540, H. A. tr. 10, n. 33, judges excessive, at least speaking universally. Therefore, since here also a universal and absolute rule cannot be established concerning the gravity or lightness of similar thefts, this must be taken 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and greater or lesser affection of the husband toward the wife; 2. from the greater or lesser dowry, from the wife in order to household economy, and from other circumstances. The reason is that from these heads it is ordinarily accustomed to happen that the husband is more or less, or at least can be, unwilling against the theft of the wife. L. 539, 542.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of servants? "Concerning thefts of servants, doctors commonly say that small thefts which are made by servants from foods which are not customarily guarded carefully never reach grave fault, provided they do not sell them or carry them outside, and provided they do not take them in extraordinary quantity, or, it must be added, if they were not things of extraordinary price." L. H. A. tr. 10, n. 34; l. 3, n. 545. And this holds especially if the owner does not furnish them due sustenance. But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, no greater quantity is required for grave sin, because owners are then not less unwilling toward them than toward others. Indeed thefts of this kind are punished more severely by civil law because of the defect of fidelity which intervenes in them. But if these things are by no means guarded, indeed if the servants themselves have the administration of things, several and grave theologians require still a greater quantity than for strangers; this must be judged 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and affection of the owner toward the servant; 2. from the labor, utility, and necessity of the servant himself, and from the greater or lesser liberty which is given to him in administering the things committed to him. Tambur., Exp. Dec., l. 8, tr. 2, c. 3, par. 4, n. 1; L. 539, 545, 546.

What if several small thefts are made? More grave matter can also become relatively light when it is done through several small thefts and performed successively. The reason is that in these thefts less damage is effected; hence owners also are not accustomed to be so gravely unwilling against these thefts.

Hence, if small thefts are made from the same person at different times, the matter will be grave when it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - If small thefts are made from different persons, matter will be judged grave of itself when it is twice greater than the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Wherefore a still greater quantity is required if these thefts are made against several persons and several times, and then the excess seems to be required threefold greater. But these things hold when those small thefts coalesce among themselves. L. 530; D'Annibale, p. 2, n. 254, ed. 4.

Whether small thefts made several times can coalesce together? - Small thefts can coalesce into grave matter. It is proved 1. from the similar case in meals on a fast day, in servile works on a feast day. 2. From proposition 38 condemned by Innocent XI. 3. Because from multiplied light thefts there can be grave damage, or danger of grave damage. And this holds even if the little thefts are made from several persons. For although grave damage is not done to individuals as individuals, nevertheless grave damage is done to the community and society itself, or to one moral body in its members. Moreover, the matter concerns a thing which, unless it were gravely prohibited by justice, would give rise to a most grave evil against the common good; for it would be easy for sellers, e.g., to defraud measures, etc. Ithur., Cas. 1; L. 533, 534; E. M.

When do small thefts coalesce together? Small thefts coalesce into grave matter in four cases: 1. Through the intention of reaching grave matter, unless that prior will is retracted. The moral effect of this intention is to give moral unity to the various little thefts, and thus they reach grave matter. 2. If there is not a great interval of time between theft and theft. Otherwise, morally speaking, theft is not united with theft; nor therefore do they constitute one object in the moral genus. But more probably, and commonly speaking, thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months, even if they would approach quasi-grave matter. Yet others assign a longer interval, others a shorter one. The variety of these opinions shows that judgment in this matter must be taken not from the space of time alone, but also from other circumstances of things. Moreover, small thefts, even with whatever interval posited, coalesce according to the opinion of all whenever they were committed with the intention of reaching a notable sum; because by this intention they are truly united among themselves. But this intention being excluded, if the thefts are altogether modest, even with a lesser space of time, say fifteen days or even less, they do not coalesce. For who would say that the drink of coffee which a maid takes today coalesces with that which she will take after fifteen or ten days; or that the draught of wine taken today coalesces with the draught of wine taken tomorrow? 3.

Through conspiracy, where several conspire among themselves, and the little thefts of individuals, collected together, constitute grave matter. Since then each is the cause of the whole damage, in which he cooperates together with the others. - 4. Through the accession of a stolen thing to a stolen thing, if both are preserved; and then not only moral but also material union is had. Ithur., Cas. 27, n. 16; L. 530, 533, 535, 536, 537.

Note: 1. He who often steals a little from the same person, even if he has not had the will of becoming rich or of taking away a notable quantity, nevertheless if in the last small theft he notices that he has now reached a great quantity, by the last small theft, regularly speaking, he sins mortally. The reason is that such a thief by the last theft wills to continue and complete the grave damage of another; therefore by force of this volition he sins mortally, although the external theft according to itself precisely is light. L. 533. The same must be said if after grave matter has been completed, he steals something light; for the grave sin is continued. L. 538. - 2.

"It is not mortal, speaking of itself, to take secretly any sum whatever with the intention of restoring immediately, e.g., within a quarter-hour. The same is the case if within that brief time someone wishes to restore only that last part completing grave matter, or if he delays restitution for a brief time." L. 531, 533, 653. - 3. "If little thefts which together reach a great quantity have been made from different certain owners..., it seems more probably to be said that a thief of this kind does not sin gravely if he does not restore to the certain owners, when he can conveniently do so, and that he satisfies his grave obligation if he distributes the things owed to the poor... and he will also be excused from venial sin if some reasonable cause is present." L. 534.

Whether in extreme necessity it is licit to take secretly another's things. In extreme necessity, namely when no other way appears for preserving oneself, it is licit to take secretly another's things which are simply necessary for preserving life. The reason is 1. because against a taking of this kind the owner of the thing cannot be reasonably unwilling. 2. Because the division of goods, in whatever way it occurred, cannot derogate from natural or divine right. But according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, lower things are ordered to this, that from them relief be given to the necessity of men. Wherefore a right belongs to each one to provide for himself when he labors under extreme necessity. Therefore in such a case all things become common; and thus one accepting another's thing for relieving himself accepts a thing truly common, which he makes his own, just as happened before the division of goods. Therefore he does not commit theft. Nor indeed is he bound to ask or accept the thing as a loan; otherwise now nothing would ever become common. But because he has a right to that thing from justice, he can, if he is prevented, even take it by force. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 32, a. 7, ad 3; q. 66, a. 7; L. 520, 623, 624.

Resolutions: A poor person in extreme need can accept a thing even of great value, if it is absolutely necessary to him for preserving life; and unless it is an altogether extraordinary means for preserving life, although another is not bound to give. For the obligation of giving is from charity, which does not urge with great inconvenience; but the faculty of accepting is from the very right of nature, which all have of using goods destined by nature itself for the sustenance and conservation of man. But nature itself does not wish goods, especially very precious ones, to be common to all; whence no one is obliged to employ even those extraordinary goods to preserve life for himself. Yet someone can well preserve life even by extraordinary means, from the very faculty which he has of preserving life by created means. Lugo d. 16, n. 159; L. 520.

Note: Since the reason for taking another's things secretly is necessity, hence if one in extreme need has elsewhere, in fact or in probable hope, from which he can pay, he cannot take another's thing except with the burden of restitution, because necessity does not require that the ownership of the thing be acquired when it can sufficiently be relieved by a thing accepted as mutuum or commodatum. A rich man hiding his own things, or using another industry so as not to help the poor man, when the necessity of the poor man ceases, is not bound to restitution, because necessity, even extreme necessity, confers on the poor man a right to the use of another's thing only as long as the necessity itself urges. In addition, even while that extreme necessity of the poor man stands, the thing of the rich man does not cease to be his own as long as the poor man has not occupied it.

If a rich man prevents a poor man by force from accepting his goods, he sins against justice and is held concerning the damages arising from it; for since in that case the poor man has a right of using those things, he also has a right not to be impeded from them. L. 520, 701; H. A. 19, 20; St. Thomas, Quodl. 5, a. 17.

Whether also in merely grave necessity it is licit to take secretly another's things, by private right? - Resp. Negatively. 1. From proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI.

2. Because in these circumstances owners are reasonably unwilling, since things do not become common. For in this grave necessity, either the matter does not concern common goods of life, to the sustaining and conserving of which nature destined exterior common goods; or, if the matter concerns those goods, there is not absolute impossibility of providing for oneself from elsewhere, although not without inconvenience and labor. 3. Hallucination in this matter would be easy, and an entrance to plunderings would be more easily opened. Moreover, it does not seem illicit to take some small thing to avert grave damage of life, both from the intention of nature, which destined these lesser exterior goods for those lesser common goods of life, and from the presumed will of the owner. Lugo d. 16, n. 156. In merely grave necessity. For if someone suffers necessity, not indeed actually extreme, but very urgent, which more probably or certainly will soon verge into extreme necessity, he could take secretly from another's property for avoiding extreme necessity and danger of life. By private right, because since the common good prevails over the particular good, on account of public necessity and good the Prince can by high right at least dispose that the rich, e.g., open their granaries and sell at a just fixed price, etc. L. 520; Lugo d. 16, n. 154, 156, 160; E. M.

Whether, if a thief threatens to take your thing unless you accept and hand over to him another's thing, you can take this secretly so as not to lose your own? "This is not licit to do, because I do not have the right of inflicting damage on another in order to preserve my own goods; and therefore if I do this, I do an illicit and unjust action." L. 569.

"Whether those cutting wood in a forbidden forest sin and are bound to restitution? Doctors commonly teach that if the grove belongs to the whole community, its inhabitants who cut wood against the prohibition do not sin at least gravely, indeed not even venially according to Sanchez, etc., and are bound to restore nothing unless they make great destruction, but are bound only to the penalty after sentence; for such a prohibition is judged purely penal." L. 529, 614; l. 1, n. 145. The same holds concerning fields of the whole community as regards pasturing animals. L. ib. "Consequently those are free from all, or certainly from grave, fault who cut single bundles on single days for the use of the family, and the poor who cut besides two bundles each week for selling." D'Annibale, p. 2, n. 253, ed. 4. One must stand by the usages of places in this matter, Gousset 983. "In private forests, the poor are free from all, or at least from grave, fault who gather from them, indeed even cut down shrubs and brushwood necessary for fire; for not undeservedly you would say these are owed to them from charity, especially if the owners know and are silent, provided they do not devastate by cutting down, nor cut small trees or branches of trees, unless perhaps dead ones, nor carry away their poles or those of vineyards, nor tear down hedges." D'Annibale, l.c.

"Whether it is licit to eat grapes in another's vineyard? - Covarruvias, Valerius, Ripa, etc., apud Lugo d. 16, n. 33, affirm, provided one does not carry away the grapes, and they adduce Deut. 23:24, 25. And the same thing that is said concerning grapes and ears of grain, says Abulensis apud Cornelius a Lapide, understand concerning apples and other fruits." L. 529. St. Alphonsus in the same place says this opinion is sufficiently probable, and adds: "Moreover, probably," says Lugo, "by the law of nature it is licit to eat one or another cluster of grapes, that is, one or another grape; and in like manner he concedes eating from another's orchard one or another apple. For to prohibit this seems very harsh and contrary to humanity." Nor indeed would someone sin gravely if he ate up to satiety, provided he carried nothing away. - L. H. A. tr. 10, n. 24; D'Annibale, l.c.

What is to be judged concerning remnants of tailors? - If the remnant is a notable part, they are bound to restore it to the owner, if he pays the due price of labor. The reason is that the owner would be reasonably unwilling. If the remnant is of lesser moment, and is expressly reclaimed by the owner, they are also bound to restore, if he pays the due price of labor, for the same reason. If the remnant is of lesser moment and is not expressly reclaimed by the owner, then it can be retained, because owners commonly know that tailors retain similar moderate remnants, and therefore also often pay a lower price for the labor. L. 568.

How does he sin who takes away from another a small thing very dear to him, or a thing of greater moment which he does not care about? - Resp. To the 1st: He sins mortally against charity, yet not in the genus of theft against justice. The reason is that such a person unjustly gravely saddens another, yet in the goods of fortune he does not inflict grave damage. Hence, if such a thing perishes, the thief is not bound to restore to the owner as much as that owner valued the thing, but only the value and common estimation of the thing in itself. Resp. To the 2nd: He sins only venially if the owner cares little about it, as if it were of small moment; but if the owner does not care about it at all, and holds it as neglected and abandoned, he does not sin even venially. The reason is that injury is inflicted on the owner in the goods of fortune insofar as he himself is unwilling; therefore, since in the former case he is lightly unwilling, and in the latter in no way unwilling, in the former a light injury is inflicted on him, and in the latter none.