War

War, or an armed struggle between sovereign states, is defensive when it is undertaken to resist attack; otherwise it is offensive when undertaken to avenge an injury, or in vindication of a right.

When a quarrel has arisen between two sovereign states, if it is clear that one of the parties is in the wrong, it is bound to make reparation to the offended party. In national quarrels, however, this is seldom the case; as a rule, international disputes are matters of great complexity, and it is very difficult to say on which side right and justice lie. In ordinary cases, then, defensive war is always lawful, for if individuals have the right of self-defence the same right must a fortiori be conceded to a sovereign state. Even offensive war is lawful, provided that certain conditions be fulfilled. This is the certain teaching of Catholic theology, although the Church constantly prays to be delivered from all wars and from the terrible evils to which they give rise. Although war is a great evil, yet it is sometimes a hard necessity if still greater evils are to be avoided. For there is no higher tribunal to which sovereign states can have recourse to settle their disputed rights, and nothing is left but the final arbitrament of the sword. In modern times arbitration courts have been established, and they have done useful work, but cases arise in which their aid cannot be invoked with effect.

The conditions on which war may be lawfully waged are three:

(a) The public authority of a sovereign state is requisite to declare war, for war, except in just defence, cannot be made on private authority, or by a less than sovereign state; for private persons and subject states can always have recourse to higher authority for the vindication of their rights.

(b) A just and weighty cause is necessary, for the cause should be such as to outweigh the grave evils and risks which always accompany war. Such causes, in the judgement of divines, are: the retaking of a conquered country or rebellious province, the avenging of a grave insult or injury offered to the State, the freeing of the unjustly oppressed, the refusal of infidel states to allow the Gospel to be preached in their dominions. There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether certainty of the existence of a sufficient cause is required or not for the lawfulness of a war. Some divines hold that a probability of right is sufficient, for with such a probable right a private person may commence an action at law, and states should not be in a worse position than private persons in the prosecution of their claims. However, on account of the grave public evils connected with war, and because it is unlawful to deprive another of what he possesses on the ground that it is only probably mine, it would seem that at least a more probable right or even a moral certainty of right is required on the side of the state that begins the war.

(c) There must be an upright intention of advancing the cause of good or preventing evil. Mere delight in the excitement of war, or the desire of showing one’s prowess or obtaining promotion, would not justify war.

When the end of the war has been sufficiently obtained the victorious party should be ready to make peace on proper guarantees being given.

Where conscription exists or soldiers have already enlisted before the outbreak of war, they are not bound to make inquiries about the origin of the war in order to satisfy their consciences of its justice; they may presume that their country is in the right unless it is evident that it is in the wrong, and in doubt they are bound to obey the commands of their lawful superiors. If the war is clearly unjust it only remains for the conscientious soldier to abstain from inflicting unjust damage on the enemy, otherwise he will be a co-operator in injustice. Volunteers who had not enlisted at the outbreak of war are bound to satisfy their consciences as to its lawfulness before they take any part in it, just as they are bound to form a morally certain conscience about the lawfulness of any action that they undertake, as we saw in the Book on Conscience.

In a just war all means that conduce to the end of gaining victory over the enemy are lawful, provided that they are not against the law of nature and international law or agreement. International agreements are only binding if they are faithfully adhered to by the adverse party. In modern war it is the practice to spare the persons and property of non-belligerents as far as possible. In naval warfare not only the enemy’s ships of war may be attacked and taken, but his merchantmen, and any British vessel or vessel of an ally trading with or acting in the service of the enemy at war with England, or any neutral vessel engaged in the same way or in the carriage of contraband, and blockade runners, may be captured and made lawful prize by duly commissioned British ships. war on land is restricted to arms, ammunition, Booty of and military provisions and stores. Private property on land is no longer liable to capture and confiscation, but requisitions and contributions of men for labour, money, victuals, etc., are still levied on the invaded territory by duly qualified officials of the invading army. Beyond these limits, or at least beyond what is permitted by lawful authority, it is not allowed to appropriate private property belonging to the enemy.

Vol. I, Bk. VI, Pt. VII, Div. III, Ch. V, Section II. How Much is to be Restored

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. V, Sect. III, Scholion II. On War · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Appendix II. On Legal Just…, III. On Military Service · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. I, Article II. On Sacramental Jurisdiction Over Some Classes of Persons Specifically · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. VII, Diss. III, Pt. III, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article III. Impediments in Particular

In such cases as this each must, of course, make restitution for the harm which he personally and immediately caused. If each one takes his share and makes reparation for that portion of the injustice which he committed, the whole damage will be repaired. But sometimes some of the partners of injustice are unable or unwilling to make restitution for their share in the unjust act; the question then arises whether the rest are bound to make good the whole damage inflicted.

Each and all will jointly and severally be bound to make reparation for the whole damage, or in solidum, as divines say, when each and all were jointly and severally the efficacious moral or physical cause of the whole damage; for we are bound to make reparation for the damage which we have caused, and for that alone. This will be the case under the - following circumstances: (az) When the action of each and all is the necessary and sufficient cause of the whole damage. This condition is fulfilled when one commands or counsels an unjust act and another in consequence performs it.

(6) When the action of each is sufficient to cause the damage, and it has an actual effect in producing it, though the effect would have been produced without it. Thus if two men inflict fatal wounds on another, each is responsible for his death and all losses necessarily connected with it. In the same way, when several conspire together to commit an injury, and mutually encourage and assist each other to inflict it, all are bound jointly and severally to make restitution, (c) When the action of each is necessary for the production of the effect, so that it could not be produced without it, though the action of each would not be sufficient by itself, all are bound jointly and severally to repair the injury. Thus if two thieves carry off a safe which they could not carry alone, each in the other’s default must make good the whole damage.

When several acting together, but without mutual conspiracy in the strict sense, inflict injury on another, divines are not agreed as to whether each and all are bound to make reparation for the whole damage. Each is certainly bound to repair the damage due to his personal action, but probably be may be excused from restoring more than is equivalent to the damage which he actually caused. Thus, though those responsible for an unjust war are bound to make compensation for all the unjust damage which it causes, yet the private soldiers are only bound to make restitution for the damage which they personally cause. In the same way, if a crowd damage the property of an obnoxious political opponent, individuals who formed the crowd will only be obliged to make good the damage which they severally caused. Similarly, if injustice be done by picketing in a strike, the leaders will be bound to make reparation for all the injuries inflicted; the men who take part in it may be excused if they contribute their quota.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 6 passages

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. V, Sect. III, Scholion II. On War

Vol. I, On the Third Precept of th…, II. On the Prohibition of Servile Works · Vol. I, On the Fifth Precept of th…, VII. On War · Vol. III, On the Sacraments in General, IV. On the Subject of the Sacraments

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 402-411; Homo Apostolicus, tract 8, nn. 29-32.)

n. 751.

I. War, that is, a fight of one people against another, is distinguished into defensive and offensive. Defensive war is that which repels force here and now being brought against one; offensive war is that which is undertaken to compensate for or vindicate an injury that has been inflicted (St. Alphonsus, III, 402).

II. War is sometimes lawfully waged; defensive war, because a commonwealth, just as a private person, can repel unjust force by force; offensive war, because society ought to enjoy a means of defending its rights and of vindicating or recovering things lost. But sometimes no other means is at hand except war (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). There is added that God in the Old Testament more than once commanded war.

III. Only the supreme authority in the commonwealth can declare war. For since "the care of the commonwealth has been committed to princes, it pertains to them to protect the commonwealth of the city, or kingdom, or province subject to them" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 402). Nor can an inferior authority or a private person declare war which regards only part of the commonwealth. The reason is that inferiors can "prosecute their right in the judgment of a superior" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). Besides, as regards a private person, "to summon a multitude, which must be done in wars, does not pertain to a private person" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.; St. Alphonsus, III, 402).

Nevertheless, with natural law considered, the Supreme Prince can confer on an inferior magistrate, for example on the governor of a town or province, the faculty of declaring war on another town or province of a kingdom; and the same faculty can also belong to an inferior magistrate by force of the law of nations.

IV. In order that war may be lawfully declared, a just cause is required, and that the end justly intended cannot be obtained in another way.

A just cause, that is, one proportionate to the damages annexed to war. Moreover:

a) For defensive war, the unjust aggression itself of the other party suffices. As regards offensive war, "just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, if a nation or city is to be punished because it has either neglected to vindicate what was wickedly done by its own people, or to restore what was taken away by injury"¹ (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 402).

b) In doubt whether a just cause is present, war cannot be declared; both because in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and because "war commonly brings with it such crimes and damages to religion, to the innocent, to the honor of women, and so forth, that practically it can scarcely ever seem just if it is inferred from things merely probable and not certain" (St. Alphonsus, III, 404). But subjects, called by law or already bound by contract before the war, are not bound to inquire into the justice of the war as long as no vehement suspicion occurs; indeed, even in doubt about the justice of the war, although an arduous matter is involved, they are bound to obey on account of the common good. The contrary must be said of those who are bound neither by law nor by contract (St. Alphonsus, III, 408).

That the end justly intended cannot be obtained in another way; for example, through arbiters who settle the case. Indeed, with the immense damages annexed to war considered, princes must strive with every effort and work that wars always be averted.

V. As regards things lawful, prescribed, and prohibited in war, it suffices to have noted these things:

It is lawful, if it conduces to the end of the war, to lay waste fields, to destroy fortresses, to occupy hostile goods and lands, to besiege cities and harass them with fire, although by accident it happens that innocent persons are harmed and killed. Indeed, sometimes it is right to destroy monasteries and churches, and in them to despoil and kill, if, for example, enemies use them as a fortress to defend themselves. Yet the aforesaid things are not lawful for private soldiers or inferior officers without the permission of the commander² (St. Alphonsus, III, 409, 410). It is likewise lawful to use ambushes and stratagems, provided lies are absent (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 410).
"Faith pledged to an enemy must be kept, unless either you gave it under compulsion, or it would turn to grave detriment of the commonwealth or of religion; or if the enemies do not keep it; or finally if the conditions and circumstances have been altogether changed" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).
"Soldiers sin with the burden of making restitution if they take from country people or others, among whom they lodge or through whose places they pass, or extort from them unwilling, anything beyond those things which, by the constitution of the prince, these persons ought to furnish to them; unless, however, they are in extreme or at least grave necessity" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).
To the question, who can be justly killed in war, one must answer thus:

a) The following can be killed directly: commanders and soldiers of the hostile army; likewise those who bring aid to them.

b) The following cannot be killed: 1. the conquered and captured, unless from another source they are guilty of a crime of death; 2. those who have surrendered, under an agreement that they be spared; 3. the innocent, such as children, women, the elderly, country people, clerics, religious, pilgrims, unless it is established that they themselves are guilty; nevertheless they can be killed indirectly, insofar as their death cannot be avoided in military operations (St. Alphonsus, III, 409).³

Finally, citizens not belonging to the army, by force of the law accepted among nations, are bound to abstain from bloody defense of the fatherland and bloody attack upon enemy soldiers.⁴

¹ St. Augustine, book 6, Quaestiones (on Joshua, q. 16).

² Aertnys-Damen, I, 590.

³ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, I, 590.

⁴ Nederlandsche Katholieke Stemmen, 1915, p. 86.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Appendix II. On Legal Just…, III. On Military Service

n. 1059.

I. Justice of the law. The law of forced conscription is just. For by those to whom it especially belongs to judge about this matter, especially considering conscription as commonly admitted, it is judged very useful, or rather necessary, for protecting the republic. Nor is injustice present in the fact that families which do not have suitable young men are not held to some compensation, because the burden of military service is not familial but individual; nevertheless it would be equitable for the aforesaid families to contribute in another way. Furthermore, those whom ecclesiastical law exempts are to be exempted from the law of conscription.¹

¹ Cf. Damen, De vrijdom der Geestelijken van den krijgsdienst als Kerkelijke en Staatkundige Instelling.

n. 1060.

II. Obligation of the law. According to some, the law of military service is merely penal; according to others, it is mixed or obliges to the act of serving. Moreover:

First, the natural law dictates that the republic must be protected against unjust aggressors in good time and in a due manner, even with danger of life.
The law of military service seems mixed, or to oblige to the act. For the legislator, as we argued in n. 1054, is judged to make laws in that manner which is especially suited to the matter of the law. But to the matter of military law, since it is moral and even determinative of the natural law itself, it is especially suited that the very act of serving be prescribed; as was said about tax laws (n. cited). Nor does common estimation hold that military law is merely penal.
The law of military service does not oblige from commutative justice, but from legal justice or another virtue, yet one distinct from commutative justice; this is proved by the same reason by which it was proved in n. 1054 with respect to tax laws.

Corollary. Those sin who neglect registration in order to conscription; likewise those who obtain exemption by illegitimate means; and these indeed sin even apart from the sin which the means themselves contain, such as a lie, corruption of physicians, mutilation of oneself; likewise those who do not obey the precept of mobilization, or desert military service. And this holds even if someone, after the precept has been issued, is staying in another region; for, as common estimation has it, he remains a subject until he has been naturalized in another region, as it is called. Yet deserters are not held to return if a grave penalty threatens them.

Question 1. Whether those act unjustly with respect to those who are substituted in their place, and therefore are held to restore to them: 1° those who render themselves unfit for military service; 2° those who deceive physicians or magistrates, so that they are declared unfit; 3° those who desert military service.

Response. It is disputed; but it seems it must be denied, since those who act thus are not the cause, but only the occasion of the damage. The cause of the damage is the law itself, which orders that a fixed number be called, so that, when one is lacking, another is called.

Objection. Those who draw lots tacitly enter among themselves an aleatory contract, by force of which they are held to leave all things to the lot, and therefore to abstain from deceiving officials.

Response. A contract of this sort is asserted gratuitously; indeed, it would be entered even by those unaware of it.

Question 2. What must be said about those who corrupt magistrates or physicians?

Response 1. Those corrupting certainly act unjustly toward the republic, namely by cooperating toward an unjust act of magistrates or physicians, who with respect to the republic are held from justice to fulfill their office faithfully. Yet the damage which the republic suffers cannot be estimated, nor practically does restitution seem to be imposed on the penitent.

Response 2. It is sharply disputed whether they also act unjustly with respect to those who are called in their place, i.e. in the place of those corrupting. Moreover, sufficiently probably it is denied, because also in this case those corrupting are not the cause, but the occasion of the damage coming upon a third party; nor is it clear that the officials are held by a tacit contract with respect to the third party, namely, to turn the damage away from him.

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. I, Article II. On Sacramental Jurisdiction Over Some Classes of Persons Specifically

n. 368.

I. Jurisdiction over soldiers. 1. It is clear that soldiers can confess to a priest who has jurisdiction from the local Ordinary in whose place the confessions are instituted. What military chaplains can do independently of the local Ordinary depends on the special prescriptions of the Holy See (cf. can. 451, § 3). Namely, if a military bishop has been constituted, or at least if a chief chaplain has been placed over the whole army, the faculty of conferring jurisdiction over soldiers on other priests is easily granted to these.¹

Soldiers called to war, or mobilized as it is said, are equated with those constituted in danger of death; hence for them there hold the things which we shall say about jurisdiction over the dying (n. 370).²

¹ Cf. A.A.S. 1915, p. 217.

² Sacred Penitentiary, March 18, 1912; May 29, 1915 (A.A.S. 1915, p. 282); cf. Sacred Penitentiary, December 18, 1914 (A.A.S. 1914, p. 712); December 4, 1915 (A.A.S. 1915, p. 526).

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. VII, Diss. III, Pt. III, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article III. Impediments in Particular

n. 641.

IV. Slaves in slavery properly so called, before liberty has been accepted (canon 987, 4°).

V. Those who are bound by civil law to ordinary military service, before they have completed it (canon 987, 5°).

Those who by the law itself are called to care for the sick are not said to be bound to military service.
Annual exercises to which citizens are bound after ordinary service has been completed do not pertain to ordinary military service.¹
Those are also judged still bound by law to military service who perhaps will be called to military service, but are not yet called, either because they are unequal in age, or because they have been declared temporarily unfit.²

¹ Sacred Congregation of Religious, January 1, 1911 (A.A.S. 1911, p. 37).

² Pontifical Commission, June 2-3, 1918 (A.A.S. 1918, p. 344-345).

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 38 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 8. The Sins Against P…, War

n. 1376.

War

War.—War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.

(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts, such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.

(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war, sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation, not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a nation.

(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war, rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of diplomatic relations, etc.

n. 1377.

There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation); (b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the enslavement of a nation).

n. 1378.

Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right (e.g., invasion of the enemy’s territory to obtain compensation for damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust attack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of one’s country).

n. 1380.

War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings (Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged the lawfulness of the soldier’s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion was praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34). Our Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14 sqq.).

n. 1383.

War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus a premium would be set on iniquity.

n. 1384.

Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object, its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:

(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to the higher authority.

(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against those who are not its subjects.

(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war because one loves excitement or wishes to show one’s skill or get promotion, is not a right frame of mind.

n. 1385.

What public authority has the right to declare war? (a) Ordinarily, only the sovereign power—that is, the person or body in whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the nation—can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if custom or law allows it.

(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.

n. 1386.

In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less than that of toleration.

(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.

(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause for war, because a state has no right to use force against another sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war should not be declared.

(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all warfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare. “A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in passive indifference” (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).

n. 1389.

Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II Kings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence, self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law. Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.

n. 1393.

The following causes for war are not sufficient:

(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed, jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one’s own side. Hence, it is not lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the enlargement of one’s territory, for the advantage that may be gained over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power, or for the prevention of difficulties at home.

(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one’s own citizens.

(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice, but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus, the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a casus belli; for in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.

n. 1394.

Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one should refrain from hostilities as long as one’s moral right is uncertain.

(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just. They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves that their choice is correct.

(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean, however, that one should be willing to fight for one’s country, right or wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.

n. 1396.

Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or restitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants, for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the controversy.

n. 1398.

What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to natural law?

(a) Examination of the Cause of War.—It is clear that those charged with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel, not of a few, but of many—not merely among those who are experts in the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question, but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.

(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.—It is also clear that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism, yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful, unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement; but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive war.

(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.—Prudence demands that, even when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32). Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot at all foresee, are criminals.

(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.—Even if the cause is just and the war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last means. Hence, pacific means—such as direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes, boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.—should be tried in the first place.

n. 1399.

The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International Law

The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International Law.—(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one’s territory should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.

n. 1401.

What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful means, according to one’s position, to secure victory for one’s country. Fighting to gain only a “stalemate,” in itself, is immoral. (b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or international law.

n. 1403.

Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a) Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any means that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of one’s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the enemy of his weapons.

n. 1405.

Acts of War and Sacred Times

Acts of War and Sacred Times.—(a) It is lawful to carry on warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary, just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at those times.

n. 1406.

Acts of War and Sacred Places

Acts of War and Sacred Places.—(a) It is lawful to attack a church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes. It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.

n. 1407.

Acts of War and Sacred Persons

Acts of War and Sacred Persons.—(a) It is lawful for clerics to cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers, and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity (as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ, shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).

n. 1408.

The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a) Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation, old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.

n. 1409.

The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants

The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.—(a) According to natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without hastening the decision.

n. 1410.

The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants

The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.—(a) The indirect killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect (see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications, arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops, although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities, where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly, if not as an end, at least as a means.

(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder. Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.

Occasionally it is argued that modern “total” warfare demands that all citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” by John C. Ford, S.J. (Theological Studies, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law, exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or wounding of non-combatants.

n. 1411.

The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes

The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.—(a) It is lawful to sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops, guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel or break faith.

n. 1412.

Imprisonment and Restraint

Imprisonment and Restraint.—(a) Combatants may be made prisoners of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases they may be transported behind their enemy’s lines. (b) Prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human beings, but not better than the soldiers of one’s own army. They may not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one’s own forces.

n. 1413.

The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War

The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.—(a) The military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money, food or drink.

(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and some others are excepted by international law), and he may use immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted by law).

(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against private persons, but against the state.

(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.

(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search, seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.

n. 1414.

It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises: Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore, since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.

n. 1415.

Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery? (a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when compensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In modern times and according to present international law, looting is strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no right to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible, and valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the rights of the inhabitants to their goods.

n. 1416.

Stratagems in War

Stratagems in War.—(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for concealing one’s plans from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke screens, censored reports of engagements, etc. Thus, Josue by command of the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens of Hai (Jos., viii. 2). (b) It is lawful also to conceal one’s identity by wearing the uniforms of the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord commanded Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num., xiii. 1). While it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is lawful to conceal the truth from those who have no right to know it.

n. 1417.

Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to unlawful aggressions of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against him. Their morality depends on circumstances. (a) Thus, if the act of the enemy is opposed only to international law, it is not unlawful to use the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith, the treaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the enemy, contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful to use poison gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however, without authorization from the proper authority. (b) If the act of the enemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible to retaliate by the same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But one may retaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await compensation at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders the civil population, this does not justify one in murdering enemy citizens who are in one’s power.

n. 1418.

Duties of the Nation Victorious in War

Duties of the Nation Victorious in War.—(a) The victorious nation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained, or after the enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice. (b) It must not exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.

n. 1419.

The Rights of the Victor

The Rights of the Victor.—(a) If the cause of the victorious nation was unjust, its victory gives it no claim, for might does not make right. On the contrary, it may be obliged to make restitution to the defeated nation for the losses it has suffered. (b) If the cause of the victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim to three things: (i) to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which the war was undertaken; (ii) to compensation for damages caused by the enemy during the war, and (iii) to guarantees against a recurrence of the former injury. Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal has much to recommend it, since victors are prone to disregard charity and justice when treating with a conquered foe, and to extort from him forced agreements.

n. 1420.

The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust

The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust.—(a) If the victorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived the injustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which it has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before the war. (b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory does not prove that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It does not make a bad cause good.

n. 1421.

The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization, or with a Wrong Purpose

The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization, or with a Wrong Purpose.—(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy against the orders of the commanders (e.g., by burning dwellings, robbing private citizens, murdering, etc.), are obliged to restitution for those injuries, for such acts are not war, but brigandage. (b) Soldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not obliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for similarly a judge, who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his motive is hate, but he is not held to restitution.

n. 1422.

What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?—(a) According to justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses one has sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for these. (b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part of what is owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a debt, as when the enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay at present.

n. 1424.

Guarantees for the Future

Guarantees for the Future.—(a) One may insist on such guarantees as will insure against a probable renewal of the offense committed by the conquered nation. Hence, one may require that it destroy or deliver over fortifications and munition plants, sink warships, reduce its military force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain rulers.

(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal of war by the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible. As said above, a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against aggression, but it has no right to work at destroying equality or competition on the part of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to demand that the conquered nation surrender its independence or the management of its affairs, or that one be allowed to annex all the territory taken during war, if one’s rights or reasonable security does not require these conditions. Subjugation or temporary occupation are lawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress or securities.

n. 1425.

Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during War

Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during War.—(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of non-combatants) may be punished, but the punishment should be visited on those responsible, not on those who merely executed orders. (b) The crime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers, for it is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and rulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The Nurenberg trials held commanders and high officers responsible for crimes against humanity, and not without precedent.

n. 1426.

Preparation for Future Wars

Preparation for Future Wars.—(a) Reasonable preparedness is not only lawful, but a duty of the state to its own people. A nation should have such a military establishment or such alliances as will safeguard its right against probable attack. (b) Unreasonable preparedness is unlawful since it burdens the people and prepares the way for war. Examples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance of an army or navy far in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military expenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too dangerous for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.

n. 1427.

Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory than preparation for defensive war. Two chief ways of preparing for peace: (a) will for peace; (b) work for peace.

(a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their people to a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness and folly of a narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has not all the conditions of a just war in its favor. Without the will for peace, conferences and treaties will effect little.

(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical plans for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world amity. Among these plans are agreements among nations to substitute moral right for material force, to abolish conscription and armaments, to establish international tribunals, associations and world courts, to make arbitration of disputes among themselves compulsory, to codify international law. History bears witness to the many and great services to humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters between nations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement among governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless continue to work for peace and by constitutional means make their wishes prevail among the governments. With the Church we should pray: “From pestilence, famine and war, deliver us, O Lord.”

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 13 passages

Vol. I, On the Third Precept of th…, II. On the Prohibition of Servile Works

n. 658.

By suit is understood a civil sentence or the hearing of civil causes in judgment. By judgment unto death is understood the citation of the accused to judgment, his examination, condemnation, and execution of the sentence. Now then, judicial processes are prohibited on feast days, and are void by the law itself from C. ult., de Feriis. Except, however, if a cause is present both of necessity and also of piety, as is clear from the same Cap. ult., de Feriis, and from the common authority of theologians.

Therefore it is licit on a feast day to excommunicate, dispense, inform a judge privately, consult an advocate, prepare counsels, etc., because these things are done outside judgment and consequently do not require judicial noise. It is said to be judicial noise where the cause is contentious and litigious, and where questions and disputes are handled; and indeed judicial noise consists in citation, from which the cause chiefly seems to begin, in the formation of process and the cognition of the cause, and in the pronouncement of sentence. Therefore acts of voluntary jurisdiction are not prohibited on a feast day, nor extrajudicial acts. Suarez, l. 2, c. 38; Cajetan, 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4; Schmalz., l. 2, t. 9, nn. 52, 53; Struggl 6; Bonacina, t. 2, d. 5, q. un., p. 2, n. 25; L. 284, 287, 294, 295. "Necessity ceasing, it is not licit to wage war on feast days." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 4. For war is against the rest and sanctification of the feast day, which is ordered to being free for divine things. But if necessity is present, as other works become licit from necessity, so also to wage war. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4; C. Treguas, de Tregua et pace.

Vol. I, On the Fifth Precept of th…, VII. On War

n. 751.

What is war? War is a fight of a multitude against an external multitude, undertaken by the legitimate authority of Princes, for defending the good of the commonwealth or for vindicating an injury inflicted upon it. War differs from a brawl because a brawl is a fight between private persons, of a few or of individuals against a few or individuals. It differs from sedition, because sedition is the attack of a multitude against a multitude in the same commonwealth or society. A brawl proceeds from an inordinate will. And therefore a brawl always imports sin. And in him indeed who unjustly attacks another, it is per se mortal sin; for to inflict harm on a neighbor, even by natural work, is not without mortal sin. But because sedition has a special good to which it is opposed, namely the unity and peace of the multitude, it is a special sin. It is opposed to justice and to the common good, insofar as it inflicts harm on the commonwealth and its citizens. "And therefore from its genus it is mortal sin, and so much the more grave as the common good which is attacked through sedition is greater than private good.... But those who defend the common good by resisting them are not to be called seditious, just as neither are those who defend themselves called brawlers." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 1; q. 41, a. 1; q. 42, a. 1.

n. 752.

How many kinds of war are there? One war is defensive, another offensive. Offensive war pertains to vindicative justice, and cannot be instituted except by the authority of the supreme Prince. But defensive war looks only to this, that force brought by another commonwealth be repelled by force. "Moreover, since all laws permit force unjustly brought to be repelled by force, hence defensive war can be undertaken not only by public authority, but also by private authority of those invaded by the enemy, as is found in L. 3 ff. de Iust. et iur. Meanwhile, however, between war undertaken by private and public authority there is this distinction: that those fighting in defensive war by private authority are bound to the moderation of blameless defense, stopping in only necessary and sufficient defense; on the contrary, those fighting in defensive war undertaken by public authority can justly proceed further offensively to vengeance for the injury inflicted." Struggl 40; L. 402; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 1.

n. 753.

Is war lawful? - The lawfulness of defensive war is clear from this, that if it is lawful for a private man to repel force by force, the same certainly will be lawful for the whole society.

But the lawfulness of offensive war, if the due conditions concur, is clear both from the common authority of Catholics and because by natural law it is lawful not only to ward off an injury while it is being inflicted unjustly on someone, but also to vindicate and remove it by public authority after it has been inflicted, lest it be inflicted again thereafter. Therefore supreme Princes, who on earth do not have a higher judge, can vindicate injuries inflicted on them by another Prince; and this cannot be done except through offensive war. Therefore. C. Iustum 1, c. 23, q. 2; C. Dominus 2 ib.; Struggl 41; Ithur. Cas. 40, n. 13; L. 402; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 1; E. M. Consequently war is lawful for bringing help to another people which is waging a lawful war. E. M. 757.

n. 754.

What are the conditions for beginning, continuing, and ending war lawfully and justly? - R. To the 1st: 1. Public authority, that is, supreme authority, recognizing no other superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a greater authority is had, this must judge concerning the dispute. 2. A just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences going to follow from war, for example, a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury to the commonwealth to be warded off, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, etc. For since from war so many evils come to the body and soul of many, it is not to be attempted except in extremes. 3. Morally certain right. The reason is: 1. because a possessor in good faith cannot be despoiled of the thing possessed, unless it is established that he unjustly retains it. 2. Because for positing the cause of most grave evils, both of private persons and of society itself, such as killings, injustices, corruptions of morals, and other such things, which ordinarily follow war, moral certainty of one's right seems to be required. Thus far more probably and more truly, St. Liguori 404, Pal., Tamb., and others against many, of whom some think that only greater probability suffices, others that equal probability suffices. But theologians commonly teach that lesser probability by no means suffices. 4. That before war, condign satisfaction be demanded from the adverse party; if it is offered, it must be accepted from justice, for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. 5. Right intention is required, namely that good be promoted and evil avoided, not by cupidity or cruelty, but by zeal for peace. L. 403, 405; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 10, a. 8; q. 40, a. 1; Verricelli tr. de Apost. Mission. t. 13, q. 128, s. 17, section 13.

R. To the 2nd: Even after mutual aggression and conflict, when some have already fallen on the side of him who wages a just war, condign satisfaction must be accepted and the war interrupted, if that is offered by the adversary Prince; if not from the rigor of justice, at least for the most part from charity, provided that the other party is willing to compensate all expenses already made, and it is not necessary for the public good that his insolence be beaten back. The 1st reason is that then war already ceases to be necessary for the end. The 2nd reason is that, since in a vindicative war, after many have already fallen, it is almost impossible to give condign satisfaction, the offended Prince, from a war actually begun, is not bound from justice, but rather from charity alone, to desist and to accept satisfaction. Laymann l. 2, tr. 3, c. 12, n. 5; L. 405.

R. To the 3rd: In offensive war, after the thing owed has been recovered and every indemnity, or after the injury has been sufficiently vindicated, the victor is bound to accept peace furnished with just conditions. The same is true of the victor in defensive war, after he has sufficiently vindicated the injury inflicted on him. The reason is that excess would be against the right of vindicative justice, indeed even of commutative justice. Besides, the end of war is peace and security. Therefore, once these have been sufficiently obtained, war, as an atrocious means, must be desisted from. Moreover also the conquered, per accidens, is often bound to accept peace, lest he expose himself and his subjects to greater danger, misfortune, or intolerable inconvenience. Struggl 44; Cajetan, Summ. v. Bellum. A nation which justly wages war can occupy the goods of enemies as much as is necessary for compensation of the damages which it has suffered, for payment of the expenses of war, and for just vengeance of the injury.

n. 755.

What is lawful to do against the enemy in war? - In a just war it is lawful to do all things against the enemy which are necessary and apt for obtaining the just end of war, yet according to the command and express or tacit will of the commander of the war. The reason is that he who has a right to the end also has a right to the necessary and apt means. Therefore in a just war it is lawful to do against the enemy all things which are necessary and apt for obtaining the just end of war. Which are necessary and apt; for other things harmful to the neighbor, which are not necessary for such an end, cannot justly be inflicted, and the damage afterward must be repaired. The just end of war, namely to overcome the enemies. Laym. 9; Sporer 112; Struggl 45; L. 409.

n. 756.

You will resolve: In a just war it is lawful to fight in open warfare, and to use ambushes and stratagems. These are not reputed lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since those means are customarily used in war. But deceits are unlawful which cannot be guarded against by prudence. It is lawful to deprive cities of water; but it is not lawful to infect wells and fountains with poison, or otherwise to use methods of bringing slaughter which can be avoided by no human prudence, or which bring grave harm even to the innocent, or which savor of cruelty and atrocity, S. Th. 2. 2, q. 108, a. 2 ad 3; much less indeed is it lawful directly to kill the innocent, legates, cf. 737, who by the law of nations are everywhere inviolable, and likewise to suborn assassins who secretly butcher the Prince or commander of the army.

Therefore the use of any kind of weapons is lawful, provided that these are not poisoned, or lethal in another similar way. It is lawful to besiege cities and citadels, to discharge artillery against them, indeed sometimes to destroy or burn monasteries and churches, to plunder and kill in them, if, for example, enemies use a church as a citadel for defending themselves.

To use the standards of enemies in order to deceive enemies is a very true lie of fact.

Scouts also, who are sent to enemies under the appearance of friends or by another fictitious reason, and approach them asking, for example, medicines which they do not need, are not even free from a lie.

Lying, deceit, fraud are never lawful. Likewise it is sometimes lawful to give a captured city to plunder, but only for most grave reasons. This, however, is not lawful for soldiers by their own authority, but it is necessary that legitimate permission be present. And then it is in no way lawful directly to kill the innocent, under whose name come children, women, the elderly, foreigners, clerics, peasants, merchants, etc., because these have committed nothing on account of which they could be deprived of life, nor are they actual or proximate aggressors. Moreover it is not lawful per se to despoil innocent foreigners even of goods, because they are guilty neither in themselves nor in society. Likewise, when a city is given to plunder, monasteries, churches, and pious places are always excepted. C. 2 de Treg. et pac. But immovable goods by the law of war fall to the Prince or commonwealth; movable goods of use become the property of the first taker, unless custom or law is that a part fall to the Prince and community, or all be placed in common, and distribution be made to individuals with due proportion. Besides spoils, reprisals also are lawful; they are occupation by force made and retention of persons or things of enemies, which by chance or by design come into the hands of the other party, since they are certain compensations and a kind of war. They are lawful, if however: 1. It is manifestly established that citizens of the other commonwealth have done an injury. 2. If their superiors, when asked, refuse to administer justice. 3. If it is established that they culpably refuse this. 4. If the supreme Prince, the cause having been known, concedes this. 5. If no more damage is inflicted than just satisfaction requires. 6. If they are not committed against ecclesiastical persons; C. Etsi unic., de Iniur. in 6. In the conflict itself or attack it is lawful to kill all fighting against one, or existing in arms, of whatever condition, state, or sex, until they give themselves as captives, and perfect victory is obtained. But after the conflict and victory obtained, it is sometimes lawful also to kill captured or surrendered guilty persons, namely if before this they have merited death by some crime; or if this is necessary for establishing peace and security or justly vindicating the injury, unless they have surrendered with a pact of life to be preserved; or unless they are clerics, even guilty, whom after the conflict it is in no way lawful for a secular Prince to kill because of their immunity. But since soldiers today are regularly compelled and not voluntary, they also are to be held as innocent, whom it is not lawful to kill after conflict. 1 Kings 30; C. Miles 13, c. 23, q. 5; L. 409, 410; Struggl 47 seqq.; Ithur. Cas. 40, nn. 14, 17; Laym. l. 2, tr. 3, c. 12, nn. 7, 9 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 3; q. 66, a. 8 ad 1; q. 108, a. 1 ad 5.

n. 757.

Can Catholic Princes in war call heretics or even gentiles to their aid? - The first opinion universally affirms. The second opinion absolutely denies. The third opinion affirms that per se it is lawful; nevertheless per accidens by reason of scandal and harm to religion, which for the most part is present, it is unlawful. "This third opinion," says St. Alphonsus 406, "speculatively is indeed probable, but the second in practice seems altogether to be held. The reason is that it is morally impossible that, with alliance contracted with enemies of the faith, the aforesaid harms will not come to religion." Prop. 62 Syll. condemned by Pius IX; E. M.

n. 758.

Can soldiers wage war with doubt concerning the justice of the war? - Either the matter concerns soldiers who are subjects; or non-subjects; or hired men. If the 1st, they are bound to obey the Prince commanding, until they are altogether certain concerning the injustice of the war; for subjects are bound to obey where sin is not certain. Then, in the proposed case, they must presume the war as just, where the contrary does not clearly appear. Namely, the right of the superior possesses, so that, Augustine teaching, "perhaps the injustice of commanding makes the king guilty, but the order of serving shows the soldier innocent." L. 22 cont. Faust. c. 75.

If the 2nd, they must not fight unless they become certain of the justice of that war; for since the matter concerns the damage of a third party and indeed most grave damage, it cannot be inflicted on him before there is certainty concerning the injustice of the possessor. If the 3rd, either they were already hired before the war was declared, and the same thing must be said as of subjects; or afterward, and what was said of non-subjects holds. Luc. 3:14; L. 407, 408; Ithur. Cas. 40, n. 16; Tambur. Explic. Dec. l. 6, c. 1, par. 1, n. 9; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 10, n. 144; Laym. l. c. n. 8. In an evidently unjust war, soldiers, although compelled, cannot fire upon enemies and kill or wound them. Yet if they are attacked by enemies who, if they handed over their arms, would be unwilling to grant pardon, then they can defend themselves with arms against them, as against unjust aggressors. Tambur. in Decal. l. 6, c. 1, section 1, n. 9.

n. 759.

Is it lawful for clerics to wage war? - Outside the cases of necessity, clerics are prohibited by canon law, under penalty of irregularity, from fighting by their own hand in war. C. Clericum D. 50; C. Eos qui c. 20. q. 3, etc. Outside the case of necessity; for in certain cases of necessity, clerics, without license of the Pope and without the penalty of irregularity, can fight by their own hand in war. Struggl 54; Laym. l. c. n. 19; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 2.

n. 760.

What special obligation is present in time of war for the Prince and commanders, and for soldiers? R. To the 1st: Princes and commanders, especially in time of war, are bound to take care that soldiers observe the precepts of morals and religion, lest they be a scandal or harm to peoples. They must command nothing too dangerous to soldiers, unless because of manifest necessity; and with every zeal they must provide for their lives, and they must not rashly expose their own life to danger, lest the whole army or the whole legion lack a prudent leader. Likewise they must pay stipends to them by right administration, and with due equity distribute burdens among citizens if at any time they spend the night and stay among them; otherwise they are bound to compensate damages to them, both to soldiers and to others who have received damages from soldiers, since they are the unjust and efficaciously moving cause of these. Likewise to citizens who in time of war have suffered immense damage, a certain restitution is owed by the commonwealth. For the law of war excuses not those things which are done to citizens, but those things which harm the enemy. Nor indeed is it fair that some be burdened more than others, when the matter concerns a good common to all. By the same reason a contribution is customarily made if the merchandise of one has been thrown into the sea so that the things of others may be saved. "For the protection of the commonwealth of the faithful it is lawful to carry on just wars on feast days." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 4; C. 1 de Treg. et pac.; Cf. here 658.

R. To the 2nd: Citizens are altogether lawfully compelled by legitimate authority, when public necessity compels, to make military service. Soldiers, however, must obey the commander in all things which regard military service, with the divine law preserved. Therefore they must keep their station, attack the enemy, and fight bravely even with danger of life. But they cannot do anything unordered, although for the utility of their own and the harm of enemies. For it is better that necessary discipline be preserved than that utility be sought at anyone's discretion with danger of harm. Soldiers who depart from the army for a time without the commander's license sin; but those who entirely desert the camp are guilty of a more grave sin. Luc. 3:14; L. 405, 407; Laym. l. c. n. 18; Cajetan, Summ. v. Bellum; Gousset 1003 seqq.

n. 761.

When war has been completed, are the parties bound to preserve public pacts, extorted by the force of war and of victory obtained? Gury, Cas. 410, responds affirmatively to this question. "The reason is," he says, "because public treaties were introduced by the law of nations, common to the whole human race, the common good of the human race so requiring.

For unless public pacts between so many different Princes, and between magistrates and subjects, were to be preserved in every way, no stable peace or society could consist; but a way would be opened to perpetual wars and slaughters." Reuter has the same opinion, which he affirms to be common, saying p. 3, n. 510: "Public faith given to an enemy, even one waging an unjust war, is to be preserved, provided the treaty is not objectively evil." Concerning this same question Lugo has these things: "In war, because of the public good of peace and the security of kingdoms, it is necessary that pacts be preserved on both sides, when they are made without coercion and fear; otherwise, since each one presumes that he has a just cause of war, pacts of this sort would never be preserved, which would be the greatest impediment to composing peace; just as also, because of the same reason, impunity and indemnity are owed to orators and public legates, because otherwise there could not be negotiation concerning peace, which would be a great inconvenience." De Iust. et Iur. d. 37, s. 15, n. 179. And S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 3 says: "Someone can be deceived from the deed or saying of another from the fact that something false is said to him or a promise is not kept; and that is always unlawful; and in this way no one ought to deceive enemies; for there are certain laws of wars, and treaties to be preserved even among enemies themselves." C. Noli 3, c. 23, q. 1. Laym. l. c. nn. 15, 16.

Vol. III, On the Sacraments in General, IV. On the Subject of the Sacraments

n. 383.

What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.

In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.

For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.

L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.

Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 11 passages

61. On the Duel and War

Marcus and Marcianus, soldiers, quarreled among themselves, and each afflicted the other with various insults. This was reported to the commander of the cohort, who ordered that those two soldiers should perpetrate a duel between themselves, otherwise they were to be cast into hard prison for a month. Unwillingly they institute the duel, and Marcus gravely wounded Marcianus.

Q. 1. What is a duel, and is it licit? 2. What of the duel of Marcus and Marcianus?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 746 seqq.; E. M. 747. To the second. The commander of the cohort indeed sins gravely by commanding the duel, and Marcus and Marcianus also sin gravely by perpetrating the duel. For a duel is intrinsically illicit and is gravely prohibited both by natural law and by canonical law. Nor indeed can the duel become licit for those perpetrating it from the fact that it is commanded. For from such a precept the danger in it of grave wound, mutilation, and death is not taken away, nor do those perpetrating the duel acquire a right, each over the other's members and life. Hence neither is its illicitness taken away as regards the one commanding, in the case, who commands it by way of punishment to avoid the frequent quarrels of soldiers. For the one commanding, in the case, neither himself has a right over the integrity of the members and the life of the soldiers, nor consequently can confer that right on the duellists themselves. Then the great scandal which comes from this is clear; for by this manner of acting, a broad way is opened for entering duels, especially among military men. And if a duel is illicit when it is only for the sake of spectacle or of showing courage, how much more must a duel be illicit in the case. C. Felicis 1, de Torneamentis. And this can also be confirmed from the following resolution of the Sacred Congregation of the Council.

"In the schools of the German universities certain special duels are had. For scholastic duels consist in this: that the duellists, using special arms, that is, a certain small knife, and the other parts of the body being well covered, inflict on themselves an incision or wound in the face, the traces of which nevertheless generally disappear in a short time. Therefore in no way is death or mutilation intended, and these sad facts happen very rarely and only by accident, from imprudence or from another cause extrinsic to the duel. Nor are these duels always committed properly from vengeance or for repairing honor, but chiefly for the sake of a game, cruel indeed, or of exercise. For this effect, indeed under the appearance of furnishing and fostering this game or exercise, there are societies among the disciples of the University, in which, for obtaining a higher grade, a certain number of duels to be instituted is prescribed, and, after a certain time has passed without duels, the presidents of the societies come together to raise pretexts for instituting duels."

But when the doubt was proposed: "Whether, by whom, and from what title irregularity is contracted when a duel is committed in that way in which in these times it is customary to be done among alumni of the University of Germany in the case," the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 9 Aug. 1890, responded: "Affirmatively, by the duellists and their seconds, from infamy of law." Acta S. Sed., v. 23, p. 242. From infamy of law, established by the Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 19; by no means from lenity, which in the case has no place, nor from delict, since neither death nor mutilation follows. Cf. I. M. V. 2, n. 1332 seqq., 1350 seqq.

Therefore Marcus and Marcianus incur irregularity from infamy. As regards irregularity from delict, if death in reality or mutilation had followed, this also would have had place; but since Marcianus was only wounded, Marcus does not incur irregularity also from delict. I. M. V. 2, n. 1335.

But whether they have also incurred the excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff can at first sight be doubted, because ex condicto seems to be lacking in the case, since Marcus and Marcianus institute the duel unwillingly and perpetrate the duel from a command imposed on them under penalty. But it does not seem that the agreement is in reality lacking in the case as to place, as to time, and as to arms, although unwillingly and from fear of prison they consent into the previous agreement, into the duel itself. Nor indeed do they seem able to be excused from fear of the penalty of prison, since even positive law, in the case, does not cease. And this is gathered from the propositions condemned by Benedict XIV. Cf. Enchirid. Moral. 747, 748; I. M. V. 2, n. 1118, 1128 seqq.

An unjust war was declared between Prince Albinus and Prince Rubinus. The army of Rubinus, who was justly defending himself in the war, was conquered; and, victory already having been obtained by the army of Albinus, the signal for ceasing from hostilities was made on both sides by the commanders. While the soldiers of Albinus are returning peacefully to camp from the field of battle, Leontius, a most ardent soldier of Rubinus, was still pursuing the enemies and killed one of them. Seeing this, a certain soldier from those to whom the military police had been committed in the army of Albinus immediately seized Leontius and was leading him before himself to the commander of the war. Leontius, now certain of undergoing the punishment of death, when they had to pass through a narrow place, feigning civility, invited the soldier to pass before him. Scarcely had the soldier gone before, when Leon- tius struck him from behind with a sword and killed him, immediately fleeing unharmed.

Q. 1. Is war licit, and what things are licit in war? 2. What must be thought of Leontius?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 751 seqq.; E. M. 753. - To the second. Leontius is guilty of a double homicide. He is guilty of the first homicide because, the hostilities now having ceased, and the signal of truce having been made by the commander of war, no soldier could now pursue, strike, and kill adversaries. And although the soldiers of the army of Rubinus were fighting altogether justly, nevertheless, the war ceasing, or even only being interrupted, none of them could now licitly and justly kill, since no one by private authority can kill a man, even one guilty and culpable. Hence Leontius is also guilty of the second homicide. For that soldier altogether legitimately and justly seized him, nor was he an unjust aggressor against his life. But the fact that Leontius killed him in order to avoid the punishment of death by no means makes the unjust homicide honorable.

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Fifth Precept of th…, Chapter IV. On War · Vol. I, Treatise on Justice and Ri…, Third Part. On Restitution, Sect. II, Ch. III, Article II. On Damage Inflicted on Occasion of Military Service

Hence another case is resolved: whether, during war, private citizens can kill enemy soldiers whom they peacefully receive as guests, although they are compelled to this, or who meet them on the road, for example, unarmed, or few in number, or each one alone separated from the others. It must be altogether denied; for by private authority it is permitted to kill no one; and even in time of war, private citizens do not receive this power of wounding and killing. This one thing is permitted to them: to repel by force the force unjustly inflicted upon them, plainly in the same way as when there is question of an unjust aggressor.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 42 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Fifth Precept of th…, Chapter IV. On War

- War is a fight of a multitude against a multitude foreign to the Republic, for the cause of defending or vindicating the Republic.

Hence it differs: 1. from a brawl, which is the fight of a few against a few; 2. from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against the political society to which it pertains.

War is distinguished as: 1. offensive, if it is done for vindicating an injury; 2. defensive, if it is sustained for repelling force.

Principles. - I. War per se is lawful, whether for repelling an injury, or for vindicating one's own right. The reason is that any society independent from another society must have a means of protecting itself against injury and vindicating its own right; but sometimes no other means is available for obtaining this end except war. Indeed, since higher tribunals are lacking to which Nations or Princes can have recourse, it remains only that they use war for obtaining satisfaction from another society. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 40, art. 1, and others.

II. For a just and lawful war, the following are necessarily required:

Legitimate authority, that is, supreme, acknowledging no other Superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a greater authority is had, this must judge concerning the dispute.

A just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences going to follow from the war; for example, a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury to the Republic to be driven away, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, etc.

The due manner of waging war, namely that before war fitting satisfaction be demanded from the adverse party; if this is offered, it must be accepted from justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. - St. Thomas, ibid. - Billuart, etc.

Questions. - Q. 1. Whether it is lawful to wage war with probability of one's own right?

Resp. It is disputed. But the negative part is far more probable, at least intrinsically and practically. The reason is: 1. because a possessor in good faith cannot be despoiled of the thing possessed unless it is clear that he unjustly retains it; 2. because for placing the cause of most grave evils, such as slaughters, injustices, corruptions of morals, and other things of this sort which ordinarily follow war, moral certitude of one's own right seems to be required. - St. Alphonsus, n. 404; Tamburini; Billuart, against several, of whom some think that only greater probability suffices, but others that equal probability does.

Q. 2. Whether soldiers can wage war with doubt concerning the justice of the war?

Resp. 1. If there is question of a soldier who is a subject, he is bound to obey where the war is not evidently unjust, because it does not pertain to him to examine the reasons of Superiors ¹.

¹ What some have said, that the authority of the prince suffices for a probable judgment of the justice of a war, Lugo rightly observes (De Iust., disp. 18, n. 21) is not always and universally true. For when (he says) I know from elsewhere that the prince commonly commands shameful things at his pleasure, and... without any attention at all to what is lawful, how can I believe from the mere command of the prince that what he commands is just? And a little after, as regards princes whom we know to be destitute of the Christian faith: Since the soldier cannot prudently trust to their conscience, inasmuch as they care little about the justice of war, he ought attentively to consider and examine the justice and the cause of the war, so that he may be able to form that probable judgment.

If there is question of a soldier hired before the war was declared, he can obey; for he is hired for this. Whence he must conduct himself almost as if he were a subject.

If there is question of a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire concerning the justice of the war, nor in doubt concerning the justice can he hire himself out. The reason is that no one can cooperate toward despoiling another of a thing which he possesses, unless he is certain that it is possessed by him unjustly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 408.

Q. 3. Whether it is lawful for Catholic Princes in a just war to call heretics and infidels to their aid?

Resp. It is affirmed per se, at least speaking speculatively, provided scandal and danger of the Faith are absent. But, says St. Alphonsus, n. 406, for the most part by accident it is illicit on account of damages threatening Religion.

Q. 4. Whether guilty or innocent persons can be killed by the victor?

Resp. 1. Guilty persons can sometimes be killed, or soldiers who have fought, if this is necessary for establishing peace and security or vindicating injury, unless they have surrendered themselves with an agreement that life be preserved. But this is altogether alien to the customs of our time.

But innocents, that is, women, the old, pilgrims, Clerics, Religious, etc., cannot be killed directly unless it is clear that they were associates in the war. Yet they can be killed indirectly, while the battle is not yet completed, if they are mixed with the guilty, so that, with these preserved, the remaining crowd of the guilty which must be destroyed cannot be killed. - St. Alphonsus, n. 409.

Resolves. - 1. Soldiers in an unjust war cannot lawfully kill enemies even for the sake of defense; if they cannot flee, they must take care lest they strike with their blows. For they themselves are unjust aggressors, and contrary rights cannot be given in the same matter. - Lacroix, and others commonly ².

² Understand that saying, that a war cannot be just on both sides, unless by accident it is judged just on both sides on account of some invincible ignorance; which in soldiers, to whom in doubt it does not pertain to define the cause, can often happen.

And as regards the resolution, what Molina has with Soto must not be neglected. "If someone," he says, "in a war which in good faith he had thought just, nevertheless in the conflict itself recognized its injustice, and while he flees sees an adversary pursuing, whom he cannot escape unless he kills him, he could kill him in defense of himself, because since he is really innocent, he is not worthy of the death which the adversary wishes to inflict on him, who, if the truth were clear to him, would have to leave him." In Lugo (De Iust., disp. 10, n. 144), to whom nevertheless these things are less pleasing (ibid., n. 176). But the inconveniences can be avoided without difficulty: for in flight the soldier can surrender himself to those pursuing, and in this way escape death.

The Prince, after the injustice of the war has been ascertained, must propose it to the adverse party, nor can he begin the war if competent satisfaction is offered to him; indeed even after war has begun, adequate satisfaction being offered, he is bound to leave it, if not from the rigor of justice, at least for the most part from charity, provided the other party is willing to compensate all expenses already made, and it is not necessary for the public good that his insolence be beaten back.

It is lawful in war to prepare ambushes and apply stratagems, so that enemies may be deceived by fallacies and cast into dangers. For these are not reputed lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since those means are customarily applied in war. Thus it is lawful to feign flight, to use the flags of enemies, etc. But frauds are illicit which can be forestalled by no prudence, for example to infect wells and springs with poison, etc.; for these, by the common sense, fight against the rights of war. - St. Alphonsus, n. 410.

In a just war it is lawful to besiege cities and fortresses, to discharge cannons against them, indeed sometimes to destroy or burn monasteries and Churches, to plunder and kill in them, if, for example, the enemies use a Church as a fortress for defending themselves. - Likewise it is sometimes lawful to give a captured city over to plunder, but only for most grave reasons. - St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Commanders of the army and soldiers must take the greatest precaution lest they exceed after victory in punishing the vanquished; for they are ministers of legitimate vengeance, but not robbers and assassins. They must especially avoid whatever smacks of cruelty or a spirit of harming.

Commanders and soldiers cannot injure legates of the adverse party, because by the law of Nations they are everywhere inviolable; nor can they send spies who may secretly butcher the Prince or Commander of the army or other Nobles of the kingdom, because by the consent of all this pertains to treachery.

Vol. I, Treatise on Justice and Ri…, Third Part. On Restitution, Sect. II, Ch. III, Article II. On Damage Inflicted on Occasion of Military Service

n. 746.

Principles. - I. Soldiers are held to nothing by reason of damage inflicted through a common action, unless the injustice of the war is certain to them, because they are not formally unjust damagers. - Recall what was said concerning the fifth precept of the Decalogue, n. 406 and following.

n. 746.

II. But soldiers in a war evidently unjust are held for all damages which they inflicted through private action; and each is held pro rata for damages inflicted by the whole army, unless perhaps they were compelled to wage war from grave fear. - See above, concerning unjust damage, n. 658 and following.

n. 746.

III. But commanders or Princes are held primarily and in solidum for the whole damage inflicted by the army, because they are truly those mandating; or, if they did not command the damage, nevertheless they were held from office to impede it.

Questions. - Q. 1. Whether individual soldiers in the defect of others are held in solidum for the whole damage inflicted by the army?

Resp. More probably negatively; because individuals are not the cause of the whole damage, but of part only. Moreover in practice they would have to be excused from absolute inability. - Lugo with others.

Q. 2. To what are conscripted soldiers who are deserters held?

Resp. 1. From obedience or from legal justice they are held to return to camp. - Thus commonly.

Except: 1. if they would meet with grave danger to salvation, for example, if the means of confessing were not at hand..., etc., as can happen in some places...; 2. if, on returning, they would be punished with death, the galleys, or other very grave penalties; 3. if the war is evidently unjust.

Resp. 2. But certainly deserters are held to no restitution, where the law does not require others in their place; because in no way do they injure commutative justice, since they inflict damage on no other. (Thus in France from the new law of conscription given March 10, 1818.)

n. 748.

- Q. 3. To what are those held who hired themselves in place of others, and then deserted military service?

n. 748.

Resp. Of themselves they are held to restore the price accepted to him from whom they accepted it, because they lack a reason for retaining the money, which is expended only on account of the burden of military service.

n. 748.

Nevertheless this seems to be valid only where he who hired a soldier in his place is exposed to the danger of undergoing military service. But that danger is not given in France, except in the first year of military service, for which alone the hirers are responsible.

n. 749.

- Q. 4. To what are those designated by lot for military service held who withdraw themselves from it, or obtain exemption without true causes?

n. 749.

Resp. 1. Those who corrupt magistrates or physicians so that they may be declared invalid by them, are certainly held to restitution ¹. - Thus all.

¹ Indeed you will reconcile these things with difficulty with those which the Author then subjoins according to the sentence of others. Nor in this matter is the distinction of any moment which is had between this and the following hypothesis. For it is the same whether those designated by lot for military service contrive by themselves alone the fraud by which they withdraw themselves iniquitously, or whether they use physicians or magistrates as partners of the fraud.

n. 749.

Resp. 2. Likewise, according to the more common sentence, those who deceive magistrates by lies, frauds, or prior mutilation. The reason is that after the lot, as the laws establish, has defined who ought to undergo the burden of military service and who are exempt from it, the rights of justice certainly demand that those already assigned to military service not use iniquitous means for shaking off the burden which must necessarily fall back upon those exempt. - Thus Bouvier, de Restitutione, quaest. 2, art. 2. - Gousset, n. 1002. - Collat. Andeg., etc.

…and 2 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 13 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XVIII. On the Tyrant and on Rebellion

n. 214.

A tyrant is either of regime or of usurpation. The first is a prince who, possessing the principate legitimately and justly, exercises its power wickedly and unjustly. The latter is a prince who possesses the principate illegitimately and unjustly, by reason of wicked usurpation made by force or fraud.

n. 215.

A tyrant of regime, from the fact that he abuses his authority, does not therefore, per se, lose it. Wherefore no obedience indeed is owed to his unjust laws, and by passive resistance subjects can defend themselves against them; but to deprive a tyrant of the kingdom, or to kill him, is lawful to absolutely no one. - To deprive the king of the kingdom. "Too pernicious in this matter," says St. Alphonsus, "was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that the monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the prince by judging and punishing him. Hence the objection is dissolved which is made from the Angelic Doctor, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: "that tyrannical rule is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler... And therefore disturbance of this rule does not have the character of sedition," which is opposed to the common good. For indeed, although that disturbance of rule does not have the character of sedition, it does not therefore follow from the Angelic Doctor that it is lawful. For from the same St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 60, a. 6: "just as it would be unjust that someone should compel another to observe a law which was not sanctioned by public authority; so also it is unjust if someone compels someone to undergo a judgment which is not borne by public authority... and therefore it is unjust that someone be judged by him who does not have public authority."

n. 216.

And from these things it is clear much more that it is lawful to absolutely no one to kill a tyrant. Nor likewise is it valid to object from the Angelic Doctor, 2.2, q. 70, a. 1, that "as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful to resist bad princes." For St. Thomas is treating there of just defense, in the case of actual unjust aggression, namely of one condemned unjustly to death. Wherefore the objection taken from procuring the common good is also of no value. For it is not sufficient for the honesty of an action that the end be good, but the means also must be good. And the means assumed in the case is intrinsically evil.

n. 217.

Aptly Leo XIII, encyclical Quod apostolici muneris: "If at any time it should happen that public power is exercised rashly and beyond measure by princes, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not permit rising up against them by one's own force, lest the tranquillity of order be disturbed more and more, and lest society take greater detriment from this. And when the matter has come to such a point that no other hope of safety shines forth, it teaches that remedy is to be hastened by the merits of Christian patience and by urgent prayers to God. But if the decrees of legislators and princes have sanctioned or commanded something which is repugnant to divine or natural law, the dignity and office of the Christian name and the apostolic sentence persuade that God must be obeyed rather than men."

n. 218.

Therefore from a twofold head it is illicit to rise up against a legitimate prince: because one rising up by his own force violates the rights of justice, and because from this violation of justice a greater damage of the commonwealth follows, against the common good, under pretext of which that insurrection is attempted to be made honorable. "Wherefore," says Gregory XVI absolutely, Ep. a. 1832, "both divine and human rights cry out against those who by the most disgraceful machinations of treason and seditions strive to withdraw from fidelity to princes and to cast them down from command." Therefore rebellion against legitimate princes, possessors of the supreme authority or principate, is altogether illicit. It is a manifest denial of due obedience; for the legitimate right of authority exacts the office of obedience on the part of subjects. Besides, it is manifest injury against commutative justice; for a legitimate prince cannot be despoiled of the right to authority which he legitimately possesses. Each crime is proscribed in proposition 63 of the Syllabus, which is condemned thus absolutely: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, indeed even to rebel."

n. 219.

The same certainly must be said, in proportionate reason, of a tyrant of usurpation after he is already in peaceful possession of the kingdom. Before the usurper comes into this possession, it is clear from what has been said that subjects are bound, according to their powers, to defend the legitimate prince, nor can they in any way help the usurper to despoil the legitimate prince of supreme authority. But after the usurper has now despoiled the legitimate prince of this authority, and he himself now possesses it peacefully in fact, he himself is certainly bound to restore it while he possesses it; but by reason of the common good subjects are bound to obey him, because the commonwealth cannot ruin itself, if that usurper truly provides for the public good by his laws, just as the obligation rests upon him and at the same time he has the right of doing this, by reason namely of the usurped authority itself, not of the legitimacy of the usurper. For although that authority is detained unjustly, nevertheless it cannot be deprived of its own force and its own proper effect. Therefore subjects are bound to obey those laws which conduce to the common good, to public order, and to public peace; but they cannot furnish obedience to laws which would tend directly to confirming the usurper in the unjust possession of supreme authority. Yet the usurper can become legitimate, in various cases, in various ways: by consent of the people, by spontaneous cession of the legitimate prince, by natural prescription; for society cannot always endure in a violent state.

n. 220.

But if subjects are bound to observe the common good, public order, and peace, how indeed could they promote sedition, which is opposed to the common good, public order, and public peace? How could they themselves, private persons, kill the usurper? "A fight which is lawful," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, "is done for the common utility. But sedition is done against the common good of the multitude." And St. Alphonsus: "It belongs to subjects to obey, not to judge concerning the prince, who is subject to God alone concerning the things of his dominion, nor depends on any other earthly power. If subjects could bear judgment concerning the title or possession of the prince, those who are affected with a depraved mind would never lack a pretext to find for stirring themselves against the prince... Neither prince nor private person can be despoiled of his life and things, unless first he is heard, or at least condemned by his legitimate judge. But subjects can never have the right of bearing judgment upon their actual lord." The contrary opinion, which even now some sustain at least speculatively, is soon called by the Holy Doctor "improbable, false, most false." And then the same St. Alphonsus adds: "But he who occupies the kingdom of another without any title and possesses it without any reason is neither its lord nor prince, but a thief and usurper. Let him indeed be, I answer, a thief, usurper, and not prince nor lord. I ask: is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot himself be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to despoil him of life or goods. The doctrine of the Holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, although private, and however wicked he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life... But St. Thomas gives the reason for this, saying: To kill an evildoer is lawful insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the whole community, 2.2, q. 64, a. 5. Then he adds that killing evildoers is permitted only to princes, who have public authority and to whom care of the common good has been committed: But care of the common good has been committed to princes having public authority, and therefore it is lawful for them alone to kill evildoers and not for private persons." Homo Apost., tr. 8, n. 13.

n. 221.

"But it is altogether false that in the community of subjects there is present a certain superior authority, independent from the prince, so that in a case in which the prince governs the kingdom perversely, the whole community can despoil him of kingdom and life. Too pernicious in this matter was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that the monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly; for he said that, since the nation is the whole of the kingdom in respect to the prince, who is only a part, supreme authority must necessarily exist with the nation itself. A principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious; for in this way there would be two supreme powers in the kingdom, whence most enormous schisms and the desolation of the kingdom would occur. St. Thomas recognizes no other supreme authority except that which princes have, to whom care of the common good is attributed. Care of the common good has been committed to princes having public authority. Wherefore, even if the prince were perverse and burdensome to the people, nevertheless the people is bound to furnish obsequium and obedience to him, since subjects can never have the right of judging concerning the deeds of the prince, and much less of condemning him to losing life or kingdom." St. Alphonsus, l. c.

n. 222.

Therefore it is not valid to object that a tyrant cannot be deposed by the proper authority of some private person, which is the crime of treason, but can be deposed by the common judgment of the whole nation. The whole nation certainly could do this if it retained the principate itself, which is contrary to the hypothesis; but if it does not retain the principate itself, it would do that by no authority, and it would indeed be treason not of one, but of all.

n. 223.

Nor likewise is a better objection taken from the fact that public power is for the public good. For even private ownership of things is for the good of the proprietor himself and of others. If someone abuses it to his own evil and that of others, he does not therefore lose ownership of his things. And the reason is that the title or cause of having dominion, whether of property or of jurisdiction, is not the use of it. Therefore, so long as that title or cause remains, each dominion remains.

n. 224.

Lastly, it cannot be objected that society can cast out a tyrant by force not by the right of punishing, but by the right of defense. For for this no jurisdiction is needed; but the right of proper conservation, which belongs to society just as to individuals, seems to suffice, and this certainly prevails over the right existing in such tyrants to possession of authority. - But these things, speciously said, in reality are nothing. For if the question concerns individuals, legitimate defense will not be lawful to them except in the act of unjust aggression, and by repelling force with force, with the moderation of blameless defense. But if the discourse is of the whole commonwealth or society rising up against a tyrant and moving war against him, to undertake war against him, whether offensive or defensive, besides a just cause, public authority is needed, which, from the hypothesis, is in no private person nor in the whole nation. For the question concerns a prince in whom supreme authority is found absolutely. Besides, just defense is not lawful except with the moderation of blameless defense, which is held to be most sufficient and most efficacious by passive resistance, by not obeying wicked laws. Therefore, speculatively speaking, it is illicit to disturb a tyrant from possession of authority, and to deprive him of kingdom and life. But practically all agree that it is illicit from the fact that greater damages follow, and greater detriment of the public good is had from the consequent disturbance; then true sedition is had, which from its kind is a mortal sin. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3.

n. 224.

And, as the distinguished adversaries themselves confess, there exists much hallucination in that matter practically; and the people does not rise up to disturb a tyrant without a ruin greater than the tyranny following.

n. 225.

This condemnation is had concerning tyrannicide: The Sacred Synod of Constance, a. 1414-1418, declares and defines that this sentence: "Any tyrant whatever can and ought licitly and meritoriously to be killed by any vassal or subject of his, even by secret ambushes and subtle flatteries and adulations, notwithstanding any oath given, or confederation made with him, without waiting for the sentence or mandate of any judge whatsoever" is erroneous in faith and morals; and it reproves and condemns it as heretical, scandalous, and giving a way to frauds, deceptions, lies, betrayals, and perjuries. It declares besides, decrees, and defines that those pertinaciously asserting this most pernicious doctrine are heretics.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 18 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. III, Contracts, and the Obligat…, On the Virtue of Justice (…, Part I — Chapter II: On Injury, or the Violation of Right

n. 346.

I. On the Legitimacy of War.

Principle: In order that war may be undertaken legitimately, a threefold condition is required and suffices: the authority of the supreme civil power, a just cause, and a right intention.²

² Thus St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 40, a. 1.

There is required: (A) Supreme authority; for it does not belong to a private person to move war, since he can pursue his right before tribunals, even when injury has been inflicted by a foreigner; but only to him to whom the care of the commonwealth has been committed: for there is question of a matter pertaining to the good of the whole society; and therefore, just as it belongs to supreme authority to use the sword against evildoers who disturb the social order from within, so it belongs to it to protect the commonwealth from exterior enemies by the military sword. But this supreme authority sometimes resides in princes, sometimes in presidents of the commonwealth, with the assent of the Legislative Assembly;³ in whatever hypothesis, it is licit to declare war only after mature deliberation, and after upright men and experts in international law have been consulted: for there is question of a matter of most grave moment.

³ Thus in France: "The President of the Republic cannot declare war without the prior assent of the two Chambers." (Loi constit. of July 16, 1875, a. 9.)

n. 347.

(B) A just cause; and this must be proportionately grave; now since in wars, especially modern wars, many men are killed and innumerable resources are destroyed, war can be declared only from a most grave cause; indeed it is required that it be necessary, namely one for which no peaceful means can provide a remedy. Therefore, before recourse is had to arms, a way must solicitously be sought by which the dispute that has arisen can be settled peacefully, whether by sending ambassadors, or by having recourse to mediators or arbiters,¹ as often as this can be done without dishonor.

¹ At The Hague (La Haye) an international tribunal was instituted in the year 1899, for peacefully settling disputes which arise between various Nations: it is certainly to be wished that recourse be had to this tribunal for the most part, rather than to arms; cf. De Martens, La Conference de la Paix a la Haye, Paris, 1901; H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 527. - The same author shows that arbitration was already in use, and indeed with a happy outcome, p. 533-542.

n. 348.

Among just causes are numbered: the unjust invasion or detention of some province by enemies; grave injuries inflicted either upon the nation itself, or upon ambassadors, or upon citizens, which a foreign nation obstinately refuses to repair; violation of a treaty or pact, with great detriment to the commonwealth; violation of neutrality, as they say; the necessity of bringing aid to another people unjustly oppressed. - But diversity of religion or the desire of converting infidels to the faith by no means suffices: for true religion is propagated not by arms, but by prayers and preaching.² - Nor the sole enlargement of empire: otherwise there would be an equally just cause on each side of those waging war, and the right of the stronger, not the stronger right, would prevail everywhere. - Nor the singular progress of some nation, which so increases in power that it now surpasses neighboring nations formerly equal. - Nor one's own glory or the private good of the Prince or of his family: for private good ought to yield to public good.

² Vitoria proves this at length, op. cit., De Indis, p. 305-409.

n. 349.

Yet here it can be asked whether a cultivated nation can invade the territory of a barbarous nation, in order to impart to it the benefit of modern civilization. And here indeed a distinction is needed: (a) if a certain nation has more citizens than it can nourish, and on the other hand there are regions by no means or little cultivated, because of the scarcity of inhabitants or their ignorance or sloth, it is not unjust by peaceful means to occupy almost empty territories, while giving fair compensation to the natives; but if they do not wish to accept this and wish to repel the occupiers by force, those who use moderate force to retain the territory which they need for procuring the necessities of life for themselves cannot be reproved for injustice; for the earth was entrusted primarily to our first parents for assisting human necessities. (b) But if, under the pretext of imparting a higher civilization, regions already sufficiently cultivated by their inhabitants are invaded by force and arms, the aggression seems to be unjust: for civilization ought to be propagated not by arms, but by persuasion, industry, and commerce; otherwise nations which consider themselves more cultivated will soon invade and oppress others.

n. 350.

(C) Right intention, by which, namely, it is intended that the good of society be promoted or evil warded off; therefore intentions which are opposed to Christian charity or justice must carefully be removed, such as desire of harming, cruelty of taking revenge, lust for dominating, an implacable mind. Therefore occasions of war are not to be sought on account of the great profit hoped for from it: "For it is of the utmost savagery," says Vitoria, op. cit., p. 466, "to seek causes, and to rejoice that there are causes for killing and destroying men whom God created, and for whom Christ died; but one ought to come to the necessity of war compelled and unwilling." Indeed equity counsels that Rulers desist from that which they foresee will be an occasion of war; for the occasion of such grave evils must carefully be removed.

n. 351.

1. It suffices, or, with all the conditions set forth above having been posited, war is licit. For often war is the only means by which some nation can efficaciously protect its own existence or rights of great moment; for there is no tribunal on earth, even today, which can compel nations dissenting among themselves to settle a dispute peacefully. Now a nation can defend itself and its rights, when they are of most grave moment, against unjust aggressors; for if private persons can do this, in the case of actual aggression, a fortiori a nation can, which has the same and more powerful rights, insofar as it enjoys public authority; but if an enemy is not actually attacking, but does not wish to repair a grave injury inflicted, rights can be vindicated by force, since there is no tribunal before which they can peacefully be sought again; otherwise the unjust and violent would soon oppress the honest and meek. Therefore war can be licit.

Nevertheless it is to be wished that soon an international tribunal be instituted before which nations dissenting about a matter of grave moment are bound to present themselves; and indeed it is equitable that the president of this tribunal be the Roman Pontiff, vicar of Him who is deservedly called the Prince of peace.

n. 352.

Corollaries. (a) For declaring offensive war a probable motive does not suffice, but a morally certain cause is required; thus commonly. For since here there is question not only of one's own rights, but of the rights of others, and on the other hand so many and so great evils follow from war, it is not licit to use probable opinions in a matter of such moment. Hence it is necessary to weigh the causes of war with the greatest prudence, to hear the reasons of the adversaries, if they wish to discuss from fairness and goodness, and to seek the counsel of upright and wise men, who may speak with liberty, without anger and hatred. When this has been done, if doubt remains, recourse must be had to arbiters; if the other party rejects this recourse, a legitimate cause for declaring war is now had.

(b) Even when a just cause certainly exists, justice demands that, before war is begun, reparation be sought from the adverse party; and if suitable reparation is offered, one must abstain from war. This is clear from what was said above; for war must be warded off by all legitimate and honorable means.

n. 353.

II. On the Mode of Conducting War.

What is licit or illicit in time of war can be defined only with difficulty; some things are determined by natural law, some by the law of nations; and since customs are diverse according to times and places, certain things today among cultivated nations are held as illicit which formerly were esteemed as legitimate. Hence in practice the modern expositors of international law must be approached, who declare at length what is licit, with attention paid to the customs, conventions, and laws of various nations.¹ We hand down only certain more general things briefly.

¹ Cf. H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 571-877. - Hence not a few of the things which are set forth by older theologians on this matter, with circumstances changed, must be reformed today.

n. 354.

(A) Today, among cultivated nations, the declaration of war ought to be preceded by what they call an ultimatum, that is, an intimation concerning war soon to be undertaken, unless such or such a condition be fulfilled; for thus a last opportunity is given to the enemy of repairing the injury inflicted. - Moreover at the time when war is declared, humanity demands that to foreigners living within the borders of the territory some space of time be granted, within which they can provide for themselves and their goods.

n. 355.

(B) Once military operations have begun, it must be kept before the mind that war is not waged against private citizens, but against the nation as a public person. (a) Hence, although all things are licit which are necessary for breaking the forces of the enemies, it is held today as illicit to usurp the goods of private persons without compensation,¹ and a fortiori directly to kill noncombatants or reduce them into captivity.² But since the expenses of war can be exacted from the enemy, the victor, when cities and villages have been captured, can impose taxes, provided they are proportionate to the resources of the inhabitants;³ but to give a captured city to the army for plunder is not licit today.⁴

¹ H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 664-682.

² Ibid., p. 638-643.

³ Ibid., p. 674-677.

⁴ Ibid., p. 678-680.

n. 356.

(b) It is licit to besiege fortified citadels, and to deprive them of water and food, so that they may submit themselves more quickly; likewise to discharge artillery (canons) against them, even with the danger of killing innocents; to demolish houses, even monasteries and churches, when the enemies use them to protect themselves; likewise to destroy the walls of a city, etc.; because all these things are necessary for conquering the enemies. - But it is illicit to infect springs or wells with poison, or to use poisoned weapons, because these things, as cruel, are prohibited by the modern law of nations.

n. 357.

(c) Whether reprisals are licit, that is, actions otherwise prohibited by international law, when the enemies first have violated the law of nations, is not so certain. If they are employed only for this end, that the enemies may thus be compelled to avoid injuries of this kind, strictly speaking they are not unjust, because they are one of the means of averting similar injuries in the future. But since in this matter it is easy to exceed, and on the other hand this mode of acting can induce the enemy to inflict new and worse injuries, generally it is expedient to abstain from this, while nevertheless protesting against an open violation of international law.⁵

⁵ Ibid., p. 575-579.

(d) To prepare ambushes for enemies, and to use various stratagems for overcoming them, is part of military prudence, and is prohibited by no law; likewise it is licit to search out the secrets of the enemies and, when these are known, to use them for conquering the same more easily; for all these things are very useful for pursuing the end of war.

n. 358.

(C) When war has been ended and the enemy asks for peace, the victor ought to use the victory obtained moderately. For he can:

(a) Exact that for which war had been declared, e.g., recovery of a province, satisfaction for grave injury inflicted, etc.; for since the war is supposed just, it certainly gives the power of vindicating rights which he already possessed beforehand; (b) demand an equitable indemnity for the expenses of war and other damages inflicted on the occasion of the war; for all these things are deservedly imputed to the enemy who unjustly undertook war; (c) exact securities for future safety; for the victor ought wisely to provide for his own security; e.g., the conquered nation can be bound to hand over fortified places situated on the borders into the hands of the victor, at least for a time, or to demolish them and not build new ones, - but not to cede to the victor all provinces and cities captured during the war; yet certain parts of the occupied region could be retained by way of indemnity, if the conquered could not pay money.¹

¹ H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 874-877.

n. 359.

III. On the Duties of Commanders and Soldiers.

1. Duties common to both. (a) In time of a just war commanders and soldiers are bound to serve the fatherland, even with danger to life, because the public good demands this. Hence they cannot desert military service, and deserters ought to return to camp; but those who would flee to the enemies and render them any help whatever would be traitors and guilty of a grave crime.

(b) If the war is certainly and evidently unjust, it is not licit to serve as a soldier, nor to kill enemies in battle; for unjust aggression and the killing of an innocent person are something intrinsically evil. But in practice this rarely happens; for even when war is unjust in itself, for the most part it does not seem to be such to soldiers, who otherwise neither are accustomed nor generally are able to inquire concerning the legitimacy of war: for this is left to the supreme authority and to the Legislative Assembly.

(c) In doubt whether war is just, soldiers already hired, or otherwise called under the banners by supreme authority, are not bound to inquire concerning the legitimacy of the war, but can presume that it is just. Otherwise it must be said of foreigners who voluntarily wish to enter the army; they cannot serve as soldiers unless first the justice of the war is clear; for there is question of inflicting most grave damage upon another, and they cannot freely expose themselves to the danger of killing innocents.

n. 360.

1. Duties of commanders. (a) Upon them lies the duty of using all legitimate means for bringing back victory, and therefore of following the rules of military art in the best way they can, - of watching over discipline, - of taking care that, insofar as this can be done, nothing be lacking to soldiers either as regards the health of the body or as regards the salvation of the soul.

(b) They ought to follow the international laws of war, to restrain useless plunderings, devastations, and the killing of innocents by suitable penalties.

(c) They can indeed exact from inhabitants those things which are necessary for the support of the army, but they ought to pay the price of these, either immediately or after the war.²

² "Prestations in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash; if not, they shall be recorded by receipts" (Acte de la Haye, art. 52).

n. 361.

1. Duties of soldiers. (a) Soldiers ought to obey commanders, and not begin a hostile action unless the same command them.

(b) Since today the right of plunder is not acknowledged, they cannot make the spoils of enemies their own, nor a fortiori take away the goods of private persons.

n. 362.

Scholion on Sedition and Tyrannicide.

(A) Active sedition against legitimate civil authority has always been reproved in the Church. The ancient Christians, even while persecutions raged, served the emperors in all things which pertained to civil affairs, and did not resist them except in the cause of faith, because it is better to obey God than men. Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas teaches that sedition is a mortal sin, and so much the graver as the common good is greater than private good.¹ (B) If there is question of tyrannical power usurped, it was commonly taught that a tyrant can be killed by any private person, with certain conditions posited: (a) that it be certain the tyrant has no right to the kingdom; (b) that there likewise be no superior to whom recourse can be had; (c) that the commonwealth does not contradict the killing of the tyrant; (d) that from his killing more and greater goods than evils can be expected.² These conditions indeed rarely occurred together. (C) As regards legitimate power, but acting tyrannically, passive resistance is of itself licit and sometimes obligatory.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 42, a. 2. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, Tr. VIII, c. 2, n. 13; Meyer, II, n. 522-537.

² Billuart, diss. X, art. 2.

n. 363.

But today, since the exercise of supreme authority is especially in the hands of the Legislative Assembly, whose members are chosen by the votes of citizens, the most efficacious means for shaking off tyranny is not sedition, nor rebellion or tyrannicide; but the provident and perpetual association of upright citizens, which should strive with all its strength to elect honest and upright men, who in the Legislative Assembly may be able to restore and protect true liberty. For in our days the votes of citizens have greater force than arms of any kind; but the votes of individuals are of little value, unless by common counsel the upright are united among themselves.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 21 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. V, Pt. I, Ch. IV, Section 3: The Moral Principles Involved in War

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. V, CHAPTER III: On Duel and War · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. V, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: On War

LAWFULNESS OF WAR.—What self-defense is for the individual, that war (bellum) is for society or the State, namely, the act of warding off unjust attacks or of asserting important rights by force of arms.¹

¹ J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 418: “War is the struggle of a multitude against an external multitude for the purpose of defending or vindicating the commonwealth. Hence it differs: 1. From a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few; 2. From sedition, which is a disturbance or conflict of a multitude against political society.”

n. ¶2.

The purpose of war, therefore, is to protect the material, moral, and spiritual possessions of a nation, such as religion, liberty, independence, honor, good name, its right and power to conclude treaties, etc. When war is waged within the limits of a just self-defense, that is, after all other means to preserve the peace² (such as diplo- matic negotiations, arbitration, reprisals, blockade, etc.) have proved ineffective, and the sword has become the final and inevitable arbiter, and if the moderamen inculpatae tutelae is duly observed, war is not only morally lawful, but may be a social duty, and participation therein may become a highly meritorious act.³

² Cfr. Deut. XX, 10.—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 419: “For a just and lawful war the following are required: 1. Public authority, that is, supreme authority acknowledging no other superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a higher authority exists, it must judge the dispute; 2. A just and grave cause which outweighs the disadvantages that will follow from the war, e. g., a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury done to the commonwealth to be repelled, or a rebellion of subjects to be suppressed, etc.; 3. The proper manner of waging war, namely, that before war adequate satisfaction be demanded from the opposing party, and if it is offered, it must be accepted as a matter of justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just.” N. 424: “A prince, once the justice of a war has been recognized, must present it to the opposing party and cannot begin the war, if adequate satisfaction is offered to him; indeed, even a war already begun he is bound to abandon when adequate satisfaction is offered, if not from the rigor of justice, at least generally from charity, provided the other party is willing to compensate all expenses already incurred and it is not necessary for the public good that it be repelled.”

³ Cfr. Judg. XI, 27.—Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 419: “War is of itself permissible either to repel an injury or to vindicate one's right. The reason is that every society independent of another society must have a means of protecting itself against injury and vindicating its right. Sometimes, however, no other means is available for obtaining this end except war. For since higher authorities to whom nations or princes might have recourse are lacking, they may wage war to obtain satisfaction from another society.”

n. ¶3.

God repeatedly commanded His Chosen People to wage war against their enemies and lent them His special assistance and co-operation.⁴ St. John baptized soldiers, but neither he nor Christ Himself required of them that they renounce their profession;⁵ all they asked of them was, to “do violence to no man,” i. e. abstain from injustice.⁶ St. Paul says that the civil authority, as the representative of God, has the right of wielding the sword in order to protect law and order against domestic evil-doers and foreign enemies.⁷

⁴ Ex. XIV, 13 sq.; Deut. I, 29 sq.; III, 21 sqq.—Cfr. F. Schwally, Semitische Kriegsaltertümer, Leipzig 1901, 1. Heft, pp. 3 sqq.

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “Otherwise John, when soldiers came to him to be baptized, saying, ‘And what shall we do?’ would have answered them: ‘Cast away your arms, abandon this military service, strike no one, wound no one, lay no one low.’ But because he knew that when they did these things as soldiers they were not murderers but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries but defenders of the public safety, he answered them: ‘Do violence to no one,’” etc. (Migne, P. L., XLII, 447.) IDEM, Epist. 189 (al. 205), n. 4: “Do not think that no one who serves under arms in war can please God. Holy David was among them, to whom the Lord bore such great testimony; among them also were very many righteous men of that time. . . . John certainly did not forbid those soldiers to serve under arms whom he instructed that their own pay ought to suffice.” (P. L., XXXIII, 855).

⁶ Luke III, 14; Acts X, 1 sqq.

⁷ Rom. XIII, 1–5; cfr. John XIX, 10 sqq.

n. ¶4.

If some of the Church Fathers objected to Christians serving as soldiers, they did so for the reason that the life of a soldier in their days was full of danger to faith and morals, and that the ancient State, with its emperor-worship, was essentially pagan. There is sufficient evidence to show that the early Christians acknowledged legitimate warfare as morally licit.⁸ The canonical law exempting clerics from military service was based upon the supernatural and pacific character of their office.⁹ The Church not only admits that war may be just, but she admonishes her children to fight for their highest and most sacred possessions.¹⁰

⁸ Cfr. Ch. Lupus, De Antiqua Disciplina Christianae Militiae, XI (Opera Omnia, Venice ed., 1729), pp. 94 sqq.—Hefele, Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 20 sqq.—K. Künstle, Zwei Dokumente zur altchristlichen Militärseelsorge, Mayence 1900, pp. 3 sqq.—A. Bigelmair, Die Beteiligung der Christen am öffentlichen Leben, Munich, 1902.—A. Harnack, Militia Christi, Tübingen 1905, pp. 46 sqq.

⁹ Syllabus Errorum, n. 32 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1732).—C. Richert, Die Anfänge der Irregularitäten, Freiburg 1901, pp. 114 sqq.

¹⁰ Errores M. Lutheri damn. a Leone X, n. 34 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 774).

n. ¶5.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES.—a) Every just war is by its very definition defensive (bellum defensivum), because war is permitted only as an extreme means of self-help or to protect a na- tion's legitimate rights or interests. It does not, however, follow that when a State is unjustly menaced in its vital interests,—be they material, moral, or spiritual,—it is not permitted to make use of its right per modum praeventionis, i. e., to forestall a threatening attack, for instance, by occupying foreign territory, compelling enemy troops to lay down their arms, cutting off their supplies, destroying fortifications, and so forth. Such a war, though seemingly offensive, would in reality be defensive, for the justice of a war depends not upon its physical, but upon its moral authorship. It is also licit and therefore just, nay, it may even be a duty for a nation to assist another, especially an allied nation, in warding off an unjust attack.

n. ¶6.

The socalled principle of non-intervention, that is, non-interference of a State in hostilities between other States, unless its own territory or rights are attacked, may be justifiable from a purely political point of view, but not morally,¹¹ because if a nation unjustly attacks another, all others are threatened in their very existence, and under the law of nations every State is in duty bound to protect right and justice. Intervention, if exercised in accordance with the principles of morality, constitutes an effective support of international law and order. For the rest, its exercise in most cases will not entail war, but merely lead to diplomatic negotiations.

¹¹ Syllabus Errorum, n. 62: “The principle which they call that of non-intervention must be proclaimed and observed.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1762).—Cfr. M. Pachtler, S. J., “Das Prinzip der Nichtintervention,” in the Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, Vol. I (1871), pp. 107 sqq., 196 sqq.—A. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. II, pp. 353 sqq.; Vol. III, pp. 22 sqq.

n. ¶7.

b) The moderamen inculpatae tutelae must be kept inviolate even in a just war. Consequently, war may not be continued longer than is necessary to accomplish its object, that is, until full satisfaction or reparation has been obtained and peace secured. Disregard of this principle would be a violation of the moral law of nature and involve the duty of restitution. To undertake or continue a war solely for the acquisition of territory or as a preventive of internal dissensions would be positively criminal.¹²

¹² Osee V, 13.—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. IV, c. 6: “To bring wars upon neighboring peoples and thence proceed against others, and from mere lust for dominion to crush and subjugate peoples who do not trouble one—what else should this be called but grand robbery?” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 116 sq.).—Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “What is blamed in war? Is it that those who will die sometime die, so that those who will live in peace may be subdued? To censure this belongs to the timid, not to the religious. The desire to harm, the cruelty of vengeance, an unpacified and implacable spirit, the savagery of rebellion, the lust for domination, and anything similar—these are the things rightly blamed in wars.” (P. L., XLII, 447).

n. ¶8.

Secondly, not all is fair in war. Absolutely damnable and illicit means of warfare are: lying, perjury, the intentional dissemination of false reports, e. g., of faked victories. Among the licit means are: espionage, stratagems, ambuscades, etc.; these are allowed because they are not based on lies pure and simple, but merely furnish the enemy an occasion for drawing false conclusions.

n. ¶9.

Third, the means employed in warfare must not be more cruel than is necessary for the successful termination of the bloody struggle.

n. ¶10.

It goes without saying that the direct slaying of innocent and unarmed persons, such as women, children, and old men, or the dishonoring of women can never be justified under any pretext.¹³

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 40, art. 3: “It is permissible in war to prepare ambushes and employ stratagems, so that enemies may be deceived by ruses and cast into various dangers. For these things are not reckoned lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since such means are customarily employed in war; thus it is permissible to feign flight, to use the enemy's standards, etc. But those deceptions are illicit which cannot be guarded against by any prudence, e. g., to poison wells and springs, etc. For these things, in common judgment, conflict with the laws of war.”

n. ¶11.

Fourth, the right to kill the enemy or damage his property belongs to individual soldiers or single divisions of an army only in so far as they have been authorized to proceed by legitimate authority. Therefore, if an army, or any single division thereof, marches through enemy territory plundering and robbing the populace, without the express or at least implicit authorization of its commander, it is no better than a band of marauders and its members are bound to restitution. Officers bearing a flag of truce are inviolable.

n. ¶12.

c) In addition to these general principles, derived from the moral law of nature, the so-called international law has laid down others which deserve mention. One of these is that the laws of war apply only to active combatants, i. e., persons actually wielding or entitled to wield arms. Hence it is not allowed to kill a disarmed or captured soldier. Non-combatants engaged in the service of an army, such as chaplains, physicians, nurses, etc., may not be killed, but they may be made captives. Prisoners of war should be treated humanely, but not better than the soldiers of one's own army, lest cowardly members of the latter be tempted to surrender. Weapons which render war more cruel without hastening the decision are forbidden. To this class belong explosive hand guns, poisoned arrows, poison substances, the poisoning of wells, etc. Those living peaceably in enemy territory should not be treated harshly and their property should be spared unless it is needed to enable the invading army to live. The retention of hostages, the devastation of the country, the destruction of crops, the burning of dwelling houses and other necessities of life are permissible only in exceptional cases, when necessary for the carrying out of an important operation or to overcome the hostile attitude of the populace. Wounded soldiers who are no longer able to fight should be protected against attacks upon their person.¹⁴

¹⁴ Of the barbarities of war Fr. Ross justly says: “Once the dogs of war are let loose, it is difficult to keep them within the bounds of civilized Christian custom. The records of Sherman's march to the sea, of English conduct in the Sepoy rebellion, of our water cure and other tortures in the Philippines, of the international intervention in China during the Boxer rebellion, do not make us very proud of humanity. There is an old saying, ‘Scratch an Englishman and you find a barbarian,’ and this is equally true of the Germans, French, Italians, and Americans.” (Christian Ethics, pp. 426 sq.).

n. ¶14.

Under the Geneva Convention, of August 22, 1864, all military hospitals and ambulances with their attendants, physicians and nurses, when carrying the Red Cross, as well as all buildings containing wounded soldiers who display the Red Cross flag, are neutral and must not be attacked or molested. Citizens who receive wounded war victims into their houses shall be excused from quartering troops and also, partially, from paying war contributions.¹⁵

¹⁵ H. Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solférino, Geneva 1862; 2nd ed., Paris 1871; C. Lueder, Die Genfer Konvention, Erlangen 1876; H. Lammasch, Die Fortbildung des Völkerrechts durch die Haager Konferenz, Stuttgart and Vienna 1900; A. Zorn, Das Kriegsrecht zu Lande in seiner neuesten Gestaltung, Berlin 1906; J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 430 sq.; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, Boston 1909.

n. ¶15.

The use of savages or convicted criminals is morally objectionable, because they are apt to disregard the laws of war. Attempts to induce enemy soldiers to break their oath of loyalty or to rebel against their superiors are likewise inadmissible.

n. ¶16.

d) Voluntary participation in a war which one regards as unjust is sinful. Since, however, the individual citizen is rarely in a position to form a reliable judgment concerning the justice or injustice of a war, and since, moreover, a soldier employed or drafted by the government (miles subditus) has not the right to question the justice of an international quarrel, he must obey his supe- rior officers even though he doubts the justice of the cause. But he is never permitted to co-operate in manifest injustice or criminal acts of violence, e. g., the maltreatment of peaceful non-combatants or the killing of soldiers who have unconditionally surrendered. Mercenaries (milites conducti), who have been hired before the outbreak of a war, may take part therein even if they doubt its justice. The case is different with those who volunteer their services after the war has started (milites nondum conducti); if they are in doubt as to the justice of the cause in which they intend to enlist, they are in duty bound to obtain certainty, for no man is permitted to co-operate in an unjust cause.¹⁶

¹⁶ Rom. XIII, 1 sqq.—St. Augustine, Contra Faust. Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “And for this purpose taxes are paid (Mt. 22, 21), so that, because of wars, pay may necessarily be furnished to the soldier.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 447).—IDEM, ibid., c. 75: “When a just man happens to serve as a soldier under a king who is even a sacrilegious man, he can rightly wage war at that king's command while preserving the order of civic peace: either it is certain that what is commanded of him is not contrary to God's precept, or it is not certain whether it is; so that perhaps the injustice of commanding makes the king guilty, while the order of serving shows the soldier innocent.” (P. L., XLII, 448).—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 421: “It is asked whether soldiers may wage war while in doubt about the justice of the war. The answer is: 1. If the question concerns a subject soldier, he is bound to obey where the war is not evidently unjust, because it does not belong to him to examine the reasons of his superiors. 2. If the question concerns a soldier hired before war was declared, he may obey; for he is hired for this, and therefore must conduct himself almost as if he were a subject. 3. If the question concerns a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire into the justice of the war and cannot place himself in doubt about its justice. The reason is that no one can co-operate in despoiling another of a thing which he possesses unless he is certain that it is possessed by him unjustly.”

n. ¶17.

The causes of war are as a rule hidden to the ordinary citizen, nay ofttimes even to the better informed and more sensitive organs of public opinion. Ordinarily, the private citizen may and should presume that his country is right. The question how far his duty of obedience goes, and for what acts of violence he may allow himself to be used, are answered by the ius belli, but its provisions are of little practical importance, because in case of doubt every citizen will naturally submit his subjective opinion to the supposedly more enlightened judgment of the authorities.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cfr. F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 469 sqq.; Ross, Christian Ethics, p. 440.

n. ¶18.

MORAL ESTIMATE OF WAR.—a) Just war is not only permissible as an act of self-defense, but it may be useful for the punishment of injustice, the restoration of law and order, and as an instrument of correction in the hands of God.¹⁸

¹⁸ Judg. II, 20 sqq.; III, 1 sqq.; Is. X, 5 sqq.; 2 Macch. V, 17 sq.

n. ¶19.

Nor can it be denied that a number of noble virtues, e. g., loyalty, courage, self-sacrifice, fidelity to duty, are developed by and in war, and that bloody conflicts with other nations often strengthen the moral and religious fibre of a nation and promote patriotism. A war waged against savage tribes, may, moreover, serve the purpose of genuine culture and the legitimate needs of colonization.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cfr. Horace, Epist., l. II, 1, 156 sq.: “Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latio.”

n. ¶20.

b) On the other hand, though a just war may prove a moral blessing for a nation or for humanity at large, even the justest war is in- variably accompanied by so many horrors and barbarities, and entails so much material and moral destruction that it must be regarded as an evil and a terrible scourge. Though the Bible acknowledges the legitimacy of war and of the military profession, there are many passages in both Testaments which point to lasting peace as the final goal for the human race to strive after.²⁰ War does not fit into the ideal picture of international intercourse. Its existence and relative necessity is merely a sad proof how little even Christian nations are actuated by the spirit of charity, peace, and justice. The highest good of the State, the ideal political condition of a people, is that “rest from all enemies round about” described in Deuteronomy,²¹ and permanent peace must be the first and foremost aim of every real statesman. Kant's idea of a universal peace²² has no prospect of realization because it is based for the most part upon purely worldly interests or upon so-called humanitarian or philanthropic considerations and motives, which are at bottom utopian, instead of seeking the peace of Christ which the world cannot give.²³ Nevertheless every attempt to settle international difficulties and quarrels by means of arbitration should be hailed with joy. An international tribunal of arbitration might not prevent war entirely, but it would postpone the outbreak of hostilities and thus give reason instead of passion an opportunity to speak the last word. Even though war were abolished, it would still be “sweet and meet to die for one's fatherland,”²⁴ and every citizen would have sufficient opportunities to prove his patriotism by faithfully performing his duties towards God and the legitimate civil authorities.

²⁰ Ps. 67, 31; Is. II, 4; Mich. IV, 1 sqq.; Matt. XXIV, 6; Mark XIII, 7; Luke XXI, 9 sq.

²¹ Deut. XII, 9 sq.; XXV, 19. St. Augustine, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 6: “The will ought to have peace, necessity war, so that God may free us from necessity and preserve us in peace. For peace is not sought so that war may be stirred up, but war is waged so that peace may be acquired.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 856).—IDEM, Epist., 229 (al. 262), n. 2: “Great indeed are not only the bravest warriors, and they have their own glory, but also—and this is a truer kind of praise—the most faithful warriors, by whose labors and dangers, with the aid of God who protects and helps, the untamed enemy is conquered and tranquility is procured for the commonwealth and the pacified provinces. But it is of greater glory to kill wars themselves with a word than men with the sword, and to acquire or obtain peace by peace, not by war. For even those who fight, if they are good, undoubtedly seek peace, but nevertheless through blood.” (P. L., XXXIII, 1020).

²² I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, Königsberg 1795 (edited by K. Kehrbach, Leipsic 1881).—Cfr. F. von Holtzendorff, Die Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens, Berlin 1882.—L. Stein, Das Ideal des ewigen Friedens, Berlin 1896.—Ch. Richet, Les Guerres et la Paix, Paris 1901. K. F. Küster, De Treuga et Pace Dei, Cologne, 1902.—P. Meyer, Die Idee des ewigen Friedens bei Kants Zeitgenossen, Berlin 1903.—K. Geissler, Der Krieg und die sozialen Sünden, Jena 1905.

²³ John XIV, 27; cfr. Judith XVI, 3: “The Lord putteth an end to wars.”—St. Leo the Great, Serm., 82 (al. 80), c. 1: “Although [the city of Rome], enlarged by many victories, extended the jurisdiction of your empire by land and sea, nevertheless what military toil subjected to you is less than what Christian peace subjected to you.” (Migne, P. L., LIV, 423).

²⁴ Horace, Carm., III, 2, 18: “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.”—Cfr. Homer, Ilias, XII, 243.

n. ¶21.

In striving for international peace it is well for us to realize that there are many strong “interests” that must be vigorously opposed. First of all come the war traders. “Those who en- gage in the sale of materials of war know that it is to their advantage to foster the military spirit. The more one nation spends on preparation, the more the others are forced to spend. It is an endless chain. A few individuals are enriched, but the vast majority suffer from such enormous expenditure in unproductive ways. Perhaps the problem could be partly solved by the various governments taking over the munition factories. But the solution is problematical and at best would be merely partial. For only a completely socialized State could take over all the industries directly and indirectly depending upon war. A hardly less important expression of commercialism versus peace is found in yellow journalism. Newspapers recognize that in order to sell large editions they must exaggerate. As a consequence they are absolutely conscienceless in dressing up reports of differences between nations. Again, there arises in the popular mind induced by this irresponsible journalism a certain spread-eagleism, an attitude that sees no fault in one's own nation, but faults innumerable in others—a loud-mouthed patriotism [rectius: jingoism] that is ready to call every man a traitor who happens to advocate peaceful methods. . . . This evil of yellow journalism tends to grow worse and worse. New forms of exaggeration, new appeals to this false patri- otism must be constantly devised; for as one form grows stale, it becomes useless from a journalistic standpoint. And so one fosters the other. The public, weary of the drab dullness of everyday life, demands of the newspapers a certain amount of sensationalism and grows more rampant the more it gets.”²⁵

²⁵ J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 436 sqq.

n. ¶22.

READINGS.—St. Augustine, Contra Faust. Manich., l. XXII, c. 74–78.—IDEM, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 4 to 6.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 40 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, I, 407 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 402–411 (ed. Gaudé, I, 659 sqq.).—H. Grotius, De Iure Belli et Pacis, Amsterdam 1712.—J. Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, pp. 462 sqq.—A. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. III, pp. 417 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 468 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 741 sqq.—F. Kattenbusch, Das sittliche Recht des Krieges, Giessen 1906.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 663 sqq.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 191 sqq.—Chs. Macksey, S.J., art. “War” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XV, pp. 546–550.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 3 passages

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tractate V: On Justice, Ch. II, Art. I, § 2. Injuries Against the Body or Temporal Life of Neighbor

n. 635.

I. What Public Power Can Do Against the Innocent. Not even public power is ever permitted, whether in peace or in war, directly to kill an innocent person, or to take vengeance upon innocent persons, for example hostages, for the delict of others. If a tyrant demands it, the republic can compel an innocent person to go to the tyrant, because he is held to expose his life for the republic; and one refusing, since, as such, he has become guilty, it can hand over. Yet a virgin, on account of the danger of consent, must never give herself to be violated. Wherefore she can indeed be permitted to her own lot, but never handed over for this end.

n. 636.

II. What Against the Guilty. By public authority and with the order of law preserved, an evildoer can be punished even by death. From preserving that order, on account of the extraordinary necessity alone of the republic, where provision must be made for public safety, public powers can be dispensed and can dispense.

The formal reason why they can exact bloody punishments does not seem to be sought from the quality of parts which citizens have. For the body pertains to the person, inviolable by men. But since capital punishment is demanded by social necessity, God, to whom the right certainly belongs, did not omit to provide for that necessity by a power bestowed.

n. 637.

III. On War. 1. On the Justice of War. a). War cannot be just unless for proper defense or for exercising vindicative justice.

But before he declares war, the prince must take care with all diligence that he be certain of its justice and of a grave cause. If the right is only probable, the matter is to be settled by friendly compact or through arbiters. If the other party refuses these things, it then commits a certain injury which, if there is proportionate cause, it will be lawful to vindicate by arms. Cf. Waffelaert, Iust., II, 444. But once the justice of the war has been perceived, it is to be proposed to the opposing party. Competent satisfaction offered by this party must per se be accepted.

In defensive war, it is enough that there is no certainty of an injury having been committed.

b) Common Subjects, unless there is a vehement contrary suspicion, ought not to inquire into the justice of the war. But today especially, where in public administration so little attention is paid to the obligation of conscience, learned men and theologians cannot rashly admit and defend the justice of war. The same must be said of voluntary soldiers.

c) He who is compelled to have part in an unjust war must abstain from hostile acts, and surrender himself to a hostile soldier whom he cannot avoid by flight. If the opportunity of acting thus is lacking, he will be able, when invaded by the enemy, since by error he is held as guilty, to use the right of defense against him who does not wish to grant life to him surrendering himself.

2. What Things Are Lawful in a Just War. a) In a just war it is lawful to do all those things which are necessary for the end of the war, and are prohibited neither by the law of nature nor by agreements of the law of nations.

For the common good of men demands that those agreements and rules of the law of nations, by which such great evils are tempered, be observed sacredly at least as other agreements are, within the tacitly agreed limits of human foresight.

Faith given to an enemy must per se be kept.

Reprisals are lawful where the injustice is certain, satisfaction has been denied, and they are exercised upon guilty persons or upon goods.

Those who carry on a just war can, according to the case, treat opposing soldiers as formal evildoers, or at least as aggressors materially unjust, with international agreements saved.

Soldiers, I say, because among cultivated nations this is received today, that war ought to be circumscribed by the armies themselves, so that unconscribed citizens and soldiers must abstain from mutual offense.

b) On the Conversion of War into the Combat of a Few.

It must not be said too absolutely that war can, by public authority, be converted into the duel of a few. For this will be lawful only when he who pursues his right does not thereby make his condition worse. Cf. Sanchez, Decal., l. 2, c. 39, n. 15, 16.

3. Right When War Is Finished. a) When war is finished, restitution of things taken and of expenses can be sought, besides a just punishment or congruous satisfaction.

b) Treaties of peace are rather imposed by the victor than freely agreed upon. Yet because it is of the greatest interest for the common good of all that an end of warring be made, they are to be observed sacredly, unless they labor under the most manifest injustice. Therefore they are fortified by a much broader presumption than private agreements.

4. On Restitution. As to restitution, common soldiers of the same army, even if they conspire, are nevertheless not judged to act from conspiracy. For if you except those immediately nearby, the rest are not moved by the cooperation of a determinate soldier. Wherefore, in an unjust war, their obligation comes down almost to this: that they repair the damages done by their own hand. Nor do the owners of things will or expect more. More grave, as is plain, is the obligation of the war leader, who must also repair damages which are inflicted by soldiers on account of his blameworthy negligence.

5. Customary Irregularity. Finally let us recall that by the new Code the irregularity from defect of lenity has been suppressed, so that only those become irregular who have made themselves guilty of gravely blameworthy homicide or mutilation.

Article II. - On Real Injury.

§ 1. - On Injury Itself.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 3 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. I, Q. III, Ch. III, Art. III, § 2, 4. On War

n. ¶31.

¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ A. Vanderpol treats aptly of this matter in his works Le droit de guerre d'après les théologiens et les canonistes du moyen-âge (Paris 1911) and La guerre devant le Christianisme (Paris 1912).

n. 129.

129. Notions. War can be defined: a contest by force and arms between two opposing (external) armies. Therefore war differs from a duel, which is a contest by force and arms between two or a few men. Besides, war differs both from a brawl, which is as it were a certain private war between private persons, arisen not from any public authority but rather from disordered will,¹⁵⁰ and from sedition, which is as it were civil war and armed discord among citizens of one kingdom.¹⁵¹ St. Thomas briefly indicates the difference among these three in this way: "War properly is against external enemies, as it were of multitude against multitude; but brawl is of one against one, or of few against few; but sedition properly is among parts of one multitude disagreeing among themselves, for example when one part of the city is stirred up in tumult against another." - War is one thing offensive, which is undertaken for obtaining satisfaction for an injury received; another thing defensive, which is the repression of an unjust aggression made by another prince or kingdom. Often, but not always, offensive war is waged by him who first begins warlike hostilities. But sometimes a preventive aggression is nothing other than necessary self-defense.

Note. Today, whether from the law of nations or from custom and a more cultivated humanity, the manner of waging war differs greatly from wars waged in antiquity or the middle age. Indeed today someone would call wars cruel which would be done as, for example, the wars of the Israelites in the Old Testament are described to us. Hence not all things which the older theologians permitted in war can today commonly be done licitly.

Principle. For licitly beginning war a threefold condition is required, namely authority of the supreme civil power, just cause, right intention. But for licitly waging war, the current statutes of the law of nations must be observed.

¹⁵⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 41, a. 1.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. q. 42, a. 1. In a broader sense, however, sedition of this kind is called civil war.

n. 130.

130. It is explained. That war is sometimes licit is admitted by all (except the Manichaeans, Quakers, and a few others). For war is sometimes the only means for some people to vindicate its own rights, indeed to defend its own existence. Besides, if war were something illicit, God Himself would not often have commanded wars in the Old Testament. - But for licitly beginning war, according to St. Thomas¹⁵² and other authors, three conditions are required:

a) The authority of the supreme civil power, because a private person can pursue his right in the judgment of a superior judge, and therefore does not need war in his own cause; nor does it belong to him directly to procure the common good. - "Likewise also to call together a multitude, which must be done in wars, does not belong to a private person. But since the care of the republic has been entrusted to princes, it belongs to them to guard the republic of the city or kingdom or province subject to them. And just as they licitly defend it with the material sword against interior disturbances when they punish malefactors, ... so also it belongs to them to guard the republic with the warlike sword against exterior enemies."¹⁵³ Now this supreme authority of declaring war sometimes resides in the prince alone, sometimes in the prince or president with the assent of the legislative assembly.

b) A just cause, and that most grave, is required, according to this: "To wage war is not of will, but of necessity."¹⁵⁴ The reason is that in war the greatest material damages arise, a great number of men is killed, and often even the innocent must suffer the harshest cruelties. Therefore before war is begun, one must strive with all strength that peace be preserved and the causes provoking war be eliminated. But if all efforts have been vain, it is licit to begin war. For defensive war a most urgent cause is not required; it is enough that the prince offer fitting satisfaction for the complaints of the other prince; if this satisfaction is spurned, defensive war is licit. For beginning offensive war there is not sufficient a) the desire of converting infidels to the true faith, nor b) the enlargement of one's own empire, nor c) one's own glory, etc. "There is one and only just cause of making war: an injury received." Thus rightly says Francis de Victoria;¹⁵⁵ hence, for example, the following causes suffice: recovery of a province unjustly held by another, vindication of a grave insult brought upon the republic or prince, vengeance upon a nation which has unjustly violated a treaty entered into, etc. In present times the question can arise whether a civilized nation can make war upon pagan tribes altogether lacking culture in order to found colonies? - If those pagans are treated kindly and fitting compensation for vacant or lost land is offered to them, which they refuse to accept, war does not seem to be so illicit. The reason is that otherwise those lands would remain uncultivated, and the inhabitants would lack the great benefit of moral and religious culture. Therefore they seem to be irrationally unwilling that colonies be founded in their regions so sparsely inhabited. Thus speaking theoretically; for in fact European nations have often founded colonies in foreign regions with the greatest injustice.

c) A right intention is necessary, by which namely it is intended that good be promoted or that evil be avoided, and by which an act of true vindicative justice is exercised.¹⁵⁶ On this matter St. Augustine writes: "The desire of harming, cruelty of avenging, an unpacified and implacable spirit, fierceness of rebellion, lust of domination, and whatever things are similar: these are the things which are rightly blamed in wars";¹⁵⁷ and: "War is waged that peace may be acquired. Therefore be peaceful by warring, so that by conquering you may lead those whom you attack to the utility of peace."¹⁵⁸

If these three conditions are present, war may be licitly begun. Nevertheless it is often much better, in discords arisen among diverse nations, to have recourse to the so-called international tribunals of peace; because it is almost always better to suffer some material damage than to prepare the scourge of war for oneself or others. Hence not undeservedly in the Litany of All Saints there is the deprecation: "From pestilence, famine, and war, deliver us, O Lord!" - In our times and in our regions it no longer belongs to common soldiers or inferior officers to judge concerning the liceity or illicitness of war; for it is altogether impossible for a private man to know all the motives which induced the so-called national Diplomacy to begin war. Besides, soldiers now are not free to fight or not to fight; on the contrary they would be punished with death itself if they refused to fight. Therefore in practice any soldier and subordinate officer can suspend his judgment concerning the justice or injustice of war, and if he is compelled to war, can fight with a safe conscience. But in those regions where soldiers are still freely hired and can freely desert military service, the matter stands otherwise. For then any soldier, before he undertakes military service, must have moral certitude concerning the justice of the fight and war; for it is a matter of the gravest damages to be inflicted upon the neighbor and of the most imminent danger to one's own life.

Once war has been begun, the statutes of the law of nations must be observed. But what things in particular are permitted or prohibited by the law of nations according to modern practice sometimes does not so appear. This must be held as a fundamental principle: War is not waged against private citizens, but against the nation as a public person, as has already been said above, n. 47. It is lawful to employ all those things which are necessary for breaking the strength of the enemy and which are not intrinsically illicit. Wherefore it is lawful to besiege fortified citadels and deprive them of all provisions, so that they may surrender themselves more quickly; likewise to fire cannons (commonly, Kanonen) against them, even with danger (but not with direct intention) of killing innocent persons, destroying churches, monasteries, etc.¹⁵⁹ "But since the expenses of war can be exacted from the enemy, the victor, when cities and villages have been captured, can impose taxes, provided they are proportionate to the resources of the inhabitants; but to give a captured city as booty to the army is not lawful today."¹⁶⁰ Also licit are the so-called Repressalia, provided they have been justly determined by the prince for repelling an injury inflicted by the enemy. - Soldiers sin gravely if in a just war they desert military service or flee over to the enemy. The reason is that they sin gravely against obedience, and because they expose themselves to the greatest danger of death; for, if they shall have been captured, they are killed without mercy.

When the conquered enemies ask for peace, the victor must use the victory obtained moderately. Therefore let the conditions of peace not be very harsh. But it belongs to no private man to judge concerning the equity of such compensations and conditions.

Among the ancient authors besides St. Thomas, especially Francis de Victoria wrote best concerning the right of war.¹⁶¹

Scholion. On private men during war. Today it is most strictly prohibited that private men involve themselves during war in warlike affairs or take up arms. Transgressors of this statute are certainly justly punished with the penalty of death. Therefore during war especially clerics should beware lest in any way by words or deeds they participate in war.

¹⁵² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 40, a. 1.

¹⁵³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 40, a. 1.

¹⁵⁴ c. 1, C. 23, q. 2.

¹⁵⁵ Relectiones de iure belli n. 13. In a similar way St. Augustine says: "Just wars are accustomed to be defined as those which avenge injuries" (c. 2, C. 23, q. 1).

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Cajetan, Summula, s.v. "Bellum."

¹⁵⁷ Contra Faustum l. 22, c. 74; cf. c. 4, C. 23, q. 1.

¹⁵⁸ Ep. 149 to Boniface; cf. c. 3, C. 23, q. 1.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 410.

¹⁶⁰ Thus rightly Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de iustitia n. 355.

¹⁶¹ Relectiones theologicae lect. 6.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 5 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. V, CHAPTER III: On Duel and War

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, CHAPTER IV: ON WAR · Vol. I, TREATISE ON RIGHT AND JUST…, THIRD PART: ON RESTITUTION, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: ON DAMAGE INFLICTED ON OCCASION OF MILITARY SERVICE

St. Alphonsus, I, 400; ed. G., I, p. 656; H. Ap., VIII, 27; Noldin, II, n. 347; Tanquerey, II, n. 145; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1894, p. 345; Nouv. Rev. Theol., 22, p. 589; Linz. Quart. Schr., 49, p. 556; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 698.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. V, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: On War

n. ¶749.

Definition. War is a public taking up of arms for the sake of protecting or vindicating the republic. - It differs from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against the political society to which it pertains.

Division. War is called offensive if it happens for avenging injury; defensive, if it is sustained for repelling force.

n. ¶750.

Principles. I. War is licit if just conditions are present. This is established both from Sacred Scripture, for example Gen., 14; Exod., 17; Deuter., 23, etc., and from the example of holy kings. And the reason is because

the prince cannot, as a private person can, pursue his right in the judgment of a superior, and therefore he is held to protect it by right of war (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 40, a. 1).

It was said: If just conditions are present, which are numbered as three: 1. Legitimate authority, that is, supreme. - 2. A just and grave cause, which would outweigh the evils about to follow from war: for example a province usurped by an adversary to be recovered, a grave injury to the republic to be driven off, rebellion of subjects to be repressed, religion to be protected from wicked aggressors, indeed the defense of another nation unjustly oppressed; cf. the 62nd proposition on the principle of non-intervention condemned in the Syllabus. - A just cause would not be: enlargement of the kingdom, diminishing the power of a neighboring prince. A war of this kind is rather great robbery, says St. Augustine (de Civit. Dei, l. 4, c. 6). - 3. Right intention, namely that it happen from love of the common good. Yet if this last condition is lacking, since the war in itself is not unjust, there is not given an obligation of restoring. Cf. III, 402; S. Off., 20 Jun. 1866 (A. S. S., vol. 28, p. 451).¹

Hence you will deduce: 1. The PRINCE, before he begins war, is held diligently to weigh the matter before God and with his counselors.

In doubt concerning the justice of war, or with only a probable right, one must distinguish: a) If the war is defensive, the prince can certainly defend his own kingdom, because it is in possession. Let him always be prepared to satisfy the equitable and certain demands of the adversary. - b) If the war is offensive, in doubt even broad doubt, it is not licit to begin it; both because a possessor of good faith cannot, in doubt, be despoiled, and because here there is question of a cause from which horrible consequences arise for a third party (III, 403). Therefore they are not to be heard who think that for offensive war either greater probability or equal doubt suffices. - Let the whole controversy be proposed to the judgment of another prince, especially of the Supreme Pontiff. If the adversary rejects even this, true injury, and a certain one, is present, and offensive war becomes licit.

A SOLDIER doubting concerning the justice of war, if he is a subject and hired or coerced by the prince, is held to obey; because subjects are held to obey where sin is not certain, and besides they must presume war to be just, whenever the contrary is not established. But a soldier not hired, in doubt concerning the justice of offensive war, cannot hire himself; because, since there is question of the harm of a third party, he cannot inflict it unless the injustice of the possessor is established (III, 408; H. Ap., VIII, 31).

But in an evidently unjust war, soldiers cannot licitly kill enemies, not even for the cause of defense. Hence, if they cannot flee, they must take care that they do not strike with their blows. For they themselves are unjust aggressors, and contrary rights cannot be given in the same thing. - Yet if they are in good faith and do not ask, the confessor ought not instruct them, lest the sin become formal from material. Cf. Bouvier, de Bello, § 3.

n. ¶751.

II. The mode of waging war must be consonant with the rules of justice and the right of nations. Recall what was said n. 136.

Therefore: 1. Before war, namely offensive war, satisfaction must be sought from the adverse party; and if worthy satisfaction is offered, the offended party is held from charity and justice to accept it.

During the course of war, all those things are licit which are permitted by the right of nations and are necessary for obtaining the end. Hence, it is licit to prepare ambushes, to despoil innocent persons of goods, if they themselves are parts of the hostile republic and victory cannot be had in another mode, to demolish churches if the enemies use them for defense, to inflict damages on the goods of adversaries, which are called reprisals, provided the precept of the prince is present, and the injury inflicted by enemies is established, and just compensation is not exceeded. Sometimes, but only from a most urgent cause, it will be licit for a leader to give a city to plundering. Yet this is already opposed to today's customs, except the case in which a tax justly imposed would be denied.

Frauds are illicit which by no prudence can be guarded against, for example to infect wells and fountains with poison; acts of cruelty toward envoys of the adverse party; acts of perfidy toward the leader of the army, for example to suborn assassins who may secretly butcher him; killing of captives and unarmed persons. But captives, unless scandal or their special promise stands in the way, can flee; and in a war unjust on the part of the enemies, they can take away their goods with them in compensation of harm inflicted (Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 12, n. 15).

War having ended, public faith made with the enemy, even if he waged an unjust war, must be preserved; unless the enemy himself first broke faith, or the treaty is objectively evil. Leaders of the army and soldiers must take the greatest care lest after victory they exceed in punishing the conquered; especially they must avoid whatever savors of cruelty or a mind of harming.

n. ¶752.

Of the greatest moment, especially as regards priests who give their name to military service, are the following decisions of the S. Poenitentiary, on 18 March 1912:

Any soldier whatsoever, from that moment when he is constituted in the state of mobilization, is equated with those who are in danger of death. Therefore he can be absolved by any priest at hand, according to the rules handed on by approved authors.
Priests serving as soldiers, other things being equal, can during military operations make the sacred rite, absolve others, notwithstanding irregularity which perhaps they have incurred. But when the war has been settled, let them have recourse to the competent authority. Clerics fighting can, although perhaps irregular, be admitted to the sacraments.
Priests and other clerics are dispensed from the divine office during war and its proximate preparation. It is the same whether they are actively occupied in war, or only in ministering to the wounded. Cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 44, p. 499; Quest. actuell., t. 112, p. 570; Ami du Cl., 1913, p. 145.

On 18 Dec. 1914, the Sacred Poenitentiary enlarged the faculties of chaplains of soldiers, and indeed: a) Chaplains of soldiers, while they accompany the army, can, during war, receive the confessions of any faithful whatsoever, and in their favor use all faculties entrusted to them for the forum of conscience. b) If they are detained in captivity, they enjoy the same power in favor of all fellow captives (A. A. S., VI, p. 712).

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 8 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, CHAPTER IV: ON WAR

n. ¶479.

- War is the fight of a multitude against a multitude foreign to the Republic, for the sake of defending or vindicating the Republic.

Hence it differs 1° from a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few; 2° from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against political society, to which it belongs.

War is distinguished as 1° offensive, if it is done for vindicating an injury; 2° defensive, if it is sustained for repelling force.

Principles. - I. War of itself is licit, whether for repelling injury, or for vindicating one's right. The reason is that any society, independent from another society, ought to have a means of defending itself against injury, and of vindicating its right; but sometimes no other means is supplied for obtaining this end except war. - St. Thomas.²

II. For a just and licit war the following things are necessarily required:

1° Legitimate authority, that is, supreme, acknowledging no other Superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a greater authority is had, this ought to judge concerning the dispute.

2° A just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences to follow from the war, for example, a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury against the Republic to be driven away, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, ... etc.

3° The due mode of waging war, namely that before the war fitting satisfaction be required from the adverse party; and if this is offered, it ought to be accepted from justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. - St. Thomas,¹ Billuart, etc.

n. ¶480.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to declare war with probability of one's right?

Resp. It is controverted. But the negative part is by far more probable, at least intrinsically and practically. The reason is, 1° because a possessor in good faith cannot be despoiled of the thing possessed, unless it is clear that he retains it unjustly; 2° because for positing the cause of very grave evils, such as slaughters, injustices, corruptions of morals, and other things of this sort, which ordinarily follow war, moral certitude of one's right seems to be required.² Tamburini, Billuart, against several, some of whom judge that only greater probability suffices, while others judge that even equal probability suffices.

Quaer. 2° Can soldiers wage war with doubt concerning the justice of the war?

Resp. 1° If there is question of a subject soldier (drafted), he is bound to obey, where the war is not evidently unjust, because it does not pertain to him to examine the reasons of Superiors.

2° If there is question of a hired soldier (volunteer) before war has been declared, he is bound to obey; for he is hired for this: hence he ought to conduct himself almost as if he were a subject.

3° If there is question of a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire concerning the justice of the war, nor can he place himself in doubt concerning justice. The reason is that no one can cooperate in despoiling another of a thing which he possesses, unless he is certain that it is possessed unjustly by him.³ (X) p. 480.

Quaer. 3° Can the guilty or the innocent be killed by the victor?

Resp. 1° Sometimes the guilty can be killed, or soldiers who have fought, if this is necessary for establishing peace and security or for vindicating injury, unless they have surrendered themselves with a pact of life to be preserved. But this is wholly alien from the morals of our time. (W) p. 480.

2° But the innocent, that is women, old men, foreigners, Clerics, Religious, etc., ... cannot be killed directly, unless it is clear that they were associates in the war. Yet they can be killed indirectly, the fight not yet having been completed, if they are mixed with the guilty, so that, with these preserved, the remaining crowd of the guilty which needs to be destroyed cannot be killed.¹

n. ¶481.

You will resolve. - 1° Soldiers in an unjust war cannot licitly kill enemies even for the sake of defense; if they cannot flee, they ought to take care that they do not strike with their blows. For they themselves are unjust aggressors, and contrary rights in the same matter cannot be given, unless by accident, on account of some invincible ignorance, each side be judged just; which can often happen in soldiers, to whom in doubt it does not pertain to define the cause. - Lacroix, and others commonly.

2° A Prince, the justice of the war having been ascertained, ought to propose it to the adverse party, nor can he begin war if competent satisfaction is offered to him; indeed even war already begun, adequate satisfaction having been offered, he is bound to leave, if not from the rigor of justice, at least for the most part from charity, provided the other party wishes to compensate all expenses already made, and it is not necessary for the public good that his insolence be broken.

3° It is licit in war to prepare ambushes, to use stratagems so that enemies may be deceived by fallacies and cast into dangers. For these are not reputed lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since those means are generally accustomed to be used in war; thus it is licit to feign flight, etc. ... But frauds which cannot be guarded against by any prudence are illicit, for example to infect wells and fountains with poison, etc.; ... for these things in the common sense fight against the rights of war.²

4° It is licit in a just war to besiege cities and fortresses, to discharge artillery against them, indeed sometimes to destroy or burn monasteries and churches, and in them to plunder and kill, if, for example, the enemies use the church as a fortress for defending themselves. - Likewise sometimes it is licit to give a captured city over to plunder, but only on account of most grave reasons.³

5° Leaders of the army and soldiers ought especially to guard against exceeding after victory in punishing the conquered: for they are ministers of legitimate vengeance, but not robbers and assassins; especially they ought to avoid whatever smacks of cruelty or the spirit of harming.

6° Leaders and soldiers cannot harm the envoys of the adverse party, because by the law of nations they are everywhere inviolable; nor can they send spies who secretly slaughter the Prince or Leader of the army or other Primates of the kingdom, because this pertains to treachery by the consensus of all.

7° By the right of war soldiers acquire things of the enemies captured in a just war, but not for themselves; for according to a very well-known principle of law: things won by war fall to the republic. It is said 1° in a just war, because in an unjust war an injury is done to the enemy, which must be repaired by restitution both by its author and by all who are participants in this injury (n. 824 and 825. q. 1°).... It is said 2° they acquire not for themselves, because they occupy those things not in their own name, but in the name of the republic, by right of war. But by today's law of nations, not private things of enemies, but only public things, among which the arms of soldiers and also the spoils of the slain are reckoned, are acquired in this way. Leaders command that harm be done to private things of citizens only indirectly, insofar as they either hold the line of battle attacking, or the enemy uses them for harming.¹

Therefore soldiers commit injury and are held by the obligation of restitution: 1° who from public things captured in war retain for themselves those things which have been granted to them neither by the express nor by the tacit will of the prince. But unless the contrary will is clear, soldiers can presume with reason that by this tacit consent the spoils of the slain are conceded to them; 2° who, besides provisions and other things of this sort commanded, extort certain things, as money, from private persons, or without reason and the authority of the leaders do damage to them.¹ 3° who, if they pass through the regions of those who are not conjoined by any treaty with the enemies, and who are called neutrals, take what is not necessary.²

By the express will of the prince, the ships of enemies and all things which are found in them are captured for themselves by those who, in these Federated States, obtain from legitimate authority letters or a license ("commission") for outfitting ships at their own expense, so that they may attack enemies. Yet he who captures and retains booty without that license does not seem guilty of violated justice; for that license pertains only to the order of law, and the tacit consent of the republic, among us, adjudicates the booty to the one capturing it. It pertains to the same order only of law that those who have obtained a license are bound to lead the booty into port and subject it to judgment.³ The things said, among us, are valid also concerning goods captured at sea, although they pertain to private persons; yet of that nation with which war is being waged.

ON THE SIXTH AND NINTH PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

You shall not commit adultery. - You shall not desire his (your neighbor's) wife.¹

Admonition of St. Alphonsus. "Now with difficulty we approach the treating of that matter whose name alone infects the minds of men. Would that I could have explained myself more briefly or more obscurely! But since it is the more frequent and more abundant matter of Confessions, and that on account of which a greater number of souls slide down to hell, indeed I do not doubt to assert that, on account of this one vice of impurity, or at least not without it, all are damned who are damned; hence it was necessary for me to explain myself clearly, although as chastely as it could be done, and to discuss very many particulars. - Yet I beg students who are preparing themselves for the office of hearing Confessions, that they not read this treatise (just as also the other on the conjugal debt), unless they shall already be near to receiving Confessions; and that they read it for this end alone; and, at that time, that they often raise their mind to God, lest, while they strive to acquire the souls of others for God, they themselves suffer detriment to their own."²

The Sixth precept of the Decalogue prohibits any external luxury, or that which is committed by deed. - The Ninth also prohibits sins of the heart, or evil thoughts and desires. - Each indirectly commands chastity.³

Here we must treat only of external sins; for of internal sins, or of morose delectation and evil desire, it has already been said in n. 228 sq. Hence 1° of chastity and luxury in general; 2° of sins of luxury not consummated; 3° of sins of luxury consummated.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON RIGHT AND JUST…, THIRD PART: ON RESTITUTION, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: ON DAMAGE INFLICTED ON OCCASION OF MILITARY SERVICE

n. ¶824.

Principles. - I. Soldiers are bound to nothing by reason of damage inflicted through a common action, unless the injustice of the war is established for them, because they are not formally unjust damagers. - Recall what was said concerning the Fifth Precept of the Decalogue, n. 480. q. 2° and following.

II. But soldiers in an evidently unjust war are bound concerning all damages which they inflicted through private action; and individuals are bound according to proportion concerning damages inflicted by the whole army, unless perhaps they were compelled to fight from grave fear. - See above concerning the unjust damager n. 746 and following, and concerning one participating n. 772. III.

III. But leaders or Princes are bound primarily and in solidum concerning the whole damage inflicted by the army, because they are truly commanding; or, if they did not command the damage, nevertheless they were bound to impede it by office.

n. ¶825.

Questions. - Query 1° Are individual soldiers, in default of the others, bound in solidum concerning the whole damage inflicted by the army?

Resp. More probably negatively, because individuals are not the cause of the whole damage, but only of a part. Moreover in practice they would be excused from absolute inability. - Lugo with others. Cf. n. 779. q. 3°. n. 780.

Query 2° To what are conscripted deserter soldiers bound?

Resp. 1° From obedience or from legal justice they are bound to return to the standards, supposing namely the justice of the law of conscription.

Except a) if they would meet grave danger to salvation, for example if means of confessing would not be at hand, etc., as can happen in some places; b) if, returning, they would be punished with death or other most grave penalties; c) if the war is evidently unjust.

Resp. 2° But certainly deserters are bound to no restitution, whether the law requires others in their place or not; because at most they injure legal justice, and probably (n. 827) they cooperate not unjustly toward the damage of others.

n. ¶826.

- Query 3° To what are those bound who hired themselves out for others and then deserted military service?

Resp. They cannot retain the price received, because a reason for retaining the money is lacking for them, since it is spent only on account of the burden of military service. Therefore they must restore it, and indeed to him from whom they received it in the case in which this man had to undergo military service or procure another soldier. Otherwise, to pious causes. Hence you easily resolve to whom those called "Bounty-jumpers" ought to restore.

n. ¶827.

- Query 4° To what are those designated by lot for military service bound, who withdraw themselves from it, or obtain exemption without true causes?

Resp. It can scarcely be denied that the opinion of those is probable who hold that the law of conscription is unjust. For, they say, it is not necessary for the common good, since the republic can sufficiently provide for its security by hiring soldiers for pay. Besides, they say, that law is opposed to distributive justice, since it imposes such a burden only upon those families having young men fit for military service. The probability of this opinion standing, the right of the Superior (of the Republic) commanding conscription becomes doubtful. But a Superior in doubt whether he exceeds his own power is not to be obeyed in a case in which, as in the present matter, the thing commanded is very difficult or exposes the subject to danger of grave damage.¹ Therefore those concerning whom in the Question are not to be compelled to restitution, whether they corrupt magistrates or physicians so that they be declared invalid by them, or deceive magistrates by lies, frauds, or previous mutilation, or desert the standards.

He to whom this opinion would seem improbable should take care not to urge the burden of restitution against conscripts imprudently, since most by no means think that injustice is committed, and otherwise they are rarely going to comply with admonitions.

Those conscripted by lot who desert the standards after they have obligated themselves by oath to military service sin, as is clear of itself, against religion. Yet for the most part they are exempted from the obligation of returning to the standards, which is implicitly contained in this oath, on account of the causes brought forward n. 825. q. 2°. They also sin on account of the lies, frauds, and mutilation by which they exempt themselves from military service; but not on account of injustice either toward the republic, if this must hire others in their place for pay, or toward those who by law would have to supply their place, because they use their own right, and that, as was said, practically certain. Nor do they sin by corrupting magistrates or physicians, since they redeem themselves from a vexation which, probably and therefore practically certainly, is unjust. Nor do the corrupted magistrates or physicians seem obligated to restitution either toward the republic or toward the corrupters; not toward the republic, because they seem to be equated to tax-collectors not exacting taxes which for a grave reason are judged unjust; nor toward the corrupters, because the price of a base work (in the case, of a lie), after it was furnished, can be retained (n. 834. q. 6°).

Query 5° What if a sufficient number of soldiers cannot be hired for pay?

Resp. 1° Even in this case the law will be unjust as to clerics (n. 112), and, if the law prohibits hiring another in one's place, as to those who are prepared to hire another.

Resp. 2° With these excepted, the rest from commutative justice must abstain from all fraud. The reason is that although the law by which military service is commanded, even in this case, obliges toward the republic from legal justice alone, nevertheless by force of the aleatory contract or of the drawing of lots an obligation of commutative justice arises toward those with whom the lot is drawn. Wherefore also physicians and magistrates exempting someone without just cause in this case, on account of the quasi-contract violated, which they entered into with the republic, must restore to it, and indeed in the first place; but the corrupters, as cooperators, in the second. But concerning the damage which was inflicted upon those who, by the frauds of those drawing lots with them, had to undertake the burden of military service, those who employed those frauds are bound in the first place, in the second place the physicians and magistrates corrupted by these, or favoring them.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 13 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Second Part: Concerning Le…, Question Three: Concerning the Defense of the Common Good or On War

S. Th. II-II, q. 40.

272. War is a means of defending the common good of the political community against foreign enemies: namely, the public taking up of arms for the sake of protecting or vindicating the commonwealth. It can be defined: a conflict by force and arms between two or more nations; or the fight of a multitude or commonwealth with a foreign multitude or commonwealth, undertaken by public authority for the common good.

It differs: a) from a brawl, which is undertaken in a private capacity and is of one or a few against one or a few, and not always with arms;

b) from a duel, which is a contest with arms, but singular, not of a multitude, and is instituted by agreement;

c) from sedition, which is an uprising or conflict of a multitude against the prince, or against the political society to which it belongs, or the fight of a multitude against a multitude in the same community; whence it is, as it were, civil war.

Hence St. Thomas, q. 42, a. 1: "War properly is against foreign enemies, as of a multitude against a multitude; but a brawl is of one against one, or of few against few; sedition, however, is properly among the parts of one multitude disagreeing among themselves, for instance, when one part of the political community is stirred up in tumult against another."

War is either offensive, when it is undertaken to avenge or obtain reparation for an injury inflicted by another nation; or defensive, when it is sustained for repelling unjust force by force, namely, an aggression made by another prince or kingdom, or for warding off an injury which is being inflicted here and now.

Ordinarily offensive war is waged by him who first begins hostilities; not always, however, because sometimes an apparent aggression is nothing other than necessary defense.

276. Observations. — 1. Today, because a society of nations has been instituted among several peoples, and because of the international pact which places war outside the law, cases are now rarer in which war occurs or offensive war is licit and just. Nevertheless it is not impossible, because nations, just as they freely enter the society of nations, so also can freely leave it, nor must all conflicts be subjected to it; moreover, the international pact has not been concluded or ratified by all peoples; and it could also happen that some nation would not wish to submit itself to an arbitral sentence.

Nevertheless, because of these new circumstances, a) it will now be easier to judge concerning the justice or injustice of a war, and, when war has been declared, cases of licit or obligatory flight or abstention will be more frequent; — b) subjects can now more easily demand from rulers that a conflict be submitted to arbiters; — c) or also that military expenses and the number of soldiers be notably diminished, since these have been increased and multiplied beyond every proportion of necessities.⁶

⁶ Benedict XV said, in the peace proposals directed to the belligerent princes on August 1, 1917: "First of all, the fundamental point must be that the moral force of right be substituted for the material force of arms; whence a just agreement of all for the simultaneous and reciprocal diminution of armaments, according to rules and guarantees to be established, in the measure necessary and sufficient for maintaining public order in each State; then, in substitution for armies, the institution of arbitration, with its high pacifying function, according to norms to be agreed upon and sanctions to be determined against the State which would refuse either to submit international questions to arbitration or to accept its decisions."

To serve as soldiers, which by natural and divine right is less fitting for clerics and religious, is strictly forbidden by ecclesiastical law (can. 141), unless by urgent necessity, or unless it has been dispensed by the Church (a. 2). They can, however, take part in war so that they may be present to those fighting with spiritual or bodily help (ad 2); indeed, they can exhort them to fight for the fatherland in a war that is not certainly unjust (ad 3): nevertheless, in judging concerning this matter, let them be prudent.

On feast days, just as from judicial business, so also from war one must abstain, especially because of the public unrest which draws back from divine worship; unless, however, necessity is present (a. 4).

Princes and commanders by office ought to take care of military discipline and restrain plunder, thefts, arson, and rapes, etc.; otherwise they are bound to restitution in solidum together with the soldiers; but the latter individually, unless they inflicted injustices from a true conspiracy. See below, n. 316-317.

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P. — 9 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Ch. I, Question VI: Concerning Merchants and Soldiers

n. ¶4392.

III. Soldiers are especially to be questioned:

n. ¶4393.

Concerning blasphemies and undue oaths.

n. ¶4394.

Concerning omissions in fulfilling the precepts of the Church, especially concerning Sunday Mass neglected, if they were not impeded by reason of military service.

n. ¶4395.

Concerning quarrels and duels; if these are entered by agreement, excommunication is incurred.

n. ¶4396.

Concerning lust, and indeed not only concerning pollution, but also and especially concerning fornication, or even concerning stuprum, and sometimes, especially among cavalrymen, concerning sodomy.

n. ¶4397.

Concerning immodest, depraved amusements or readings.

n. ¶4398.

Concerning thefts and injustices.

n. ¶4399.

Concerning damages unjustly inflicted.

n. ¶4400.

This especially holds for time of war. On which occasion it can be asked: whether they have not harmed the innocent, have not seized the goods of private persons or inflicted damage upon them, have not occupied goods without necessity of sustenance or legitimate requisition of the leader, have not destroyed things belonging to another without necessity, etc. For those things which they would unjustly seize or destroy, they would be bound to restitution.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 3 passages

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Fifth Precept of th…, Chapter IV. On War

War is a fight of a multitude against a foreign multitude, for the sake of defending or vindicating the commonwealth. Hence it differs: 1st. from a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few, and without authority, nor undertaken for the good of the commonwealth; 2nd. from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against the political society to which it belongs.

n. 277.

I say 1st. War is licit of itself, whether for repelling injury or for vindicating one's own right. The reason is that any society independent from another society ought to have a means of protecting itself against injury and of vindicating its own right; but sometimes no other means is available for obtaining this end except war. For since higher tribunals are lacking to which nations or Princes may have recourse, it remains only that, in order to obtain satisfaction from another society, they use war. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 40, art. 1.

I say 2nd. For a just and licit war, the following are necessarily required: 1st. legitimate authority, that is, supreme authority, acknowledging no other superior in civil matters, and the reason is that where a greater authority is had, this authority ought to judge concerning the dispute; 2nd. a just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences that will follow from the war, e.g., a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury to the commonwealth to be repelled, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, etc.; 3rd. the due mode of waging war, namely that before war condign satisfaction be required from the adverse party; and if this is offered, it ought to be accepted as a matter of justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. - Cf. St. Thomas, ibid.

n. 278.

You Will Ask. Can soldiers wage war with doubt concerning the justice of the war?

Response. If it concerns a subject soldier, or even a soldier hired before the war was declared, he can, indeed he ought to obey where the war is not evidently unjust, because in doubt one must stand for the superior. But if it concerns a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire concerning the justice of the war, nor can he hire himself out in doubt concerning its justice. The reason is that no one can cooperate toward despoiling someone of a thing which he possesses, unless he is certain that it is unjustly possessed by him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 408.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1112, n. 58.

Billuart, Summa Summae

Charles-René Billuart, O.P. — 38 passages

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On the Vices Opposed to Ch…, On war

War can be defined : «A clash by force and arms between two hostile armies.» By which it differs from a duel, which is a clash of one against one.

War is twofold : offensive, which is for obtaining satisfaction for an injury inflicted, and defensive, which is for repelling an injury being inflicted.

You will ask 1° whether war is licit.

[That war is always sin the Manichaeans once dogmatized, from St. Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 74; then the Wyclifites, as Waldensis testifies. But Luther proclaimed that to fight against the Turks was to contradict God willing through them to punish our sins. Erasmus contended that all war is forbidden Christians, against whom]

Tr. I, Disputation XVI: On War, Question I: Whether any war can be just · Tr. I, Disputation XVI: On War, Question II: What conditions are required for a just war

I answer. To make war is not per se evil, but, with three conditions posited, namely legitimate authority of declaring war, just cause and right intention, it is licit²¹⁴ . ²¹⁴ Here q. 40, a. 1, o.

n. 6.

Proof. from Scripture. In the ancient Law, God often commanded or approved war : Exod., XXII, 8 seqq. ; Num., XXI, 2 et 3 and XXV, 17 et 18 ; Deuter., VII, 1 seqq. ; I Reg., XV, 2 et 3 ; II Reg., VIII, 1 seqq. ; Josue, I, 2 seqq., VI, 2 seqq., VIII, 1 seqq., X, 8 seqq., and elsewhere often.

n. 7.

In the new Law²¹⁵ , Luc., III, 14, when soldiers asked what they should do that they might flee the coming wrath which John the Baptist threatened to sinners, the holy Precursor did not bid them desert military service, but to use it well : Do nothing violently, he says, nor accuse anyone falsely, and be content with your pay. By which words he tacitly approves war, as Augustine teaches, Epist. 138²¹⁶ , to Marcellinus. ²¹⁵ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra. ²¹⁶ Formerly 5.

n. 8.

It is confirmed. from the usage of the Church, which in several councils decreed war for the recovery of the Holy Land.

n. 9.

Proof by reason. By the law of nature it is licit to repel force by force. Ergo defensive war is licit. As to offensive : A private man who has suffered injury or damage can seek satisfaction or restitution. Ergo likewise can the state. — I subsume. But sometimes satisfaction or restitution cannot otherwise be had than by arms, say if those who injure or damage, being required, refuse to satisfy or restitute, nor have they a superior who would or could compel them to satisfaction or restitution. Ergo.

n. 10.

I said : «With certain conditions posited, namely legitimate authority, just cause and right intention.»

n. 11.

The authority required for declaring an offensive war must be supreme²¹⁷ , acknowledging no other superior in temporal matters, such as emperors, kings, certain dukes, independent states have, such as Venice, Switzerland, etc. 1° Because whoever has a superior can prosecute his right before him. But war cannot be undertaken except when there is no other way of prosecuting his right. 2° Offensive war is an act of supreme vindicative justice. Ergo it pertains to the supreme prince. But defensive war, the danger pressing, dependent princes, dukes, magistrates can declare it by natural law, since it is licit even to any private person to repel force by force. Understand, while danger and necessity last; these ceasing, they ought to seek and await from the supreme prince or independent state the judgment, power and execution of the injury to be avenged. ²¹⁷ Here q. 40, a. 1, c.

n. 12.

The just cause of declaring offensive war, generally speaking, is single, namely grave injury or damage inflicted, unrepaired, nor repairable in any other way.

n. 13.

As to right intention, war must not be waged except from intention of justice and common good, as Augustine teaches, Epist. 189²¹⁸ and lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 74. ²¹⁸ Formerly 205.

n. 14.

You will ask 2° whether, in doubt about the justice of a war, it is licit to make war.

n. 15.

I answer. 1°. If reparation of injury is at stake, a prince doubtful about the justice of the war cannot declare war; because in doubt, especially of such moment, the safer part must be chosen. If recovery of possession is at stake, the condition of the possessor is better in doubt, and therefore war cannot be moved against him. If neither possess, it is licit to bring war against him who refuses to divide the thing pro rata of the doubt.

n. 16.

[The true reason why, in doubt about the justice of a war, it is not licit to declare it, is because no one acts licitly, when the act can be good or evil, unless he be morally certain of the honesty of his action, as was explained and proved in the treatise on Human Acts, dissert. V, on Conscience.

n. 17.

When neither possesses, and the right is doubtful, it does not seem that this one or that one should be compelled by violence and arms to divide the thing pro rata of the doubt, because, proceeding thus, the one or the other would be despoiled of his right; but the titles invoked on either side are to be examined and weighed, and if the parties cannot compose their litigation between themselves, they ought to commit the decision of the cause to the arbitration of another, whose sentence they promise themselves to stand by. But if the contenders should come forward voluntarily to agree upon dividing the litigated thing between them, so that each abandon part of the right which perhaps belongs to him, this manner of proceeding is certainly to be commended, whereby justice is fully satisfied, but it seems nowise to be imposed.]

n. 18.

I answer. 2°. Those who are subjects of a warring prince, when ordered, can and ought to enroll themselves in the militia, and enrolled to make war, even if they doubt of the justice of the war, forming however for themselves a practical judgment that they may licitly obey and make war; because 1° the superior has a certain right of commanding, nor is he stripped of his right by the subject's doubt. Ergo the subject is bound to obey; for the right of commanding and the obligation of obeying are correlatives. 2° From denial of obedience, while its cause manifest cannot be assigned, authority is enervated in superiors, and the whole government subverted. From these principles therefore the subject can form the practical judgment that when ordered he may licitly make war. Confer what I wrote dissert. V on Human Acts, art. 2, You will ask 3°.

n. 19.

I answer. 3°. Those who are not subjects of the warring prince, in doubt about the justice of the war, cannot serve as soldiers; because by not soldiering they injure no one, since they have not the necessity of obeying like the subjects of whom in the preceding answer; but by soldiering they expose themselves to inflict grave injury upon another prince. The same seems altogether the reason concerning the subjects of the warring prince, if, not ordered, but of their own will, they serve for pay.

n. 20.

However, since the causes of wars are often not manifest, and the justice of a war also often is obscure even to theologians and jurists themselves, from this answer, true elsewhere per se, it would follow that almost all soldiers were blameworthy; for who among them, whether subjects or not, inquires into the causes and justice of the war? Therefore several weighty authors judge that, if their doubt be merely negative, insofar as they have no reasons for or against, and from the probity and prudence of the prince and his counsels they can persuade themselves that they would not move war unless it were just, they may licitly serve.

n. 21.

But those who are ready to make war whether the war be just or unjust, are certainly in the state of damnation, because of the will to make war even unjustly.

n. 22.

You will ask 3° whether there can be a just war on both sides.

n. 23.

I answer. War per se from the nature of the thing cannot be just on both sides, but it can per accidens and from ignorance, or, others say, it cannot be just on both sides materially, well however formally : because it cannot come to pass, according to the truth of the thing, that in one there be right of seeking satisfaction or restitution without there being in the other obligation of satisfying or restituting; for right and obligation are correlatives. Ergo, if he resist, he resists unjustly, and conversely if he resists justly, the other seeks unjustly. But truly, if one ignore the right of the other, he sins not by resisting, and thus per accidens, by reason of ignorance, the war is just on both sides.

n. 24.

You will ask 4° whether in a just war it is licit to kill innocents.

n. 25.

I answer. In a just war it is never licit per se and by intention to kill innocents, unless special authority has been made by God. Yet it is licit per accidens and beside intention. Proof of the first part. 1° From that general command of God, Exod., XXIII, 7: Thou shalt not kill the innocent and just. 2° An innocent cannot be killed in a just war except on account of the guilt of the state. But that is not licit. Ergo. — Proof of the minor. The state cannot be punished by the enemy except in goods over which it has dominion. But the state has not dominion over the life of innocents, but God alone, who granted not the right of the sword to the state except against those who do evil. Ergo.

n. 26.

Under the name of innocents come infants, children unfit for war, women, peasants, plebeians, merchants having nothing to do with war, clerics and religious, cap. de treuga et pace, lib. I Decretal., tit. 34, c. 2. All these, I say, by presumption of law are judged innocent, until the contrary be proved of them.

n. 27.

Proof of the second part: 1° If neither per accidens and beside intention killing innocents were licit in a just war, it would be impossible to carry out a war : a city could not, e.g., be stormed, or a tower demolished in which innocents were enclosed; enemies could not be attacked who placed innocents in the front of battle, which they would never omit, and thus the justice of the combatants would be frustrated. 2° When two effects, equally immediate, of one act, the one good, the other evil, can, a just reason subsisting, the good effect be intended and the evil permitted.²¹⁹ But the demolition of a tower or the explosion of war machines upon enemies is immediately protective of the homeland and destructive of innocents. Ergo the first effect can be intended for the common good, and the other permitted. This principle of the Author more widely drawn out and expounded you have dissert. VIII, On Justice, art. 2. ²¹⁹ Here q. 64, a. 7, o.

n. 28.

You will ask 5° what are the obligations and sins of combatants.

n. 29.

I answer. 1°. Supreme princes and leaders of armies 1° are bound ex officio to see that military discipline be observed insofar as they can, and to coerce soldiers from plunderings, thefts, burnings, ravishments, etc.; otherwise they sin mortally and are bound to restitution of those damages. 2° They sin mortally if they provide not just pay to the soldiers, and they are bound to restitute damages which soldiers inflict by lack of pay.

n. 30.

I answer. 2°. Subordinate leaders sin mortally and are bound to restitution : 1° If, no necessity compelling, they rashly expose soldiers to sure slaughter. 2° If they retain part of the pay or moneys conceded for soldiers. 3° If they have a smaller number of soldiers and receive pay for a greater, such are those who, while the troops are mustered, present not real soldiers in military dress, commonly called passe-volants, or present the same twice or thrice : into which sin also those muster-masters or commissaries implicate themselves who knowingly admit it; nor are they bound only for theft of pay, but for the damage which can accrue to the state on account of insufficient number of soldiers. Except how, they shall have seen. 4° Those sin and are bound to restitution who, while they lead troops through a province, on account of accepted gifts from certain villages or citizens, burden other villages, or citizens, with the number of soldiers.

n. 31.

I answer. 3°. Common soldiers 1° ought to be content with their pay, according to the precept of the holy Precursor, Luc., III, 14. Whence they sin mortally and are bound to restitution if, in lands not hostile, beyond roof, bed, straw, etc., as custom allows, they extort moneys, despoil, pillage, or otherwise do damage. Nor does the authority or connivance of leaders excuse them, unless perchance, the pay failing or diminished, they take precisely what is necessary for urgent need. 2° They are bound, even with certain peril of life, not to desert their post, or fortress, unless victory be plainly despaired of.

n. 32.

[I answer. 4°. While war lasts, all those things are licit which are permitted by the law of nations and are necessary for obtaining the end. Hence it is licit to prepare ambushes, employ stratagems, e.g., feign flight, etc. In a just war it is licit to besiege cities and storm them, deprive them of water. Likewise to despoil innocents of goods, if they be members of the enemy state, nor can victory be had otherwise. It is licit even to demolish churches, if enemies use them for defense. Sometimes, but only from the most urgent cause, cities can be delivered to plunder. This however is adverse to modern customs, besides the case where a justly imposed tribute is denied.

n. 33.

But illicit are frauds which can be guarded against by no prudence, as to infect wells and fountains with poison. Nor is it licit to hire assassins who secretly slay the leader of the opposing army; for, by consent of all, perfidy can never be made honorable.

n. 34.

Likewise it is not licit to kill captives taken in war and all who can harm no longer, except in punishment of crime. Captives moreover can flee, if no promise given by them stand in the way.²²⁰ ²²⁰ Cfr. Marci, Institut. morales Alphonsianae, n. 751.

n. 35.

You will ask 6° whether it is licit for a Catholic prince to call heretics or Gentiles to aid.

n. 36.

I answer. affirmatively per se, at least speaking speculatively, provided scandal and peril of faith be far off. But it can be per accidens illicit, namely on account of damages imminent to religion.

n. 37.

You will ask 7° when do the fighting become irregular.

n. 38.

I answer. In a just defensive war, even those who kill do not become irregular. But in a just offensive war, those alone who kill incur irregularity, not indeed others. But in an unjust war, though only one be killed, all aggressors are irregular, because they act after the manner of one agent.²²¹ This last is drawn out from St. Thomas.²²² Of these things more fully below, on Irregularity. ²²¹ Id., lib. VII, n. 459. ²²² Here q. 64, a. 8, o, and ad 3.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 70 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Tr. I, Disputation XVI: On War, Question I: Whether any war can be just

strike no one, wound no one; but because he knew that when they did these things as soldiers they were not homicides, but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries, but defenders of the public safety: he answered them: shake no one down, etc.; but be content with your wages.

John the Baptist was certainly speaking on behalf of men even of the New Testament; for he was the precursor of Christ.

IT IS PROVED secondly from the Heroes, praised in Scripture as saints, who waged wars: thus Abraham, Moses, Josue, Gedeon, Sampson, David, Josias, the Machabees, and others.

IT IS PROVED thirdly from holy Pontiffs, who praised wars waged by Christians, or urged that they be waged: Damasus, in Theodorus book 5, chapter 10; Gregory book 1, epistle 72; Chrysostom on Psalm 45; Nazianzen oration 3, on peace; Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapters 40 and 41; Jerome on Micheas 4; see the Holy Doctor in the sermons of the Hexaemeron.

IT IS PROVED by reason, D. Bonaventure at the place cited, drawing on Aristotle 7 Politics, chapter 14, and D. Augustine epistle 207: because peace is necessary to the human commonwealth, that we and ours may have the means of living; but this is often impeded by acts of violence, which cannot otherwise be repelled than by war; and it is a law of nature that we repel violence, whence the opposing arguments collapse.

n. 6.

The Holy Doctor confirms all this on Luke 6, in these words: and he who strikes you on the cheek, etc., from D. Augustine book 1 of the City of God, chapter 21, where he says, expounding that precept: Thou shalt not kill: Against this precept they did not act who, by God's authority, waged wars, or who, bearing the person of public power, and according to its laws — that is, by the most just command of reason — punished criminals with death.

n. 7.

It is confirmed from the chapter Fortitudo 23, question 3, which is by D. Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapter 27: Fortitude, which either defends the fatherland from barbarians in war, or at home defends the weak, or one's companions from robbers, is full of justice.

n. 8.

YOU WILL OBJECT first. It was said in Isaias 2 and Micheas 4 that wars are to be put away in the time of grace.

n. 9.

IT IS ANSWERED with D. Ambrose on Psalm 45 and D. Jerome on chapter 4 of Micheas, that what was foretold was the peace to come in the whole world at the time of Christ's advent, so that it might be prepared to receive the Gospel.

n. 10.

YOU OBJECT secondly that in the Gospel it is commanded: Matth. 5. Whoever strikes you on one cheek, offer him the other also. Matth. 26. Whoever takes up the sword shall perish by the sword. Rom. 12. Rendering to no one evil for evil.

n. 11.

IT IS ANSWERED from D. Augustine epistle 5 to Marcellinus, that this is forbidden lest it be done by private authority.

n. 12.

TAKE NOTE that in the Council of Nicaea, canon 11, those are condemned who, after first laying down the military belt lest they sacrifice to idols, returned again as a dog to its vomit, serving Pagan Emperors, Diocletian, Licinius, and others, who all dishonored the military belt of Christians unless they sacrificed to idols.

n. 13.

Some Fathers indeed condemn only unjust wars, or those which are occasions of sinning proximately, or dissuade men in religious orders, or urge them to enter religion, etc.

n. 14.

From these you have that wars even against the Turks are lawful; for if God uses the Turks for our exercise, he also uses pestilence and famine, and yet we are bound to defend ourselves, lest they overwhelm the Christian world with superstitious clouds. See Valentia at the place cited and Bellarmine, chapter 16. For the Turks are unjust possessors of Christian kingdoms.

Tr. I, Disputation XVI: On War, Question II: What conditions are required for a just war

Most excellently, after D. Augustine book 22 against Faustus, chapter 74, and epistles 5 and 207, the following wrote on this matter: D. Thomas here; Alensis part 3, question 76, member 3; Gandavus quodlibet 15, question 16; Gabriel book 4, distinction 15, question 4; Victoria relectio on the Law of War; Castro book 2 on the just punishment of heretics, chapter 14; Covarruvias relectio on the chapter Peccatum, on the rules of law, part 2, §§ 9 and 10; Bellarmine book 3 on the Morals of the Church, chapter 14; Bannes, Cajetan, and other Thomists here; Valentia question 16, point 1; Tannerus disputation 2, question 6, dubium 3; Sylvester and other Summists, under the word Bellum. The Canonists question 23, qq. 1, 2 and 3; and D. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, at the end, and in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 82, where from the Scriptures he gathers wondrous examples, outstandingly proving that the integrity and prayers of the Saints contribute more to victory than arms.

FIRST, then, the Holy Doctor requires three conditions for a just war in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, from D. Augustine. The first is legitimate authority. So D. Augustine at the place cited, against Faustus, chapter 74. The second is a just cause; so D. Augustine question 10 on Josue. The third is a right intention; so D. Augustine epistle 207.

AS TO the first condition, only the Prince, or the Republic, ruling absolutely, can declare offensive war. Hence Princes who are parts of some whole dominion cannot do so: so Molina disputation 100, Tannerus number 30, and the common view. For defensive war, however, all peoples and Magistrates are admitted, because anyone may repel force with force.

AS TO the second, the cause must be against an enemy unjustly and gravely injuring, as D. Augustine admonishes at the place cited. I shall set out, moreover, the specific injuries for which war may be declared, which D. Bonaventure relates in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 82.

THE FIRST is if what is owed is denied: thus the sons of Israel made war on the Amorrhites, because they denied them an unmolested passage Num. 21, and D. Augustine notes this question 43 on the Book of Numbers.

n. 6.

NOR indeed did Julius Caesar have a just cause, on the ground that the Romans denied access to the city, as Alphonsus a Castro thinks book 2 on the penal law, chapter 14, and Covarruvias at the place cited, § 9: for he was bound to lay down his arms at the Rubicon, since he was a subject of the Republic commanding it. Nor is just war made against the Indians on the ground that they deny free access to their provinces. So Molina disputation 105, Tannerus number 34 — provided, however, they do not resist the preaching of the faith.

n. 7.

THE SECOND cause is for recovering one's own possessions. Thus David fought against Isboseth, 2 Reg. 2.

n. 8.

THE THIRD cause is to resist invaders of the Republic. Thus the Jews often fought against the Philistines, and the Machabees against Antiochus and Demetrius.

n. 9.

THE FOURTH, if they render aid to unjust enemies; thus David fought against Syria of Damascus, because it brought aid to Adarezer, 2 Reg. 8.

n. 10.

THE FIFTH, to avenge a public injury. Thus David fought against Hannon, who had dismissed the messengers with contempt, 2 Reg. 10.

n. 11.

THE SIXTH, against rebellious subjects, thus David 2 Reg. 20. Hence D. Gregory infers that war against pertinacious heretics is just, book 1 of the Register, chapter 72.

n. 12.

THE SEVENTH, if some defend public malefactors, as D. Augustine teaches, question 10 on Josue; thus in Judges 20 the Hebrews fought against the Benjamites, their own fellow-citizens.

n. 13.

THE EIGHTH, on account of a violated pact; you have an example in Jotham and Josaphat, 4 Reg. 3. Therefore the sole cause of a just war is injury — to be repelled by the right of defense, or compensated by the right of commutative justice, or avenged by the right of vindicative justice — and that, when due satisfaction is not otherwise rendered. So all agree with D. Augustine book 22 against Faustus, chapter 74.

n. 14.

Making war, however, against infidels not baptized, Castro and others approve; but the common opinion is that it is not lawful; for no Prince has a right to this except as a member of the Church, which has no right over those not subject to it.

n. 15.

The Archbishop of Valencia relates in his History of America that not a few armies of Christian warfare went astray in this, who, making war upon the most wretched Indians for the sake of winning them to religion, utterly destroyed that people even to extermination: the Gospel surely does not command that nations be destroyed with such savagery, but that they be redeemed with supreme humanity and patience; it would rather be fitting to spend one's own blood on their behalf by labor and long-suffering preaching than to draw their blood off into streams; for the Apostles, Christ commands, are to be as sheep, handing them not a savage sword, but the sword of the tongue — namely, the word of God, which is more penetrating than every two-edged sword.

n. 16.

One who makes a just war, however, CAN call others to his aid and partnership in the war; for so the Machabees demanded the alliance of the Romans, as Tannerus notes number 52; so also everywhere among the nations, while wars are waged, we have it as established that this is done. Yet I do not refuse that where the scandal of the Christian name threatens, it is not lawful; so Molina disputation 112, Azor tomus 1, book 8, chapter 25, question 14, and Tannerus as above.

n. 17.

But since the necessity of the one calling them is so well known that he is recognized as compelled to do so for his own defense, not to the injury of the faith, no one will deny that scandal will arise from it for anyone. By this is clear the answer to what Valentia objects disputation 3, question 16, point 2.

n. 18.

One CAN also lay ambushes, and is not bound to announce the battle beforehand, as the Holy Doctor notes in the Bibliotheca, chapter 82, which he proves by the examples of Abraham Genesis 14; Josue 8 and 10; and of Gedeon, Judith 8. So Tannerus.

n. 19.

In doubt, however, about the just cause, the condition of the possessor is the better one, as is commonly taught, according to Valentia. Nevertheless it is reasonable also to satisfy even the adverse party, as Victoria notes number 28, Molina disputation 103, Valentia question 16, point 2, Tannerus number 41.

n. 20.

TAKE NOTE, moreover, that a just cause once recognized does not mean war is at once to be declared, but satisfaction must first be sought, as is had in Deuteron. 20; otherwise the undertaking will be against justice, and consequently with guilt and the obligation of restitution. So Bannes dubium 8, Tannerus numbers 32 and 51, Valentia point 2, at the end.

n. 21.

If, however, neither party is in legitimate possession, the thing must be divided or done by the other according to the reasons, in proportion to compensation. See Tannerus number 43.

n. 22.

AS TO intention, it is so necessary that if the other conditions are present but this one is lacking, it does not give rise to the necessity of restitution. So, from the common view, Cajetan teaches, Bannes here, Valentia point 2, Molina tomus 1 on justice, disputation 123, Tannerus dubium 2, number 28.

n. 23.

War can indeed be just on both sides per accidens, if on one side there is invincible ignorance, in which way the wars of the Amorrhites with Israel seem to have been, as Tostatus teaches on Josue 10; and then, once the truth is recognized, they are bound to withdraw and restore those things that still survive, and by which they have been made richer; as Valentia notes. But Princes must first consult the learned; otherwise, in a matter of the gravest moment, they expose themselves to the danger of guilt. So Victoria on the law of war, number 20, Valentia question 16, point 2, Molina disputation 109, Tannerus disputation 2, question 6, dubium 4, number 37.

n. 24.

BEYOND the conditions stated, to the substance of a just war there follows the manner of conducting it. First, indeed, in the damages to be inflicted: necessary reaction is indeed allowed, both to repair the damages inflicted and to establish peace; yet not all excesses are allowed — for instance, to kill innocents, such as women and infants, as is decreed in Exodi 23, Deuteron. 20. But if God at some time commanded that even women and infants be killed — Josue 6, in Jericho; 1 Reg. 15, against Amalech — there was a special cause by the will of the supreme Lord. So Molina, Valentia, Victoria, according to Tannerus number 66.

n. 25.

BEYOND children and women, however, others must be presumed innocent, as is had in the chapter Innovamus, on truce and peace, from Alexander III: Innovamus, that Priests, monks, conversi, pilgrims, merchants, rustics, those going and returning, and the animals with which they plough and carry seed to the field, be let be with fitting service. To these are added Legates or Orators, in the chapter Paternarum 24, question 3. See there.

n. 26.

It would nevertheless be lawful per accidens, if the citadel could not otherwise be stormed, and that storming would bring very great advantage. So Tannerus number 67, with Victoria.

…and 30 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 4 passages

Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section IX. Of War

War, a science by itself, has no interest for the philosopher except as an instance on a grand scale of self-defence. When the theory of self-defence has been mastered (c. ii. s. ii., p. 208), little further remains to be said about war. In a State, the self-defence of citizen against citizen is confined to the moment of immediate physical aggression. But in a region where the State is powerless and practically non-existent, self-defence assumes a far greater amplitude. (S. ii., n, 2, p. 309.) When the Highland chief lifted the cattle of the Lowland farmer, and the King of Scotland lay unconcerned and unable to intervene, feasting at Holyrood, or fighting on the English border, then, if there were a fair hope of recovering the booty without a disproportionate effusion of blood, the farmer did right to arm his people, march after the robber, and fight him for the stolen oxen, as the gallant Baron of Bradwardine would fain have done. (Waverley, c. xv.) Here is the right of self-defence in its full development, including the right of private war. But in a private individual this is an undesirable, rank, and luxuriant growth; and when the individual comes to live, as it should be his aim to live, in a well-organized State, the growth is pruned and cut down: he may then defend himself for the instant when the State cannot defend him; but after the wrong is done, he must hold his hand, and quietly apply to the State to procure him restitution and redress. But there is no State of States, no King of Kings, upon earth; therefore, when of two independent States the one has wronged, or is about to wrong the other, and will not desist nor make amends, nothing is left for it; Nature has made no other provision, but they must fight. They must fall back upon the steel and the shotted gun, the ratio ultima regum.

The Lowland farmer above mentioned might be spoken of as punishing the Highland robber, chastising his insolence, and the like. This is popular phraseology, but it is not accurate. Punishment, an act of vindictive justice, is from superior to inferior. (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 4, p. 104.) War, like other self-defence, is between equals. War is indeed an act of authority, of the authority of each belligerent State over its own subjects, but not of one belligerent over the other. We are not here considering the case of putting down a rebellion: rebels are not properly belligerents, and have no belligerent rights.

The study of Civil and Canon Law flourished in the Middle Ages, while moral science, which is the study of the Natural Law, was still in its infancy. No wonder that the mediaeval jurists occasionally formulated maxims, which can only be squared with the principles of Natural Law by an exceeding amount of interpretation,—which are in fact much better dropped, quoted though they sometimes be by moralists of repute. One such maxim is this, that a wrong-doer becomes the subject of the injured party by reason of the offence. Admit this, and you can hardly keep clear of Locke's doctrine of the origin of civil power, (s. ii., per totum, p. 307; cf. Suarez, De Caritate, d. xiii., s. iv., nn. 5, 6).