4. On War

¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ A. Vanderpol treats aptly of this matter in his works Le droit de guerre d'après les théologiens et les canonistes du moyen-âge (Paris 1911) and La guerre devant le Christianisme (Paris 1912).

129. Notions. War can be defined: a contest by force and arms between two opposing (external) armies. Therefore war differs from a duel, which is a contest by force and arms between two or a few men. Besides, war differs both from a brawl, which is as it were a certain private war between private persons, arisen not from any public authority but rather from disordered will,¹⁵⁰ and from sedition, which is as it were civil war and armed discord among citizens of one kingdom.¹⁵¹ St. Thomas briefly indicates the difference among these three in this way: "War properly is against external enemies, as it were of multitude against multitude; but brawl is of one against one, or of few against few; but sedition properly is among parts of one multitude disagreeing among themselves, for example when one part of the city is stirred up in tumult against another." - War is one thing offensive, which is undertaken for obtaining satisfaction for an injury received; another thing defensive, which is the repression of an unjust aggression made by another prince or kingdom. Often, but not always, offensive war is waged by him who first begins warlike hostilities. But sometimes a preventive aggression is nothing other than necessary self-defense.

Note. Today, whether from the law of nations or from custom and a more cultivated humanity, the manner of waging war differs greatly from wars waged in antiquity or the middle age. Indeed today someone would call wars cruel which would be done as, for example, the wars of the Israelites in the Old Testament are described to us. Hence not all things which the older theologians permitted in war can today commonly be done licitly.

Principle. For licitly beginning war a threefold condition is required, namely authority of the supreme civil power, just cause, right intention. But for licitly waging war, the current statutes of the law of nations must be observed.

¹⁵⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 41, a. 1.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. q. 42, a. 1. In a broader sense, however, sedition of this kind is called civil war.

130. It is explained. That war is sometimes licit is admitted by all (except the Manichaeans, Quakers, and a few others). For war is sometimes the only means for some people to vindicate its own rights, indeed to defend its own existence. Besides, if war were something illicit, God Himself would not often have commanded wars in the Old Testament. - But for licitly beginning war, according to St. Thomas¹⁵² and other authors, three conditions are required:

a) The authority of the supreme civil power, because a private person can pursue his right in the judgment of a superior judge, and therefore does not need war in his own cause; nor does it belong to him directly to procure the common good. - "Likewise also to call together a multitude, which must be done in wars, does not belong to a private person. But since the care of the republic has been entrusted to princes, it belongs to them to guard the republic of the city or kingdom or province subject to them. And just as they licitly defend it with the material sword against interior disturbances when they punish malefactors, ... so also it belongs to them to guard the republic with the warlike sword against exterior enemies."¹⁵³ Now this supreme authority of declaring war sometimes resides in the prince alone, sometimes in the prince or president with the assent of the legislative assembly.

b) A just cause, and that most grave, is required, according to this: "To wage war is not of will, but of necessity."¹⁵⁴ The reason is that in war the greatest material damages arise, a great number of men is killed, and often even the innocent must suffer the harshest cruelties. Therefore before war is begun, one must strive with all strength that peace be preserved and the causes provoking war be eliminated. But if all efforts have been vain, it is licit to begin war. For defensive war a most urgent cause is not required; it is enough that the prince offer fitting satisfaction for the complaints of the other prince; if this satisfaction is spurned, defensive war is licit. For beginning offensive war there is not sufficient a) the desire of converting infidels to the true faith, nor b) the enlargement of one's own empire, nor c) one's own glory, etc. "There is one and only just cause of making war: an injury received." Thus rightly says Francis de Victoria;¹⁵⁵ hence, for example, the following causes suffice: recovery of a province unjustly held by another, vindication of a grave insult brought upon the republic or prince, vengeance upon a nation which has unjustly violated a treaty entered into, etc. In present times the question can arise whether a civilized nation can make war upon pagan tribes altogether lacking culture in order to found colonies? - If those pagans are treated kindly and fitting compensation for vacant or lost land is offered to them, which they refuse to accept, war does not seem to be so illicit. The reason is that otherwise those lands would remain uncultivated, and the inhabitants would lack the great benefit of moral and religious culture. Therefore they seem to be irrationally unwilling that colonies be founded in their regions so sparsely inhabited. Thus speaking theoretically; for in fact European nations have often founded colonies in foreign regions with the greatest injustice.

c) A right intention is necessary, by which namely it is intended that good be promoted or that evil be avoided, and by which an act of true vindicative justice is exercised.¹⁵⁶ On this matter St. Augustine writes: "The desire of harming, cruelty of avenging, an unpacified and implacable spirit, fierceness of rebellion, lust of domination, and whatever things are similar: these are the things which are rightly blamed in wars";¹⁵⁷ and: "War is waged that peace may be acquired. Therefore be peaceful by warring, so that by conquering you may lead those whom you attack to the utility of peace."¹⁵⁸

If these three conditions are present, war may be licitly begun. Nevertheless it is often much better, in discords arisen among diverse nations, to have recourse to the so-called international tribunals of peace; because it is almost always better to suffer some material damage than to prepare the scourge of war for oneself or others. Hence not undeservedly in the Litany of All Saints there is the deprecation: "From pestilence, famine, and war, deliver us, O Lord!" - In our times and in our regions it no longer belongs to common soldiers or inferior officers to judge concerning the liceity or illicitness of war; for it is altogether impossible for a private man to know all the motives which induced the so-called national Diplomacy to begin war. Besides, soldiers now are not free to fight or not to fight; on the contrary they would be punished with death itself if they refused to fight. Therefore in practice any soldier and subordinate officer can suspend his judgment concerning the justice or injustice of war, and if he is compelled to war, can fight with a safe conscience. But in those regions where soldiers are still freely hired and can freely desert military service, the matter stands otherwise. For then any soldier, before he undertakes military service, must have moral certitude concerning the justice of the fight and war; for it is a matter of the gravest damages to be inflicted upon the neighbor and of the most imminent danger to one's own life.

Once war has been begun, the statutes of the law of nations must be observed. But what things in particular are permitted or prohibited by the law of nations according to modern practice sometimes does not so appear. This must be held as a fundamental principle: War is not waged against private citizens, but against the nation as a public person, as has already been said above, n. 47. It is lawful to employ all those things which are necessary for breaking the strength of the enemy and which are not intrinsically illicit. Wherefore it is lawful to besiege fortified citadels and deprive them of all provisions, so that they may surrender themselves more quickly; likewise to fire cannons (commonly, Kanonen) against them, even with danger (but not with direct intention) of killing innocent persons, destroying churches, monasteries, etc.¹⁵⁹ "But since the expenses of war can be exacted from the enemy, the victor, when cities and villages have been captured, can impose taxes, provided they are proportionate to the resources of the inhabitants; but to give a captured city as booty to the army is not lawful today."¹⁶⁰ Also licit are the so-called Repressalia, provided they have been justly determined by the prince for repelling an injury inflicted by the enemy. - Soldiers sin gravely if in a just war they desert military service or flee over to the enemy. The reason is that they sin gravely against obedience, and because they expose themselves to the greatest danger of death; for, if they shall have been captured, they are killed without mercy.

When the conquered enemies ask for peace, the victor must use the victory obtained moderately. Therefore let the conditions of peace not be very harsh. But it belongs to no private man to judge concerning the equity of such compensations and conditions.

Among the ancient authors besides St. Thomas, especially Francis de Victoria wrote best concerning the right of war.¹⁶¹

Scholion. On private men during war. Today it is most strictly prohibited that private men involve themselves during war in warlike affairs or take up arms. Transgressors of this statute are certainly justly punished with the penalty of death. Therefore during war especially clerics should beware lest in any way by words or deeds they participate in war.

¹⁵² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 40, a. 1.

¹⁵³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 40, a. 1.

¹⁵⁴ c. 1, C. 23, q. 2.

¹⁵⁵ Relectiones de iure belli n. 13. In a similar way St. Augustine says: "Just wars are accustomed to be defined as those which avenge injuries" (c. 2, C. 23, q. 1).

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Cajetan, Summula, s.v. "Bellum."

¹⁵⁷ Contra Faustum l. 22, c. 74; cf. c. 4, C. 23, q. 1.

¹⁵⁸ Ep. 149 to Boniface; cf. c. 3, C. 23, q. 1.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 410.

¹⁶⁰ Thus rightly Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de iustitia n. 355.

¹⁶¹ Relectiones theologicae lect. 6.