CHAPTER IV: ON WAR

479. • War is the fight of a multitude against a multitude foreign to the Republic, for the sake of defending or vindicating the Republic.

Hence it differs 1° from a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few; 2° from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against political society, to which it belongs.

War is distinguished as 1° offensive, if it is done for vindicating an injury; 2° defensive, if it is sustained for repelling force.

Principles. - I. War of itself is licit, whether for repelling injury, or for vindicating one's right. The reason is that any society, independent from another society, ought to have a means of defending itself against injury, and of vindicating its right; but sometimes no other means is supplied for obtaining this end except war. - St. Thomas.²

II. For a just and licit war the following things are necessarily required:

1° Legitimate authority, that is, supreme, acknowledging no other Superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a greater authority is had, this ought to judge concerning the dispute.

2° A just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences to follow from the war, for example, a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury against the Republic to be driven away, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, ... etc.

3° The due mode of waging war, namely that before the war fitting satisfaction be required from the adverse party; and if this is offered, it ought to be accepted from justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. - St. Thomas,¹ Billuart, etc.

480. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to declare war with probability of one's right?

Resp. It is controverted. But the negative part is by far more probable, at least intrinsically and practically. The reason is, 1° because a possessor in good faith cannot be despoiled of the thing possessed, unless it is clear that he retains it unjustly; 2° because for positing the cause of very grave evils, such as slaughters, injustices, corruptions of morals, and other things of this sort, which ordinarily follow war, moral certitude of one's right seems to be required.² Tamburini, Billuart, against several, some of whom judge that only greater probability suffices, while others judge that even equal probability suffices.

Quaer. 2° Can soldiers wage war with doubt concerning the justice of the war?

Resp. 1° If there is question of a subject soldier (drafted), he is bound to obey, where the war is not evidently unjust, because it does not pertain to him to examine the reasons of Superiors.

2° If there is question of a hired soldier (volunteer) before war has been declared, he is bound to obey; for he is hired for this: hence he ought to conduct himself almost as if he were a subject.

3° If there is question of a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire concerning the justice of the war, nor can he place himself in doubt concerning justice. The reason is that no one can cooperate in despoiling another of a thing which he possesses, unless he is certain that it is possessed unjustly by him.³ (X) p. 480.

Quaer. 3° Can the guilty or the innocent be killed by the victor?

Resp. 1° Sometimes the guilty can be killed, or soldiers who have fought, if this is necessary for establishing peace and security or for vindicating injury, unless they have surrendered themselves with a pact of life to be preserved. But this is wholly alien from the morals of our time. (W) p. 480.

2° But the innocent, that is women, old men, foreigners, Clerics, Religious, etc., ... cannot be killed directly, unless it is clear that they were associates in the war. Yet they can be killed indirectly, the fight not yet having been completed, if they are mixed with the guilty, so that, with these preserved, the remaining crowd of the guilty which needs to be destroyed cannot be killed.¹

481. You will resolve. - 1° Soldiers in an unjust war cannot licitly kill enemies even for the sake of defense; if they cannot flee, they ought to take care that they do not strike with their blows. For they themselves are unjust aggressors, and contrary rights in the same matter cannot be given, unless by accident, on account of some invincible ignorance, each side be judged just; which can often happen in soldiers, to whom in doubt it does not pertain to define the cause. - Lacroix, and others commonly.

2° A Prince, the justice of the war having been ascertained, ought to propose it to the adverse party, nor can he begin war if competent satisfaction is offered to him; indeed even war already begun, adequate satisfaction having been offered, he is bound to leave, if not from the rigor of justice, at least for the most part from charity, provided the other party wishes to compensate all expenses already made, and it is not necessary for the public good that his insolence be broken.

3° It is licit in war to prepare ambushes, to use stratagems so that enemies may be deceived by fallacies and cast into dangers. For these are not reputed lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since those means are generally accustomed to be used in war; thus it is licit to feign flight, etc. ... But frauds which cannot be guarded against by any prudence are illicit, for example to infect wells and fountains with poison, etc.; ... for these things in the common sense fight against the rights of war.²

4° It is licit in a just war to besiege cities and fortresses, to discharge artillery against them, indeed sometimes to destroy or burn monasteries and churches, and in them to plunder and kill, if, for example, the enemies use the church as a fortress for defending themselves. - Likewise sometimes it is licit to give a captured city over to plunder, but only on account of most grave reasons.³

5° Leaders of the army and soldiers ought especially to guard against exceeding after victory in punishing the conquered: for they are ministers of legitimate vengeance, but not robbers and assassins; especially they ought to avoid whatever smacks of cruelty or the spirit of harming.

6° Leaders and soldiers cannot harm the envoys of the adverse party, because by the law of nations they are everywhere inviolable; nor can they send spies who secretly slaughter the Prince or Leader of the army or other Primates of the kingdom, because this pertains to treachery by the consensus of all.

7° By the right of war soldiers acquire things of the enemies captured in a just war, but not for themselves; for according to a very well-known principle of law: things won by war fall to the republic. It is said 1° in a just war, because in an unjust war an injury is done to the enemy, which must be repaired by restitution both by its author and by all who are participants in this injury (n. 824 and 825. q. 1°).... It is said 2° they acquire not for themselves, because they occupy those things not in their own name, but in the name of the republic, by right of war. But by today's law of nations, not private things of enemies, but only public things, among which the arms of soldiers and also the spoils of the slain are reckoned, are acquired in this way. Leaders command that harm be done to private things of citizens only indirectly, insofar as they either hold the line of battle attacking, or the enemy uses them for harming.¹

Therefore soldiers commit injury and are held by the obligation of restitution: 1° who from public things captured in war retain for themselves those things which have been granted to them neither by the express nor by the tacit will of the prince. But unless the contrary will is clear, soldiers can presume with reason that by this tacit consent the spoils of the slain are conceded to them; 2° who, besides provisions and other things of this sort commanded, extort certain things, as money, from private persons, or without reason and the authority of the leaders do damage to them.¹ 3° who, if they pass through the regions of those who are not conjoined by any treaty with the enemies, and who are called neutrals, take what is not necessary.²

By the express will of the prince, the ships of enemies and all things which are found in them are captured for themselves by those who, in these Federated States, obtain from legitimate authority letters or a license ("commission") for outfitting ships at their own expense, so that they may attack enemies. Yet he who captures and retains booty without that license does not seem guilty of violated justice; for that license pertains only to the order of law, and the tacit consent of the republic, among us, adjudicates the booty to the one capturing it. It pertains to the same order only of law that those who have obtained a license are bound to lead the booty into port and subject it to judgment.³ The things said, among us, are valid also concerning goods captured at sea, although they pertain to private persons; yet of that nation with which war is being waged.

You shall not commit adultery. - You shall not desire his (your neighbor's) wife.¹

Admonition of St. Alphonsus. "Now with difficulty we approach the treating of that matter whose name alone infects the minds of men. Would that I could have explained myself more briefly or more obscurely! But since it is the more frequent and more abundant matter of Confessions, and that on account of which a greater number of souls slide down to hell, indeed I do not doubt to assert that, on account of this one vice of impurity, or at least not without it, all are damned who are damned; hence it was necessary for me to explain myself clearly, although as chastely as it could be done, and to discuss very many particulars. - Yet I beg students who are preparing themselves for the office of hearing Confessions, that they not read this treatise (just as also the other on the conjugal debt), unless they shall already be near to receiving Confessions; and that they read it for this end alone; and, at that time, that they often raise their mind to God, lest, while they strive to acquire the souls of others for God, they themselves suffer detriment to their own."²

The Sixth precept of the Decalogue prohibits any external luxury, or that which is committed by deed. - The Ninth also prohibits sins of the heart, or evil thoughts and desires. - Each indirectly commands chastity.³

Here we must treat only of external sins; for of internal sins, or of morose delectation and evil desire, it has already been said in n. 228 sq. Hence 1° of chastity and luxury in general; 2° of sins of luxury not consummated; 3° of sins of luxury consummated.