Title — Decretals of Gregory IX

Title I: On Betrothals and Marriages

English · Latin · Both

1.

Chapter I

Latin source headnote: Marriage is contracted by consent alone, nor is it invalidated if the custom of the homeland is not observed.

From the Council of Tribur.

A certain noble man from Francia took a noble woman from Saxony as wife according to the law of the Saxons, and kept her for many years and begot sons from her. But because the Saxons and the Frankish people do not use the same laws, he alleged that he had not betrothed her according to his own law, that is, the law of the Franks, or received her or endowed her, and, dismissing her, he brought in another. Concerning this the holy synod determined that the transgressor of the evangelical law is to be subjected to penance, separated from the second wife, and compelled to return to the first.

2.

Chapter II

Latin source headnote: Betrothals for the future are dissolved if the betrothed dissolve them, even if they were sworn.

Innocent III, to the Bishop of Exeter.

Furthermore, those who purely and without any condition gave their pledge [or] made an oath concerning contracting marriage are to be admonished and more diligently exhorted, and by every means induced to observe the pledge furnished or the oath made, and to join themselves as they promised. But if they are unwilling to admit one another, lest perhaps something worse happen from it—namely, that he take one whom he [always] hates—it appears that, after the manner of those who contract a partnership by oath or by the interposition of a pledge and afterward remit the same to one another, this can be tolerated with patience.

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3.

Chapter III

Latin source headnote: If one older than seven years took as wife one younger than seven years and conducted her to his house, the justice of public honesty arises from such a contract. This is what it says by adhering to the letter. Panormitanus.

Pope Eugenius.

That young man who took a girl not yet seven years old, although age opposed it, nevertheless from human frailty perhaps attempted what he could not complete. Therefore, because in those things which are doubtful we ought to hold what we consider more certain, both on account of the honesty of the Church, since she is said to have been his wife, and on account of the aforesaid doubt, we command you to separate from him the cousin of the girl whom he afterward took.

4.

Chapter IV

Latin source headnote: From betrothals contracted with a blood relative arises the justice of public honesty.

Alexander III, to the Bishop of Pavia.

It came to the hearing of our apostolate that, when H. Albericus, a citizen of Pavia, wished to give his daughter as wife to a certain one of the sons of L., he swore that, if he to whom she was betrothed could not have her because some eventuality intervened, he would join the same girl in marriage to another son whom L. had begotten of another wife. But after betrothals had been contracted by the first son, certain persons, approaching the church, affirmed with oaths interposed that consanguinity existed between them. And therefore the aforesaid H. strives to give the same woman to the other son, as he swore. But because it is written that a brother cannot have his brother’s betrothed, we command your discretion by apostolic writings, instructing that you not permit him to fulfill his purpose, which opposes canonical reason, but, after admonition has been given, compel him by ecclesiastical rigor to do penance for the unlawful oath.

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5.

Chapter V

Latin source headnote: If one betrothed for the future transfers himself to distant places before union, the betrothed woman freely contracts with another; nevertheless, if it stood through her that the marriage was not perfected, penance is imposed upon her.

The same, to the Archbishop of Palermo.

Concerning those who, after furnishing an oath, promise that they will take certain women and afterward, without the women’s knowledge, leave the land, transferring themselves to other regions, we wish this to become known to you: that it will be free for the women themselves, if the deed has not proceeded further, to transfer themselves to other vows, yet after receiving penance for perjury if it stood through them that the marriage was not consummated. But if, etc. (cf. c. 3, On Conditions Appended IV. 3.)

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6.

Chapter VI

Latin source headnote: Not every violence impedes the contract of marriage. This is what it says as to the title.

The same, to the Bishop of Padua.

Concerning a woman who was unwillingly delivered to and detained by a man, since there is a difference between one kind of force and another, and you thereafter expressed nothing certain to us as to whether consent afterward intervened, we can answer you nothing certain concerning it. But those, etc. (cf. c. 3, On a Marriage Contracted IV. 16.)

7.

Chapter VII

Latin source headnote: If persons fit for marriage contract through obscure words, they are held to follow the common understanding of the words.

The same, to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

From the letters which you transmitted concerning the matrimonial cause of a certain young man named R. and Mary, daughter of Gilbert of Saint-Léger, the solicitude which you observed in the examination of that business became known to us. But because, with the parties absent, we could not investigate the truth fully, nor remit the cause itself to you, from whom the woman’s party is known to have appealed to our hearing, we considered that it should be committed to our venerable brothers the Bishops of Winchester, Hereford, and Bath. And therefore we command your fraternity by apostolic writings, instructing that, when the parties have been summoned by them, you compel the parties to approach their presence and, with contradiction and appeal ceasing, inviolably to observe what they shall judge.

But concerning that which you consulted near the end of the letters—what ought to be observed when betrothals are contracted between certain persons and one does not understand what the other proposes—we respond that the judge must examine whether those about to contract marriage are fit to do so in knowledge and age. Once this is known, if one did not understand what the other proposed, recourse is to be had to the common understanding of the word, and each is to be compelled to retain the words uttered in that sense which they are accustomed to produce in those understanding correctly. But as to what you asked—whether deference ought to be given to an appeal where, under its pretext, adultery or another crime is known to be about to be committed—we respond briefly to your consultation that, where it would be notorious that adultery or another crime would be committed if deference were given to an appeal interposed, we would not wish deference to be given. For we do not wish to furnish to anyone material for incest or adultery.

8.

Chapter VIII

Latin source headnote: Between a betrothed woman and the blood relatives of the betrothed man arises an impediment of public honesty, impeding and dissolving a marriage to be contracted between them.

The same, to the Bishop of Vigevano.

No blood relative can in any way join to himself in marriage the betrothed woman of another, especially if she is near marriageable age.

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9.

Chapter IX

Latin source headnote: If a man and a woman promise one another that from that time they will hold themselves as spouses, a marriage of the present has been contracted. This is what it says, and it is a notable case.

The same, to the Abbots of Saint Edmund and Demer.

It was intimated to us on the part of the woman C. that Andrew before a certain priest and deacon, and very many others, clerics as well as lay persons, summoned for this purpose, furnished her an oath that from that time he would hold her as wife and preserve fidelity to her as to his wife. She likewise swore to the same Andrew that she would have him as husband and preserve fidelity to him as to her own man. This having been done, living together for a long time in the same house, they begot children for themselves. But as time proceeded, the aforesaid A., contrary to the oath furnished, left her and the children begotten of her and withdrew from living together with them.

Therefore, because it is lawful for no one to dismiss his wife without manifest cause of fornication, and even then he ought either to reconcile her to himself [or] to remain continent while she is living, nor ought we to sustain that the aforesaid Andrew violate the religious obligation of the oath furnished, we command your discretion by apostolic writings, instructing that, after the truth of the matter has been more diligently investigated, if you find it to be so as was said above, after the woman brought in, whom he has, has first been dismissed, you compel the same Andrew, that, taking counsel for his salvation, he return to his wife and treat her with marital affection, and take care to expiate his guilt by worthy penance, by ecclesiastical censure after admonition has been given. But if perhaps he should be unwilling to acquiesce in your admonition, with every occasion and appeal removed, bind him and the woman brought in with the bond of excommunication, and command that they be more carefully avoided by all as excommunicates until worthy satisfaction.

10.

Chapter X

Latin source headnote: He who swore to contract with a certain woman, if no impediment exists, is compelled by ecclesiastical censure to contract.

The same, to the Bishop of Poitiers.

We received from the letters of our venerable brother, Silvanus the bishop, that, when two noble men of his episcopate, namely G. of Monstra and B. of Mauritania, had sons and daughters who were approaching puberty, and in hope of reconciling peace between them thus agreed with one another that they would join them to one another in mutual marriages. And both the fathers and the children promised under oath that they would do this; among them, indeed, G., with the father consenting, swore once and again that he would take the daughter of the other as wife. When he wished to pass to other vows, the bishop wished to compel him to fulfill what he had sworn. He appealed to our hearing, and, although the other party sent its messenger to us, he neither came nor transmitted any representative for himself.

Therefore, because it is dangerous for the aforesaid G. to act against his oath, we command your fraternity by apostolic writings, instructing that, when you have been requested concerning this, you summon each party before your presence and, after the arguments on each side have been more fully heard and discussed, if this is established to you, admonish him and, if he does not acquiesce in the admonitions, compel him by ecclesiastical censure to receive her as wife and treat her with marital affection, unless a reasonable cause stands in the way. But if he should wish to advance a reasonable cause, hear it with every diligence and care, and decide it by a canonical conclusion with every appeal ceasing. Moreover, if, after being lawfully admonished, he should contemn obeying your judgment, bind him and his father, if the father should presume to support him in his malice, with the bond of excommunication, and prohibit all divine offices, except the baptism of little children and the penances of the dying, from being celebrated throughout all their land.

11.

Chapter XI

Latin source headnote: By ecclesiastical censure a father is compelled to restore to his son the latter’s wife, whom he unjustly detained or detains.

The same, to the Archbishops, Bishops, and Other Prelates Constituted throughout England.

It is not unknown to you, as we judge, how Henry, the illustrious King of the English, on account of the discord which, as sins demanded, has arisen between him and his sons, detains their wives [namely, the daughters of our dearest son in Christ Louis, the illustrious King of the Franks], for whose restoration to them [the same] King of the Franks [and the sons of the aforesaid King of the English] and his sons-in-law offered solicitous prayers to us. We therefore, [more earnestly] considering that it is just and honorable that husbands should seek their wives, and wishing with ready spirit to acquiesce in the prayers of the same [King of the Franks and his sons-in-law not only in those things which we are held to effect from the obligation of office, but also] in all things which do not disagree with justice, admonished the aforesaid King of England earnestly enough and attentively, and gave him a command that, at the admonition of [our venerable brothers] the Archbishop of Tarentaise and the Bishop of Clermont, and of [his beloved son] the Prior of the Carthusians, or in his place the Prior of Mont-Dieu if he cannot be present, or of two of these if three cannot be present, he not postpone restoring the wives to his sons within forty days after receipt of our letters. But if he does not restore them to their husbands within the aforesaid term, by apostolic authority we command that the whole province within which they are detained, and to which they are transferred, for as long as they are there and until they are restored to their husbands, cease from all divine offices except the baptism of little children and the penance of the dying. Hence it is that by apostolic writings, instructing, we command [and by commanding instruct] all of you that you solicitously admonish the same King of the English to restore them and induce him by exhortations, setting before him that it is no less expedient for him to restore them than for their husbands to receive them.

And if, according to the command and your admonition, he does not restore their wives to his sons within a certain term, from then on, in whichever of your provinces they are detained or [to which] they are transferred, for as long as they are there, celebrate no divine offices except the baptism of little children and the penances of the dying, nor permit them in any way to be celebrated, with every [contradiction concerning these things and] appeal ceasing; knowing for certain that, if any should attempt to act against our interdict, which we do not believe, by the Lord’s authority they will carry away the punishment due for their rashness and transgression.

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12.

Chapter XII

Latin source headnote: The statement of one person asserting an impediment impedes an unsworn marriage from being contracted.

The same, to the Bishop of Saint Agatha.

Furthermore, concerning the woman who is sought by a man, whose blood relative proposes that he sinned with her but refuses publicly to confess this on account of the woman’s fear and power, we respond to your providence in this manner: that, unless an oath had intervened, you are strictly to prohibit the marriage itself from being made, lest something worse occur from it.

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13.

Chapter XIII

Latin source headnote: If a woman unwillingly contracts with someone and does not afterward consent to him, the marriage holds if she afterward marries another. Thus it is commonly summarized. And according to this understanding this would be an open case that a marriage contracted through fear is void by the law itself. Nevertheless, this is not clearly gathered from the letter.

The same, to the Procurator and Canons of Sora.

Coming to the Apostolic See, Mariota, bearer of the present letters, showed to us by a suppliant to us intimation that, while she was constituted in adolescence, she loved a certain young man [named E.] to such an extent that each of them between themselves furnished an oath concerning contracting marriage under the testimony of three persons. Her parents, ignorant of this, delivered her, unwilling and protesting, as wife to a certain other man, whom she so abhorred that she by no means permitted herself to be known by him. And when she publicly confessed that she had been known by and sworn to the former man, the Bishop of Sora, who then existed, caused them to come before his presence, and, it being known and proved that so close a line of consanguinity existed between them that they could not and ought not by law to be joined together, separated them from one another.

Moreover, when the cause itself was being treated and she was unwilling to consent to the man to whom she had been delivered by her parents, he took another as wife, and she publicly married in the sight of the Church a certain man named T. At last, when she had begotten a son by him, the father of T., seeking an occasion for obtaining a judicial separation, objected to her that she could not have his son as husband because she had first been betrothed to the other man, who is now dead. But because we did not apply faith to his assertion, as neither ought we to have done, nor could we pass this over in silence, we considered that she should be remitted to you, and we command your discretion by apostolic writings, instructing that, after the truth of this matter has been more fully ascertained, if you find that the aforesaid woman was separated from the former man by judgment of the Church, was taken as wife by the same T. without contradiction of the Church, and that the man to whom she was joined by her parents unwilling and resisting has departed from the present life, after admonition has been given, compel the aforesaid T. to receive the aforesaid Mariota with the occasion set aside, and to take care to love her as his wife and treat her with marital affection. Otherwise, subject him, the woman brought in, and also his father, if they resist this, to excommunication, and cause the sentence itself to be inviolably observed until worthy satisfaction.

14.

Chapter XIV

Latin source headnote: If it is feared that violence will be inflicted upon a girl concerning whose marriage there is litigation, the judge ought to provide for her a safe and honorable place until the cause is terminated. This is what it says, and it is a text very capable of being alleged.

The same, to the Bishop of Pavia.

Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes, it is necessary that, where someone’s assent is required, the material of coercion be repelled. But marriage is contracted by consent alone, and, where inquiry is made concerning it, the person whose intention is to be investigated ought to enjoy full security, lest through fear that person say that what is hated is pleasing, and there follow the outcome which is accustomed to proceed from unwilling nuptials. Wherefore we command your fraternity by apostolic writings, instructing that you cause the girl, concerning whose marriage between your citizens the Siderii and the Canes a question is debated, to be kept honorably in the house in which you placed her in such a way that she need fear nothing, until the aforesaid cause has been terminated by a canonical conclusion, and the sentence can be put into execution without anyone’s contradiction.

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15.

Chapter XV

Latin source headnote: Betrothals for the future, if intercourse followed, are not dissolved by betrothals of the present; otherwise the betrothals of the present hold, unless they were contracted through fear which could have befallen a steadfast man.

The same.

Coming to us, G., bearer of the present letters, showed to us by his report that he received a certain woman in his house, by whom he had offspring, and to whom he furnished a pledge before many persons that he would take her as wife. Meanwhile, however, when he spent the night at the house of his neighbor, the latter’s daughter lay with him that night; finding them together in one bed, the girl’s father compelled him to betroth her through words of the present. Recently constituted in our presence, he consulted us as to which one he ought rather to adhere to. But because it by no means became known to us whether he knew the first woman after the pledge was furnished, we therefore command that you diligently inquire into the truth of the matter, and, if you find that he knew the first woman after furnishing the pledge, cause him to remain with her; otherwise, cause him to adhere as wife to the second, unless he betrothed her after being coerced by fear which could befall a steadfast man.

16.

Chapter XVI

Latin source headnote: He who swore to contract with a certain woman, if he wishes to enter religion, ought first to contract so that the oath may be observed, and before carnal union he will be able to enter a monastery.

The same, to the Bishop of Exeter.

Committed—(And below:) Your fraternity signified to us that a certain learned and noble man, when the paternal inheritance devolved upon him, gave a noble woman a pledge concerning contracting marriage in the presence of certain persons, and affirmed by an oath furnished upon the sacrosanct Gospels that within two years he would contract with her through words of the present. But now, led by a private law, he sighs to pass to the fruit of a better life, and, consulting your prudence concerning this, suspects that before the marriage has been contracted he can lawfully pass to the habit of monastic religion, because, if he had contracted, he could, with her unwilling, pass within two months to the religion of a stricter life, according to the statutes of the ancient canons renewed by our constitution. Therefore, because your fraternity considered that we should be consulted concerning this, we respond to your fraternity in this manner: it is safer for him, with the religious obligation of the oath observed, first to contract and afterward, if he chooses, to migrate to religion, provided that carnal union is not known to have intervened after the first betrothal.

17.

Chapter XVII

Latin source headnote: One who swore to contract with a certain person ought rather to be admonished than compelled to contract. This is what it says by adhering to the letter.

Lucius III, to the Bishop of Rapallo.

Your fraternity asked us by what censure a woman ought to be compelled who, neglecting the religious obligation of an oath, refuses to marry him whom she affirmed by an oath interposed that she would marry. You asked also whether she whose husband polluted the bed of her mother can, since she desires to become a mother, pass to other vows while her husband is living. To this we respond to you briefly that, since marriages ought by law to be free, the woman who swore that she would marry is to be admonished rather than compelled, especially since coercions [of this kind] are accustomed frequently to have difficult outcomes. Indeed, she whose husband committed adultery and incest with her mother ought neither to be joined carnally to her husband nor, while he is living, to enter marriage with another.

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18.

Chapter XVIII

Latin source headnote: Pendency of litigation concerning a marriage does not impede a second marriage from being contracted if the first was void.

Urban III.

Since in the Apostolic See, over which, although undeserving, we preside, resides the mastery of all ecclesiastical discipline, it is worthy and consonant with reason that, as often as any doubt arises concerning a business of the Church, recourse be had to the judgment of its deliberation. We understood indeed that, when a matrimonial question between the bailiff of N. and his wife was being treated before you, after witnesses had been produced and their attestations discussed by diligent examination, before publication of the testimony the same bailiff, returning to his own region, publicly alleged that a sentence of separation between him and his wife had [been] promulgated by judgment of the Church; and thus, after falsehood had been suggested to all, he presumed to join to himself a certain other woman ignorant of the deed. But afterward, when letters from the Apostolic See had been obtained concerning the question of the prior marriage, the delegated judges pronounced a sentence of separation.

But because you assert that the bailiff and the woman whom he brought in consented to one another while the litigation concerning the former wife was pending, your fraternity considered that we should be consulted as to whether such persons are to be admitted to marriage. We therefore, by authority of the present letters, respond to your consultation in this manner: after suitable penance has been imposed upon the man and carnal intercourse forbidden during the time of that penance, afterward they can remain in marital union. [But concerning, etc.; cf. c. 5, On Conditions Appended IV. 5.]

19.

Chapter XIX

Latin source headnote: A wife not made certain of the death of her husband cannot contract, although she does not know what has become of a husband who has been absent for a long time.

Clement III, to the Bishop of Zaragoza.

Placed in our presence, you asked of us what is to be done by you concerning certain women constituted in your diocese who, although they have now waited beyond seven years for their husbands absent on account of captivity or pilgrimage, cannot be made certain concerning their life or death, although they have applied diligent solicitude concerning this, and, on account of youthful age or the frailty of the flesh, cannot remain continent, and petition to be joined to others in marriage. But since the Apostle says, “A woman is bound to her husband for as long as her husband lives,” we therefore respond to your consultation in this manner: however great a number of years they remain thus, while their husbands live they cannot canonically pass over to union with others, nor are you by authority of the Church to permit them to contract until they receive certain report of the death of their husbands. [Given at the Lateran.]

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20.

Chapter XX

Latin source headnote: The contract of marriage with a female sinner wishing to correct herself profits toward remission of sins.

The same.

Among the works of charity which are set before us by authority of sacred Scripture to be imitated, as evangelical authority testifies, it is not the least to call one who errs back from the path of her error, and especially to invite women living voluptuously and admitting indiscriminately any persons whatsoever to intercourse of the flesh to the lawful fellowship of the bed, so that they may live chastely. Therefore, considering this, by apostolic authority we establish that, for all who draw public women from the brothel and take them as wives, what they do shall profit toward remission of sins. [Given at Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on the third day before the Kalends of May, in the first year of our pontificate. 1198.]

21.

Chapter XXI

Latin source headnote: A marriage contracted by force acquires validity through voluntary cohabitation. This is what it says, and it is alleged daily.

The same.

To that which you intimated to us by your letters concerning a certain female parishioner of yours whom her stepfather joined matrimonially to a certain German, we respond in this manner: although, when she was still eleven years old, she had at the beginning been delivered to him unwilling and resisting, nevertheless, because afterward, by living with him for a year and a half, she appears to have consented, she is to be compelled to return to him. Nor henceforth are witnesses to be received if the aforesaid woman should name any to be produced in order to prove that she did not consent to him, since the delay of so much time excludes proof of this kind. We therefore command that on this account you not omit to compel by ecclesiastical censure, with appeal removed, each to treat the other with marital affection, unless perhaps they wish together to pass to religion, with penance enjoined upon them because each passed to alien and unlawful sexual unions. [Given at the Lateran.]

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22.

Chapter XXII

Latin source headnote: Betrothals for the future, even if sworn, are dissolved by second betrothals of the present, but not by second betrothals for the future.

Innocent III, to the Bishop of Ferentino.

As we received from the letters of your fraternity, when L., your parishioner, had affirmed by his own oath into the hands of the father of the woman P. that he would take P. as wife, her father swearing that he would deliver her to him as wife, and it did not stand through the man, but rather through the woman, that matrimonial solemnity did not follow between them, after four or five years had later elapsed, the same L. betrothed the woman E. through words of the present, as her blood relatives assert, on account of which the brother of the aforesaid P. lodged his question in your presence. But because you ask to be instructed by our response as to what is to be done concerning these things, we respond to your petition in this manner: if it is established to you that the same L. betrothed the woman P. through words of the future, but E. through words of the present, after suitable penance has been imposed upon him because he made the first pledge void—unless perhaps in his oath he fixed a certain term within which he would take the said P. as wife, and it was not owing to him that he did not consummate the marriage at the appointed term—judge the marriage contracted in the second place lawful and compel him by ecclesiastical rigor, if there is need, to observe it, unless perhaps something else should stand in the way which ought to impede him.

But if perhaps he contracted betrothals with each through words of the future, compel him to observe the first oath, just as it was lawfully made, being about to enjoin penance upon him for the second. But if these things are not fully established to you, continue to take cognizance of the cause until you are sufficiently instructed concerning them. For what is contained in the attestations which you sent to the Apostolic See concerning co-parenthood does not pertain to the cause, since neither of the contracting persons is that person through whose mediation co-parenthood was contracted between their parents. [Given at the Lateran, on the fifth day before the Kalends of March, in the first year of our pontificate. 1198.]

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23.

Chapter XXIII

Latin source headnote: A mute and a deaf person, and all who are not prohibited, can contract marriage.

The same, to the Archbishop of Arles.

Since at the Apostolic See, over which, although undeserving, we preside, resides the magistracy of all ecclesiastical discipline, it is worthy and consonant with reason that, as often as any doubt arises concerning various and diverse businesses, recourse be had to the judgment of that see which, by the Lord’s ordering, merited to obtain primacy among all churches. Indeed, you consulted us through your messengers and letters as to whether a mute and a deaf person can be joined matrimonially to another. To this we respond to your fraternity in this manner: since the edict concerning contracting marriage is prohibitory, so that whoever is not prohibited is consequently admitted, and the consent alone of those men and women concerning whose joining there is litigation suffices for marriage, it appears that, if such a person wishes to contract, it neither can nor ought to be denied to him, since what he cannot declare by words he can declare by signs. [Given at Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on the Ides of July. 1198.]

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24.

Chapter XXIV

Latin source headnote: An insane person cannot contract marriage.

The same, to the Bishop of Vercelli.

The beloved son R., a knight of Alessandria, proposed before us that he joined his daughter Rufina matrimonially to a certain Opizo Lancavecla, ignorant that Opizo was insane. Whence he humbly petitioned us that we deign to take counsel for both him and his daughter. But since the same woman cannot remain with the man himself, who labors under continual madness, and lawful consent could not intervene on account of the derangement of madness, we command your fraternity by apostolic writings that, after the truth has been more fully investigated, if you know the matter to be so, you take care to separate the aforesaid persons from one another with the subterfuge of appeal removed. [Given at Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on the fifth day before the Kalends of January. 1205.]

25.

Chapter XXV

Latin source headnote: Marriage is contracted by lawful consent alone, but words are required as to proof; and understand: or other equivalent signs. This is what it says according to the understanding which Panormitanus holds.

The same, to the Bishop of Brescia.

To your fraternity—(And below: [cf. c. 10, On Him Who Knew IV. 13.]) You asked in addition to be instructed whether marriage is contracted from words alone and from which words, since it is doubted by some that a spiritual bond is contracted by words alone. We therefore respond to your inquiry in this manner: in truth marriage is contracted through the lawful consent of a man and a woman; but, as regards the Church, words expressing present consent are necessary. For the deaf and mute can contract marriage through mutual consent without words, and children before the lawful years do not contract by words alone, since they are understood not at all to consent. [Given at Rome, etc. 1206.]

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26.

Chapter XXVI

Latin source headnote: If one of the contracting persons uses doubtful words with the intention of deceiving the woman, and afterward knows her carnally, judgment is given for marriage in the judicial forum; it is otherwise in the penitential forum. This is what it says according to the true and common understanding.

The same.

Your fraternity considered that we should be consulted—(And below: [cf. c. 7, On Consanguinity and Affinity IV. 14.]) Consecutively, however, you asked [that], when a certain man could not otherwise induce a certain woman to mingle carnally with him unless he betrothed her, with no solemnity applied or anyone present, he said to her, “John betroths you,” although he was not called John but pretended that he was called John, not believing there to be marriage because he was not called by this name and did not have the purpose of contracting but only of accomplishing carnal union: whether marriage was celebrated between the aforesaid persons, since the woman consented and consents to him, and he dissented and dissents, and did nothing else except [that which] was expressed above, apart from knowing her.

Concerning this we respond to you that, since the aforesaid man betrothed the aforesaid woman in his own person and under an alien name by which he then pretended that he was called, and carnal union followed between them, it perhaps appears that there is a presumption for marriage, unless you had written to us expressly that he neither purposed nor consents to take her as wife—which we do not see how was established to you. But we, rescribing what the law is, say [this]: that, if the matter is thus—namely, that he did not purpose to take her as wife and never consented to the aforesaid person—marriage ought not to be adjudged from that deed, since neither the substance of the conjugal contract nor [even] the form of contracting marriage can be found in it, because on the one side only fraud was present and consent was wholly absent, without which the other things cannot perfect a conjugal covenant. [Third, you asked, etc.; cf. c. 19, On Homicide V. 12. Given at the Lateran, on the Ides of February, in the fourteenth year of our pontificate. 1212.]

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27.

Chapter XXVII

Latin source headnote: At the denunciation of one honorable man who reports consanguinity and gives information concerning reputation or scandal, a marriage is impeded from being contracted.

The same, to the Bishop of Beauvais.

When in your diocese—(And below: [cf. c. 36, On Tithes III. 30.]) Indeed, because it sometimes happens that, when certain persons wish to contract marriage, banns, to use your words, have been issued in the churches according to the custom of the Gallican Church, and no objector publicly appears, although report relates a private impediment of kinship, while oaths of the elders concerning their relationship are offered on the part of the contracting persons so that material for suspicion may be removed, you asked what is to be done by you in cases of this kind.

To this we respond in this manner: if a grave person to whom faith is to be applied denounces to you that those who are to be joined in marriage touch one another by kinship, and gives information concerning report or scandal, or if you can even be made certain immediately through yourself, not only ought you not to receive the oaths of the parents spontaneously offered, but you ought also to compel those who thus strive to contract, if they cannot be induced after being admonished, either [to] desist from such a contract or, according to the judgment of your discretion, to furnish oaths of their relatives against report of this kind. Otherwise, if the person denouncing does not exist as such as we have said, or cannot give information concerning report or scandal, you will be able to admonish those contracting to desist, but not compel them. [But if, etc.; cf. c. 6, Who May Accuse a Marriage IV. 18. Given at the Lateran, on the fourth day before the Kalends of November, in the fifteenth year of our pontificate. 1212.]

28.

Chapter XXVIII

Latin source headnote: A woman who denies that she consented to marriage is not believed when the husband proves the contrary; it is otherwise if she proves that she consented through fear which can befall a steadfast man.

Honorius III, to the Bishop of Bergen.

We respond briefly to your consultation that women who according to custom come with betrothed men to the doors of the church to be blessed, and there, protesting, affirm that they never consented to marriage with them, ought not to be heard when the betrothed men lawfully prove the contrary, since the simple assertion of the women ought not to prevail over lawful and suitable witnesses. Indeed, a hearing is not immediately to be denied to those who, after receiving the blessing, soon flee from the betrothed men before carnal union has followed, asserting that they never truly consented to them but, compelled by fear inflicted, uttered words of consent although they dissented in intention. Rather, inquiry is to be made with diligence concerning the fear inflicted; and, if such fear is found to have been inflicted as could befall a steadfast man, they will not undeservedly be heard.

29.

Chapter XXIX

Latin source headnote: In marriages and betrothals there ought to be freedom; whence in them a promise of a penalty does not bind.

Gregory IX.

The woman Gemma explained to us that, when T., her daughter, contracted marriage with C., B. of Alferio, on the occasion that betrothals were contracted between his son P. and the aforesaid girl while they were constituted under seven years, strives to extort from her the penalty placed in the stipulation, to be paid by the party who should contravene. Therefore, since marriages ought to be free and for this reason such a stipulation is deservedly to be disapproved on account of the interposition of a penalty, we command that, if it is so, you compel the same B. by ecclesiastical censure to desist from extortion of the aforesaid penalty.

Cited by 3 passages

30.

Chapter XXX

Latin source headnote: Betrothals for the future pass into marriage through carnal union following, but not through an attempt at carnal union alone. This is what it says with the final chapter below under the same title.

The same, to the Bishop of Le Mans.

He who gave a pledge to the woman M. concerning contracting marriage, with carnal union following, even if in the face of the Church he takes another and knows her, is held to return to the first; because, although the first marriage appears to be presumed, nevertheless proof against a presumption of this kind is not to be admitted. From this it follows that the marriage which afterward followed in fact is considered neither a true marriage nor any marriage.

Cited by 3 passages

31.

Chapter XXXI

Latin source headnote: Betrothals of the present are not dissolved by a following marriage, even one consummated by carnal union; but betrothals for the future, even if sworn, are dissolved by following betrothals of the present.

The same.

If lawful consent of the present intervenes between a man and a woman so that one receives the other by mutual consent expressed in customary words, each saying, “I receive you as mine,” and, “I receive you as mine,” or other words expressing present consent, whether an oath has been interposed or not, it is not lawful for either to pass to other vows. But if either does so, the second marriage contracted in fact, even if carnal union followed, ought to be separated, and the first remain in its firmness.

But if only a promise of the future was made between them, each saying to the other, “I will receive you as mine,” and, “I will receive you as mine,” or similar words, if another should betroth that woman through words of the present, even if an oath concerning the future, as we have said, intervened between her and the first, the second marriage cannot be separated in view of a betrothal of this kind; but penance is to be enjoined upon them for violation of the pledge.

Cited by 1 passage

32.

Chapter XXXII

Latin source headnote: An attempt at intercourse does not cause betrothals for the future to pass into marriage.

The same.

A young man who, although he often attempted it, did not know carnally the woman betrothed to him through words of the future, and afterward contracted with another through words of the present, ought to have as wife not the first, with whom there was neither a true marriage from the form of the contract nor a presumed marriage, since the attempt had no effect, but the second.