Question III: What obedience is to be shown to parents by children

I ASSERT first that children are bound to obey their parents in matters concerning the governance of the household. Thus for children not to obey their parents commanding the son to guard against some mortal sin, or its near occasion, so that he not go out by night, nor walk with criminals, so as to flee forbidden games, harlots, and the like, is mortal. So St. Bonaventure serm. 5. in decem praecepta, Toletus lib. 5. cap. 1. Navarr. man. cap. 14. Fagundez in 4. praeceptum, cap. 4.

I ASSERT second, that children are not bound to obey their parents in unjust matters, and in this sense Christ commands hatred toward parents, as I said quaest. prima. So D. Bonaventure loco cit. Toletus lib. 5. cap. 5. Navarr. Fagundez loco cit.

I ASSERT third, that children are not bound to obey their parents in those things which pertain to taking on a state of life, as religion or matrimony. For each one ought to be free in this, as the holy Doctor observes on those words of the rule, cap. 2. Si qui voluerint hanc vitam accipere. He proves it by that passage of Matt. 19, Si vis perfectus esse, etc. The same is noted by Fagundez num. 3. with others. The same the holy Doctor shows from the liberty of vocation to these states in 1. dist. 29. quaest. 3.

I ASSERT fourth, yet supposing that the children wish to marry, that it is mortal not to take, at the father's command, a worthy bride, so that the enmities may be lulled to sleep, says Fagundez with Toletus and Navarrus to be adduced, and Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 6. et this is the common opinion, and it is D. Bonaventure's, to be cited below. But I would add that it be understood, if that please, and there be no danger, as often happens, of perpetual estrangement, or of the dishonor of marriage, so that he turn aside to harlots. For this is a law of perpetual servitude: so the Doctors commonly, as at Hurtado de matr. d. 6. diff. 10. num. 35. Diana part. 4. tract. 4. resol. 132.

A GRAVE question however presses: whether a son sins gravely, unwilling to marry a worthy woman at his father's command, and taking another worthy one without a reasonable cause, by his mere will.

The FIRST opinion is that he sins gravely. So Guttierrez lib. 1. qq. can. cap. 20. Barbosa 4. part. lib. 1. ff. soluto matrimonio, num. 33. Veracruz in speculo coniugali 3. part. art. 20. They cite also both Sotos, Menochius, and others; Fagundez follows them lib. 4. cap. 4. num. 4. it seems to Navarr. in summa Lat. cap. 4. num. 15.

The SECOND opinion denies it: So Toler. lib. 5. cap. 1. Molina de primog. lib. 2. cap. 13. D. Thomas is also cited 2. 2. quaest. 104. art. 5. in corpore, Corduba casu 171. Victoria §. 267. Couarr. cap. 3. § 8. Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 6. Bassaeus V. Filius, num. 5. provided however no grave cause of forbidding be present for the Father.

The THIRD opinion teaches that he is indeed bound to consult his parents, yet not to obey their counsel. So Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. d. 23. adducing others, especially D. Thomas and Guttierrez, but wrongly.

The SENTENCE of D. Bonaventure in 4. d. 29. quaest. 1. is this, that a father cannot command a son to take some woman in marriage, unless a reasonable cause urges, as if they have enmities, nor can they otherwise be reconciled. Or unless charity urges, as if he commands that he not contract with a wicked woman. Or unless the son himself has promised, or contracted espousals. Wherefore the holy Doctor is with the second opinion, which I maintain.

It is PROVED first by the holy Doctor, because in that in which we are equals, one is not bound to obey the other; but with respect to the right of marriage all are equals, unless another precept of the same natural law presses from above: Therefore the command of a father, as father, does not compel.

It is PROVED second by the holy Doctor: With the father commanding marriage, the son can vow chastity: Therefore he is not bound to obey his father.

It is PROVED third by the holy Doctor; if a son wishes to enter religion, he is not bound to obey his father determining or forbidding, because the vow is spontaneous: Therefore likewise the promise of marriage.

It is PROVED fourth by the holy Doctor: No one can destine me to perpetual servitude. But a man, by the fact that he contracts with a wife, gives her perpetual power over his body: Therefore.

It is PROVED fifth by the holy Doctor: If a father can compel: Therefore espousals contracted by parents without the son's consent are valid.

YOU WILL OBJECT however first. Isaac commanded his son Jacob not to take wives of the Chanaanites, Genes. 28. Therefore a Father can forbid this.

The holy Doctor RESPONDS, that he commanded this both because those women were wicked and contagious. For of them the Lord said: Certissime avertent corda vestra. Then because this kind of men was to be destroyed by God's command, and this is intimated in the text to have been known to Isaac.

YOU WILL OBJECT second, Coloss. 3. we have: Filii obedite parentibus per omnia. The Gloss adds, quae non sunt contra Dominum: But marriage is not against God: Therefore.

The holy Doctor RESPONDS, that that distribution is understood only of those things which pertain to the honorification of parents and to the governance of the family. As to the rest, it is only counsel, which the Gloss intimates, saying: Placet Deo, si per omnia obediatis, ita tamen, si Domino obediatis.

YOU WILL OBJECT third. As the spiritual Father stands with respect to spiritual matrimony, so the carnal father with respect to carnal: But the Lord Pope can command under excommunication that someone espouse himself to the Church by spiritual marriage, by accepting a Bishopric: Therefore.

The holy Doctor RESPONDS by denying the parity, because the spiritual Father has ampler power in governance than the carnal; and the more so because it pertains to the public good, which prevails over the private. Then a heavier yoke is imposed by carnal marriage, which is inseparable; whereas a Bishopric can be dispensed, laid down, etc.

He ADDS that of so great a parent it is presumed that, inspired by the Holy Spirit, he governs the Church, and accordingly commands for the public good, and therefore is to be obeyed. Wherefore the holy Doctor explodes the opinion of those saying that the Pontiff cannot command this. That one can, he says, refuse, if he knows certainly that he is unequal to the burden, and therefore that the Bishopric is dangerous for himself.

In our matter much more can the son, who is oppressed by his father, whether because he is not nourished, or not according to his station, or is sent farther away, that he not marry, marry with a worthy woman against his father's will; even if of inferior condition: So almost all grant, from the liberty of the state of marriage, Fagundez num. 5. Molina lib. 2. de primog. cap. 13. and others, as at Bassaeus loc. cit.

From which I also deduce, that such a son or daughter does not lose a legacy left under this condition, that she marry with her father's consent. So Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 6. Gamma decis. 314. Emmanuel Acosta l. cum tale, §. si arbitratus, ff. de condit. et demonst. Molina lib. 2. de primog. cap. 13. Sanchez Tom. 1. de matrim. lib. 1. d. 34. Molina the Theologian Tom. 1. de Iust. d. 207. Manuel Rodrig. tom. 1. summae edit. prima, cap. 133. Sylvest. verbo Concilium, Mencacha, controv. cap. 5. Fagund. num. 6. and others commonly among these authors.

The SAME must be said of the right of primogeniture and the like, if they are established under such a condition. For there is one and the same reason on both sides, as Molina, Iustisconsultus, and Fagundez note.

The FOUNDATION is, because such a condition impedes the liberty of marriage, and therefore must be judged as not appended; for although it is honorable for children to follow the will of their parents in contracting marriages, nevertheless the laws, wishing to favor altogether the liberty of marriage, reject conditions repugnant to this liberty, and judge them as not appended. Certainly such conditions weaken the liberty, which ought to be full, as we have cap. Gemma mulieri, de sponsal. Second, because this case must be decided according to l. filia suae, ff. de condit. et demonst. et l. cum tale, §. si arbitratu.

MANY however of those cited ADD that it avails, if a condition be appended of consulting parents or others, without denying the liberty not to carry out the counsel.

This however Acosta impugns loc. cit. referring to others who hold the same as himself.

YET I think the legacy avails, if it be left under that condition, that she marry a certain kind of noble persons, because it invites by a reward and compels toward better things. So Henriquez loc. cit. and Fagundez num. 9.