Thesis XV

Finally, with regard had to the primitive divine institution, by it a norm and example of monogamy was certainly prescribed beforehand, and its congruity was signified; indeed it also seems that there a law of the same was enacted for all future marriages, although afterwards for some time there was a dispensation from that law by God.

I. The question finally is whether by the law of the primitive institution polygamy was unlawful and invalid; that is, whether in the divine institution itself of marriage a law concerning monogamy was enacted by God, making polygamy invalid. It is certain, and all easily concede it, that when God instituted the first conjugal union, joining only one Eve to one Adam, by a deed of this sort He showed that monogamy is congruent to the condition of man, and that this state is most natural to man, and that monogamy is approved by Himself as author of nature. For the first parent could have no other wives than those whom God had created; for it is too foreign to human sense for a father to marry his daughter. But God, having fashioned only one woman for the man Adam, compelled him to be monogamous. And it is altogether according to reason that God, in the very institution of marriage, wished to prescribe beforehand an example and norm of conjugal unions thereafter to be contracted according to the laws of nature. But it is asked whether in the institution itself a law properly so called was enacted by God commanding monogamy, and whether He thus sanctioned a secondary precept of natural law, so that afterwards, for polygamy to be lawfully employed, there was need of a divine dispensation.

II. The theologians dispute. Some deny this and say that polygamy was prohibited only by positive Evangelical law. They rest chiefly upon the authority of the Fathers, who seem to deny a primitive law of this sort; thus Clement of Alexandria, Strom. l. III, l. c., who teaches that God required polygamy in the old economy; Jerome, Epist. 69 to Oceanus, saying, n. 5: "The Apostle knew that by law it had been conceded, and by the example of the patriarchs and Moses he had known that it was familiar to the people to scatter children among many wives; the judgment of this license lay open even to the priests themselves." Augustine, de Doct. Christ. l. III, c. 12: "For the sake of supplying offspring there was an inculpable custom of several wives being had at the same time by one man"; de Civit. Dei l. XVI, c. 38: "At that time no law prohibited several wives for the sake of multiplying posterity"; contra Faustum l. XXII, c. 47: "Some sins are against nature, others against customs, others against precepts. Since these things are so, what, finally, is objected against the holy man Jacob concerning several wives had at the same time? If you consult nature, he used those women not for the sake of indulging lust but of begetting; if custom, at that time and in those lands this was done as a matter of practice; if precept, he was prohibited by no law." Theodoret, Quaest. 67 on Genesis: "Sarah asked Abraham for this reason to come together with Hagar, so that she herself might receive children from this source: what sin did Abraham commit? Especially since neither nature nor any law then written prohibited marrying several wives." These are the clearer testimonies which are brought forward. Cf. Perrone, de Matrim. l. III, sect. 1, c. 1, a. 3.

III. Others, on the contrary, teach that in the institution itself God sanctioned by a positive law the secondary precept of nature concerning monogamy; and therefore that by divine dispensation it happened that polygamy was at some time lawful. Bellarmine, de Matrim., c. 11, hands down that this opinion is common among the Scholastics, and St. Thomas seems to teach it, q. LXV, a. 2. The first argument can be this, from the authority of the Council of Trent. Sess. XXIV, de Sacram. Matrim., says that "Christ taught more openly that by this matrimonial bond only two are joined, when, reporting those last words (they shall be two in one flesh) as uttered by God, He said: therefore now they are not two, but one flesh, and immediately confirmed the firmness of that same bond, long before foretold by Adam, with these words: what therefore God has joined, let not man separate." Moreover, Christ, in teaching, commanded the same thing which He taught; or this doctrine here is practical doctrine, prescribing what is to be done. Now if Christ, explaining the words of Adam, which are the words of God, taught more openly the unity of marriage, then God had taught the same thing sufficiently openly, that is, had commanded it from the beginning. Namely, the Tridentine Fathers do not attribute to Christ that He first taught this, nor that He first taught this openly, but only that He taught it more openly, insofar, namely, as He signified (which Moses did not note) that Adam spoke from the Spirit of God; and He inferred that they are no longer two but one flesh, and that man cannot separate what God has joined. But if in the words of Adam this practical doctrine, or law of God, was already contained, one may judge that Adam, who uttered those words, understood their sense, or that law; and with this posited, that law must be said to have been promulgated to the head of the whole of nature.

A second argument is from the practice of the Church, which Bellarmine, l. c., and Sanchez, de Matr. l. VII, D. 82, employ. Namely, if a polygamous unbeliever comes to baptism, he is compelled to dismiss the other women except the first; therefore the Church judges that only the conjugal union with the first was a true marriage. For if in unbelief there had been a true marriage with the second, the Church would not prescribe this, both because through the sacrament of baptism conjugal unions are not dissolved, but crimes are forgiven, as Innocent III says, c. Gaudemus, de Divortiis, and because Christian law prohibits true marriages from being dissolved, as Bellarmine notes. Besides, if the Church prescribed this only because it is not lawful for Christians to have several wives, while nevertheless judging that the marriages contracted with several in unbelief were true, she would grant power of retaining either one from the prior spouses; but she commands the first (who is supposed to be the true wife) to be retained, the others being dismissed (Roman Catechism, de Matrim., n. 19; cited c. Gaudemus); although at intervals dispensation has been given that the other, not the first, be retained in certain cases, namely when by the authority of the Roman Pontiff a marriage contracted in unbelief has been dissolved; but then the consent must be renewed in due form, because the prior consent offered with the second woman in unbelief was null. Now either the Church judges that these second conjugal unions in unbelief are null by natural law alone, or also by divine law. But not by natural law alone; because they are opposed only to the secondary precepts, which teach what is more honorable, not what is necessary. But divine law is either the law enacted by Christ in the Gospel, or the law enacted by God in the primitive institution; but the law of Christ obliges the faithful alone directly; therefore it must be said that the law was enacted from the beginning: therefore the Church judges that a law of this sort was then enacted.

Third is the authority of Innocent III, c. d. Gaudemus; for he says that "it was never lawful for anyone to have several wives at the same time, unless it was conceded to him by divine revelation."

IV. If the arguments of each side are compared, it is clear that the testimonies of the Fathers brought forward for the first opinion can be taken in such a way that they do not conflict with the second. For if some dispensation for a certain time, and that a common one, which the second opinion thinks was necessary and judges existed, was made by God, it can truly be said that for that time and those persons the law did not exist, insofar as its force was suspended; nor was there certainly any written law in the age of Abraham, as Theodoret says.

V. But if the matter is so, then as soon as the law was established, dispensation from the same was granted to all; for if polygamy was lawful after the flood, it must be said to have been lawful also before, which is also clear from the example of Lamech: for the reason for the concession was also valid then, indeed much more, namely the multiplication of the human race. But what sort of law is it, from which almost as soon as it has been established a general dispensation is granted?

I answer, first: even granting that the dispensation was immediately conceded, these things are not mutually repugnant of themselves, that a law be made which will be valid always and everywhere, and afterwards, on account of some special end, a dispensation from it be conceded for a certain time; for it is accidental whether a dispensation is added to the law immediately or after some time. Secondly: it is not certain that a dispensation of this sort was conceded immediately from the beginning. For a) the multiplication of the human race does not seem to have been a sufficient reason for granting that dispensation; for since the race itself began from one, and God willed this, it was also placed in the condition of the human race, and God must be judged to have willed this, that it be increased and propagated gradually. Indeed b) before the flood, mention is made only of one Lamech from Cain who had several wives; and he is reprehended on account of this also by those Fathers who are cited for the first opinion, as by Jerome, Epist. 79 to Salvina, by Tertullian, de Monogamia, c. 4, and by the Pontiffs Nicholas I, ad Consulta Bulgar., n. 51, Innocent III, d. c. Gaudemus, Gregory IX, Epist. VI to Germanus, Archbishop of the Greeks. Cf. also Theodore Abucara, opusc. 24 (Migne, P. G. V. 97), de Una uxore. c) The reason for this dispensation which is brought forward by the Fathers is not the multiplication of offspring alone, but the multiplication of offspring for divine worship: "For by the same vein of charity," says Augustine, de Bono coniugali, n. 18-19-22, "now spiritually, then carnally, sons were to be propagated for that mother Jerusalem. ... Now indeed no one perfect in piety seeks to have sons except spiritually; but then the operation of that very piety was also to propagate sons carnally, because the generation of that people was the messenger of future things and pertained to the prophetic dispensation. Those men surpassed by a far holier mind this affection of mortal nature, who sought offspring from their nuptials on account of Christ." Whence St. Thomas says (q. LXV, a. 2, ad 4), "that with Christ coming, it was the time of the fullness of grace, through which the worship of God was diffused into all nations by spiritual propagation. And therefore there is not the same reason for dispensation which existed before the advent of Christ, when the worship of God was multiplied and preserved by carnal propagation." Namely, before the advent of Christ the people of God was propagated by carnal generation; but after Christ, by spiritual generation and the preaching of the word: so that for this reason "service should be rendered to Christ not by the office of bearing, but by the zeal of continence; not by conjugal wombs to be made fruitful, but by morals to be made chaste" (Augustine, de Bono viduitatis, n. 10). Wherefore, after comparing these sentences of the Fathers, we can judge at least as more probable that the dispensation of polygamy was made after the flood, by which the harm inflicted by it would be more quickly repaired; for from the very institution of the human race it was already fitting that it should be diffused everywhere; and it would be repaired by the multiplication of offspring devoted to divine worship, which is the end of generation. And therefore this power was made of itself for those who would propagate offspring in this way, namely for the patriarchs worshipping God. But since this permission was made directly to just men and to the people of God, God seems to have extended that concession indirectly to all, even unbelievers. For the matter was placed in a public fact, but no law publicly promulgated was present, from which it could be understood that that concession pertained to the faithful alone; and unbelievers, especially with ignorance of the primitive law intervening and the law of nature not resisting altogether, could easily judge that what the just and holy did was lawful for themselves. But with these conditions existing, if God had wished to grant this privilege to the faithful alone, with all others altogether excluded, He would have declared this clearly, lest shameful concubinage be defended under some reasonable pretext arising from the very concession of God. Therefore one may judge that God permitted that the privilege granted of itself to the faithful be used also by unbelievers. But from this it followed that they themselves would be deprived of it as soon as it had been removed for the people of God, so that ignorance would indeed still excuse them, but they could no longer validly have several wives. Thus the opinions of Bellarmine and Sanchez, l. c., seem able to be composed; for the former thinks it more probable that this dispensation was granted also to the nations, not to the Hebrews alone; the latter, on the contrary, more probably judges that that power was not given to the nations, because in them the reason of dispensation did not hold, namely the multiplication of the faithful people.

VI. How, then, was this dispensation made? Bellarmine answers, after St. Thomas and Innocent III, that there was no need of some external speech or writing, but a peculiar inspiration of God was required. The reason for the first is that "as the law is, so also the dispensation is required: but the law prohibiting polygamy in the time of the Patriarchs was not written in any book, but only impressed upon minds," propagated by tradition. The reason for the second is that "the law prohibiting polygamy was not natural only because conformable to right reason, but because God by special inspiration had taught Adam what was the nature of marriage instituted by Himself, and therefore that He willed it to contain monogamy. For those secondary precepts of natural law do not have coercive force unless they are specially sanctioned by God or by some prince. ... Therefore, just as by special inspiration the law of monogamy had been sanctioned by God, so special inspiration was needed in its dispensation." This interior inspiration, says St. Thomas, l. c., "was principally made to the holy Fathers, and through their example derived to others."

VII. Therefore is a clear law of monogamy contained in those words uttered by Adam? The words of Adam are: This now (Hebr. זאת, this one, namely the woman brought by God, הפעם, this time, otherwise than in the preceding case, when the animals had been brought), bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she has been taken from man. Wherefore a man shall leave his father and his mother and shall adhere to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh (interpreters dispute who uttered these last words, whether Adam from a prophetic spirit or the inspired writer; either is the same for us). Now, first, in these words mention is made only of two, that is, of one with one. Secondly, there is a connection between the union of these two (they shall be two in one flesh) and the union of Adam and Eve; namely the connection which exists between type and ectype, which is signified by that causal particle wherefore. That is: because God formed the woman from me and gave her to me as wife, לאשה (cf. v. 22 with 24), hence by the law of nature and divine institution a man shall leave father and mother and shall adhere to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh, just as I and Eve are one flesh. Moreover, if this connection intervenes between the union of two in one flesh and the first union of Adam and Eve, the two must be taken exclusively, so that they are only two, male and female; for such was that primitive union. Nor could there be another, since God formed one Eve, and it was not lawful for Adam to join his daughters to himself in marriage. And indeed, thirdly, at least perfectly, one flesh is made from two if the man is united to only one woman. For they are one flesh, one man, not only by reason of actual carnal commingling, but also insofar as they are habitually one principle of generation, male and female; and they are this habitually because one belongs to the other. But this habitual unity (one flesh, one man) is not preserved perfectly if the man is coupled with several wives; for insofar as he adheres to a second woman and belongs to her, a certain multiplicity of the principle of generation is had. Therefore polygamy also is contrary to the perfect unity of marriage, by which the flesh of the man is in some way divided and separated from the wife. Moreover, that perfect unity was signified by the words they shall be two in one flesh is sufficiently shown from the type itself: for the unity of Adam and Eve was greatest, since she was taken from him and he was coupled with her alone. And so monogamy is proposed in these words. But since these are the words of God (Matt. XIX. 4), or, what is the same, uttered by Adam by a special instinct of God enlightening and teaching him, and they are words sanctioning right and law (for Christ in the same place appeals to them as to a law), and as St. Asterius, Bishop of Amasia, says, Hom. on Matt. XIX. 3: "whatever things happened concerning the first-formed, ταῦτα τοῦ ἀκολούθου γένους φύσις ἐγένετο, these became the nature of the following race," it follows that by these words the law of monogamy was then promulgated, which Adam certainly knew, since he knew by what spirit he was speaking.

And so the second opinion, on account of the arguments brought forward and the authority of Innocent III, seems to us certain or at least more probable. And indeed it is certain that the polygamy of unbelievers is now both unlawful and invalid; but, as Bellarmine just noted, this cannot be by natural law alone: therefore some divine law is required. But it cannot be said that the law of the Gospel directly obliges unbelievers; moreover there is no divine law besides the law of institution: therefore unbelievers are obliged by this. But even if you say that the law of Christ which regards marriage was also valid for the nations - for neither was authority lacking to Him in this matter, and the matter at issue was common to all - even in this hypothesis I would have you note that Christ did nothing other than recall the primitive law, declaring it more openly to us, as the Council of Trent speaks. Therefore the primitive law existed, which sanctioned monogamy.

From the things said you have that the arguments proving polygamy unlawful by divine law for Christians are more certain than those which prove it unlawful for unbelievers; for with respect to the faithful this is certain from faith and is demonstrated by its own arguments. Cf. Th. XIII.

VIII. It remains that we dispose of certain fallacies of a heretical man. Marcus Antonius De Dominis, Bishop of Spalato (de Repub. ecclesiastica l. V, c. 11, a. 58), distinguishing a twofold concubinage, one of a freeborn man with his own female slave, or one who is in his dominion, the other of a freeborn man with a freeborn woman, asks concerning the first whether the use of female slaves for receiving offspring is lawful, so that a man may have power over the body of his legitimate female slave even if he has his own freeborn wife joined to himself in legitimate conjugal union. But he says that certain examples from Sacred Scripture seem to persuade that this is lawful. The examples, namely, are of Hagar the slave, to whom Abraham went in, and of Bilhah the slave, to whom Jacob went in, although Abraham and Jacob had their own wives. But from the sacred text it is manifest that Abraham and Jacob went in to them by the right not of dominion over a slave, but by marital right; for Scripture testifies, Gen. XVI. 3; XXX. 4, that those female slaves were given to them as wives, and therefore that a perennial union was contracted and a true marriage existed.

As to the other species of concubinage, the same author first affirms simply that it is not lawful for a man already having his own wife, because by divine law promulgated from Adam and declared by Christ, monogamy was instituted. Yet he adds: "But whether this reason would cease where a married man cannot use his wife because of some incurable disease of hers, or irrecoverable absence, or some similar cause from among those on account of which even divorce would be lawful for him, and yet he does not wish or is not able to dismiss his wife, but is wholly bound to retain her, someone will think is not clear; some also will leave room for ambiguity much more concerning a free man and one unbound and tied by no conjugal union, whether he can join a concubine to himself, where neither strength nor opportunity permits him to have as wife a matron worthy of his rank." Namely, Spalato doubts whether a concubine who is not a wife can be had by a married or unmarried man for procreating offspring. But truly this was never lawful either after Christ or before Christ. For fornicatory intercourse, which is between unmarried persons, was never lawful; nor was adultery ever lawful, which is between the spouse of another and an unmarried person or one bound by another marriage. It was indeed lawful to have several wives, with whom, namely, a perennial obligation would exist; but this is altogether different from what Spalato invents: for the concubine of whom he speaks is not a wife. Civil laws indeed formerly permitted or tolerated that; but laws of this sort have no force.

IX. But lest any difficulty be sought from the opinions of certain ancients, it must first be noted that the name concubine formerly had a twofold signification: namely, she was called a concubine who was in no way a wife, but a mistress; and she was also called a concubine who was a wife of an inferior grade, that is, not married with the solemnities of dowry tablets employed, nor admitted to governing the family and administering family affairs, namely, she was not a matron, who was called wife simply or lawful wife (cf. Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. IX, c. 12). This is gathered from Roman law, l. Donationes, ff. de Donationibus, and l. 144, de Verborum signif., and Justinian's Novella 18. The same is also clear from the usage of speech in the Scriptures, as we have already indicated.

Moreover, concerning these concubines spoken of in the second place, the author of the Apostolic Constitutions speaks, l. VIII, c. 32: "Let the concubine of some unbeliever, devoted to him alone, be admitted (to Baptism); but if she also acted wantonly with others, let her be rejected." Likewise the First Council of Toledo, year 400 (cf. Gratian, in can. Is qui, Dist. 34, c. 17): "If anyone having a faithful wife has a concubine, let him not communicate. But he who does not have a wife, and has a concubine in place of a wife, is not to be repelled from communion, provided only that he is content with the conjunction of one woman, either wife or concubine, as it has pleased him. Living otherwise, let him be cast out, until he ceases and returns to penance." Again Isidore (cf. ibid. can. 5): "I will not say that it is lawful for a Christian to have many women, but it is not lawful even to have two at the same time, except only one, either a wife, or certainly, in place of a wife (if a spouse is lacking), a concubine." Cf. Natalis Alexander, Sec. 1, Diss. 28. For faith, by which it has always been believed that the conjugal union ought to be only of one with one, persuades that sentences of this sort must be taken in this way; and certainly the context fully admits this interpretation.

On the contrary, the words of Leo the Great in Epist. 167 to Rusticus, Bishop of Narbonne, n. 4, must be explained otherwise, that is, according to the former signification of concubine: "Not every woman joined to a man is the man's wife, because not every son (say, a natural son from fornication) is the father's heir. But the covenants of nuptials are legitimate among the freeborn and among equals, the Lord Himself having established this long before the beginning of Roman law existed (by which also that law was enacted). And so one thing is wife, another concubine, just as one thing is slave, another free woman. ... Therefore if a cleric of any place gives his daughter in marriage to a man having a concubine, it is not to be taken as if he had given her to a married man, unless perhaps that woman (whom he called a concubine) seems both to have been made freeborn and legitimately endowed and honored by public nuptials." That is, if she is in reality not a concubine but a wife, or has passed into the dignity of a wife; but he requires those conditions not in reality so that the nuptials may be true, but because by these they were usually proved. And so he who gives his daughter as wife to one having a concubine is not to be said to hand her over to a married man. But why does Leo say that conjugal unions are legitimate among the freeborn, not between a freeborn man and a female slave? This is another question, to be treated below; but for now let it suffice to note that a servile condition in either party is an impediment of marriage, unless the other, knowing and prudent, consents to it. The law of Constantine existed (l. 2, C. de incestis et inutilibus nuptiis): "There cannot be marriage with a female slave; for from a contubernium of this sort slaves are born." Moreover, this law being supposed, St. Leo so interprets the will of the man, that he did not wish to join her to himself by an indissoluble bond if the woman was not made freeborn, nor endowed, nor honored by public nuptials. To understanding this opinion there also conduces what he has a little later, n. 6: "because one thing is a married woman, another a concubine; to cast away a female slave from the bed and to receive a wife of certain freedom is not a duplication of conjugal union, but an advancement of honor." And so the female slave assumed to the bed here is the same as the concubine, and it is clear from the Pontiff that she is supposed not to have been legitimately joined, because he denies that, when another has been married, a second conjugal union exists. Moreover, this is that concubine which is called a harlot. The words of Leo, n. 4 cited, before the conclusion, indicate this most clearly: "Whence, since the society of nuptials was so constituted from the beginning that, besides the conjunction of two, it had in itself the sacrament of Christ and the Church, there is no doubt that that woman does not pertain to marriage in whom it is taught that the nuptial mystery was not present," which is the signification of the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church through the indissoluble bond of the man and the woman. Therefore that woman to whom the nuptial mystery is lacking is a woman associated to a man by a dissoluble, temporary bond, that is, a concubine according to the base signification, or a harlot. But see also what we shall say concerning these words of Leo in the Appendix.

Augustine speaks of such concubines, Serm. 392: "It is not lawful for you to have concubines. And if you do not have wives, it is not lawful for you to have concubines whom you afterwards dismiss (so all manuscript codices read; the printed editions have: whom you afterwards marry as wives, with Dismiss them so that omitted), so that you may marry wives; how much more condemnation will there be for you, if you have willed to have both concubines and wives." Augustine always reproved this concubinage in express words. In the book de Bono coniugali, c. 5, he says: "It is also customary to ask, when a male and female, neither he the husband nor she the wife of another, are joined to one another not for the procreating of children, but on account of incontinence, for the sake of intercourse alone, with this faith intervening, that neither he does this with another nor she with another, whether these are to be called nuptials. And perhaps this can not absurdly be called marriage, if even unto the death of one of them this has pleased them between themselves, and they have not nevertheless avoided the generation of offspring (although they were not joined for that cause), so that either they do not wish children to be born to them or even do something by some evil work so that they are not born. But if either both of these or one of these is lacking, I do not find how we can call these nuptials." Namely, a perpetual or indissoluble conjunction entered for the sake of avoiding incontinence is true marriage. Cf. ibid. c. 14, n. 6: "nor do concubines taken for a time, if they lie together for the sake of children, make their concubinage just."

X. Now note: since by Roman law there was no marriage of an illustrious woman, for example of senatorial or consular rank, with a base person, but concubinage between the same persons was not prohibited, and those concubinary conjunctions accordingly took place, Callistus, Roman Pontiff in the third century, did not indeed approve concubinages of this sort, but permitted that such conjunctions be bound by a nuptial covenant before the Church and thus be true marriages; for by the natural and positive law of God nothing stood in the way and nothing stands in the way of conjugal unions of this sort, and the Church is not bound by the laws of the age. Cf. the Appendix.

XI. You will ask what Augustine means when he says, l. c., in the following number: "Then to apply another woman to the will of the wife, from whom common children would be born, by the commingling and seed of the one, but by the right and power of the other, among the ancient Fathers was lawful; whether also now it is lawful we would not rashly say." He signifies, namely, that he fears lest it be rash to affirm it; but what? Namely, to have two wives, each of whom indeed is your wife, in the way it was for those Patriarchs, yet one handed over to you by the right of the prior wife, as Sarah did, who gave her handmaid to Abraham. But in that phrase, we would not rashly say, there is a certain μείωσις, and it is a locution not of one doubting, but modestly denying: that is, it would be rash to say it. For the opinion was certain to Augustine that a simultaneous plurality of wives was interdicted, which opinion he teaches also in this place immediately before. For he teaches that even on account of sterility it is not lawful to dismiss a spouse; but if it is done and another conjugal union is entered, adultery is committed, because the first conjugal union remains. But if it were lawful to have several wives, even though the prior conjugal union remained, there would be no adultery if another wife were received. Cf. besides the same Augustine in book I, de Sermone Domini in monte, n. 49, where he simply denies that very thing which here he says he will not say rashly; although in the following number he leaves in the middle another question, nevertheless akin to this one, which you may read. For the rest, it will not be beside the matter to note what Augustine testifies concerning himself in another work written long after these things: de Adulterinis coniugiis, l. I, n. 32, namely: "I am not ignorant that the question concerning conjugal unions is most obscure and most intricate. Nor do I dare to profess that, either in this work or in another, I have yet unfolded all its recesses, or that, if I am pressed, I can now unfold them."