Article I. On Necessity which Permits Taking Away Another's Thing

I say. Although common necessity, namely that which ordinary beggars suffer, certainly does not excuse from theft, because otherwise access would lie open to many plunderings and thus society would be overthrown; nevertheless in extreme necessity it is lawful to take from another's goods only so much as is sufficient for freeing oneself from such necessity. The reason is that the goods of life are of a higher order than the goods of fortune, and therefore by the division and appropriation of things it is not prevented that assistance be given to man's necessity. Therefore dominion is not to be so understood that even he who is placed in extreme necessity is excluded from the use and enjoyment of the thing; and consequently he, taking away secretly or openly a thing common under this aspect, makes it his own, as happened before the division of goods. Indeed not only with his own hands, but also through another, as through a procurator, he can take that thing, without any malice of theft being contracted. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 66, art. 7. - St. Alphonsus, n. 420. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, dub. 12.

Question 1. Whether in grave necessity it is lawful to take from another's goods as in extreme necessity?

Resp. It is much controverted, both concerning the solution itself and concerning the force of the argument which those who deny derive from proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: "It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity but also in grave necessity." For it is not clear whether this proposition was condemned on account of the word grave, or rather on account of the verb to steal. - But as regards the solution of the question, it seems that one must say that the whole matter depends on the force which is attributed to the word grave; wherefore if that necessity is so grave that it is to be called quasi-extreme or most grave, as several Doctors speak, then the same thing is to be held concerning it as concerning extreme necessity; otherwise, if it is less grave, so that it reaches common necessity. But this quasi-extreme necessity is judged to be present when one is in probable danger of incurring death, of losing some principal member, of falling into perpetual captivity, or of undergoing a most grave or perpetual disease. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 520; and Hom. Ap., n. 15. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 154. - Lessius, loc. cit. - Ballerini, note (a), p. 534; and note (a), p. 536.

Question 2. Whether he who is about to be killed by robbers, or to whom perpetual or most grave captivity or another similar misfortune threatens, unless he hands over a great sum of money, can secretly take it, if otherwise he cannot free himself from so great a necessity?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the more common and more probable opinion, provided that the rich man is not constituted in equal necessity through such taking away, and that the poor man takes only that of which he stands in absolute need. The reason is that, as all admit, extreme necessity is the cause why in this case goods become common to the needy man with the rich man; therefore the community of goods extends as widely as the necessity itself, and the needy man can assume for himself as much as is necessary for relieving this necessity. - Nor should you say, 1st, that the poor man cannot provide for himself through an unusual and extraordinary means; for a means of this sort perhaps is unusual and extraordinary relative to common necessity, but not to the present necessity, as we suppose. - Nor should you say, 2nd, that the rich man in this case is not bound to give with so great a loss to himself, therefore neither can the poor man take; for the answer is that the rich man indeed is not bound to give, because he is obliged from charity alone, which does not urge with so great an inconvenience, but he is bound from justice not to prevent the poor man from using his own right and occupying goods absolutely necessary for himself in such straits. - Nor, finally, should you say, 3rd, that the privilege of secretly taking another's things in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity is not to be extended to cases arising from the mere malice of men; both because that limitation rests on no solid foundation, and because it lacks the weight of authority. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 520. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 146 and seq.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is not lawful for a poor man placed in extreme necessity to take away more than is necessary for himself. Hence if the mere use of a thing suffices, for example, of a horse, when the necessity ceases, the obligation of restoring remains. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 15.

2nd. If an extremely needy man has elsewhere, in reality or in probable hope, whence he can pay, he cannot remove another's thing except with the burden of restitution; because necessity does not require that ownership of the thing accrue, when he can be sufficiently relieved by a thing accepted by loan or for use. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 19.

3rd. But he who, in extreme want, has consumed another's thing, is held to nothing after the use of the thing, if he had no probable hope that he would at some time be able to restore, even if afterward he should come to a better condition. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., ibid.

4th. A rich man hiding his own things, or using some other device so that he may not aid the poor man, when the poor man's necessity ceases, is not held to restitution, because he sinned only against charity. But if by force he prevents the poor man from taking some thing, then indeed he sins against justice; but when the necessity ceases, and thus the right of the poor man, the burden of restitution also would cease. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 20. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 142.