Bad desires

328. Notions. 1. A depraved desire is an act of the will by which someone deliberately intends to accomplish an evil thing.

2. It is called efficacious when someone absolutely proposes to execute the evil thing by deed, and inefficacious when someone intends to execute the evil thing conditionally, e.g. if I could, if it were licit. Therefore what is said of desire is valid by equal reason concerning purpose: for purpose is efficacious desire.

Even an inefficacious desire of itself tends toward the evil thing; wherefore of itself the same theological and specific malice is in it as in an efficacious desire; and therefore it is not necessary that it be declared in confession whether the desire was efficacious or inefficacious.

329. Principles. 1. The desire, efficacious and inefficacious, of an evil thing is a sin of the same gravity and species which the object, that is, the external act toward which it tends, has. The reason for the first is that desire receives malice from the object toward which it tends, and therefore in a grave matter it is grave, in a light matter light. The reason for the second is that desire tends toward the external thing itself as afterward to be accomplished, and therefore includes all the malices which are in the thing itself, provided they are apprehended.

Hence it is that Christ says: He who shall have looked at a woman to covet her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.¹ Therefore the desire of stealing a consecrated chalice contains the twofold malice of theft and sacrilege. The desire of sinning with a relative by blood or with one consecrated to God is mental incest or mental sacrilege. Wherefore desires gravely evil, both efficacious and inefficacious, must be declared in confession in such a way that circumstances changing the species also appear.

2. An inefficacious desire is not a sin if the condition attached removes the malice of the act: for in this case the will is borne toward an object which contains no malice, since the attached condition excludes it.

a. The attached condition, e.g. if it were licit, if it were not a sin, if God permitted, can exclude malice from the object: a. in those things which are prohibited only by positive law: I would wish to eat meat, unless it were a day of abstinence; I would take a wife if I were not a priest; b. in those things which indeed are prohibited by the law of nature, but nevertheless can sometimes be done licitly: I would kill an enemy, I would steal, if God permitted. Nevertheless desires of this kind are not only idle, but often also dangerous.

b. The attached condition cannot remove malice from the object: a. in those things in which the condition is impossible, because they are so intrinsically evil that they cannot be changed even by God, e.g. I would blaspheme, I would fornicate, if it were not a sin; b. if the attached condition is referred not to the malice of the act, but to another circumstance. Therefore these desires are sins: I would wish to take vengeance, if I were not a priest; I would fornicate, if there were no hell; I would steal, if it could be done secretly.

c. But if the conditioned desire of a thing intrinsically evil, I would fornicate, I would avenge myself, if it were licit, is not a true and deliberate desire, but rather the signification of a natural propensity by which the will or the sensitive appetite is borne toward an evil thing, it is not a sin, because this desire is explained in this way: nature indeed draws toward the evil thing, but I do not will it, because it is prohibited.

¹ Matt. 5, 28.

330. Whether it is licit to wish evil to one's neighbor for a good end. It is licit under these conditions: a. if it is not done from hatred and vengeance, but merely on account of a good end; b. if it is done with the order of charity preserved, i.e. if the good on account of which temporal evil is wished to one's neighbor surpasses or at least equals the evil which is wished to him.

a. It is licit to wish death to one's neighbor on account of one's own or another's spiritual good necessary for salvation; thus it is licit for a father to wish the death of a son whom he foresees will be seduced if he lives longer: for the order of charity is preserved, since a good of a greater order is preferred to a good of a lesser order.

b. It is licit to wish death to one's neighbor also on account of a temporal good, not only common but also private, provided this good is not of lesser moment than the life of the neighbor. Thus it is licit to wish the death of a tyrant, that peace and common happiness may return; likewise it is licit for a wife to wish the death of a husband by whom, beyond hope of amendment, she is treated most harshly: for the temporal safety of the wife is a greater, or at least an equal, good than the life of the husband. In the same way a wife in this case can licitly wish death to herself: for death is better than a bitter life.¹ The reason for these things is that also in this case the order of charity is preserved: for since anyone ought to love himself more than his neighbor, he licitly prefers his own good to a lesser or equal good of his neighbor.

c. It is not licit to wish death to one's neighbor on account of a temporal good of lesser moment than the life of the neighbor, because it is against the right order of charity. Therefore it is not licit for a mother to desire the death of a daughter whom, on account of deformity, she cannot place in marriage; nor is it licit for a son to desire the death of his father so that he may more quickly enter upon the inheritance. In the same way it is not licit, without sin, to wish death to oneself on account of the daily miseries of this life.

Note. In desires of this kind, however, one must take care lest the will tend directly and immediately toward the evil of the neighbor, but rather toward the good on account of which the evil is wished: otherwise the will would elicit an act evil in itself, by wishing the evil of the neighbor as it is his evil, not as it is the good of the one desiring or of another.

¹ Eccli. 30, 17.

THERE are as many kinds of bad thoughts as there are different kinds of sin, but for the purpose of this chapter they are commonly reduced by theologians to two kinds: bad desires and morose pleasure in evil imaginations. Desire, therefore, is here understood in a wide sense and comprises a longing, a wish, purpose, or intention of doing something wrong. Morose pleasure is voluntary joy, delight, and satisfaction in an evil imagination, and what is said about it is also applicable to voluntary sadness and sorrow on account of something good, which should cause the opposite sentiments.

Desires are efficacious when there is the intention of taking the necessary means to obtain what is desired; they are inefficacious or conditional when this is not the case.

An efficacious desire of doing what is wrong is a sin of the same kind as the external action would be; it contracts the malice of the object and of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is plain. The external action in the concrete with all its circumstances is the object to which the will tends in forming an efficacious desire; and as an act is specified by its object, the evil desire belongs to the same species of sin to which the external act would belong when . performed in the circumstances contemplated.

The same must be said of inefficacious or conditional desires, unless the condition takes away all the malice of the act, as it frequently may do, ‘There is no harm, for example, in saying, “‘ I should like to eat meat on a Friday, unless the Church forbade it’’; and the same is true generally whenever the condition, “if it were lawful,” is annexed to a merely positive prohibition. If this condition is annexed to a desire against the natural law, as ‘1 should like to steal if it were lawful,” or ‘‘ I should like to commit fornication if it were not forbidden,” the condition does not remove all the malice of the vicious will, for the very tendency of the will toward such objects is against right reason. Such conditional desires, then, are sinful, unless they indicate a mere propensity towards such sins without any voluntary affection of the will. In any case, however, they are dangerous, and should not be indulged or expressed,

III. Enumeration of the passions. Eleven are enumerated, namely:

1. On the part of the concupiscible appetite:

a) Love, which is the complacency of the concupiscible appetite in sensible good, abstracting from its absence and presence (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26, aa. 1 and 2).

b) Desire, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite tending toward an absent sensible good (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 2).

c) Joy, which is the complacency or rest of the concupiscible appetite in an attained sensible good (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 31, a. 1).

Each is clarified by these words of St. Thomas: "The first change of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than complacency in the appetible; and from this complacency there follows motion toward the appetible, which is desire; and finally rest, which is joy" (I-II, q. 26, a. 2).

d) Hatred, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from sensible evil, abstracting from its absence and presence (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 1).

e) Flight, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from an absent sensible evil (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 2, ad 3).

f) Sadness, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from sensible evil that is present or joined to it (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 35, aa. 1-3).

2. On the part of the irascible appetite:

a) Hope, which is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it tends toward a future sensible good that is arduous and possible to attain. "Concerning the object of hope," says Aquinas, "four conditions are considered. First, indeed, that it be good; and by this hope differs from fear, which concerns evil. Second, that it be future; for hope does not concern a present thing already had, and by this hope differs from joy, which concerns a present good. Third, it is required that it be something arduous, attainable with difficulty; for someone is not said to hope for something minimal which is immediately in his power to have, and by this hope differs from desire, which concerns future good absolutely. Fourth, that that arduous thing be possible to attain; for no one hopes for that which he cannot attain at all" (I-II, q. 40, a. 1).

b) Despair is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it turns away from an arduous sensible good which seems impossible to attain. "Now the object of hope, which is an arduous good, has the character of something attractive insofar as it is considered with the possibility of attaining it; but insofar as it is considered with the impossibility of obtaining it, it has the character of something repulsive; and thus despair regards this object, whence it implies a motion of a certain withdrawal; and for this reason it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is contrary to approach" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 40, a. 4).

c) Daring is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it rises up against a terrible sensible evil in order to overcome it. Now daring follows upon hope. For from the fact that someone hopes to overcome the terrible thing threatening him, from this he boldly pursues it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 45, a. 2).

d) Fear is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it is cast down because of a sensible evil that is arduous, threatening, and scarcely possible to overcome. It is called threatening, for on the one hand it does not concern present evil, but future evil, in which respect it differs from sadness (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 42, a. 3, ad 2); on the other hand, it does not concern a remote and distant future evil: "for because of its distance we imagine this as not going to happen, and therefore we either do not fear it or fear it little. For as the Philosopher says in Rhetoric II, chapter 5, number 1, things very far away are not feared; for all know that they will die, but because it is not near, they care nothing" (St. Thomas, same place, a. 2).

e) Anger is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it seeks vengeance against something harmful, because of harm inflicted. "For whoever is angry seeks to be avenged against someone, and thus the motion of anger tends toward two things: namely, toward the vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as a certain good, whence it is also delighted in it; it tends also toward the one against whom it seeks vengeance, as toward something contrary and harmful, which pertains to the character of evil" (St. Thomas, same place).

No passion is opposed to anger. "The Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, book 2, chapter 3, number 1, that becoming mild is opposed to being angry; and this is not a contrary opposite, but a negative or privative one" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 45, a. 2).

Love is the cause of all passions, for "there is no other passion which does not presuppose some love. The reason for this is that every other passion of the soul implies motion toward something or rest in something. But every motion toward something, or rest in something, proceeds from some connaturality or fittingness, which pertains to the character of love" (I-II, q. 27, a. 4).

I. Notion and Division. Desire is distinguished into simple desire and purpose. Simple desire is an act by which the will is indeed borne toward carrying out a work, but which nevertheless does not reach the purpose of carrying that work out. Purpose is an act by which the will proposes to carry out a work. It is distinguished into absolute and conditional, according as someone resolves to commit an act absolutely or conditionally.

Joy is here understood as deliberate complacency concerning an act committed. Joy expressed in words is called boasting.

II. Morality. 1. Simple desire, absolute purpose, and joy concerning an evil act are evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil, according as the act is gravely or lightly evil. For they involve an affection of the will toward an evil act, which they embrace: desire with respect to the future, joy with respect to the past. But an affection of this kind is manifestly evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil, according as the act is gravely or lightly evil. Add these words of Sacred Scripture: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife."¹

2. Simple desire, absolute purpose, and joy take their species both from the object considered according to its lowest species and from the circumstances both of the subject and of the object. The reason is that they tend toward an act according as it is or was in reality, with all its circumstances. It is said:

a) From the object considered according to its lowest species. Hence one who proposes to himself to commit, for example, pollution or fornication, contracts the guilt of pollution or fornication.

b) From circumstances of the subject, as was said concerning morose delectation.

c) From circumstances of the object. Hence one who takes the purpose of sinning with a married person, a blood-relative, etc., becomes guilty of adultery or incest.

The foregoing points, moreover, hold even if desire or joy regards an act that is only materially evil. Hence proposition 14 was deservedly proscribed by Innocent XI: "It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent, perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance thereby"² (St. Alphonsus, V, 20). It is licit, however, to rejoice that the materially evil act happened as materially rather than formally evil.

Note. Boasting about a sin truly committed commonly carries with it joy, properly so called, concerning the sin. But boasting about a fictitious sin seems rather to involve morose delectation than joy properly so called; indeed sometimes delectation concerning only the manner of the evil work. Hence to this boasting are to be applied the things which we have said concerning morose delectation, whether of the work or only of the manner (St. Alphonsus, V, 26).

3. Conditional purpose concerning an act which, apart from the condition, would be wicked:

a) It is evil if the condition does not remove the malice of the object; this has place if the condition does not regard the malice of the act, as if someone were to say: "I would steal, if there were no hell; I would kill my enemy, if I had a sword; I would fornicate, if I were not a religious," etc. (St. Alphonsus, V, 13).

b) It is not evil, at least not gravely, if the condition removes the malice of the object. "And this can occur, not only in things forbidden by positive law (as if you were to say: I would eat meats in Lent unless the Church forbade it), but also in things forbidden by natural law, in the case in which the object could be licit (namely by saying: If God permitted it, I would wish to take that thing of Titius; if I were not a priest, I would marry; and similar things)... We said: at least not gravely; for ordinarily desires of this kind are not excused from venial sin, since commonly they are dangerous or at least idle" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) What if someone were to say that he would do something which is intrinsically evil, adding the condition: if it were licit; for instance, if you were to say: "if it were not a sin, I would wish to blaspheme, perjure myself, commit adultery, fornicate, take revenge, and similar things" (St. Alphonsus, cited place). Now most authors charge the one who speaks thus with sin, because the condition is impossible and therefore cannot remove the malice of the object. Be it so; but one rightly doubts whether in the case there is a true desire, or, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "it is said, with sufficient probability, that when the will desires some impossible evil object under the condition if it were licit, it never efficaciously consents to it; for when you wish for that object by saying if it were licit, and you know that it is not and cannot be licit, you do not truly wish, but only show your propensity. It would be different, however, if you wished that that evil object were not prohibited; because it is evil in itself to will that the order and law of nature be overturned" (St. Alphonsus, cited place). So also Cajetan,³ the Salmanticenses,⁴ and Suarez.⁵

¹ Exod. 20:17.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1165.

³ Cajetan, In I-II, q. 13, a. 5.

⁴ Salmanticenses, tract. 20, De principiis moralitatis, c. 13, n. 62.

⁵ Suarez, De legibus, bk. 3, c. 13, n. 10.

Corollary I. It is licit to rejoice and to take delight in a good effect, for example, in a temptation quieted through pollution, in offspring conceived from fornicatory intercourse, etc. The reason is that the object of the delectation is good. Nevertheless "delectations of this kind are sometimes not without danger" (St. Alphonsus, V, 20), because there is an easy transition to delectation concerning the wicked act itself which was the cause of the effect.

Likewise, once an evil act is supposed, it is licit to desire its good effect, for instance that someone, if he sins again, may be punished and amended. But it is not licit to desire that someone sin again, even for this end, that he may be punished and come to his senses.

It is disputed whether it is licit to rejoice and to take delight in an evil act, for example, in fornication, insofar as it was the cause of a good effect (not because it was such a cause). With St. Alphonsus (V, 20), against several others, it seems this must be denied, because that expression, "insofar as it was the cause of a good effect," or "as cause of a good effect," is not really distinguished from the evil act, so that joy concerning such an act as cause of the effect in reality embraces the evil act itself, and therefore becomes evil from an evil object.

Corollary II. It is licit, for an honorable end, to rejoice over merely natural pollution and to wish for it, because it is not a sin, not even materially (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, ad 5; St. Alphonsus, cited place; n. 65). The contrary must be said of another pollution, even if it was only a material sin (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

In what respect it is licit to rejoice over a temporal evil of one's neighbor or to wish for it is explained in the treatise on the cultivation of charity.

I. Notion and division. Desire is distinguished into simple desire and proposal. Simple desire is the act by which the will is indeed borne toward a work to be executed, but which nevertheless does not reach a proposal of executing that work. Proposal is the act by which the will proposes to execute the work. It is distinguished into absolute and conditioned, according as someone resolves absolutely or conditionally to commit the act.

Joy here is understood as deliberate complacency concerning an act committed. Joy expressed in words is called boasting.

II. Morality.

1. Simple desire, proposal, and joy concerning an evil act are evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as the act is gravely or lightly evil. For they involve an affection of the will toward an evil act which they embrace: desire toward the future, joy toward the past. But an affection of this sort is manifestly evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as the act is gravely or lightly evil. Add these words of Sacred Scripture: "You shall not covet your neighbor's wife."¹

¹ Exod. 20:17.

The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the first of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence; (b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection produced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of the object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul on account of the presence of an evil.

As was said above (89-93), the external acts of the members of the body have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject to the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if classification is made according to the faculties from which the sins proceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we treated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of desire and reminiscent approval.

Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in sins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish between sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.

(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts, either because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it as the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man rejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some helpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy the perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.

(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is confined to the second part of the news.

To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.

Impure Desires.—Impure desire is a deliberate intention to commit impurity in the future.

(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which consent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same thing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that he would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only that he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as a mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances that would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were lawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both he and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these velleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of danger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will consents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to fornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take away the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were it not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to practise fornication).

(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure desire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual, mental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or what is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but without carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future married relationship).

Malice of Impure Desires.—Impure desires are mortal sins and have the malice of the object and of the circumstances that one has in mind; that is, one commits the same kind of sin in desiring as in performing impurity. Hence, Our Lord declares that he who looks upon a woman to desire her unlawfully has already committed adultery in his heart (Matt., v. 28), and hence also the ninth commandment forbids sins of impure desire. The principles given in 2506, 2507, apply also to impure desires with this difference that the mind when it wills external performance considers the object as it is in itself, not as it is mentally represented, and hence is less likely to prescind from actual circumstances known to it, But even here confessional investigation is sometimes not necessary on account of its moral impossibility.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What is election? - Election is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as a means, or as a useful good; namely, it is the efficacious volition of some particular thing which is loved on account of another.

Therefore election proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is the useful good as such and possible for us; and it contains at least virtually the volition of the end itself.

Likewise election retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to take place among several things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of election remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is the only means or whether it is compared with others. Election is after the manner of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing.

Moreover election is the purpose of the will; since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he will do something. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, d. 8, s. 1, 2.

Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience as regards depraved desires and other merely internal acts, namely if no exterior action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more uneducated and less instructed, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain; and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach this." This opinion, says S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 9, "I have never been able to judge probable.... With other learned recent authors I judge it little probable." The reason for this opinion is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How then will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, that invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will toward evil is not so evident as in desire efficacious of itself. And the same also seems to have to be said of inefficacious desire.

Note: One sins against the law not only by action, namely by commission or omission, by doing or not doing those things which are prohibited or commanded by law, but also by simple desire, without execution of the thing, by simple morose delectation, or voluntary complacency, without desire, or, conversely, by voluntary sadness. Hence he also sins against the law who despises, censures, reproaches those things which are to be done or were to be done; which is the same as despising, censuring, reproaching the law which commands them; or, on the contrary, approves, praises, boasts of those things which are not to be done or were not to be done; whether he himself or another has transgressed the law. Moreover scandal can easily be present by reproach or boasting; since these easily furnish others with an incitement, or delight. Except if someone praises not the evil thing itself, but the new, clever, vigorous manner in which the thing was accomplished: for this is a certain natural good, provided nevertheless that the danger of delight in the evil thing and of scandal is absent. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266, 273; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 186, a. 9, ad 3.

Formal contempt of law, by which someone expressly despises the law, or its author, as he is superior, refusing to be subject to his ordinance, is always, speaking in itself, mortal. For it is contempt of authority. Hence it is not grave: 1. If the thing itself commanded is despised, insofar as it is made little account of. 2. If the superior is despised, not as superior, but insofar as he is a contemptible individual person, because, for example, he is imprudent, base, idiotic, rude, unlearned. Nevertheless this would still be mortal, if such a judgment, which is thus formed about that person, were gravely rash, as is clear. 3. If the act by which the precept, or the superior, is despised is not perfect by reason of advertence and deliberation, as often happens. Hence Lessius, Sanchez, etc. say that mortal sin by reason of contempt rarely occurs. But material contempt, by which someone violates the law in order to indulge his passions, is mortal or venial according to the measure of the matter. L. 142; S. Th. l. c.

What are the merely internal sins of the will, and what is their nature? All sins which are committed by the interior will alone can easily be reduced to desire and delectation. - Desire is the purpose of some thing, or an act of the will by which we will to attain some good. One is efficacious, and is a purpose absolutely efficacious of itself, whence it is that someone in reality undertakes means to lead it to effect. Another is inefficacious, and is a purpose only conditionally efficacious, which someone would execute if he could; e.g., if he could steal the treasure of the Church, he would steal it. Now the desire of an evil thing is evil, since the object of action and of desire is one and the same. Hence a depraved desire has the species and malice, mortal or venial, of the sin which the exterior thing has toward which it is borne. Namely desire tends to this, absolutely or at least conditionally, that it execute the thing and constitute it as really existing. But if someone truly executed the thing, he would contract every malice both of the object and of the circumstances. Therefore the same must be said if someone pursues the thing by affection and desire; for since this affection of desire is joined with the very existence of the object, it is necessarily joined with all things necessarily connected with the object itself. Wherefore Titius having relations with Caia, another's wife, commits adultery if he knows her to belong to another, even if he would not wish her to belong to another; in the same way one desiring Caia, another's wife, is also guilty of adultery if he knows her to belong to another, and even if he would not wish her to belong to another, because desire tends, as the execution itself does, into the same existing work, and thus concrete with all its circumstances. Consequently in confession of the desire, e.g., of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, marriage, the vow of chastity of the person, etc., are to be declared. L. 12. By no means, however, is there need to add whether the act concerning the object was absolute or conditioned. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1032.

Delectation is a certain simple rest and complacency of the will from the presence of a fitting good, either possessed according to the thing, or according to cognition and apprehension. Delectation does not properly differ from joy, except insofar as joy is rather called the delectation of the rational appetite, and delectation rather is called that which belongs to the sensitive appetite with a certain transmutation of the body; and this delectation is also called sensible or sensual, and if it is with transmutation of the organs and spirits serving generation, it is called carnal or venereal delectation. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31; q. 72, a. 2; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 33. - But according to St. Alphonsus, 15, as desire regards future time and the work to be committed, so joy regards past time, namely when someone is pleased with himself concerning an evil work committed; and delectation regards present time, that is, when someone through imagination and thought renders present to himself the work of sin, e.g., fornication, and with deliberate consent delights in it, as if he were actually fornicating, yet without the desire of executing it. Morose delectation in a depraved thing is sin, because love is present in delectation. For that depraved thing would never delight unless it were loved according to itself. Suarez, de Pecc., d. 5, s. 7, n. 5. Moreover delectation is the rest of the appetite in good. "And therefore according to the delectation of the human will a man is chiefly judged good or evil. For he is good and virtuous who rejoices in the works of virtues, but evil who rejoices in evil works." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 34, a. 4. Morose delectation is voluntary delectation; for it is called morose not on account of a necessary delay of some time, but on account of the necessary consent of the will. For not delectation, but consent to delectation, is sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 6, 8; q. 88, a. 5, ad 2. In a depraved thing; for delectation is twofold. One is concerning a depraved work, so that the evil work is the object of delectation, and this is always evil; another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the very thought concerning the evil work is of itself the object of delectation. And this can either be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, e.g., for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes be even gravely evil, if there is proximate danger of consent. S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 16, 17.

Morose delectation in a depraved thing, insofar as delectation is distinguished from joy according to time, has malice and species according only to the variety of objects exhibited by the mind. For simple delectation does not tend into the object as something to be placed in reality, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object except that one which moves delectation. L. 15, 28. But joy, as desire, takes on the malice and species both of the object and of the circumstances really annexed to it. For joy, since it is a volition pleased with itself, and therefore approving the past thing, is borne into it such as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Hence, in recollection and complacency over past sins, it is necessary in confession to declare the nature and specific circumstances of the object. L. 15. In recollection and complacency. For sin is not had by simple recollection of a sin formerly committed, from the fact that it neither pleases nor displeases the one remembering, because by no law are we commanded to repent several times of sins, if we have already done penance for them, or here and now to repent, if we have not yet repented of them. Laymann, de Poenit., d. 2, s. 8; Sporer, de Poenit., n. 192; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 376 ff.; S. Th. Quodl. 12, a. 33.

Lest in this matter the confessor scandalize the penitent by indiscreet questions, it must be noted that the confessor, from the general rule, ought to make judgment concerning sins as they are set forth, according to the obvious and natural sense of the accusation. Thoughts about a venereal matter, delectations, desires, are regularly borne, the former into carnal commotion, the latter into pollution and copulation. Wherefore the confessor satisfies his duty if he asks the penitent concerning consent furnished; for the aforesaid acts are not always voluntary and deliberate, nor is consent always explicitly explained. Consent often in these acts is not concerning some determined object, but is indeterminate consent into venereal delectation, pollution, and copulation, which is regularly followed by delectation arising from the commotion of the genital organs. And into this ordinarily are simple delectations borne. Desires, on the contrary, are borne into the completed act. Therefore the confessor will then be able to ask the penitent only whether the aforesaid acts regarded himself or another person, of a different or the same sex. But even from this question one must abstain if the penitent is still ignorant of these matters, especially since it is a lesser evil that confession not be exact than that the penitent be scandalized. Besides, if at times extraordinary species are present, and penitents know them, they are ordinarily accustomed to declare them themselves. Reuter, p. 2, n. 209.

Resolves: To rejoice concerning the manner, e.g., new, clever, vigorous, by which a thing was accomplished is not illicit, since the object of delectation is not evil. L. 18. If the thing, as it happened, is not evil, not even materially, nor harmful to another, to desire it is not of itself illicit, although otherwise it would be intrinsically evil, e.g., pollution which naturally happens in sleep. To desire, namely by simple affection and without any cooperation. But if it is licit to desire, it is also licit to rejoice concerning it already done. The reason is, "because what it is licit to desire that it be done, it is also licit to rejoice that it has been done; and conversely, if it is right to rejoice concerning the fact, it is also licit to desire that it be done; for these are of the same morality: for joy necessarily results from the desired good obtained, and supposes or implicitly includes desire." Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; Laymann, l. 3, s. 4, n. 17; Lugo, l. c., n. 389. "I, however," says the same Lessius, l. c., "am not an author that desires of this sort be admitted to anyone; both because, although they are not evil in themselves, nevertheless they indicate an imperfect affection of chastity; and because holier remedies, and those used by holy men, are not lacking. I would say the same about joy. Also in all matters of this sort, as we have already often warned, every cooperation and danger of consent must be avoided." - Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 4, Obj. III; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154, a. 5; L. 19, 20; l. 3, n. 478.

It is not a sin, speaking in itself, at least not mortal, if spouses delight, only by the rational appetite, concerning an act of marriage past, future, or possible, with respect to the co-partner present or absent. The same must be said if a spouse-to-be desires future copulation, or likewise delights in it only by the rational appetite, or a widow concerning a past one, with the danger of consent into venereal delectation arising from it set aside. The reason is that these acts have a licit object. Nevertheless they are full of danger on account of the aforesaid venereal delectation often arising from them. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 19, n. 376, 385; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 47, n. 1, 4, 7; L. 23, 24, 25.

Sadness concerning a good accomplished which was commanded under grave obligation is gravely culpable; concerning a good which was commanded under light obligation, it is light. Likewise concerning a good under neither grave nor light precept, it is light, unless there is a just cause now of regretting it; for it is a certain disorder to be saddened over a good accomplished, although not commanded by precept. But if sadness is borne not into the good itself, but into the annoyance, the labor, etc., it is of itself not a sin. Sanch. in Dec., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2; Suarez, l. 5 de Voto, c. 7, n. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 39.

Is it licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

R. Affirmatively in itself, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the work, e.g., I would eat meats in Lent, unless the Church prohibited it. For such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object, from which all malice is excluded by the condition. - But otherwise negatively, e.g., I would sin if there were no hell, because the affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however added, cannot remove malice, e.g., if it were licit, I would destroy God. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed; and therefore the condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish such things is to desire that the law and order of nature be changed, which would be still worse. Yet probably he would be excused from grave sin who, by such a desire, would not certainly will that what is intrinsically evil become licit, but would only show his natural inclination toward that object, e.g., I would avenge myself if it were licit, but I do not wish it because of the law of God; or would state the matter only enunciatively, e.g., younger, I would have avenged myself, signifying not what he would now wish if he were younger, but what perhaps as a younger man he would have done; yet with the danger of efficacious desire always removed, and also of true inefficacious desire, namely every will of doing, and every simple affection of the will. What has been said of desire must consequently also be said of delectation and joy of the rational appetite. For it is not licit to rejoice and delight in that good which it is not licit to love and desire; and, conversely, it is licit to rejoice and delight by the rational appetite in that good which it is licit to love and desire. For love and desire are the way to joy and delectation, as motion tending to rest. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 284 ff.; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 22 ff.; Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 15, § IV, You ask third; S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 12, 13, 14.

What order generally is to be observed in charity toward neighbor?

In the order of charity each one is bound after God to love: 1. himself according to spiritual goods, insofar as he wills God, his end, i.e., the supreme and uniquely necessary good, more to himself than to another; then neighbor as to the same spiritual goods; 2. himself as to intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc.; then neighbor as to the same bodily goods; 3. himself, and then neighbor, as to external goods, such as reputation, honor, riches. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor. But the rule is prior and preferable to what is ruled. Therefore love of self always precedes and is preferred to love of neighbor, where the matter concerns goods of the same order and equal necessity.

Of the same order: Supernatural goods are to be preferred to natural goods. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to private good, because the common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Intrinsic natural goods, life, health, integrity of members, are to be preferred to extrinsic goods, reputation, honor, riches. But reputation and honor with respect to riches are of a higher order, because they are something spiritual and moral.

Necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold: 1. Extreme, when danger of life, that is, of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without another's help. And it is quasi-extreme if he can free himself, but only with the greatest difficulty; or if there is only probable danger of the aforesaid evil: of life, of integrity of principal members, of liberty, of a most grave disease, of infamy. 2. Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil, which he cannot escape without great difficulty. Such is the necessity in which those things necessary for conserving one's state are lacking. 3. Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are vulgar sinners who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order poor beggars are generally in it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. Tambur., Expl. Dec., l. 5, c. 1, § 1, n. 4 seqq.; § 2, n. 5 seqq.; Suarez, de Carit., d. 9, s. 2, n. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 4-6; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 3; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; L. 25, 27, 31; H. A. 18.

Cf. nn. 288, 389.

167. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited by the imagination as present, without desire.

2. Joy, or deliberate complacency concerning a past evil thing, or an evil work performed either by oneself or by another ¹.

¹ Complacency here does not mean pleasure or delight drawn from consideration of the evil object, but rather a certain approval by which the will has the evil perpetrated as pleasing and accepted: which approval indeed can be called joy in this sense, that someone concerning the evil deed not only is not sorry, as he ought to be, but rather rejoices.

Moreover joy is properly said also of a present good; indeed it is customarily defined as enjoyment of a good possessed and loved (Suarez, On 1.2, treat. 2, disp. 7, sect. 1, nos. 3-5). Concerning which matter St. Thomas says thus (1.2, q. 31, art. 3): Joy is a certain species of delectation... For we are delighted also in those things which we desire, when we obtain them.... But the name of joy does not have place except in delectation which follows reason; whence we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but only the name of delectation.

3. Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if an intention or absolute proposal of executing it is present; otherwise it is called inefficacious ². - St. Lig., no. 15.

² It is necessary that some efficacy be present even in inefficacious desires; otherwise they would not even deserve the name of desire. Namely there is present a conditionally efficacious will, which would pass into work unless something else obstructed. Hence St. Alphonsus well says (book 5, no. 15): A desire is called inefficacious if it does not propose absolutely to execute, but consents that it would execute, if it could, when, for example, it says: If I could steal the treasure of the Church, I would steal it.

But what the malice of these is, and what the species, hold in these few words:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1. it is truly a sin. For this is established from the precept, Thou shalt not covet, which must generally and indefinitely be understood of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is opposed to right reason: for it is base and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, that which it is not licit to execute.

2. It takes on the species of its object. For any desire, even inefficacious, tends to its object, and consequently is a volition of the special malice of that object, and therefore contracts its specific malice ³. This is also established from the words of Christ, Matth. 5.28: He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood as adultery. Therefore...

³ The internal act about which this treats here regards the external act as to be entrusted to execution, either absolutely or at least hypothetically; therefore it is necessarily carried to it according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or of their own accord follow from it.

3. It also takes on the species of the circumstances of the object. For desire, since it tends to an object, touches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. Hence in confession, for example of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the person desired must be declared. - St. Lig., no. 12.

168. • II. Joy likewise is a sin and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances joined to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of a past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also takes on the whole malice of these.

Hence he who in the recollection of past sins is complacent in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency, and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting about a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed ⁴, must be recalled to joy.

⁴ Understand this especially of a work which had to be performed by strict obligation; and thus sadness of this sort will be such a sin as a refusal to fulfill the obligation would have been. But if the discourse is about a good act to which one was not held, to repent without just cause of a good of this kind will certainly not lack some venial fault; since this is against reason, because the proper object of repentance is an evil thing; but there will be no fault if a cause is present which makes the repentance honorable. Confer what Sanchez has concerning one who repents of a vow emitted (On the Decalogue, book 4, ch. 12, no. 2).

169. • III. Morose delectation 1. is certainly a sin; 2. it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is that it is opposed to rational nature and divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it: but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear ⁵. Therefore... Hence Osee 9.10: They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Prov. 15.26: Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord. Therefore...

⁵ The guilt of morose delectation appears easily, since in reality it is nothing other than consent to delectation concerning an evil work. Thus St. Thomas, where he excellently distinguishes delectation about the thought of an evil work, which does not pertain here, and delectation about the evil work thought of (1.2, q. 74, art. 8): Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted about two things. In one way, about the thought itself; in another way, about the fornication itself thought of... But the thought itself, according to itself, is not mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for example when someone thinks about it uselessly; but sometimes it is without any sin at all, for example when someone thinks usefully about it, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it. And therefore consequently the affection and delectation which is thus about the thought of fornication is not of the genus of mortal sin, but sometimes is venial sin, sometimes none. Whence neither is consent to such delectation mortal sin... But that someone thinking about fornication is delighted ABOUT THE ACT ITSELF thought of, this happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act. Whence that someone consents to such delectation is nothing other than that he consents in this, that his affection be inclined toward fornication: for no one is delighted except concerning that which is conformable to his appetite. But that someone chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which according to themselves are mortal sins is mortal sin. Whence such consent to the delectation of mortal sin is mortal sin.

More briefly Laymann (book 1, treat. 3, ch. 6, no. 2): It is one thing to be delighted about the thing thought of, for example fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thing itself, but thought is only the condition proposing and applying the thing thought of; but another thing is to be delighted about the thought, for example of fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thought itself... We are speaking here about delectation WHICH IS TAKEN FROM THE THING ITSELF. For since the thought of an evil thing is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, as if you think about base things for the sake of teaching or admonishing, but sometimes venially evil, as if you think about the same things from curiosity; it follows that delectation also concerning such thought as object is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, sometimes venially evil.

The reason for the second is that whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in what degree and species the object is evil, in the same plainly will its delectation be evil. Therefore... - St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 74, art. 8. - St. Lig., no. 15.

170. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether morose delectation also takes on the specific malice of circumstances, as desire and joy do?

I answer: It is controverted. Probably no. The reason is that simple delectation does not tend to the object as to be placed, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object besides that which moves the delectation ⁶. Lugo, Laymann, Reuter, Bonacina, etc., against others who contend that simple delectation takes on all the species of the object, just as desire itself does. St. Lig. says that each opinion is probable, book 5, no. 15 ⁷.

⁶ This opinion does not deny that specific malice is taken also from circumstances, if these also are the object of delectation; but if the delectation, as Sanchez says (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 11), whom therefore the Salmanticenses wrongly allege for the opposite opinion, no differently than several others there reported by Sanchez (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 31), is not carried to the object according to its whole malice apprehended, but according to a part, as to a woman apprehended indeed as not his own, yet not as married to another or a nun; it will not have the whole malice of the external work, but only the malice apprehended, and that alone will have to be confessed, and it will be reduced to the species of simple fornication.

This hypothesis indeed is founded in the nature of the thing. For it happens that the will is carried to that which is indeed delectable, the circumstances of which, far from alluring, rather blunt the appetite, for example that the woman is already married to another, that she is a nun, or a blood relative, etc., which the Salmanticenses also suggest (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 30), where they well advert that the things said above hold indeed concerning the circumstances of the object, but not concerning the circumstances of the person sinning, for example if he is married or bound by a vow of chastity, although these circumstances contribute nothing to the delectation.

⁷ ** Although St. Alphonsus says that the opinion of the Author is very probable, nevertheless he adds (ibid.) that he greatly likes what Holzmann says (On the Precepts of the Decalogue, treat. 2, no. 698), that, for example, the circumstance of adultery must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of desiring at least inefficaciously, etc. And the VV. (page 913, no. 20) recall here those things which the Holy Doctor has elsewhere (Apostolic Man, treat. 3, no. 48), where after alleging some from the indicated false allegations of the Salmanticenses, he adds that in practice... without doubt all the circumstances of the object must be explained in delectation.

I answer: The opinion of Holzmann will be able to have place when he who is morosely delighted concerning an evil object at the same time has known that he is then violating the obligation of guarding against the grave and proximate danger of falling into depraved desire for that same object. But otherwise in the other hypothesis. The reason is clear from the first principles of ethics; for no sin is ever committed if some notion of obligation does not shine beforehand.

171. • QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

I answer with a distinction: Yes, of itself, if the condition applied takes away the whole malice of the thing; the reason is that such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which by the condition malice is wholly excluded. But no in the other hypothesis; the reason is that such an affection tends to an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not take away malice from the object even as represented, and consequently the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition however applied cannot take away malice. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and consequently a condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish for such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed. - St. Lig., no. 27; Apostolic Man, no. 50.

Yet he is probably to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not wish that that which was intrinsically evil should become licit, but only would show his propensity toward that object. - St. Lig., Apostolic Man, ibid., with others. Moreover everyone sees how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition applied were to take away the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, but licit in some case or state, for example: I would kill an enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by a vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife. Such desires Cajetan (Sins of Thought) deservedly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because although a desire of this kind is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in a venereal matter will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive law are also to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection ⁸.

⁸ Sometimes desires of this kind can be neither idle nor disordered, namely if they are concerning a good object, for example if, with a suitable condition applied, a married man were to foster desires about undertaking sacred ministries and enjoying Communion of the chalice, or a Religious bound by vow of poverty about distributing alms, building hospitals, adorning churches, etc., or a cleric about destroying the enemies of the Church in a just battle, etc.

172. • QUESTION 3. Whether it is licit to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left undone from forgetfulness?

I answer: No, if the joy is referred to the omission insofar as it is objectively evil. But yes, if it is referred only to the pleasure or advantage honest in itself. - Suarez, On Sins, disp. 5, sect. 7, no. 15. - Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 389, etc., against others who deny it without distinction ⁹.

⁹ Suarez and Lugo, alleged here by the Author, and also others commonly, hand this down not only concerning the omission of a commanded work, but generally concerning any act whatsoever evil according to itself, which nevertheless someone performed without fault, namely from inadvertence or ignorance, or in madness, sleep, drunkenness: namely, that it is not licit to rejoice concerning the past act according to itself and on account of its pleasure; nevertheless it is licit to rejoice concerning the good effect thence following, and therefore concerning that act only insofar as it was the cause of such an effect, as Suarez says.

Here carefully observe those words: According to itself and on account of its pleasure; for by these is excluded the reason because of which St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20) seems with Sanchez and certain others to depart from this doctrine. For Sanchez shrewdly observes (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) that the aforesaid causes, which are reduced to defect of free consent, indeed excuse the exterior work from fault, but do not likewise make licit the delectation inherent in an evil work which is later freely taken. And hence comes the solution of the question whether it is licit to rejoice concerning pollution in sleep, or even to desire it. For as St. Thomas teaches (on 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5), it will be a sin if pollution pleases on account of the delectation; but not if it pleases as an unloading or alleviation of nature. Concerning this matter see the same St. Thomas (2.2, q. 154, art. 5), where, contrary to what St. Alph. has, l. c., he recalls to the natural cause of pollution a base dream, to which also the touches or movements following that same dream can be reduced. For when, he says, seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of humor has occurred... the sleeper dreams those things which pertain to the emission of such abundant or resolved humors; as also happens when nature is burdened by some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination.

** The VV. (page 140) move a twofold complaint: 1. that you will seek in vain in the text of Sanchez the words brought above; 2. that the Author twists Sanchez into his own sense.

I answer to 1. There the opinion of Sanchez is reported, not the words. If the VV. desire that opinion expressed in the words of Sanchez, behold it (l. c.): As often as the cause excusing the exterior deed from mortal fault, namely defect of consent, does not concur in the delectation itself, although the deed is free from fault, nevertheless the delectation will not be free from sin.... The reason is that that deed was OF ITSELF mortal, and free from fault solely by ignorance or defect of reason. Since therefore that delectation lacks a similar excusing cause, and is wholly voluntary, and is concerned with an object OF ITSELF mortal, it will be mortal. Was not this opinion expressed in the preceding, even though in other words?

I answer to 2. There is no twisting there, nor could there have been any necessity of twisting. The Author was suggesting there that the hypothesis or question about which Suarez, Lugo, etc., who affirm that joy is licit, is one thing, but the hypothesis about which Sanchez, who denies it, is another. It was a deed worthy of its authors that the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 48) in some way set up the question according to the hypothesis of Suarez, Lessius, etc., and then in a manner often customary to them opposed (ibid., no. 49) to these Sanchez, Azor, etc., who discuss the question according to another hypothesis. The great confidence of St. Alphonsus toward the Salmanticenses caused that here, as also often elsewhere, he transcribed these things from them, and moreover added Collet, Roncaglia, and also Croix; although the last, since he sets up each hypothesis, therefore, as the matter demanded, in the one (book 5, no. 89) agrees with Sanchez, etc., but in the other (ibid., no. 91) with Suarez. But you would say that the Salmanticenses are less worthy of excuse in this, because since apud Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, etc., they could see each hypothesis most clearly proposed, and aptly solved according to the diverse merits of the cause, they opposed to them authors who did not even mention a word concerning the other hypothesis. But as to the fact that the VV., with no one preceding, undertook (l. c.) to refute the resolution of Suarez, etc., for the diverse hypothesis, it will have been enough to observe that the question is brought to this: whether the same fact, under a diverse aspect or consideration, can or cannot stir up a diverse and indeed right affection; and whoever understands this question will be able by himself to decide concerning the merit of the refutation.

The VV. add (page 142) that the authority of St. Thomas is invoked by the Author. But from what has been related in the Note, that appears false. For by the Author only two things are suggested. 1. Under a diverse consideration it is licit or not licit to have delectation concerning nocturnal illusion. 2. That St. Thomas stands against the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20), that pollution in sleep is objectively evil if it comes from touch and a base dream; St. Thomas recalls even that which proceeds from a base dream to a natural cause. And these things suffice for the seventeen columns with which the VV. detain the reader. For concerning condemned propositions it will be said in its own place.

Concerning the general question proposed in the text, it will be useful to have indicated that several Doctors distinguish between things prohibited by the law of nature and things prohibited only by human law; and they affirm delectation illicit concerning the first genus, but not likewise as to the other, provided it is not done under the aspect of prohibition. Thus Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 10), Azor (part 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1), and others, whom St. Alphonsus follows (book 5, no. 27), saying, thus it must be held... whatever Croix says (book 1, no. 81). Yet immediately the Holy Doctor (l. c.) adds: Nevertheless it is not licit to be delighted concerning Mass left aside because of forgetfulness, and similar things; because the omission is objectively evil, as Roncaglia (treat. 2, ch. 3, q. 5) with Azor and Sanchez.

And in reality Roncaglia wrote thus, distinguishing with the Salmanticenses (whom he transcribes with their name passed over in silence) whether an impediment of fulfilling a precept withdraws from the obligation of the precept, or only excuses. Hence he deduces that it is licit for a youth to be delighted concerning the omission of a fast to which he is not yet held, and for the sick to be delighted concerning the omission of Mass; but otherwise if this happens from forgetfulness, because the omission then remains objectively evil; then he alleges Azor and Sanchez. But Sanchez in the very place cited by Roncaglia (book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) teaches the opposite and adds this exception to the general rule: Understand, unless concerning things prohibited only by human law... there is delectation about the material act, and as to its substance, with the prohibition set aside; in which case we said, no. 10, that it is not mortal to be delighted, even when breaking the precept is mortal, much less when it is freed from sin by ignorance. - But Azor (q. 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1): If he who is delighted thinking about eating flesh meats absolutely and in itself, but not as it is forbidden at certain times, does not sin, therefore it is because he does not take delectation from an evil thing insofar as evil; for the eating of flesh meats is not evil of itself. Tamburini (Decalogue, 1.3, ch. 5, sect. 1, no. 2) applies this doctrine to the omission of the Breviary, since the object of delectation can be the lack of labor and watching; and say the same of the omission of Mass, when someone can be delighted merely concerning the avoided inconvenience of a journey, rain, etc. The defect of coherence in this question is owed to the Salmanticenses, whom Roncaglia also copied; since they (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 37) say that in things prohibited by positive law the substance of the work can be set aside from its prohibition; and then they forget this very thing.

173. Resolves. - 1. If a penitent accuses himself of some depraved thought, he must be asked whether he knew it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged wholly immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused cognition of the malice, and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a God-fearing conscience. - Saettler.

2. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, but another to be delighted concerning the, for example, clever mode by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed of itself can lack fault); nevertheless the Confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who willingly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except to make manifest the ingenious mode by which they were performed; and certainly if the discourse were about honest actions, however ingeniously performed, they would generally perceive much less delectation. Say the same about those who eagerly read books less honest ¹⁰.

¹⁰ In these things it must chiefly be attended whether at other times the penitent is accustomed to consent to depraved delectation. For otherwise, that someone is more inclined and eager to be engaged in reading or hearing a base subject is not an indication of deliberate delectation from base things, but of human infirmity; and although the delectation by which the lower appetite is solicited is rejected, this does not impede weak nature from inclining toward matters of this kind more than toward other matters to be handled; especially because sometimes there also accedes a certain curiosity, which is accustomed to be sharpened toward new and unusual things the more a man would not dare without just cause to undertake that work. Hence the anxiety by which some are sometimes troubled must be calmed, because in handling these matters rather than others, or in hearing confessions of women rather than of men, they seem to themselves to be willingly engaged.

3. It is not mortal to be saddened concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is burdensome only, or in the divided sense of the law, for example concerning the burden of fasting. - St. Lig.

4. It is not licit to be delighted concerning the evil thing itself considered in itself, because the object of delectation is always evil. Nevertheless it is licit to be delighted concerning the good effect which proceeds from it, provided the order of charity is not violated ¹¹. Hence the following proposition under no. 15 was condemned by Innoc. IX: It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of his father perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thence obtained from the inheritance.

¹¹ The Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 47), whom St. Alphonsus followed (book 5, no. 20), fabricate a disagreement here among doctors, and accuse Vasquez, Lessius, Palau, etc., as if they taught that, on account of a good effect, it is licit to be delighted concerning a formally such sin, and consequently that affection can licitly be terminated, on account of a good end, in a thing intrinsically evil. But these things are wrongly fabricated, since no disagreement is had in these authors except perhaps in words. Let Lessius, with whom the others also agree, be heard (On Justice and Right, book 4, ch. 3, no. 105): When someone is said to rejoice concerning an evil work, insofar as it is the cause of good, it can be understood in two ways. First, that on account of the good effect he rejoices that that work is or was, or was done by himself; and this is wholly illicit, if that work was intrinsically sin: because this is to approve sin, and to have complacency in it on account of a good end.... For just as that effect, or relation to that effect, cannot effect that that work, which is intrinsically sin, be licit or good, so neither that it be worthy of joy and complacency.... Secondly it can be understood that he rejoices that that depraved work had or has such a good effect; and thus it is licit to rejoice concerning an evil work. For we do not rejoice that that work is evil; but supposing that it has been done, we rejoice that it gave cause for a good effect. For it is truly worthy of joy that by divine goodness the greatest goods proceed even from the worst works. But this is rather to rejoice concerning the effect than concerning the work, although we also rejoice concerning the causation of the good which belongs to the work.

** The VV. (page 145), having set forth the opinions, as they understood them, of Vasquez, Bonacina, Lessius, and Palau, conclude (page 144): Rightly therefore St. Alphonsus attributed to Palau and Lessius the opinion that it is licit to be delighted concerning an evil work not as sin, but as cause of the effect following. They add that Vasquez and Bonacina, whom they falsely say was added by St. Alphonsus, had progressed further; and therefore that a disagreement of doctors concerning this question exists.

I answer: 1. The mark of false accusation was attributed to the Salmanticenses, not because the accused Authors do not have that thesis, but because this is explained by the Salmanticenses as if the affection, as is said in the Note, were terminated to a thing intrinsically evil. But this is false; because the aspect of causality in the case is not evil.

2. It was said that there is no disagreement among the Doctors except in words. This is clear from the words of Lessius brought forward, and also from the fact that none of the Doctors whom the Salmanticenses and St. Alphonsus oppose as contrary has anything against the thesis thus proposed.

3. Finally, what the VV. add, that Vasquez and Bonacina progressed further, is an indication that they did not grasp even the least bit the opinion of Vasquez, and therefore of Bonacina; whence we think it happened that they wrote: Vasquez, S.J., teaches that it is not mortal sin to desire a formally evil work with efficacious will; which words indeed, having regard not to the mind of the VV. but to the words, carry open calumny. Vasquez and Sayrus, says Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 9), say that although in general an efficacious will (which they call desire) of any mortal thing is mortal, yet not every delectation concerning any work whatsoever, even by natural right prohibited under mortal sin, is mortal, provided it is not concerning the work under the aspect under which it is sin, or contrary to a precept. He then indicates their singular doctrine, which he says is proved most widely and learnedly by Vasquez, and concludes: And thus, although Vasquez admits that morose delectation of a mortal thing is mortal, nevertheless he recedes from the foundations by which the most common opinion proves this. These things prove that Vasquez, as to substance, did not recede from the common doctrine. Lugo himself also testifies to the same thing (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 363), saying: This opinion of Vasquez is embraced by not a few others, Reginald, Sayrus, and others, whom Diana reports and follows..., and Azor, Salas, Filliuccius, Bonacina, and Lessius apud the same Diana call it probable, and Castrus Palao follows the same. And he indeed adds (no. 364): This opinion is difficult perhaps more in the mode of explaining than in the thing itself; which he pursues up to no. 370. Yet that Vasquez declined to these absurdities which the VV. saw, neither Lugo, nor anyone else, saw through or suspected.

5. The Confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice about an advantage coming to them from their own or another's sin, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor ¹². The same is to be feared about him who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but which proceeds from his misfortune, for example from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For joy concerning the neighbor's evil can sometimes creep in rather than concerning the good effect thence proceeding, especially if he previously had enmity with him. Therefore the Confessor, if the matter seems to require it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent. - St. Lig., no. 20. - See Cases, no. 150 and following.

¹² The vigilance of the Confessor is opportune because of two things, namely 1. lest the desire or joy of a good effect (for those things which are said here about joy, from the common opinion of the Doctors, are almost valid concerning desire, or even concerning delectation) pass over into joy, or desire, or approval of sin considered in itself, from which that effect is caused; especially if someone has obtained profit of great moment from his sin; in which case joy and delectation concerning the great happiness acquired will indeed scarcely be abstracted from delectation in the evil cause. 2. Lest ever, namely even if any fault whatsoever of anyone is absent, or at least delectation concerning fault is absent, the order of charity be violated, which certainly demands that the good which we intend be reasonably preferable to the good of which we either wish another to be deprived or rejoice that he is deprived. Hence the condemnation of the proposition mentioned in the preceding number; for the order of charity does not permit that a son prefer the hope of inheritance to the death of his father. But concerning these things better where charity is treated.

19. 2. Depraved desire is had when someone depicts for himself venereal delectation as future, and deliberately wishes to enjoy it. Now the absolute desire of a gravely unlawful act is a mortal sin. This is clear from the words of Christ: "Whoever shall look on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart."¹ Besides, desire includes all the malices which it apprehends in the object; hence if someone wishes to have copulation with a married woman, his sin takes on the malice of adultery.

¹ Matt. 5:28.

The same must be said in practice concerning conditioned desire; for from what has been said, n. 505, in those things which are intrinsically evil, as venereal delectation outside matrimony is, the condition added does not remove the malice of the act.

But among unlawful desires must not be counted those which spouses foster of legitimately using matrimony, and therefore of enjoying the venereal delectation annexed to marital intercourse: for this is lawful for them, provided the danger of pollution outside legitimate intercourse is absent. Indeed, a betrothed man can of itself desire future intercourse; but because in such desire there is also danger of consenting here and now to venereal delectation, the betrothed are to be exhorted diligently to turn away from themselves thoughts of this kind.

— Notion and morality of desire. Desire, as we saw above, carries with itself some intention of execution; or, besides love, it says some intention, absolute or conditional.

1. Absolute desire, by which the will consents into a sin to be perpetrated at some time, necessarily participates in the theological and moral species of the exterior act toward which it is borne. This is clear from St. Matt. 5, 28 itself: "Whoever shall have looked upon a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart." And the reason is manifest: an interior act draws its goodness and malice from the external act, as from its object.

2. Conditional desire will be sinful or not, according as the malice remains in the object or is taken away from it. The reason is that although conditional desire effects nothing exterior, nevertheless it places in the will an affection for the action: therefore of what sort the fault would be to execute it, of that sort it will be to love it.

Wherefore, made under the condition "if it were not prohibited," or in the state in which these acts are lawful, desires concerning things prohibited by positive law alone are innocent in themselves: I would eat meat on Friday, unless the Church forbade it; concerning things lawful by natural law in some case or state: I would kill Peter, if God commanded it to me; I would hang a thief, if I were a judge; I would marry a wife, unless I were a priest. Yet observe that these idle desires become dangerous in many things.

On the contrary, these are evil: if there were no hell, I would commit adultery; if I were not a religious, I would fornicate; if I had no account of my state, I would avenge an injury, I would kill you; indeed also these others (although some perhaps have contradicted): if it were not a sin, I would fornicate, I would despoil the rich, etc. Provided, however, that by all these you signify a present voluntary affection, and not merely a natural propensity or that which in another age, in another state, in another religious faith, you would have done.

215. - Besides the general indications of Christian piety, these things are usefully to be advised:

1. A diligent and complete flight from the proximate occasion. Let the confessor endeavor to dispose the soul to the greatest liberality in this matter, so that he may obtain more than he could strictly command, and may lead the penitent to follow the safer parts.

The other spouse will sometimes have to be admonished of imprudence. Imprudent is the wife who, from religion, refuses to accompany her husband to the theater, for it is by no means expedient that the husband go alone to these places; imprudent is she who introduces or fosters her husband's familiar association with her marriageable but unmarried sister, for, by the very reason that two sisters are accustomed to be similar, the husband is easily tempted by those allurements of that sister which he previously loved in his wife; he in turn is an occasion of temptation for that unmarried woman. Imprudent also is the wife who introduces or admits into the home governesses or maidservants who have not been cautiously selected; imprudent is she who desires to use a separate bed.

2. The suppression of the cause which rendered the marriage less happy. Let the confessor, insofar as discretion permits it, inquire attentively into those things which one of the spouses casts against the other or desires in the other, in case perhaps he can remove by opportune counsel certain things done unskillfully. It happens, for example, that the wife is reluctant in rendering the debt; that she does not provide sufficiently for domestic order; that she neglects cleanliness in clothing and body; whereas it contributes greatly to a happy family that all things be well polished and carefully arranged, that appetizing foods stimulate the appetite, and that no wrongly understood piety prohibit the wife from pleasing her husband.

3. Discreet severity in judging the sin of adultery. It cannot be tolerated that a Catholic man seem to make little of what he has committed against conjugal fidelity. Therefore, the adulterer will have to be reproved by the confessor with grave words, although without anger, especially if he seems to accuse himself of such things coldly and with an even mind.

IV. Absolute lustful desire (onkuische begeerte) and joy (onkuisch verheugen) have the same species and gravity of malice which the work has about which they are concerned, to be posited or already posited, with all known circumstances (Matt. V, 28). For desire tends into a work really to be posited, and accordingly not as it is represented abstractly in the intellect as pleasurable, but as it is on the part of the thing; and joy is concerning a past work as it was. Each tends into all the circumstances which are in the work and are not separable from it in the concrete.

On the contrary, in conditioned desire, if the condition excludes all or partial malice of the object, that malice is totally or partially not contracted, for example: I would have copulation with her if she were mine; I would sin with her unless she were married.¹ But if the condition does not exclude the malice, the whole malice is contracted, for example: I would fornicate if it were licit or if I could.

¹ Yet in practice this can be dangerous, as will be said on the following page.

402. Notion. Evil desire is complacency in some evil action to be done, or is the choice of doing something morally evil. Desire is divided into efficacious desire, which is a true and firm purpose of doing something evil, and into inefficacious desire, which is only a certain velleity without a firm purpose, and which is also called conditioned desire. For someone would wish the evil work if he could or if it were licit. Concerning the morality of desire, the following things are to be noted:

403. Morality. a) Efficacious, or absolute, desire of an evil action is a sin of the same species and malice as the external act toward which it is borne. Thus all. - The reason is that the whole malice of a human act is founded in the perverse will, and the external act adds no special morality, as is clear from what was said above in n. 133. Hence Christ also said: "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart."⁹⁴

From this it follows that desire takes its species from its object and from its circumstances changing the species. Likewise it follows that the sinner is bound to confess his evil absolute desires in altogether the same way as the external acts to which they refer. Hence if someone, for example, desires to steal a consecrated chalice, it does not suffice to confess: I wished to steal; but he must say: I wished to steal a consecrated thing. But the sin committed by that evil desire is not only mental theft, but also mental sacrilege. - In practice, however, it not rarely happens that desires do not refer to an entirely determinate object, but rather to something generic. For example, someone desires to take vengeance on his enemy, without determining the manner in which he wishes that vengeance; or someone desires to sin carnally with a person of the other sex, without being conscious to himself of a special act to be committed. In these cases it would suffice to confess: I wished to take vengeance on my enemy, or: I wished to sin with a person of the other sex.

⁹⁴ Matth. 5, 28.

404. b) Inefficacious, or conditioned, desire of some evil a) is always idle and thence dangerous; b) is not of itself a sin, if the condition attached removes the malice of the act; c) but is of itself a sin, light or grave according to the quality of the object, if in it there is found disorder, notwithstanding the condition attached. - The individual parts of this proposition are explained:

As to a), all agree. For to what purpose are those velleities? Through them phantasy is disturbed and time is wasted. Besides, consent to an evil thing can easily arise from them. For example, the inefficacious desire of a priest who would say: I would wish to marry a wife, if I were not a priest. Everyone sees how idle and dangerous a desire of this kind is. Other velleities concerning illicit objects are wont to be similar.

As to b), the matter is clear. For if the condition attached strips the desired object of its malice, desire or velleity of this kind is not of itself a sin. For example: I would eat meats, if it were not Friday; I would wish to remain in bed, if I were not bound to work, etc.

As to c), it is evident; for if someone wills a disorder, he sins, although he should attach any conditions whatever. Therefore the following velleities are sins: I would fornicate if there were no hell; I would wish to commit adultery if this were licit; I would wish to kill my enemy if I could. The reason is that all these things are against the natural law, and the condition attached cannot remove the disorder of the act. Nevertheless it must be noted that desires of this kind among the uneducated are often not sins, at least not grave sins, because they do not know their malice and by them wish only to express a natural propensity toward the object, yet without free consent of the will. Nevertheless these wishes are always to be avoided by any man, however much conditions may be attached, because in every case they are useless and dangerous.

405. Scholion. On desire of evil on account of a good end or effect. Moral evil or sin cannot licitly be desired, however good the end or effect may be. This is clear from what was said above. Sometimes, nevertheless, an evil of this kind can be permitted, as when it follows from our action otherwise good or indifferent, as was said in n. 57 sqq. concerning the indirectly evil voluntary. In order that physical evil can be licitly desired, first of all the order of charity must be preserved and excessive self-love must not be indulged. Innocent XI proscribed several propositions concerning this matter, for example prop. 13: "If you do this with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death, ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal gain"; and prop. 14: "It is licit by an absolute desire to desire the death of one's father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one desiring, because, namely, a rich inheritance is going to come to him."⁹⁵ - These propositions seem to have been proscribed for two reasons: 1. because in such joys and desires the proximate danger of sinning will scarcely be absent; 2. because otherwise the order of charity would be gravely wounded. For human life, and a fortiori the life of one's father, is far to be preferred to temporal gain or to a rich inheritance. But if the order of charity is preserved, of itself nothing prevents someone from desiring some physical evil from which a good effect is hoped. Thus it is licit to wish illness to an unruly youth, so that he may come back to his senses from his vices; it is licit for a father to wish the death of a son whom he foresees will be seduced if he lives longer. But whether it is licit for a wife to wish the death of a husband by whom, beyond hope of amendment, she is treated most harshly, or whether in that case the wife can wish her own death, is not so clear. Many⁹⁶ affirm, because "death is better than a bitter life"⁹⁷ and because in this case the order of charity is preserved. Nevertheless the negative opinion seems better and safer, both because from such a desire a greater spiritual good is almost always impeded, namely the exercise of most precious patience, and because it is truly not clear whether by such a desire the order of charity is not wounded. Is physical death really better than a bitter life? But the cited text can be explained otherwise.

⁹⁵ Denz. n. 1163 sq.

⁹⁶ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 22.

⁹⁷ Eccli. 30, 17.

St. Alphonsus, V, 12; ed. G., II, p. 720; H. Ap., III, 47; Vind. Alph., P. 2, q. 2; Aertnys, I, n. 236; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 353; Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 1025.

345. Internal sins, as such, are all evil acts elicited by the will and deliberately willed, which are perfected in the mind. Concerning these the Tridentine Synod warns (Sess. XIV, c. 5) "that sometimes they wound the soul more gravely, and are more dangerous than those which are admitted openly." The reason is because they are more easily perpetrated, are less cared for, and especially in the article of death expose the soul to the danger of damnation (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 6, n. 4).

Internal sins are reduced to a threefold class: 1. to desire and purpose, which regard future time; 2. to joy or complacency, which look to past time; 3. to delectation, which refers itself to present time.

346. DEFINITION. Desire, not insofar as it is a passion, but insofar as it is an affection of the soul, is defined: An act of the rational appetite tending toward an absent good. As it is taken here, that is, as sin, it is an act of the will by which someone deliberately desires to complete an evil work by deed.

DIVISION. Desire, with respect to execution, is said to be: 1. inefficacious (or conditioned), which someone consents to execute if he could; which therefore stands without purpose and is called velleity, for example, if he says: if I could steal the treasure of the church, I would steal it; 2. efficacious (or absolute), if he consents to execute it with foresight, or at least hope, of completing the work, and thus a purpose is elicited, for example, if someone devises means for killing an enemy (V, 15; H. Ap., III, 47). Purpose is the act by which the will determinately wills and resolves to complete the work.

347. PRINCIPLES. I. Any desire, even inefficacious, or purpose, concerning an evil thing or action, is sin. This is clear both from the precept, "Thou shalt not covet," and from reason, because to seek evil is certainly repugnant to rational nature and to the divine ordination (recall the things said n. 316).

348. II. A depraved desire or purpose includes the same malice and species which are in the desired work. This is clear from Matt. (5:28): He who shall have looked upon a woman to covet her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. The reason is because the internal act of desire has its goodness and malice from the external act as from its object, indeed simply, that is, as it exists concretely (V, 12; H. Ap., III, 48). Cf. n. 312.

Hence: 1. It must be well examined whether he who admitted a depraved desire apprehended all the malices which are in the object, or only adverted to this or that one.

2. A penitent who elicited a desire, even inefficacious, of stealing ought to explain whether it concerned a grave thing. Likewise, he who basely desired a woman ought to say whether she is a blood-relative, or an affine, etc.; because such circumstances (unless they are invincibly unknown by the sinner) add new malice to the sin. Indeed, it is EXPEDIENT in hearing confession to understand whether the desire was efficacious or not, and a true purpose of perpetrating external sin, so that occasions to be fled and remedies to be applied may be better known.

349. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he sins gravely who wishes for some gravely evil object under the condition: IF IT WERE LAWFUL?

Resp. Regularly negatively, since the condition appended takes away in fact the malice of the work, because then the desire is borne toward an object stripped of malice.

I say regularly, because this is certain:

1. In those things which are forbidden by positive right alone; for example, if someone says: I would eat meat on Friday if the Church had not forbidden it; or: I would wish that today the eating of meat were not prohibited, so that I could feed on it. 2. In those things forbidden by natural right, which in some case and state are lawful: for example, I would kill an enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest.

This is also sufficiently probable if the matter concerns those things in which malice cannot be separated from the object, because then also malice is taken away, while the will, by wishing under a condition which it knows cannot be verified, does not truly wish, but rather shows a natural propensity. For the rest, desires of this sort commonly are dangerous, or at least idle.

But to desire that things intrinsically evil be lawful is a grave sin, for it is to wish for the inversion of the order of nature. Likewise, it is a grave sin if the condition appended does not regard the malice of the object, but the punishment or something else; for example, I would fornicate if there were no hell; I would kill an enemy if I were not a priest (V, 13; H. Ap., III, 50).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is lawful to wish temporal evil to a neighbor FOR A GOOD END?

Resp. 1. It is lawful, if the order of charity is preserved, namely so that temporal evil is wished for a greater good. Thus St. Alphonsus (V, 21) with St. Thomas and others commonly.

Hence it is lawful to desire temporal evil for a neighbor: a) on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; b) on account of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; c) on account of the good even of a third innocent person, provided that it is of greater moment. Thus, for example, it is lawful to wish for the death of a heresiarch, or of a disturber of public peace, on account of the common good and the good of many, according to that saying (Gal. 5:12): Would that they be cut off who trouble you. Likewise, it is lawful to be saddened by the fact that dignities are conferred upon the unworthy; or by the health of him who takes from it an occasion of sinning. Likewise, it is lawful to wish poverty, disease, or some other adversity to a wicked man, so that he may come to his senses. Nevertheless desires of this kind sometimes are not free from danger. Cf. II, 30; H. Ap., III, 63.

Resp. 2. It is not lawful in other cases, where, namely, the good intended does not surpass or at least equal the evil which is wished to the neighbor.

Wherefore it is illicit for a wife to desire the death of her husband because she is treated badly by him; and for a mother to desire the death of a daughter who, on account of deformity or poverty, lacks hope of marrying honorably. That these and similar things are not lawful is clear also from the condemnation of the 13th and 14th propositions made by Innocent XI, of which the former sounds thus: "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened about the life of someone, and rejoice about his natural death, ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage"; but the latter: "It is lawful with an absolute desire to desire the death of one's father, not indeed as the evil of the father, but as the good of the one desiring, because, namely, a rich inheritance is going to come to him" (V, 22).¹

350. DEFINITION. Complacency is an act or affection of the will delighting itself in some thing. Joy, in general, is the complacency of the appetite in a good already obtained, or apprehended as such. As it is taken here, it is the deliberate complacency of the will concerning an evil work carried out either by oneself or by others (V, 15).

To this also can be recalled: 1. boasting about a sin committed; 2. sorrow or displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, or impossible; 3. sadness concerning a good carried out.

351. PRINCIPLES. I. Joy concerning an evil perpetrated is sin. For such joy includes approval of evil. The same must be said concerning displeasure on account of an evil not perpetrated, for example, on account of a theft omitted.

But sadness concerning a good carried out is not always sin, if, namely, a cause is present which renders the regret honorable, for example, after some vow not sufficiently considered when emitted. But if no cause rendering the regret honorable is present, he would sin venially who was saddened concerning a good act to which he was not bound; for this sadness would be against reason, since the proper object of sadness is an evil thing. But he would sin mortally if he were saddened concerning a good work to which he was bound from a grave obligation (Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2).

352. II. Joy concerning an evil carried out comprehends the whole malice of the work, and all its species. The reason is because joy or complacency in a work already perpetrated necessarily, just as desire also, embraces the sinful act as it exists in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the morality of these, not otherwise than a depraved desire.

Hence: 1. He who takes complacency for himself in the remembrance of past sins, and approves them, ought to explain in confession both the object of this complacency and its species-changing circumstances, if any are present. 2. Likewise, "he who boasts about a grave sin truly perpetrated by himself ought to explain in confession also the species of the sin; because then complacency concerning the sin done is commonly added to the boasting, and this takes the same species of sin. But otherwise if the boasting is about a fictitious sin" (V, 26; H. Ap., III, 48).

353. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning an EVIL WORK ON ACCOUNT OF A GOOD EFFECT which followed from it?

Resp. 1. If the work is formally evil, namely perpetrated with sin, it is certain among all that it is not lawful to be delighted concerning it.

2. But if it is only materially evil, because it happened without sin, for example, homicide committed in drunkenness, there are not lacking authors who admit that the will can be delighted concerning it, as concerning the cause of a good effect.

But St. Alphonsus (V, 20; H. Ap., III, 52), with many others, says that the following must be held as truer: that such delectation is always illicit; because although the action was not formally sinful, nevertheless it was objectively evil. If someone therefore is delighted not concerning the effect alone, but concerning the evil thing itself, as concerning the cause of a good effect, the direct object of his delectation is an objectively evil thing; and therefore he sins.

Therefore you have among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI the 15th, which sounds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the enormous riches thereafter obtained from inheritance."² Hence they sin at least lightly (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 358), who are delighted concerning the omission of the Hours, or the eating of meat, or the breaking of a fast, even if these occurred from inadvertence or from ignorance (H. Ap., III, 54; cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 2).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning THE GOOD EFFECT of an evil work?

Resp. It is lawful, speaking per se; because then the will is not borne into an evil object. We say speaking per se, that is, setting aside the danger of rejoicing concerning the evil work itself; for we are bound to avoid such danger (cf. n. 374).

Hence: 1. It is lawful to be delighted concerning relief following from pollution, whether accidental or voluntary, provided there is absent the danger of delighting oneself concerning the pollution itself, which, always and objectively evil, ought to be displeasing, even if inculpably in sleep, through touches or a base dream, it was had. 2. A son does not sin who rejoices concerning the obtaining of an inheritance on account of homicide; nor a woman who is delighted concerning gain acquired for herself from dishonest trade; provided that in these or similar cases the cause itself is always held in hatred (V, 20).

QUAER. 3. Whether it is lawful to rejoice or be delighted CONCERNING THE NOT EVIL MODE by which an evil action was carried out?

Resp. It is lawful, per se, because, since the mode of action was not evil in itself, the delectation is not concerning an evil object. Thus, without sin, stories, comedies, wars, homicides, frauds, thefts, quarrels, etc., often delight us (V, 18).

It was said per se, because by reason of danger it can be illicit. Thus those easily come into danger of delighting themselves concerning the evil thing who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base deeds, in the narration of which only the ingenious manner by which they were carried out seems to please. For if the discourse were concerning honest actions, even carried out in an ingenious manner, persons of this kind, for the most part, would perceive much less delight (Praxis, n. 40).

Note. The things which above (n. 349) were said concerning a licit object of desire can also be said concerning joy and complacency. For concerning the things which it is lawful to desire, concerning these it is likewise lawful to rejoice.

354. DEFINITION. Delectation, taken generally, is the rest of the appetite in a good possessed, that is, apprehended or had; and it can be in both the sensitive appetite and the intellective.

Morose delectation (or depraved thought properly so called) contains a double element: the thought by which an act of sin is rendered present, and the complacency of the will, by which it is delighted concerning that act as if it then executed it, yet without the intention of executing it (V, 15).

It is called morose not indeed from a delay of time, since even in one point of time every internal sin can be completed, but on account of the deliberate delay which the will makes in it.

The object of this delectation and of these thoughts is more often something illicit in itself, for example, homicide, fornication, and similar things; it can also be an object prohibited by positive law, for example, the eating of meat on a fast day, provided the will is borne toward it under the aspect of prohibition. For the law, with respect to these things, prohibits only the external action.

It is called depraved thought properly so called, that is, sinful, because the will, when it ought to have resisted it, rests in it. Therefore depraved thought is not to be confused with thought concerning a depraved thing, which thought can be lawful. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 1025. See n. 357.

355. PRINCIPLES. I. Morose delectation is sin. For it is repugnant to right reason and to the divine law that someone have as pleasing what displeases God. Hence that saying (Hos. 9:10): They became abominable, like those things which they loved; and (Prov. 15:26): Evil thoughts are an abomination of the Lord.

356. II. Morose delectation takes its theological and moral species from the object which someone renders present to himself through the imagination of fantasy. The reason is because whoever is delighted concerning an act of sin takes that act as object, approves it, and adheres to it by his affection insofar as it is rendered present. Therefore, since morality is specified from the object, according to the grade and species of malice of the object, its delectation also will be evil with the same [malice]. Thus St. Thomas (1.2, q. 74, n. 8) and St. Alphonsus (V, n. 12). See the things said n. 347, 348.

357. Corollaries. 1. Speculatively speaking, it is very probable that morose delectation does not necessarily assume the specific malice of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as posited, or to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now, the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object, besides that which moves delectation. Thus, for example, if someone is delighted concerning copula with a married woman, not as married but only as beautiful, he does not commit adultery, since the circumstance of adultery does not move the delectation.

Note. But considering the matter practically, the opposite opinion greatly pleases St. Alphonsus, namely in the case where the delectation concerns some libidinous act with a determinate person. For then, on account of the corruption of human nature, there is a proximate danger of coveting or desiring, at least inefficaciously, the determinate object itself, especially if it is inordinately loved; and therefore these circumstances are to be explained in confession. But it would be otherwise if, from the nature of the thing, or from past experience, or from the disposition of the person, such a danger is judged not to be proximate (V, 15; H. Ap., III, 48). Cf. n. 1820.

2. It is lawful per se to be delighted concerning the thought or knowledge of an evil thing. We say: per se, that is, excluding depraved affection and danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself. For knowledge of evil is not per se evil, and therefore can be the object of the will, unless it is prohibited from elsewhere, or illicit.

Therefore the delectation which is had, not concerning the evil work, but concerning speculative or scientific thought of an evil object, can be: either 1. good, if a just cause of thinking is present, for example, on account of study, consultation, etc., with abomination of the object; or 2. venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc., with only remote danger; or 3. gravely evil, if, when the matter concerns a gravely evil work, there is present a proximate danger of consenting in the delectation (V, 17; H. Ap., III, 49).

Now, the danger of delighting oneself concerning the evil thing itself must practically be measured: a) from the mode of thinking; b) from the quality of the person thinking; c) from the matter thought about; d) from the cause on account of which it is thought about. Thus, for example, if someone reads a book less honorable, there must be considered: the mode by which he reads, for example, greedily; the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; the book which is read, perhaps obscene by profession; the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself be entered upon (Kon., n. 233).

3. It is not lawful for the betrothed and widowed, according to the truer opinion, to have delectation concerning the future or past work of marriage, even with the danger of sensitive delectation excluded. "The reason is because delectation renders the object present to itself; and therefore whenever the present object here and now is evil, since here and now there is absent the condition rendering marriage honorable, every actual delectation concerning it is also evil" (V, 24; H. Ap., III, 51).

"Another thing must be said concerning desire, by which the betrothed man wills future copula; for this is lawful, because, when the will is borne toward a future object, it can desire it under the condition by which the object will be lawful. But because in such desire there is also danger of delectation, therefore the betrothed are very much to be exhorted that they carefully turn away from themselves base thoughts of this kind." Concerning the Married, cf. n. 2111, 2.

358. Practical rules. The confessor, so that he may judge rightly concerning sinful thoughts, should duly attend to the following:

1. Lest he uselessly waste time through questions troublesome to himself and to the penitent, or even dangerous, let him not inquire concerning the species or number of thoughts unless it has first been clear to him concerning consent. Wherefore let him first ask the penitent whether he adverted that thoughts of this kind were sins. But if the penitent responds that he detested them as soon as he knew that they were base, he must be judged altogether immune from sin. If he responds that for some time he indeed had a confused knowledge concerning their malice, but did not attend to it perfectly, he is easily to be excused from grave sin, though not from venial.

2. But if the penitent is not able to free himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent, or perfect advertence, was lacking to him, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins, and fears them little, in doubt must be presumed to have consented (Kon., n. 235). Recall the things said n. 337, q. 3.

228. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1° Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through the imagination as present, without desire.

2° Joy, or deliberate complacency in a past evil thing, or in an evil work performed either by oneself or by another.

3° Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if there is an intention or absolute purpose of executing it; otherwise it is called inefficacious.

But what the malice of these is, and what species, hold in these few things:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and assumes the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1° it is truly a sin. This is established from the precept: Thou shalt not covet, which must be understood generally and indefinitely of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is repugnant to right reason: for it is shameful and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, what it is not licit to execute.

2° It assumes the species of its object. For any desire whatever regards the external act as to be mandated to execution, either absolutely, if the desire is efficacious, or at least hypothetically, if it is inefficacious; necessarily therefore it is borne into that act according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or follow from it of their own accord. This is established also from the words of Christ:² He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood of adultery. Therefore ...

3° It also assumes the species of the circumstances of the object. This is clear from the reason just brought under 2°. Hence in confession, for example, of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, the bond of matrimony, or a vow of chastity, which affect the desired person, must be declared.

229. • II. Joy likewise is a sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is conversant, and similarly assumes the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself.

The reason is because joy, as we said above, is the approval of past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the whole malice of these. - Hence he who takes complacency in the recollection of past sins and approves them must in confession explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting concerning a sin committed, sorrow over evil not performed, and also sadness over good accomplished are to be referred back to joy.

230. • III. Morose delectation 1° is certainly a sin; 2° it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is because it is repugnant to rational nature and to divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant from right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object indicates affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is evil affection, as is clear. Therefore ... Hence Osee:² They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Proverbs:³ Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord.

The reason for the second is because whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in the very degree and species in which the object is evil, in the same entirely will the delectation concerning it be evil. Therefore ... St. Thomas¹ and St. Alphonsus.²

Does it also assume the malice of the circumstances of the object? Negatively, very probably, theoretically speaking. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object besides that which moves delectation. In practice, however, the opposite opinion is very pleasing to St. Alphonsus,³ namely because of the proximate danger of depraved desire. Yet if you foresee that the penitent will be induced with difficulty to open the circumstances of the object thought upon, because of the speculative probability of the former opinion you will prudently abstain from troublesome questions. Thus with Billuart, Scavini, T. I, n. 923.

231. Questions. - Quaer. 1° ON DESIRE. Is it licit to desire evil under a condition, if it would be licit?

Resp. Distinguish. Affirmatively of itself if the appended condition removes the whole malice of the thing; the reason is because such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which through the condition the malice is wholly excluded. But negatively in the other hypothesis; the reason is because such an affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove the malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however appended, cannot remove the malice. For things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and therefore a condition would be appended uselessly, since to choose such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed.⁴

Nevertheless he would probably have to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but would only disclose what he would will in another condition of things. - St. Alphonsus⁵ with others. Besides, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this sort are, even if the appended condition removed the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife; which desires Cajetan rightly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because, although such a desire is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in venereal matters will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditional desires concerning things prohibited by positive law alone must also be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes they can labor under some inordinate affection.

Hence the confessor must prohibit betrothed persons from lingering in the desire of intercourse to be had in future matrimony; for "great" is "the danger of present delectation, which is evil when the condition which gives honorable character to that object is absent." Yet often betrothed persons and widowers are in good faith, not thinking it to be mortal to be delighted concerning a licit object, as intercourse in matrimony is; and therefore the confessor will prudently be silent about mortal sin, unless he should see pollution to follow from that complacency.

232. • Quaer. 2° ON JOY. Is it licit to rejoice 1) concerning the evil act itself because of the good effect following from it; 2) concerning the good effect of an evil act?

Resp. to the 1st: Negatively, and this (provided the reason for the prohibition of the act is not to be sought precisely from advertence alone, as for example in a lie) even though it was materially evil only. The reason is because then the act was evil from the object. This is also clear from proposition 15 among those condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV), in which the discussion is evidently of an act materially evil only, of parricide committed in drunkenness.

Hence they sin who are delighted concerning the eating of meat, or the breaking of fast, from ignorance or oblivion, even involuntary, or concerning nocturnal pollution not purely natural, that is, proceeding also from some cause other than from nature discharging itself; for example, from base phantasms presented to the imagination of the sleeper, or from touches wholly involuntary.²

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a probable danger of formal sin; for in this case you do not rejoice concerning evil. Yet I said: provided it is absent, etc. The reason is because, as was said at n. 87, I, without a sufficient cause it is licit for no one to expose himself to such danger. Therefore it will be licit, speaking of itself, or setting aside that danger, to rejoice concerning the discharge caused by pollution, even voluntary, or concerning the obtaining of an inheritance from homicide.¹ - Each response is valid also concerning desire and delectation.

233. • Quaer. 3° ON DELECTATION. Is it licit to be delighted concerning 1) the thought of an evil thing; 2) the mode?

Resp. to the 1st: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a proximate danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself, as St. Thomas² explains in the following words: "Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted in two ways: in one way concerning the thought itself, in another way concerning the fornication itself thought of; ... but the thought itself according to itself is not a mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for instance when someone thinks uselessly about it; but sometimes it is wholly without sin, for instance when someone usefully thinks about it, as when he wills to preach or dispute about it," etc. - But the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself in practice must be measured from the mode of thinking, - from the quality of the person thinking, - from the matter thought upon, - from the cause on account of which it is thought upon. Thus, if someone reads a less honorable book, these things must be considered: the mode in which he reads, for example eagerly; - the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; - the book which is read, for example obscene by design; - the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that he expose himself to the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself.

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided 1) the mode is not evil of itself, and 2) the danger of which we have just spoken is absent. The matter is clear of itself. Thus he does not sin who laughs at the mode in which a drunk man proceeds with his foot wavering because of wine; because the mode of itself is not evil. On the contrary, he sins who is delighted concerning the frauds and lies which he used to seduce a girl, because those frauds and lies are evil. - But because of the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing, those can easily sin who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base things which do not seem to be narrated except to show the ingenious mode in which they were done; for if the conversation concerned honest actions, even if done more ingeniously, they would for the most part perceive much less delectation.

234. • Quaer. 4° Whether and when does he sin who does not resist the motions of concupiscence?

Resp. By concupiscence in this place we do not understand a passion of the sensitive appetite, indifferent to good or evil, insofar as it is considered as diminishing or even altogether removing the voluntary (n. 12-14), but the tinder of depraved desires, or propensity to evil, residing not only in the inferior appetite but also in the superior. Concerning the motions of this concupiscence hold these things:

Principles. - I. However much the soul may be struck by the stimuli of the depraved tinder, there will never be any stain of sin, unless the will in some way either consents to them, or does not impede them when it can and ought to impede them. Common and certain. - See St. Thomas.¹

II. Motions of the will which are first-first, namely those which precede any deliberation of reason whatever and are elicited before attention is given to the object's agreement with the rule of morals, are wholly without fault. The reason is because insofar as they precede deliberation of reason and advertence to moral malice, they are neither voluntary nor free, and consequently are free from formal sin. Thus all Theologians.

III. Motions of the will which are second-first, namely those which follow upon some use of reason, yet are elicited with only slight, obscure, and imperfect advertence to the rule of morals, in any matter, even grave, are only venial sin. The reason is because acts of this sort are imperfectly free and only semi-deliberate; and so on account of the imperfection of the act they are excused from grave fault. Thus likewise the common opinion of Theologians.

Resolves. - 1° Motions, however depraved, so long as they displease the will, even after advertence to the rule of morals, are free from all fault.²

2° One who bears himself negatively, that is, neither consenting nor resisting, when the danger of consent is absent, sins lightly; otherwise, in grave matter and when a just cause of bearing himself negatively is lacking, gravely. Hence:

a. In vehement motions, which greatly allure the consent of the will to grave sin, because, for example, venereal delectation is added, it is illicit to bear oneself negatively or indifferently, but there is required a positive act of resistance or at least of displeasure, and this under grave obligation; since with the same obligation by which one is held to avoid sin itself, one is also held to avoid the danger of it. Direct resistance is nevertheless not necessary; but indirect resistance suffices, and indeed is more advisable, namely by turning the mind to other things; nor is material resistance necessary, for example by pressing excited parts over the clothing, although that can be useful. But prayer will be best. - Resistance that is positive indeed, but tepid, excuses from mortal sin, but not from venial.

b. In carnal motions with which there is not joined a proximate danger of consent, to bear oneself negatively is not free from venial sin, since we are held to take care lest the appetite disturb reason even lightly, or entice to sin, even only remotely. - But light motions are better resisted by contempt.

c. There is no sin in bearing oneself negatively, if a just cause is present, as if you have experienced that the motions are increased by positive resistance or anxious solicitude or reflex thought; or the motions arise from an action necessary or useful, for example from hearing confessions, from reading base matters useful to be known, from a touch necessary for healing, and similar things.¹

235. • Quaer. 5° What is to be done with a penitent accusing himself of some depraved thought?

Resp. Lest you waste time uselessly and through questions annoying to you and the penitent, or even dangerous, do not inquire about the species or number unless first it is sufficiently certain to you concerning consent. But that you may recognize this, he must be asked whether he noticed that it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged entirely immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused knowledge of the malice and adhered to it, but without fully attending to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins or abhors them little is, in doubt, presumed to have consented; for in doubt a prudent presumption is sought from things commonly occurring. - But commonly it happens that a pious man does not consent without knowing that he is really consenting to sin; while a depraved man does not resist sin without a struggle, which indeed removes doubt concerning consent or dissent.

He who doubts whether he did something while awake or sleeping, in possession of himself or not, is judged not to have sufficiently adverted nor consented; for he who is awake sufficiently perceives himself to be awake.

If there is a defect of age, that is, before the completed seventh year, at least perfect advertence and full consent are not presumed, unless malice certainly supplies for age (yet see n. 548, q. 1° and n. 1344, 7°). Finally, the mere continuation of a depraved thought is not an indication of consent; since both temptation and resistance can be long-lasting.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 7, 9.

456. Morose delight, desire, and joy differ: the first regards present time because it is concerned with an object insofar as it is here and now present to us by cognition; desire regards the future because it is an act of the will wishing for an evil thing; finally joy regards the past and is complacency or approval of an evil work perpetrated by the one rejoicing or by others. In other words, morose delight is consent in the thought present delight alone and not in the act itself; desire is also consent in the future act and in the act to be placed; joy in the past act and in the act placed.

1. If the act were present so that the sin were committed here and now, delight concerning it as present would not be morally distinct from the sin.

2. "It is wrong to confuse consent in a past act with consent in the delight of a past act thought of as present, which is morose delight." Waffelaert, De Virtutibus Cardinalibus, p. 323.

By reason of the object, desire is twofold: efficacious or absolute, which is called proposal, when someone proposes to perform the work; inefficacious or conditioned, when he wills that the work be performed by himself or by another under a certain given condition, for example, if nothing stood in the way, if he could, if it were licit, etc. This is not conditioned on the part of the will but on the part of the object: for it is not a merely interpretative will which someone does not have but would have if he knew something (this does not exist), but an actual will which he has here and now and by which he now establishes and intends that he would will the work to be performed if the condition were given.

457. Principle I. Absolute desire and joy have the same species and gravity of malice, mortal or venial, which the work has about which they are concerned, to be perpetrated or perpetrated, with all known circumstances (Matt. V, 28): for the interior act of the will has malice from the exterior act as from the object; for desire tends into the work really to be placed and consequently not as represented in the intellect as delectable but as it is on the part of the thing, and joy is concerning a past work as it was, and each tends into all the circumstances which are in the work and are not separable from it in the concrete. Whence, by difference from morose delight, desire contracts the malice of all circumstances, even those which are not held as delectable nor are the motive of the will.

Thus, for example, he who desires to sin with a married woman, not because she is married but because she is beautiful, is guilty of adultery; and he who wills to steal a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, is guilty of sacrilege. "In practice, however, it not rarely happens that desires are not referred to an object altogether determined, but rather to something generic. For example, someone desires to take revenge on his enemy, without determining the mode by which he wills that revenge; or someone desires to sin carnally with a person of the other sex, without being conscious to himself of the special act to be committed. In these cases it suffices to confess: I willed to take revenge on my enemy, or I willed to sin with a person of the other sex" (Prummer, Theologia Moralis I, n. 403).

458. Principle II. Conditioned desire, under a condition which takes away all malice from the object, per se is not sin, yet often it is idle and sometimes dangerous. Hence:

a) in all things prohibited only by positive right, desire under the condition "if it were not prohibited" is licit;

b) in things prohibited by natural right, naturally or ordinarily illicit or illicit outside a state, but licit in some case or state, desire is licit (although dangerous) under the condition of this state or case, for example: I would kill Peter if God commanded it; I would take a wife if I were not a religious; I would hang a thief if I were a judge; I would have intercourse with her if she were my wife;

c) things prohibited by the right of nature as essentially evil, which are never licit, are never licitly desired, because malice cannot be separated from them, for example: if it were not sin, I would will to blaspheme, to commit sodomy, to perjure myself, to avenge myself, etc.; for an impossible condition cannot take away malice.

Locutions of this kind, however, rather often only signify a natural propensity into such an object, without affection toward it, so that the sense is: I am inclined to blaspheme but I do not will it on account of the law of God; and then they are not sin. On the contrary, if it were a true desire or consent in the work, or if the sense were: I would will blasphemy not to be sin, which would still be worse than the simple desire of blasphemy.

459. Principle III. Conditioned desire, if the condition partially takes away the malice of the object, is sin, but less than absolute desire: namely, it puts on the malice which remains in the object, but does not contract that which was taken away. Thus if someone were to say: if I were not a priest I would fornicate, he would contract the malice of fornication, not of sacrilege, because the condition takes away the malice of this.

460. Principle IV. Conditioned desire, if the condition, as not pertaining to morality, in no way takes away the malice of the object, puts on its malice with all the circumstances. - The reason is that even conditioned desire consents and tends into the external work according to itself and as it is on the part of the thing. Thus if someone were to say: I would fornicate if there were no hell; if I could secretly, I would take revenge.

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 6-8.

1020. Internal luxury is that which consists in mere affection toward venereal pleasure or use. It is, namely, the consent of reason and will to inordinate venereal pleasure alone, represented in the mind; and therefore it is called morose delectation. But if besides this there is consent to a shameful work, it will be either desire of a future work to be executed, or joy concerning a past work perpetrated.

Morose delectation is the same as voluntary delectation. For it is not called morose from delay of time, since in one instant the sin of delectation can be completed by the consent of the will; but it is called morose from delay of reason, insofar as reason, noticing it, either consents to it, or voluntarily accepts it, or does not repel it as it can and ought, and thus lingers about it in that sense in which one who is not fulfilling his office is said to be in delay. But there can be delectation either concerning the very apprehension or cognition of a shameful object, or concerning the shameful thing itself apprehended or known. Now the question is whether simple voluntary delectation, both concerning the apprehension or cognition of a venereal thing, and concerning the venereal thing apprehended or thought, without the will of executing the work, is sin, and indeed mortal sin; for no one can doubt that the will of the luxurious work itself is mortally evil.

1021. Principle I. Voluntary delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing is not mortally evil; indeed of itself it is no sin. - The reason is that delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing, for example, fornication, follows the inclination of affection into the thought itself. But the thought or cognition itself, for example, of fornication, is not of itself mortally evil, indeed not even a sin, since it is in God. In fact, however, it will sometimes be venial, for example, when someone thinks altogether uselessly about fornication; but sometimes without sin, for example, when he thinks about it usefully, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it.

1022. Principle II. Morose delectation, or direct and fully deliberate consent to the very pleasure of a depraved venereal thing through the apprehension of it as present, is always a mortal sin. - For he who takes pleasure in a mortally evil thing, for example, fornication, loves it and is voluntarily affected toward it; for no one takes pleasure except in that which seems good to him and conformable to his appetite. But that someone deliberately loves and has as conformable to his affection that which in itself is mortal sin, such as venereal action and pleasure sought outside marriage, is already mortal sin. Therefore he who deliberately takes pleasure in a venereal thing sought outside marriage commits mortal sin.

It is said:

1. Direct consent to the very delectation, because consent in the cause or indirect consent can be only a venial sin and sometimes none, as was said above concerning pollution, n. 1018;

2. Fully deliberate, for which full advertence is required; for if this is half-full, or consent imperfect, it will be venial sin; if there is no advertence, it will not be sin, even if the delectation is long-lasting;

3. Of a venereal thing, and not of the mode or effect only. For to take pleasure in the subtle, clever, new mode of perpetrating luxury is not evil, unless the mode itself is in itself venially or mortally evil, as is a mere change of position in conjugal copulation, or a mode of sinning against nature. And similarly, to take pleasure only in the good effect following from luxury, or in the fact that it had a good effect, is not evil, provided it is not also done concerning the luxurious work itself, even though because of the good effect.

1023. Principle III. Morose delectation has the specific malice of the object thought, insofar as it is its object. - For a human act has morality from its object as such; hence:

1. Morose delectation joined to the will or desire of completing the work, or to joy concerning a work perpetrated, contracts the whole malice which the object has in itself with all its circumstances; as if someone takes pleasure in copulation with a married blood relative, and wills or desires it, or approves it as had, he is guilty not only of fornication, but of incest and adultery. The reason is that the will of the work or desire is borne toward the work as it is to be exercised on the part of reality, and joy toward the work as it was exercised; but the work is exercised with all its circumstances.

2. Morose delectation without the will of doing the work contracts as many malices of circumstances as are apprehended as delightful and concerning which pleasure is taken. The reason is that human acts, such as voluntary delectation itself, have species from their formal object; hence he who takes pleasure in a woman precisely as blood relative or married contracts the malice of incest or adultery.

3. Morose delectation which prescinds from the circumstances of the work and does not take pleasure in them, although they are known to be present, probably does not contract their malice, provided the will to execute the work is absent; as if someone merely takes pleasure in copulation with a woman whom he knows to be married and a blood relative, yet not insofar as she is married and a blood relative, but precisely insofar as she is a woman fitting for him. The reason is that delectation tends toward the object, not as it is on the part of reality with all circumstances, but as it is represented in the mind as delightful, and therefore it does not tend toward circumstances which are not represented as delightful and which are not the motive of delectation, but from which it prescinds in taking pleasure.

A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1st. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through imagination as present, without desire.

2nd. Joy, or deliberate approval of an evil work performed either by oneself or by another, by which the will holds the perpetrated evil as pleasing and acceptable.

3rd. Desire, or an act of the will seeking an evil thing as to be obtained, and therefore to be carried out by work. It is called efficacious if there is present an absolute purpose of carrying it out; inefficacious if there is present only conditioned consent, for example, if someone says: I would steal if I could; or I would fornicate with this woman unless I feared infamy, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Therefore morose delectation is concerned with the object, not as it is in itself, but as here and now it is presented to the imagination; joy, on the contrary, and desire are concerned with the object as it once was or will be in itself.

I Say 1st. Desire of an evil thing, even inefficacious, is truly sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances. The reason for the first is that it is base and dishonorable to desire absolutely or conditionally what it is not lawful to carry out. The reason for the second is that every desire, even inefficacious, tends toward its object, and therefore is a willing of the special malice of that object, and so contracts it. The reason for the third is the same; for desire, since it tends toward the object as to be carried out by work, reaches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. - Hence in confession, for example, of a desire of fornicating, there must be declared the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the desired person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 12.

I say 2nd. Joy likewise is sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action with which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of past evil, which necessarily embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, clothed namely with its circumstances. Hence one who, in the recollection of past sins, takes complacency in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned again in act.

To joy are to be reduced boasting concerning a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed.

I say 3rd. Morose delectation is certainly sin, and certainly also takes on the gravity and species of the objects exhibited to the mind. The reason for the first is that it is repugnant to rational nature and divine law for the will to hold as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Besides, deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear of itself. Therefore ... Hence in Osee ix, 10, it is said: "They became abominable like those things which they loved." But the reason for the second is that whoever takes delight in an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection; and therefore the malice of that delectation will plainly be evil with the same gravity and species by which the object is evil. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 74, art. 8. - St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Question 1. Does morose delectation take on also the specific malice of the circumstances of the object, as desire and joy do?

Response. Negatively, probably, according to many theologians; and the reason is that simple delectation does not tend toward the object as it really exists, but rests in it as it is represented by phantasy. Moreover this, neither from the nature of the thing nor in fact, is accustomed to represent all circumstances, but only that one which moves the delectation more. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 148.

Question 2. Is it lawful to desire an evil under the condition, if it were licit?

Response. Affirmatively, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the thing, because such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object from which by the condition malice is altogether excluded. But the response would be negative in another hypothesis, because such an affection tends toward an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object even as represented, as would be blasphemy, perjury, etc. Nevertheless he would probably be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly did not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but only showed his propensity toward that object. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27; and Hom. Ap., n. 50.

For the rest, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition added would remove the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural right, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Bertha if I did not have a wife. Cajetan deservedly calls these desires foolish and diabolical temptations. Indeed also other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive right are to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection. - Cf. Cajet., under the title Sins of Thought.

Question 3. Is it lawful to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left aside from forgetfulness?

Response. Although it is never lawful to rejoice or take delight either concerning an evil omission or concerning an evil work, even when inculpably admitted, according as they were evil in themselves; yet it is lawful, of itself, that is, with the danger of consent to delectation concerning the evil cause excluded, to rejoice or take delight concerning the good and honorable effect which arose from them.

But whether it is also lawful to rejoice or take delight concerning the evil cause itself, not according as it is evil, but according as it was the cause of a good effect, many affirm with Lessius, Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, and others; but St. Alphonsus, with several others, denies it, alleging proposition 15, condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance." - But it must be said that it is not clear whether by this proposition absolutely every joy concerning an inculpable evil work was condemned; or rather only the joy was reprobated by which the son, against the right order of charity, places the good of a much inferior order, namely the riches obtained from it, before the death of his parent. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Lessius, de just. et jure, lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 105. - Suarez, disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 15. - Lugo, de poenit., disp. 16, n. 389. - Viva, in the cited proposition, n. 12. - Baller., note (a), p. 152; and note (c), p. 186.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is not lawful to be delighted concerning nocturnal pollution according to itself and on account of its pleasure, but it is certainly lawful to be delighted concerning it according as it is an exoneration or alleviation of nature. For the defect of free consent through sleep, although it cannot make licit a delectation inherent in an evil work which thereafter is freely taken, nevertheless can very well excuse the exterior work from fault. And this is the true doctrine of St. Thomas, who also refers a base dream to the natural cause of pollution, to which can be reduced also the touches or motions following that same dream. "For when," he says, "seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of the humor has been made, ... the one sleeping dreams those things which pertain to the expulsion of such abundant or resolved humor; just as also happens when nature is burdened from some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination." - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 154, art. 5; and in 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Baller., note (b), p. 149.

2nd. The confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice concerning an advantage coming to them from their own sin or another's, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor. The same is to be feared concerning one who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but one which arises from his misfortune, for example, from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For sometimes joy concerning the evil of the neighbor can creep in rather than concerning the good effect arising from it, especially if he previously bore enmity against him; therefore the confessor, if the matter seems to demand it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent.

• Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

3rd. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, and another to be delighted concerning the manner, for example, an ingenious one, by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed can of itself be free from fault), nevertheless the confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who gladly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except for manifesting the ingenious manner by which they were done, especially when a habit of consenting to evil delectation confirms this suspicion.

4th. It is not mortal to be sad concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is only troublesome, or in the divided sense of the law, for example, concerning the trouble of fasting.

5th. If the penitent accuses himself of some evil thought, he is to be asked whether he knew it to be sin; and if he responds that he detested it as soon as he knew it to be base, he is to be judged altogether immune from sin. - If he responds that for some time he had some confused cognition of malice and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial sin. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it is to be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a timorous conscience.

Caius, a most innocent young man of sixteen years who is being educated in a certain Catholic college, one day comes upon an expurgated passage in a pagan author whom he studies. Thereupon, led by curiosity, he seeks another copy of the same book, in which he finds the complete passage. He reads it and finds described a fornication committed by a certain pagan god with a woman. Troubled and attracted by this reading, he thinks about the matter within himself and begins to suspect how human beings derive their origin, something of which he had previously been altogether ignorant. The young man, moreover, being exceedingly ingenuous, asks his teacher so that he may have certainty about the matter. The teacher consents, astonished at such innocence and suspecting that others in the class of about the same age are perhaps in the same state, and publicly explains to all of them the physiology of human generation. It is asked:

1. What is a bad thought, and what is required in order that someone may sin mortally by it?

2. Is thought about a bad thing sinful, and is anything to be noted particularly about thought concerning the matter of lust?

3. What is to be said about the manner of acting of Caius and of his teacher?

1. What is a bad thought and what is requisite for a mortal sin of thought? A bad thought is either a desire to do something bad, or morose delectation in something evil as represented in the mind. All bad thoughts can be reduced to those two classes. Under bad desires are placed all internal sins which tend toward the doing of some evil. Under morose delectation come all internal sins which are consummated in the mind, and which do not tend to the accomplishment of some evil outside the mind. For a mortal sin of thought the object must be gravely sinful, and there must be clear advertence to the grave malice and full consent to it.

2. Is the thought of an evil object sinful, and is there anything to be specially noted concerning thinking about sins of impurity ?

The thought of an evil object is not necessarily sinful. If, for example, I think about a brutal murder which has been committed, I do not thereby commit sin. I should commit sin if I thought of it with pleasure and approbation, gloating over the hideous details, or rejoicing in the murder because the murdered man was an enemy of my own. Although it is not sinful to think of an evil object in itself, yet sometimes there is danger in such a thought, because it tends to excite a sinful appetite. Thoughts of revenge are of this class, and still more so thoughts of impurity. A thought about impurity may be either no sin at all, or it may be a venial sin, or it may be mortal. A thought about impurity is no sin at all if there is good reason for entertaining the thought, as when a priest studies moral theology, and there is not proximate danger of consenting to it or to any evil motions which arise from the thought. Venial sin will be committed when there is no good reason for thinking of the bad object, and the danger of consenting to evil is not proximate. If this danger is proximate, mortal sin will be committed when the object is grievously sinful.

3. The case. Caius committed venial sin in indulging his curiosity, but as far as the case allows us to judge he does not seem to have committed mortal sin. After his curiosity was aroused the master acted rightly in briefly and clearly explaining to him the physiology of generation, but he should have told him not to think or talk about the matter with others, and he should have told him where the danger of sin lay. The master acted very imprudently in giving a public lecture on the subject in class; the few cases in which it would have done good had better have been treated privately. In other cases in all probability it would have done harm by needlessly directing attention to what should not be thought about except at the proper time, and by occasioning comment and talk about the matter among the boys, to their serious danger.