Article III. On evil desire

402. Notion. Evil desire is complacency in some evil action to be done, or is the choice of doing something morally evil. Desire is divided into efficacious desire, which is a true and firm purpose of doing something evil, and into inefficacious desire, which is only a certain velleity without a firm purpose, and which is also called conditioned desire. For someone would wish the evil work if he could or if it were licit. Concerning the morality of desire, the following things are to be noted:

403. Morality. a) Efficacious, or absolute, desire of an evil action is a sin of the same species and malice as the external act toward which it is borne. Thus all. - The reason is that the whole malice of a human act is founded in the perverse will, and the external act adds no special morality, as is clear from what was said above in n. 133. Hence Christ also said: "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart."⁹⁴

From this it follows that desire takes its species from its object and from its circumstances changing the species. Likewise it follows that the sinner is bound to confess his evil absolute desires in altogether the same way as the external acts to which they refer. Hence if someone, for example, desires to steal a consecrated chalice, it does not suffice to confess: I wished to steal; but he must say: I wished to steal a consecrated thing. But the sin committed by that evil desire is not only mental theft, but also mental sacrilege. - In practice, however, it not rarely happens that desires do not refer to an entirely determinate object, but rather to something generic. For example, someone desires to take vengeance on his enemy, without determining the manner in which he wishes that vengeance; or someone desires to sin carnally with a person of the other sex, without being conscious to himself of a special act to be committed. In these cases it would suffice to confess: I wished to take vengeance on my enemy, or: I wished to sin with a person of the other sex.

⁹⁴ Matth. 5, 28.

404. b) Inefficacious, or conditioned, desire of some evil a) is always idle and thence dangerous; b) is not of itself a sin, if the condition attached removes the malice of the act; c) but is of itself a sin, light or grave according to the quality of the object, if in it there is found disorder, notwithstanding the condition attached. - The individual parts of this proposition are explained:

As to a), all agree. For to what purpose are those velleities? Through them phantasy is disturbed and time is wasted. Besides, consent to an evil thing can easily arise from them. For example, the inefficacious desire of a priest who would say: I would wish to marry a wife, if I were not a priest. Everyone sees how idle and dangerous a desire of this kind is. Other velleities concerning illicit objects are wont to be similar.

As to b), the matter is clear. For if the condition attached strips the desired object of its malice, desire or velleity of this kind is not of itself a sin. For example: I would eat meats, if it were not Friday; I would wish to remain in bed, if I were not bound to work, etc.

As to c), it is evident; for if someone wills a disorder, he sins, although he should attach any conditions whatever. Therefore the following velleities are sins: I would fornicate if there were no hell; I would wish to commit adultery if this were licit; I would wish to kill my enemy if I could. The reason is that all these things are against the natural law, and the condition attached cannot remove the disorder of the act. Nevertheless it must be noted that desires of this kind among the uneducated are often not sins, at least not grave sins, because they do not know their malice and by them wish only to express a natural propensity toward the object, yet without free consent of the will. Nevertheless these wishes are always to be avoided by any man, however much conditions may be attached, because in every case they are useless and dangerous.

405. Scholion. On desire of evil on account of a good end or effect. Moral evil or sin cannot licitly be desired, however good the end or effect may be. This is clear from what was said above. Sometimes, nevertheless, an evil of this kind can be permitted, as when it follows from our action otherwise good or indifferent, as was said in n. 57 sqq. concerning the indirectly evil voluntary. In order that physical evil can be licitly desired, first of all the order of charity must be preserved and excessive self-love must not be indulged. Innocent XI proscribed several propositions concerning this matter, for example prop. 13: "If you do this with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death, ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal gain"; and prop. 14: "It is licit by an absolute desire to desire the death of one's father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one desiring, because, namely, a rich inheritance is going to come to him."⁹⁵ - These propositions seem to have been proscribed for two reasons: 1. because in such joys and desires the proximate danger of sinning will scarcely be absent; 2. because otherwise the order of charity would be gravely wounded. For human life, and a fortiori the life of one's father, is far to be preferred to temporal gain or to a rich inheritance. But if the order of charity is preserved, of itself nothing prevents someone from desiring some physical evil from which a good effect is hoped. Thus it is licit to wish illness to an unruly youth, so that he may come back to his senses from his vices; it is licit for a father to wish the death of a son whom he foresees will be seduced if he lives longer. But whether it is licit for a wife to wish the death of a husband by whom, beyond hope of amendment, she is treated most harshly, or whether in that case the wife can wish her own death, is not so clear. Many⁹⁶ affirm, because "death is better than a bitter life"⁹⁷ and because in this case the order of charity is preserved. Nevertheless the negative opinion seems better and safer, both because from such a desire a greater spiritual good is almost always impeded, namely the exercise of most precious patience, and because it is truly not clear whether by such a desire the order of charity is not wounded. Is physical death really better than a bitter life? But the cited text can be explained otherwise.

⁹⁵ Denz. n. 1163 sq.

⁹⁶ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 22.

⁹⁷ Eccli. 30, 17.