Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Section I. On the Passions in General
I. Notion. Passion is usually defined: a more vehement motion of the sensitive appetite from the imagination of good or evil, with an unusual transmutation of the body. It is said:
Motion, that is, an act, not a faculty or a habit. More vehement is added because although all motions of the sensitive appetite can be called passions, by usage only the more vehement motions are designated by this name.
Of the sensitive appetite. Therefore passion is a motion of the appetitive faculty, not of the cognitive faculty, and indeed of the sensitive appetitive faculty, not of the rational faculty or will.
From the imagination of good or evil. By these words the mode by which passion is excited is indicated.
With an unusual transmutation of the body. By these words the effect of passion is assigned. It is called an unusual or graver transmutation because the graver motions, which alone come under the name of passions, produce graver bodily transmutations (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 22).
Note. Motions of the rational appetite or will are called affections, not passions, because of themselves they do not produce a bodily transmutation, which is a kind of passion.
II. The principle eliciting passion, as follows from the definition, is the sensitive appetite, that is, the faculty which pursues sensible good or flees sensible evil. The sensitive appetite is twofold: concupiscible and irascible. The concupiscible appetite pursues sensible good or flees sensible evil taken simply. The irascible appetite pursues sensible good as arduous, or difficult to attain, or flees sensible evil as arduous, or difficult to avoid (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 23, a. 1).
III. Enumeration of the passions. Eleven are enumerated, namely:
- On the part of the concupiscible appetite:
a) Love, which is the complacency of the concupiscible appetite in sensible good, abstracting from its absence and presence (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26, aa. 1 and 2).
b) Desire, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite tending toward an absent sensible good (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 2).
c) Joy, which is the complacency or rest of the concupiscible appetite in an attained sensible good (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 31, a. 1).
Each is clarified by these words of St. Thomas: "The first change of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than complacency in the appetible; and from this complacency there follows motion toward the appetible, which is desire; and finally rest, which is joy" (I-II, q. 26, a. 2).
d) Hatred, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from sensible evil, abstracting from its absence and presence (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 1).
e) Flight, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from an absent sensible evil (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 2, ad 3).
f) Sadness, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from sensible evil that is present or joined to it (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 35, aa. 1-3).
- On the part of the irascible appetite:
a) Hope, which is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it tends toward a future sensible good that is arduous and possible to attain. "Concerning the object of hope," says Aquinas, "four conditions are considered. First, indeed, that it be good; and by this hope differs from fear, which concerns evil. Second, that it be future; for hope does not concern a present thing already had, and by this hope differs from joy, which concerns a present good. Third, it is required that it be something arduous, attainable with difficulty; for someone is not said to hope for something minimal which is immediately in his power to have, and by this hope differs from desire, which concerns future good absolutely. Fourth, that that arduous thing be possible to attain; for no one hopes for that which he cannot attain at all" (I-II, q. 40, a. 1).
b) Despair is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it turns away from an arduous sensible good which seems impossible to attain. "Now the object of hope, which is an arduous good, has the character of something attractive insofar as it is considered with the possibility of attaining it; but insofar as it is considered with the impossibility of obtaining it, it has the character of something repulsive; and thus despair regards this object, whence it implies a motion of a certain withdrawal; and for this reason it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is contrary to approach" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 40, a. 4).
c) Daring is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it rises up against a terrible sensible evil in order to overcome it. Now daring follows upon hope. For from the fact that someone hopes to overcome the terrible thing threatening him, from this he boldly pursues it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 45, a. 2).
d) Fear is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it is cast down because of a sensible evil that is arduous, threatening, and scarcely possible to overcome. It is called threatening, for on the one hand it does not concern present evil, but future evil, in which respect it differs from sadness (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 42, a. 3, ad 2); on the other hand, it does not concern a remote and distant future evil: "for because of its distance we imagine this as not going to happen, and therefore we either do not fear it or fear it little. For as the Philosopher says in Rhetoric II, chapter 5, number 1, things very far away are not feared; for all know that they will die, but because it is not near, they care nothing" (St. Thomas, same place, a. 2).
e) Anger is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it seeks vengeance against something harmful, because of harm inflicted. "For whoever is angry seeks to be avenged against someone, and thus the motion of anger tends toward two things: namely, toward the vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as a certain good, whence it is also delighted in it; it tends also toward the one against whom it seeks vengeance, as toward something contrary and harmful, which pertains to the character of evil" (St. Thomas, same place).
No passion is opposed to anger. "The Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, book 2, chapter 3, number 1, that becoming mild is opposed to being angry; and this is not a contrary opposite, but a negative or privative one" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 45, a. 2).
Love is the cause of all passions, for "there is no other passion which does not presuppose some love. The reason for this is that every other passion of the soul implies motion toward something or rest in something. But every motion toward something, or rest in something, proceeds from some connaturality or fittingness, which pertains to the character of love" (I-II, q. 27, a. 4).
IV. Influence on the free.
The passions exercise influence on the free will. "According to the order of nature, because of the binding together of the powers of the soul in one essence, and of soul and body in one being of the composite, the higher and lower powers, and also soul and body, mutually influence one another with what abounds in any of them" (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 26, a. 10).
The passions influence the will through the imagination. Namely, this faculty, through the image of sensible good or evil, excites motions in the sensitive appetite; and by presenting the same image to the intellect, it supplies matter to it for presenting the same object to the will. But since the soul according to the sensitive appetite is inclined toward the object or turns away from it, the will too easily freely admits or turns away from that same object.
As to the efficacy of this influence, take this: the passions generally do not remove the free, but only lessen it. The reason is that the passions generally do not remove deliberation, but only lessen it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, V, III). These matters are developed more where concupiscence and fear are treated in particular.
Note. As we noted in n. 32, in the rational appetite or will there are also, not indeed passions properly so called, but spiritual motions or affections, such as of love, desire, joy, hatred, etc. Now if a similar motion of the sensitive appetite corresponds to a motion of the will, peace is said to be had. If a motion of the sensitive appetite resists a motion of the will, there is conflict, concerning which St. Paul says: "I see another law in my members, resisting the law of my mind."1 If a motion of the sensitive appetite neither corresponds to nor resists a motion of the will, there is aridity.2
1 Rom. 7:23.
2 Cf. Potters, Compendium Ethicae generalis, numbers 112 and 113.