What hope is and its necessity

AN act of hope is an act of the will by which we desire the possession of God and of heaven, and firmly trust that we shall obtain them together with the necessary means through the goodness of God and God’s fidelity to his promises. The material object, then, of hope is God, heaven, and the supernatural helps necessary to attain thereto. ‘The formal object is God’s infinite goodness towards us, his omnipotence, and his faithfulness to his promises. God is infinitely good and wishes us to be happy with him for ever; he has promised that we shall be happy with him if only we persevere to the end. He will enable us to do this by his all-powerful grace.

Hope is necessary for salvation for all who have come to the use of reason. The sinner must hope in order to ask for pardon and to be able to rise from his sin. The just man must hope, otherwise he will not pray, and without prayer it is impossible to persevere in the grace of God. Hope is also matter of precept, which obliges sometimes per se, at other times per accidens, in much the same way as the precept of faith. Explicit acts of hope, however, are not necessary in order to fulfil this precept; what was said above about the acts of faith is applicable to acts of hope. Implicit acts contained in prayer, the reception of the sacraments, and other works of piety are sufficient to fulfil the obligation. Nobody, then, who is complying with the ordinary obligations of a Christian life need be anxious whether he is fulfilling the precept of eliciting acts of the theological virtues; but it is well, as a matter of counsel, to renew them frequently and explicitly.

Concerning this second theological virtue, which in the order of generation follows faith and precedes charity, its notion, object, subject, and properties must be investigated, just as was done above concerning faith.

I. Notion of Hope. Hope is a theological virtue inclining man to expect, with certain confidence, through the help of God, eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 6). It is said:

1. With certain confidence. By these words is indicated the essential property of the virtue of hope; if this is lacking, the virtue of theological hope cannot exist.

2. Through the help of God. These words assign the formal object of the virtue of hope.

3. Eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. By these words is indicated the material object of this virtue, both primary, which is beatitude, and secondary, namely the means to attaining it.

Since the virtue of hope, as we have indicated, is not destroyed by just any mortal sin, but only by the sin of heresy and of despair, it is clear that, equally with faith, by reason of charity it is distinguished into formed and unformed hope, according as it exists in a subject which has charity or lacks it.

II. Object of Hope. 1. Material object. All agree that beatitude is the primary material object of theological hope. But beatitude is twofold: objective, which is God Himself, and subjective, which is the possession of God. Theologians dispute in which beatitude the primary material object is to be placed. Some admit both kinds of beatitude as such; others admit objective beatitude only. This latter, which is the opinion of the Thomists, seems to be admitted as more probable. For that is the primary material object of hope which beatifies man. Now it is not the very action by which we attain that object which beatifies us, but the object itself. There is added the fact that the primary material object of a theological virtue is immediately God; and this cannot be said of possession itself. It is indeed true that God is not the material object of theological hope except insofar as He is attained by means of subjective beatitude; but this merely makes subjective beatitude a condition without which not.

To the secondary material object of hope pertain all supernatural goods, and even natural goods, insofar as they conduce to beatitude. For the same virtue which primarily tends toward some end secondarily tends toward the means conducing to that end, since they stand under the same formal object.

2. Formal object. Omitting the opinions of the few who assign as the formal object of the virtue of hope either the arduousness of the good to be obtained, or only the goodness of God as desirable by us, with the far greater part of theologians we admit as certain that the formal object consists in divine help. But theologians dispute what divine attributes divine help involves by reason of the formal object. More commonly they teach that divine help, by reason of the formal object, involves at least omnipotence, by which in every case God can help us, and relative goodness, by which God wills to help us. With regard to the fidelity of God in His promises, authors disagree. But with St. Alphonsus (Theologia moralis, II, 21) and many others we admit that this fidelity is also a constitutive part of the formal object. For a formal object which regards the future moves to an act only insofar as that object is certain. But that object becomes certain for us through fidelity. For fidelity is that property by force of which the help of God is known as immutable; but help known as immutable is certain help; therefore help becomes formally certain for us through fidelity, and therefore fidelity is a constitutive part of the formal object of theological hope. Yet from this it does not follow that promise too enters into the essence of the formal object; for this is required only so that by divine faith we may be able to believe in divine help, and it is a condition without which there is no eliciting of an act of hope.

III. Subject of Hope. 1. The subject by which and partial of hope is the will. For the virtue of hope is occupied around the divine good, known by reason illumined by faith; but this is the good of the will.

2. The subject which and total of hope are:

a) All just wayfarers. For in the just there are all infused virtues compossible with their state. But the virtue of hope is compossible with all wayfarers, even with souls detained in purgatory, since beatitude is for them an arduous good, not yet possessed and possible to obtain.

b) All faithful wayfarers, although sinners, provided they are not guilty of the mortal sin of despair or of unbelieving presumption. This doctrine is founded on the analogy of faith and hope. For on the one hand it is established that divine faith is not always lost when charity is lost. On the other hand: a) while faith remains, the foundation of hope remains, and so hope is not destroyed indirectly;¹ b) hope, like faith, is in its essence independent of charity and of habitual grace, although this is the connatural principle of both habits; c) the act of hope, like the act of faith, is, as is clear from the Council of Trent, a remote disposition to justification.² Therefore, just as the merciful God leaves divine faith in the sinner as long as he does not directly destroy it by the sin of infidelity or heresy, it must be presumed that God similarly does not take away theological hope as long as the sinner does not despair or presume unbelievingly.

Corollary. From what has been said it follows that the subject which and total of the virtue of hope is in no way: 1. the Blessed, for they are possessors of the good to be hoped for; 2. the damned, for whom beatitude is simply impossible; 3. formal heretics as such, since by the sin of infidelity the foundation of hope is destroyed; 4. sinners guilty of the mortal sin of despair, by which the formal object of hope is directly destroyed, and sinners guilty of the sin of presumption joined with the sin of infidelity, by which the formal object is indirectly destroyed through the destruction of its foundation.

¹ A virtue is said to be destroyed directly, or per se, by an act contrary to it, by which the object is destroyed; but it is said to be destroyed indirectly, or per accidens, when the foundation is removed.

² Session 6, chapter 6.

IV. Properties of Hope. The properties of hope are enumerated as: certitude, moral goodness, utility, and necessity.

1. Certitude of hope consists in this, that it firmly expects its object insofar as the attainment of it depends on God's help; it is therefore founded on a complete persuasion that God on His part will furnish man all things necessary for salvation, so that, if man falls short of his end, he ought to ascribe this ruin to himself. From these points it follows of itself that most certain hope does not exclude fear. For man, in cooperating with the grace of God, which is required for salvation, is defectible of himself; and to this defectibility of nature there is added the arduousness of obtaining the good, which can turn man aside from his duty. Hence the certitude of hope and the fear of one hoping are very well joined together. For the one hoping is certain on the part of the motive on which hope rests, but he fears on the part of his own defectibility; this leaves the nature of hope intact.

That certitude belongs to hope is taught 1. by the Council of Trent,¹ saying: "All ought to place and repose a most firm hope in the help of God"; 2. by Sacred Scripture, which in various places praises it, for example, as "a sure and firm anchor of the soul";² 3. by theological reason, because the expectation of some thing participates in the state of mind in which it is founded. Now the expectation of beatitude is founded on certitude, namely that God on His part will furnish the things necessary for beatitude (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 18, a. 4).

2. The moral goodness of hope consists in this, that the virtue of hope inclines man to acts conformed to right reason; from this it follows that the habit itself and its acts, elicited with a view to reward, are morally good. That this property is truly present in the virtue of hope is established from the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the justified man sins when he works well with a view to eternal reward, let him be anathema."³ It is further proved from Sacred Scripture, in which men are urged countless times to good works with a view to eternal happiness.⁴ It is confirmed by reason. For that habit and its acts are certainly morally good by which man is inclined to his salvation according to that order by which God Himself has set it before man, that is, by referring it, or at least leaving it referable, to God as the ultimate end. But man by the habit of hope and by its act tends toward himself as the end to whom he wills the good, yet without excluding the further relation, or at least referability, of this act to God as the ultimate end.

3. The utility of hope is derived both from its moral goodness just explained and from its necessity still to be explained.

4. Necessity of hope. a) The habit of hope, or habitual hope, is necessary for salvation for all men by necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But sanctifying grace is not granted without the habit of hope. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means, so also is the habit of hope.

b) In what respect the act of hope, or actual hope, is necessary, we shall explain in Book II, where we shall speak of the exercise or cultivation of virtues.

¹ Session 6, chapter 13.

² Heb. 6:18.

³ Session 6, canon 31.

⁴ Cf. Gen. 15:1.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 17-22.)

Definition.—The word “hope” is variously used. (a) In a wide and improper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil, or desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for misfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has succeeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that some unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b) In its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some desired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or to recover from illness.

Hope, strictly understood, is of various kinds. (a) It is an emotion or an affection, according as it proceeds from the sensitive or the rational appetite. The emotion of hope is an inclination of the irascible appetite to possess some object known through the senses and apprehended as good and attainable, and is found both in man and in the brutes. The affection of hope is a spiritual inclination, tending to good as known through the reason.

(b) Hope is either natural or supernatural, according as it tends either to goods that are temporal and within the power of man to acquire, or to goods that are eternal and above the unaided powers of creatures. It is in this latter sense that hope is now taken.

Supernatural hope is understood, sometimes in a wide sense, sometimes in a strict sense. (a) In a wide sense, it is used objectively to designate the object, material or formal, of hope. Thus, St. Paul is speaking of the material object of hope (i.e., of the things hoped for), when he says: “Hope that is seen is not hope” (Rom., viii. 24), “Looking for the blessed hope” (Tit., ii. 13); while the Psalmist is speaking of the formal object of hope (i.e., the motive of hope), when he says: “Thou hast been my hope, a tower of strength against the face of the enemy” (Ps. lx. 4). (b) In a strict sense, hope is used subjectively to designate the act or habit of hope. The act of hope is spoken of in the following texts: “We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Rejoicing in hope” (Rom., vii. 12). The habit of hope is indicated in these verses from Job and St. Paul: “This my hope is laid up in my bosom” (Job, xix. 27); “There remain faith, hope, charity, these three” (I Cor., xiii. 13). Hope is now taken in the strict sense, as a virtue or infused habit, from which proceed supernatural acts.

The virtue of hope is defined: “An infused habit, by which we confidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of everlasting life.”

(a) It is “an infused habit.” These words express the genus to which hope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection of hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely natural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with reference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man, fallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded virtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere of action.

(b) Hope is a habit “by which we expect, etc.” These words express the specific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul in which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.

(c) “Through the help of God.” These words express the formal object or motive of hope.

(d) “The rewards of eternal life.” These words express the material object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.

There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and natural hope as regards their objects and acts.

(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).

(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is therefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks forward to goods not as yet attained: “We hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience” (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is not certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the virtue of hope demands strength of soul: “Do ye manfully and let your heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord” (Ps. xxx. 25).

(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The virtue of hope also is confident: “Hold fast the glory and confidence of hope unto the end” (Heb. iii. 6).

Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a supernatural virtue.

(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it the will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing its lofty aspirations: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications for ever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112); “Trust in the Lord, and do good” (Ps, xxxvi. 3).

(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is sanctified and saved: “I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope” (Ecclus., xxiv. 24); God “hath regenerated us into a lively hope” (I Pet., i. 3); “We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Everyone that hath this hope in Him sanctifieth himself” (I John, iii. 3).

Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all, and his neighbor as himself: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications forever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope of the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire charity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: “He that hopeth in the Lord shall be healed” (Prov., xxviii. 25).

Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not so commanded—that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.

The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not admissible:

(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good, and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope (which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could an act be meritorious.

(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone) and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).

The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.—Since hope is a necessary preparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the supernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised that scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.

(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor hope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already believed and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments from God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith being enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins with the words: “I am the Lord thy God” (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being prescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in the First and Fourth Commandments.

(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope, in order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also that which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: “Hope in Him, all ye congregation of people” (Ps. lxi. 9); “Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God” (I Tim., vi. 17).

Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life, the Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and absolute holy indifference (Denzinger, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence, man can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not thought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition that that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure love, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be admitted (Philip., iii. 14; II Tim., iv, 8). (b) Indifference to the happenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be indifferent about one’s own salvation, or the means thereto. Indifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.

Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the sake of another’s spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself, this is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God’s book (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of Messianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolical expressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is question, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it (such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its possession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit of his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his entrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip., i. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain uncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain of salvation and die at once.

At what times does the commandment of hope oblige? (a) In its negative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times and at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even when things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest. (b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges for all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains always in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts of hope.

By reason of the virtue of hope itself (i.e., on account of the response one should make to the promises of God concerning eternal life), an act of hope is obligatory on the following occasions:

(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that is, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between God and creatures as the object of one’s happiness. This moment occurs for all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in this connection the words of Christ: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice” (Matt, vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are in the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning from creatures towards God: “Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day” (Ecclus, v. 8).

(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to renew the act of hope: “The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world, looking for the blessed hope” (Titus, ii. 11, 12), “Serving the Lord, rejoicing in hope” (Rom., xii. 11, 12); “He that plougheth, should plough in hope” (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more perfect must have on “the helmet of hope” (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope all are saved (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) It seems that at the end of life one is especially bound to elicit an act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi). But, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well prepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is no manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).

How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About the theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as with regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there is agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all those who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the virtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply with the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Mass and the reception of the Sacraments.

How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made explicitly, when one expresses one’s confident expectation, the objects expected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according to the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: “O my God, relying on Thy all-powerful assistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to obtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life everlasting.” This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it expresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is made implicitly, when one offers petitions to God as one ought; for the confidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of hope of God and of hope in God. Thus, the words, “Thy Kingdom come,” utter the soul’s expectation of bliss and its reliance on God. The implicit act of hope satisfies the commandment, and hence those who comply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.

By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also arises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another virtue will be lost or endangered without the assistance of hope, one is bound to make an act of hope. Examples: Titus is so discouraged by the difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he stirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of aridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the motive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another commandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of hope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being contained in another virtue. Example: Sempronius is in the state of sin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes hope of pardon as a means to salvation, Sempronius must not only grieve over his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.

Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could remain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?

(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego heaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope (I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that God be the chief object of our desires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019, 1031).

(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their wish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or its goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but they are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of inordinate love of creatures.

(c) If such persons mean by their wish only that they are very much attached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as God will allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated or other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live forever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.

So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of hope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about faith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.

(a) The act of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all adults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he hopes in God’s mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he relies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven by his works and must pray to God in his necessities—things that are impossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).

(b) The habit of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul and its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is elevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific vision.

The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.

(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine infusion, not on human acts (see 745).

(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal object or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues. For it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same time not love God for His own sake, or not regulate one’s conduct conformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to believe and yet not practise one’s belief (see 1016, 1030).

(c) Hope is lost by sins of commission that remove its foundation or its formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the foundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they take away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It should be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are named presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor consequently the virtue of hope. Examples: Titus does not believe in a future life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a future life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all expectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is living on stolen property and intends to continue to do so, but he hopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Sempronius, who is associated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and restitution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by reason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an expectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Sempronius is presumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is not theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through divine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not contrary to, but beyond theological hope.

Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.—(a) Servile fear was not commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however, commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear were given. Thus, Job says: “I feared all my works, knowing that Thou didst not spare the offender” (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments” (Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: “Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matt, x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first law was given. “What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God?” (Deut., x. 12).

As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.

“7. The soul ought not to think either of punishment, or of paradise, or of hell, or of death, or of eternity. — 12. He who has given his free will to God ought to take care for nothing, neither for hell nor for paradise; nor ought he to have a desire for his own perfection, or for virtues, or for his own sanctity, or for his own salvation, the hope of which he ought to purge away.” Propositions of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 79.

211. • Hope is a supernatural virtue through which, with certain confidence from the promise of God, we expect future beatitude, and the means for attaining it.

The primary material object of Hope is God to be possessed, according to that saying, Gen. 15.1: I will be your reward exceedingly great. But the secondary object is all the means necessary for attaining beatitude, such as the remission of sins, the grace of God through the merits of Christ, etc... ¹.

¹ ** Other benefits, even temporal ones, which we expect from the goodness of God, are not to be excluded from this; since these also were promised by the Lord (Luke 12.31): And all these things shall be added to you.

But the formal object of Hope is the goodness and fidelity of God joined with his omnipotence ².

² Hope... rests upon... divine omnipotence and mercy, through which even he who does not have grace can obtain it, so that thus he may arrive at eternal life. But whoever has faith is certain of the omnipotence of God and of his mercy. St. Thom. (2. 2. q. 18. art. 4. ad 2.). And again the same Holy Doctor (De Virt. q. 4. art. 1.): The formal object of hope is the help of divine power and piety, on account of which the motion of hope tends toward hoped-for goods, which are the material object of hope.

But the acts included in Hope are the desire of eternal beatitude, firm confidence of arriving at it, and a raised-up spirit against occurring difficulties ³.

³ Hope, as St. Thomas says (2. 2. q. 17. art. 5. ad 4.), according as it is a theological virtue, regards something arduous to be attained by the help of another. But (3. Dist. 26. q. 2. art. 1. ad 2.) this arduous thing, which is eternal life, exceeds the faculty of nature. Therefore (ibid. art. 2. o) it is necessary that from some gift superadded to nature there be made an inclination into that arduous thing; and that gift is the habit of hope. Therefore insofar as (2. 2. q. 17. art. 1. o) we hope for something as possible for us through divine help, our hope reaches to God himself, upon whose help it rests.

But the sins opposed to Hope are despair and presumption. The former is voluntary distrust of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. - But the latter is an inordinate confidence of obtaining beatitude without the means ordained by God.

212. Principles. - I. Hope in adults is required by necessity of means for justification. For man cannot arrive at attaining God, his ultimate end, unless by his own acts he tends toward him: but this cannot be done without hope. This is also clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 6. c. 6.

II. Hope is also necessary by necessity of precept; since there is a true precept of eliciting acts of Hope at some times in life. This is clear from the 1st proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which sounds thus: At no time whatever of his life is a man bound to elicit an act of Faith, Hope, and Charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues ⁴.

⁴ Since the precept itself does not expressly determine a time, it seems one must recur to an article of necessity, which scarcely can be designated in the matter proposed. But it must be noted that this necessity can be either per se, or from an extrinsic reason: in this second way this precept will oblige when it shall be necessary to hope either for duly praying, or for overcoming a temptation, or for something similar: nevertheless in these occasions it will often not be necessary to elicit a formal act of hope, but it will be enough in the very effect duly to do that in which hope is virtually included, such as to petition efficaciously, or to grieve over sin, or something similar.... Concerning necessity per se..... I say, as concerning charity and penance, that this time cannot be designated positively and altogether determinately, but as it were negatively and confusedly: for a man is bound sometime in life to exercise hope; but whether that is now, or later, is left to the man's judgment. Suarez, De Spe Disp. 2. Sect. 1. n. 2. 3.

Moreover the Doctors commonly warn that no place is to be given to anxieties concerning the sufficient execution of this precept. Since, to fulfill it, just as was said concerning faith, virtual hope suffices, and this is commonly exercised; hence there can scarcely be a suspicion that the faithful are lacking in this obligation. But if any are lacking in it, since they do this almost without advertence, the matter falls back to the same point.

699. 1. Various opinions. Since hope can be considered under different respects, there are different opinions concerning the motive upon which it rests, according to the different way in which this virtue is regarded.

(a) The Scotists, considering hope chiefly as an appetite of the supreme good insofar as it beatifies us, say that the sole motive of hope is God, as He is our supreme good;¹⁰ for what seems principal in this virtue is the love of God, insofar as He is the supreme good of man: the rest, namely desire and expectation of grace, is something accessory.

¹⁰ Suarez, De Spe, disp. I, sect. 3.

(b) The Thomists, considering hope as the pursuit of an arduous good, think that its motive is the helping omnipotence of God; for the reason on account of which we tend toward an arduous good is divine power insofar as it can help us.

(c) But some place the motive of hope in the fidelity of God; for since there is question of supernatural beatitude and the means proportioned to this end, which exceed the powers and merits of man, we cannot hope for these unless God has promised to bestow the same upon us.

(d) Finally, there are many today who, observing that the act of hope is virtually threefold, or can be regarded under a threefold respect, contend that the three aforesaid motives concur together for the production of this act; this opinion indeed seems to us more probable.

700. 2. The more probable opinion: The adequate motive of hope is the goodness of God toward us, and at the same time His helping power, and also fidelity in keeping promises.

(A) The motive of hope, insofar as it includes love of the supreme good, is the goodness of God toward us. For hope tends toward divine good through love; for we do not hope except for that which we love. But the motive of this love is not divine goodness absolute, or regarded in itself, which is the motive of charity, but the relative goodness of God, or His goodness toward us; for as in the natural order we hope for those things which seem good to us, so in the supernatural order we hope for the supreme good insofar as it is ours and makes us blessed.

Thus Christ proposes the kingdom of God to the elect as the reward prepared for them and hoped for by them:¹¹ "Come, blessed of My Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Wherefore the Apostle, after many labors bravely endured for Christ, expects the crown of justice which will beatify him:¹² "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day."

¹¹ Matt. 25:34.

¹² 2 Tim. 4:7-8.

701. (B) The motive of hope, insofar as it includes elevation of soul, is the helping power of God. For since the supreme good which we hope for is truly arduous, and cannot be attained without divine help, there accedes another motive of hope, namely the helping power of God: this comprises not only omnipotence, by which God can help us, but also mercy, by which He is kindly prepared to furnish His help in our weakness.

This indeed is gathered from innumerable texts of Scripture in which we are commanded to hope in the Lord, because He is powerful and merciful, and therefore our helper: "In God is my salvation and my glory; He is the God of my help, and my hope is in God. Hope in Him... God is our helper forever."¹³ - "But I, as a fruitful olive tree in the house of God; I have hoped in the mercy of God forever and ever."¹⁴ - "And God is able to make all grace abound in you, that in all things, always having all sufficiency, you may abound unto every good work."¹⁵ - "But God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, quickened us together in Christ, by whose grace you are saved, and raised us up together and made us sit together in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus, that He might show in the ages to come the abundant riches of His grace in His goodness toward us in Christ Jesus."¹⁶

¹³ Ps. 61:8-9. This is often repeated in the Psalms.

¹⁴ Ps. 51:10.

¹⁵ 2 Cor. 9:8.

¹⁶ Eph. 2:4-7.

The same can be gathered from Trent, where it declares that the gift of perseverance is not had "except from Him who is powerful to establish him who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls; let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude, although all ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God."¹

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 13, Denzing., n. 689.

In truth, in order that amid the multiple temptations and miseries of life by which we are surrounded we may be able to raise the soul to the supernatural good which is not only arduous but also surpasses our powers, it is necessary that we expect help from Him who, on account of His power, is able, and, on account of His mercy, wills to help us.

702. (C) The motive of hope, insofar as this includes confidence, or a firm and certain expectation of heavenly goods, is the fidelity of God in promises. For since God is by no means bound to bestow upon us supernatural goods, we cannot hope for these with firm certitude unless He has promised to grant the same to men; moreover, since He is faithful, we can rely upon His promises with all confidence.

Therefore Scripture not rarely derives the certitude of our hope from the promises or fidelity of God: "Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful who has promised";² - "unto the hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, has promised."³ - In the same sense must be understood the words of Paul cited above (n. 700); for eternal life is not a crown of justice unless the promise of God accedes.

² Heb. 10:23; cf. 6:13-20.

³ Titus 1:2.

703. Corollary. Although properly the motive of our hope is God, good, helping, and faithful, yet it is certain that our confidence is much increased from the merits and satisfactions of Christ: for He, as the moral head of the whole human race, satisfied for our sins, and merited for us all spiritual helps which we need for obtaining eternal life, as was proved in the Treatise on the Incarnate Word, nn. 179-214.

Therefore He is truly the meritorious cause of our justification and salvation, according to that saying of Trent:⁴ "Who, when we were enemies, on account of the exceeding charity with which He loved us, merited justification for us by His most holy passion on the wood of the cross, and satisfied God the Father for us." Therefore when we act and pray through Christ and in Christ, relying upon His merits, we are certainly able to conceive greater confidence.

⁴ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, Denzing., n. 681.

Besides, by force of the communion of saints, the intercession of the Blessed Mary and of the elect reigning in heaven, and also the prayers of the just on earth, can increase our confidence secondarily; for these can obtain for us opportune helps, by which we are assisted not a little toward obtaining eternal beatitude. (De Verbo Incarnato, nn. 292-294 and nn. 304-306.)

710. Once the nature of hope has been explained, it is easy enough to understand its excellence. (a) Nevertheless, some contended that hope, considered separately from charity, or the desire of some reward, is of itself infected by some stain of baseness, and cannot be made honest unless it is converted into an affection of benevolence and charity; and therefore they said that a work exercised with a view to eternal reward, without charity, is not truly honest: thus the Calvinists, Baius, and the Jansenists.² Besides, not a few modern philosophers, especially Kantians, and (what is astonishing) evolutionists, turn it into a fault of the Christian religion that it proposes a reward to those doing good; for thus, they say, virtue is mercenary (above, nn. 30 and 56).

¹ Suarez, De spe, disp. I, sect. 5; Perrone, op. cit., nn. 82-124; Bouquillon, nn. 346-371; Billot, th. 27-28; Pesch, nn. 514-530.

² Calvin, Instit., lib. III, c. 16, § 3, and c. 18, § 2; Baius, lib. de Caritate, c. 6; de virtutibus impiorum, c. 5-6; with regard to the Jansenists, see propositions 44-45 of Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI, Sept. 8, 1713, apud Denzing., nn. 1259-1278.

(b) The Quietists, under the leadership of Michael Molinos, did not proceed so far, but, thinking that perfection consists in a continuous act of contemplation and love, asserted that hope, which regards one's own good, is imperfect, and therefore cannot be composed with the pure love of God and the highest perfection. From this they also inferred that all desires, even pious ones, all petitions, all acts except the pure love of God, as imperfect, are to be omitted; and that temptations are not to be resisted actively, but only passively.³ The will, they said, ought to remain altogether quiet, and not act except when divine grace impels, which alone works good in us. From this error the pious widow Guyon did not withdraw far enough; her defense was undertaken by the Archbishop of Cambrai, Fenelon, in the work Explication des Maximes des Saints, where he taught that there is given a habitual state of pure love which excludes hope.⁴

³ Yet the greatest difference must be established between the errors of M. Molinos and of Fenelon. The former indeed proceeded much farther both speculatively and practically, by deducing immoral conclusions from his principles. Theoretically he taught: "The soul must not think either of reward, or of punishment, or of paradise, or of hell, or of death, or of eternity." Practically: "The free will having been handed over to God, and the care and thought of our soul having been left to Him, there is no longer to be any account of temptations; nor should any resistance be made to them except negative resistance, with no effort being used: and if nature is moved, it is necessary to allow it to be moved, because it is nature... When violences of this kind (diabolical temptations) occur, it is necessary to allow Satan to work, by applying no effort and no proper endeavor, but man ought to remain in his nothingness: and even if pollutions and obscene acts by one's own hands, and even worse things, follow, there is no need to disturb oneself..." (Ap. Denzing., nn. 1094, 1104, 1134.)

⁴ Fenelon said: "There is given a habitual state of the love of God, which is pure charity and without any admixture of the motive of one's own interest. Neither fear of punishments nor desire of rewards any longer has a part in it. God is no longer loved on account of merit, nor on account of perfection, nor on account of the happiness to be found in Him... In this state the soul loses every hope of its own proper interest; but never loses in the higher part, that is, in its direct and intimate acts, perfect hope, which is the disinterested desire of the promises." (Ap. Denzing., nn. 1193 and 1203.) It is known to all with how great humility Fenelon retracted his errors, condemned by Innocent XII. - The history of quietism has been sketched among others by Gosselin, Analyse de la controverse du Quietisme (Oeuvres de Fenelon, Versailles, t. IV); L. Crouste, Fenelon et Bossuet, Paris, 1894-1895, t. I, pp. 375-564, t. II in entirety. - You will find the doctrine of Bossuet especially in the work Instruction sur les etats d'oraison, where the articles called Issy are set forth, concerning quietism.

Against these errors we shall prove the honesty and necessity of hope.

711. Thesis. Theological hope, by which we work good with a view to eternal beatitude, not only bears before itself nothing disordered, but truly has the character of virtue.

(A) This indeed is clear from the texts of Scripture cited above, nn. 700-702, in which hope in God is commended; but besides, from many others in which works done with a view to eternal reward are explicitly praised as good: "Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."⁵ - "Make unto yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity, that, when you shall fail, they may receive you into eternal dwellings."⁶ Therefore the Apostle exhorts the Corinthians that, like athletes, they abstain from all things and thus receive an incorruptible crown,⁷ and elsewhere adds:⁸ "Whatever you do, work from the soul, as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution of the inheritance." Now God cannot so earnestly and frequently exhort us to hope unless it is honest and praiseworthy. Indeed St. John explicitly declares that this hope is sanctifying:⁹ "And everyone who has this hope in Him sanctifies himself, as He also is holy."

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

⁶ Luke 16:9.

⁷ 1 Cor. 9:25.

⁸ Col. 3:23-24.

⁹ 1 John 3:3.

(B) Therefore deservedly Trent reproved those "who establish that in all works the just sin, if in those works, by arousing their own sluggishness and exhorting themselves to run in the stadium, with this, that God first of all be glorified, they also look to eternal reward"; and afterward declared: "And therefore to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised through Christ Jesus to the sons of God, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered, from the promise of God Himself, to their good works and merits."¹⁰

¹⁰ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11 and 16, Denzing., nn. 687 and 692.

712. (C) It is consonant with reason to hope in God, to love Him as our good, and to expect from Him eternal life and the means for obtaining it. (a) Certainly good and honest is the act by which we tend toward God as our end and the fountain of supreme beatitude; for thus our faculties are rightly developed, while they are ordered to infinite good; moreover, by loving God as good for us, we easily love Him as lovable in Himself.

Some say that thus the order is perverted, because we refer God to ourselves as to an end. But undeservedly; for when we seek our beatitude in the knowledge and love of God, by that very fact we recognize God to be our ultimate end; wherefore we refer ourselves to God as to the ultimate end.

(b) Moreover, when we confidently expect divine help, by that very fact we adhere to God helping; now the perfection of man consists in this, that he is united to God. Besides, to hope in the Lord is honorable to Him: for thus we recognize His power, goodness, and fidelity: "Because he has hoped in Me, I will deliver him; I will protect him because he has known My name."¹¹

¹¹ Ps. 90:14.

713. Therefore they err, as we showed above, n. 30, who say that a work done with a view to eternal life is mercenary: for hope of a merely spiritual and future reward does not exclude an honest motive, but, given human weakness, powerfully incites us to the good.¹² - And indeed those who boast that they act well on account of duty, and not on account of reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience establishes that men are only gradually drawn to the good of a higher order, to pure love, elicited without any hope of gratitude or reward. - The Catholic doctrine seems much more adapted to the weakness of human nature, which draws men to spiritual good by hope of future reward, and gradually raises them from hope to the supreme good loved for its own sake. We confess besides that our acts are more perfect the less they regard our own advantage.¹³

¹² This Seailles himself admits, although otherwise hostile to Catholic doctrine: "It is not my intention to diminish or calumniate Christian morality; what it has obtained from men, what it has given them suffices to defend it from voluntary injustices and unintelligent bias. It has deepened souls, it has made them more delicate and more pure, it has restrained the impatient and brutal beast, it has opposed to its immediate desires the dream of paradise and the nightmares of hell: by binding beatitude to sacrifice, it has made disinterestedness come forth from egoism itself. Some are scandalized by this: instinct is found again, fear, desire, hope, trembling or appetite of the beast in this expectation of reward; but, to what is seen, to what is touched, victoriously to oppose an image, a dream of happiness, what one does not verify by the senses, what exists only to the extent that one believes it, is this not already idealism, proof that the idea can conquer?" (Les affirmat. de la conscience, pp. 49-50.)

¹³ Which M. d'Hulst splendidly explains, Careme 1891, pp. 200 and 412: "It is not because the virtuous man will have made a calculation that he will be beatified, it is because he will have done his duty. The more he has forgotten himself in the virtuous effort, the greater will be his reward. To mediocre souls, enamored of themselves even in the practice of good, the lesser happiness; to heroic souls, unoccupied with themselves even in the care of their salvation, the highest felicity."

726. First of all it must be noted that hope is increased by the same means by which faith grows (above, nn. 689-694), since faith is the foundation of hope. But besides this, like the other virtues, it is strengthened by exercise and becomes more prompt.

⁴ Scaramelli, op. cit., art. II, concerning Hope, ch. 7-8; Schram, Instit. theol. mysticae, § 119-123; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1892, conf. 4-5.

(A) But in order that hope may be rightly exercised, there is required first a good conscience, that is, the state of grace and the practice of good works, or at least a sincere and efficacious desire of recovering grace; for he who remains in the state of mortal sin rightly fears damnation; while the just man, who knows that he is a son of God, easily trusts in his heavenly Father: "If our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God, and whatsoever we shall ask, we shall receive from Him, because we keep His commandments and do those things which are pleasing before Him."⁵

⁵ 1 John 3:21-22.

Augustine explains the reason for this thus:⁶ "A good conscience bears hope: as an evil conscience is wholly in despair, so a good conscience is wholly in hope... For he hopes who bears a good conscience. But he whom an evil conscience stings withdraws himself from hope, and hopes for nothing for himself except damnation. Therefore, in order that he may hope for the kingdom, let him have a good conscience; and in order that he may have a good conscience, let him believe and work."

⁶ In Ps. XXXI, n. 5, P. L., XXXVI, 261.

727. (B) When someone enjoys a good conscience, he ought now no longer to trust in man or in other creatures, but in God; wherefore, in all events, he should ask and expect from God alone counsel, strength, and grace, recalling to memory the motives of hope set forth above, nn. 700-703, namely the infinite power, mercy, and fidelity of God. For then, relying on divine help, he can overcome all adverse things: "The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The Lord is the protector of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?... If armies in camp should stand together against me, my heart shall not fear."⁷

⁷ Ps. 26:1-3.

The reason is that nothing can separate us from the charity of God, which is plainly sufficient for rendering us blessed: "I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come... nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the charity of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."⁸

⁸ Rom. 8:38-39.

728. (C) But especially in adverse things all hope must be placed in God, who alone can rescue us from dangers, and at the same time give grace that we may use tribulations for increasing eternal beatitude.

Thus indeed Paul says: "Not only so, but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; and hope confounds not..."⁹ The reason is that if we suffer with Christ and for Christ, with Him we shall be glorified; and our glory will be proportioned to the tribulations patiently endured, and every arduous work done for God works in us an eternal weight of glory: "Yet so if we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us."¹⁰ - "For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation works for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."¹¹

⁹ Rom. 5:3-5.

¹⁰ Rom. 8:17-18.

¹¹ 2 Cor. 4:17.

729. (D) But also in prosperous things we must raise the mind to eternal goods; otherwise we shall adhere to creatures and to pleasure, with the greatest detriment to the soul. Namely, when all things proceed prosperously, we are prone to pass God by, and to place our hope in creatures, riches, and friends; whence it happens that we become earthly, gaping after pleasure and contemning heavenly goods.

Wherefore it is necessary to look upon heaven, "while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."¹² It is also necessary to pray, that, despising temporal and earthly things, we may learn to love heavenly things: "Grant to Thy peoples to love that which Thou commandest, to desire that which Thou dost promise; that, amid worldly changes, our hearts may there be fixed where true joys are."¹³

¹² 2 Cor. 4:18.

¹³ Missal, prayer for the 4th Sunday after Easter.

Concerning the exercise of hope, or confidence, in prayer we shall speak below.

By these and other means of this kind hope is strengthened and raised up, and the way is prepared for charity, concerning which it remains to speak.

1. NATURE OF HOPE.—Hope is an act of the will by which we desire to possess God, and firmly trust that through His goodness and fidelity we shall obtain Him, together with the necessary means, both natural and supernatural, of reaching Heaven.¹

¹ Rom. VIII, 24 sq.; Heb. XI, 1.—Cfr. Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 26, n. 1: “It is hope by which spiritual and eternal things are hoped for, that is, awaited with confidence. For hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude, proceeding from the grace of God and preceding merits, either charity which precedes hope by nature, or the thing hoped for, that is, eternal beatitude. For to hope for something without merits can be called not hope but presumption.” (Migne, P. L., CXCII, 811).—IDEM, Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., c. 5, 2–5: “Hope is the certain expectation of future glory, which seems vain to human reason, but is confirmed by the testimony of power, that is, by patience or miracles.” (P. L., CXCI, 1380).

Hope, therefore, may be either a transient act or a permanent habit (habitus). Both as an act and as a habit it has two essential constituents, namely, the effective desire of salvation and a firm trust in the promises and the providence of God. This twofold note distinguishes the Christian virtue of hope from resignation or apathy on the one hand, and, on the other, from presumption, which is an inordinate confidence of attaining Heaven without using the prescribed means.²

² 1 Pet. V, 6–10.

a) Through these two constituents of desire and trust, hope, though essentially distinct from faith and charity, is intimately united with both—with faith, because it is based on belief in God and shares its motives and object; with charity, because hope without the love of God would be fruitless and ineffective.³ “Charity flows from faith,” says St. Ambrose, “and hope from charity, and together they flow back and forth as in a sort of holy intercourse.”⁴ And St. Augustine: “Hope is impossible without charity. . . . Hence charity cannot exist without hope, nor hope without charity, nor either of the two without faith.”⁵ And in another place: “He who does not love, believes in vain, even though his belief is true, and hopes in vain, even though the things he hopes for appertain to real happiness. . . .”⁶

³ Luke VIII, 47–50; Rom. V, 1–5; XV, 13; 1 Cor. XIII, 13; Eph. III, 12; Col. I, 4 sq.; Heb. VI, 19 sq.; XI, 1.—Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 7, can. 12.

⁴ Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., l. VIII, n. 30: “From faith comes charity, from charity hope, and in turn they flow back into one another in a certain holy circle.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1774).

⁵ Enchiridion, c. 8: “What can be hoped for that is not believed? Moreover, something that is not hoped for can also be believed. For which of the faithful does not believe in the punishments of the impious? Yet he does not hope for them. . . . Now what shall I say about love, without which faith profits nothing? Hope, however, cannot exist without love (Jas. ii, 19). . . . Therefore neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor either without faith.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 234).

⁶ IDEM, ibid., c. 117: “When it is asked whether anyone is a good man, it is not asked what he believes or hopes, but what he loves. He who loves rightly without doubt believes and hopes rightly; but he who does not love believes in vain, even if the things he believes are true, and hopes in vain, even if the things he hopes for are taught to pertain to true happiness, unless he also believes and hopes that it can be granted to him when he asks, so that he may love.” (P. L., XL, 286).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 17, art. 6: “A virtue is called theological because it has God as the object to which it adheres. A person can adhere to another in two ways: in one way for his own sake, and in another way insofar as one comes through him to something else. Charity, therefore, makes man adhere to God for His own sake, uniting the mind of man to God through the affection of love. Hope and faith, however, make man adhere to God as to a principle from which certain things come to us. From God there come to us both the knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Faith, therefore, makes man adhere to God insofar as He is for us the principle of knowing truth; for we believe those things to be true which are said to us by God. Hope makes man adhere to God insofar as He is for us the principle of perfect goodness, namely, insofar as through hope we rely upon divine assistance to obtain beatitude.”

b) Hope, being on the one hand an indestructible natural tendency and, on the other, a virtue supernaturally infused by God, may by practice become an acquired virtue and thereby truly moral. Its de facto object lies in the future, since eternal beatitude cannot be fully realized in the present life. Patient resignation to the will of God here on earth, with a view to eternal happiness in Heaven, demands a moral effort and entails sacrifices which not infrequently assume heroic proportions.

St. Paul calls Christ “the hope of glory”⁷ and says that God glorified us in Him; but he adds: “Your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ shall appear, who is your life, then you shall also appear with him in glory.”⁸ The higher life of the Christian believer, therefore, whilst he sojourns in this vale of tears, is subject to manifold hindrances, which will not disappear entirely until Christ reveals to us His hidden glory in Heaven.

⁷ Col. I, 27.

⁸ Rom. VIII, 30; Col. III, 3 sq.

To this consideration may be added another. No man is certain that he will reach Heaven. God has created us, but He will not save us, without our coöperation. No one is crowned unless he has fought the good fight, and only those obtain eternal life who have kept the commandments, abstained from mortal sin, or purged themselves from it if they had the misfortune to fall. Hence our ultimate fate depends upon how we wage war against the enemies of our soul, and we must “work out our salvation with fear and trembling.”⁹ This explains why Sacred Scripture warns men against inordinate confidence and exhorts them to strive unceasingly for sanctification by performing good works. In this terrific struggle Christian hope proves itself a moral virtue, supernatural both in origin and substance, founded solely upon “the word of the truth of the gospel.”¹⁰

⁹ Matt. VII, 21 sq.; 1 Cor. VI, 9; Phil. II, 12; 1 Pet. I, 17; 1 John II, 3–6; Apoc. XXI, 27.—Peter Lombard, Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 5: “It is no great thing to glory in prosperity; the upright of heart glory even in tribulations, knowing the greatness of the reward, and that when tribulation has ended they will acquire an infinite reward.” (Migne, P. L., CXCI, 1379).

¹⁰ Col. I, 5; cfr. 1 Cor. X, 13; 2 Pet. I, 10.—Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 13, can. 15, 16.

2. THE OBJECT OF HOPE.—The material object (obiectum materiale) of hope is Heaven, i. e., the beatific vision of God, and the means that are necessary to obtain it. Some writers distinguish a primary and a secondary object. The primary object is God,¹¹ whereas the secondary object are the graces,—natural and supernatural, spiritual and physical,—which He grants for the purposes of salvation.¹²

¹¹ Gen. XV, 1; Tob. II, 16–18; John XIV, 1–3; Tit. III, 7; 1 John II, 25.—St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, l. XXII, c. 30, n. 1: “The reward of virtue will be He Himself [God], who gave the virtue and promised Himself to it, than whom nothing can be better or greater.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 801).—IDEM, Tr. in Ioa., III, n. 21: “Do not love God for the sake of a reward; let Him Himself be your reward.” (P. L., XXXV, 1405).—IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., LXXIX, n. 14: “You [God] will be the whole reward of the justified.” (P. L., XXXVI, 1028).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 17, art. 2: “The hope of which we now speak attains God by relying on His help to obtain the good hoped for. An effect must be proportionate to its cause. And therefore the good which we ought primarily and principally to hope for from God is the infinite good proportionate to the power of God who assists us, for it belongs to infinite power to lead to an infinite good. This good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For nothing less is to be hoped for from Him than He Himself, since His goodness, by which He communicates good things to creatures, is not less than His essence. And therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal beatitude.”

¹² Matt. VI, 9–13, 33; 1 Tim. IV, 8.—St. Augustine, Enchirid., c. 114: “Of all the things that are to be faithfully believed, only those pertain to hope which are contained in the Lord’s Prayer.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 285).—IDEM, ibid., c. 115: “In the Evangelist Matthew the Lord’s Prayer appears to contain seven petitions, in three of which eternal things are asked, and in the remaining four temporal things, which nevertheless are necessary for obtaining eternal things.” (P. L., XL, 285).—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. VIII, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1900, pp. 205 sqq.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 3 sqq.

The primary formal object of hope is God, in so far as He is the Sovereign Good and, as such, capable of satisfying the human heart, and be- cause He has promised us eternal salvation for the sake of Jesus Christ; in other words, God’s infinite goodness towards us, His omnipotence, and His fidelity to His promises.¹³ Secondary motives are the merits acquired through His grace, which are not fruits of human righteousness, but free gifts of God,¹⁴ and the intercession of the Saints or of our fellowmen; for in all these things the hope of the Christian is directed medi- ately to God Himself, or to Christ, who is “the one mediator between God and men.”¹⁵

¹³ Acts IV, 12; Rom. IX, 32; Eph. I, 19 sq.; II, 4–7; Phil. I, 6; 2 Tim. I, 12; Heb. VI, 17 sq.; X, 23; 1 Pet. I, 3; V, 7.—St. Augustine, De Trinit., l. XIII, c. 10, n. 13: “What was so necessary for raising up our hope as that it should be shown to us how highly God values us and how greatly He loves us? And what more manifest and splendid indication of this could there be than that the Son of God deigned to enter into fellowship with our nature?” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 1024).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 18, art. 4, ad 2: “Hope does not rest principally upon grace already possessed, but upon divine omnipotence and mercy, through which even one who does not have grace can obtain it and thus arrive at eternal life. Everyone who has faith is certain of the omnipotence and mercy of God.”—Cfr. Ph. Kneib, Die “Lohnsucht” in der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904, pp. 7 sqq.

¹⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 16: “Far be it that a Christian man should trust or glory in himself and not in the Lord, whose goodness toward all men is so great that He wills His own gifts to be their merits.”—St. Augustine, Epist., 194 (al. 105), c. 5, n. 19: “What merit does man have before grace, by which merit he might receive grace, since nothing but grace produces every good merit of ours in us, and when God crowns our merits, He crowns nothing other than His own gifts?” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 880).—IDEM, Serm., 170 (al. 49, De Temp.), n. 10: “When you depart from here, you will receive according to the merits and deeds which you have performed. Then God will crown not so much your merits as His gifts to you.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 932).—IDEM, Serm., 333, n. 5 (P. L., XXXVIII, 1466); Confess., l. IX, c. 13, n. 34 (P. L., XXXII, 778); Enarr. in Ps., 98, n. 8 (P. L., XXXVII, 1246); ibid., 144, n. 11 (P. L., XXXVIII, 1876); ibid., 126, n. 4: “No one has anything good unless he has received it from Him who alone is good.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1670).—On the Catholic doctrine of supernatural merit see Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 397 sqq.; P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918, pp. 47 sqq.; G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London and New York 1920, pp. 158 sqq.

¹⁵ 1 Tim. II, 5; cfr. Heb. XII, 24; Jas. V, 16 sqq.—H. Denifle, O.P., Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 400 sqq.—K. Krogh-Tonning, Der letzte Scholastiker, Freiburg 1904, p. 209.—On Christ as the Mediator of mankind see Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, 3rd ed., St. Louis 1919, pp. 5 sqq.; on the intercession of the Saints, Pohle-Preuss, Mariology, 3rd ed., St. Louis 1919, pp. 142 sqq.

3. NECESSITY OF HOPE.—a) Hope is a necessary means of salvation for all who have attained the use of reason. Hope corresponds to an elemental need of human nature. “We are saved by hope,” says St. Paul,¹⁶ and Christ Himself demands trust and confidence in God as an indispensable condition for the forgiveness of sins.¹⁷ The sinner must hope (actualiter) in order to prepare himself for justification, and after he has been justified, he must hope (habitualiter) in order to obtain the grace of prayer and to persevere and grow in the favor of God.

¹⁶ Rom. VIII, 24.

¹⁷ Matt. IX, 22, 28–30; Luke XVIII, 42.—Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 6 and 7.

The Church has condemned the opinion that perfect charity excludes hope.¹⁸ This condemnation is in entire harmony with Holy Scripture, which admonishes us again and again to have unlimited confidence in the omnipotence, the goodness, and the mercy of God.¹⁹ b) In proportion to the necessity of hope is the duty of cultivating this virtue, keeping it alive and nourishing it in the soul. Innumerable are the passages in which the Bible exhorts us to hope in God and confide in His mercy.²⁰ However, it is not necessary to make explicit acts of hope, except in times of special temptation against this virtue.²¹ The most effective means of preserving and increasing hope are prayer, meditating on the divine goodness and fidelity, eliciting frequent acts of this virtue, and thanking God for the favors He confers upon us.²² The Church specially recommends the frequent and confident invocation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is the refuge of sinners and the help of Christians.²³

¹⁸ Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., n. 1 and 23 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1327, 1349).

¹⁹ Ps. IV, 6; Matt. XI, 12; Heb. X, 23.

²⁰ Ps. XXVI, 14; Luke XII, 32; John XIV, 1; 1 Tim. VI, 17; Heb. X, 35.—Cfr. Prop. Damnat. ab Alex. VII., n. 1 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101).

²¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 186.

²² Ps. XXIV, 2 sqq.; Matt. VI, 25 sqq.; Luke XV, 11 sqq.; Rom. V, 1 sqq.; VIII, 23 sqq.; Phil. I, 6.

²³ “Refugium peccatorum,” “Auxilium Christianorum” (Litany of Loreto).—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 188: “The principal remedies opposed to despair are: 1. consideration of the infinite goodness and mercy of God; 2. frequent recollection of the greatest sinners who obtained pardon; 3. meditation on the parables of the holy Gospel, especially of the lost sheep; 4. special devotion to the Blessed Virgin, the refuge of sinners; 5. confidence in Christ affixed to the cross for us, etc.”

READINGS.—Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 16.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 17 sq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 396–400.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 47–54.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 240–247.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 55–64.—F. Abert, S. Thom. Aqu. Compend. Theol., pp. 457 sq., 461 sqq., 472 sqq.—G. Mayer, System der christl. Hoffnung, Leipsic 1900.—J. B. Ferreres, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., Barcelona 1918, pp. 192 sqq.—Thos. Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 177 sq.—G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London and New York 1920, pp. 80 sqq.—P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918, pp. 28 sqq.

Utility. - From this treatise the moral theologian chiefly has to gather arguments for raising and increasing the souls of the faithful by perpetual hope and confidence, and criteria by which true despair and presumption contrary to the theological virtue are distinguished from other sins of the same name.

The order of speaking will be this: first we shall explain the notion, necessity, and use of hope; then briefly the sins against hope.

I. Notion. — Hope is a theological virtue by which, relying on the goodness, omnipotence, and fidelity of God in His promises, we are raised in soul to a certain expectation of beatitude and consequently of the means which are necessary for obtaining it. Hope formally consists in that elevation of soul and firm expectation. But we do not hope except for what we have known as desirable and possible of attainment, although difficult. Wherefore hope is said to be of a future, arduous, possible good (St. Thomas, Q. De Spe, art. 1). The infinite perfection of God, by which He Himself supremely befits the creature, declares that He is supremely concupiscible. At the same time, however, He is in Himself altogether inaccessible to us, so that hope of possessing God must rest in no way upon our own powers or actions, but wholly upon divine assistance. Therefore the formal object of hope, or the motive on which it rests, is the Omnipotence of God, His Supreme relative Goodness, and His fidelity in promises. But our merits, if we are adults, are a condition appended to the attainment of the thing hoped for. Moreover, he hopes more perfectly who, in the state of grace, actually has merits than he who only proposes to acquire future ones (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 65, art. 4). Eternal beatitude, or God beatifying, is the primary material object of hope; the means or necessary aids are its secondary material object. That beatitude directly terminates hope as it is objective, or God to be possessed in Himself; yet at the same time, in oblique, the subjective happiness of His possession is intended.

But God is not desired by the one hoping as a means of enjoying another good, but as the very good which the one hoping desires to enjoy; and love of God as relatively good by no means excludes the love by which we love God for His own sake; just as the divine amiability as to us by no means removes, but presupposes, the infinite amiability of God in Himself and for His own sake.

Hope presupposes faith: what we hope and why we hope must suitably be apprehended; theologically I cannot expect what theologically I do not know. It is begun in a theological affection or love of its primary object, or of God, insofar as He is discerned by the light of faith and is believed to be our supreme good, infinitely to be sought. Hope formally gives us a true ambition, proportioned to the thing, for this good. Insofar as we raise ourselves to attaining so arduous a good, hope is an outstanding magnanimity of the Christian; insofar as we dare this, relying on the divine promise and trusting in God, hope is glorious to God; insofar as by free will we cooperate with the inviting grace of God, hope is of the greatest merit for us.

Through hope we participate in the immutable will by which God loves and wills His beatitude; indeed it confers upon us a certain anticipated possession of so great a beatitude; in which sense Paul called us "rejoicing in hope" (Rom. 12, 12). On the part of God, the attainment of the hoped-for good is certain: hence the firmness of hope; on our part, it can fail per accidens: hence the fear and trembling with which, from the Apostle (Phil. 2, 12), our salvation is to be worked out by us.

Confidence itself is "hope strengthened from some firm opinion"; it is a certain mode and perfection of hope (2, 2, q. 129, art. 6, ad 3).

The various things which are controverted concerning the material and formal object of hope we leave to dogmatic lectures.

II. Necessity of Hope. — Without hope there can be no charity, since it is repugnant to our nature that we love what in no way is our good. Therefore both the habit of hope is an essential part of justification for every man, and the act of hope has, in an adult, necessity both of means and of precept.

This precept obliges per se, or from the virtue of hope: 1. At the beginning of moral life, as a part of voluntary conversion to God, our end (thus St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 89, art. 6; but cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 122); - 2. For recovering the habit of hope which has been lost through an act of despair or one repugnant to hope; - 3. For overcoming a temptation of despair, if it is a necessary means; - 4. As many wish, around the end of life, when a conscious man, by an almost necessary inclination, will aspire to heaven, unless he contemns heaven; - 5. Sometimes in life. How often? This cannot be defined. But in fulfilling the duties of Christian life, acts sufficient in number will not be lacking. Cf. the things said concerning faith.

The same precept of hope obliges by accident: 1. As often as acts are imposed which contain a virtual use of hope: prayer, penance, charity; - 2. When a tempted man is in proximate danger of consent, unless he raises his soul by hope: if, however, he is conscious of this connection.

— Detractors of the Catholic faith preach a gratuitous love of virtue, and deny the true moral honesty of an action which is commanded by fear of hell or hope of eternal reward. In this attack of theirs, first, they are shamefully deceived concerning the true nature of hope and fear. They entirely pass over the theological essence of hope; they hold as vulgar cupidity the sublime participation of anticipated divine beatitude; the desired good or reward they thrust down to a certain supreme but vulgar delight, while there is question of the very intrinsic and supernatural perfection of man; they suppose the affection to be human, while it is a communication of that most holy love by which God loves His own beatitude. Then they are ignorant, or pretend to be ignorant, that in Catholic doctrine fear servilely servile is not made honorable, but only that fear which excludes affection for sin; nor is hope praised, or indeed able to subsist, with the exclusion of the superior motive which is love. But by their preaching of gratuitous virtue, they sin against human nature, which by an invincible tendency can love nothing unless it is in some way its own good; logically they would have to condemn all social institutions which, in order to restrain the wicked and stimulate the good, promise penalties for delicts and a just reward for good deeds. Wherefore their preaching is shown to be perfectly sterile.

How much more happily that outstanding exhorter of most perfect charity, St. Paul, keeps the eyes of the Christian athlete intent on the heavenly prize, while he inculcates to him faith which works through charity. Hence R. P. Bover, S.I. (La ascetica de S. Pablo, p. 90), commends this formula of action as Pauline: "Faith works through charity on account of hope."

— I. Hope is a theological virtue by which, relying on the goodness, omnipotence, and fidelity of God in His promises, we are raised in soul to a certain expectation of beatitude, and consequently of the means which are required for obtaining it. In that elevation of soul and firm expectation, hope formally consists. The relative assisting Goodness of God, His Omnipotence and Fidelity in promises, constitute its formal object. God beatifying, connoting the beatific vision, is its primary material object, while the secondary consists in the necessary means or aids. Hope presupposes faith and is begun in the theological affection or love of God (imperfect charity). It is at the same time glorious to God, magnanimous and meritorious for us. On the part of God, the attainment of the hoped-for good is certain; on our part, per accidens, it can fail.

Confidence is a certain mode and perfection of hope, insofar as it is hope strengthened from some firm opinion.

II. Since without hope there can be no charity, its habit is an essential part of justification; and its act has, in the adult, necessity of means and of precept.

III. The precept obliges per se and by accident, almost as was said concerning faith, except that the obligation of an act of hope immediately from the use of reason is controverted. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 122.

IV. Since we wish to enjoy God Himself, and the love of God as good to us by no means excludes, but indeed prepares, love of God for His own sake, hope can fall under no reproach. The preachers of gratuitous love of virtue are deceived by ignorance, and sin against human nature.

534. Definition. The theological virtue of hope can be defined: a virtue of the will divinely infused, by which with certain confidence on account of the omnipotence of God assisting, we await and pursue both eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it.

For a fuller explanation of this definition we shall deal separately 1. with the object of hope; 2. with the subject of hope; 3. with the properties of hope.

535. As was already said above concerning the object of faith (n. 481), a threefold object of some virtue is distinguished, namely the material object, the formal object which, and the formal object by which.

1. The primary material object of hope is eternal beatitude; but secondarily it is all the means conducting to beatitude.

Thus all theologians teach; and it is drawn from Sacred Scripture: "That, justified by His grace, we may be heirs according to the hope of eternal life."⁶ "We are the children of saints, and we await that life which God will give to those who never change their faith from Him."⁷ St. Thomas⁸ writes about this matter: "For nothing less is to be hoped for from Him than He Himself, since His goodness, by which He communicates goods to the creature, is not less than His essence; and therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal beatitude." - But that the secondary object of hope is all the means necessary for eternal beatitude is clear in itself; because man is not able by his own powers to acquire eternal beatitude. Such means are all graces by which man is enlightened and strengthened for exercising works of virtue; indeed also temporal goods, but only insofar as they are means to eternal beatitude. The general principle is: It is licit to hope for the things which it is licit to ask for in prayer. Or, as St. Augustine says: "Those things pertain to hope which are contained in the Lord's Prayer."⁹

2. The formal object which of theological hope is God about to beatify us by supernatural beatitude.

Thus the more common and truer opinion,¹⁰ which is proved in this way by Billuart:¹¹ "The formal object which and the immediate object of hope ought to be something purely divine and uncreated, as is clear in charity and in faith, and because otherwise religion, which by means of worship reaches God, would be a theological virtue, which is commonly denied. But only objective beatitude, or God Himself, is something divine and uncreated, not formal beatitude, which is a created act. Therefore ... It is confirmed: the object into which the movement of hope or desire tends and in which it rests when it attains that object is the same, just as the place into which a stone tends and in which it rests is the same. But the formal object which and the immediate object of rest and fruition of God is God Himself, as infinite good, not something created. Therefore ..."

From what has been said, the true nature and dignity of hope appears. For although in hope there is love of concupiscence, nevertheless that is not the ultimate motive, because we indeed hope for the possession of God and in this possession we desire our beatitude, but we do not stop there; for we order that beatitude of ours further to the honor of God. Besides, since we openly profess that beatitude consists in union with God, we greatly honor God by acknowledging His infinite goodness. Hence Lutherans, Calvinists, Baius, Jansenists, Quietists, and several moderns err when they think that it is something dishonorable and vile to act on account of reward, as Catholics do by performing virtues on account of eternal reward.¹² For often in Sacred Scripture we are admonished to do good works with a view to eternal recompense: "Everyone who contends in a contest abstains from all things; and they indeed, that they may receive a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible one."¹³ "Be faithful unto death, and I will give thee the crown of life."¹⁴ "I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications forever, on account of retribution."¹⁵ Deservedly, therefore, the Council of Trent reproved those "who state that in all works the just sin, if in them by stirring up their own sloth ... they also have regard to eternal recompense."¹⁶

⁶ Tit. 3, 7.

⁷ Tob. 2, 18.

⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 2; cf. also ib. ad 2.

⁹ Enchir. c. 114 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 285).

¹⁰ Durandus (In 3 Sent. disp. 26, q. 2) thinks that subjective beatitude alone is the immediate object of hope, but that God is the mediate object; Coninck (De act. supern. disp. 19, dub. 3, n. 42), Ripalda (De spe disp. 23, sect. 4, n. 34), Chr. Pesch (Prael. dogm. VIII, 477) think that the object of hope is composed of objective and subjective beatitude. On the contrary, St. Thomas and the Thomists commonly teach that objective beatitude is the immediate object of hope, but that subjective beatitude, or the beatific vision, is only a condition of reaching this object. Billuart (Diss. de spe a. 2) well refutes the opinion proposed by Coninck, Ripalda, and Chr. Pesch: "The aggregate from formal and objective beatitude cannot be called the formal object which of hope, both because that aggregate is not something purely divine and uncreated, and because formal (subjective) and objective beatitude in the object of hope are not two things or two causes, but only one thing and one cause with the application of the cause, so that the whole formal reason of the object is objective beatitude or God, but His possession only the condition required that He may beatify; just as when fire applied to wood burns, fire and application are not two causes, but only one, which is fire alone; for in it alone is the whole power of burning, none in the application, but it is required only that the power of fire reach the wood and act upon it."

¹¹ Diss. de spe a. 1.

¹² Cf. Ph. Kneib, Die Jenseitsmoral im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen (1906), 109 sqq.

¹³ 1 Cor. 9, 25.

¹⁴ Apoc. 2, 10.

¹⁵ Ps. 118, 112.

¹⁶ Sess. 6, cap. 11 de iustif. (Denz. n. 804).

536. 3. The formal object by which of hope is omnipotence assisting, i.e. providing or offering helps. Thus St. Thomas.¹⁷

Theologians do not agree on this point. The Scotists and Suarez teach that the formal object by which, or the proper motive of our hope, is the highest goodness of God. But some place the motive of hope in the fidelity of God, who promised eternal life to those who keep the commandments. Others (St. Alphonsus,¹⁸ Bouquillon, Tanquerey, Schilling, etc.) place the motive of hope in the three moments just recounted taken together. Hence Tanquerey¹⁹ posits the proposition: "The adequate motive of hope is God's goodness toward us, and at the same time His helping power, and also His fidelity in keeping promises." Without doubt these three moments ought to intervene in an act of theological hope, just as motives of credibility and the preambles of faith are also necessary for an act of faith; but if it is asked what constitutes the proper motive of theological hope, this seems to be the omnipotence of God assisting. This indeed can be proved by the following reason: "That is the formal object by which of hope into which its last resolution is made, just as the formal object of faith is that into which its last resolution is made. But the last resolution of our hope is made into omnipotence assisting; for to one asking why you hope for beatitude, you adequately answer, because God can and wills to give it, just as to one asking why you believe God to be one and triune, you adequately answer, because God, who is truthful, has revealed it."²⁰ Certainly God wills to give us the reward of eternal life because He is supremely good toward us and because He promised this to us, but each is a certain preamble to hope, and is not the very motive of hope. For God as supremely good toward us is reached by love of concupiscence, which is presupposed to hope itself; but the promise of God is something extrinsic, since theological hope is at least possible without this promise. St. Thomas²¹ expresses this doctrine thus: "Hope of attaining eternal life has two objects, namely eternal life, which one hopes for, and divine help, from which one hopes; just as faith also has two objects, namely the thing which it believes and First Truth, to which it corresponds. ... Thus, therefore, just as the formal object of faith is First Truth, through which as through a certain means it assents to those things which are believed, which are the material object of faith; so also the formal object of hope is the help of divine power and mercy, on account of which the movement of hope tends into the hoped-for goods, which are the material object of hope." In another place the Angelic Doctor says forcefully: "But of hope, according as it is a theological virtue, the formal object is divine help, to which it adheres."²²

Corollary. From what has been said about the object of hope, it follows that it is a theological virtue and that it is distinct from faith and charity.^22a For the formal object which of hope is indeed God, just as He is the object of faith and charity; but the formal object by which of hope differs from the formal object by which both of faith (which is God as true) and of charity (which is God as good in Himself).

¹⁷ Quaest. disp. de spe a. 1.

¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 2, 21.

¹⁹ Synopsis Theol. mor. II, 697.

²⁰ Thus Billuart, Diss. de spe a. 2.

²¹ Quaest. disp. de spe a. 1.

²² Quaest. disp. de spe a. 4.

^22a S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 5 and 6.

537. Scholion. On the secondary motives of hope. Therefore the proper motive of hope is God the helper, good and faithful. Nevertheless, besides God, we can place our hope also in creatures, but only as secondary causes acting under God.^22b The most noble among these creatures is the humanity of Christ, which was the instrument of God for accomplishing our redemption. After the humanity of Christ come the saints and especially the Blessed Virgin, by whose merits and prayers we can rightly hope to be helped. Then also our merits acquired under the influence of grace found in us hope of eternal life. Yet the first and last cause of our hope must always remain God, to whom we can say with the prophet Isaiah: "Behold God is my savior; I will act confidently and will not fear, because my strength and my praise is the Lord, and He has been made salvation for me";²³ or more briefly with the Psalmist: "My God is my helper, and I will hope in Him."²⁴

^22b Ib. a. 4.

²³ Is. 12, 2.

²⁴ Ps. 17, 3.

538. The proximate subject, i.e. the faculty of the soul in which theological hope resides, is not the sensible appetite nor the intellect, but the will. Thus almost all Catholics teach with St. Thomas, who says: "Hope is in the higher appetite, which is called the will."²⁵ The reason is that the object of hope is a spiritual good, which is not attained except by the spiritual appetite, namely, by the will.

The remote subject of the virtue of hope, or the persons in whom true theological hope is found, are the following:

1. All the faithful, even sinners, except those who fall a) into formal heresy, or b) into presumption or desperation.

2. Souls detained in purgatory.

As to 1: The Council of Trent requires hope for the justification of an impious adult, teaching concerning the preparation for the remission of sins: "While, understanding that they are sinners, by turning themselves from the fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, to considering the mercy of God, they are raised up into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ."²⁶ Therefore the Council manifestly supposes that hope can remain in a sinner. - But the intrinsic reason is that the foundation of hope is faith, which remains in sinners, as was said above, n. 492. But a sinner having true faith can elicit an act of supernatural hope (with the aid of actual grace), namely, by hoping that through the merits of Christ he will obtain the remission of sins and at last eternal beatitude. Moreover, nothing prevents such an act of hope from proceeding from a true virtue of hope previously possessed and not yet wholly destroyed.²⁷ - But the virtue of hope is necessarily destroyed: a) Through formal heresy, since it destroys faith and therefore the very foundation of hope. Hence St. Augustine says excellently: "Faith believes, hope and charity pray, but without faith they cannot exist.... Neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor either without faith."²⁸ b) Through presumption and gravely culpable desperation, as directly contrary to the virtue of hope. For contraries destroy one another.

As to 2: Although the souls in purgatory are certain of obtaining salvation, nevertheless they do not yet have it, nor are they able to arrive at it except by tolerating grave punishments. Eternal beatitude, therefore, is for them a future, arduous, possible good, and consequently has all the conditions of the object of hope.²⁹

²⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 18, a. 1.

²⁶ Sess. 6, c. 6 de iustif. (Denz. n. 798).

²⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 4.

²⁸ Enchir. c. 7 et 8.

²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 18, a. 3.

539. Corollaries. From what has been said it follows that hope is not:

a) in Christ, since from the beginning of His conception He was a comprehensor and always enjoyed the blessed vision.³⁰

b) in the blessed, for the same reason. For they already possess beatitude; therefore they cannot hope for it as future, according to this: "But hope which is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he hope?"³¹ For this reason St. Augustine³² beautifully says: "Hope will no longer be when the thing will be." Some theologians indeed (Suarez, Ripalda, Becanus) assert that the blessed can hope for accidental beatitude for themselves, and even essential beatitude for men who are wayfarers. But St. Thomas denies this, because accidental beatitude for the blessed does not have the character of something arduous and difficult, since the blessed will have this beatitude without any difficulty or uncertainty. But the hope by which the blessed hope beatitude for wayfarers is not hope properly theological, but taken in a broader sense. For every theological hope presupposes love of concupiscence, as was already said above. Hence if someone on this earth hopes for the eternal salvation of his neighbor, he does this because the neighbor is another self, and his beatitude increases his own beatitude. But in the blessed every such love of concupiscence is impossible. Therefore the blessed indeed desire the beatitude of wayfarers, but such a desire proceeds from the love of charity and not from hope.

c) in the damned. The reason is obvious; for hope is concerning future possible beatitude. But the damned know that beatitude is impossible for them, and consequently that their hope is vain and fruitless. Moreover, the damned no longer have theological faith; but without theological faith hope is impossible, since faith is the foundation of hope.³³ Hence it is said: "When the impious man is dead, there will be no further hope."³⁴

d) in formal heretics, since they lack faith, which is the necessary foundation of hope, as was already said above.

e) in a man who is despairing or presumptuous, since desperation and presumption (at least perfect) destroy hope as being contrary to it.

³⁰ Ib. a. 2 ad 1; 3, q. 7, a. 4.

³¹ Rom. 8, 24.

³² Sermo 158, n. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 38, 866).

³³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 18, a. 2 ad 3.

³⁴ Prov. 11, 7.

540. Scholion. On the opinion of St. Thomas concerning the object and subject of hope. Briefly and excellently the Angelic Doctor explains the object and proximate subject of the virtue of hope, at the same time indicating its difference from desire, cupidity, and similar things: "It is manifest that to hope implies a certain movement of the appetitive power tending toward a good, not indeed as joy and delight do, but as something to be attained, as also desire and cupidity do. Yet hope differs from desire in two ways: first indeed, because desire is commonly of any good whatsoever, and therefore is attributed to the concupiscible; but hope is of an arduous good, which is difficult to attain, and therefore is attributed to the irascible. Secondly, because desire is of some good absolutely, without consideration of its possibility; but hope tends toward some good as toward that which is possible to acquire; for it implies in its notion a certain security of acquisition. Thus, therefore, in the object of hope four things are considered: first indeed, that it is good, by which it differs from fear; secondly, that it is of future good, by which it differs from joy or delight; thirdly, that it is of arduous good, by which it differs from desire; fourthly, that it is of possible good, by which it differs from desperation. - But it is possible to have something from someone in two ways: in one way through one's own power, in another way through the help of another; for those things which are possible through friends we call possible in some way. Thus, therefore, sometimes a man hopes to acquire something through his own power; sometimes indeed through another's help; and such hope has expectation, inasmuch as a man looks to the help of another. And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be borne toward two objects, namely, toward the good to be acquired, and toward him upon whose help it rests. But the highest good, which is eternal beatitude, man cannot acquire except through divine help, according to that of Romans 6:23: The grace of God is eternal life. And therefore the hope of acquiring eternal life has two objects, namely eternal life, which one hopes for, and divine help, from which one hopes.... Just as the formal object of faith is First Truth, through which, as through a certain medium, it assents to those things which are believed..., so also the formal object of hope is the help of divine power and piety; on account of which the movement of hope tends toward the hoped-for goods, which are the material object of hope."³⁵

³⁵ Quaest. disp. de spe a. 1.

541. Three properties of hope can be enumerated, namely, supernaturality, efficacy, firmness.

1. That theological hope is supernatural is easily understood, because it is an infused virtue, whose a) motive or formal object by which is wholly supernatural, namely, the omnipotence of God assisting, and b) formal object which is likewise supernatural, namely, objective eternal beatitude.

2. Hope ought to be efficacious and living; for we not only expect, but also must courageously pursue eternal beatitude and the means conducive to it. Hence St. Thomas says:³⁶ "Hope makes one tend into God as into a certain final good to be attained."

3. As to the third property of hope, namely, its firmness, a distinction is needed: theological hope, insofar as it regards God, is absolutely firm; but insofar as it supposes our cooperation, it includes uncertainty and fear.

Before the proof of this assertion, it must be noted that certitude properly belongs to the intellect and includes two things: on the part of the object, that it be infallibly true (infallibility); on the part of the subject, that the man adhere to the object without fluctuation or doubt (firmness). This certitude, which is proper to the intellect, is participated in by the will according to an objective and a subjective respect. On the part of the object, insofar as the object, i.e. eternal beatitude, infallibly corresponds to the act of hoping, and thus that act is called "unfrustrable"; on the part of the subject, insofar as the will firmly adheres to this object, excluding fluctuation and doubt, and so the act of hope is called firm. But the object of hope, or eternal beatitude, is obtained by us through a twofold cause, namely, the omnipotence of God assisting and our cooperation.

That our hope is supremely firm, if the help of God is considered, is clear both from Sacred Scripture and from the Council of Trent, and from theological reason. For in many places Sacred Scripture inculcates this firmness, e.g. the Psalmist says: "My God, in Thee I trust; let me not be ashamed. Neither let my enemies laugh at me; for all who await Thee shall not be confounded";³⁷ and elsewhere³⁸ it is said: "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped; let me not be confounded forever." St. Paul extols hope in these words: "Wherein God, willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of His counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have strongest consolation, who have fled for refuge to hold fast the hope set before us, which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm, and entering in even to the interior of the veil."³⁹ This is confirmed by the Council of Trent, saying: "All ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God."⁴⁰ - But the reason for this doctrine is evident. For theological hope is founded upon certain faith in God's omnipotence, goodness, and fidelity, which can never fail or deceive. Consequently our hope and confidence in God must be as firm as our faith is certain.⁴¹ Besides, all theologians agree in this matter.

On our part, however, hope admits a certain uncertainty, for although God cannot be lacking to us, nevertheless we can be lacking to God; and because God does not will to save us without our cooperation, hence it is that, considering our own infirmity, inconstancy, and malice, we rightly can, and even ought, to fear lest we lose eternal salvation. Nevertheless this fear ought to be moderated, lest it pass into pusillanimity or into desperation. - That hope, as far as concerns our part, is not supremely certain and excluding all fear (as the Lutherans taught) is manifestly drawn from Sacred Scripture: "Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or hatred; but all things are kept uncertain for the future."⁴² St. Paul warns the faithful: "Therefore he who thinks himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall."⁴³ Indeed he says of himself: "For I am conscious of nothing to myself, yet I am not hereby justified; but He who judges me is the Lord.... I chastise my body and bring it into servitude, lest perhaps, after I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."⁴⁴ The Council of Trent taught the same:⁴⁵ "For just as no pious person ought to doubt concerning the mercy of God, concerning the merit of Christ, and concerning the efficacy of the sacraments, so anyone, while he regards himself and his own proper infirmity and indisposition, can be apprehensive and fearful concerning his grace; since no one can know with the certitude of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God.... Nevertheless let those who think themselves to stand take heed lest they fall; and with fear and trembling let them work out their salvation in labors, in watchings, in alms, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity. For they ought to fear, knowing that they have been reborn unto the hope of glory and not yet unto glory."

³⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 6 ad 3.

³⁷ Ps. 24, 2 sq.

³⁸ Ps. 30, 2.

³⁹ Hebr. 6, 17 sqq.

⁴⁰ Sess. 6, c. 13 de iustif. (Denz. n. 806).

⁴¹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 18, a. 4.

⁴² Eccli. 9, 1 sq.

⁴³ 1 Cor. 10, 12.

⁴⁴ 1 Cor. 4, 4 et 9, 27.

⁴⁵ Sess. 6, c. 9 et 13 de iustif. (Denz. n. 802, 806).

542. Scholion. On fear. Therefore fear in this life is necessarily joined with hope; for it tempers hope, lest on one side it grow into false security, and on the other side, lest it fall into desperation. Hence St. Thomas, in the treatise on hope, also treats of the gift of fear.⁴⁶ Fear in general can be defined: a movement of the appetite fleeing an arduous and imminent evil; or, as is commonly said: "a trepidation of the mind on account of a future and impending danger." But fear of God includes a twofold moment, namely, the evil of punishment and the infinite power and majesty of God; and therefore the act of fear is not only to flee evil, but also to revere the highest majesty of God. Generally a fourfold fear is usually distinguished in relation to God: 1. worldly, 2. servile, 3. filial, 4. initial.

Worldly fear is a withdrawal from God on account of some imminent earthly evil; e.g. a man denies the faith because of fear of death. Worldly fear is morally evil, as is evident of itself.

Servile fear causes the observance of God's commandments on account of fear of punishment; it is subdivided into simply servile fear and servilely servile fear. He who acts from fear simply servile observes God's commandments indeed from fear of punishment, but also sincerely wills to avoid sins and from his heart expels every positive propensity to sin. But he who acts from fear servilely servile avoids sin solely on account of punishment, so that, if punishment did not exist, guilt would be committed. Fear servilely servile indeed restrains the hand from evil, but not the soul. The first servile fear is good and most useful, and therefore the Psalmist prays: "Pierce my flesh with Thy fear."⁴⁷ The second fear is evil, because it is something disordered, to fear punishment more than fault.

Filial fear makes one avoid sins and the transgression of God's commandments on account of love toward God; for the offense of the father is feared. This fear is most perfect. Indeed, it will remain even in heaven, at least as to substance; for it has two acts: to revere God and to fear separation from Him. The act of most perfect reverence remains in heaven, but fear of separation from God does not remain there, since the blessed are secure concerning their own glory.

Initial fear is midway between simply servile fear and filial fear; for it makes one avoid sin both on account of punishment and on account of the love of God. It does not differ essentially from filial fear, for it is as it were its beginning, although imperfect.⁴⁸ As charity increases, filial fear increases; for the more a man loves God, the more he fears to offend Him and to be separated from Him. But as charity increases, servile fear is diminished; both because the more someone loves God, the less he attends to his own good; and also because, by charity adhering more fervently to God, he trusts more concerning the reward and consequently fears punishment less.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 19.

⁴⁷ Ps. 118, 120.

⁴⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 19, a. 8.

⁴⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 19, a. 10.

Just as there is a necessity of means and a necessity of precept for faith, so likewise there exists this twofold necessity of hope. Hence let there be:

543. Proposition 1. Habitual hope infused by God is necessary for salvation for children as well as adults, and always has been necessary by necessity of means.

It is proved. No one will obtain eternal salvation without sanctifying grace. But together with sanctifying grace all the theological virtues are infused.⁵⁰ Therefore hope also will necessarily be present together with sanctifying grace. Hence the Council of Trent teaches: "Faith, unless hope and charity are added to it, neither unites perfectly with Christ nor makes one a living member of His body."⁵¹

⁵⁰ Cf. above, n. 472.

⁵¹ Sess. 6, c. 7 de iustif. (Denz. n. 800).

544. Proposition 2. Actual hope, or some act of hope, has always been necessary for salvation for all adults having the use of reason, by necessity of means.

It is proved. a) No adult obtains eternal salvation without theological faith, as was proved above, n. 496. But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. Therefore wherever there is true and perfect faith, there also an act of hope is elicited. And indeed the first movement of the will which connaturally follows faith is confidence of obtaining salvation.

b) Moreover, eternal salvation is given to all adults as a reward and not as a pure inheritance. But no one of sound mind works for some reward unless he has firm confidence of obtaining it. Hence St. Paul says: "For by hope we have been saved."⁵²

c) It is added that no one will obtain eternal salvation without final perseverance. But final perseverance does not fall under merit strictly so called (as is taught in the treatise on grace), but can only be obtained by prayer. But true impetratory prayer is impossible without firm hope and confidence, since this is an essential property of prayer. Therefore hope is absolutely necessary for obtaining eternal salvation. St. Augustine says fittingly: "The house of God [beatitude] is founded by believing, raised up by hoping, perfected by loving."⁵³

⁵² Rom. 8, 24.

⁵³ Sermo 27, c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 38, 178).

545. Proposition 3. An act of hope is also necessary for all adults having the use of reason by necessity of a positive divine precept.

It is proved. Very many places from Sacred Scripture are brought forward in which that precept is contained, e.g.: "Hope in Him, all the congregation of the people."⁵⁴ "Command the rich of this world not ... to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God."⁵⁵ St. Paul inculcates the precept of hope especially upon the rich, because riches are not rarely an obstacle to hoping in a higher beatitude than that which riches give. But to all the same Apostle says: "Let us live piously in this world, expecting the blessed hope."⁵⁶

The divine precept of hope obliges just as the precept of faith does, namely, per se and per accidens.

It obliges per se:

1. At the beginning of the moral life, i.e. at the beginning of perfect use of reason. The reason is that then the precept of faith obliges. But faith in God the rewarder necessarily causes an act of hope.

2. At the article of death. For if ever hope is necessary, then certainly this is at the article of death, when man is constituted at the boundary of this and the other life, and when he is about to receive the recompense for his merits at once.

3. At some times in life, as is clear from the condemnation of the proposition already cited above: "A man is never, at any time of his life, bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to these virtues."⁵⁷ - But if it is asked how often a man is bound to elicit an act of theological hope, authors do not agree, and there are the same dissensions and uncertainties which were indicated above, n. 502, concerning the act of faith. For practice there is no difficulty, since formal hope is not necessarily required, but virtual hope suffices, and any Christian living and praying religiously already sufficiently satisfies this precept by any pious deprecatory prayer, eliciting an act of virtual hope.

It obliges per accidens:

1. When a grave temptation against hope urges, e.g. a temptation of desperation, which cannot be conquered otherwise than through an act of hope; or if other temptations urge, which must be conquered either by prayer or by the very hope of divine help. Hence it can rightly be said: An act of hope obliges as often as there is an obligation of asking divine help.

2. When a precept must be fulfilled which cannot be done without an act of hope, e.g. the precept of receiving the sacrament of penance, the precept of praying, the precept of expelling admitted desperation, etc.

⁵⁴ Ps. 61, 9.

⁵⁵ 1 Tim. 6, 17.

⁵⁶ Tit. 2, 12 sq.

⁵⁷ Denz. n. 1101.

546. Corollary. The excellence and honesty of hope follow from what has been said, as does the falsity of Quietism and Semiquietism. For if hope is so commended and commanded in Sacred Scripture, it cannot be anything except honest and excellent. Hence the Council of Trent establishes: "If anyone says that the just ought not, for the good works which have been done in God, to expect and hope for an eternal recompense from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by acting well and by keeping the divine commandments they have persevered even to the end, let him be anathema."⁵⁸ Therefore falsely do many modern non-Catholics despise us as mercenaries, as though we did not live virtuously except for the obtaining of a reward. Certainly we live virtuously for the obtaining of beatitude, but we openly profess that this beatitude consists in union with God. Therefore God and His glory is our last end and the supreme motive of our actions. And so any good Catholic can say with St. Paul: "I wished myself to be anathema from Christ for my brethren";⁵⁹ but also: "I pursue toward the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation of God in Christ Jesus";⁶⁰ and: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day."⁶¹ - Quietism underwent diverse modifications in the course of time. Eckhart already seems to have erred concerning the utility of hope, and therefore the proposition was condemned by John XXII: "Those who do not intend things, nor honors, nor utility, nor internal devotion, nor sanctity, nor reward, nor the kingdom of heaven, but have renounced all these things, even what is their own, in those men God is honored."⁶² But naked and crude Quietism was defended by Michael de Molinos (1640-1696), who taught 68 propositions condemned by Innocent XI.⁶³ Thus, e.g., his proposition 12 was condemned: "He who has given his free will to God ought to have care about nothing, neither hell, nor paradise, nor ought he to have a desire of his own perfection, nor of virtues, nor of his own sanctity, nor of his own salvation, the hope of which he ought to purge away."⁶⁴ - Semiquietism indeed does not reject hope as something illicit, but teaches that there is a habitual state of love without hope. This doctrine was proposed by Fenelon⁶⁵ (1651-1715), bishop of Cambrai, but after the condemnation made by Innocent XII in 1699 he revoked it. Among the propositions condemned concerning this matter is found this one: "There is a habitual state of the love of God, which is pure charity and without any admixture of one's own interest. Neither fear of punishments nor desire of rewards has any further part in it. God is no longer loved on account of merit, nor on account of perfection, nor on account of happiness to be found in loving Him."⁶⁶

⁵⁸ Sess. 6, can. 26 de iustif. (Denz. n. 836).

⁵⁹ Rom. 9, 3.

⁶⁰ Phil. 3, 14.

⁶¹ 2 Tim. 4, 8.

⁶² Denz. n. 508.

⁶³ Cf. Denz. n. 1221-1288.

⁶⁴ Denz. n. 1232.

⁶⁵ Explications des maximes des Saints sur la vie intérieure, Paris 1697.

⁶⁶ Denz. n. 1327.

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, aa. 1 and 4; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1.

799. Thesis. The formal object of hope is the omnipotence of God giving aid. - The formal object of hope is that on account of which we hope for that which we hope. Moreover we hope for something because it seems to us possible of attainment; but something is possible to us in two ways, either through our own power or through the power or help of another. Hence by divine hope we hope on account of divine power or help. Now:

1. The divine power or help, that is, the attribute by which God assists us, is the aiding virtue of God, or God's very omnipotence insofar as it in fact gives aid to us. For if we ask someone: why do you hope for beatitude? he will rightly answer: because God is ready to assist us; and if we ask: by what does he assist us? he will answer: by his power. Hence the Scriptures constantly indicate as the motive of hope the help and strength of God (Gen. XV, 1; Ps. XVII, 3; LVI, 2; LXI, 7; CXVIII often; Is. XXVI, 4; II Kings XXII, 3; Prov. XVIII, 10; II Cor. IX, 8; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 13).

2. Nevertheless, the omnipotence of God would not help us unless God were benign and merciful (good toward us). Hence the Scriptures sometimes found hope upon divine mercy (Ps. XII, 6; LI, 10; CXVIII).

3. Similarly we would not be certain, nor would we hope firmly that the power of God helps us, unless he had promised this and were faithful in his promises. Hence the Scriptures found the certitude of hope upon fidelity (Heb. X, 23; Tit. I, 2).

Hence it is said by theologians that the formal object of hope is aiding omnipotence, insofar as it supposes the benignity of God by which it is moved and commanded, and insofar as it supposes the fidelity by which he is bound to helping us. Nevertheless the ultimate and immediate motive of hope is only aiding omnipotence.

St. Thomas aptly says, Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 1:

"It is possible for something to be had by someone in two ways: in one way through his own power; in another way through the help of another.... Thus therefore sometimes a man hopes to obtain something through his own power, sometimes through another's help.... And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be borne toward two objects, namely, toward the good to be obtained, and toward him on whose help he relies" ("The good which someone hopes to obtain," he says in II-II, q. 17, a. 4, "has the aspect of a final cause; but the help through which someone hopes to obtain that good has the aspect of an efficient cause"). "But man cannot obtain the supreme good, which is eternal beatitude, except through divine help... and therefore the hope of obtaining eternal life has two objects, namely, eternal life itself, which someone hopes for, and the divine help from which he hopes. Just as also faith has two objects, namely, the thing which it believes, and the first truth" (in speaking) "to which it corresponds. But faith does not have the nature of virtue except insofar as it adheres to the testimony of first truth.... Whence also hope has the nature of virtue from this very fact, that man adheres to the help of the divine power for attaining eternal life...."

800. Corollaries concerning various opinions not to be approved. - From what has been said, it is easily understood what must be judged concerning various opinions of theologians, who labor much in designating the divine attribute which performs the office of the formal object in hope.

a) Some simply say it is the omnipotence of God.¹ - But in order that we expect something from God, it is not enough that God can bear help to us for obtaining it; rather it is also required that he in fact bear it and help us. Hence the complete formal object is not omnipotence considered in itself and almost abstractly, but only insofar as it is in fact aiding.

¹ Thus several Thomists. The more eminent, however, indicate aiding omnipotence: thus Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Gotti, Contenson, Billuart, the Salmanticenses; also recently Waffelaert and Billot.

b) Others hold that it is divine mercy.² - But although mercy moves God to bearing help, nevertheless it is not that by which he immediately helps us and assists us; rather this is his power. But if a merciful one wished to bear help, yet did not have the power for it, every hope would become impossible; on the contrary, if he could help without benignity and in fact did help, whether he helped from mercy or not, provided nevertheless he helped, hope would subsist equally.

² Thus preachers are accustomed to speak. Very many theologians place mercy and omnipotence in the same line, because by each God gives aid. Thus Vasquez, Turrianus, Meratius, Malderus, Schiffini. St. Bonaventure seems to speak in the same way, III Sent., d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. - But St. Thomas constantly assigns divine help, virtue, the power of another, and by name of God, as the motive of hope. Cf. for example, I-II, q. 40, a. 2, ad 1, and a. 7; II-II, q. 17, aa. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 ad 3, and 7; q. 18, a. 2; Q. D. de Virt. 4, aa. 1 and 4.

c) Others say that it is God's fidelity in promises.³ - But again fidelity is not that by which he immediately bears help to us, although it gives certitude and firmness to hope. But if the faithful God wished to execute his promises, yet did not have the power, hope would be impossible; on the contrary, even if God had promised nothing or were not faithful in promises, provided that with some probability it appeared likely that he would help by his power, there would be a sufficient foundation for hoping, although this hope would not be certain.

³ For this opinion Juanin is alleged by St. Alphonsus, Th. M. l. II, n. 21.

d) Others, especially the very recent with St. Alphonsus, hold that those three together constitute the formal object.⁴ - But these do not solve the knot of the question, nor do they touch it. For 1. of each habit, just as of each act, there is only one formal object and proximate motive; hence it is impossible that these three concur equally principally for the motive of hope. Moreover 2. if one formal object is constituted from these three, it must still be shown how they concur into one, which the aforesaid authors do not sufficiently, or even in any way, indicate; moreover this cannot happen otherwise than in the mode indicated above, insofar as the mercy of God moves omnipotence to aid, and this is altogether certain from his fidelity.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, ibid. Lorea seems first to have defended this, whom Ripalda, Kilber, and many moderns followed: Theologia Mechliniensis, Haine, Bouquillon, Lehmkuhl, Genicot, Noldin, Aertnijs, Tanquerey, Vermeersch.

It remains, therefore, that aiding omnipotence alone, which is commanded by the mercy of God and executes his fidelity, is the formal object and immediate motive of hope: namely, mercy and fidelity are rather the reason why omnipotence helps than why we hope. - Or these two are also necessary to hope as a preamble, just as motives of credibility are a preamble of faith; but they are not the motive of hope itself.

e) Finally, others do not indicate a divine attribute as the formal object of hope, but speak too soberly by assigning only divine help.⁵ - Yet this is not to be understood as the created help of grace: for that is something which we hope for, and pertains to the material object; - and otherwise nothing created can be the motive of a theological or divine virtue (cf. n. 669). It remains, therefore, that the help is understood as uncreated, and this again is nothing other than aiding omnipotence (q. 18, a. 4, ad 2; q. 17, a. 6, ad 3).

⁵ Thus several of the ancients.

But if he also makes mention of divine piety or mercy, this is rather rare and accessory to power (II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2 and 3; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1), nor can it be opposed to his general theory concerning the motive of hope, namely, that the motive of hope is that by which something becomes possible, whether by one's own or another's virtue. Therefore do not conclude from these that according to St. Thomas mercy as well as power pertains to the motive of hope; rather understand that he sometimes also adds piety, because in some way, although remotely, it concurs for founding hope.

801. The proper motive of hope is not God as our supreme good. - Scotus teaches, whom Suarez follows, that the motive of hope is God insofar as he is our supreme good,⁶ or the goodness of God relative to us,⁷ that is, the infinite perfection of God insofar as, possessed by us, it perfectly quiets our appetite and completes all our desires. - This indeed is the motive of the love of concupiscence and of desire, which are necessarily presupposed to hope (as a preamble) and are virtually included in it; for we covet and desire God because to possess him is good and delightful to us. But this is not the motive of the act which is proper to hope, and which adds, beyond desire, the expectation of beatitude which is had with difficulty. For what is obtained with difficulty, nevertheless we hope for on account of the power of him from whom we are able to obtain it.

⁶ Thus Scotus, in III Sent., d. 26; Suarez, de Spe, disp. 1, sect. 3; Granados, Arriaga, Coninck, Wiggers, Harent. Cf. Ballerini, Opus theol. mor. II, de Spe, nn. 4 and 5; Schiffini, o. c., d. 5, sect. 3; Billot, o. c., th. 26.

⁷ The goodness of God toward us and his goodness relative to us should not be confused: the latter is the aptitude or capacity of quieting our appetite, insofar as God is our supreme good, possessed by whom nothing to be desired remains; but the former is the infinite propensity and inclination of God to diffuse his perfection and to communicate it to us.

802. Secondary motives of hope. - The power of God alone is the principal efficient cause which leads us to beatitude; hence from him alone as from the principal cause or the first moving cause can we hope. But God uses creatures as instruments by which he helps us in some way toward beatitude. Therefore from creatures, as from secondary and instrumental causes acting under God, we can hope for some aid for obtaining goods ordered to beatitude.

In this way: 1. we hope on account of the merits of Christ, our head, in view of which God promised eternal life and helps toward it (Council of Trent, sess. 6, cc. 3 and 7); in addition, by their virtue all things must be asked from God;

2. we hope on account of the prayers and merits of the Saints, especially of the Blessed Virgin Mary, mediatrix; indeed, on account of the prayers and helps of men dwelling on earth, and therefore we ask something from them;

3. we hope for our own merits, insofar as they are made from grace and are gifts of God; not indeed because in this way they are the motive of hoping, but because they are dispositions required so that we may arrive at eternal life (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, can. 26).

Nevertheless the power of God alone is the formal object of hope: for the merits of Christ, of the Saints, or of the one hoping himself do not help us, nor therefore move us to hoping, except dependently upon the very omnipotence of God, which uses them and from which they have efficacy, and which remains the foundation upon which our hope rests.

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2.

803. The material object of hope is that which we hope for; but this object is twofold: one principal or primary, which we hope for on account of itself and by reason of which we hope for the rest, and this is God himself as the supernatural end to be possessed by us, for we do not hope for all other things, such as remission of sins, grace, etc., except insofar as they have an order to God, so that we may be able to arrive at him as our supernatural end, or arrive better. The other is the secondary object, and this is all the means which conduce to beatitude.

804. Thesis. The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. - It is proved:

a) In Sacred Scripture hope is constantly described in relation to eternal life: it is called hope of eternal life (Tit. I, 2; III, 7), - and hope of the glory of the sons of God (Rom. V, 2); - it is the hope by which we expect that life which God is going to give to those who never change their faith from it (Tob. II, 18), and by which we know that we shall be like God because we shall see God as he is (I Jn. III, 2); - it is the hope which enters, that is, penetrates, even unto the inner parts of the veil, that is, unto hidden things, where Jesus has entered for us as forerunner (Heb. VI, 18). From all these things it appears that eternal life is the principal object of hope, whence Mt. VI, 33: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all things shall be added to you." - This having been posited, we reason thus:¹ The object which we hope to obtain, and that in which we rest when we have obtained it, are the same. But the principal object in which we rest in eternal life is God himself. Therefore God himself is the principal object of hope. Whence Ps. LXXII, 25: "What is there for me in heaven, and apart from thee what have I wished upon earth?... The God of my heart and God my portion forever."

¹ Therefore the thesis is not proved directly from the Scriptures, where it is not stated, but the theological argument is present, deduced from the Scriptures.

b) The material object of hope is everything which can be attained through the formal object; but the primary material object is that which is proportioned to the formal object. Now the formal object, the omnipotence of God giving aid, is infinite. Therefore the material object which is proportioned to it cannot be anything except the infinite good; and consequently it is God himself.

805. Opinion not to be approved. - Certain theologians judge that the principal object of hope is not God to be possessed by us, but the very vision or possession of God, or the act by which we possess God.² Against this opinion not only do the two reasons brought forth in the preceding number militate, but also the fact that the primary object of a theological virtue is nothing except God, and in no way something created (cf. n. 800, e); and that one hoping does not seek God on account of possession, otherwise he would place the ultimate end in a creature, but he seeks possession of God on account of God. It remains, therefore, that the vision and possession of God is only the condition required so that God may be attained and possessed, and the application of God to be possessed and beatifying made to us.³

² Durandus judges that it is subjective beatitude; but that God is the mediate object (in III Sent., d. 26, q. 2). Others say that the object is composed from objective and subjective beatitude: thus Coninck, Ripalda, Pesch.

³ Thus the Thomists; Cajetan, in q. 17, a. 2, and Billuart can be consulted.

806. The secondary material object of hope is all things which conduce to beatitude. And indeed the secondary object per se is the supernatural means which from their nature lead to beatitude, namely, sanctifying grace together with the supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, remission of sins, sacramental graces and actual graces. But the object per accidens is all created goods, even natural and temporal ones (which per se are indifferent to beatitude and from their nature do not tend to it), insofar as sometimes in certain circumstances they can in some way conduce us to beatitude; hence also in the Lord's prayer we ask for them.

807. Observations. - 1. In order that something can be hoped for, it is required that it be at the same time future and arduous. These indeed are not the motive of hope, but are conditions required for the material object, just as obscurity is a condition of the material object of faith.

2. "Movement is toward the proper term proportioned to the movable thing. And therefore hope directly regards one's proper good, and not what pertains to another. But presupposing the union of love toward another" (by which someone has another as one with himself and another self), "then someone can hope and desire something for another as for himself; and according to this someone can hope eternal life for another, insofar as he is united to him through love" (a. 3).

808. Principle I. Hope is necessary by necessity of means. - By necessity of means for salvation, both for little children and for adults, from the nature of the thing the habit of hope is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7).

By necessity of means for justification, and in this way for salvation, for adults having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing the act of hope is necessary. For no one can have supernatural contrition for sin unless he hopes for pardon; no one will be justified unless he hopes to be justified by God (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4; sess. 6, c. 6).

809. Principle II. Hope is necessary by necessity of precept. - The act of hope is also necessary by necessity of precept, not only for sinners so that they may arrive at justice, but also for the just; not only ordinarily and regularly, but always and for all, even the perfect.

The Quietists1 denied the necessity of hope for the perfect, so called from quiet or indifference concerning one's own salvation, who said that perfection consists in an act passively received and continuous, of contemplation and love, and in a passivity excluding every desire of beatitude, every activity in good works, indeed every resistance to temptations. Likewise the Semiquietists, saying that there is given a habitual state of pure love and consummate perfection, which excludes fear of punishments, desire of beatitude, and consequently the exercise of hope.

Now these opinions were condemned as erroneous, respectively by Innocent XI (November 20, 1687; cf. propositions 7 and 12 of Molinos) and by Innocent XII (March 12, 1699; propositions 1, 2 and 11 of Fenelon); and deservedly.

It is clear:

1. From the Scriptures, in which faith is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for, to which therefore hope connaturally follows; but faith is necessary for all. Hence also in many places, whether in the manner of a promise or in the manner of an admonition, hope is commended, and indeed to all (Ps. IV; LXI, 9; Wis. II, 22; Eccli. II, 6; Hos. XII; I Cor. IX, 24, 25; Rom. XII, 12; VIII, 23-25; Col. I, 4, 5; I Thess. V, 8; Tit. II, 13; Heb. III, 6; VI, 18, 19; I Tim. VI, 17; I Jn. III, 3). These suppose that the act of hope must be elicited at least sometimes.

2. From the necessity of good works: eternal salvation is given to all adults as a reward and not as a pure inheritance; but no one works on account of reward unless he has confidence and hope of obtaining it. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 26: "If anyone shall say that the just ought not, for the good works which have been done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by acting well and keeping the divine commandments they have persevered unto the end: let him be anathema." Cf. Phil. III, 14; II Tim. IV, 8.

3. From the necessity of prayer for perseverance; but prayer to God supposes and includes hope (Jas. I, 6); hence also in the Lord's prayer we are commanded to express the desire of beatitude and to ask for it: Thy kingdom come.

Hope is a supernatural virtue through which, with certain confidence from the promise of God, we expect future beatitude and the means for obtaining it.

The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. But the secondary object is all the means necessary for obtaining beatitude, such as remission of sins, the grace of God through the merits of Christ, etc.

But the acts included in hope, or the formalities of hope itself, are love, desire of eternal beatitude, firm confidence of arriving at it, and raising up of the soul against occurring difficulties. - Cf. Mazzella, disp. 5, art. 2, § 1; and art. 3, § 2.

The sins opposed to hope are despair and presumption. The former is voluntary diffidence of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. - But the latter is disordered confidence of obtaining beatitude without the means ordained by God.

I Say. Hope in adults is required both by necessity of means and by necessity of precept. The first is clear from the fact that man cannot arrive at obtaining God, his ultimate end, unless by his own acts he tends toward him: but this tendency necessarily supposes hope, indeed, as we said, it is one of the formalities of hope itself. - The other is clear both from the Apostle saying, I Tim. vi, 17: "I command ... not to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God," and from proposition 1 proscribed by Alexander VII and related above, n. 152.

But when, and in what manner, the precept of hope presses is to be determined by the same rules which we established above, n. 153, concerning faith.

[Necessity is either of means or of precept; it concerns hope whether habitual or actual.

I say 1° : Habitual hope is necessary for all men, both children and adults, by necessity of means for justification and salvation.

Proof. 1° Sacred Scripture. The Apostle says, Rom., VII, 24 : By hope we are saved. Therefore without hope, just as without faith and charity, there is no salvation; consequently neither justification, since only the just man is to be saved. The same, 1 Cor., XIII, 13 : Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity. Hope is here placed among the three virtues which now, that is, in the present life, are necessary for the life of the soul, or for justification. To those who had come to the Church from paganism the same Apostle says, Ephes., II, 12 : You were at that time without Christ,... strangers to the covenants, having no hope of the promise, and without God in this world. Whence those who have no hope are estranged from Christ and God, and therefore not just. Similar things are read Tit., III, 7 ; Hebr., X, 23.

Proof. 2° from Trident., sess. VI, cap. 7 : « Faith, unless hope and charity come to it, neither unites one perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of his body. » What is dealt with here is not acts, but the habits of these three virtues.

Proof. 3° by reason. Man is not just unless his will is ordered to his last end, that is, to eternal beatitude. Yet he cannot be thus ordered unless he hopes that he will obtain this end. Therefore.

I say 2° : Actual hope is necessary for all adults possessed of reason, by necessity both of means and of precept.

Proof. first part. 1° The just, without hope, cannot ask of God graces and helps of every kind for persevering in justice and for attaining the last end. This is intimated by the text of Paul cited above : By hope we are saved. — 2° Sinners certainly need hope in order to dispose themselves for justification, as Trident. teaches, loc. cit. Moreover, in both cases the habit alone does not suffice, but an act is required, that man may be moved toward God.

Confirmation. The habit of hope is necessary by necessity of means for justification. Yet this habit is ordered to act. Therefore.

Proof. second part. 1° The Apostle, Hebr., X, 23 : Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering ; for he is faithful who hath promised. The confession of hope is nothing else than an act, and the precept is expressed by this word, let us hold fast. 1 Tim., V, 5 : But she that is a widow indeed, let her hope in God, and continue in supplications. Let her hope contains alike the act and the precept. Ibid., VI, 17 : Charge them... not to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God. The same, I Petr., I, 13 : Being sober,... hope perfectly for the grace that is offered you in the revelation of Jesus Christ. — 2° Acts of faith, hope, and charity, which are of necessity of means, are likewise necessary by necessity of precept, because God certainly and necessarily wills these means to be employed. Yet the act of hope is necessary by necessity of means. Therefore. — 3° This necessity is brought out by the condemnation of the following proposition, n. 1, by Alexander VII : « Man is never bound, at any time of his life, to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity in virtue of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues. »

The necessity of the act of hope was denied by the Quietists. Indeed, Michael de Molinos went so far as to teach that the interior life consists in this, that man annihilate his powers and hold himself merely passive, because « to will to act actively is to offend God, who wills to be himself the only agent. » Applying this principle, which is destructive of every act of every virtue, to hope, Molinos said : « The soul ought not to think either of reward or of punishment; nor of paradise, nor of hell; nor of death, nor of eternity. » This proposition is the 7th among the 68 condemned by Innocent XII. The doctrine of absolute quietism had already been reprobated by this definition of Trident., sess. VI, can. 31 : « If anyone shall say that the justified man sins when he performs good works with a view to eternal reward; let him be anathema. » The Semi-Quietists, among whom the most illustrious Fénelon held first place for some time, did not indeed reprobate the act of hope as evil, but they held it to be less perfect, teaching that the soul can be raised to a state of charity so pure as to become wholly indifferent to the things that concern itself, and « to will nothing for itself, all things for God. » This system is sufficiently known from these three propositions, which are the 1st, 2nd, and 4th among the 23 condemned by Innocent XII : « There is given a habitual state of the love of God which is pure charity, and in which there is no admixture whatsoever of interested motive. Neither the fear of punishments nor the desire of rewards have any longer a part in it. God is loved no longer on account of merit, nor on account of perfection, nor on account of the happiness to be found in loving. » — « In the state of the contemplative or unitive life, every motive of interested fear and hope is lost. » — « In the state of holy indifference, the soul no longer has voluntary and deliberate desires on account of its own interest, except on those occasions in which it fails faithfully to cooperate with all its grace. »

All know how humbly and even cheerfully Fénelon embraced the pontifical decree, of whom it is reported that Innocent said that « the Archbishop of Cambrai sinned only through excess of the love of God. »

You will ask when the precept of hope binds.

I answer. 1° It binds, like the precept of faith, per se : 1° at the beginning of the use of reason, namely when eternal beatitude has been sufficiently proposed as the last end to which everyone must tend; 2° in danger of death, that man may be strengthened against the temptations that then commonly arise, and be borne toward God as the end soon to be attained; 3° frequently in life, at least once each year; for without an act of hope we can neither persist in the state of justice nor act meritoriously. Besides, virtual hope suffices, which the faithful exercise everywhere, e. g., when they pray or receive the sacraments.

2° It binds per accidens : 1° when an act of another virtue must be elicited by precept, e. g., of prayer or of penance, which cannot be exercised without at least an implicit act of hope; 2° when one finds himself in danger of despair; 3° in every temptation, when there is danger of consenting to it unless hope raises up the mind.^{117 117} S. Lig., lib. II, n. 20; Homo apost., IV, 13.

IV. Question II. Is there a precept of hope? Answer. All affirm it, and the holy Scriptures perspicuously impose it. Hope in the Lord. Nay, as the Prophet adds, the life of the faithful is a life of hope: For thou, O Lord, singularly hast settled me in hope: Psalm 4. For what is our life — or rather our pilgrimage — but the way to our Fatherland? Thither all our desires must conspire. This truth the Council of Trent defined, session 6, chapter 6; and Alexander VII condemned the following thesis: A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity by force of the precepts pertaining to those virtues. This precept obliges as soon as the light of reason shines forth, and that of itself; as also when one must depart from this world. Finally, this precept presses of itself unto the frequenting of the acts of this virtue. Many teach that there is no determinate time at which such a precept presses. By what reason so great a paradox can be asserted by Christian men, I truly do not perceive. Christians can scarcely recite the Lord's Prayer sincerely without eliciting acts of hope. Per accidens this precept presses whenever a grave temptation against hope strikes the soul; when the Sacrament of Penance is to be performed; when the precepts of charity and of prayer press; and so forth.

I do not treat of Hope as it is a passion, which is defined in lib. 2, Rhet. cap. 5 by Aristotle thus: Hope is a surmise of the supreme good, as the holy Doctor reports, 3. p. Coemil., sect. 39, and in 3. dist 26, dub. 2, but as it is a Theological virtue.

It is defined first by the Master, dist. 26, as cited by the Seraphic Doctor, in that dist., dub. 2: It is the virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for, that is, awaited with confidence.

The holy Doctor observes, however, that Hope is here defined in order to the object, which is eternal and glorious good; but this is twofold: uncreated, which is God; and created, which is beatitude, to which grace, forgiveness, perseverance, and the other things leading to glory are also reduced. Therefore when spiritual goods are said, the generic object is touched; but when eternal is said, the specific object is touched.

It is defined secondly by the Master from Haymo, as the holy Doctor reports at the places cited: Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from the grace of God and from preceding merits. This definition is broad in order to the object and to the principle, as the holy Doctor notes there.

It is defined thirdly by D. Augustine, Lib. de civitate Dei, passim: Hope is the virtue by which one presumes that he will arrive at that which he believes. This definition is broad in order to the object and the habit.

¶ The holy Doctor distinguishes these definitions in ANOTHER way. The first is broad by genus and difference; and it is Formal. The second is Causal, broad by act and cause. The third is partly causal, partly formal, because it is given by the object of Hope and by the preamble virtue of faith.

Then in dub. 3 the holy Doctor considers that both Hope and faith are of invisible things, as the Master says; but faith is of invisible things inasmuch as they are not seen, whereas Hope is of invisible things as they are not possessed.

He observes also in dub. 4 that Hope, even as a passion and as a virtue, differs from joy and sorrow, because these are of a present object; but Hope is of the future, and by this Hope differs also from beatitude, while it agrees with love, which is also of the future.

But it differs from Fear, because fear is with respect to evil, whereas Hope is with respect to good. Wherefore if hope is sometimes said with respect to evil, it is said improperly, as when Cicero, Lib. 1, ad Atticum, speaks of the hope of evils, and Virgil, AEneid. 4:

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem.

The holy Doctor notes this with D. Augustine, cap. 8, Enchiridii.

Our Hope, however, can thus be defined: *It is the Theological Virtue by which the will is borne toward God as our beatitude, arduous to attain, which nevertheless can be obtained by the help of God. It is called a Virtue, because it makes morally good the one having it; for this is the notable mark of virtue, from Aristotle, 2 Eth., cap. 6.

It is called Theological; for it is exercised about God, exceeding our natural capacity, as is said, 1 Corinth. 2: The eye has not seen, etc. That Hope is a gift of God is had in Rom. 15: Now the God of hope fill you with all joy, etc. that you may abound in hope, and in 1 Peter, first: Who has regenerated us unto a living hope. Therefore the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 7, defines that it is infused; and can. 3 says it is a gift of grace.

The remaining parts of the definition will be explained in the questions, when we shall examine the Object of Hope and discuss its subject. I gather this definition from D. Bonavent., at the places adduced, and in the little work Declaratio terminorum Theologiae, and in the Diaeta, tit. 5, cap. 4, where he most beautifully likens Hope to precious things, and in Lib. 5, Compend. Theologiae, cap. 2.

All AGREE that the primary matter of this virtue is eternal Beatitude, as we saw in the definitions of hope adduced from S. Bonavent., and it is deduced from that text, Rom. 5: We glory in the hope of the glory, etc., and 1 ad Titum: according to the hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, has promised.

The question is therefore raised, whether formal beatitude, which is the vision of God, and love, and fruition; or rather objective beatitude, that is, God himself, be the object of this virtue.

The FIRST opinion is that Hope is concerned proximately with formal beatitude; with God, however, remotely, and accordingly that this virtue does not attain God immediately in himself. Thus Durandus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. 2; Palud., ibi, and other older authors, among whom S. Bonavent. is also renewed by many.

The SECOND opinion, diametrically opposite, is that Hope is concerned proximately with God; the vision, however, being a mere expository condition.

The THIRD opinion, the middle one, is that Hope is concerned with God and with Beatitude as referred to God. Thus D. Thom., prima secundae, quaest. 1, art. 3, ad 3; Becanus, cap. 17, quaest. 1; Poncius, disp. 31, quaest. 2; Coninchyus, disp. 19, dub. 3; Mastrius, disp. 6, de virtutibus Theol. quaest. 17, num. 442; Caspens., disp. 1, sect. 1, num. 3; Morandus, Tract. unic. quaest. 15; Tannerus, disp. 2, quaest. 1, dub. 1, num. 16; Valentia, disp. 2, quaest. 1, puncto 1, and other recent authors commonly; and this same is the will of those who say that God is the object just as beatitude is to be attained, so that we attain God immediately. Thus Scotus, 2 dist. 26 and 27; Gabriel, dist. 26; Almainus, Tract. 2, cap. 7; Suarez, de spe, disp. 1, sect. 3, num. 4; Fagundez, in primum praeceptum Decalogi, Lib. 1, cap. 31; Tannerus, disputatione 2, quaestione prima, dub. 1, num. 14; Fuliens., lib. 3, cap. 7.

This surely is the opinion of D. Bonavent. in corpore, as is clear to one reading.

I ASSERT first, with this opinion, that not the vision itself alone, but God also, is the material object of Hope.

It is PROVED from the authors alleged, with D. Bonav., ex 15 Genes., where God says to Abraham: I am your protector, and your reward exceeding great. Hence D. Augustine, 22 de civitate, cap. ultimo: The reward of virtue will be he himself, who gave the virtue, and who promised himself to it.

Isidore, Lib. 8, Ethymolog. cap. 2, however, seems to intimate this when he says: Hope is said, as it were, the foot of advancing toward God.

And D. Gregory, Lib. 10, moral. cap. 12, when he says: Hope in God rises the more solid, the graver the things you have borne for him — as the holy Doctor reports in Pharetra Lib. 2, cap. 24.

It is PROVED by the reason of D. Bonavent. given by Mastrius; for God, not only by reason of the vision, but also by reason of his intrinsic goodness, is our supreme good: Therefore, as such, love of concupiscence tends toward him; for he himself is given to us per se, and is joined to us, as is said Ioan. 14, Rom. 5, and this very thing is our greatest good.

It is confirmed by foundation 4: for the object of Hope is the same as that of delight, which succeeds hope, the thing already obtained; but the object of delight is God himself; for the will delights in the object known and possessed, as I showed in prima secundae, Tract. 1, disp. 2, quaest. 7.

It is confirmed secondly, because otherwise it would not be a Theological Virtue, since it would not attain God, as Mastrius infers from D. Bonavent., 3 dist. 26, art. 1, quaest. 3, and here at argument two, with the response.

I ASSERT secondly, that formal beatitude also enters into the reason of the object of this virtue.

It is PROVED first from S. Doct. at the places adduced of the Fathers, quaest. 1; he also brings forward many in Lib. 2, Pharetrae, cap. 24: D. Gregory, Lib. 6, moral. cap. 14, and Lib. 10, cap. 12; August., Lib 10, confess. cap. 43, and epist. 120; Bernard, Lib. de diligendo Deo, cap. 14.

It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonavent., by the reason which Morandus, Mastrius, and others use: for Hope tends toward its object because it is the good of those hoping; but it is the good of those hoping that the habit in beatitude, or beatitude itself, is a good for us: Therefore.

It is PROVED thirdly from S. Doct. at argument 3, with the response. The object is the same which we hope for and which we desire; but desire is of supernatural beatitude: Therefore so is Hope.

You will OBJECT. Love of concupiscence orders the thing loved to something else, as to an end; but to order God to another end is perverse: Therefore.

It is ANSWERED that what is loved with love of concupiscence need not be ordered to something else as to an end; but it suffices that it be willed for another; nor is it necessary that it be willed on account of that. Whence this love, by which we love God for ourselves, is good. Hence S. Augustine, manuali, cap. 10: Kindle in me, O Lord, your will, and your concupiscence, which is holy and good, and Psalm. 83: My soul longs and faints for the courts of the Lord.

The REASON is, because God is not compared as a lesser good, as something to be perfected; hence the reason of use, reproved by D. Augustine in Lib. 83, qq., quaest. 30 — Perverse is the love that uses what should be enjoyed — does not intervene; nor is our appetite ended in beatitude, but through the conjunction with the uncreated, whence finally the appetite terminates in God, as D. Bonav. acutely answers in primo, dist. 1, at the end of the cited quaest., and with him Arriaga, disp. 27, sect. 2; Mastrius, num. 448, with his Scotus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. unic.; Caspens., num. 5; and soon again, in setting out the third opinion of quaest. 1, I shall recall it: for Hope tends toward God as seen. Hence in the hymn Te Deum it is said: AEterna fac in gloria munerari, that is, with God.

THREE opinions in this question as well are adduced from the holy Doctors cited above.

THE FIRST is, that beatitude is the formal object of Hope, as it is arduous. Henry, Richard, Durandus, Paludanus, D. Bonaventure and other ancients are alleged. Amicus follows it, disp. 19. sect. 1.

The SECOND opinion is, that the formal object of Hope is the aid of God's omnipotence, just as the testimony of the first truth is the formal object of faith. So Vasquez p. p. disp. 84. cap. 1. and disp. 139., whom Turrianus and Meracius follow, alleging D. Thom. qq. disp. quaest. de spe, art. 1. and here, art. 1. and 5.

The THIRD opinion is, that the object of Hope is God, as the highest good, lovable by the love of concupiscence, as it were for the lover's advantage; or that the formal object of Hope is objective beatitude, insofar as it is our good. So Scotus 3. dist. 26. quaest. unic. q. ad quaest., Suarez disp. 1. sect. 3., Coninchius, Arriaga as reported by Mastrius, Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 2. Mastrius loco cit., Morandus quaest. 15., Aragon quaest. cit. art. 2., Falsensis lib. 3. cap. 7., Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 1. dub. 1. num. 19., who at n. 20. carps at the holy Doctor, whom he reports mutilated, as I shall say.

HERE I halt: for Vulpius disp. 50. art. 4. denies that this is Scotus's opinion, but holds that God, under the absolute aspect of the Deity, is the formal object of Hope; not, however, as he is a good for us. Vulpius was moved because Scotus, in the body of the text, proposes this Instance: if it be said that to desire a good for me varies the formal aspect of the object, because it changes the good of honesty into the useful good. He answers that it is false, because that condition, or circumstance, For whom, is not a condition of the object per se; indeed such a condition can be added upon the object, the formal aspect of the object standing.

For indeed Lichetus and Arretinus expound these words thus, that the act of Hope, which is to desire the infinite good, is terminated first, and immediately, to that good under its absolute formal aspect; not that the act is terminated to such a good as in itself, and for itself, but to it as a good for me; a good indeed superabundant, and ultimately perfecting me, but in that mode whereby an object can perfect a power; because it perfects not intrinsically, but only extrinsically. The reason of this is, that if the will willed that good only as convenient to itself, that volition would not be right; it would be an illicit mercenary love, which Lichetus declares, bringing forward a notable doctrine of Scotus ex 1. dist. 6. quaest. 2. inf. L., where he says that to desire a perfect act, whereby the object may be more loved in itself, comes from the affection of justice; because from the fact that I love something in itself, thence I will something in itself; and thus the good Angels could desire beatitude, so that possessing it they might love the Highest good more perfectly, and that act of concupiscence for beatitude would be meritorious, because it does not use by enjoying, but enjoys it, because the good it covets for itself it covets for this, that it may love that good in itself the more. Mastrius reports this at n. 459. from D. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 1. quaest. ult., and refutes the opinion of Vulpius n. 458., against D. Bonaventure here, in its foundations, in which he shows that the formal object of Hope is not the goodness of God as such, against Vulpius.