Question I: What hope is

I do not treat of Hope as it is a passion, which is defined in lib. 2, Rhet. cap. 5 by Aristotle thus: Hope is a surmise of the supreme good, as the holy Doctor reports, 3. p. Coemil., sect. 39, and in 3. dist 26, dub. 2, but as it is a Theological virtue.

It is defined first by the Master, dist. 26, as cited by the Seraphic Doctor, in that dist., dub. 2: It is the virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for, that is, awaited with confidence.

The holy Doctor observes, however, that Hope is here defined in order to the object, which is eternal and glorious good; but this is twofold: uncreated, which is God; and created, which is beatitude, to which grace, forgiveness, perseverance, and the other things leading to glory are also reduced. Therefore when spiritual goods are said, the generic object is touched; but when eternal is said, the specific object is touched.

It is defined secondly by the Master from Haymo, as the holy Doctor reports at the places cited: Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from the grace of God and from preceding merits. This definition is broad in order to the object and to the principle, as the holy Doctor notes there.

It is defined thirdly by D. Augustine, Lib. de civitate Dei, passim: Hope is the virtue by which one presumes that he will arrive at that which he believes. This definition is broad in order to the object and the habit.

¶ The holy Doctor distinguishes these definitions in ANOTHER way. The first is broad by genus and difference; and it is Formal. The second is Causal, broad by act and cause. The third is partly causal, partly formal, because it is given by the object of Hope and by the preamble virtue of faith.

Then in dub. 3 the holy Doctor considers that both Hope and faith are of invisible things, as the Master says; but faith is of invisible things inasmuch as they are not seen, whereas Hope is of invisible things as they are not possessed.

He observes also in dub. 4 that Hope, even as a passion and as a virtue, differs from joy and sorrow, because these are of a present object; but Hope is of the future, and by this Hope differs also from beatitude, while it agrees with love, which is also of the future.

But it differs from Fear, because fear is with respect to evil, whereas Hope is with respect to good. Wherefore if hope is sometimes said with respect to evil, it is said improperly, as when Cicero, Lib. 1, ad Atticum, speaks of the hope of evils, and Virgil, AEneid. 4:

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem.

The holy Doctor notes this with D. Augustine, cap. 8, Enchiridii.

Our Hope, however, can thus be defined: *It is the Theological Virtue by which the will is borne toward God as our beatitude, arduous to attain, which nevertheless can be obtained by the help of God. It is called a Virtue, because it makes morally good the one having it; for this is the notable mark of virtue, from Aristotle, 2 Eth., cap. 6.

It is called Theological; for it is exercised about God, exceeding our natural capacity, as is said, 1 Corinth. 2: The eye has not seen, etc. That Hope is a gift of God is had in Rom. 15: Now the God of hope fill you with all joy, etc. that you may abound in hope, and in 1 Peter, first: Who has regenerated us unto a living hope. Therefore the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 7, defines that it is infused; and can. 3 says it is a gift of grace.

The remaining parts of the definition will be explained in the questions, when we shall examine the Object of Hope and discuss its subject. I gather this definition from D. Bonavent., at the places adduced, and in the little work Declaratio terminorum Theologiae, and in the Diaeta, tit. 5, cap. 4, where he most beautifully likens Hope to precious things, and in Lib. 5, Compend. Theologiae, cap. 2.