Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Question Two: On the Material Object of Hope
S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2.
803. The material object of hope is that which we hope for; but this object is twofold: one principal or primary, which we hope for on account of itself and by reason of which we hope for the rest, and this is God himself as the supernatural end to be possessed by us, for we do not hope for all other things, such as remission of sins, grace, etc., except insofar as they have an order to God, so that we may be able to arrive at him as our supernatural end, or arrive better. The other is the secondary object, and this is all the means which conduce to beatitude.
804. Thesis. The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. - It is proved:
a) In Sacred Scripture hope is constantly described in relation to eternal life: it is called hope of eternal life (Tit. I, 2; III, 7), - and hope of the glory of the sons of God (Rom. V, 2); - it is the hope by which we expect that life which God is going to give to those who never change their faith from it (Tob. II, 18), and by which we know that we shall be like God because we shall see God as he is (I Jn. III, 2); - it is the hope which enters, that is, penetrates, even unto the inner parts of the veil, that is, unto hidden things, where Jesus has entered for us as forerunner (Heb. VI, 18). From all these things it appears that eternal life is the principal object of hope, whence Mt. VI, 33: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all things shall be added to you." - This having been posited, we reason thus:1 The object which we hope to obtain, and that in which we rest when we have obtained it, are the same. But the principal object in which we rest in eternal life is God himself. Therefore God himself is the principal object of hope. Whence Ps. LXXII, 25: "What is there for me in heaven, and apart from thee what have I wished upon earth?... The God of my heart and God my portion forever."
1 Therefore the thesis is not proved directly from the Scriptures, where it is not stated, but the theological argument is present, deduced from the Scriptures.
b) The material object of hope is everything which can be attained through the formal object; but the primary material object is that which is proportioned to the formal object. Now the formal object, the omnipotence of God giving aid, is infinite. Therefore the material object which is proportioned to it cannot be anything except the infinite good; and consequently it is God himself.
805. Opinion not to be approved. - Certain theologians judge that the principal object of hope is not God to be possessed by us, but the very vision or possession of God, or the act by which we possess God.2 Against this opinion not only do the two reasons brought forth in the preceding number militate, but also the fact that the primary object of a theological virtue is nothing except God, and in no way something created (cf. n. 800, e); and that one hoping does not seek God on account of possession, otherwise he would place the ultimate end in a creature, but he seeks possession of God on account of God. It remains, therefore, that the vision and possession of God is only the condition required so that God may be attained and possessed, and the application of God to be possessed and beatifying made to us.3
2 Durandus judges that it is subjective beatitude; but that God is the mediate object (in III Sent., d. 26, q. 2). Others say that the object is composed from objective and subjective beatitude: thus Coninck, Ripalda, Pesch.
3 Thus the Thomists; Cajetan, in q. 17, a. 2, and Billuart can be consulted.
806. The secondary material object of hope is all things which conduce to beatitude. And indeed the secondary object per se is the supernatural means which from their nature lead to beatitude, namely, sanctifying grace together with the supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, remission of sins, sacramental graces and actual graces. But the object per accidens is all created goods, even natural and temporal ones (which per se are indifferent to beatitude and from their nature do not tend to it), insofar as sometimes in certain circumstances they can in some way conduce us to beatitude; hence also in the Lord's prayer we ask for them.
807. Observations. - 1. In order that something can be hoped for, it is required that it be at the same time future and arduous. These indeed are not the motive of hope, but are conditions required for the material object, just as obscurity is a condition of the material object of faith.
- "Movement is toward the proper term proportioned to the movable thing. And therefore hope directly regards one's proper good, and not what pertains to another. But presupposing the union of love toward another" (by which someone has another as one with himself and another self), "then someone can hope and desire something for another as for himself; and according to this someone can hope eternal life for another, insofar as he is united to him through love" (a. 3).