Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Question Three: On the Necessity of Hope

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808.

808. Principle I. Hope is necessary by necessity of means. - By necessity of means for salvation, both for little children and for adults, from the nature of the thing the habit of hope is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7).

808.

By necessity of means for justification, and in this way for salvation, for adults having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing the act of hope is necessary. For no one can have supernatural contrition for sin unless he hopes for pardon; no one will be justified unless he hopes to be justified by God (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4; sess. 6, c. 6).

809.

809. Principle II. Hope is necessary by necessity of precept. - The act of hope is also necessary by necessity of precept, not only for sinners so that they may arrive at justice, but also for the just; not only ordinarily and regularly, but always and for all, even the perfect.

809.

The Quietists1 denied the necessity of hope for the perfect, so called from quiet or indifference concerning one's own salvation, who said that perfection consists in an act passively received and continuous, of contemplation and love, and in a passivity excluding every desire of beatitude, every activity in good works, indeed every resistance to temptations. Likewise the Semiquietists, saying that there is given a habitual state of pure love and consummate perfection, which excludes fear of punishments, desire of beatitude, and consequently the exercise of hope.

809.

Now these opinions were condemned as erroneous, respectively by Innocent XI (November 20, 1687; cf. propositions 7 and 12 of Molinos) and by Innocent XII (March 12, 1699; propositions 1, 2 and 11 of Fenelon); and deservedly.

809.
  1. From the Scriptures, in which faith is said to be the substance of things to be hoped for, to which therefore hope connaturally follows; but faith is necessary for all. Hence also in many places, whether in the manner of a promise or in the manner of an admonition, hope is commended, and indeed to all (Ps. IV; LXI, 9; Wis. II, 22; Eccli. II, 6; Hos. XII; I Cor. IX, 24, 25; Rom. XII, 12; VIII, 23-25; Col. I, 4, 5; I Thess. V, 8; Tit. II, 13; Heb. III, 6; VI, 18, 19; I Tim. VI, 17; I Jn. III, 3). These suppose that the act of hope must be elicited at least sometimes.
809.
  1. From the necessity of good works: eternal salvation is given to all adults as a reward and not as a pure inheritance; but no one works on account of reward unless he has confidence and hope of obtaining it. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 26: "If anyone shall say that the just ought not, for the good works which have been done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by acting well and keeping the divine commandments they have persevered unto the end: let him be anathema." Cf. Phil. III, 14; II Tim. IV, 8.
809.
  1. From the necessity of prayer for perseverance; but prayer to God supposes and includes hope (Jas. I, 6); hence also in the Lord's prayer we are commanded to express the desire of beatitude and to ask for it: Thy kingdom come.
809.
  1. From the nature of pure love or perfect charity, which does not exclude the desire and hope of beatitude. Namely, the perfection of charity consists: a) on the part of the act of love, in this, that one's proper good is not the motive of the act of charity itself, and b) on the part of the state of the one loving, that all acts are ordered to charity and thus stand under the end of charity, which is God to be loved and glorified for his own sake; - but not that other acts are excluded, for example, that we do not desire beatitude, since this is a condition required so that we can perfectly love God for his own sake, and thus it can be ordered to God to be glorified for his own sake. Hence indifference to beatitude and salvation is utterly impossible, speaking of beatitude in the abstract; it is sinful, speaking of beatitude insofar as in the concrete it consists in God; indeed it renders charity impossible.1

1 Ekkard seems to have preluded these (prop. 8).

809.

But if the adversaries hold that hope is imperfect, they err. The whole imperfection lies in this, that we do not possess God, which is the imperfection of the state of the way, not of hope itself. And although it is less perfect than charity, nevertheless it is in itself perfect, as being a true virtue uniting to God, as is now to be seen.

809.
  1. The vocation to supernatural beatitude is the foundation and condition of charity or friendship toward God, as will be clear from the treatise on charity.