Article II. On the subject of theological hope

538. The proximate subject, i.e. the faculty of the soul in which theological hope resides, is not the sensible appetite nor the intellect, but the will. Thus almost all Catholics teach with St. Thomas, who says: "Hope is in the higher appetite, which is called the will."²⁵ The reason is that the object of hope is a spiritual good, which is not attained except by the spiritual appetite, namely, by the will.

The remote subject of the virtue of hope, or the persons in whom true theological hope is found, are the following:

1. All the faithful, even sinners, except those who fall a) into formal heresy, or b) into presumption or desperation.

2. Souls detained in purgatory.

As to 1: The Council of Trent requires hope for the justification of an impious adult, teaching concerning the preparation for the remission of sins: "While, understanding that they are sinners, by turning themselves from the fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, to considering the mercy of God, they are raised up into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ."²⁶ Therefore the Council manifestly supposes that hope can remain in a sinner. - But the intrinsic reason is that the foundation of hope is faith, which remains in sinners, as was said above, n. 492. But a sinner having true faith can elicit an act of supernatural hope (with the aid of actual grace), namely, by hoping that through the merits of Christ he will obtain the remission of sins and at last eternal beatitude. Moreover, nothing prevents such an act of hope from proceeding from a true virtue of hope previously possessed and not yet wholly destroyed.²⁷ - But the virtue of hope is necessarily destroyed: a) Through formal heresy, since it destroys faith and therefore the very foundation of hope. Hence St. Augustine says excellently: "Faith believes, hope and charity pray, but without faith they cannot exist.... Neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor either without faith."²⁸ b) Through presumption and gravely culpable desperation, as directly contrary to the virtue of hope. For contraries destroy one another.

As to 2: Although the souls in purgatory are certain of obtaining salvation, nevertheless they do not yet have it, nor are they able to arrive at it except by tolerating grave punishments. Eternal beatitude, therefore, is for them a future, arduous, possible good, and consequently has all the conditions of the object of hope.²⁹

²⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 18, a. 1.

²⁶ Sess. 6, c. 6 de iustif. (Denz. n. 798).

²⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 4.

²⁸ Enchir. c. 7 et 8.

²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 18, a. 3.

539. Corollaries. From what has been said it follows that hope is not:

a) in Christ, since from the beginning of His conception He was a comprehensor and always enjoyed the blessed vision.³⁰

b) in the blessed, for the same reason. For they already possess beatitude; therefore they cannot hope for it as future, according to this: "But hope which is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he hope?"³¹ For this reason St. Augustine³² beautifully says: "Hope will no longer be when the thing will be." Some theologians indeed (Suarez, Ripalda, Becanus) assert that the blessed can hope for accidental beatitude for themselves, and even essential beatitude for men who are wayfarers. But St. Thomas denies this, because accidental beatitude for the blessed does not have the character of something arduous and difficult, since the blessed will have this beatitude without any difficulty or uncertainty. But the hope by which the blessed hope beatitude for wayfarers is not hope properly theological, but taken in a broader sense. For every theological hope presupposes love of concupiscence, as was already said above. Hence if someone on this earth hopes for the eternal salvation of his neighbor, he does this because the neighbor is another self, and his beatitude increases his own beatitude. But in the blessed every such love of concupiscence is impossible. Therefore the blessed indeed desire the beatitude of wayfarers, but such a desire proceeds from the love of charity and not from hope.

c) in the damned. The reason is obvious; for hope is concerning future possible beatitude. But the damned know that beatitude is impossible for them, and consequently that their hope is vain and fruitless. Moreover, the damned no longer have theological faith; but without theological faith hope is impossible, since faith is the foundation of hope.³³ Hence it is said: "When the impious man is dead, there will be no further hope."³⁴

d) in formal heretics, since they lack faith, which is the necessary foundation of hope, as was already said above.

e) in a man who is despairing or presumptuous, since desperation and presumption (at least perfect) destroy hope as being contrary to it.

³⁰ Ib. a. 2 ad 1; 3, q. 7, a. 4.

³¹ Rom. 8, 24.

³² Sermo 158, n. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 38, 866).

³³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 18, a. 2 ad 3.

³⁴ Prov. 11, 7.

540. Scholion. On the opinion of St. Thomas concerning the object and subject of hope. Briefly and excellently the Angelic Doctor explains the object and proximate subject of the virtue of hope, at the same time indicating its difference from desire, cupidity, and similar things: "It is manifest that to hope implies a certain movement of the appetitive power tending toward a good, not indeed as joy and delight do, but as something to be attained, as also desire and cupidity do. Yet hope differs from desire in two ways: first indeed, because desire is commonly of any good whatsoever, and therefore is attributed to the concupiscible; but hope is of an arduous good, which is difficult to attain, and therefore is attributed to the irascible. Secondly, because desire is of some good absolutely, without consideration of its possibility; but hope tends toward some good as toward that which is possible to acquire; for it implies in its notion a certain security of acquisition. Thus, therefore, in the object of hope four things are considered: first indeed, that it is good, by which it differs from fear; secondly, that it is of future good, by which it differs from joy or delight; thirdly, that it is of arduous good, by which it differs from desire; fourthly, that it is of possible good, by which it differs from desperation. - But it is possible to have something from someone in two ways: in one way through one's own power, in another way through the help of another; for those things which are possible through friends we call possible in some way. Thus, therefore, sometimes a man hopes to acquire something through his own power; sometimes indeed through another's help; and such hope has expectation, inasmuch as a man looks to the help of another. And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be borne toward two objects, namely, toward the good to be acquired, and toward him upon whose help it rests. But the highest good, which is eternal beatitude, man cannot acquire except through divine help, according to that of Romans 6:23: The grace of God is eternal life. And therefore the hope of acquiring eternal life has two objects, namely eternal life, which one hopes for, and divine help, from which one hopes.... Just as the formal object of faith is First Truth, through which, as through a certain medium, it assents to those things which are believed..., so also the formal object of hope is the help of divine power and piety; on account of which the movement of hope tends toward the hoped-for goods, which are the material object of hope."³⁵

³⁵ Quaest. disp. de spe a. 1.