Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article I. On the object of theological hope
535. As was already said above concerning the object of faith (n. 481), a threefold object of some virtue is distinguished, namely the material object, the formal object which, and the formal object by which.
- The primary material object of hope is eternal beatitude; but secondarily it is all the means conducting to beatitude.
Thus all theologians teach; and it is drawn from Sacred Scripture: "That, justified by His grace, we may be heirs according to the hope of eternal life."6 "We are the children of saints, and we await that life which God will give to those who never change their faith from Him."7 St. Thomas8 writes about this matter: "For nothing less is to be hoped for from Him than He Himself, since His goodness, by which He communicates goods to the creature, is not less than His essence; and therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal beatitude." - But that the secondary object of hope is all the means necessary for eternal beatitude is clear in itself; because man is not able by his own powers to acquire eternal beatitude. Such means are all graces by which man is enlightened and strengthened for exercising works of virtue; indeed also temporal goods, but only insofar as they are means to eternal beatitude. The general principle is: It is licit to hope for the things which it is licit to ask for in prayer. Or, as St. Augustine says: "Those things pertain to hope which are contained in the Lord's Prayer."9
- The formal object which of theological hope is God about to beatify us by supernatural beatitude.
Thus the more common and truer opinion,10 which is proved in this way by Billuart:11 "The formal object which and the immediate object of hope ought to be something purely divine and uncreated, as is clear in charity and in faith, and because otherwise religion, which by means of worship reaches God, would be a theological virtue, which is commonly denied. But only objective beatitude, or God Himself, is something divine and uncreated, not formal beatitude, which is a created act. Therefore ... It is confirmed: the object into which the movement of hope or desire tends and in which it rests when it attains that object is the same, just as the place into which a stone tends and in which it rests is the same. But the formal object which and the immediate object of rest and fruition of God is God Himself, as infinite good, not something created. Therefore ..."
From what has been said, the true nature and dignity of hope appears. For although in hope there is love of concupiscence, nevertheless that is not the ultimate motive, because we indeed hope for the possession of God and in this possession we desire our beatitude, but we do not stop there; for we order that beatitude of ours further to the honor of God. Besides, since we openly profess that beatitude consists in union with God, we greatly honor God by acknowledging His infinite goodness. Hence Lutherans, Calvinists, Baius, Jansenists, Quietists, and several moderns err when they think that it is something dishonorable and vile to act on account of reward, as Catholics do by performing virtues on account of eternal reward.12 For often in Sacred Scripture we are admonished to do good works with a view to eternal recompense: "Everyone who contends in a contest abstains from all things; and they indeed, that they may receive a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible one."13 "Be faithful unto death, and I will give thee the crown of life."14 "I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications forever, on account of retribution."15 Deservedly, therefore, the Council of Trent reproved those "who state that in all works the just sin, if in them by stirring up their own sloth ... they also have regard to eternal recompense."16
6 Tit. 3, 7.
7 Tob. 2, 18.
8 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 2; cf. also ib. ad 2.
9 Enchir. c. 114 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 285).
10 Durandus (In 3 Sent. disp. 26, q. 2) thinks that subjective beatitude alone is the immediate object of hope, but that God is the mediate object; Coninck (De act. supern. disp. 19, dub. 3, n. 42), Ripalda (De spe disp. 23, sect. 4, n. 34), Chr. Pesch (Prael. dogm. VIII, 477) think that the object of hope is composed of objective and subjective beatitude. On the contrary, St. Thomas and the Thomists commonly teach that objective beatitude is the immediate object of hope, but that subjective beatitude, or the beatific vision, is only a condition of reaching this object. Billuart (Diss. de spe a. 2) well refutes the opinion proposed by Coninck, Ripalda, and Chr. Pesch: "The aggregate from formal and objective beatitude cannot be called the formal object which of hope, both because that aggregate is not something purely divine and uncreated, and because formal (subjective) and objective beatitude in the object of hope are not two things or two causes, but only one thing and one cause with the application of the cause, so that the whole formal reason of the object is objective beatitude or God, but His possession only the condition required that He may beatify; just as when fire applied to wood burns, fire and application are not two causes, but only one, which is fire alone; for in it alone is the whole power of burning, none in the application, but it is required only that the power of fire reach the wood and act upon it."
11 Diss. de spe a. 1.
12 Cf. Ph. Kneib, Die Jenseitsmoral im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen (1906), 109 sqq.
13 1 Cor. 9, 25.
14 Apoc. 2, 10.
15 Ps. 118, 112.
536. 3. The formal object by which of hope is omnipotence assisting, i.e. providing or offering helps. Thus St. Thomas.17
Theologians do not agree on this point. The Scotists and Suarez teach that the formal object by which, or the proper motive of our hope, is the highest goodness of God. But some place the motive of hope in the fidelity of God, who promised eternal life to those who keep the commandments. Others (St. Alphonsus,18 Bouquillon, Tanquerey, Schilling, etc.) place the motive of hope in the three moments just recounted taken together. Hence Tanquerey19 posits the proposition: "The adequate motive of hope is God's goodness toward us, and at the same time His helping power, and also His fidelity in keeping promises." Without doubt these three moments ought to intervene in an act of theological hope, just as motives of credibility and the preambles of faith are also necessary for an act of faith; but if it is asked what constitutes the proper motive of theological hope, this seems to be the omnipotence of God assisting. This indeed can be proved by the following reason: "That is the formal object by which of hope into which its last resolution is made, just as the formal object of faith is that into which its last resolution is made. But the last resolution of our hope is made into omnipotence assisting; for to one asking why you hope for beatitude, you adequately answer, because God can and wills to give it, just as to one asking why you believe God to be one and triune, you adequately answer, because God, who is truthful, has revealed it."20 Certainly God wills to give us the reward of eternal life because He is supremely good toward us and because He promised this to us, but each is a certain preamble to hope, and is not the very motive of hope. For God as supremely good toward us is reached by love of concupiscence, which is presupposed to hope itself; but the promise of God is something extrinsic, since theological hope is at least possible without this promise. St. Thomas21 expresses this doctrine thus: "Hope of attaining eternal life has two objects, namely eternal life, which one hopes for, and divine help, from which one hopes; just as faith also has two objects, namely the thing which it believes and First Truth, to which it corresponds. ... Thus, therefore, just as the formal object of faith is First Truth, through which as through a certain means it assents to those things which are believed, which are the material object of faith; so also the formal object of hope is the help of divine power and mercy, on account of which the movement of hope tends into the hoped-for goods, which are the material object of hope." In another place the Angelic Doctor says forcefully: "But of hope, according as it is a theological virtue, the formal object is divine help, to which it adheres."22
Corollary. From what has been said about the object of hope, it follows that it is a theological virtue and that it is distinct from faith and charity.22a For the formal object which of hope is indeed God, just as He is the object of faith and charity; but the formal object by which of hope differs from the formal object by which both of faith (which is God as true) and of charity (which is God as good in Himself).
17 Quaest. disp. de spe a. 1.
18 Theol. mor. l. 2, 21.
19 Synopsis Theol. mor. II, 697.
20 Thus Billuart, Diss. de spe a. 2.
21 Quaest. disp. de spe a. 1.
22 Quaest. disp. de spe a. 4.
22a S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 5 and 6.
537. Scholion. On the secondary motives of hope. Therefore the proper motive of hope is God the helper, good and faithful. Nevertheless, besides God, we can place our hope also in creatures, but only as secondary causes acting under God.22b The most noble among these creatures is the humanity of Christ, which was the instrument of God for accomplishing our redemption. After the humanity of Christ come the saints and especially the Blessed Virgin, by whose merits and prayers we can rightly hope to be helped. Then also our merits acquired under the influence of grace found in us hope of eternal life. Yet the first and last cause of our hope must always remain God, to whom we can say with the prophet Isaiah: "Behold God is my savior; I will act confidently and will not fear, because my strength and my praise is the Lord, and He has been made salvation for me";23 or more briefly with the Psalmist: "My God is my helper, and I will hope in Him."24
22b Ib. a. 4.
23 Is. 12, 2.
24 Ps. 17, 3.