The order of charity

THE law of charity is not fulfilled by a general and equal esteem for all mankind. Such a vague and general regard for others would probably he inoperative, and charity is above all things active. Charity, then, to be genuine must be well ordered and discriminating. It must look at the claims which others have on our charity; it must appreciate things at their true value, otherwise in wishing to confer a favour it will do harm to the object of love; it must assist others wisely according to their necessity, otherwise it will foster hypocrisy and produce professional and able-bodied beggars. In other words, as theologians teach, the order of charity has reference to the persons who claim our love, to the advantages which we desire to procure for them, and to the necessity in which they are placed,

God, the fountain and reason of charity, the infinite source of all good, has the first and highest claim on our love. “ He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.”¹ Next to God we must love ourselves with that genuine charity which makes one’s own salvation the first great duty of every man—‘‘ For what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul ?”² We are never justified, then, in committing the slightest sin for the love of anyone or anything whatsoever.

Neither must we without good cause expose ourselves to the proximate occasions of sin. If duty demands it and if proper precautions be taken, we may confidently trust in the protection of God, and expose ourselves to risk for the sake of our neighbour. We may, too, forego a small spiritual advantage which is not matter of precept for the sake of our neighbour. Moreover, we are sometimes called upon to sacrifice our own good of a lower order for the higher good of our neighbour. In this connection we may distinguish a triple order of goods, those which pertain to the salvation of the soul; the intrinsic and natural goods of soul and body, consisting in life, health, knowledge, liberty, etc.; and extrinsic goods consisting in reputation, wealth, etc. Theologians also distinguish three degrees of necessity in which one in need of charity, spiritual or temporal, may be placed. If he is in danger of damnation or of loss of life, or of other good of almost equal importance, and can do nothing to help himself, he is said to be in extreme necessity. If he is in similar danger but can do something to help himself, though not without grave difficulty, he is in grave necessity. Ordinary sinners and beggars who can help themselves without grave difficulty are in common necessity.

¹ Matt. x 37

² Matt. xvi 26.

Every man, as far as he can, is bound to help his neighbour in extreme spiritual necessity even at the cost of his own life: ‘‘ In this we have known the charity of God, because he hath laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.”¹ However, we do not lie under so serious an obligation unless the spiritual necessity of our neighbour is certain, the prospect of our being able to render effective help is equally certain, and no help is forthcoming from elsewhere. Neither should we be bound to risk our lives in order to help another in extreme spiritual need if greater harm would follow from our making the attempt. So that it is not often that ordinary people are bound to expose their lives to fulfil this obligation of charity; the obligation more frequently presses on Bishops and priests who have the cure of souls, and who are bound to execute their charge in justice as well as in charity. These are bound to expose their lives for their flock not only in extreme but also in grave necessity.

Except in the case of extreme spiritual necessity, we are not bound by the precept of charity to risk life or limb or expose ourselves to any serious inconvenience. The reason is because we are not bound to use extraordinary means and suffer serious inconvenience in order to preserve our own lives, and we cannot as a rule be bound to do more for our neighbour than we are bound to do for ourselves, especially as in grave or common necessity he can help himself. We might be obliged to do more for one whose welfare was of public importance. However, when our neighbour is in grave or even in common necessity, we must be prepared to undergo some inconvenience and trouble in order to help him. More precise rules on the subject will be given below.

It is a disputed question among theologians whether one is allowed to sacrifice his own life in order to save the life of another whose welfare is not of public importance. Many deny that it is lawful, for we should love ourselves in the first place when there is question of equal good; charity begins at home. Others, however, more probably teach that it may lawfully be done, and that it is an act of heroic virtue; so that in yielding a plank to another in a shipwreck and permitting himself to be drowned, a man does not prefer the life of another to his own, but he sacrifices his life for the sake of virtue.

¹ 1 John iii 16,

The more important spiritual goods of the soul should be the first objects of our solicitude, then the intrinsic goods of the soul and body, finally the extrinsic goods of reputation and wealth.

With the love of complacency which inclines us to show reverence, honour, and respect to others, we should give the preference to those who are more worthy of it on account of their closer union with God. The love of benevolence, on the other hand, leads us to prefer those who are nearer to us in sharing with them the goods which are specially due to them on account of their union with us. Although no absolute and universal rule can be laid down to guide us as to whom the preference should be given when we cannot help all, yet there is general agreement among theologians that the claims of our neighbour rank somewhat in the following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, domestics, those who live in the same place, country, and finally all others.

Preliminary Note. One can be loved before another in three ways: 1. intensively, when the will is borne toward one with a greater or more intense effort than toward another; 2. objectively, when we will a greater good to one than to another; 3. appreciatively, when you judge one to be worthier of love than another, so that you would rather lose the friendship of the other than of the former.

With these things noted beforehand, we shall speak first of the order of charity between God and creature, then of the order of charity between ourselves and our neighbor, and finally of the order of charity among our neighbors.

I. If on each side there is question of spiritual goods, each person is bound to prefer himself to his neighbor, as follows:

1. Each person is bound to prefer himself to others with respect to those things necessary for the last end.

2. It is not lawful to commit even a venial sin in order to promote the temporal or spiritual good of one's neighbor, or to prevent his temporal or spiritual evil; both because the true evil of one's own soul must be avoided before all things, and because evils are not to be done that good things may come (St. Alphonsus, II, 26, 2).

3. Nevertheless sometimes it is lawful, indeed there is even an obligation, to omit an act good in itself or better, or even to expose oneself to danger of sinning, in order to succor the spiritual or even temporal necessity of one's neighbor (St. Alphonsus, II, 26, 1; VI, 453).

II. If there is question of one's own spiritual and temporal goods, hold these things:

1. If the spiritual necessity of one's neighbor is extreme or quasi-extreme, he must be succored with the loss of any temporal good whatever, even of life² (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 5, ad 3; q. 44, a. 8, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, II, q. 27).

Corollary. Someone is bound, even with danger to life, to baptize an infant if no one else is present who would do it (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, 3). Likewise, to confer Extreme Unction on a dying Catholic person deprived of his senses, who is probably judged to be in the state of mortal sin and probably is attrite. Likewise, to absolve a dying person "if he is habitual in sins, and is so uneducated that he does not know how to elicit an act of contrition" (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, dic. 2). Many deny this, because no one is so uneducated that he cannot, with the help of grace, elicit an act of contrition. This indeed is true theoretically, but in practice it seems that one must stand with the opinion of St. Alphonsus and others, because, as death approaches, it seems more difficult, and for the man of whom we are speaking most difficult, to elicit an act of contrition. But those who voluntarily expose themselves to danger of damnation, for example by hanging themselves or by attacking an innocent person, must not be succored with danger to life, unless they grieve over the sin, or are judged so uneducated that they do not know how to elicit an act of contrition, or afterward are deprived of their senses.

2. If it is grave, one must assist with a middling inconvenience; but with a grave one if there is an obligation of piety, as in children with respect to parents; or of special charity, as in parents with respect to children, in spouses with respect to the partner, in superiors with respect to subjects and conversely; with a most grave one, if there is an obligation of justice, as in pastors of souls; likewise, if there is question of a grave and common spiritual necessity. Hence, for example, when plague is raging, even a priest to whom the care of souls has not been committed is bound, if another is lacking, to administer the necessary sacraments with danger to life (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, 39, 40).

III. If on each side there is question of temporal goods, in other words, of the temporal necessity of one's neighbor, see what was said on almsgiving (n. 533).

¹ Cf. Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 321 sq.

² Cf. 1 John 3:16.

The Order of Charity.—Charity not only requires that we love God, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these objects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.

(a) God must be loved above all, more than self (Matt, xvi. 24), more than father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the common good of all, and the source of all good.

(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one’s neighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor (Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance with the saying: “Charity begins at home.”

(c) Among neighbors those should be loved more who have more of a claim on account of their greater nearness to God or to ourselves.

Love can become greater in two ways: (a) objectively, when the person loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more titles to affection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) subjectively, when the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even though the object be not more amiable in itself.

The Character of our Love of God.—(a) It must be supreme objectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss rather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our desire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need not be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought of a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will places God above all.

Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note: (a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of one’s service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be preferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things their end, but in the sense that one hopes one’s service of God will be so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.

Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our spiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others who are higher in sanctity than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity such progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may perfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.

Is it lawful to sacrifice one’s own spiritual goods for the benefit of a neighbor?

(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in so doing one inflicts a wound on one’s own soul and prefers the good of others to one’s own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish to be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to prevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and proximate danger of sin for the sake of another’s spiritual progress.

(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by doing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not lessen but rather increases one’s own profit. Thus, a priest should interrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a daughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her parents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if an invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it is laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers the satisfactory value of one’s good works to the souls in purgatory; one may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a great service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account of irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one’s entrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls (Philip., i. 23, 24).

The Love of the Body.—(a) One should prefer the spiritual welfare of one’s neighbor to one’s own bodily welfare, for our neighbor is called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the body will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one’s own bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal, for it has more of a claim on one.

There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one’s bodily welfare for the other’s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a) extreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die without baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself, as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.

For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the needy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help the many rather than the one.

For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.

For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity requires that something be done (Ecclus, xvii. 12). (a) But it does not require the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in danger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary that one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger one’s life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places. (b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily inconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of a meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep him away from bad company.

If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is compared with corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should prefer one’s own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to offer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one’s family into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if a neighbor’s corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected with higher goods, then one may sacrifice one’s own good for that of another.

(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a lesser corporal good of one’s own. Examples: One may weaken one’s health to save another’s life. One may give of one’s blood for a transfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.

(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal corporal good of one’s own, if the common good requires this; for the good of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may expose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public person whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and firemen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety for the safety of the public.

(c) One may prefer an equal corporal good of another, who is only a private individual, to one’s own equal good, if the intention is to practise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At least, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue is a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy men who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as hostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold up for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for the other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump into a river and risk one’s life in order to rescue a drowning person, for heroic charity is a hotter adornment to self than mere, ordinary charity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough provisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his rations to the other, that both may not be lost.

There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person should not risk his life for another’s life, if he thereby endangers his own salvation (e.g., if he is in a state of sin and cannot reconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is admitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life with a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of charity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a multitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one’s life for the life of another, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married man, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life for the sake of a friend.

The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows: (a) as to good in general (e.g., the attainment of salvation), we should love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for all; (b) as to good in particular (e.g., the degree of beatitude), we should love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher degree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.

The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be reduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and hence more deserving of love—for example, a saintly acquaintance may be nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer to ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage, friendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer by nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.

The order of charity as between those nearer to God and those nearer to self is as follows:

(a) Objectively, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire for them that higher degree of God’s favor which belongs to their merits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will finally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus attain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect (i.e., that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer in many respects (e.g., on account of relationship, friendship, gratitude) another who is less holy.

(b) Subjectively, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that is, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for those nearer to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere natural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God’s will that more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel” (I Tim., v. 8). Hence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one’s own, and it supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.

The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will correspond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom greater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more respect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom greater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have shown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given spiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one would have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom greater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as visits) should be given.

Exceptions to the above are the following cases, in which the good of the better person should be preferred:

(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or private friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should decide in favor of the better man;

(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to preference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is a wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of strangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.

The order of charity between various kinds of natural relationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from consanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature itself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since it arises from one’s own choice, may be more congenial and may be preferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and companionship (Prov., xviii. 24).

In practice, other things being equal, one should manifest more love to a relative in those things that belong to the relationship.

(a) To those who are related by blood, corporal or temporal assistance is more due. If one has to choose between helping one’s indigent parents or an indigent friend, one should rather help one’s parents.

(b) To those who are spiritually related (e.g., pastor and parishioner, director and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual assistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is supposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than his relatives who belong to another congregation.

(c) To those who are related by some special tie, political, military, religious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious, etc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer, and not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest owes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not to his parents.

Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship, should have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private relationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as regards spiritual matters (e.g., calling a priest to give absolution), if a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity, one’s first duty would be to one’s parent. (b) As regards temporal matters, if one has to choose between assisting one’s needy parents and remaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one should give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is allowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.

The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of course to the nearer relatives-parents, children, wife. Between these nearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a) objectively (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect and honor), the order is: father, mother, wife, children; (b) subjectively (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of affection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.

The following should be noted about this order of preference between the members of one’s family: (a) the basis of preference given is only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change the order given (e.g., a pious mother is rightly more respected and honored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no notable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of another, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given are not guilty of serious sin.

The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when several are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need the order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his wife (Gen., ii. 24), second, the children, for ordinarily parents must provide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14), third, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country, all others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be preferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one receives life from parents.

The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is loved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His amiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b) Self is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more, objectively, than those who are lower in glory: for the state of the blessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But, subjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity itself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish the same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be entirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence of one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in holiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than those who are nearer by kinship or friendship.

Since charity should be universal, no class of persons, such as strangers, unbelievers or sinners, may be excluded from the benefit of almsgiving (Matt, v. 45). However, charity is also well ordered, and hence there is a preference to be observed, as follows:

(a) Other things being equal, one should favor those who are nearer to oneself by bonds of kinship, friendship, etc., since their claim on one’s charity is greater. Charity begins at home.

(b) If other things (such as worthiness, need or public utility) are on the side of those not related by kinship, friendship, etc., the order of preference may be reversed. Thus, if a person had to choose between helping a distant relative for whom he was not specially responsible, and who was a worthless fellow, or who was not in great need or who was not of great value to the community, and helping a stranger, who was most deserving, or in dire distress, or of great value to the community, the latter should be assisted rather than the former.

(c) In case of two strangers in equal poverty, one should help first the one who is more worthy or who feels his distress more. Thus, a person who is poor through misfortune is more deserving than one who gambled his money away; those who were once wealthy feel the sufferings of poverty more than those who are inured to a life of privation.

What order generally is to be observed in charity toward neighbor?

In the order of charity each one is bound after God to love: 1. himself according to spiritual goods, insofar as he wills God, his end, i.e., the supreme and uniquely necessary good, more to himself than to another; then neighbor as to the same spiritual goods; 2. himself as to intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc.; then neighbor as to the same bodily goods; 3. himself, and then neighbor, as to external goods, such as reputation, honor, riches. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor. But the rule is prior and preferable to what is ruled. Therefore love of self always precedes and is preferred to love of neighbor, where the matter concerns goods of the same order and equal necessity.

Of the same order: Supernatural goods are to be preferred to natural goods. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to private good, because the common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Intrinsic natural goods, life, health, integrity of members, are to be preferred to extrinsic goods, reputation, honor, riches. But reputation and honor with respect to riches are of a higher order, because they are something spiritual and moral.

Necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold: 1. Extreme, when danger of life, that is, of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without another's help. And it is quasi-extreme if he can free himself, but only with the greatest difficulty; or if there is only probable danger of the aforesaid evil: of life, of integrity of principal members, of liberty, of a most grave disease, of infamy. 2. Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil, which he cannot escape without great difficulty. Such is the necessity in which those things necessary for conserving one's state are lacking. 3. Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are vulgar sinners who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order poor beggars are generally in it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. Tambur., Expl. Dec., l. 5, c. 1, § 1, n. 4 seqq.; § 2, n. 5 seqq.; Suarez, de Carit., d. 9, s. 2, n. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 4-6; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 3; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; L. 25, 27, 31; H. A. 18.

Resolves: He sins against charity toward himself, gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter, who neglects due care of soul or body. - It is indeed licit, speaking per se, to deprive oneself of spiritual goods not necessary for salvation because of the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, as it would be to omit entering religion, lest there be lacking one who may devote labor either to a parish, or seminary, or mission, or in order to support his parents or children. Indeed someone can wish for and procure for his neighbor greater spiritual goods, not necessary, than for himself, contempt of them being excluded. But it is not licit to sin lightly or gravely, nor to undergo proximate danger of sinning, in order that you may impede another's sin, when your fall appears in some way certain; otherwise, if that danger can become remote, so that you may rightly trust that you will not fall. L. 26; l. 4, n. 78; l. 5, n. 63; l. 6, n. 453; H. A. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 3, 4.

In extreme spiritual necessity, neighbor must be helped even with certain danger to life, provided that these four things are established: 1. that there is equally certain hope of helping him; 2. that the neighbor has no one else by whom he may be relieved; 3. that the neighbor is certainly to be damned unless he is helped by you, so that it is established for you that the neighbor cannot free himself from sin through baptism, through the sacrament of penance, or at least through perfect contrition; 4. that a graver evil is not thence imminent, e.g., if, because someone dies for that cause, the salvation of several others is endangered. - 1 John 3:16; L. 27; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5; Reginald., Prax. For. Poenit., l. 4, c. 25, s. 6, n. 357.

In extreme temporal necessity, neighbor must ordinarily be helped with great inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest, such as even for a rich man would be a great largess of money. The reason is that on the one hand the life of neighbor is a more excellent good than some good of ours; and on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo such great inconvenience for others. L. 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, a. 7.

In grave necessity of either order, no one is bound to help neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, yet title of justice, piety, office, or common harm being excluded. The reason is the same, because namely the good of neighbor can be more excellent than some good of ours; but, since love of self always precedes by force of charity itself, charity does not command procuring the good of neighbor except always with less detriment to ourselves than the harm of neighbor which is urgent. Hence the common saying: Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience. Excluded, etc.; whence by justice pastors, namely Bishops and parish priests, are bound, with danger to life, to minister to their sheep the necessary sacraments, such as baptism and penance, but not others. Nor can the pastor then renounce his office, although he can substitute others with the just permission of the Ordinary. A pastor is also bound, with great temporal harm to himself, to procure great spiritual utility for a subject. L. 27; l. 6, n. 621; S. Th. l. c.

In common necessity of either order, neighbor must be helped with some inconvenience indeed, because love of neighbor requires this, but only a light one; for there can only be a light obligation of charity when the neighbor can fairly easily rescue himself from that necessity, or it is not too burdensome to him. But we are not bound to help all persons placed in common necessity. For this is impossible, and if it could be done, it would no longer be a light inconvenience. L. 32; S. Th. l. c.

Is it against charity to wish death for oneself because of misfortunes of life? - R. Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life or eternal happiness, as is clear of itself; or when life is so troublesome that it is judged harsher than death itself. Phil. 1:21-23; Ecclus. 30:17; 1 Mach. 3:50-60.

R. Affirmatively, if this is done from weariness of life and dejection of soul; yet this does not exceed venial sin, if that desire is inefficacious, and does not wish contrary to the order of divine Providence. For it is a certain pusillanimity and timidity, which fears all things, even light things, and per se is light. Very often also defect of advertence and deliberation excuses. Cf. 373; Struggl, q. 5, n. 12; Viva, in prop. 13-15 Innoc. XI, n. 3; L. 30; l. 5, n. 22; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64, a. 5 ad 3.

In those things which are necessary for life, is it licit to prefer another to oneself? - Some probably deny it, because the order of charity demands that someone, other things being equal, love himself more than neighbor. Yet except if the public good required saving the life of the other. Others probably affirm it, for in these things one does not in reality love neighbor more than oneself, but loves the good of heroic virtue more than life; Tob. 2:3-8; 12:12. But except if he who exposes himself is necessary to the republic or to his own family. Hence it is licit to yield to another the plank from a shipwreck; to give oneself up to enemies for preserving the fatherland unharmed; to defend a prince by interposing one's body against the weapon of an assassin. For this is not to inflict death on oneself, but to permit it. But from a most grave cause it is licit not to withdraw oneself from danger of death, indeed to expose oneself to it voluntarily. And thus it is licit also for a Carthusian gravely ill to meet death rather than eat flesh-meat, from love of virtue, and of faith given to God, or of keeping a vow. - L. l. 3, n. 366; H. A. tr. 8, n. 1; S. Th. 3, D. 29, a. 5 ad 3; Struggl 20, tr. 7, q. 3, n. 8.

What order especially is to be observed among neighbors? The order to be observed in charity regards both the love itself, and the goods, and the persons. - As to love, one must attend whether it is a love merely appreciative and of simple complacency and joy concerning goods possessed, which is followed by worship, honor, reverence; or a love of efficacious benevolence and mercy by exterior work, by which we will and procure for another goods not yet possessed. - As to persons, there must be attended both the comparison to God, according to which some are more excellent and better than others, and the comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others; but with ourselves we do not have conjunction, but unity and identity. As to goods, some are more excellent than others and more necessary, as was already declared in n. 389. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 7, 9, 11, 12.

First, by the love of simple complacency, the better are to be loved more. - "Among neighbors, we ought to love more the better and those more closely related." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 2. For since "the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of these principles, the affection of love be greater." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6. - Hence by appreciative love of simple complacency and joy, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those benefited; for the former have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all, and are more closely joined with God, the chief object of charity. By the other love of beneficence and mercy, those more closely joined are to be loved more. "It must be said that from this very fact that it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are more near are to be loved more." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 3. If the intensity of love is considered, "those who are more near to himself a man loves with more intense affection toward that good to which he loves them, than better persons toward a greater good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. For every movement has intensity of speed from the disposition of the movable thing and the power of the mover. S. Th. ibid.

If conjunction with God and conjunction with us are considered at the same time, "some neighbors are near to us according to natural origin, from which they cannot depart, because according to it they are what they are. But the goodness of virtue, according to which some approach God, can come and recede, increase and diminish; and therefore from charity I can will that this person, who is joined to me, be better than another, and thus be able to arrive at a greater degree of blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. "But there is also another mode by which we love more from charity those more joined to us, because we love them in more ways. For toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; but toward those who are joined to us we have certain other friendships, according to the mode of their conjunction to us. But since the good upon which any other honorable friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good upon which charity is founded, it follows that charity commands the act of any other friendship." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

For there are various friendships of men: the supernatural friendship of charity is founded upon communication of supernatural goods; other friendships are founded upon communication of particular goods. All these friendships can be subordinated to the first. Hence the same Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 103, a. 3 ad 2, says: "The reason of loving neighbor is God. And therefore the charity by which God and neighbor are loved is the same. Nevertheless there are other friendships different from charity, according to other accounts by which men are loved." Therefore, other things being equal, by love of benevolence and desire, by which we will and wish for another a good not yet possessed, which beneficence follows by doing good, those who are more joined to us are to be loved more as to those goods which are owed to such conjunction. The reason is that communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. And thus in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood relatives more; in matters pertaining to civil communication, our fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers ought to be preferred to others. But in spiritual helps greater account is to be had of those who are judged our sons, fathers, or brothers according to the spirit. Nevertheless not improbably carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred, partly because their conjunction with us is founded also in these things; partly because carnal conjunction, the foundation and basis of other conjunctions, is by its own nature prior and more stable, while other conjunctions supervene upon it and can be removed, as S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 8, warns. But the grace of charity does not destroy the inclination of nature, but perfects it and directs it to a supernatural end. S. Th. l. c., a. 7. And what has been said of parents ought by the same reason to be said of children and carnal brothers, in comparison with spiritual sons or brothers.

Finally in goods pertaining to nature and to conserving bodily life, help must be given, other things being equal: 1. to one's wife, because she is one flesh with the husband; 2. to children, for whom by natural right parents are more obliged to provide than conversely; for children ought not lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 12:14, and teaches S. Th., a. 9; 3. to parents, but more to the father than the mother, because he obtains the more excellent account of principle, S. Th., a. 10; indeed, in a case of extreme necessity, S. Th., a. 9, 11 ad 3; q. 31, a. 3 ad 4, thinks that parents must be helped before all others, even wife and one's own children, since they were the cause and principle of our existing; therefore equity demands that in extreme necessity, by freeing them from destruction, we repay as much; 4. to brothers, sisters; 5. to other blood relatives; 6. to benefactors, friends. Other things being equal; for to a distinguished benefactor or friend, for example, help must be given by the law of charity rather than to a blood relative not very near or not well deserving of us. Similarly it seems that spiritual brothers must be helped more, even in temporal goods, than relatives not very near, since spiritual conjunction excels carnal conjunction.

There is indeed no order on the part of the good which we wish for the neighbor through supernatural charity, if generally such good is considered according to itself. "As to this we love all men equally from charity, because we wish for all the same good in genus, namely eternal blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6 ad 1. Yet if the aforesaid good is considered according to the diverse participations of blessedness, we ought from charity to will a greater good to those who are nearer to God. "And this pertains to charity, that it wills the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

But if necessary good is attended to, other things being equal, those are to be loved more, and indeed with efficacious love, who are in greater necessity. For since the obligation of this efficacious charity is not except by reason of necessity, it is clear that generally the greater necessity obliges more. But since a greater or lesser obligation also depends on greater or lesser conjunction, and there are diverse degrees both of need and of nearness, no universal rule can be determined for all cases as to whom help should be given more. Therefore this requires the judgment of a prudent person. And thus, generally, a stranger in grave spiritual necessity must be helped rather than a blood relative in grave temporal necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 9; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; q. 64, a. 6 ad 2; L. 27.

Is it against charity to desire a temporal evil for neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end? - R. Negatively, if the due order of charity is preserved, i.e., if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. R. Affirmatively, if the order of charity is perverted. Confirmation from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI. - To desire; with an inefficacious desire; for it is not licit to inflict evil on neighbor, and therefore neither to desire it efficaciously.

Therefore it is licit to wish temporal evil for neighbor, or to rejoice over it: 1. because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2. because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3. because also of the good of many persons, of much greater moment, e.g., of the family, community, etc. - But it is illicit for a wife to desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, or of her daughter in order to avoid her own trouble, because, on account of deformity or poverty, she cannot marry. - Hence, if it is against charity to wish evil for neighbor, it is also against charity to imprecate evil upon neighbor; and each per se is grave. For if charity commands loving neighbor, it consequently forbids hating him, which is to will evil. - L. 30; l. 5, nn. 21, 22; S. Th. de Carit., q. un., a. 8 ad 10; 3, D. 30, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4; 2. 2. q. 76, a. 1; Viva, in prop. cit., n. 20; Struggl, q. 5, n. 9; E. M. 389.

220. Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is clear 1º from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, founded according to his image, and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude: therefore just as we ought to love God, so also we ought to love the neighbor on account of God. - 2º It is clear from Sacred Scripture, Matt. 22.39: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. - 3º It is also clear from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI, which lies thus: We are not bound to love the neighbor by an internal and formal act.

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, with regard to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor, or by reciting the Lord's Prayer ¹. But with regard to external acts he satisfies by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be laid down below.

¹ For satisfying the precept, a general love suffices, which excludes no one and embraces all, as St. Thom. teaches (2. 2. q. 25. art. 8.). And therefore for this suffices a prayer which is made for all by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and an external act.

II. Some order of Charity is to be observed in love of neighbor. The reason is that both the persons to be loved are more or less perfect, or more or less joined to us, and the goods to be desired or procured for them are more or less necessary ².

² Concerning the order of charity among neighbors, Laymann (Lib. 2. Tract. 5. Cap. 3. n. 5 and 6.), after St. Thomas, more clearly uses a threefold principle: I. With that love which is accompanied by complacency or joy in another's possessed good, and likewise which is accompanied by honor, reverence, those are to be loved more who are better, St. Thomas being the author (2. 2. q. 26. art. 7. 8. 9.): and for the same reason parents are to be loved more than children and wife, and benefactors more than those upon whom we have conferred benefits. The reason is that they have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all. - II. With that love by which we desire for another a good not yet possessed, and which is accompanied by mercy and beneficence, those are to be loved more who are more joined to us. - III. Those who are more joined to us ought to be preferred to others according to those goods in which conjunction or friendship is founded: because communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. Hence St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 26. art. 8.): The love of diverse persons is to be measured according to the diverse reason of conjunction, so that each one may be loved more in that which pertains to that conjunction according to which he is loved... And therefore in those things which pertain to nature, we ought to love blood-relatives more; but in those things which pertain to civil association, we ought to love fellow citizens more; and in military matters, fellow soldiers more. And (3. Dist. 29. q. 1. art. 6. ad 3.) from the same principles he deduces that ecclesiastical benefices are not to be given more to blood-relatives, but to those who are more fit for the government of the Church.

Likewise the necessities in which the neighbor is to be succored are diverse. For necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold, namely:

1º Extreme, when the danger of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without the help of another.

2º Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil ³, which he cannot escape without great difficulty.

³ The Author in reality exhibits grave necessity with those colors by which other Doctors are accustomed to indicate quasi-extreme, or at least most grave, necessity.

3º Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In the spiritual order vulgar sinners are in this, who, if they wished to employ some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order beggar-poor generally suffer it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. - St. Lig. n. 27, Hom. apost. n. 18.

221. • First rule. Everyone is bound to love himself more, simply and absolutely, than the neighbor ⁴. The reason is that each one is nearer to himself than any other. This is clear besides from the natural and invincible inclination to love oneself more than the neighbor; whence the common axiom: Well-ordered Charity begins from oneself.

⁴ ** In order that this assertion be true, it must be understood concerning those goods which we are bound to obtain or preserve for ourselves. For if this obligation is absent, to prefer the neighbor to ourselves is not only lawful, but pertains to virtue.

Second rule. Nevertheless, we ought to succor the neighbor, even with our own advantages put after ⁵, in the following order:

⁵ Namely, the first rule has force where goods are of the same order, and in the remaining things our condition and the neighbor's condition are equal. But the second has force when either in the order of goods or in the remaining things there is disparity, which can happen in three ways; whence a threefold rule, namely: 1º If the good necessary for the neighbor is of a higher order, we can and sometimes are bound to deprive ourselves of a good of a lower order for procuring that good for the neighbor. - 2º We can and sometimes are bound to help a neighbor constituted in greater necessity with damage to ourselves. - 3º The same thing must be said if indeed the necessity is equal, but the cause of each is not equal, for example, it is of greater importance that the life of the neighbor, as of a public person, be preserved.

But the order among goods is that spiritual and supernatural goods hold the first place; natural and intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc., the second; but natural extrinsic goods, such as reputation, honor, riches, the third. Yet reputation and honor with respect to goods of fortune are of a higher order, because reputation is something spiritual and moral.

1º In extreme spiritual necessity, per se ⁶, the neighbor must be succored even with danger of life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a good more excellent than our temporal life. - St. Lig. n. 27.

⁶ It is said per se; for one must except: 1º if there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor; whence a mother is not bound to undergo danger of life so that offspring may be baptized, since it is uncertain whether it will arrive at baptism. - 2º If there is another who can perform this; for then my work is not necessary (see Reginald, Prax. For. poenit. lib. 4. c. 25. n. 357.). - 3º If a graver evil threatens thence, for example, if by someone's dying for that cause, the salvation of many others would be endangered. Moreover, those things are to be seen which St. Alphonsus (Lib. 6. n. 624.) has concerning a dying person to be absolved even with danger of life.

2º In extreme temporal necessity the neighbor must ordinarily be succored with great ⁷ inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest. The reason is that on the one hand the life of the neighbor is a good more excellent than some good of ours; and on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo so great an inconvenience for others. - St. Lig. n. 31.

⁷ See below, n. 228. q. 3, where from St. Alphonsus with the common opinion of the Doctors it is established that someone is not bound to pay out a great sum of money in order to exempt another from danger of death.

3º In grave necessity of either order no one is bound to succor the neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, provided nevertheless the title of justice, piety, or office is excluded ⁸. For from what has been said it follows that we are bound to furnish some help, but not with grave loss of one's own good. - St. Lig. ibid.

⁸ From office, in grave necessity, for example, the pastor and physician are bound to care for another's safety; therefore it is not lawful for them to flee in time of plague, unless an equally suitable substitute has been appointed.

4º In common necessity of either order the neighbor is to be succored with some inconvenience indeed, because the love of neighbor requires this, but only with light inconvenience; for there can be only a light obligation of Charity when the neighbor can fairly easily remove himself from that necessity, or it is not too burdensome for him. But we are not bound to aid all who are placed in common necessity. For this is impossible, and if it could be done, it would already not be a light inconvenience ⁹. - St. Lig. n. 32.

⁹ With regard to relieving the common temporal necessities of the neighbor, see what is said below concerning alms; but with regard to spiritual necessities compare what St. Alphonsus has (Lib. 6. n. 625.) concerning the proper obligation of priests, that they render themselves fit for helping the faithful in spiritual matters, and also what is to be said below concerning fraternal correction.

Third rule. Among various persons to be loved, other things being equal, those are to be preferred who are more joined to us by blood, friendship, office, Religion, living together, etc., since God has bound them to us by stricter bonds.

Hence to be preferred are 1º parents to the rest; 2º a spouse to children, children to brothers, brothers to relatives; 3º friends, benefactors, Superiors, and persons more useful to the public good to the rest. Nevertheless in ordinary necessity, according to the common opinion, spouse and children ought to be preferred to parents ¹⁰. - St. Lig. Hom. apost. n. 15.

¹⁰ It belongs properly to the father that honor be bestowed on him by the children; but to the child, that utility be provided to him by the parents. Although in an article of necessity a son is obligated from benefits received to provide especially for his parents. St. Thom. (2. 2. q. 26. art. 9. ad 3.). And concerning a wife (ibid. art. 11.): A wife is loved more intensely; but greater reverence is to be shown to parents.

222. Resolves. - 1º In an equal order of goods, and equal necessity and cause, we are bound more to love ourselves than the neighbor. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor according to that saying: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. But the rule is prior and more powerful than the thing ruled ¹¹.

¹¹ Thus St. Thomas argues from that evangelical text (2. 2. q. 26. art. 4.): From which it seems that man's love toward himself is as the exemplar of the love which is had toward another. But the exemplar is prior to the thing exemplified. Therefore man ought from charity to love himself more than the neighbor. For this reason the words of Christ, as theologians commonly note, denote likeness, but not equality.

2º He sins against Charity toward himself, gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter, who neglects due care of soul or body ¹². - Nevertheless it is lawful to deprive oneself of non-necessary spiritual goods for the temporal or spiritual good of the neighbor, for example, to omit hearing Mass on a weekday ¹³, etc. Indeed someone can desire and procure for the neighbor greater non-necessary spiritual goods than for himself, provided contempt of them is excluded.

¹² Sins of this kind, however, are scarcely accustomed to be accused in confession. For either it is a matter of damage to the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must not be expressed any more than in the sin, for example, of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or it is a matter of omission of means by which faults may be guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing the precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins (see Lugo de Poenit. Disp. 7. n. 242 and Disp. 15. n. 56.). But if it is a matter of damages inflicted upon life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself seems to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body; nevertheless, since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost do not infer grave guilt.

¹³ Thus someone leaves the goods of contemplation, fasting, choir, etc., in order to instruct the neighbor, or defers entrance into religion, lest there be lacking someone who may devote labor either to a parish, or to a seminary, or to a mission. Nor indeed then in reality is there a ceasing spiritual gain; since the lesser good is compensated by the greater. Indeed someone can even choose the delay of eternal beatitude in order to help the neighbor; whence that saying of St. Martin: Lord, if I am necessary to your people, I do not refuse labor. The words of the Apostle, Phil. 1.23, also pertain here.

3º No one is bound with danger of life or goods to extract others from sins from which they can free themselves through the Sacrament of Penance or perfect contrition, even if they are in danger of life; but otherwise, per se, if it is judged that with difficulty they can elicit an act of contrition ¹⁴. - St. Lig. and others commonly.

¹⁴ The necessity of succoring certain persons near death, whether from sickness or from a grave wound, does not flow chiefly from the difficulty of eliciting an act of contrition; for the faithful, however rude and sunk in sins, sufficiently know that they must turn themselves to God with their whole heart, nor is the opportune help of divine grace lacking to them: rather there underlies the danger lest in those straits, with the mind distracted to other things, lethal sleep and death may snatch them away before they think anything concerning the salvation of the soul.

A greater and easily even extreme necessity will be able to press when danger threatens from deception, which does not depend on the will alone of those who are deceived; for example, if a teacher of heresy somewhere diffuses his errors, etc. Hence if there are any who in these our days use, as they say, the prudent economy of silence, lest they incur the hatred of the wicked, these surely seem to have entirely forgotten this obligation.

4º It is not lawful for you to undergo the proximate danger of sinning in order that you may prevent another's sin, when your fall appears somehow certain; otherwise, if that danger can be made remote, so that you rightly trust that you will not fall ¹⁵. - St. Lig. Hom. apost. n. 14.

¹⁵ Therefore dangerous matters are lawfully read and handled either by those who must care for souls, such as priests, or by those who must heal bodies, such as physicians. Likewise these latter lawfully undergo danger in treating women, and the former in hearing confessions. See St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 26 and Lib. 5. n. 63.), who indeed from the common opinion teaches (Lib. 6. n. 453.) that sometimes someone can even be obligated to a work of charity, although otherwise a fall is very probable, if the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity. For the help of God, who then commands that the neighbor be succored, is prudently still hoped for.

5º More probably, in those things which are necessary for life, it is lawful to prefer to oneself an equal or inferior, indeed it is a heroic act of charity, provided it is done on account of God. Except if he who exposes himself is necessary to the Republic or to his family. - Thus Suarez. - Laymann, etc., against others.

223. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself on account of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1º Neg., if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2º Affirm., if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet they do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is considered harder than death itself. - St. Lig. n. 30. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever, although not gravely, unless someone should wish to oppose the order of divine Providence ¹⁶.

¹⁶ Here the question concerns only an inefficacious desire of death, insofar as someone wishes or even asks that death be sent upon him by God. The Salmanticenses (Tr. 20. Cap. 13. n. 46.) condemn this as a grave fault, because (they say) it is a vice of timidity and pusillanimity to wish to lack life for the sake of avoiding evils of lesser moment. But where, then, is grave fault in pusillanimity, unless someone is thence impelled to break a grave precept? But where will you find a grave precept, that I may not ask God to rescue me from the miseries of the world? Therefore if I am impelled by a light cause, it will at last be an act of impatience, which from its genus is light. And since to wish to exchange the present life for the future life is not per se against the order of charity, here indeed we shall have some fault of impatience and pusillanimity, but not of violated charity.

Q. 2º Is it against Charity to desire a temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, on account of a good end?

Resp. 1º Neg., if the due order of Charity is observed, that is, if it is done on account of a greater good, or on account of a lesser evil ¹⁷. Hence this is lawful, 1º on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2º on account of the common good, either spiritual or temporal; 3º on account of the good even of many, of much greater moment, for example, of a family, community, etc. - St. Lig. n. 30. - Moreover such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones ¹⁸.

¹⁷ ** Hence the true and only cause is to be sought why Propositions XIII, XIV, and XV were condemned by Innocent XI; for now it will be enough to allege the authority of Viva, Cardenas, and Duarte, who treated expressly of the condemned theses. Thus those propositions have themselves: XIII. If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be sad over the life of someone, and rejoice over his natural death, and ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal emolument. - XIV. It is lawful by an absolute desire to desire the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one desiring; because, namely, a rich inheritance will come to him. - XV. It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness on account of the immense riches thence obtained from the inheritance.

Concerning these Viva says (n. 12.): The falsity is shown: because the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal emolument... Therefore the order of charity is perverted if we seek the death of the neighbor, or rejoice over it, on account of our temporal emolument; because by these affections our emolument is preferred to the life of the neighbor, which is in an order far superior; so that the perversion of order cannot be called light, nor can affections of this kind be free from grave fault. And n. 20: If a daughter were delighted concerning a parricide inculpably committed, lest she be further harassed by a father who wished to prostitute her and was impelling her to sin, such delight could be excused from the end and from the spiritual good, which far excels the life of the father. But a rich inheritance does not excel the life of the father; and therefore a son cannot without mortal sin be delighted over a parricide inculpably perpetrated on account of immense riches obtained from the inheritance.

But Duarte (Brev. Expos. Propp. damn. n. 207. 208.): The reason is that the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal emolument, indeed it requires that for preserving that life we succor a poor man even from things necessary to our state; therefore etc... From which it follows that if a son should wish death for his father, or rejoice over it, or if he should rejoice over parricide committed by himself in drunkenness for the sake of taking possession of an inheritance, he will sin mortally not only against charity, but also against piety, etc.

Finally Cardenas (Part. 4. Diss. 10. n. 20.): It is not lawful to wish death for the neighbor on account of a good of lesser moment. But he who wishes death for the neighbor... on account of any temporal emolument whatever, or on account of entering upon a rich inheritance, desires evil for him on account of a good of lesser moment. Therefore it is mortally illicit. Which doctrine he then (ibid. n. 27.) applies also to Prop. XV with regard to a son who rejoices over parricide perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, etc.

And indeed it will have been useful to note these things, so that it may be clear that VV. have in vain objected the condemnation of these theses against the doctrine of Suarez and others, concerning which we spoke in the Note at n. 172. Since for an entirely different reason than they contend, those theses (as is plain from what has been said) were condemned.

¹⁸ That it can seem more perfect to desire that the impious be converted does not cause those to be reprehended who, for the good of the Church and of society, desire and earnestly ask that by the powerful hand of God they be humbled or even exterminated; since also in this the virtue of true charity toward the Church and neighbors is exercised in a most ordered way. Therefore the Church also in her prayers asks from God now their conversion, now their perdition, now both at the same time disjunctively.

Resp. 2º Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor of her daughter, because on account of deformity or poverty she cannot marry ¹⁹. This is clear from the condemnation of propositions 13 and 14 by Innocent XI. - St. Lig. n. 30.

¹⁹ St. Alphonsus explains his mind better with regard to this last case in Lib. 5. n. 22, namely that the question is about a mother who, merely to avoid her own annoyance, wishes the death of her daughter; and therefore he gives the reason, because the evil of the mother does not outweigh the evil wished for the daughter. Therefore he does not contradict the other Doctors affirming that, in those circumstances in which death is better than bitter life (as is said Eccli. 30.), both the daughter for herself, and the mother for the daughter, can lawfully wish death and ask it from God. Moreover, also for avoiding her own grave troubles, it will certainly be lawful for a mother, if not to wish the death of either husband or daughter, at least to desire and ask from God that in whatever way it pleases Him, He rescue her from those straits.

764. We cannot rightly love God unless we love His works, especially those in which divine goodness shines forth more perfectly, namely intellectual creatures, which were made to the image and likeness of God, angels and men. Passing over angels and the blessed, concerning whom there is treatment where the communion of saints is discussed, it remains to treat men who are wayfarers. Now we ought to love ourselves and our neighbor.

765. Concerning love of oneself there is no explicit precept, because, as Augustine notes, man does not need a precept in order to love himself:¹ "Therefore, since there is no need of a precept that each one should love himself and his body... it remained that we should receive precepts both concerning that which is above us and concerning that which is beside us." Nevertheless Christ implicitly commanded this dilection, saying:² "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Naturally indeed man loves himself; this love is not properly friendship, but something greater: for friendship imports a certain union; "but to each one toward himself there is unity, which is more powerful than union toward another; whence just as unity is the principle of union, so the love by which someone loves himself is the form and root of friendship: for in this we have friendship toward others, that we conduct ourselves toward them as toward ourselves."³

¹ St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, c. 26, P. L., XXXIV, 29.

² Matt. 22:39.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 4.

766. But by force of the divine precept, man ought to love himself supernaturally, for God's sake: (A) first of all his soul, which was created by God, made through grace a sharer in the divine nature, - and also redeemed by the blood of Christ, - the temple of the Holy Spirit, - capable of eternal beatitude.

Hence St. Thomas says:⁴ "And according to this the good love themselves, as to the interior man, because they will that he be preserved in his integrity; and they desire for him the goods which are spiritual, and also spend effort in order to attain them, and delightfully return to their own heart, because there they find both good thoughts in the present, and the memory of past goods, and the hope of future goods, from which delight is caused." Wherefore we ought to put the salvation of our soul and its sanctification before all things: "Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added to you."⁵ Therefore we ought to cultivate Christian virtues, and rather die than be defiled; and therefore do good and meritorious works rather than heap up money: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth, where rust and moth consume, and where thieves break through and steal; but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither rust nor moth consumes, and where thieves do not break through nor steal."⁶ Accordingly we ought to esteem grace, and the means for preserving and increasing it, more than temporal helps. - We ought to fear one thing, sin, as we reported concerning Chrysostom, n. 471.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 7.

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

⁶ Matt. 6:19-20.

767. (B) We ought likewise to love the body for God's sake; for it is the instrument of the soul for rendering honor to God and carrying out good works: "Neither yield ye your members as instruments of iniquity unto sin, but present yourselves to God as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of justice unto God";⁷ - and also the temple of God, sanctified through redemption, and capable of some beatitude, which from the glorious soul will redound into the risen body: "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you? For you are bought with a great price; glorify and bear God in your body."⁸ - "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory. It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power. It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body."⁹

⁷ Rom. 6:13; cf. 19.

⁸ 1 Cor. 6:19-20.

⁹ 1 Cor. 15:42-43.

But, in order that the matter may be so, we ought to mortify the concupiscence of the flesh and disordered desires, lest otherwise we be drawn to unlawful things and incur damnation: "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth, fornication, uncleanness, lust, evil concupiscence, and covetousness."¹⁰ Wherefore the Apostle chastised his own body, lest he be allured to sin:¹¹ "But I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."

¹⁰ Col. 3:5.

¹¹ 1 Cor. 9:27.

768. They sin against love of self: (a) by excess, who indulge egotism, inordinately seeking private advantage, by passing over the good of God and neighbor: "For all seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ's."¹² We can indeed seek our own things, but not exclusively:¹³ "Let no one seek what is his own (that is, only), but what belongs to another."

¹² Phil. 2:21.

¹³ 1 Cor. 10:24.

(b) By defect, by loving exterior goods in such a way that spiritual goods are contemned: for thus the good of the body is preferred to the good of the soul, contrary to right reason and the divine precept: "And fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell";¹⁴ - or even by esteeming the goods of fortune in such a way that they are preferred to the salvation and life of the body; - or a fortiori by taking bodily life away by one's own hands, through suicide.¹⁵

¹⁴ Matt. 10:28.

¹⁵ Concerning suicide, concerning care of one's own body, etc., we spoke in De Justitia, n. 288-310.

Concerning all these things we speak only briefly, because they are developed more fully in the course of Moral Theology.

Concerning charity toward neighbor we shall examine three things: 1. the precept of charity; 2. the works of charity, especially those which are called social; 3. sins against charity.

805. Charity prescribes not only the works to be furnished, but also the order to be observed in dilection, whether as regards persons or as regards goods.

St. Augustine explains that a certain order is to be established among things to be loved: "But he lives justly and holily who is an uncorrupted appraiser of things: and he is the one who has ordered dilection, lest he either love what is not to be loved, or not love what is to be loved, or love more what is to be loved less, or love equally what is to be loved either less or more, or love less or more what is to be loved equally. Every sinner, insofar as he is a sinner, is not to be loved; and every man, insofar as he is a man, is to be loved for God's sake, but God for His own sake. And if God is to be loved more than every man, each one ought to love God more than himself. Likewise another man is to be loved more than our body: because all these things are to be loved for God's sake, and another man can enjoy God with us, which the body cannot; because the body lives through the soul by which we enjoy God. But all are to be loved equally: yet since you cannot benefit all, you must especially consult for those who, according to opportunities of places and times or of any things whatever, are joined more closely to you by a certain lot."⁹ These words, which embrace the sum of Catholic doctrine, we shall explain by setting forth the order to be followed as regards the persons and goods to be loved.

⁹ St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, lib. I, c. 27-28, P. L., XXXIV, 35-36.

806. (A) Concerning the order between love of self and of neighbor: Each one is ordinarily bound, other things being equal, to love himself more than his neighbor. - I say other things being equal, that is, in the same order of goods and in the same necessity, as will be clear from what is to be said.

For (a) the precept of fraternal charity is contained in these words:¹ "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; and thus dilection of oneself is established as the rule of dilection toward neighbor; but this supposes love of self to be something more known and more powerful than love of neighbor: for the rule is prior and more powerful than the thing ruled. (b) Otherwise, psychologically man is inclined to love himself more than others: for he is nearer to himself than another is (above, n. 765); hence he loves God as the principle of every good, himself as a participant of the divine good, but the neighbor as a sharer of this participation. Hence the axiom was born: well-ordered charity begins from oneself.

¹ Matt. 22:39.

Yet we are also commanded to love the neighbor as Christ loved us, and therefore in certain cases we ought to prefer the spiritual good of the neighbor to our own temporal good. In order to understand this rightly, certain rules are handed down.

807. Practical rules. (a) As regards spiritual goods, it is not licit to sin, even lightly, in order to procure the temporal or spiritual good of the neighbor: for evils are not to be done that goods may come. - Nor is it licit to expose oneself to a proximate and certain danger of sinning in order to help the neighbor, unless the danger can morally be removed by prayer, serious effort of the will, or other spiritual remedies; for he who exposes himself to a danger of this kind already sins, from what has been said in the Treatise on Penance, n. 458. Yet it must be noted that those who by office are engaged in the temporal or eternal salvation of others, such as priests and physicians, are helped by special grace for resisting temptations occurring in the exercise of their office, provided that they themselves have recourse to God by frequent prayer: therefore these can, and often ought, approach occasions proximate of themselves, provided that by spiritual remedies they render the danger of sinning remote.

But someone can, and sometimes ought, to omit or at least defer useful spiritual goods, but not necessary ones, for the salvation or sanctification of the neighbor, for example, to defer meditation in order to hear confessions; for then he is not truly deprived of a spiritual good, but, by laboring for the salvation of souls for God's sake, exercises charity and does not cease to pray; otherwise, after the confessions have been heard, he will be able to return to meditation.

Nor is it illicit to desire the delay of heavenly beatitude, in order to devote oneself longer to the salvation of souls; for thus many saints thought, who with the Apostle said: "I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, a thing by far the better; but to abide still in the flesh is needful for you."² - Likewise we can desire greater spiritual goods for others than for ourselves, hoping that in the neighbor they will conduce to the greater glory of God: for this proceeds from charity toward God and from humility.

² Phil. 1:23-24. Thus St. Martin: "Lord, if I am necessary to Thy people, I do not refuse labor"; of St. Ignatius (Breviary, July 31, lect. 6) it is read: "He was heard once to say: if a choice were given, he would prefer to live uncertain of beatitude and meanwhile to serve God and the salvation of neighbors, than, certain of the same glory, to die at once."

808. (b) As regards temporal goods, regularly each one is bound to prefer his own temporal life to the life of another; for each one is commanded to preserve his own life, and therefore to care for it before he provides for others.

Yet not rarely it is licit to place the life of others before our own: on account of the public good, for example, if there is question of protecting the life of a man who is very useful to the Church or the State, or of a community or multitude in danger: for the public good is to be set before the private. - Likewise it is licit to expose one's own life in order to save the life of the neighbor, on account of the exercise of virtue, especially charity, because an act of heroic charity is of greater worth than temporal life; therefore it is laudable to serve those infected by plague, to leap into the sea to snatch another from the waves, even with danger to one's own life.

809. (B) Concerning the order to be observed among different neighbors. Other things being equal, we ought to love more those neighbors who are nearer to God or to ourselves.

(a) If there is question of love of complacency, we ought to love more those who are nearer to God, or holier; thus a holy man should be loved more than an impious parent; for love of complacency, which rests upon qualities already possessed, ought to be proportioned to the virtues of those whom we love.

(b) But if there is question of affective and effective love, or of benevolence and beneficence, those who are nearer to us are to be loved more; for here there is question of goods not yet possessed, and it is consonant with reason that we desire or confer them upon those whose necessities, on account of a special bond of piety or gratitude, we are bound to provide for more strictly.

810. But the nearness by which men are joined among themselves can be threefold: carnal, by which by reason of blood they are connected to one another, as parents and children, husband and wife, blood-relations, relatives by marriage; - civil, by which those who are members of the same society are joined among themselves, for example, fellow citizens, fellow soldiers, friends, associates, etc.; - spiritual, when by force of some spiritual office they are united among themselves, such as superiors and inferiors, pastors and their subjects, confessors and penitents. - Now, in any kind of conjunction, those are to be preferred who are nearer in the same kind; thus, in those things which pertain to nature, blood-relations are to be preferred to strangers;³ in civil matters we ought to love fellow citizens more than foreigners; in spiritual matters, those who are joined by a more intimate bond are to be loved more.

³ Among blood-relations themselves a diverse order is assigned, according to diverse respects. Thus, outside the case of extreme necessity, or in ordinary necessities, the following are to be helped: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters, other blood-relations according to the degree of blood-relationship. - In extreme necessity, parents of themselves are to be preferred to wife and children. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 9-11). But in practice, before the fact, there is scarcely room for deliberation, and, after the fact, the matter is to be judged from the dispositions of the subject.

Yet it must be noted that not rarely special and extraordinary circumstances intervene, which permit some inversion of order; thus, by reason of a special friendship otherwise legitimate, friends are loved more than blood-relations; likewise, among blood-relations, sometimes those who have conferred greater benefits are loved more, although less near. But those who feel thus are not to be made anxious, provided that they render due love to those nearer.

811. In ordering charity, attention must be paid not only to persons, but also to the goods which are to be procured for these persons. The first place is held by supernatural, or spiritual, goods, such as eternal beatitude and the means necessary for obtaining it, as grace and virtues; the second by natural goods, whether of the mind, as the faculties of the soul, or bodily, as life, health, etc.; the third by external goods, as honor, reputation, riches, etc. - How, in the different necessities which occur, the neighbor is to be helped as regards these different goods must now be established.

812. (A) Man is bound to love the supernatural good of the neighbor more than his own natural good; for the eternal beatitude of the soul far surpasses bodily life and external goods, and therefore ought to be set before them. This must be explained more fully: -

(a) When the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity, so that without another's aid he cannot morally escape eternal damnation, regularly anyone is bound to help him, even with danger of life. Thus commonly. For from what has been said we ought to love brothers as Christ loved us; but He loved us so that He laid down His soul for His brothers; therefore, according to the testimony of John, "we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren."⁴ For the loss of temporal life, compared with the loss of eternal beatitude, is a light evil.

⁴ 1 John 3:16.

Sometimes, although rarely, cases of this kind occur; for example, an infant not yet baptized and about to die shortly; an adult who is certainly known to be in mortal sin and is about to die before he can morally elicit an act of contrition: for if he can easily elicit such an act, he can now help himself.

But, in order that this precept urge, it is necessary that there shine forth a very probable hope of helping him before he dies; - that graver spiritual damage not arise thence, for example, scandal, or impossibility of finding another priest to care for other sheep; - and that there be no other who can and will help him. - But let no one be delayed from this by the thought that he himself is in the state of sin: for by a heroic act of charity all sins are blotted out.

813. (b) If the neighbor is in grave spiritual necessity, that is, if without another's aid he can be saved only with great difficulty, one is not bound to help him with very grave temporal damage, unless he is obliged to this by reason of office or the public good.

For since the neighbor in this case absolutely can, if he wills, free himself from the danger of damnation without another's help, no one is strictly bound to expose himself to death or to very grave damage, when otherwise he has not undertaken special care of him; this would indeed be an exercise of heroic virtue, but by no means is it commanded.

Otherwise it must be said concerning those who by office, by force of their duty, have care of souls, such as pastors: for these, by accepting such an office, by force of a quasi-contract, have undertaken the obligation of ministering to subjects, even with danger of life, when these are in grave necessity: "The good shepherd gives his life for his sheep."⁵ And indeed if soldiers, physicians, and various administrators undergo danger of death even for furnishing temporal aid to others, how much more ought the ministers of God to be prepared to give life for the sheep committed to them! - Hence, in time of plague or public calamity, it is not licit for a pastor to desert his flock, even if he substitutes another suitable priest.⁶

⁵ John 10:11.

⁶ Benedict XIV, De Synodo, lib. XIII, c. 19, n. 2; cf. De Sacramentis in genere, n. 105; De Paenitentia (moral part), n. 365-366.

Say the same in grave public necessity, for example, if some parish or community lacks a priest, or if errors against faith are spread in some place: for when such a public danger occurs, we are bound to undergo danger of life in order to protect the faith or morals of the people; for the spiritual public good must be preferred to temporal life; otherwise in the grave necessity of a community, it can scarcely happen that there is not extreme necessity with respect to some.

814. (c) In common spiritual necessity, from which namely anyone can free himself without another's aid and without great difficulty, no one is bound to help him with great damage; but only the principles handed down above concerning fraternal correction are to be applied.

815. (B) We are bound to love the neighbor as regards bodily goods more than ourselves as regards external goods; for the life or health of the body is to be valued more than money. - Yet, in order to save the life of the neighbor, we are not bound to use extraordinary means, or to make great expenses, as has already been explained, n. 792.

816. Corollary. All these things can be briefly condensed thus: (a) our own necessary spiritual good is to be preferred to every good of the neighbor; (b) the necessary spiritual good of the neighbor is to be set before our bodily good, even our own life; (c) regularly we ought to prefer our bodily good to the bodily good of the neighbor; (d) among different neighbors, we are bound, other things being equal, to prefer the good of the neighbor more closely joined to us.

Utility. - It matters very much that we acquire for ourselves a distinct account of the order of charity, and that we understand well the connatural concord between love of ourselves and love of neighbor.

I. Varied Character. — 1. Since every friendship is founded in some communion of life, as many as are the communions, so many will be the genera of friendship. The ineffable communication by which, through supernatural sanctifying grace, we communicate in the divine life, founds a friendship at once most sublime, since it is of charity whose primary object is the divine Goodness itself in itself, and most universal, since it joins even the pure spirits with us and with our neighbor.

Communication in nature begets the universal society and friendship of men whom God has not punished with infernal degradation.

Besides, unequal conjunctions among rational creatures take their beginning from unequal communications in other goods: as in the family and in the state.

Conjunctions which rest upon a communion of lower life can be observed both from charity and from benevolence of a less high honesty.

For since they have been foreseen and willed by the most wise God, charity itself commands their observance. They integrate the order of charity, rather than being repugnant to the law of charity.

And by honestly cultivating the various friendships of the lower order, we exercise virtues which indeed are inferior to charity, but which nevertheless, in a just man, will not lack their own proper merit. Therefore we can observe legitimate conjunctions in a twofold way: insofar as, in the very exercise of charity, we attend to them; and insofar as, from an inferior motive, we show ourselves faithful friends.

2. No true love consists in exterior action alone: we can honestly offer a good and useful action even to brute animals, indeed to plants.

Wherefore, according to varied exercise, we can distinguish love of the heart, or interior love; love of the mouth, or that which is in signification; and love of work, which is in beneficence. This distinction is to be attended to in the very order of charity.

II. Universality of Charity. — It is commanded that neighbor be loved even with affection.

A neighbor is only and every rational creature, with the damned excepted. For these, like irrational creatures, are excluded from the beatitude in whose communication charity rests. - He is to be loved even with affection. For there is no true love which is merely exterior. Besides, from internal benevolence proceeds the beneficent action which we exercise toward ourselves. But from the mouth of Christ we have received the second precept, similar to the first, in these words: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore every neighbor is to be cherished with a general affection of benevolence.

To this point pertain both propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, among those condemned and prohibited at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "We are not bound to love neighbor by an internal and formal act." - "We can satisfy the precept of loving neighbor by external acts alone" (Denz. 1160, 1161).

2. That office does not demand that we elicit formal acts of universal love. It is enough that, on a given occasion, the good or evil of any neighbor which we know should excite in us some joy of approbation or some compassion, which demonstrate some general disposition of benevolence or sympathy. It is also manifested and exercised by general prayers, for example, Our Father, Hail Mary, from which we exclude no one.

III. Order of Charity. — 1. Things to be noted beforehand. Between right love of ourselves and of neighbor there is no opposition per se, but, on the contrary, a wonderful concord. We cannot love our neighbor better than by right love of ourselves, by which we become more perfect and therefore more powerful for helping our neighbor. Indeed, on account of the community of goods which follows friendship, our good is already the good of our neighbor, at least when there is question of those true goods which are not to be divided in such a way that the more one receives, the less can fall to another. And in turn, by loving neighbor we love ourselves, since right love of neighbor is meritorious. Therefore, while we procure spiritual goods for our neighbor, we in no way per se harm our own spiritual good, and we can expect more helps from a better neighbor. But if, for the utility of neighbor, we neglect our temporal goods, indeed life, that detriment of the inferior order is abundantly redeemed by compensation of the superior good (2, 2, q. 26, art. 4). Hence the friend who gives his life for his friend chooses for himself the greater good, and therefore loves himself more than his friend.

Wherefore the true question concerning practical preference, by which we prefer one to another, arises rather among various neighbors than between ourselves and neighbors. For when there is question of others, those whom our beneficence does not help do not obtain of themselves the merit and compensation of the superior order, which he obtains who "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13, 5).

Therefore, without any appearance of "egoism," we can establish, with St. Thomas, that right order demands that from charity we love ourselves more than neighbor, who nevertheless is to be loved equally, because charity as referred to us is founded in our participation of divine beatitude, while others are loved as associates in that participation (2, 2, q. 25, art. 12; q. 26, art. 1 and 4). Besides, according to Sacred Scripture and Christ Himself: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," love of ourselves is the rule for love of neighbor; but the rule is prior to the thing ruled.

Besides the communication in eternal beatitude, upon which theological charity is founded, there are among men unequal communications in other goods, which beget various conjunctions: for example, in the family, in the state. These conjunctions, since they have been foreseen and willed by the most wise God, are not repugnant to the law of charity, but rather integrate the order of charity, so that according to charity itself they are to be observed.

2. A twofold principle of order. After St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 26, art. 6, we acknowledge a twofold principle of order: one on the part of the object, which is God; the other on the part of the subject, which is the very one who loves; and according to unequal nearness to one or the other principle the very character of love from charity varies. Thus, according to the Holy Doctor, the intensity of affection is taken from the one loving; wherefore with a more intense affection we will more strongly the good which we can wish for and procure for those nearer to us (l. c., art. 7). But always the one loving himself is the principle and, as it were, the rule of loving one near to him.

— 3. The order of charity. a) As to interior acts. If there is question of simple complacency and approbation, we ought to will to each neighbor the good which he has. "It pertains to charity that it wish the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in beatitude" (2, 2, q. 26, art. 7). Wherefore in this love, which is mixed with estimation and brings with it honor, worship, and reverence, the better, the holier, are to be placed before the less holy, although the latter are more joined with us. For a similar reason, even in the order of lower communion, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those to whom we have done good ¹ (2, 2, q. 26, art. 9-12).

But if there is question of benevolence and desire, by which we wish for another a good not yet possessed, just as the solicitude of providing is increased by subjective nearness, so it will be consonant with order that we desire more the good of those who are bound to us by a closer bond. Wherefore, in this order, the wife who is one flesh with the husband, children who are something of the parents, are preferred to the parents themselves.

b) As to signification. Charity ought also to be manifested by exterior signs. These vary according to the quality of the person and the very conjunction. Observances are owed to superiors, affability to equals, benignity to inferiors. There exist common signs, which are to be denied to no one per se, and special signs, among those who are nearer.

c) As to beneficent action. Finally, true charity ought to be beneficent. In estimating the laudable acts and offices of charity, the order of charity must here be composed with the various necessities.

¹ Nevertheless by natural inclination we love more those to whom we have done good, because something of our own has been placed in them, and thus we love ourselves in them. Hence he testifies humble friendship who accepts a benefit: he consents that he belong in some way to another.

— Moreover necessity is distinguished by a twofold genus: spiritual, which is considered with respect to eternal life (not simply with respect to the life of grace); temporal, which is estimated with respect to temporal life.

Extreme spiritual necessity is that of him who without the help of another undergoes a certain and proximate danger of eternal damnation, so that this ruin is morally certain, for example, a child about to die without baptism. An uninstructed unbeliever is also in a similar necessity, or an uninstructed faithful person who has lived very badly; but not every uninstructed faithful person: for he can help himself by an act of contrition.

Grave spiritual necessity is that which is overcome with difficulty: as when someone is in a sufficiently proximate danger of losing the faith or good morals. - Common spiritual necessity presses sinners or those who are about to sin unless they are taught or corrected.

Extreme temporal necessity is that from which death or an equivalent evil in moral estimation threatens one in need: perpetual servitude, infamy, violation, ruin of health. An evil is said to threaten insofar as it will follow certainly and shortly, for example, within a few months. Cf. Busenbaum, Dubium de eleemosyna; St. Alphonsus, l. 2, 31; Lugo, De Iustitia, d. 16, n. 135; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 222. To this necessity is almost equated that which is called quasi-extreme, when the danger of an extreme evil is less threatening, yet probable, or when an evil threatens which is almost equivalent to death: perpetual weakness, grave positive infamy. - Grave necessity is constituted by a grave evil threatening, by which, however, those goods are not taken away which nature willed per se to belong to all: for example, loss of riches, of office, being cast down from one's state, captivity that is not most grave. - Common necessity is defined by that remote danger of life in which those who have no goods are habitually placed. It is the common lot of beggars; wherefore it is said to be theirs.

In the material description of necessities not all strictly agree. Lugo, d. 16, n. 154, proposes a sufficiently useful rule of formal distinction, so that you call necessity extreme, quasi-extreme, grave, according as privation with moral certitude affects goods which nature willed simply to be present to all, or per se to be available to all, or, on the contrary, granted to some and denied to others. Another formal account is taken from the relation which the good has with the temporal good which is the greatest and fundamental, that is, with life.

The Order of Charity Composed with Various Necessities. — 1. Between ourselves and neighbors, as to beneficent action, these general principles or norms are shown by the very order of charity.

1. It is lawful for us to postpone necessary spiritual good to no utility of neighbor: wherefore, with certain prevision of mortal sin, no works can be offered to neighbor. - Spiritual good which is not necessary, but certain, we must postpone to office, but to no utility of neighbor whose care has not been imposed upon us. Wherefore neither can a son desert his needy mother, nor can a religious violate obedience, in order to preach the Gospel to barbarians. But it is not to be advised that we redeem the utility of neighbor by the loss of spiritual good. - It is lawful to prefer uncertain spiritual good to the utility of neighbor. What is to be counseled must be gathered from the circumstances. Wherefore, for a probably more perfect life, it is lawful to renounce a very good action among the people, although it is not always more expedient.

But see that you observe that that opposition between our spiritual good and the utility of neighbor is only accidental. Thus, in the classic example of the son who is impeded by the office of piety toward poor parents from entering religion, or from going to foreign missions, the son per se can become no less holy among his parents than in the midst of barbarians. But human frailty brings it about that we yield to the difficulty of the circumstances.

2. We must postpone our bodily good to the extreme spiritual necessity of an individual neighbor; we can per se, but are not bound to, postpone it to the bodily good of neighbor.

3. As to external goods, we can per se, but are not bound to, prefer an individual neighbor to ourselves; and therefore, by the same reason by which it is lawful to neglect physical care of the body on account of another temporal utility of our own, by the same reason it will be right to neglect the body on account of the utility of neighbor.

4. Our spiritual good excepted, when there is question of other goods, common utility ¹ is to be placed before one's own.

These principles are easily shown if you consider: a) that it is fitting that we love ourselves more than neighbor with the love of charity; b) that spiritual detriment is compensated for us by no good, while bodily and temporal detriment admits compensation by a better good; c) that through the body and exterior goods, but not through spiritual goods, we are members or parts of a community; but parts exist for the whole, and therefore their good must yield to the good of the community.

¹ By the name of utility is meant what in Italian or French we would call interesse. Wherefore this word comprises not only useful goods but even especially necessary goods.

— 2. Among neighbors themselves, the same order of charity orders that we first succor private persons more joined to us, and indeed by attending first to those to whom we must bring help per se. Wherefore neighbors come in this order: wife or husband, children, parents, collateral blood-relatives and relatives by affinity, household members and familiars. One exception to that order is admitted: in extreme necessity, parents, because they have given life, are said to be preferred even to wife and children. Cf. Laymann, L. 2, t. 3, c. 3, n. 5.6.

Necessary public good is to be placed before private good; non-necessary public good cannot be preferred to necessary (or obligatory) private good; it can be preferred to non-necessary private good, and this per se is laudable.

— 1. Various communications in goods beget various conjunctions which can be observed from the supreme friendship of charity; and they also give place to various honest friendships, but of inferior dignity. And, according to varied exercise, interior charity is distinguished, its exterior signification, and its exterior operation.

2. We are ordered to love neighbor not by exterior action alone but also with affection, since we must love him as ourselves, and no true love can be merely exterior. But the interior affection calls for its connatural manifestation.

Moreover neighbor is only and every rational creature, with the damned excepted. Hence the universality commanded of love, which, besides formal acts which are contained in general prayer (Our Father), requires no other expressly universal acts: it is enough that, when the occasion is given, general benevolence be exercised.

3. Between right love of ourselves and of neighbor, there is no opposition per se, so that without any appearance of "egoism" we can establish the principle: from charity we must love ourselves before neighbor, who nevertheless is to be loved equally. This is gathered clearly from the words of Christ: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and from the foundation of charity. But the question concerning practical preference arises rather among various neighbors than between ourselves and neighbors. Moreover the principle of order is twofold: on the part of the object, which is God, and on the part of the subject, which is ourselves, as loving.

4. The order as to interior acts. By simple complacency and approbation, the better are to be preferred in our estimation to the less holy; but by benevolence of desire, those more joined to us are rightly preferred.

5. As to signification, signs are to be accommodated to the quality of the person and to the conjunction.

6. As to beneficent action, the order of charity must be composed with various necessities. There is distinguished, with respect to eternal life, spiritual necessity, and temporal necessity with respect to the present life. He is pressed by extreme spiritual necessity whose eternal ruin, without another's help, would be morally certain; by grave spiritual necessity, he who will overcome ruin with difficulty; by common spiritual necessity, he who, unless he is helped, is about to sin or not morally at once about to recover grace. Extreme temporal necessity is that of him who, without another's help, will not escape the danger of imminent death or of an equivalent evil; grave temporal necessity is constituted by an evil absolutely or relatively grave threatening; but a grave evil is one by which the quality of the present life is notably affected, although it leaves intact those goods which nature willed to be common to all. Common necessity is defined by removing that danger in which those who have no goods are commonly placed. Between extreme and grave necessity there lies quasi-extreme, when the danger of an extreme evil is less imminent, or an evil threatens which is almost compared with death.

These things having been posited, these are the norms of effective charity. a) Between ourselves and neighbors: it is lawful to prefer our spiritual good to the utility of neighbor; it is not always expedient; sometimes we must; but we must postpone it to office: nor then can there be question of our necessary good. - We must postpone our bodily good to the spiritual extreme necessity of neighbor; to bodily necessity, per se, we can, but are not bound. In external goods we can prefer an individual neighbor to ourselves but are not bound. Our spiritual good excepted, public or general necessity or utility is to be placed before our own.

For we must love ourselves before neighbor; but, contrary to spiritual detriment, bodily and temporal detriment admits the compensation of a better good. Moreover, through exterior goods and the body, but not through spiritual goods, we are parts of the community; but parts exist for the whole.

b) The norms among neighbors themselves return to this: that we first succor private persons more joined to us, and, among these, those to whom we must bring help per se. In extreme necessity, however, parents, since they have given life to us, are to be preferred to all others.

Preliminary note. The precept of charity extends not only to both internal and external acts, not only to friends and enemies, but also to the due order to be observed a) as to persons to be loved, b) as to goods to be loved.

That charity is necessarily ordered is established from Sacred Scripture, saying: "He ordered charity in me";²⁷ and is taught by all theologians.²⁸ St. Augustine²⁹ beautifully says: "But he lives justly and holily who is an integral estimator of things: and this is he who has ordered dilection, lest he either love what is not to be loved, or love more what is to be loved less, or love equally what is to be loved either less or more, or love less or more what is to be loved equally." - We treat of the order of charity a) as to persons to be loved, b) as to goods to be loved.

A. On the order of charity as to persons to be loved.

²⁷ Cant. 2, 4.

²⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 1 et 2; q. 44, a. 8.

²⁹ De doctr. christ. l. 1, c. 27 (Migne, Patr. lat. 34, 35).

579. It is clear of itself that God obtains the supreme place in the order of charity; for He is to be loved above all things, and our charity toward God ought to be appretiatively, although not intensively, supreme, as was said above, n. 557. Here the discussion will be only about the order of charity among the diverse men to be loved.

But in establishing this order we must attend to three things: to the person who is loved; to the goods which are loved in him or for him; and, if there is question of effective charity, or of providing help, to the necessity in which the person to be loved is placed.

A threefold necessity is usually distinguished: extreme, grave, light. Extreme necessity is judged to be present when a man is placed in proximate danger of bodily or spiritual death. If such proximate bodily danger is present, it is called extreme bodily necessity, e.g. danger of submersion in water; but if that danger is spiritual, namely, proximate danger of eternal damnation, then it is called extreme spiritual necessity, e.g. an infant about to die but not yet baptized is placed in such necessity. Grave necessity is present when someone cannot avoid grave harm of body or spirit without the help of another. Thus, e.g., an adult sinner near death who cannot confess is placed in grave spiritual necessity. For although he can be saved by perfect contrition alone, nevertheless this is done much more securely by confession. He is placed in grave bodily necessity, e.g., who will lose a great part of his fortune unless he is helped by another. Light or common necessity is judged to exist when someone is indeed placed in difficulties, but can provide for himself: common sinners and beggars are placed in such necessity. These things having been noted beforehand, the following rules are to be attended to:

580. Rule 1. Each person is ordinarily bound, other things being equal, to love himself more than neighbor. I say "other things being equal," i.e. in equal necessity and in an equal order of goods.

It is proved. 1. Christ commanded that neighbor be loved as ourselves. Therefore love of self is the rule, norm, exemplar of love of neighbor. But the exemplar is more powerful than the thing exemplified.³⁰

2. Man is naturally more inclined also to spiritual love of himself than to love of neighbor. But this natural inclination, as implanted by the author of nature, cannot be disordered. Hence the common and true adage says: "Well-ordered charity begins from oneself" (namely, from the one loving), or: "Love of another begins from the ego."

From this rule the following practical conclusions are deduced:

a) Man is bound to put his own necessary spiritual good before all other goods. Therefore he can never sin mortally or lightly, or even expose himself to a certain danger of sinning, on account of any good whatsoever of neighbor, whether spiritual or bodily. But if the danger of sinning is not so proximate, then it is licit to undergo such danger for a great advantage of neighbor, e.g. a confessor or physician can fulfill his office, even if temptations arise from it.

b) Someone can licitly, and indeed sometimes ought, to give up his own non-necessary or less necessary spiritual goods for the salvation of neighbor,

e.g. a priest can and sometimes ought to defer meditation in order to hear the confession of a penitent; a woman knowing that she is shamefully desired by a young man can omit Mass on weekdays in order to avoid the sin of the young man; a son or daughter wishing to enter the religious state can remain in the world for the consolation of parents, provided, however, that proximate danger of sinning mortally is not imminent there; it is laudable to make the so-called "heroic act" of charity, i.e. to offer all one's satisfactions for the souls in purgatory.

c) Man is regularly bound to prefer his own bodily life to the life of another. Yet there are exceptions if either the common good or the good of one's own virtue intervenes. Thus a man can and sometimes ought to give his life for the common good; e.g. a soldier ought to give his life for a commander of the army necessary for the fatherland;³¹ those who serve the sick laboring under an infectious disease can expose their life to grave danger on account of the good of virtue, e.g. on account of heroic charity. Concerning this matter the Angelic Doctor writes: "To hand oneself over to death on account of a friend is the most perfect act of virtue; hence the virtuous man desires this act more than his own bodily life. Hence that someone lays down his own bodily life on account of a friend does not happen from this, that someone loves the friend more than himself; but because in himself he loves the good of virtue more than bodily good."³²

³⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 4, where another reason for this rule is also assigned.

³¹ Quaest. de carit. a. 9 ad 15.

³² 3, dist. 29, a. 5 ad 3.

581. Rule 2. Neighbors are not to be loved equally by us, but more or less, according as they are nearer either to God or to us. Thus St. Thomas.³³

The reason is that in charity there is a twofold principle, namely, God and we ourselves. But that which is nearer to either principle is to be loved more. Hence better and more perfect men, as more similar and nearer to God, are to be loved more than others less perfect.^33a In this way a holy man is to be loved more than a wicked father. But this is to be understood only of reverence and appretiation, not of the affection of doing good and willing good; for a son can rightly desire that his father, now indeed wicked, later be converted and obtain greater glory than another man who now is holy. Hence as a rule it can be held: those who are nearer to us are to be loved more with the affection of desire and by external work. For, other things being equal, we ought to desire and procure temporal and spiritual goods for them more than for others. But among those joined and near to us, the following order is to be observed, if there is question of common necessity: 1. spouse,³⁴ 2. children,³⁵ 3. parents, 4. brothers and sisters, 5. other relatives, 6. friends, benefactors. But in extreme necessity, namely, if there is question of danger of life, parents are to be preferred to all others; therefore even to spouse and children. Thus St. Thomas³⁶ and, with him, almost all theologians.

³³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 6.

^33a Ib. a. 7.

³⁴ Ib. a. 11.

³⁵ Ib. a. 9 ad 1.

³⁶ Ib.

582. Scholion. On limiting these rules. Concerning the rules given, two things are to be noted: 1. If there is question of the common good, these rules are not to be applied strictly; for before the rest we ought to save those men who are necessary for the common good. 2. The rules given indeed oblige in conscience; yet if there is question of light necessity, some inversion of the order does not exceed the guilt of venial sin. Hence, e.g., if someone, his father and mother existing in the same necessity, would assist his mother before his father, this would not be a great sin. Likewise if someone loved a cousin more than a sister, etc.

B. On the order of charity as to goods to be loved.

Among diverse goods such an order exists: 1. spiritual goods, and those supernatural, e.g. grace, eternal salvation; 2. goods of the body, e.g. life, health, integrity of the members; 3. external goods, e.g. honor, reputation, riches. But the following rules are to be observed:

583. Rule 1. We ought to assist a neighbor constituted in extreme spiritual necessity even with danger to our bodily life, if nevertheless a) there is founded hope of saving the neighbor, and b) the common good does not stand in the way. Thus St. Thomas³⁷ with the common opinion.

For Christ says: "This is My precept, that you love one another, as I have loved you."³⁸ But Christ gave His bodily life for the salvation of souls. Hence St. John also expressly says: "We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren."³⁹ This precept obliges at least in the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor. But the intrinsic reason of this precept is that the eternal life of neighbor is a far more excellent good than our bodily life. It is added that a man, by positing such an act of perfect, and indeed heroic, charity, most certainly merits eternal life. - The reason for each limitation is easily understood: a) because without founded hope of a happy outcome no one is bound to undertake an arduous work; b) because the common good prevails over private good.

Resolves: a) A Catholic maidservant caring for a gravely sick Jewish infant is bound, even with the greatest inconvenience to herself, to baptize such an infant, unless persecutions of the Church are truly feared from this.

b) A pregnant mother would be bound, even with danger to life, to undergo a Caesarean operation, if otherwise the infant would have to die without baptism. Yet in practice the mother is sometimes indeed to be admonished to permit this operation, but almost never is a strict obligation to be imposed on her. For 1. it is not certainly established that the infant will still be alive after the operation; 2. valid baptism can be administered with moral certitude to an infant existing in the mother's womb by means of some instrument.

c) A parish priest ought, with danger to life, to administer the necessary sacraments wherever an infectious disease rages. For although a man can be saved through an act of contrition, nevertheless not all the sick are capable of eliciting an act of perfect contrition, and the necessity is truly extreme for a dying man who has lived in a habit of sinning and is so untaught that he does not know how to elicit an act of contrition. A similar obligation falls upon another priest if the parish priest and his assistant are lacking. On the contrary, extreme necessity does not seem to be present if someone throws himself into a river with the intention of suicide; for he can elicit an act of contrition and by his own fault has brought himself into that danger. Therefore in that case there does not seem to be present a strict obligation of saving such a suicide with imminent danger to one's own life.

³⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 5.

³⁸ Jo. 15, 12.

³⁹ 1 Jo. 3, 16.

584. Rule 2. Outside the case of the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor, the obligation of assisting him does not press either with imminent danger of life or even with another very great harm to oneself. Exceptions, however, are the cases in which the common good or a special office requires help even with very great bodily harm.

The reason is that in these cases there is question either of the extreme bodily necessity of neighbor, namely, of imminent danger of bodily death, or of other grave necessities but not extreme ones. In the first case no one is bound to assist neighbor with grave harm, because he is not even bound to preserve his own bodily life with great harm, as was said above. Therefore, a fortiori, he is not bound in these circumstances to preserve the bodily life of neighbor. Thus, e.g., a rich man is not bound to give a great sum of money to save a sick neighbor from certain death. But if there is question of other grave necessities of neighbor, then he rather than I is bound to undergo the same necessity. Only a) the necessity of the community is excepted, since the common good prevails over private good, and b) a special office undertaken. Hence pastors of souls are bound, even with danger to life, to administer the sacraments to their subjects; a physician appointed for some hospital is bound to care for the sick laboring under a contagious disease. The reason is that in these cases neighbor is to be assisted not only from charity, but also from justice.

585. Rule 3. A neighbor constituted in grave necessity, whether spiritual or bodily, is to be assisted with only moderate inconvenience, unless nevertheless other titles, such as justice, piety, or an office undertaken, impose a wider obligation.

The reason is that charity toward oneself precedes charity toward neighbor. Wherefore in the grave necessity of neighbor no one is bound to assist him with his own grave inconvenience, but only with moderate inconvenience.

Resolves: a) You are bound, even with some but not with great inconvenience, to lend money to a man constituted in such necessity that without your money he is compelled to make a surrender of all his goods (commonly, to make Bankrott, faillite). If, however, there is no or little hope of recovering the money to be lent, you are not now bound, because the probable loss of a rather great quantity of money is a notable inconvenience.

b) A rich man is not bound to give a great sum of money for this, that a sick poor man may be able by extraordinary means, e.g. by taking baths in a distant place, to recover health. The reason is the same.

Concerning a wider obligation from the added titles of justice, piety, and office, enough has already been said above.

586. Rule 4. Neighbor living in common or light necessity is to be assisted with only light inconvenience.

The reason is that charity indeed demands that we assist neighbor living in some necessity; but if this necessity is only light, there also exists only a light obligation of assisting, because the neighbor can help himself. In a light or common necessity of this kind there live, e.g., ordinary beggars. Wherefore we are bound to give them alms only with light inconvenience, as will be explained more fully below, n. 594.

By combining all the rules stated, the following order results: in the order of charity a man is bound after God to love 1. himself according to spiritual goods; 2. neighbor as to the same goods; 3. himself as to bodily goods; 4. neighbor as to the same goods; 5. finally himself and then neighbor as to external goods.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 25.

ORDER, in general, according to St. Augustine (de Civit. Dei, l. 19, c. 13, n. 1), "is the disposition of equal and unequal things assigning to each its own places." Hence the order of charity, which in some things participates in the virtue of justice, consists in this, that we assign to each lovable object its own fitting place (cf. n. 484).

479. PRINCIPLES. I. Some order in love must altogether be preserved. For not all goods are to be estimated equally, nor are all persons to be loved equally. Whence St. Augustine (de Doctr. christ., l. 1, c. 27): "He lives justly and holily who is an unimpaired estimator of things: and he is the one who has ordered love." St. Thomas teaches the same (2.2, q. 44, a. 8).

480. II. The order to be preserved in love regards both persons and goods. For to love is to will good to someone: therefore love is referred both to persons and to the goods which we will to them.

1. As regards PERSONS, both comparison to God must be attended to, according to which some are nearer to God than others on account of greater excellence; and comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others (II, 27, resp. 2).

2. As regards GOODS, each one ought to love and will more those things which are more excellent and more necessary.

But the first place is obtained by supernatural goods; the second, by natural and bodily goods; the third, by external goods. Cf. n. 476. Likewise, other things being equal, the common good is to be preferred to private good; certain good to uncertain good.

Spiritual things of themselves are superior to temporal things, intrinsic things to extrinsic. Yet not on that account does any and every, or even the least, good of a higher order surpass, in moral estimation, any good whatsoever of an inferior order. Thus no one would prefer to suffer the loss of an immense sum rather than suffer a very slight headache for one hour (Genicot, I, 215).

3. EVIL is opposed to good, by which neighbor is constituted in necessity; whence also the necessity of neighbor must be attended to.

NECESSITY (whether spiritual or temporal) is distinguished as threefold. It is called: a) Extreme, when someone cannot without the help of another free himself from danger of damnation, or from death or another evil nearly equal to it. To this is equated quasi-extreme necessity, when it is very difficult for someone without the help of another to free himself from a very grave evil which will soon happen. b) Grave, when someone, unless he is helped, is able with difficulty to escape danger of the soul, or of bodily life, or of another grave loss of goods or status. c) Common or middling, when someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this necessity, in the spiritual order, ordinary sinners are placed; but in the temporal order, most poor persons begging (II, 27).

These things having been premised, let us establish the special rules which the order to be preserved in charity prescribes, comparison being made both between ourselves and neighbor and among neighbors themselves.

The order of those to be loved is generally expressed thus: God, our soul, the soul of neighbor, our body, the body of neighbor.

481. PRINCIPLES. I. After God, each one is bound, absolutely speaking, to love himself more than neighbor. Whence that common axiom: Charity well ordered begins from oneself. It is established 1. from natural inclination, which grace perfects; 2. from the words of Christ: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. From these words it is gathered that the love of a man toward himself is as the exemplar of the love which is to be had toward another. But the exemplar is rather than the exemplified (2.2, q. 26, a. 4).

"But the mode of love is assigned when it is said: as thyself; which must not be understood as regards this, that someone should love neighbor equally to himself, but SIMILARLY to himself. And this in a threefold way: first indeed, on the part of the end, namely that someone love neighbor on account of God, so that thus the love of neighbor may be HOLY; second, on the part of the rule of love, namely that someone not condescend to neighbor in some evil, but only in goods, ... so that thus the love of neighbor may be JUST; third, on the part of the reason of love, namely that someone not love neighbor on account of his own usefulness or delectation, but for the reason that he wills good to neighbor, ... so that thus love of neighbor may be TRUE; for when someone loves neighbor on account of his own usefulness or delectation, he does not truly love neighbor, but himself" (2.2, q. 44, a. 7).

482. II. In those things alone necessary for salvation, this principle is to be applied to each one absolutely, that is, without any exception. For the order of charity, and the obligation of preferring oneself, is preserved in this, that each one wills more to himself than to another his own end, that is, the supreme and uniquely necessary good (Valentia, t. 3, disp. 3, q. 4).

Whence it is never licit to sin in order to consult the salvation of neighbor, neither gravely nor lightly; nor to expose oneself to danger of sinning, unless the danger by some reason becomes remote (cf. n. 375).

Hence: 1. Someone can deprive himself of spiritual goods not necessary for salvation, on account of the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, for example by deferring entrance into Religion in order to provide for a parish, or to feed parents or children (II, 26; IV, 78).

2. Someone can per se, and from the motive of virtue, immolate his own life for preserving another's. "To hand oneself over to death on account of a friend," says St. Thomas (3 Sent., D. 29, a. 5, ad 3), "is the most perfect act of virtue: whence the virtuous man desires this act more than his own bodily life." It was said that this is licit per se; for per accidens it is sometimes not licit, for example if someone is necessary to children, wife, parents. Cf. n. 753.

483. III. By order of charity we are sometimes bound to procure the good of neighbor, our own good being put after it. It is said by order of charity; for from the title of justice, piety, or office, peculiar obligations can intervene, to be discussed in their own places (2.2, q. 26, a. 5).

But in order that the obligations of charity may be defined more precisely, certain RULES can be established. Yet these have force only with the required conditions posited: that is, a) that equally certain hope of success is present; b) that another is not present who can and wishes to help; c) that a graver evil is not feared from it (II, 27).

RULE 1. In extreme public necessity (that is, of one's own community), even temporal, each one is bound to undergo any inconvenience whatsoever, indeed even loss of life.

This is clear from this, that a member is ordered to the body, a part to the whole, a private person to the community. Hence, a private man is bound to expose his own life to danger for saving the life of a man who is necessary to the Republic. Likewise, in war it is not licit for a citizen, not even for the sake of avoiding death, to indicate to the enemy means by which he can capture the city, etc. (2.2, q. 26, a. 3).

RULE 2. In extreme private spiritual necessity, neighbor must be helped even with danger of life; in the same bodily necessity, he must be helped with great inconvenience.

St. Augustine declares the first thus (de Mendacio, c. 6, n. 9): "A Christian will not hesitate to lose his temporal life for the eternal life of neighbor; for this example went before, that the Lord himself should die for us. For to this he says: This is my commandment, that you love one another, as I also have loved you." Whence, if neighbor would not be saved without our help, that saying urges (1 John 3:16): And we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. The second is clear from this, that the obligation of doing good to neighbor urges when he is placed in necessity (n. 482 and 485, 2); and consequently it urges the more, the greater the necessity is: yet without our being bound, for saving neighbor, to cast ourselves into the same necessity.

Hence: 1. You are bound, with danger of your life, to baptize an infant about to die; likewise, to absolve a dying man habituated in sins, if he is so uneducated that he does not know how to elicit an act of contrition. A mother is bound to undergo a dangerous operation so that the infant can be extracted and baptized. 2. You are not bound to save the life of a private person with your greatest inconvenience. Thus, for example, you can, but are not bound from charity to, protect the life of an innocent person with fear of enmities, of public justice, etc. (III, 390).

RULE 3. In grave necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, neighbor must be helped from charity with only middling inconvenience.

The reason is that when neighbor absolutely can free himself from danger, charity does not seem to oblige us to assist him with great difficulty, since he is not constituted in a case of strict necessity.

Hence: 1. You are not bound, with danger of life, reputation, or fortune, to draw others, even those proximately about to die, back from sins from which they can free themselves by themselves. Nor are you bound to sail for converting the Indians, since there are others who can do this, and otherwise the fruit is uncertain. - Yet you are bound from charity to come to the aid of a neighbor laboring under grave necessity of soul, if you can without grave inconvenience, and hope for fruit.

2. A simple priest is not bound, with danger of life, to minister sacraments to one constituted in grave necessity, unless it is a public necessity, for example in time of plague or war, and the people is destitute of every priest. For then extreme necessity is presumed to be present for several. Likewise, if someone spreads heresy somewhere, you are bound with danger of life to impede him, if you can do this efficaciously, and no one else impedes him (II, 27).

RULE 4. In common or ordinary necessity of either order, neighbor must be helped with light inconvenience.

Indeed one must help; but with light inconvenience, because neighbor himself can fairly easily extricate himself from that necessity; or also because it is not too troublesome to him. Nor are you bound to help all those placed in common necessity: for this would be impossible, or at least too grave.

484. PRINCIPLES. I. With love of complacency, more excellent and holier creatures are to be loved before the rest. "He who is better," says St. Alphonsus with Busenbaum, "is to be loved more, and with that love which is accompanied by joy concerning goods possessed, likewise honor, worship, and reverence. Thus holy men are to be loved more than wicked parents, parents more than children or wife, benefactors more than those to whom we do good" (cf. n. 479).

II. With love of benevolence, those who are nearer to us are to be loved more. But these ought to be preferred to others according to those goods in which conjunction or friendship is founded. The reason is that, on account of the special bonds by which God has bound them to us, we ought to apply greater zeal to providing for them goods not yet possessed, and to forestalling impending evils. Whence the Apostle says thus (1 Tim. 5:8): But if any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever.

Corollaries. A. As regards the application of the rules.

1. In goods pertaining to preserving nature and bodily life, if the necessity is extreme, or quasi-extreme, on both sides, parents, since they have given life, are to be preferred to wife and children. If necessity on both sides is only grave or middling, help is to be given: a) to wife, because she is one flesh with the man; b) to children, as those for whom by natural right parents are bound to provide more than children are for parents; c) to parents, and indeed to the father before the mother, because the father has the more excellent notion of principle; d) to brothers and sisters; e) finally to relatives, domestics, and familiars.

2. "In matters pertaining to civil communication, fellow citizens are to be preferred; in military matters, fellow soldiers; in spiritual matters, spiritual sons, fathers, brothers. Yet Bannez probably teaches that carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred before all others: because carnal conjunction is the foundation of other conjunctions."

3. Per accidens it can happen that he who would naturally be placed after another is to be preferred to him, because attention must be given not only to the conjunction of persons, but also to necessity and to the goods to be procured. Thus a good mother, useful to the offspring, can be preferred to a bad father harmful to the offspring. Likewise a son necessary to the household matter, to a useless and clamorous wife (Kon., n. 279). Likewise a friend who snatched you from death is to be loved more than a brother who wished to inflict it on you.

B. As regards inversion of order and gravity of fault.

1. Inversion of order as regards necessity, if it is a question of grave or extreme necessity, contains grave sin; because it wounds charity in grave matter, by taking away the order itself.

2. Inversion of order as regards conjunction of persons is a grave sin if the excess is notable; for example, if in grave matter strangers or remotely joined persons are preferred to those proximately joined. It is a light sin if the excess is slight; for example among those proximately joined, as among parents, spouses, and children, among whom it is not openly established who is really to be preferred (Aertnys, tr. 3, n. 45).

901. In charity order must be observed insofar as one thing ought to be loved more than another, according to comparison to the principle of the dilection of charity; which is twofold: the objective and final principle of beatitude and dilection, which is God, and the efficient principle of dilection, or the one loving himself. For the object of charity is the good loved, and this according to diverse grades insofar as one thing is better, or more proximate.

This order exists not only a) principally between diverse persons; but also secondarily, b) between diverse goods, some of which are more excellent or more necessary than others; indeed c) between diverse dilections or friendships, which, according to the diverse goods in which they are founded, are more excellent than others: for human goods, in which other conjunctions and friendships are founded, are ordered as to an ultimate end to the good upon which charity is founded, namely, to eternal beatitude; and therefore the conjunction and dilection of charity subordinates to itself all other honorable dilections, and commands the acts of every other honorable friendship (q. 26, a. 7).

902. The order to be observed is described by St. Augustine, de doctr. chr., l. I, cc. 27-28:

"But he lives justly and holily who is an uncorrupted judge of things: and he is one who has ordered dilection, lest he either love what is not to be loved, or not love what is to be loved, or love more what is to be loved less, or love equally what is to be loved either less or more, or love less or more what is to be loved equally. Every sinner insofar as he is a sinner is not to be loved; and every man, insofar as he is man, is to be loved on account of God, but God on account of himself. And if God is to be loved more than every man, each one ought to love God more than himself. Likewise another man is to be loved more than our body: because all these things are to be loved on account of God, and another man can enjoy God with us, which the body cannot; because the body lives through the soul by which we enjoy God. But all are to be loved equally; but since you cannot profit all, one must chiefly consult those who, by opportunities of places and times or of any things whatever, are more closely joined to you by a certain lot."

Therefore between persons there is a threefold order: 1. between God and us, 2. between us and neighbor, 3. between various neighbors.

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, aa. 4 and 5.

905. Notions. - It must be noted beforehand: a) that there is a threefold genus of goods, distinct in the order of charity: 1. spiritual and eternal goods, whether supernatural or natural, which of themselves and directly regard the soul and salvation, that is, the moral perfection of man, "honorableness," are to be esteemed more; - 2. then come natural temporal goods (whether of soul or of body) intrinsic to man, which of themselves and directly constitute the physical perfection of man, such as life, integrity and health of the body, doctrine, natural dispositions of soul, liberty, etc.; - 3. finally, natural goods extrinsic to man, among which nevertheless reputation and honor, as being something moral, excel riches. But note that the common good is greater than a private good, because the good of the whole, as more universal, excels the good of the part.

It must be noted beforehand: b) that in goods both spiritual and eternal and temporal, a threefold necessity is distinguished in the order of charity: 1. extreme, when danger of damnation, or of death, or of another equivalent evil, morally certainly threatens, and cannot morally be avoided without the help of another;¹ but an evil equivalent to death is perpetual privation of a great good which is equated with life and which nature willed to be common to all, such as health, reason, liberty, integrity of members, for example, an incurable disease, perpetual loss of the use of reason, and perhaps loss of a principal member, or servitude or perpetual imprisonment, especially if it is harsh; - 2. grave, when the aforesaid evils threaten only probably and man cannot avoid them without great difficulty, or when the evil certainly threatening is only grave, such as unjust captivity, notable infamy, grave illness, grave loss of goods by which it happens that someone supports himself with difficulty, loss of state, etc.; - 3. common, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty: in the spiritual order ordinary sinners are in this, and in the temporal order the poor begging at the door, whether publicly or secretly.

¹ Danger is estimated not strictly but morally, so that also a proximate danger of shortly falling into extreme necessity is understood, which by some is called quasi-extreme necessity. Hence the definition has been made so that it includes quasi-extreme necessity.

906. General principle. In the order of charity, other things being equal, man ought to love himself more than neighbor. - The order between us and neighbor is that, in equal goods and equal necessity and condition, each one simply loves himself more than neighbor. It is proved:

a) From Mt. XXII, 39: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. XIX, 18), in which words dilection of oneself is handed down as the rule and exemplar of dilection of neighbor; but a rule is more powerful than the thing ruled; therefore we ought to love ourselves more than neighbor. Hence the word "as" does not signify that man loves neighbor equally to himself, but only similarly to himself (q. 44, a. 7).

b) Man through charity loves himself as a participant of beatitude, but neighbor only as an associate in this participation. But, says St. Thomas, participation is more powerful than association, as unity is more powerful than union. Therefore man ought to love himself more than neighbor.

c) Man naturally is more inclined to love of himself than to love of neighbor. This natural inclination, as instilled by the author of nature, cannot be disordered.

907. Comparing only spiritual and eternal goods, the principle is this: each one is bound to love himself more as regards the soul or salvation than neighbor. Whence:

a) It is never permitted, for the salvation of neighbor, to sin even most lightly.

b) Nor is it permitted to expose oneself to proximate danger of sinning, because this is to sin (props. 62 and 63, condemned by Innocent XI); but it is permitted to expose oneself to danger if it is remote, - and even, for a grave cause, if, suitable remedies having been employed, so that there is founded hope of not falling, the proximate danger can be rendered remote, - indeed sometimes it is necessary so to act that help may be given to neighbor in extreme spiritual necessity.

c) Charity always inclines to desiring grace and glory more for ourselves, and indeed greater grace and glory, than for neighbor, nor is it ever permitted to desire a lesser grace and glory for oneself.

d) Charity of itself always inclines us to more perfect things; nevertheless, if these are not strictly necessary, we can and sometimes must leave them on account of the spiritual or even temporal good of neighbor, for example, a priest leaving prayer in order to hear confessions, a son leaving entrance into religion in order to support parents. Yet in this case the good, if it is left from charity because thus it pleases God more, is compensated through charity.

908. Comparing the spiritual and eternal goods of neighbor with our temporal goods, the general principle is that each one is bound to love neighbor as regards the soul and salvation more than his own body. The reason is because we ought to love the soul of neighbor as associated in the full participation of beatitude, but our body as participant of beatitude by redundancy; but association in full beatitude is a greater reason for loving than participation by redundancy. Therefore.

Specifically: a) In the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor, each one is bound, under grave sin, to aid him with certain danger of life (for example, an infant dying without Baptism, or a sinner about to undergo death who is not thinking of it or cannot elicit perfect contrition), provided that the necessity is not from his own malice (as it is in duellists and in unjust attackers of life), there is probable hope of helping him, there is no other who may bring help, nor is a graver evil feared, as if thereby the salvation of several others would be endangered (Jn. XV, 12; I Jn. III, 16).

b) In grave spiritual necessity,² neighbor must be aided, under grave sin, with some detriment in temporal goods of reputation, honor, fortune, to be morally estimated by the judgment of the prudent. Yet not with danger of life, although charity advises this; unless 1) someone is bound from justice by reason of office, as a physician, or a pastor who is bound with danger of life or of temporal goods to minister the sacrament of Penance to parishioners infected with plague (Jn. X, 11); or 2) unless there is public necessity: for this is always joined with the extreme necessity of many, and otherwise the common good excels the private; whence if someone spreads depraved doctrine among the people and there is no one who may impede him, there is an obligation to impede him with danger of life; and in a time of plague (or persecution) a priest not having care of souls is bound to assist the dying, if there is no other.

² Grave necessity of soul is that from which, although neighbor can liberate himself absolutely, nevertheless he cannot do so except with difficulty, either on account of the vehemence of passion, or on account of inveterate custom and obstinacy in evil, or on account of ignorance or another cause.

c) In common spiritual necessity, neighbor must be aided without bodily detriment, but not with even light detriment (cf. p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

909. Comparing only temporal goods, the general principle is that each one in itself is bound to love his own life and temporal goods more than the life and temporal goods of neighbor, - but neighbor more as regards bodily goods than himself as regards external goods.

Specifically: a) In extreme temporal necessity, neighbor must be aided, under grave sin, with notable proper temporal detriment; but not by extraordinary means (for to this not even man himself is bound as regards his own life), nor with loss of life or of a good almost equivalent, unless there is question of the extreme necessity of the commonwealth. Nevertheless, if someone does not distrust his state of grace, nor is there a necessity of family or of others, charity often permits and advises him to expose his life (a fortiori temporal goods) on account of a motive of virtue, for example, on account of friendship, gratitude, the honor of God, the common good, not by loving the life of neighbor equivalently to his own, but by loving the good of virtue more than his own life, because the good of virtue, which is spiritual, excels bodily life. Thus with danger of life they laudably serve those infected with plague, cast themselves into waters to rescue others, die for a person very necessary to the commonwealth or family.³

³ "To hand oneself over to death on account of a friend is the most perfect act of virtue; whence the virtuous man desires this act more than his own bodily life. Hence that someone lays down his own bodily life on account of a friend does not happen from this, that someone loves the friend more than himself, but because in himself he loves the good of virtue more than bodily good." III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.

b) In grave temporal necessity a private person must be aided, under grave sin, with only moderate inconvenience, and a community even with grave inconvenience.

c) In common temporal necessity, neighbor must be aided if this can be done without inconvenience (cf. p. 3, q. 3, a. 1).

910. Corollaries. - 1. From the aforesaid it follows that the principle, "Charity does not oblige with great inconvenience," holds in common and grave necessity, and indeed only generally, but it does not hold in extreme necessity, in which charity obliges even with the greatest inconvenience.

2. In all the aforesaid rules this is understood: if there is hope of fruit, and if another more bound has not provided it.

(St. Thomas, IIa IIae, qq. 26 and 27.)

I. By the name of neighbor are understood all rational creatures capable of eternal beatitude — whether they be infidel men or just, unjust, friends or enemies, predestined or reprobate. Demons and irrational creatures are not comprehended absolutely under the neighbor to be loved; but we can love irrational creatures only insofar as we will that they remain unto the glory of God and the utility of men, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 25, art. 3.

II. Question I. Is there a precept of loving the Neighbor? Answer. All affirm it. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: Matthew 22. And John 15: This is my commandment, that you love one another. That this mutual love is the most splendid character of the Christian profession, Christ the Lord adds in the same place: By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another. And St. Peter, first epistle, chapter 4: But before all things have a constant mutual charity among yourselves, for charity covereth a multitude of sins. St. Paul, to the Galatians, chapter 5: For all the law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. It is therefore of faith that there is a precept of loving the Neighbor. This precept is natural, insofar as it commands a natural love; but supernatural insofar as we are commanded to love our neighbor not only according as he is akin to us in nature, a neighbor, and by other titles, but also as he is a man redeemed by God and capable of eternal beatitude.

III. Question II. Does this precept oblige us to love our neighbor by peculiar internal acts? Answer. Not a few have denied it; but their doctrine was condemned by Innocent XI in these two theses: We are not bound to love our Neighbor by an internal act. 2. We can satisfy the precept of loving our Neighbor by external acts alone. Exterior works are dead unto eternal life, unless they be vivified by charity. If I have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore, interior charity being taken away, the exterior works of liberality and beneficence toward the neighbor are inept for fulfilling that divine precept by which we are commanded to love the Neighbor.

IV. Question III. Must the act by which we are commanded to love our neighbor be distinct from the act of love by which we love God? Answer. Certain authors of a more benign turn deny it; but their opinion is false. For there are two distinct precepts, of which one commands the love of God, the other the love of the neighbor. By two distinct acts, then, must the two precepts be fulfilled? Assuredly. The divine goodness is the reason under which the neighbor is loved; and it is not the reason which is loved. God is the primary object of charity, and the Neighbor the secondary. He who loves God with his whole heart above all things virtually loves his Neighbor. But this does not suffice. Nay, the doctrine contained in this thesis was condemned: We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act.

V. Question IV. Does this precept oblige of itself to the love of the neighbor? Answer. If the discourse be of the neighbor in general, it is certain that everyone is bound of himself to love his neighbor by a formal act, prescinding from any circumstance whatsoever. On the contrary, if the neighbor be regarded in particular, it is agreed among the Theologians that he is to be loved by force of the precept only when necessity presses.

VI. Per accidens this precept presses when a grave temptation of hatred assails the soul, and the opposite love is judged an opportune remedy for expelling the hatred. Secondly, when we are bound to succor a neighbor in peril, or to bring help to one pressed by any grave necessity, whether in spiritual or in temporal things: then we are bound to love our neighbor with an internal act, because the law of charity is not fulfilled without internal acts. Thirdly, when a grave injury, whether in the goods of reputation or in the goods of soul or body, is inflicted upon our neighbor, on account of which he is most gravely disturbed and afflicted. Fourthly, when our neighbor, placed in extreme necessity, needs our counsel, or spiritual or temporal aid.

VII. We ought to have our mind prepared to love our neighbor in particular, if necessity should occur. And this promptitude of soul is placed in this, that our soul burn with charity in general. This charity excludes no one from that community. But if you desire to know whether charity toward your neighbor in general burns in your heart, see whether, occasion being given either of an injury received or of one inflicted, you be prompt to love. For the plant is known by its fruits.

VIII. Question V. How ought you to love your neighbor as yourself? Answer. This phrase as thyself St. Thomas expounds, II-II, q. 44, art. 7: Now the mode of the love is touched when it is said, as thyself: which is not to be understood as though one should love his neighbor equally with himself, but in a like manner to himself. And this in three ways. First, on the part of the end: namely, that one love his neighbor for God's sake, just as he ought to love himself for God's sake; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be holy. Secondly, on the part of the rule of love: namely, that one should not comply with his neighbor in any evil, but only in good things; just as a man ought to satisfy his own will only in good things; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be just. Thirdly, on the part of the reason of the love: namely, that one love his neighbor not for his own utility or delight, but for this reason, that he wills good to his neighbor, as he wills good to himself; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be true.

IX. Certain rules are prescribed for loving the neighbor. 1. The neighbor must be loved with an affective and an effective love — one, namely, which, proceeding from the heart and from a conscience not feigned, brings aid to the neighbor according to one's powers and the circumstances. 2. The characters of fraternal love St. Paul sets forth, 1 Corinthians 13: Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not upon iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth: beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. It is God who speaks with the voice of Paul. Meditate these things seriously, O reader and teacher, that you may become a doer of charity. In these words the whole of Theology is comprehended. Charity is kind in the conversion of the brethren and in the care of their salvation. Patient in bearing the defects of the neighbor. Envieth not, neither openly nor secretly and by mines — whether by keeping silence about the neighbor's merits, or by disparaging his virtues and casting little clouds upon them. Dealeth not perversely, by contriving frauds against him, or throwing impediments in his way. Is not puffed up on account of any endowments whatsoever, whether of soul or of body, whether riches, or nobility, or knowledge. Is not ambitious, so as to lord it arrogantly over the neighbor and to stand out above him. Seeketh not her own, that she may succor the needy neighbor and relieve his necessity. Is not provoked to anger when assailed by injuries, so as to take vengeance or to repay any evil. Thinketh no evil, but interprets all things in the better part — the truth, however, being preserved: therefore it is added: rejoiceth not upon iniquity, but detests and bewails sins, disapproves indifference and deadly negligence, and lifts up her voice against it, because she rejoiceth with the truth. This truth she prefers to all things. Beareth all things, that she may attain eternal life. Believeth all things on account of the authority of God revealing and of the Church proposing. Endureth all things, that she may please God, keep his law, and attain eternal felicity. St. Paul adds, Galatians chapter 6: Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ. These few words, seriously pondered, instruct you more luminously than the many volumes of certain men. For they were dictated by God, and on these the whole law depends, and the prophets.

X. Question VI. What order is to be observed in charity? Answer. To each object of love his own place must be assigned: if he be of a higher bench, a higher place; if of a lower, a lower place must be granted him in the heart. The measure of the lover's love is the goodness of the person loved. The order is twofold: one of loving, the other of succoring. The order of loving flows from the dignity and goodness of the person; the order of succoring flows from the need of the neighbor who lacks our help. Both orders fall under the precept, says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 44, art. 8: Now the order of charity pertains to the very nature of the virtue, since it is taken according to the proportion of the love to the object of love. Whence it is manifest that the order of charity ought to fall under the precept.

XI. Each one ought to love his neighbor as himself, as is plain from the evangelical text itself: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love toward yourself, then, is the rule and measure of love toward your neighbor. He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good? says Ecclesiasticus, chapter 14. For a man is nearer to himself than all others. Fire cannot burn external matter unless it first burn in itself. If your own life and the life of your neighbor be regarded absolutely, your own is to be preferred; but if the life of your neighbor be more useful to the glory of God, your own can be exposed, from a motive of virtue, to the danger of death, that the life of the neighbor may be saved. The same must be said if you were to expose your life to save the life of your father, of your lord, of an intimate friend, of a signal benefactor, in testimony of Christian gratitude. But for the reputation, honor, and other goods of the neighbor it is not licit to expose your own life, because such goods are of an inferior order, whereas life is of a superior order.

XII. We are bound to succor the extreme spiritual necessity of our neighbor with the loss of life and of temporal goods. Extreme spiritual necessity is that in which the neighbor is eternally damned unless you bring him help. This doctrine St. John teaches, first epistle, chapter 3: As Christ laid down his life for us, so we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. Hence we are bound to baptize, with danger of life, a child abandoned among those infected with plague. If, however, your life be necessary to the common good of the Church or of the Commonwealth, then by the order of charity the common welfare is to be preferred to the welfare of one Private person. Similarly, if you were guilty of mortal sin, and contrition were difficult for you, or you doubted of it, then your own salvation is to be preferred to your neighbor's.

XIII. One condemned to die of hunger cannot refuse food secretly offered him; nor, if the judge were to command this, would he have to be obeyed, because it would be a horrendous and inhuman precept. Nor are you bound to neglect the defense of your own life, lest the killing of another follow. God must nevertheless be prayed to, that he permit us not to fall into such straits, since I count it most difficult to observe the laws of blameless self-defense. Midwives who have baptized children invalidly are bound, even at the danger of death, to make the offense manifest — whatever Fr. Laymann says to the contrary.

XIV. A pregnant mother who is unable to give birth is not bound to suffer a deadly cutting of the womb, that the child enclosed in the womb may be baptized: because evils are not to be done that goods may come. This opinion St. Thomas teaches, on the fourth book, distinction 6, question 2, article 1, ad 4: Therefore a man ought rather to let the infant perish, than that he himself should perish by committing the crime of homicide upon the mother. The graver Theologians subscribe to the Angelic Doctor. Nor is this opposed to the former opinion, in which it was said that a child must be baptized even at the danger of death: because a child existing in the mother's womb has no right to baptism, such as belongs to a child brought forth into the light. In order to provide for the spiritual salvation of your neighbor, you are not bound — nay, you ought not — to expose yourself to a probable danger of sinning; nor is it lawful to will the privation of grace, even for a time, for the salvation of others.

XV. Question VII. Who are to be preferred in love? Answer. First of all are to be preferred father and mother; then wives and children. Wives are to be preferred to parents only as regards habitation and a more tender love. Brothers are to be set before other blood-relations; and among these, those must be preferred who are nearer. Blood-relations must be set before relations by marriage; the faithful before infidels; friends before enemies; benefactors before non-benefactors; spiritual benefactors before temporal benefactors; fellow-citizens before strangers. But the precept of this preference presses only when extreme necessity presses of succoring one or the other of these neighbors. Hence a stranger placed in extreme necessity must be succored before a father who does not labor under such necessity. A community laboring under grave spiritual necessity you must succor even at the danger of life, because in such a community someone is always found placed in extreme necessity.

I ASSERT that the objects to be loved are in a certain order from the will.

IT IS PROVED first by the Holy Doctors from 2 Kings, Ordinavit in me charitatem [He ordered charity in me].

Next it is proved by St. Bonaventure from St. Augustine, book I of de doctrina Christiana, cap. 23, where he says: God, who is above us, is to be loved first; yet he did not say this, speaking of being loved first in time; but in the order of excellence and estimation.

THIRDLY from St. Ambrose in the Gloss brought forward on the words of the Canticles: First God is to be loved, second we ourselves, third parents, then children, after them the household, who, if they are good, are to be preferred to wicked children.

IT IS PROVED fourthly by the Holy Doctor. Prior and posterior is according to relation to some principle, from Aristotle 5 Metaph. t. 16. and to an end. Now order includes in itself some mode of prior and posterior; whence it is necessary that, where there is some principle and some end, there also be some order: but Charity tends to rectify the will toward God as toward a principle and supreme end, in the communication of which the friendship of Charity is founded; and therefore it is necessary that in those things which are loved by charity some order be attended to according to relation to the principle, which is God, who is also the supreme good, which is beatitude. St. Thomas also uses this argument. It is proved more fully by St. Bonaventure in 2 dist. 35 art. 2 quest. 1. On this the others rely, with Tanner disput. 2 quest. 3 dub. 2.

IT IS PROVED fifthly by the Holy Doctor. One habit tends to one principal object, and to other things by order toward it: but Charity is one habit, having for its principal object the divine goodness, from what was said in q. 19. Therefore the other things loved are regarded as ordered toward it; and thus the principal object is God, to be loved first; then the rest. He repeats the same in the body, and ad 2.

IT IS PROVED sixthly by the Holy Doctor. Order is owed more to deliberative love than to natural love; but natural love is ordered with respect to the things lovable: Therefore.

IT IS PROVED seventhly. A bond rightly connecting many things to an end ought to bind them in order to the same end: but Charity is the bond of perfection, from 3 ad Colossenses and from St. Dionysius cap. 4 of de Divinis nominibus, and it binds many things together, being a most liberal love, embracing many diverse things to be gathered in the end: Therefore it unites them in order.

IT IS PROVED eighthly by the Holy Doctor. What weight is in bodies, love is in spirits, from St. Augustine book 13 of Confessions cap. 9, and book 21 of de civitate Dei cap. 28, and 6 of de Trinitate cap. 10. But weight ought to be well balanced: Therefore also love.

You will OBJECT first. Where there is order, there is distinction; but charity with respect to diverse things is one: Therefore it is not ordered.

St. Doctor RESPONDS that order in a habit is attended to in relation to the object; and although charity is not multiple in itself, it nevertheless has many material objects and many acts, by reason of which there are many precepts.

You will OBJECT secondly. Where there is order, there is proportion; but among things lovable there is no proportion; for between the created and the uncreated there is none: Therefore.

St. Doctor RESPONDS that proportion is twofold. One is proportion properly so called, which is the commensuration of things of the same genus, and in this sense the major is false. Secondly, proportion is said broadly, and is any relation which is attended to according to the convenience of analogy; and in this way there is a proportion of created good to the uncreated, and also an order according to the ratio of primitiveness and causality; for the end is more worthy than those things which are toward the end, and in this respect order is attended to in Charity.

You will OBJECT thirdly. Order pertains to cognition, because it belongs to the wise to order: Therefore if order is not placed in cognition with respect to things to be known, much less ought it to be placed in Charity with respect to things to be loved. If you say that order is in the sciences. Against this: for charity follows the cognition of faith; but in its objects there is no order: Therefore.

St. Doctor RESPONDS that there are two kinds of order. The first is of parts in a whole, and of things in the universe: and indeed to order belongs to the intellect. The other is the order of things toward an end, and this is from the will, which tends toward the good, and thus toward the end; and such is the order of Charity.

He RESPONDS secondly that order in habits is attended to in relation to the objects; and because the Supreme Goodness by essence, with respect to the other things lovable, which are participative, is deservedly to be esteemed of more worth; and among those things lovable some participate more or less of goodness, as body less than spirit: hence it is that the love of charity ought to be ordered according to these. For thus also among things knowable there is order: first are the first principles, in which there is the greater evidence of truth; then the knowledge of conclusions follows; and so the assumption can be denied. Nor is it the same with faith; for all the articles are compared equally to the First Truth, from whose revelation all are believed uniformly.

You will OBJECT fourthly. Just as in faith there is one ratio of believing, namely the supreme truth; so in Charity there is one ratio of loving, which is the supreme goodness: but from the fact that the Truth, which is the ratio of believing, is one, Faith is one, assenting equally to all the articles: therefore from the fact that there is one ratio of loving, charity is one, having itself in the same way toward all things lovable.

St. Doctor RESPONDS that the ratio is dissimilar, for in Charity the objects terminating the affection are unequal, even if all are reduced to one.

You will OBJECT fifthly. Charity is one habit, naturally inclining to the good: therefore equally; for the same thing, always remaining the same, does the same.

St. Doctor RESPONDS that one thing always does the same given an equal disposition in natural objects; otherwise it acts diversely. Thus the sun illumines crystal more than stone; but the will is a potency acting by election, which is ruled by charity, and is itself also moved; it does not, however, remain always the same. Moreover it regards objects lovable in a diverse manner and degree.

You will OBJECT sixthly. If order is attended to in Charity, it is attended to either with respect to the habit or with respect to the act; not with respect to the habit, which is altogether one: if with respect to the act: then it is not ordered in a baptized infant, or in one sleeping, who have no act. Therefore I ask, what is attended to in the order of charity? and why is order attended to in it more than in the other virtues, since every virtue is ordered love, as St. Augustine says in de moribus Ecclesiae? And again, since about every good there are mode, species, and order, why is charity rather said to be ordered than moderated?

St. Doctor RESPONDS that order is attended to in the habit, in relation to the objects. Charity is therefore chiefly said to be ordered, because it is the weight whose it is to balance, and the bond of perfection, whose it is to gather all things in order.

I assert, that the order of charity is to be observed with respect to both.

It is proved by St. Bonaventure, first from 1 John 3: Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.

Secondly from St. Gregory homil. 30. on the Gospels: The proof of love is the exhibition of work.

Thirdly. Let us work good toward all, especially toward the household of the faith, exhorts the Apostle Galatians 6. Therefore, other things being equal, goods are rather to be bestowed upon relatives, as Valent. also notes disp. 3. quaest. 4. p. 5. So also a distinguished friend, from whom you have received outstanding benefits, is to be loved more than a kinsman not nearly so close. So Valentia at the place cited; yet not more than an intimate one, for instance a brother, etc.

You will say. Proverbs 18 says: A man friendly in society shall be more a friend than a brother.

He answers — the Holy Doctor gives the answer in the text;¹ for he speaks of the affection of society, insofar as someone can take more delight in the conversation of a friend than of a brother, and as regards companionship it is more pleasant to converse with friends than in prayer with God. Yet the Holy Doctor says ad secundum that this is not tolerable in the servant of God who is religious, whose it is to taste and see how sweet the Lord is: But parents especially are to be preferred to all, as Aristotle has, 8 Ethics, last chapter, where he says: To gods and parents there is not rendered an equal return. But that charity has more regard for order in its own elicited acts than in those commanded, the Holy Doctor observes ad 1. With this affection I ought first to will eternal life for myself; then for my father, and others in due order, as Valentia also notes. ¹ Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'Respondet Respondet S. Doct. in textu haberi responsum' — the verb duplicated; rendered with a single 'Respondet' introducing the answer.

But the imperative affection, by which we will and procure a temporal good, is not ordered so strictly.

But if the benefit regards a particular person, then the aforesaid order is well observed, other things being equal.

Yet if the benefit regards the common utility, this is rightly to be preferred to one's own utility. Therefore he gravely admonishes that dignities, ecclesiastical benefices, and the like are not to be given out of private affection to kinsmen, but to those who better serve the universal good of the Church or of the Republic; and these are reproached in Habakkuk 1: Woe to him that buildeth Sion in bloods, and Ezek. 44: Let it suffice you, O house of Israel, that you bring in the uncircumcised into the sanctuary of God. There are reproached those who confer ecclesiastical benefices rather on their own households than on others, as the Holy Doctor observes in the last argument. Hence in the answer he says that, as to these, the order of Charity is not to be observed by reason of union, but by reason of the object, which is an absolute good, or respectively a better one; and the common good is better than the private.

The Seraphic Doctor reports twofold opinions on this matter. The first is, that the same order of Charity will remain entirely in the fatherland as is on the way.

The first reason is taken from the dictate of nature, which dictates that one ought first to love oneself, then one's neighbor, and among neighbors more those who are more closely joined. But glory will be the highest perfection of nature, not its destruction.

The second reason is taken from the perfection of glory, which regards more him in whom it is, than other like and near persons; otherwise, if all things were common, there would be no reason why we should labor to attain a greater glory by our works.

The third reason is consequently taken from the order of divine justice, which orders that a man rejoice more in his own merits than in those of another, since one's own merits ought to be rewarded in the one who merits, not another's. This opinion, the Holy Doctor says, is that of very many.

The second opinion is, that charity can be considered either as regards the good, which is its object, and this is the order of Charity in itself and according to its intrinsic nature: then by reason of the subject, in which it is. As to the order of Charity in itself, it remains in the fatherland; for that is essential to Charity. Hence in the fatherland one will love above all the greatest good, and consequently in due order those things that are better.

But that order which befits Charity by reason of the underlying nature will not remain in the fatherland, because it does not befit that state: For in the state of beatitude there will be perfect obedience of nature with respect to glory, perfect conformity of our will to the Divine will, and perfect also the overflow of common joy. Because there will be perfect obedience of nature with respect to glory, nature will then be perfectly conformed to glory itself, so that just as the body will become spiritual, inasmuch as it will obey the spirit in all things, although on the way the spirit is forced to condescend to the body; so nature will be conformed in all things to the order of glory and grace, which is considered according to the differences of good, although now grace condescends to the natural affection.

Again, because there will be perfect conformity of our will to the divine will, we shall not love more that which is nearer to us; but that which is more pleasing and acceptable to God, and is better; for thus also God loves.

Moreover, because there will be a perfect overflow of common joy, he will rejoice as much in the good of his neighbor as in his own; yet not with prejudice to merit; for this will be an accidental joy from the overflow of perfect Charity.

This is what St. Anselm says in Prosol. cap. 25. In that perfect Charity of innumerable Angels and blessed men, where no one loves another less than himself, each will rejoice for the others singly no otherwise than for himself. And this opinion is confirmed, because there the offices that look to [particular ties] will cease, the necessary provision will cease, and the succor owed to those more closely joined, especially those who are the principles of our being, and all things will be united in God, the Supreme Good of all.