Morals of the Church
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Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Section II. On the Order of Charity Between Ourselves and Our Neighbors

572.

I. If on each side there is question of spiritual goods, each person is bound to prefer himself to his neighbor, as follows:

  1. Each person is bound to prefer himself to others with respect to those things necessary for the last end.

  2. It is not lawful to commit even a venial sin in order to promote the temporal or spiritual good of one's neighbor, or to prevent his temporal or spiritual evil; both because the true evil of one's own soul must be avoided before all things, and because evils are not to be done that good things may come (St. Alphonsus, II, 26, 2).

  3. Nevertheless sometimes it is lawful, indeed there is even an obligation, to omit an act good in itself or better, or even to expose oneself to danger of sinning, in order to succor the spiritual or even temporal necessity of one's neighbor (St. Alphonsus, II, 26, 1; VI, 453).

II. If there is question of one's own spiritual and temporal goods, hold these things:

  1. If the spiritual necessity of one's neighbor is extreme or quasi-extreme, he must be succored with the loss of any temporal good whatever, even of life2 (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 26, a. 5, ad 3; q. 44, a. 8, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, II, q. 27).

Corollary. Someone is bound, even with danger to life, to baptize an infant if no one else is present who would do it (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, 3). Likewise, to confer Extreme Unction on a dying Catholic person deprived of his senses, who is probably judged to be in the state of mortal sin and probably is attrite. Likewise, to absolve a dying person "if he is habitual in sins, and is so uneducated that he does not know how to elicit an act of contrition" (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, dic. 2). Many deny this, because no one is so uneducated that he cannot, with the help of grace, elicit an act of contrition. This indeed is true theoretically, but in practice it seems that one must stand with the opinion of St. Alphonsus and others, because, as death approaches, it seems more difficult, and for the man of whom we are speaking most difficult, to elicit an act of contrition. But those who voluntarily expose themselves to danger of damnation, for example by hanging themselves or by attacking an innocent person, must not be succored with danger to life, unless they grieve over the sin, or are judged so uneducated that they do not know how to elicit an act of contrition, or afterward are deprived of their senses.

  1. If it is grave, one must assist with a middling inconvenience; but with a grave one if there is an obligation of piety, as in children with respect to parents; or of special charity, as in parents with respect to children, in spouses with respect to the partner, in superiors with respect to subjects and conversely; with a most grave one, if there is an obligation of justice, as in pastors of souls; likewise, if there is question of a grave and common spiritual necessity. Hence, for example, when plague is raging, even a priest to whom the care of souls has not been committed is bound, if another is lacking, to administer the necessary sacraments with danger to life (St. Alphonsus, II, 27, 39, 40).

III. If on each side there is question of temporal goods, in other words, of the temporal necessity of one's neighbor, see what was said on almsgiving (n. 533).

1 Cf. Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 321 sq.

2 Cf. 1 John 3:16.

CharityThe order of charity